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Some observers argue the COVID-19 pandemic could be a world-changing event with potentially profound and long-lasting implications for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world. Other observers are more skeptical that the COVID-19 pandemic will have such effects.

Observers who argue the COVID-19 pandemic could be world-changing for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world have focused on several areas of potential change, including the following, which are listed here separately but overlap in some cases and can interact with one another:

- world order, international institutions, and global governance;
- U.S. global leadership and the U.S. role in the world;
- China’s potential role as a global leader;
- U.S. relations and great power competition with China and Russia, including the use of the COVID-19 pandemic as a theme or tool for conducting ideological competition;
- the relative prevalence of democratic and authoritarian or autocratic forms of government;
- societal tension, reform, transformation, and governmental stability in various countries;
- the world economy, globalization, and U.S. trade policy;
- the characteristics and conduct of conflict;
- allied defense budgets and U.S. alliances;
- the cohesion of the European Union;
- the definition of, and budgeting for, U.S. national security;
- U.S. defense strategy, defense budgets, and military operations;
- U.S. foreign assistance programs and international debt relief;
- activities of non-state actors;
- the amount of U.S. attention devoted to ongoing international issues other than the COVID-19 pandemic; and
- the role of Congress in setting and overseeing the execution of U.S. foreign and defense policy.

Issues for Congress may include whether and how the COVID-19 pandemic could change the international security environment, whether the Trump Administration’s actions for responding to such change are appropriate and sufficient, and what implications such change could have for the role of Congress in setting and overseeing the execution of U.S. foreign and defense policy.

Congress’s decisions regarding these issues could have significant and even profound implications for U.S. foreign and defense policy, and for the status of Congress as a co-equal branch relative to the executive branch in setting and overseeing the implementation of U.S. foreign and defense policy.
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Introduction

Some observers argue the COVID-19 pandemic could be a world-changing event with potentially profound and long-lasting implications for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world. Other observers are more skeptical that the COVID-19 pandemic will have such effects. This report provides a brief overview of some potential implications the COVID-19 pandemic might have for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world, and a bibliography of CRS reports and other writings for further reading.

Issues for Congress may include whether and how the COVID-19 pandemic could change the international security environment, whether the Trump Administration’s actions for responding to such change are appropriate and sufficient, and what implications such change could have for the role of Congress in setting and overseeing the execution of U.S. foreign and defense policy. Congress’s decisions regarding these issues could have significant and even profound implications for U.S. foreign and defense policy, and for the status of Congress as a co-equal branch relative to the executive branch in setting and overseeing the implementation of U.S. foreign and defense policy.

Appendix A presents a list of CRS reports that provide more in-depth discussions of issues presented in this report. Appendix B presents a list of additional writings reflecting various perspectives on these issues. A separate CRS report discusses the question of whether the U.S. role in the world is changing as a result of factors other than the COVID-19 pandemic.1

Overview of Potential Implications

Areas of potential change reflected in writings from observers who view the COVID-19 pandemic as a potentially world-changing event include but are not limited to those discussed below. Although these areas of potential change are presented separately, they overlap in some cases and can interact with one another.

World Order, International Institutions, and Global Governance

Some observers have focused on the possibility that the COVID-19 pandemic could cause or accelerate a decline or erosion in the U.S.-led liberal international order that has operated since World War II, in the international institutions and norms that contribute to it, and consequently in global governance.2 A decline or erosion in the U.S.-led liberal order or the international


2 For more on the U.S.-led liberal international order and the concept of world order generally, see CRS Report R44891, U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke and Michael Moodie. As discussed in that report, the term international order or world order generally refers in foreign policy discussions to the collection of organizations, institutions, treaties, rules, norms, and practices that are intended to organize, structure, and regulate international relations during a given historical period. Other terms used to refer to the U.S.-led liberal international order include postwar international order, rules-based international order, and open international order. Observers sometimes substitute world for international, or omit international or world and refer simply to the liberal order, the U.S.-led order, and so on. In the terms liberal international order and liberal order, the word liberal does not refer to the conservative-liberal construct often used in discussing contemporary politics in the United States or other countries. It is, instead, an older use of the term that refers to an order based on the rule of law, as opposed to an order based on the arbitrary powers of hereditary
institutions form part of it could set the stage for its replacement by a new or modified world order reflecting changed rules, norms, and practices, or by a more disorderly world.

**U.S. Global Leadership and Role in the World**

Some observers argue that the COVID-19 pandemic is demonstrating that the United States is maintaining or reasserting its role as global leader, while other observers argue that the COVID-19 pandemic is demonstrating that the United States has chosen to withdraw from or is no longer capable of performing that role. Some observers argue that the COVID-19 pandemic is the first major international crisis since World War II for which the United States has not served as the leader for spearheading, organizing, or implementing an international response.

The COVID-19 pandemic could influence discussions over the costs and benefits to the United States of acting as a global leader, not only with respect to global health but across a range of issues. Related to this, some observers have focused on how the COVID-19 pandemic may be illustrating the strengths or weaknesses of the Trump Administration’s “America First” approach to the U.S. role in the world.

Some observers, including some foreign observers, argue that the U.S. domestic response to the COVID-19 pandemic is demonstrating weaknesses in U.S. democracy, governance, and public health, particularly in comparison to how certain other countries have responded to the pandemic within their own borders, and that this will reduce the ability of the United States in the future to offer itself or be accepted by other countries as a global leader on other international issues or as a model for other countries to emulate.

Other observers argue that the U.S. response to the pandemic is focusing international attention on what they view as a need for reform at the World Health Organization (WHO), demonstrating the strength and innovativeness of the U.S. scientific establishment in terms of developing vaccines and other medical responses to the pandemic, and demonstrating the flexibility and resiliency of the U.S. federal system in terms of permitting states and localities to respond to the pandemic in ways that are tailored to local conditions.

**China’s Potential Role as a Global Leader**

Some observers have focused on how the COVID-19 pandemic may be providing insight into whether China desires and is working to become a global leader on par with (or in the place of) the United States, whether China has a capacity for doing so, and how other countries might view China acting in such a role. China’s transparency, particularly regarding its actions in the early days of its COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, as well as China’s so-called donation diplomacy or mask diplomacy—meaning China’s actions to send medical supplies and personnel to other countries, and the highlighting of these actions in statements from China’s government and state-controlled media—have become new elements of an ongoing discussion regarding China’s capacity or suitability for acting as a global leader. This ongoing discussion includes consideration of a range of other issues, including China’s actions for implementing its Belt and
Road Initiative, China’s territorial disputes with other countries, its participation in international organizations, and its technology-development and international lending activities.

U.S. Relations and Great Power Competition with China and Russia

Some observers have focused on how the COVID-19 pandemic has become a significant element in U.S-China relations, and in U.S. great power competition with China and Russia, which the Trump Administration has placed at the center of its national security construct. For some observers, the COVID-19 pandemic presents an opportunity for U.S.-China cooperation on an important international issue of common interest. For other observers, the COVID-19 pandemic is a major new source of dispute and arena of competition between the two countries, and is causing U.S.-China relations to harden more fully into a Cold War-like adversarial situation.

Some observers have focused on what they view as a competition or race between the United States, Russia, China, and other countries to be the first country to develop and field an effective vaccine for the coronavirus that causes COVID-19, and thus become the first country to be able to restore its economy to full operation and/or exploit foreign access to its vaccine as a foreign policy lever, and thereby gain a political-economic advantage in the post-pandemic world. The term vaccine nationalism is being used by some of these observers to refer to this perceived competition or race. Some observers have expressed concern that decisions by countries to pursue vaccine development and deployment in a competitive, individual manner rather than a cooperative, multilateral manner could reduce the overall effectiveness of efforts to develop and field effective vaccines and thereby prolong the pandemic.

Some observers have focused on how the COVID-19 pandemic provides a prominent new factor in the discussion of whether the United States should decouple its economy from China’s and reduce its dependence on China for key materials and products, including hospital supplies and pharmaceuticals. Some observers have focused on whether the U.S. and Chinese responses to the COVID-19 pandemic will affect views around the world regarding the relative merits of the U.S. and Chinese forms of government and economic models as potential examples to emulate.

Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Autocracy

Related to the point above about forms of government, some observers have focused on how the COVID-19 pandemic appears to be challenging democratic systems in various countries and providing national leaders with an opportunity or rationale for taking actions to seize greater power and move their countries away from democracy and toward authoritarianism or autocracy, or strengthen or consolidate their already-existing authoritarian or autocratic forms of government.\(^3\) As discussed in another CRS report, a key element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II has been to defend and promote freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, while criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government.\(^4\)

\(^3\) For additional discussion of the issue of the prevalence of democracy and authoritarian or autocratic forms of government around the world, see CRS Report R45344, Global Trends in Democracy: Background, U.S. Policy, and Issues for Congress, by Michael A. Weber.

Societal Tension, Reform, and Transformation, and Governmental Stability

Beyond the specific point above about potential movement toward greater authoritarianism and autocracy, some observers have focused on the possibility that the COVID-19 pandemic more generally could cause increased social tensions in certain countries, could lead to (or present opportunities for) societal reforms and transformations, and could destabilize and perhaps cause the downfall of governments, akin to the effects of certain past world-changing events, such as World War I. Such changes could alter the political orientations, national strategies, foreign policies, and defense policies of the countries in which they occur, potentially inducing follow-on effects among governments and other global actors that interact with those countries.

World Economy, Globalization, and U.S. Trade Policy

Some observers have focused on the possibility that the COVID-19 pandemic could lead to significant and potentially long-lasting changes to the world economy that in turn could reshape the international security environment. Among other things, observers have focused on the possibility that the COVID-19 situation could be leading the world economy into a significant recession—an effect that could contribute to the societal tensions mentioned in the previous point. Noting that the COVID-19 pandemic has reduced world trade volumes and disrupted global supply chains, they have focused on the question of whether economic globalization will as a result be slowed, halted, or reversed. Observers are monitoring how such effects could influence or be influenced by U.S. trade policy.

Allied Defense Spending and U.S. Alliances

The so-called burden-sharing issue—that is, the question of whether U.S. allies are shouldering a sufficient share of the collective allied defense burden—has long been a point of contention between the United States and its allies around the globe, and it has been a matter of particular emphasis for the Trump Administration. Some observers have focused on the possibility that the costs that U.S. allies are incurring to support their economies during stay-at-home/lockdown periods will lead to offsetting reductions in their defense expenditures. Some observers argue that the NATO allies in Europe in particular may experience contractions in their defense budgets for this reason. More generally, some observers argue that if the COVID-19 pandemic causes a global recession, allied defense budgets could be further reduced—a potential impact that could affect not only NATO allies in Europe, but those in Asia as well.

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European Union

Some observers have additionally focused on the question of whether the COVID-19 pandemic is creating tensions among the European Union member states, particularly in connection with actions they are taking to close their national borders, and what impact the COVID-19 pandemic might ultimately have on the cohesion of the European Union.

Definition of, and Budgeting for, U.S. National Security

Some observers have focused on the question of whether the COVID-19 situation will (or should) lead to a revised definition of U.S. national security, particularly one that is less military-centric and more focused on what are sometimes called human-security-oriented challenges or global issues, such as climate change, that are currently more at the periphery of U.S. national security policy and plans. Such a change in definition could lead to a changed allocation of funding between the Department of Defense (DOD) and other government agencies that perform national-security-related tasks, a realignment of resources within DOD between combat-oriented programs and other programs (such as those related to DOD’s mission of providing defense support of civil authorities), and perhaps a changed allocation of funding among the agencies other than DOD that perform national-security-related tasks.


Some observers have focused on the question of whether the large federal expenditures being made in response to the domestic U.S. economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the impact these expenditures will have on the federal budget deficit and federal debt, could lead to greater constraints in coming years on U.S. defense spending levels. As a follow-on matter, these observers are additionally focusing on the question of whether responding to such increased constraints will (or should) lead to revisions in U.S. defense strategy, changes in U.S. defense programs, and a reduction or termination of certain overseas U.S. military operations.

U.S. Foreign Assistance, International Debt Relief, and Refugee Policy

Some observers have focused on the question of whether the COVID-19 pandemic is providing a new lens through which to measure the value of U.S. foreign assistance, international debt relief, and refugee policy in promoting U.S. interests, particularly in connection with the previously mentioned issue of whether to revise the definition of U.S. national security to make it less military-centric.

Non-state Actors

Some observers have focused on how non-state actors such as international terrorist and criminal organizations are reacting to the COVID-19 pandemic, and on how much priority should be given to countering such actors in the future, particularly in a context of a changed definition of U.S. national security.

U.S. Attention to International Issues Other than COVID-19

Some observers have focused on whether responding to the COVID-19 pandemic is affecting the time and resources that U.S. leaders and agencies can devote to addressing other international
issues of concern to the United States that predate but continue to exist in parallel with the COVID-19 pandemic. Administration officials have warned other countries to not take actions during the COVID-19 pandemic to challenge U.S. interests around the world or otherwise test U.S. resolve or responsiveness on the thinking that the COVID-19 pandemic is distracting U.S. officials from other concerns or reducing U.S. capacity for responding to any such challenges.

Role of Congress
At least one observer has focused on the issue of how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the ability of Congress to conduct oversight of the Administration’s foreign policy actions.

Further Reading
For further reading on the issues outlined above, see the CRS reports presented in Appendix A and the additional writings presented in Appendix B.

Potential Issues for Congress
Potential issues for Congress regarding implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world include but are not limited to the following:

- Will the COVID-19 pandemic change the international security environment, and if so, in what ways? How clearly can potential changes be anticipated?
- How should the United States respond to potential changes in the international security environment arising from the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects, particularly in light of uncertainty regarding the precise nature and likelihood of these changes? How might U.S. action or inaction influence or accelerate these changes?
- What does the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate about the role of the United States as a global leader, and about the strengths or weaknesses of the Trump Administration’s “America First” approach to the U.S. role in the world? What impact, if any, will the U.S. domestic response to the COVID-19 pandemic have on the ability of the United States in the future to offer itself or be accepted by other countries as a global leader on other international issues, or to serve as a model for other countries to emulate in terms of their own political systems, governance, and economic models?
- What actions is the Administration developing to respond to potential changes in the international security environment arising from the COVID-19 pandemic? Does Congress have sufficient visibility into these actions? Are these actions appropriate and sufficient? What metrics should Congress use to assess them?
- What implications do potential changes in the international security environment arising from the COVID-19 pandemic have for the role of Congress in setting and overseeing the execution of U.S. foreign and defense policy? Is Congress appropriately organized for maintaining Congress as a co-equal branch of government relative to the executive branch in addressing these potential changes? If the COVID-19 pandemic becomes a world-changing event for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world, what
implications, if any, might that have for congressional organization and operations?
Appendix A. Related CRS Reports

CRS reports that provide more in-depth discussions of specific issues discussed in this report include the following, which are presented in alphabetical order of their titles:

- CRS Insight IN11481, *COVID-19 International Responses: Resources for Comparison with U.S. Policies*, by Hannah Fischer and Sara M. Tharakan

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6 Additional CRS reports that do not include COVID-19 in their titles and are not listed here may include discussions of the international implications of the COVID-19 pandemic.


• CRS In Focus IF11635, *Europe, COVID-19, and U.S. Relations*, by Kristin Archick et al.

• CRS In Focus IF11551, *Export Restrictions in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic*, by Christopher A. Casey and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.


• CRS In Focus IF11548, *Helping U.S. Citizens Abroad During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Other International Crises: Role of the Department of State*, by Cory R. Gill.


• CRS In Focus IF11537, *Intelligence Community Support to Pandemic Preparedness and Response*, by Michael E. DeVine.

• CRS In Focus IF11581, *Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19*, by Mark P. Sullivan et al.


• CRS In Focus IF11480, *Overview: The Department of Defense and COVID-19*, coordinated by Kathleen J. McInnis.

• CRS Insight IN11365, *President Trump Criticizes VOA Coverage of China’s COVID-19 Response*, by Thomas Lum and Matthew C. Weed.

• CRS Insight IN11231, *The Defense Production Act (DPA) and COVID-19: Key Authorities and Policy Considerations*, by Michael H. Cecire and Heidi M. Peters.

• CRS Insight IN11337, *The Defense Production Act (DPA) and the COVID-19 Pandemic: Recent Developments and Policy Considerations*, by Michael H. Cecire and Heidi M. Peters.

• CRS Insight IN11369, *U.S. Funding to the World Health Organization (WHO)*, by Luisa Blanchfield and Tiaji Salaam-Blyther.

- CRS In Focus IF11494, *Wildlife Trade, COVID-19, and Other Zoonotic Diseases*, by Pervaze A. Sheikh and Katarina C. O'Regan.
Appendix B. Additional Writings

In presenting sources of additional reading, this appendix includes some examples of writings reflecting various perspectives on the potential implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world, organized by specific themes or topics. Within each section, the items are presented in chronological order, with the most recent on top. For some of the sections, additional citations with dates earlier than that of the last item listed in the section can be found in previous versions of this CRS report.

**General/Multi topic**


Phillip Y. Lipscy, “It’s Too Soon to Call Coronavirus Winners and Losers, Given how much remains unknown about the virus, talk of success may be premature,” *Foreign Policy*, May 12, 2020.


John Allen et al., “How the World Will Look after the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Foreign Policy, March 20, 2020. (Includes short contributions from 12 authors.)


**World Order, International Institutions, and Global Governance**


Joshua Keating, “The Decline of the Nation-State, Trump’s War with the Governors Hints at a New Political Order,” Foreign Policy, April 29, 2020.


Joseph S. Nye Jr., “No, the Coronavirus Will Not Change the Global Order,” Foreign Policy, April 16, 2020.


Colum Lynch, “Can the United Nations Survive the Coronavirus? In the Absence of U.S. Leadership, the U.N. Is Struggling to Carve Out a Role in the Face of What May Be the Greatest Threat Since Its Founding,” Foreign Policy, April 8, 2020.


**U.S. Global Leadership and Role in World**


Christopher Smart, “To Avoid a Coronavirus Depression, the U.S. Can’t Afford to Alienate the World,” *Foreign Policy*, July 28, 2020.


**China’s Potential Role as a Global Leader**


U.S. Relations and Great Power Competition with China and Russia


Colm Lynch, “‘America First’ vs. ‘The People’s Vaccine,’ The Rise of “Vaccine Nationalism” Threatens to Leave Poor Countries Out in the Cold,” Foreign Policy, July 6, 2020.


**Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Autocracy**

Yasmeen Serhan, “The Pandemic Isn’t a Death Knell for Populism, Just Because Populist Leaders Haven’t Fared Well Against the Coronavirus Doesn’t Mean Their Opponents Should Count Them Out,” Atlantic, August 22, 2020.


James Traub, “The Pandemic Is the World’s Long Overdue Reality Check, Populists Came to Power Peddling Political Fantasies—but the Coronavirus Has Broken the Fever,” Foreign Policy, July 1, 2020.


Mu Sochua, “Coronavirus ‘Fake News’ Arrests Are Quieting Critics, In Southeast Asia, the Coronavirus Pandemic Has Provided a Handy Excuse for a Clampdown on Free Speech,” Foreign Policy, May 22, 2020.


Jacob Mchangama and Sarah McLaughlin, “Coronavirus Has Started a Censorship Pandemic,” Foreign Policy, April 1, 2020.


Societal Tension, Reform, and Transformation, and Governmental Stability


Gerald Imray and Joseph Kauss, “Worst Virus Fears Are Realized in Poor or War-torn Countries,” 

Yaroslav Trofimov and Drew Hinshaw, “Europe’s Far-Right Fails to Capitalize on Coronavirus 

Joe Parkin Daniels, “Latin America’s Wave of Protests Was Historic—Then the Pandemic 
Arrived, The Coronavirus and Lockdowns Have Worsened the Region’s Economic Divides—and 
Set the Stage for More Political Upheaval,” Foreign Policy, June 25, 2020.


Maria Snegovaya, Denis Volkov, and Stepan Goncharov, “The Coronavirus Could Hit Putin Most 
of All,” Foreign Policy, June 5, 2020.

Cyrus Newlin and Heather A. Conley, “Responding to a Pandemic, Putin Trades Russia’s Future 
for His Own,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), May 27, 2020.

Robyn Dixon, “In Russia’s Pandemic Struggles, Even Putin Couldn’t Speed Bonuses to Health 

Colm Quinn, “Do Poor Countries Face a Greater Risk From Coronavirus? The WHO Chief Is 
‘Very Concerned’ About Rising Cases in Poorer Countries, as Worldwide Cases Pass Five 
Million,” Foreign Policy, May 21, 2020.

Brian Whitmore, “The Kremlin's Numbers Racket, A Persistent and Prolific Propaganda 
Machine Meets a Deadly Global Pandemic. Now What Happens?” Center for European Policy 
Analysis (CEPA), May 19, 2020.

Janusz Bugajski, “Ethnic Echoes, The Pandemic is Animating Europe’s Ethnic and Regional 

James Crabtree et al., “How the Coronavirus Pandemic Will Permanently Expand Government 
Powers, Ten Leading Global Thinkers on an Expansion of Government Powers,” Foreign Policy, 
May 16, 2020. (Includes short contributions from 10 observers.)

Polina Beliakova, “COVID-19 and the Limits of Putin’s Power,” War on the Rocks, May 13, 
2020.


Nathan Hodge, “As Coronavirus Hits Record Numbers in Russia, This Is a Dangerous Moment for Putin,” *CNN*, May 4, 2020.


Armand Gosu, “Russia Needs an OPEC+ 2.0 Accord to Avoid a Crisis,” Middle East Institute, April 21, 2020.


**World Economy, Globalization, and U.S. Trade Policy**


Michael Nienaber, “Germany’s Altmaier Wants Europe to Be Less Dependent on Other Countries,” Reuters, May 9, 2020.


James Crabtree, “The End of Emerging Markets? Economies such as Brazil, Indonesia, India, Russia, and Turkey face a daunting new reality,” Foreign Policy, May 3, 2020.


Allied Defense Spending and U.S. Alliances


Kurt Volker, “Think Big, To Build a Post-pandemic World Order We Must Wake a Sleeping Giant: NATO,” Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), June 12, 2020.


Stéphanie Fillon, “In Canada, Patience Wearing Thin Over Trump’s Antics, A Threat to Militarize the Border and Attempts to Hold Up Lifesaving Medical Supplies Have Roiled the Calmest of Countries,” Foreign Policy, April 14, 2020.


European Union

Adam Tooze, “It’s a New Europe—if You Can Keep It, The Continent Has Managed to Take a Great Leap Forward—but There Still Might Be a Crash Landing,” Foreign Policy, August 7, 2020.


Paul Hockenos, “Has the Coronavirus Disappeared Climate Politics? Europe’s Pandemic Bailouts Are Trying to Save the Continent’s Economy. Less Clear Is If They Can Save the Planet,” Foreign Policy, May 21, 2020.


“EU’s Top Diplomat Warns Against Defense Cuts,” Defense News, May 12, 2020. (This article does not list an author.)


Definition of, and Budgeting for, U.S. National Security


Hal Brands, “Can a Broke America Fight a Cold War With China? The Coronavirus Has United Americans Against Beijing’s Aggressions, But It Will Also Devastate the Pentagon Budget,” Bloomberg, May 5, 2020.


U.S. Foreign Assistance, International Debt Relief, and Refugee Policy


Adam Tooze, “A Global Pandemic Bailout Was Coming—Until America Stopped It,” Foreign Policy, April 17, 2020.


**Non-state Actors**


Robin Simcox, “Terrorism After the Pandemic, Months of Isolation and Governments Grappling with Other Crises Could Lead to a Rise in Attacks,” Foreign Policy, July 2, 2020.


Ashley Jackson, “For the Taliban, the Pandemic Is a Ladder,” Foreign Policy, May 6, 2020.


Raffaello Pantucci, “After the Coronavirus, Terrorism Won’t Be the Same,” Foreign Policy, April 22, 2020.


U.S. Attention to International Issues Other than COVID-19


Con Coughlin, “China Exploiting the Coronavirus Pandemic to Expand in Asia,” Gatestone Institute, April 30, 2020.


Victor Davis Hanson, “Pandemic Only 1 of America’s Security Concerns,” Daily Signal, April 23, 2020.

Emily Estelle, “Eyes on the Other Global Crises,” Real Clear World, April 21, 2020.


“Wealth the world distracted, China intimidates Taiwan,” Economist, April 8, 2020. (This article does not list an author.)
Role of Congress


Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, “Pandemic Stymies Congressional Check on Trump’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, April 8, 2020.

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