Congressional Authority
to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq

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Summary

On October 16, 2002, President Bush signed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. Since the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, Congress has enacted appropriation bills to fund the continuation of the Iraq war, including military training, reconstruction, and other aid for the government of Iraq. In April, 2007, however, Congress passed a supplemental appropriations bill to fund the war that contained conditions and a deadline for ending some military operations. The President vetoed the bill, arguing in part that some of its provisions are unconstitutional. The current dispute is centered on whether Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate limits on the President’s authority to conduct military operations in Iraq, even though it did not initially provide express limits. Specific issues include whether Congress may, through limitations on appropriations, set a ceiling on the number of soldiers or regulate which soldiers the President may assign to duty in Iraq, and whether an outright repeal or expiration of the authorization for use of military force (AUMF) against Iraq would have any effect.

It has been suggested that the President’s role as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces provides sufficient authority for his deployment of troops, and any efforts on the part of Congress to intervene could represent an unconstitutional violation of separation-of-powers principles. While even proponents of strong executive prerogative in matters of war appear to concede that it is within Congress’s authority to cut off funding entirely for a military operation, it has been suggested that spending measures that restrict but do not end financial support for the war in Iraq would amount to an “unconstitutional condition.” The question may turn on whether specific proposals involve purely operational decisions committed to the President in his role as Commander in Chief, or whether they are instead valid exercises of Congress’s authority to allocate resources using its war powers and power of the purse.

This report begins by providing background, discussing constitutional provisions allocating war powers between Congress and the President, and presenting a historical overview of relevant court cases. It discusses Congress’s power to rescind prior military authorization, concluding, in light of relevant jurisprudence and the War Powers Resolution, that the repeal of the AUMF, absent the further denial of appropriations or the establishment of a specific deadline for troop withdrawal, would likely have little, if any, legal effect on the continuation of combat operations. The report discusses Congress’s ability to limit funding for military operations in Iraq, examining relevant court cases and prior measures taken by Congress to restrict military operations, as well as possible alternative avenues to fund operations if appropriations are cut. There follows a summary of relevant measures included in the vetoed FY2007 supplemental appropriations bill, H.R. 1591, and the enacted act, H.R. 2206. The report provides historical examples of measures that restrict the use of particular personnel, and concludes with a brief analysis of arguments that might be brought to bear on the question of Congress’s authority to limit the availability of troops to serve in Iraq. Although not beyond debate, such a restriction appears to be within Congress’s authority to allocate resources for military operations.
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Congressional Authority to Limit U.S. Military Operations in Iraq

Introduction

On May 1, 2007, President George W. Bush vetoed the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, H.R. 1591, in part because of measures designed to limit the U.S. military role in Iraq. He called the bill “unconstitutional because it purports to direct the conduct of operations of war in a way that infringes upon the powers vested in the presidency by the Constitution, including as commander in chief of the Armed Forces.”1 The next day, the House of Representatives voted to approve the bill by a vote of 222 to 203, failing to muster the two-thirds majority necessary to override the veto.2 Congress then passed a new version of the supplemental appropriations bill, H.R. 2206 (P.L. 110-128), without providing timetables for withdrawal from Iraq, but conditioning the release of reconstruction assistance to Iraq on achievement of certain benchmarks by the Iraqi government, unless the President waives the requirements.3 The House of Representatives agreed to vote on a withdrawal deadline when it takes up FY2008 supplemental appropriations, which is expected in September.

As Congress considers defense authorization and appropriations bills for FY2008, there may be a renewed focus on whether or to what extent Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate limits on the President’s authority to conduct military operations in Iraq. Congress may consider measures, for example, to repeal the authorization to use force in Iraq, to set deadlines for the withdrawal of most troops from Iraq, to set requirements for unit rotations into Iraq, or to make other requirements that could affect the deployment of armed forces to Iraq.

It has been suggested that the President’s role as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces provides sufficient authority for his deployment of additional troops, and any efforts on the part of Congress to intervene could represent an unconstitutional violation of separation-of-powers principles. While even proponents of strong executive prerogative in matters of war appear to concede that it is within Congress’s authority to cut off funding entirely for a military operation, it has been suggested that spending measures that restrict but do not end financial support for the

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1 153 CONG. REC. H4315 (daily ed. May 2, 2007) (President’s veto message), also available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/20070502-1.html].
2 Id. at H4326.
3 For a detailed analysis of the FY2007 supplemental appropriations bills, see CRS Report RL33900, FY2007 Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Other Purposes, by Stephen Daggett et al.
war in Iraq would amount to an “unconstitutional condition.” The question may turn on whether the President’s decisions on troop deployment and mission assignment are purely operational decisions committed to the President in his role as Commander in Chief, or whether congressional action to limit the availability of troops and the missions they may perform is a valid exercise of Congress’s authority to allocate resources using its war powers and power of the purse.

Background

On October 16, 2002, Congress passed and President Bush signed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. While the President noted he had sought a “resolution of support” from Congress to use force against Iraq, and appreciated receiving that support, he also stated that:

... my request for it did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President’s constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to U.S. interests or on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.

The President indicated he would continue to consult with Congress and to submit written reports to Congress every 60 days on matters relevant to the resolution to use force, which authorizes the President to use the armed forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

The statute required certain conditions to be met prior to the initiation of military operations and made periodic reports to Congress mandatory, but did not set a timetable or any criteria for determining when to withdraw troops from Iraq. It appears to incorporate future UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq that may be adopted by the Security Council as well as those adopted prior to its enactment, effectively authorizing military force not only to compel disarmament but to carry out other functions necessary for achieving the goals adopted or that may be adopted by the Security Council. Thus, it appears that the resolution authorizes force

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7 Id.
deemed necessary by the President for so long as Iraq poses a continuing threat to the United States and the U.S. military presence is not inconsistent with relevant U.N. resolutions.

The resolution does not itself stipulate limitations with respect to the amount of force that may be used or the resources that may be expended to accomplish the authorized objectives; however, Congress may set limits by means of legislation or the budgeting process. The Department of Defense has some latitude regarding how it allocates funds for various operations, and may have additional statutory authority to obligate funds without additional prior express authorization from Congress.

I. Constitutional Provisions

At least two arguments support the constitutionality of Congress’s authority to limit the President’s ability to increase or maintain troop levels in Iraq. First, Congress’s constitutional power over the nation’s armed forces provides ample authority to legislate with respect to how they may be employed. Under Article I, § 8, Congress has the power “To lay and collect Taxes ... to ... pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence,” “To raise and support Armies,” “To provide and maintain a Navy,” “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” and “To declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,” as well as “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” and “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States.” Further, Congress is empowered “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ...” as well as “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”

Secondly, Congress has virtually plenary constitutional power over appropriations, one that is not qualified with reference to its powers in section 8. Article I, § 9 provides that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” It is well established, as a consequence of these provisions, that “no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress”9 and that Congress can specify the terms and conditions under which an appropriation may be used,9 so long as it does not impose an unconstitutional condition on the use of the funds.10

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10 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (8 Wall.) 128 (1872) (holding invalid an appropriations proviso that effectively nullified some effects of a presidential pardon and that appeared to prescribe a rule of decision in court cases); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (continued...
On the executive side, the Constitution vests the President with the “executive Power,” Article II, § 1, cl. 1, and appoints him “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,” id., § 2, cl. 1. The President is empowered, “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,” authorized “from time to time [to] give to the Congress Information on the State of the Union, and [to] recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient,” and bound to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Id., § 3. He is bound by oath to “faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States,” and, to the best of his “Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Id., § 1, cl. 8.

It is clear that the Constitution allocates powers necessary to conduct war between the President and Congress. While the ratification record of the Constitution reveals little about the meaning of the specific war powers clauses, the importance of preventing all of those powers from accumulating in one branch appears to have been well understood, and vesting the powers of the sword and the purse in separate hands appears to have been part of a careful design.

It is generally agreed that some aspects of the exercise of those powers are reserved to the Commander in Chief, and that Congress could conceivably legislate beyond its authority in such a way as to intrude impermissibly into presidential power. The precise boundaries separating legislative from executive functions, however, remain elusive. There can be little doubt that Congress would exceed its bounds if it were to confer exclusive power to direct military operations on an officer not subordinate to the President, or to purport to issue military orders directly to subordinate officers. At the same time, Congress’s power to make rules for the

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(continued...)
government and regulation of the armed forces provides it wide latitude for restricting the nature of orders the President may give. Congress’s power of appropriations gives it ample power to supply or withhold resources, even if the President deems them necessary to carry out planned military operations.\(^{15}\)

**Congress’s War Powers**

The power “To Declare War” has long been construed to mean not only that Congress can formally take the nation into war but also that it can authorize the use of the armed forces for military expeditions that may not amount to war.\(^{16}\) While a restrictive interpretation of the power “To declare War” is possible, for example, by viewing the Framers’ use of the verb “to declare” rather than “to make”\(^ {17}\) as an indication of an intent to limit Congress’s ability to affect the course of a war once it is validly commenced,\(^{18}\) Congress’s other powers over the use of the military would likely fill any resulting void. In practice, courts have not sought to delineate the boundaries of each clause relating to war powers or identify gaps between them to find specific powers that are denied to Congress.\(^ {19}\)

Early exercises of Congress’s war powers may shed some light on the original understanding of how the war powers clauses might empower Congress to limit the President’s use of the armed forces. In the absence of a standing army, early presidents were constrained to ask Congress for support in advance of undertaking

\(^{14}\) (...continued)

Johnson’s efforts to circumvent the statute were cited in the ninth article of impeachment against him, although no proof was offered at trial).


\(^{16}\) Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800).

\(^{17}\) The Framers’ decision to substitute “declare” for “make” has generally been interpreted to allow the President the authority to repel sudden attacks. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 318-19 (rev. ed. 1937)(explanation of James Madison and Elbridge Gerry on their motion to amend text).


\(^{19}\) See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§ 1170 - 71 (1833) (stating that the powers to issue letters of marque and reprisal and to authorize captures are incidental to the power to declare war, implying their express mention was unnecessary, but noting that these “incidental” powers may also be employed during peace). But see, e.g., J. Terry Emerson, *War Powers Legislation*, 74 W. Va. L. Rev. 53, 62 (1972)(arguing that early opinions related to the Quasi-War with France, often advanced for the proposition that Congress is empowered to regulate military operations that do not amount to war, should be read as strict interpretations of Congress’s power to make rules for captures).
any military operations.\textsuperscript{20} Congress generally provided the requested support and granted the authority to raise the necessary troops to defend the frontiers from deprivations by hostile Indians\textsuperscript{21} and to build a navy to protect U.S. commerce at sea.\textsuperscript{22} Congress, in exercising its authority to raise the army and navy, sometimes raised forces for specific purposes, which may be viewed as both an implicit authorization to use the forces for such purposes and as an implicit limitation on their use.\textsuperscript{23} On the other hand, Congress often delegated broad discretion to the President within those limits, and appears to have acquiesced to military actions that were not explicitly authorized.\textsuperscript{24}

In several early instances, Congress authorized the President to use military forces for operations that did not amount to a full war. Rather than declaring a formal war with France, Congress authorized the employment of the naval forces for limited hostilities. The Third Congress authorized the President to lay and enforce embargoes of U.S. ports, but only while Congress was not in session (and embargo orders were to expire 15 days after the commencement of the next session of Congress).\textsuperscript{25} The Fifth Congress authorized the President to issue instructions to the

\textsuperscript{20} See Abraham Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power 116-17 (1976) (describing President Washington’s efforts to obtain support for military efforts, including a build-up of military strength to preserve peace and maintain U.S. stature among nations).

\textsuperscript{21} See, e.g., Act of March 3d, 1791, for raising and adding another Regiment to the Military Establishment of the United States, and for making further provision for the protection of the frontier, 1 Stat. 222; Act of March 5, 1792, 1 Stat. 241 (adding three regiments for three years or until peace with Indian tribes was established); Act of July 16, 1798, 1 Stat. 604 (authorizing the President to raise twelve additional regiments of infantry and six troops of light dragoons during the continuance of differences with the French Republic).

\textsuperscript{22} See, e.g., Act of March 27, 1794, To provide a naval armament, 1 Stat. 351 (“Whereas the depredations committed by Algerine corsairs render it necessary...” authorizing the building and manning of six ships of specific types, until the establishment of peace with the Regency of Algiers)(amended in 1796 to remove restrictions so that vessels could be used for other purposes, 1 Stat. 453); Act of April 27, 1798, To provide an additional Armament for the protection of the Trade of the United States..., 1 Stat. 552; Act of June 22, 1798, 1 Stat. 569 (authorizing the President “to increase the strength of any revenue cutter, for the purposes of defence, against hostilities near the sea coast” by manning the vessels with up to 70 seamen and marines).

\textsuperscript{23} Some proposals explicitly to limit how the vessels could be employed were stricken prior to enactment, but the congressional debates left unclear whether the majority of members thought the restrictions unconstitutional or merely unwise, or whether the absence of specific authority was meant to be a limitation. See Sofaer, supra note 20, at 147-54. The John Adams Administration interpreted the legislation restrictively, and instructed naval commanders accordingly that their authority was to be “partial and limited.” See id. at 156.

\textsuperscript{24} See id. at 129 (noting that offensive actions against Wabash Indians and against a British fort may have exceeded express statutory authorization but were authorized by implication through appropriations).

\textsuperscript{25} Act of June 4, 1794, 1 Stat. 372. See also Act of June 5, 1794 §§ 7-8, 1 Stat. 381, 384 (authorizing the President to use armed forces to detain violators and compel foreign ships
commanders of public armed ships to capture certain French armed vessels and to recapture ships from them, and to retaliate against captured French citizens who had seized U.S. citizens and subjected them to mistreatment. Congress also authorized U.S. merchant vessels to defend themselves against French vessels. The Supreme Court treated these statutes as authorizing a state of “partial war” between the United States and France. Such an undeclared war was described as an “imperfect” war, as distinguished from a “Solemn” or “perfect” war, declared as such, in that, in the first case, all members of one nation are at war with all members of the other nation; in the second case, those who are authorized to commit hostilities act “under special authority.” This suggests an early understanding that Congress’s war powers extend to establishing the scope of hostilities to be carried out by the armed forces.

In the majority of cases, however, it appears that Congress has given broad deference to the President to decide how much of the armed forces to employ in a given situation. After Tripoli declared war against the United States in 1801 and U.S. vessels were already engaged in defensive actions against them, Congress did not enact a full declaration of war. Rather, it issued a sweeping authorization for the commissioning of privateers, captures, and other actions to “equip, officer, man, and employ such of the armed vessels of the United States as may be judged requisite by the President of the United States, for protecting effectually the commerce and seamen thereof on the Atlantic ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoining seas,” as well as to “cause to be done all such other acts of precaution or hostility as the state of war will justify, and may, in his opinion, require.” In declaring war against Great Britain in 1812, Congress authorized the President to “use the whole land and naval force of the United States to carry the same into effect, and to issue to private armed vessels of the United States commissions or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper....”

That Congress has traditionally left it up to the President to decide how much of the armed forces to employ in a given conflict need not imply that such deference is constitutionally mandated. The fact that Congress has seen fit to include such

25 (...continued) to depart).

26 Act of May 28, 1798, 1 Stat. 561. See also Act of July 9, 1798, 1 Stat. 578.

27 Act of March 3, 1799, 1 Stat. 743 (empowering and requiring the President to “cause the most rigorous retaliation to be executed on [French suspects who] have been or hereafter may be captured in pursuance of any of the laws of the United States”).

28 1 Stat. 572.

29 Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S.(Dall.) 37 (1800).

30 Id. at 40. See also Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S.(Cranch) 1, 28 (1801)(“Congress may authorize general hostilities ... or partial hostilities”).

31 Act of February 6, 1802, 2 Stat.129 (emphasis added). For more examples of authorizations to use force and declarations of war, see CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications, by Richard F. Grimmert and Jennifer K. Elsea.

32 Act of June 18, 1812, ch. 102, 2 Stat 755.
language may just as easily be read as an indication that Congress believes that the
decision is its to delegate. Under this view, even in the case of a declaration of war,
Congress retains the power to authorize the President to use only a portion of the
armed forces to engage in a particular conflict. On the other hand, some have argued
that the President is authorized to deploy all of the armed forces as he sees fit, with
or without an express authorization to use force or a declaration of war. 33 According
to this theory, in essence, Congress can stop the deployment of military forces only
by cutting appropriations and discharging the troops.

Congress has also used its authority to provide for the organization and
regulation of the armed forces to regulate how military personnel are to be organized
and employed. The earliest statutes prescribed in fairly precise terms how military
units were to be formed and commanded. For example, the 1798 act establishing the
Marine Corps mandated the raising of a corps to consist of “one major, four captains,
sixteen first lieutenants, twelve second lieutenants, forty-eight sergeants, forty-eight
corporals, thirty-two drums and fifes, and seven hundred and twenty privates....” 34
Congress authorized the President to appoint certain other officers as necessary if he
were to assign the Marine Corps or any part of it to shore duty, and to assign the
detachment to duty in “forts and garrisons of the United States, on the sea-coast, or
any other duty on shore.” Officers of the Marine Corps could be detached to serve
on board frigates and other armed vessels. The Marine Corps was increased in size
and reorganized in 1834 to be commanded by a colonel, with the proviso that no
Marine Corps officer could be placed in command of a navy yard or vessel of the
United States. 35

It appears to have been understood that personnel and units authorized to
perform certain duties could not be assigned to perform other duties without
authorization from Congress. In 1808, when Congress authorized eight new
regiments of specific types and composition, it felt compelled to include language
making members of the light dragoon regiment liable to “serve on foot as light
infantry” until sufficient horses and other accouterments could be provided. 36 The
Supreme Court later interpreted an 1802 statute providing for the establishment of
the Corps of Engineers, although broadly worded to permit the President to direct
that its members serve such duty in such places as he saw fit, to authorize only
engineering duties:

33 See, e.g., Bradley Larschan, The War Powers Resolution: Conflicting Constitutional
Powers, The War Powers, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 16 Denver J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 33, 45
(1987) (arguing that once Congress has raised an army and appropriated funds for it, “it falls
to the President to use the armed forces in his capacity to conduct foreign policy in
situations short of war”). The author states that it is “clear that the Congress may prohibit
the use of U.S. forces in certain areas by statute,” but that “it is the President who orders
deployment of the troops.” Id. at 49.

34 1 Stat. 594, 595 (1798).

35 4 Stat. 712, 713 (1834).

36 2 Stat. 481, 483 (1808).
But, however broad this enactment is in its language, it never has been supposed to authorize the President to employ the corps of engineers upon any other duty, except such as belongs either to military engineering, or to civil engineering.37

The Commander-in-Chief Clause

Early in the nation’s history, the Commander-in-Chief power was understood to connote “nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the confederacy.”38 Concurring in that view in 1850, Chief Justice Taney stated:

[The President’s] duty and his power are purely military. As Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and subdue the enemy.39

This formula, taken alone, provides only an approximate demarcation of the line separating Congress’s role from the President’s. Advocates of a strong role for Congress might characterize a legislative effort to limit the number of troops available in Iraq as placing troops “by law” under the President’s command, while proponents of a strong executive would likely view it as a limitation on the President’s ability to “employ them in the manner” he sees fit. With respect to the latter argument, however, it should be noted that the particular question before the Fleming Court did not call into question the extent to which Congress could restrict the manner of employing troops once placed at the command of the President.

Other early cases demonstrate Congress’s authority to restrict the President’s options for the conduct of war. In Little v. Barreme,40 Chief Justice Marshall had occasion to recognize congressional war power and to deny the exclusivity of presidential power. There, after Congress had authorized limited hostilities with France, a U.S. vessel under orders from the President had seized what its commander believed was a U.S. merchant ship bound from a French port, allegedly carrying contraband material. Congress had, however, provided by statute only for seizure of such vessels bound to French ports.41 Upholding an award of damages to the ship’s owners for wrongful seizure, the Chief Justice said:

It is by no means clear that the president of the United States whose high duty it is to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ and who is commander in chief of the armies and navies of the United States, might not, without any special authority for that purpose in the then existing state of things, have empowered the officers commanding the armed vessels of the United States, to seize and send into port for adjudication, American vessels which were forfeited

37 Gratiot v. United States, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 336, 371 (1841)(finding that the President could contract for other services but must pay an additional stipend for them from other funds)
38 The Federalist, No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
40 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170 (1804).
41 1 Stat. 613 (1799).
by being engaged in this illicit commerce. But when it is observed that [an act of
Congress] gives a special authority to seize on the high seas, and limits that
authority to the seizure of vessels bound or sailing to a French port, the
legislature seems to have prescribed that the manner in which this law shall be
carried into execution, was to exclude a seizure of any vessel not bound to a
French port.42

Accordingly, the Court held, the President’s instructions exceeded the authority
granted by Congress and were not to be given force of law, even in the context of the
President’s military powers and even though the instructions might have been valid
in the absence of contradictory legislation.

In Bas v. Tingy,43 the Court looked to congressional enactments rather than
plenary presidential power to uphold military conduct related to the limited war with
France. The following year, in Talbot v. Seeman,44 the Court upheld as authorized by
Congress a U.S. commander’s capture of a neutral ship, saying that “[t]he whole
powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States, vested in congress, the
acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry.” During the
War of 1812, the Court recognized in Brown v. United States,45 that Congress was
empowered to authorize the confiscation of enemy property during wartime, but that
absent such authorization, a seizure authorized by the President was void.

The onset of the Civil War provided some grist for later assertions of unimpeded
presidential prerogative in matters of war. In the Prize Cases,46 the Supreme Court
sustained the blockade of Southern ports instituted by President Lincoln in April,
1861, at a time when Congress was not in session. Congress had at the first
opportunity ratified the President’s actions,47 so that it was not necessary for the
Court to consider the constitutional basis of the President’s action in the absence of
congressional authorization or in the face of any prohibition. Nevertheless, the Court
approved the blockade five-to-four as an exercise of presidential power alone, on the
basis that a state of war was a fact and that, the nation being under attack, the
President was bound to take action without waiting for Congress.48 The case has
frequently been cited to support claims of greater presidential autonomy by reason
of his role as Commander in Chief.

42 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) at 177-178.
43 4 U.S. (4 Dall. ) 37 (1800).
44 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 1, 28 (1801).
45 12 U.S. (8 Cr.) 110 (1814).
47 12 Stat. 326 (1861)(ratifying all “acts, proclamations, and orders” done by the President
“respecting the army and navy ... and calling out or relating to the militia”).
48 67 U.S. (2 Bl. ) at 668 (“[The President] does not initiate war, but is bound to accept
the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority.”). The minority argued that
only congressional authorization could stamp an insurrection with the character of war.
Later, a unanimous Court adopted the majority view. The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700
(1872).
However, it should be recalled that where Lincoln’s suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus varied from legislation enacted later to ratify it, the Court looked to the statute\(^\text{49}\) rather than to the executive proclamation\(^\text{50}\) to determine the breadth of its application.\(^\text{51}\) The Chief Justice described the allocation of war powers as follows:

The power to make the necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the President. Both powers imply many subordinate and auxiliary powers. Each includes all authorities essential to its due exercise. But neither can the President, in war more than in peace, intrude upon the proper authority of Congress, nor Congress upon the proper authority of the President....\(^\text{52}\)

The Chief Justice described the Commander-in-Chief power as entailing “the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns,”\(^\text{53}\) but nevertheless agreed that military trials of civilians accused of violating the law of war in Union states were invalid without congressional approval, despite the government’s assertion that the “[Commander in Chief’s] power to make an effectual use of his forces [must include the] power to arrest and punish one who arms men to join the enemy.”\(^\text{54}\)

On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also suggested that the President has some independent authority to employ the armed forces, at least in the absence of contrary congressional action. In the 1890 case of *In re Neagle*, the Supreme Court suggested, in dictum, that the President has the power to deploy the military abroad to protect or rescue persons with significant ties to the United States. Discussing examples of the executive lawfully acting in the absence of express statutory authority, Justice Miller approvingly described the Martin Koszta affair, in which an American naval ship intervened to prevent a lawful immigrant from being captured by an Austrian vessel, despite the absence of clear statutory authorization.\(^\text{55}\) Only one

\(^{49}\) Act of March 3d, 1863, 12 Stat. 755 (authorizing the suspension of habeas corpus, but with limitations in Union states to those held as prisoners of war; all others were to be indicted or freed.)

\(^{50}\) Proclamation of September 15, 1863, 13 Stat. 734 (suspending habeas corpus with respect to those in federal custody as military offenders or “as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders and abettors of the enemy”).

\(^{51}\) *Ex parte* Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).

\(^{52}\) *Id.* at 139 (Chase, C.J., concurring).

\(^{53}\) *Id.* at 139 (“Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns, nor can the President, or any commander under him, without the sanction of Congress, institute tribunals for the trial and punishment of offences, either of soldiers or civilians, unless in cases of a controlling necessity...”).

\(^{54}\) *Id.* at 17 (government argument).

\(^{55}\) *In re Neagle*, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890) (describing the incident and rhetorically asking, “Upon what act of congress then existing can any one lay his finger in support of the action of our government in this matter?”). For further discussion, see *Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution* 347-348 (2nd ed. 2002); *Wormuth & Firmage, supra* note 13, at 154 (stating that the U.S. captain had acted against the President’s orders, but (continued...)}
federal court, in an 1860 opinion, has clearly held that in the absence of congressional authorization, the President has authority to deploy military forces abroad to protect U.S. persons (and property). Nevertheless, there historically appears to be some support for this view by both the executive and legislative branches. However, the
The expansion of presidential power related to war, asserted as a combination of Commander-in-Chief authority and the President’s inherent authority over the nation’s foreign affairs, began in earnest in the twentieth century. In *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, the Supreme Court confirmed that the President enjoys greater discretion when acting with respect to matters of foreign affairs than may be the case when only domestic issues are involved. In that case, Congress, concerned with the outside arming of the belligerents in the war between Paraguay and Bolivia, had authorized the President to proclaim an arms embargo if he found that such action might contribute to a peaceful resolution of the dispute. President Franklin Roosevelt issued the requisite finding and proclamation, and Curtiss-Wright and associate companies were indicted for violating the embargo. They challenged the statute, arguing that Congress had failed adequately to elaborate standards to guide the President’s exercise of the power thus delegated. Justice Sutherland concluded that the limitations on delegation in the domestic field were irrelevant where foreign affairs are involved, a result he based on the premise that foreign relations is exclusively an executive function combined with his constitutional model positing that internationally, the power of the federal government is not one of enumerated but of inherent powers, emanating from concepts of sovereignty rather than the Constitution. The Court affirmed the convictions, stating that:

> It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations — a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment — perhaps serious embarrassment — is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war.

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57 (...continued)

being issued pursuant to congressional authorization, and noting that Jefferson denied having inherent authority to commit such acts). Whether such usage would legitimate the authority is also subject to debate. *See WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra* note 13, at 135.

58 299 U.S. 304 (1936).

59 The Supreme Court had recently held that the Constitution required Congress to elaborate standards when delegating authority to the President. *Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).

60 299 U.S. at 319-20.
The case is cited frequently to support a theory of presidential power not subject to restriction by Congress, although the case in fact involved an exercise of authority delegated by Congress. Curtiss-Wright remains precedent admonishing courts to show deference to the President in matters involving international affairs, including by interpreting ambiguous statutes in such a manner as to increase the President’s discretion. The case has also been cited in favor of broad presidential discretion to implement statutes related to military affairs. To the extent, however, that Justice Sutherland interpreted presidential power as being virtually plenary in the realms of foreign affairs and national defense, the case has not been followed to establish that Congress lacks authority in these areas.

The constitutional allocation of war powers between the President and Congress, where Congress had not delegated the powers exercised by the President, was described by Justice Jackson, concurring in the Steel Seizure Case:

The Constitution expressly places in Congress power “to raise and support Armies” and “to provide and maintain a Navy.” This certainly lays upon Congress primary responsibility for supplying the armed forces. Congress alone controls the raising of revenues and their appropriation and may determine in what manner and by what means they shall be spent for military and naval procurement....

There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants. He has no monopoly of “war powers,” whatever they are. While Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the army and navy, only Congress can provide him any army or navy to command.

The Jackson opinion is commonly understood to establish that whatever powers the President may exercise in the absence of congressional authorization, the President may act contrary to an act of Congress only in matters involving exclusive presidential prerogatives.

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64 Justice Jackson’s concurrence took note of the fact that Curtiss-Wright did not involve a case in which the President took action contrary to an act of Congress. Id. at 635-36 &n.2. Curtiss-Wright, he said involved, not the question of the President’s power to act without congressional authority, but the question of his right to act under and in accord with an Act of Congress. The constitutionality of the Act under which the President had proceeded was assailed on the ground that it delegated legislative powers to the President. Much of the Court’s opinion is dictum, but the ratio decidendi is (continued...)
Presidents from Truman to George W. Bush have claimed independent authority to commit U.S. armed forces to involvements abroad absent any Congressional participation other than consultation and after-the-fact financing. In 1994, for example, President Clinton based his authority to order the participation of U.S. forces in NATO actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina on his “constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations” and as his role as Commander in Chief, and protested efforts to restrict the use of military forces there and elsewhere as an improper and possibly unconstitutional limitation on his “command and control” of U.S. forces. Ever since Congress passed the War Powers Resolution over President Nixon’s veto, all Presidents have regarded it as an unconstitutional infringement on presidential powers.

In the context of what it terms the “Global War on Terror,” the Bush Administration has claimed that the President’s commander-in-chief authority entails inherent authority with respect to the capture and detention of suspected terrorists,

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64 (...continued)

contained in the following language:

When the President is to be authorized by legislation to act in respect of a matter intended to affect a situation in foreign territory, the legislator properly bears in mind the important consideration that the form of the President’s action - or, indeed, whether he shall act at all - may well depend, among other things, upon the nature of the confidential information which he has or may thereafter receive, or upon the effect which his action may have upon our foreign relations. This consideration, in connection with what we have already said on the subject, discloses the unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of governmental power to lay down narrowly definite standards by which the President is to be governed. As this court said in Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311, ‘As a government, the United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other countries. We should hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing such powers.’ (Italics supplied [by Justice Jackson]) Id., at 321-322.

That case does not solve the present controversy. It recognized internal and external affairs as being in separate categories, and held that the strict limitation upon congressional delegations of power to the President over internal affairs does not apply with respect to delegations of power in external affairs. It was intimated that the President might act in external affairs without congressional authority, but not that he might act contrary to an Act of Congress.

65 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 406 (March 2, 1994).

66 See Interview with Radio Reporters, 1993 PUB. PAPERS 1763-64; see also FISHER, supra note 11, at 184.

authority he has claimed cannot be infringed by legislation.\(^{68}\) In 2004, the Supreme Court avoided deciding whether Congress could pass a statute to prohibit or regulate the detention and interrogation of captured suspects, which the Administration had asserted would unconstitutionally interfere with core commander-in-chief powers, by finding that Congress had implicitly authorized the detention of enemy combatants when it authorized the use of force in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.\(^{69}\) However, the Supreme Court in 2006 invalidated President Bush’s military order authorizing trials of aliens accused of terrorist offenses by military commission, finding that the regulations promulgated to implement the order did not comply with relevant statutes.\(^{70}\) The Court did not expressly pass on the constitutionality of any statute or discuss possible congressional incursion into areas of exclusive presidential authority, which was seen by many as implicitly confirming Congress’s authority to legislate in such a way as to limit the power of the Commander in Chief.\(^{71}\)

**II. Repeal of Prior Authorization to Use Military Force**

While it is well-established that Congress and the President each possess authority on ending a military conflict, issues may arise if the political branches are in disagreement as to whether or how to end a military conflict. Inter-branch disagreement regarding the cessation of hostilities has been a rare occurrence, but it is not unprecedented. In the 110th Congress, a number of proposals have been introduced that would repeal or establish an expiration date for the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002.\(^{72}\) The following sections

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\(^{68}\) See, e.g. *Oversight of the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 107th Cong. (2002)* (testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft)(arguing that Congress has no constitutional authority to interfere with the President’s decision to detain enemy combatants); see also Reid Skibell, *Separation-of-Powers and the Commander in Chief — Congress’s Authority to Override Presidential Decisions in Crisis Situations, 13 GEOF. MASON L. REV. 183 (2004)* (documenting Bush Administration claims with respect to Congress’s lack of power to legislate in matters related to the conduct of the war and arguing that these represent an expansion over prior administrations’ claims).


\(^{71}\) The Court adopted Chief Justice Chase’s formulation for allocating war powers, see *id.* at 2773, and Justice Jackson’s framework for determining separation-of-powers disputes between the President and Congress, see *id.* at 2774 n.24 (“Whether or not the President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers. The Government does not argue otherwise.”)(citation omitted).

\(^{72}\) See *H.R. 1460* (repealing 2002 resolution); *H.R. 1262* (same); *S. 679* (declaring that objectives of 2002 resolution have been achieved, and requiring redeployment of forces from Iraq); *S.J. Res. 3* (establishing expiration date for 2002 resolution); *S. 670* (requiring (continued...
discuss the constitutional authority implicated by a repeal of military authorization, procedural, and other considerations involved in rescinding prior military authorization as compared to limiting appropriations, and the legal effect that a repeal would have on continuing hostilities.

**Historical Practice**

Although the U.S. Constitution expressly empowers Congress to declare war, it is notably silent regarding which political body is responsible for returning the United States to a state of peace. Some evidence suggests that this omission was not accidental.\(^{73}\) During the Constitutional Convention, a motion was made by one of the delegates to modify the draft document by adding the words “and peace” after the words “to declare war.”\(^{74}\) This motion, however, was unanimously rejected. Convention records do not clearly evidence the framers’ intent in rejecting the motion.

Some early constitutional commentators suggested that the motion failed because the framers believed that the power to make peace more naturally belonged to the treaty-making body, as conflicts between nations were typically resolved through treaties of peace.\(^{75}\) Although the framers did not specifically empower Congress to make peace, they also did not expressly locate the power with the treaty-making body, perhaps because of a recognition that peace might sometimes be more easily achieved through means other than treaty.\(^{76}\)

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\(^{72}\) (...continued)

\(^{73}\) Up to that point, the shared American and English tradition suggested that the institution with the power to instigate war was also the body with the power to end it. Blackstone believed that under the English system, “wherever the right resides of beginning a national war, there also must reside the right of ending it, or the power of making peace.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 250 (1756). When America declared its independence, it also rejected the monarchial form of government.

\(^{74}\) FARRAND, supra note 17, at 319; see also 3 JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1352 (Henry Gilpin, ed. 1840).

\(^{75}\) 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1173 (1833); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 110-111 (2\(^{nd}\) ed. 1929). It should be noted that at the time the proposal was rejected, the framers had designated the Senate as the treaty-making body. The President was made part of the treaty-making body several weeks later. FARRAND, supra note 17, at 538.

\(^{76}\) As a practical matter, a requirement that peace be achieved through a treaty between the warring parties would, in certain circumstances, lead to odd results: The President, who is the Commander-in-Chief...and a majority of both branches of Congress, which declares war and maintains the forces necessary for its (continued...)
It has been suggested that the framers did not allocate an exclusive body with peace-making authority because they believed “it should be more easy to get out of a war than into it.” Given the framers’ failure to designate a single political branch responsible for returning the country from a state of war to a state of peace, the power to make peace was likely understood to be a shared power, with each branch having the authority on terminating a military conflict. The executive could return the country to a state of peace through a treaty with the warring party, subject to the Senate’s advice and consent. Congress could declare peace or rescind a previous authorization to use military force pursuant to its plenary authority to repeal prior enactments, its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or its power to make laws “necessary and proper” to effectuate its constitutional powers.

Regardless of the framers’ intent, the legislative and executive branches have historically treated peace-making as a shared power. Peace has been declared in one of three ways: (1) via legislation terminating a conflict, (2) pursuant to a treaty negotiated and signed by the executive and ratified following the advice and consent of the Senate, and (3) through a presidential proclamation. All three methods have been recognized as constitutionally legitimate by the Supreme Court, including most clearly in the 1948 case of Ludecke v. Watkins, where the Court plainly stated, “The state of war may be terminated by treaty or legislation or Presidential...
proclamation." Notably, the Court has recognized that the termination of a military conflict is a "political act," and it has historically refused to review the political branches’ determinations of when a conflict has officially ended.

**Rescinding Military Authorization Versus Cutting Appropriations: Procedural and Other Considerations**

As a procedural matter, it is more difficult for Congress to terminate authorization for a military conflict than to limit appropriations necessary for the continuation of hostilities. As in the case of ordinary legislation, congressional declarations of peace and rescissions of military authorization have historically taken the form of a bill or joint resolution passed by both Houses and presented to the President for signature. Like other legislation, such measures are subject to presidential veto, which Congress may override only with a two-thirds majority of each House.

In contrast, Congress’s ability to deny funds for the continuation of military hostilities is not contingent upon the enactment of a positive law, though such a denial may take the form of a positive enactment. Although the President has the power to veto legislative proposals, he cannot compel Congress to pass legislation, including bills to appropriate funds necessary for the continuation of a military

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82 335 U.S. 160, 168 (1948) (internal quotations omitted). There are potentially other ways in which peace could be made that were not contemplated by the Ludecke Court. See Clinton Rossiter, The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief 79-80 (1970) (suggesting that a war could also be ended by, among other things, an executive agreement with or without specific congressional authorization).

83 Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 168-169.

84 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S 186, 213-214 (1962) (describing the Court’s refusal to review the political branches’ determination of when or whether a war has ended). See generally Rossiter, supra note 82, at 83-89 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence upholding political branches’ determinations as to the official end of a war, including in cases where actual hostilities ceased several years beforehand).

85 See CRS Report RL31133, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications, by Richard F. Grimmett and Jennifer K. Elsea; see also J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 Duke L.J. 27, 81-86 (discussing historical operation of bicameralism and presentment in the war-making context, along with scholarly views concerning whether presentment is necessary).

86 U.S. Const., art. I, § 7, cl. (2)-(3).

conflict. Thus, while a majority of both Houses would be necessary to terminate military authorization, and a super-majority of both Houses would be required to override a presidential veto, a simple majority of a single House could prevent the appropriation of funds necessary for the continuation of a military conflict. It should be noted, however, that legislation probably would be required to prevent the President from exercising statutory authority to transfer certain funds appropriated to other operations for use in support of the military conflict that Congress was attempting to limit. Like other positive legislation, such a measure would be subject to presidential veto.

While it may be procedurally easier for Congress to refuse appropriations for a military conflict than to rescind military authorization, policy considerations may sometimes make the latter option more appealing. For example, some Members of Congress who support the winding down of a military operation might nevertheless be reluctant to reduce the funds for troops on the battlefield. There might also be concerns over potential effects that a denial of appropriations might have on unrelated military operations. Although appropriations legislation can be crafted to effectively terminate hostilities while permitting funding of force protection measures during the orderly redeployment of troops from the battlefield, such legislation, like other positive enactments, would be subject to presidential veto.

In certain circumstances, a President may be more willing to agree to a rescission of military authorization than to an appropriations bill that limits the funding of military operations, particularly if the rescission does not include a deadline for troop withdrawal. Indeed, during the Vietnam War, Congress was able to rescind military authorization at an earlier date than it was able to cut off appropriations. In 1971, Congress passed and President Nixon signed a measure rescinding the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which had provided congressional authorization for U.S. military operations against North Vietnam. The Mansfield Amendment, enacted later that year, called for the “prompt and orderly” withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina at the “earliest possible date.” However, these measures did not include a deadline for troop withdrawal. Although U.S. troop presence in South Vietnam diminished considerably pursuant to the Nixon Administration’s “Vietnamization” strategy even prior to these enactments, the United States continued significant air bombing campaigns in the years following the rescission of military authorization. During this same period, President Nixon vetoed or threatened to veto a number of appropriations bills that would have either prohibited funds from being used for certain military operations in Southeast Asia or required a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. In 1973, two years after rescinding military authorization, Congress was finally able to enact appropriations limitations, signed by the President, that barred combat operations in Indochina. These appropriations measures were approved only after the signing...
of a cease-fire agreement with North Vietnam and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam, and served primarily to end the aerial bombing campaign in Cambodia and prevent U.S. forces from being reintroduced into hostilities.

In sum, in situations where Congress seeks to prevent the executive’s continuation of military combat operations, it may be procedurally easier for Congress to deny appropriations than it would be to statutorily compel a withdrawal from hostilities. However, past experience suggests that, at least in certain circumstances, policy considerations may cause the two branches to view the rescission of military authorization as a more appealing alternative — postponing an inter-branch conflict on appropriations for a later date, enabling Congress to signal its interest in winding down a conflict, and (at least temporarily) preserving the President’s discretion as to how the conflict is waged.

**Legal Consequences of Congressional Rescission of Military Authorization, Absent Additional Congressional Action**

Although Congress has the power to rescind authorization of a military conflict or enact a declaration of peace, the practical effect that such an action might have on the President’s ability to continue a military conflict may nevertheless remain difficult to predict. Historically, courts have been unwilling to interpret a congressional rescission of military authorization as barring the executive from continuing to wage a military campaign, at least so long as Congress continues to appropriate money in support of such operations. Although the War Powers Resolution establishes procedures by which Congress may direct the withdrawal of U.S. troops from military conflicts that lack statutory authorization, the constitutionality and practical effects of these requirements have been questioned. Finally, even in the absence of express congressional authorization, the President may possess some inherent or implied power as Commander in Chief to continue to engage in certain military operations. The following sections explain these points in greater detail.

**Judicial Interpretation.** Jurisprudence suggests that courts would not necessarily view a repeal of prior authorization, by itself, as compelling the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces. As an overarching matter, courts have been highly reluctant to act in cases involving national security, especially when they require a pronouncement as to the legality of a military conflict or the strategies used therein.92 Many such cases have been dismissed without reaching the merits of the

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91 (...continued)


92 This is not to say that every legal challenge to a wartime activity is doomed to failure. In (continued...)
arguments at issue, including when they involve a political question that the judiciary considers itself ill-suited to answer. Legal actions brought by Members of Congress challenging the lawfulness of military actions have had no greater success than suits brought by private citizens. While the courts have suggested a willingness to intervene in disputes between the two branches that reach a legal (as opposed to political) impasse, they have yet to find an impasse on matters of war that has required judicial settlement. In other words, as long as Congress retains options for bringing about a military disengagement but has not exercised them, courts are unlikely to get involved.

92 (...continued)

some circumstances, the courts have found unlawful certain military activities involving the seizure of property or the detention of enemy combatants, at least in instances such action was deemed to lack sufficient congressional authorization. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170 (1804) (upholding damage award to owners of U.S. merchant ship seized during quasi-war with France, when Congress had not authorized such seizures); Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (finding unlawful the government seizure of property to settle labor dispute during Korean War); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (finding that federal habeas statute applied to persons detained in Guantanamo Bay pursuant to the “war on terror”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (persons deemed “enemy combatants” in the “war on terror” have right to challenge detention before a neutral decision-maker); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006) (finding that military tribunals convened by presidential order did not comply with the Uniform Code of Military Justice).

93 In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court described situations where the political question doctrine was implicated:

It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Id. at 217.

94 For background and examples, see CRS Report RL30352, War Powers Litigation Initiated by Members of Congress Since the Enactment of the War Powers Resolution, by David. M. Ackerman.

95 See, e.g, Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp.2d 34 (D. D.C. 1999) (dismissing action seeking declaration that the President acted unlawfully in ordering air strikes in Kosovo and Yugoslavia without congressional authorization, because impasse had not been reached, as Congress had not barred introduction of U.S. forces or barred appropriations from being used for such purpose).
The Vietnam conflict is the lone instance where Congress repealed military authorization while major combat operations were still ongoing. Although the Nixon Administration significantly decreased the number of U.S. troops present in South Vietnam following the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and enactment of the Mansfield Amendment in 1971, major combat operations continued into 1973, when Congress cut off all funding for military operations in Indochina.

During this period, federal courts heard a number of suits challenging the legality of continued hostilities in the absence of congressional authorization. None of these challenges proved successful, in large part because Congress continued to appropriate money for military operations. It is a well-established principle that Congress’s appropriation of funds may serve in some circumstances to confer authority for executive action. Reviewing courts have found this principle no less applicable concerning matters of war. The appropriation of billions of dollars in support of U.S. combat operations in Indochina, even after the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, was viewed as congressional authorization for continued U.S. participation in hostilities, regardless of whether some Members of Congress had...
a motivation for approving continued appropriations other than that reflected in the express language of the enacted legislation.99

Courts have also declined on political question grounds to examine the motives of Congress in choosing to appropriate funds after rescinding direct authorization for U.S. military activities.100 In the words of one court, any attempt to assess Congress’s intentions in appropriating funds, and determining whether such appropriations were truly meant to further continuing hostilities, would necessarily “require the interrogation of members of Congress regarding what they intended by their votes, and then syntheses of the various answers. To do otherwise would call for gross speculation in a delicate matter pertaining to foreign relations.”101 Such an examination of Congress’s motivations was deemed beyond the scope of appropriate judicial scrutiny.102

Some argued that Congress’s termination of statutory authorization for ongoing hostilities and instruction that the conflict end at the soonest practical date barred the President, at the very least, from “escalating” hostilities. Though the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit suggested in a 1971 case that this argument might be valid,103 subsequent rulings indicated that the court would only be willing to consider this argument in very limited circumstances. Notably, in the 1973 case of DaCosta v. Laird,104 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed a challenge to the President’s order to mine the harbors of North Vietnam, where it was argued that this order represented an unlawful escalation of hostilities in light of congressional

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98 (...continued)

99 See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1313-1314 (2nd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974) (finding appropriations legislation gave President sufficient authority to order the bombing of Cambodia, despite claim by some Members of Congress that legislation was “coerced” by presidential veto of appropriations bills that would have immediately cut off funding of such acts); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D.C.Mass. 1973) (same).

100 Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1043 (the decision to endorse military action through appropriations rather than direct authorization was “committed to the discretion of the Congress and outside the power and competency of the judiciary, because there are no intelligible and objectively manageable standards by which to judge such actions”); Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.2d 809, 810 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 929 (“Whether a plaintiff challenges the selective service system or the foreign aid and appropriations aspects of congressional cooperation in the present conflict, he presents a political question which we decline to adjudicate.”); Berk, 317 F. Supp. at 728-729 (recognizing that method that Congress chooses to endorse or authorize action is a political question).


102 Id.; Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1314 &n.4.

103 DaCosta, 448 F.2d at 1370.

enactments ordering the withdrawal of U.S. troops at the earliest practicable date. The circuit court dismissed this challenge because it raised a nonjusticiable political question. Deciding such a case would require the court to assess the strategy and tactics used by the executive to wind down a conflict, an assessment it was ill-equipped to make:

Judges, deficient in military knowledge, lacking vital information upon which to assess the nature of battlefield decisions, and sitting thousands of miles from the field of action, cannot reasonably determine whether a specific military operation constitutes an “escalation” of the war or is merely a new tactical approach within a continuing strategic plan. What if, for example, the war “de-escalates” so that it is waged as it was prior to the mining of North Vietnam’s harbors, and then “escalates” again? Are the courts required to oversee the conduct of the war on a daily basis, away from the scene of action? In this instance, it was the President’s view that the mining of North Vietnam’s harbor was necessary to preserve the lives of American soldiers in South Vietnam and to bring the war to a close. History will tell whether or not that assessment was correct, but without the benefit of such extended hindsight we are powerless to know.105

Though the circuit court did not completely rule out the possibility that a further escalation of hostilities could be deemed unlawful, the court suggested it would be willing to consider such arguments only in the most limited of circumstances. For example, the court suggested that a “radical change in the character of war operations — as by an intentional policy of indiscriminate bombing of civilians without any military objective — might be sufficiently measurable judicially to warrant a court’s consideration.”106

In *Holtzman v. Schlesinger*, decided later that year, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court decision that had declared unlawful the continued bombing of Cambodia following the removal of U.S. troops and prisoners of war from Vietnam. The circuit court held that it was a nonjusticiable political question as to whether the bombing violated the Mansfield Amendment’s instruction that hostilities be terminated at the “earliest practicable date.” Comparing the situation with that at issue in *DaCosta*, the court found that the challenge raised “precisely the questions of fact involving military and diplomatic expertise not vested in the judiciary.”107 Further, even assuming *arguendo* that the military and diplomatic issues raised by the bombing were judicially manageable, the circuit court found that Congress had authorized the bombing through continued appropriations.108

105 *Id.* at 1155.
106 *Id.* at 1156 (italics added).
108 *Id.* at 1313. Specifically, the court noted the language of § 108 of the Joint Resolution Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal 1974, P.L. 93-52, which barred funding for military operations in and around Indochina after August 15, 1973. The Court inferred from this language that military activities at issue in the case before it, occurring before this deadline, were authorized.
Taken together, these cases suggest that a reviewing court would probably not interpret a repeal of prior military authorization as requiring the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from ongoing hostilities in Iraq. Further, courts may be reluctant to assess whether specific military tactics or strategies pursued by the executive constitute an impermissible “escalation” of a conflict in the aftermath of such a repeal. Accordingly, it does not appear that the termination of direct authorization to use force, absent additional action such as the denial of appropriations or possibly the inclusion of an unambiguous deadline for troop withdrawal, would be interpreted by a reviewing court as constraining the executive’s ability to continue U.S. combat operations.

Implications of the War Powers Resolution. The consequences of a repeal of an authorization to use military force were arguably made more significant with the enactment of the War Powers Resolution (WPR). Enacted in 1973 over President Nixon’s veto, the WPR was an effort by Congress to reassert its role in matters of war — a role that many Members believed had been allowed to erode during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Among other things, the WPR establishes a procedure by which Congress may (theoretically) compel the President to withdraw U.S. forces from foreign-based conflicts when a declaration of war or authorization to use military force has been terminated. Specifically, WPR § 5(c) provides that

at any time that United States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

While § 5(c) offers a mechanism by which Congress might compel presidential compliance with a law that had rescinded statutory authorization to use military force, its constitutional validity is doubtful given the Supreme Court’s ruling in the 1983 case of INS v. Chadha. In Chadha, the Court held that for a resolution to become a law, it must go through the bicameral and presentment process in its

109 See, e.g., Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538, 540 (1970) (characterizing the extension of the conflict in Vietnam into Cambodia as a “necessary incidental, tactical incursion ordered by the Commander in Chief” that would be authorized so long as the military operations in Vietnam were found to be authorized), rev’d on other grounds, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972)(ordering district court to dismiss for lack of standing).


111 The wording of the War Powers Resolution makes clear that appropriations in support of military operations does not in itself constitute “specific statutory authorization” of those operations for purposes of WPR requirements. See WPR § 8(a) (noting that authorization is not to be inferred from provisions “contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision specifically authorizes the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities ... [and states] that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization...”).

entirety. Accordingly, a concurrent or simple resolution could not be used as a “legislative veto” against executive action. Although the Chadha Court did not expressly find WPR § 5(c) to be unconstitutional, it was listed in Justice White’s dissent as one of nearly 200 legislative vetoes for which the majority had sounded the “death knell,” and most commentators have agreed with this assessment. Thus, it seems highly unlikely that the WPR could be used to enforce a congressional repeal of an authorization to use military force in Iraq.

Section 5(b) of the WPR establishes a requirement for the withdrawal of U.S. troops 60 days after armed forces are introduced without congressional authorization into a situation where hostilities are imminent, unless Congress enacts legislation providing authority for the use of force or extends the deadline. This provision would not appear to supply a means by which Congress could compel the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, as the introduction of those forces was done pursuant to congressional authorization. Even if Congress were to rescind that authorization, the legality of actions taken pursuant to it would not be nullified. Arguably,

113 Id. at 951.
114 Id. at 967, 1003 (White, J., dissenting).
115 See, e.g., Senate Foreign Relations Comm. Rep., Persian Gulf and the War Powers Resolution, S.Rept. No. 106, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6 (1987) (describing § 5(c) as being “effectively nullified” by the Chadha decision); Henkin, supra note 55, at 126-127 (recognizing invalidation of § 5(c) by Chadha and describing arguments to the contrary as “plausible but not compelling”); Wormuth and Firmage, supra note 13, at 222 (noting that the reasoning of Chadha “apparently invalidates section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution”); Ronald D. Rotunda, the War Powers Act in Perspective, 2 Mich. L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 8 (1997) (claiming that most “scholars have concluded that...[§ 5(c)] is unconstitutional ever since INS v. Chadha). In contrast, some have argued that neither a declaration of war nor a subsequent rescission of authorization to use force constitutes an “ordinary” act of legislation falling under the requirements of the Presentment Clause. See Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 Va. L. Rev. 101, 130-132 (1984). The legitimacy of this argument is untested and highly controversial, as Congress has always presented a declaration of war or authorization to use military force to the president. Further, even assuming arguendo that a declaration of war does not need to be presented to the President, it is not necessarily clear that legislation ending hostilities would also not require presentment. See Henkin, supra note 55, at 127, 379; Carter, supra, at 130-132 (describing weaknesses of argument against presentment requirement); see also Sidak, supra note 85, at 84-85 (discussing historical and scholarly view that presentment is necessary).
116 The requirement in § 5(b) does not apply in cases in which Congress “is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1554. The 60-day deadline is automatically extended for thirty days “if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.”
117 P.L. 107-243, § 5 (c) (“Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.”).
118 See DaCosta, 448 F.2d at 1369 (the repeal of Gulf of Tonkin resolution “ did not wipe (continued...)
however, a substantial increase in troop levels that takes place subsequent to any
repeal of the authorization for use of military force against Iraq could trigger the
requirements of WPR § 5(b), although it is unclear how large such an increase
would need to be before it would be sufficiently “substantial.” Congress has in
the past enacted or considered legislation declaring the 60-day limit to have taken
effect, although apparently with little practical effect. In any case, it appears that
WPR section 5(c), which permits Congress to compel the withdrawal of U.S. troops
via concurrent resolution, was intended to address situations where Congress desired
an end to previously authorized hostilities.

Inherent Presidential Authority to Use Military Force Absent
Congressional Authorization. Even in the absence of express congressional
authorization, it is well-recognized that the President may still employ military force
in some circumstances pursuant to his powers as Commander in Chief and his
inherent authority in the area of foreign affairs, at least so long as no statute stands
in his way. A President would likely argue that this inherent authority would permit
him to instruct U.S. forces to engage in certain military operations related to an
ongoing conflict, even if statutory authorization for U.S. participation in that conflict
had been rescinded. Further, even if Congress were to enact legislation requiring the
cessation of military operations after a specified date, it is highly unlikely that this
measure would be interpreted to prohibit any and all military operations, specifically

118 (...continued)
out its history nor could it have the effect of a nunc pro tunc action”.

119 P.L. 93-148, §§ 4(a), 5(b). The reporting requirement in § 4(a), which begins the sixty-
day withdrawal deadline, also comes into effect in the event troops are introduced in
“numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat
already located in a foreign nation.” However, it appears that the deadline only applies if
the report was made necessary due to circumstances described in § 4(a)(1), where troops are
initially introduced into hostilities. See Michael J. Glennon, Constitutional
Diplomacy 103 (1990)(explaining that the omission of a requirement for the President to
specify whether a report is submitted pursuant to § 4(a)(1) or § 4(a)(2) or (3) makes it
impossible to know whether the sixty-day time period has been triggered).

120 In addition, it could be argued that even if Congress repealed the AUMF, the subsequent
appropriation of funds in support of military operations would constitute legal authorization
for such activity — at least in circumstances where Congress intended appropriations to
support further hostilities, rather than simply to protect troops already in the field. See OLC
Opinion on Hostilities in Kosovo, supra note 97, at * 33-52 (discussing instances in which
appropriations suggest a clear intent by Congress to authorize further hostilities, and arguing
that the WPR “cannot be read to deny legal effect to...[the] clear intent” of Congress to use
appropriations measures to authorize further hostilities).

121 See Glennon, supra note 119, at 104 (noting efforts with respect to Lebanon in 1983,
P.L. 98-119, and Grenada, in which case no such final triggering legislation emerged,
despite both Houses having passed measures to that effect). The necessity for separate
legislation to trigger the triggering provision, subject as it is to presidential veto, seems to
defeat the purpose for § 5(b). See id. at 105 (opining that the provision’s “central objective
was to create a self-activating mechanism to control abuse of presidential discretion in the
event Congress lacked the backbone to do so”).

122 See supra at 9-15.
III. Use of the Power of the Purse to Restrict Military Operations

Congress has used its spending power to restrict the deployment and use of the armed forces in the past. In 1973, for instance, after other legislative efforts failed to draw down U.S. participation in combat operations in Indochina, Congress effectively ended it by means of appropriations riders prohibiting use of funds. Section 307 of the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1973, P.L. 93-50 (1973), stated that, “None of the funds herein appropriated under this act may be expended to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam, and after August 15, 1973, no other funds heretofore appropriated under any other act may be expended for such purpose.” Section 108 of the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for Fiscal Year 1974, P.L. 93-52 (1973), provided that, “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.” A year later, Congress passed an authorizing statute, section 38(f)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, P.L. 93-559 (1974), which set

123 For example, even after Congress enacted legislation cutting off funding for all combat operations in Indochina, President Ford’s subsequent use of military forces to evacuate U.S. citizens and third country nationals was not seriously questioned, nor was a subsequent authorization of an operation to rescue the crew of the Mayaguez from Cambodian territory (a mission which was reported to Congress following the procedures of the War Powers Resolution, but only after the operation was completed). For background on congressional attitudes towards these rescue missions, see Fisher, supra note 11, at 157-158. See also Rappenecker v. United States, 509 F.Supp. 1024, 1030 (D.C. Cal. 1980). The Rappenecker case involved a civil suit by former crewmen of the Mayaguez for injuries they received during their rescue. Although the President ordered their rescue in the absence of prior congressional authorization, the Court assumed that the order was constitutionally valid. Id.


125 See P.L. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053 (repealing Gulf of Tonkin Resolution); P.L. 92-156, § 601(a), 85 Stat. 423, 430 (Mansfield Amendment); see also P.L. 92-156, § 501(a), 85 Stat. 423, 427 (1971) (Fullbright proviso).
a total ceiling of U.S. civilian and military personnel in Vietnam of 4,000 six months after enactment and a total ceiling of 3,000 within one year of enactment.


Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no assistance of any kind may be provided for the purpose, or which would have the effect, of promoting, augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola, unless and until Congress expressly authorizes such assistance by law enacted after the date of enactment of this section.

This section added that if the President determined that the prohibited assistance to Angola should be furnished, he should submit to the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations a report describing recommended amounts and categories of assistance to be provided and identities of proposed aid recipients. This report also was to include a certification of his determination that furnishing such assistance was important to U.S. national security interests and an unclassified detailed statement of reasons supporting it.

Section 109 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1976, P.L. 94-330 (1976), signed the same day as P.L. 94-329, provided that, “None of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to this act shall be obligated to finance directly or indirectly any type of military assistance to Angola.”

In the 1980s, various versions of the Boland Amendment were enacted to prohibit using funds for various military activities in or around Nicaragua. For example, section 8066 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act included in the Continuing Appropriations Resolution for Fiscal Year, 1985, P.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1935 (1984), for example, stated that “During Fiscal Year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose, or which would have the effect of supporting, indirectly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operation in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual.” This provision stated that after February 28, 1985, the President could expend $14 million in funds if the President made a report to Congress which specified certain criteria, including the need to provide further assistance for military or paramilitary operations prohibited by the Boland Amendment, and if Congress passed a joint resolution approving such action.

In the 1990s, Congress enacted section 8151 of the DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994, P.L. 103-139 (1993), which approved using armed forces for certain purposes including combat in a security role to protect United Nations units

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126 E.g., P.L. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1904, 1935 (1984); see 133 Cong Rec. 15664-15701 (June 15, 1987) (detailing various forms of the Boland Amendment that were enacted).
in Somalia, but cut off funding after March 31, 1994, except for a limited number of military troops to protect American diplomatic personnel and American citizens unless further authorized by Congress. Section 8135 of the DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1995, P.L. 103-335 (1994), provided that, “None of the funds appropriated in this act may be used for the continuous presence in Somalia of United States military personnel, except for the protection of United States personnel, after September 30, 1994.” In title IX of the DOD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1995, P.L. 103-335 (1994), Congress provided that, “No funds provided in this act are available for United States military participation to continue Operation Support Hope in or around Rwanda after October 7, 1994, except for any action that is necessary to protect the lives of United States citizens.”

These examples reveal the approaches that Congress has employed to prohibit or restrict using military force. They have ranged from the least comprehensive “none of the funds appropriated in this act may be used” to the most comprehensive “notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be used.” The phrase “none of the funds appropriated in this act” limits only funds appropriated and made available in the act that carries the restriction, but not funds, if any, that may be available pursuant to other appropriations acts or authorizing statutes. To restrict funds appropriated and made available not only in the act that carries the restriction, but also pursuant to other appropriations acts, Congress has used the phrase “none of the funds appropriated in this act or any other act may be used.” The most comprehensive restriction is “notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be used.” This language precludes using funds that have been appropriated in any appropriations acts as well as any funds that may be made available pursuant to any authorizing statutes including laws that authorize transfers of appropriated or nonappropriated funds.127

Procedural Considerations

There is a parliamentary impediment to including the phrases “none of the funds appropriated in this act or any other act may be used” or “notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be used” in a general appropriations bill. House Rule XXI, clause 2, makes subject to a point of order language that changes existing law (i.e., legislation) in a general appropriations bill (i.e., one providing appropriations for several agencies). A bill that appropriates funds for a single purpose or a single agency is not a general appropriations bill to which this restriction applies. The intent of Rule XXI, clause 2 is to separate the authorizing and appropriating functions and place them in separate committees.

127 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. chap. 15, subchap. III “Transfers and Reimbursements” for provisions that authorize transfers of funds, including the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1535 and 1536, which allows an agency to transfer funds to another agency if the receiving agency can provide or get by contract goods or services less expensively or more conveniently than the ordering agency can get goods or services by a contract with a commercial enterprise. Transfer authority also is included in some other provisions of the United States Code that apply to individual departments and agencies and sometimes in appropriations acts.
Nonetheless, a practice has developed that just as the House may decline to appropriate funds for a purpose that has been authorized by law, it may by limitation prohibit appropriating money in a general appropriations bill for part of a purpose while appropriating funds for the remainder of it. Such a limitation “... may apply solely to the money of the appropriation under consideration” and “... may not apply to money appropriated in other acts.” Thus, the phrase “none of the funds appropriated in this act may be used” is not subject to a point of order, but the phrase “none of the funds appropriated in this act or any other act may be used” and the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be used” do not appear to qualify as permissible limitations in a general appropriations bill and would be subject to points of order under Rule XXI, clause 2 because they are considered legislation. To avoid a point of order, a limitation in a general appropriations bill may not impose new or additional duties on an executive official, may not restrict authority to incur obligations, and may not make an appropriation contingent upon (i.e., “unless” or “until”) the occurrence of an event not required by law. If a Member raises a point of order that language in a general appropriations bill violates Rule XXI, clause 2, and the point of order is sustained by the chair, the legislative language is stricken.

Although legislation in a general appropriations bill is subject to a point of order under Rule XXI, clause 2, a restriction in a House rule is not self-enforcing. Consequently, legislation may be included in a general appropriations bill and become law if no point of order is raised, if a point of order is overruled, or if the House either suspends the rules or agrees to a special order known as a rule reported from the Committee on Rules that waives the point of order against including such legislation.

Like House Rule XXI, clause 2, Senate Standing Rule XVI also prohibits including legislation in a general appropriations bill, but the Senate rule permits legislation to be included if it is germane to the subject matter of the bill under consideration. If a point of order that language constitutes legislation on an appropriations bill is raised, the proponent of the language may defend it by asserting that it is germane. The question of germaneness is not decided by the presiding officer; it is submitted to the Senate. If a majority of Senators vote that the language in question is germane, it remains in the bill and the point of order that it constitutes legislation is dismissed and is not presented to the presiding officer for a ruling. If a majority of the Senate votes that language is not germane, the presiding officer then rules on whether it constitutes legislation. If the point of order is sustained, the language is removed; if it is overruled, the language remains in the bill and can be enacted.
As mentioned earlier, the intent of these House and Senate rules is to separate authorizing and appropriating functions by constraining the bodies from enacting legislation in appropriations bills, but prohibiting use of funds for a purpose or purposes does not contravene the House or Senate rule provided that the prohibition applies only to funds appropriated in the bill being considered.

Because an appropriations act generally funds programs for a fiscal year, each provision contained in the act is presumed to be in effect only until the end of the fiscal year. “A provision contained in an annual appropriation act is not to be construed as permanent legislation unless the language used therein or the nature of the provision makes it clear that Congress intended it to be permanent. The presumption can be overcome if the provision uses language indicating futurity or if the provision is of a general character bearing no relation to the object of the appropriation.... The most common word of futurity is ‘hereafter’ and provisions using this term have often been construed to be permanent.”\textsuperscript{132} Other words of futurity include “after the date of approval of this act,” “henceforth,” and specific references to future fiscal years.\textsuperscript{133}

While including a word or words of futurity has the effect of making a provision extend beyond the fiscal year covered by an appropriations act, such a provision would constitute legislation that would appear to be subject to a point of order under House Rule XXI, clause 2 and Senate Standing Rule XVI during congressional consideration. If the parliamentary impediments can be overcome, however, such legislation may be enacted and become valid law.

**Availability of Alternative Funds**

A fundamental principle in appropriations law is that appropriations may not be augmented with funds from outside sources without statutory authority.

As a general proposition, an agency may not augment its appropriations from outside sources without specific statutory authority. When Congress makes an appropriation, it also is establishing an authorized program level. In other words, it is telling the agency that it cannot operate beyond the level that it can finance under its appropriation. To permit an agency to operate beyond this level with funds derived from some other source without specific congressional sanction would amount to a usurpation of the congressional prerogative. Restated, the objective of the rule against augmentation of appropriations is to prevent a government agency from undercutting the congressional power of the purse by circuitously exceeding the amount Congress has appropriated for that activity.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{131} (...continued)

\textsuperscript{132} GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, I PRINCIPLES OF APPROPRIATIONS LAW 2-34 (3d ed. 2006) (footnotes omitted).

\textsuperscript{133} Id. at 2-36.

\textsuperscript{134} GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, II PRINCIPLES (continued...)
While no statute in precise terms expressly prohibits augmenting appropriations, the concept is based on some appropriations laws. The Miscellaneous Receipts Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b), requires that a government official who receives money for the government from any source must deposit it in the U.S. Treasury as soon as practicable without deduction for any charge or claim. Under the Purpose Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 1301, appropriated funds may be used only for the purposes for which they are appropriated. A criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 209, prohibits supplementing the salary of an officer or employee of the government from any source other than the United States government.135

An example of a statute permitting gift funds from other countries to finance a war is section 202 of the Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1991, P.L. 101-403 (1990), passed before the first Gulf war. Section 202 added a new section 2608 to title 10 of the United States Code to authorize any person, foreign government, or international organization to contribute money or real or personal property for use by the Department of Defense. However, before the Department of Defense could spend the funds, they had to be first appropriated by Congress.

The Purpose Statute states that funds may be used only for purposes for which they have been appropriated; by implication it precludes using funds for purposes that Congress has prohibited. When Congress states that no funds may be used for a purpose, an agency would violate the Purpose Statute if it should use funds for that purpose; it also in some circumstances could contravene a provision of the Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341. Section 1341 prohibits entering into obligations or expending funds in advance of or in excess of an amount appropriated unless authorized by law. If Congress has barred using funds for a purpose, entering into an obligation or expending any amount for it would violate the act by exceeding the amount — zero — that Congress has appropriated for the prohibited purpose.136

To determine whether an agency has violated the Antideficiency Act, it would be necessary to review the language in an appropriations act or authorizing statute that includes a prohibition on using funds for a specific purpose. If an appropriations act prohibits using funds “in this act” for a purpose, for example, expending any amount from that act for the prohibited purpose would appear to contravene the Antideficiency Act because Congress has appropriated zero funds for it. Entering into obligations or expending funds, if any, that may be available from a different appropriations act or other fund for that purpose, however, would not appear to be prohibited by the Antideficiency Act; an agency would be able to use funds from sources other than the appropriations act that contains the prohibition or limitation.

Violating the Antideficiency Act would be significant because it has notification and penalty provisions not found in the Purpose Statute. The Purpose Statute does not expressly provide for penalties; it generally is enforced by imposing

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134 (...continued)

135 \textit{Id.} at 6-163.

136 \textit{Id.} at 6-62.
administrative sanctions on the officer or employee who violates the statute.\textsuperscript{137} The Antideficiency Act, by contrast, contains a provision that not only provides for administrative discipline, including, when circumstances warrant, suspension from duty without pay or removal from office, 31 U.S.C. § 1349, but also one that requires an immediate report of a violation to the President and Congress, 31 U.S.C. § 1351. Moreover, the Antideficiency Act has a criminal penalty provision: Section 1350 of title 31 provides that an officer or employee who “knowingly and willfully” violates the act “shall be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.” Although the act has a criminal provision, no one appears to have been prosecuted or convicted for violating it.\textsuperscript{138} Another criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 435, not part of the Antideficiency Act, makes punishable by a fine of $1,000, imprisonment of not more than one year, or both, knowingly contracting to erect, repair, or furnish any public building or for any public improvement for an amount more than the amount appropriated for that purpose.

The Antideficiency Act prohibits entering into obligations or expending funds in advance of or in excess of an amount appropriated unless authorized by law. One law that authorizes entering into obligations in advance of appropriations is the Feed and Forage Act. Also referred to as Revised Statute 3732, the Feed and Forage Act is part of and an express exception to the Adequacy of Appropriations Act, 41 U.S.C. § 11. Section 11 generally states that no government contract or purchase may be made unless it is authorized by law or is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment. The Feed and Forage Act exception authorizes the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation\textsuperscript{139} with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as service in the Navy to make contracts in advance of appropriations for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, transportation, or medical and hospital supplies. Obligations entered into pursuant to Feed and Forage Act authority must not exceed the necessities of the current year. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation immediately must advise Congress of the exercise of this authority and report quarterly on the estimated obligations incurred pursuant to it.\textsuperscript{140} Although the Feed and Forage Act authorizes entering into obligations such as contracts, actual expenditures are not permitted pursuant to this authority until Congress appropriates the necessary funds.\textsuperscript{141}

\textsuperscript{137} Id. at 6-78.

\textsuperscript{138} Id. at 6-141.

\textsuperscript{139} 6 U.S.C. § 468 transfers the Coast Guard to the Department of Homeland Security, but a corresponding change to 41 U.S.C. § 11 has not been enacted.

\textsuperscript{140} See Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power 238-247 (1975) for an explanation of the Feed and Forage Act.

Redeployment from Iraq: Provisions in the Vetoed Supplemental

On May 1, 2007, President George W. Bush vetoed the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, H.R. 1591. In his veto message, the President said that the bill was objectionable because it would set an arbitrary date to begin withdrawing American forces from Iraq and would micromanage commanders in the field by restricting their ability to fight. He also objected to the inclusion of billions of dollars of spending and other provisions not related to the war. Finally, he asserted that the bill was unconstitutional because it “purport[ed] to direct the conduct of operations of war in a way that infringes upon the powers vested in the presidency by the Constitution, including as commander in chief of the Armed Forces.” The next day, the House of Representatives, by a vote of 222 to 203 — two-thirds not voting in the affirmative — failed to override the veto.

Criteria Relating to Troops. Section 1901 of H.R. 1591, had it become law, would have provided that none of the funds appropriated or made available in the supplemental appropriations bill or in any other act could be used to deploy any armed forces unit unless the chief of the military department concerned certified in writing to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed Services in advance of deployment that the unit was “fully mission capable” (i.e., “capable of performing assigned mission essential tasks to prescribed standards under the conditions expected in the theater of operations, consistent with the guidelines set forth in the Department of Defense readiness reporting system”). The President would have had the authority to waive the capability requirement on a unit-by-unit basis if he certified in writing to the appropriate committees that deploying a unit that is not fully mission-capable were required for reasons of national security and transmitted a report detailing the reason or reasons.

Under section 1902, no funds appropriated or made available in the supplemental or in any other act would have been permitted to be obligated or expended to initiate developing, to continue developing, or to execute any order that would have the effect of extending the deployment of any Army, Army Reserve, or

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143 See 153 CONG. REC. H4315 (daily ed. May 2, 2007) for a reprint of the veto message.

144 Id. at H4326.
Army National Guard unit beyond 365 days or of any Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve unit beyond 210 days. This limitation was not to be construed to require force levels in Iraq to be decreased below the total U.S. force levels in Iraq prior to January 10, 2007. The President would have had the authority to waive this limitation on a unit-by-unit basis by certifying in writing national security reasons and reporting details to the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed Services.

Pursuant to section 1903, no funds in the supplemental or in any other act were to be available for deploying Army, Army Reserve, or Army National Guard units for Operation Iraqi Freedom if such unit had been deployed within the previous 365 days, or for deploying any Marine Corps or Marine Corps Reserve unit if such unit had been deployed within the previous 210 days. This limitation was not to be construed to require force levels in Iraq to be decreased below the levels in that country prior to January 10, 2007. Like the limitations in sections 1901 and 1902, this one would have been subject to waiver by the President on a unit-by-unit basis under the certification and notification procedures prescribed in the earlier limitations.

**Benchmarks for Iraqi Government and Dates for Redeployment.**
Section 1904 modified House and Senate language relating to Iraqi benchmarks and timetables. It would have required the President by July 1, 2007, to make and report to Congress determinations relating to progress that the government of Iraq is making in meeting benchmarks taken from the House and Senate bills. The President’s inability to make any of the determinations relating to the benchmarks was to have resulted in the commencement of troop redeployment from Iraq no later than July 1, 2007, with a goal of completing redeployment within 180 days. If the President were able to make the determinations, the Secretary of Defense would have been required to commence redeploying forces from Iraq not later than October 1, 2007, with a goal of completing redeployment within 180 days. In either case, funds appropriated or otherwise made available in the bill or any other act were to be immediately available to plan and execute a safe and orderly redeployment of the Armed Forces from Iraq.

Section 1904(a) of H.R. 1591 would have directed the President to determine and report findings to Congress on or before July 1, 2007, that relate to several matters including whether the Iraqi government —

- has given U.S. and Iraqi forces authority to pursue all extremists and is making substantial progress in delivering Iraqi forces to Baghdad and protecting them from political interference;

- is making substantial progress in meeting its commitment to pursue reconciliation initiatives, including enacting a hydro-carbon law, adopting legislation for conducting provincial and local elections, reforming current laws governing the de-Baathification process, amending the Iraqi constitution, and allocating Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects;

- is making, with U.S. armed forces, substantial progress in reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq; and
is ensuring the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi Parliament are protected.

Under section 1904(e), after the conclusion of the 180-day redeployment period specified above, the Secretary of Defense would not be permitted to deploy or maintain members of the U.S. armed forces for any purpose other than the following:

- protecting American diplomatic facilities and American citizens, including U.S. armed forces;
- serving in roles consistent with customary diplomatic positions;
- engaging in targeted special actions limited in duration and scope to killing or capturing members of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations with global reach; or
- training members of the Iraqi security forces.

Section 1904(f) would have required that 50% of funds for assistance to Iraq under the headings “Economic Support Fund” and “International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement” was to be withheld from obligation until the President had made a determination that the government of Iraq has met certain benchmarks.

Finally, Section 1904(h) would have required that, beginning on September 1, 2007, and every 60 days thereafter, the Commander of the Multi-National Forces, Iraq, and the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq were jointly to submit to Congress a report describing and assessing in detail the progress that the government of Iraq is making regarding benchmarks listed in section 1904(a).

**Other Restrictions.** Section 1311 would have prohibited the use of funds in the supplemental or in any other act to establish any military installation or base for the permanent stationing of U.S. military forces in Iraq or to exercise U.S. control over oil revenues in Iraq. Section 1312 would have denied authority to use funds in the supplemental to contravene several conventions and laws, including the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and 18 U.S. Code section 2340A. This limitation also applied to renditions. Section 1313 contained a requirement for the Secretary of Defense, within 30 days of enactment and every 90 days thereafter, to submit to the congressional defense committees a classified report assessing the individual transition readiness of units of Iraqi and Afghan security forces.

**Provisions from the Enacted Supplemental, P.L. 110-28**

The House and Senate agreed to H.R. 2206, the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Act Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-28, on May 24, 2007, and the President signed it on May 25. This act

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145 The House divided the question and held two votes; the first one on $10.8 billion in (continued...)
provides supplemental funding through September 30, 2007, with no timetable for withdrawing troops. Section 1314 contains the major provisions relating to Iraq; it establishes 18 political and security benchmarks for the Iraqi government to meet. These benchmarks, similar to those that were included in the vetoed H.R. 1591, include enacting and implementing legislation on de-Baathification and on ensuring equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources, increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently, and allocating $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivering essential services, on an equitable basis.

The President is required to submit reports to Congress by July 15, 2007, and by September 15, 2007, on whether the Iraqi government is making sufficient progress in achieving these benchmarks. Obligation of reconstruction assistance to Iraq in the Economic Support Fund, about $1.6 billion, is prohibited unless the President certifies in both reports that Iraq is making progress on all the benchmarks or waives this requirement with a detailed rationale. The act requires an assessment of progress by the Iraqi government in meeting the benchmarks from the Government Accountability Office and an assessment of combat readiness of Iraqi security forces from an independent private sector entity selected by the Department of Defense.

P.L. 110-28 does not include criteria relating to United States forces including mission readiness, periods between deployments, and duration of deployments, which were a part of the vetoed H.R. 1591 and could have been waived on a unit-by-unit basis by the President for national security reasons.

An earlier version of H.R. 2206, passed by the House, would have split the total amount into two portions. The first portion, about $47.6 billion, would have been available immediately to fund about two additional months of military operations. The second portion, about $53.2 billion, would have been available only if the President on or before July 13, 2007, submitted a report to Congress detailing progress of the Iraqi government in meeting political and security benchmarks, similar to those that were included in the vetoed H.R. 1591, and a joint resolution of approval was enacted into law. The Senate passed on May 17, 2007, a version of H.R. 2206 that expressed the sense of Congress in support of United States forces and requested a conference with the House. The House earlier rejected by a vote...
of 171 to 255 H.R. 2337, a bill to require the Department of Defense to redeploy service members and contractors from Iraq within 180 days.\textsuperscript{148}

The rule reported by the Committee on Rules which provided for consideration of H.R. 2206 in the House of Representatives, H.Res. 486, 110\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} Sess., makes in order as an amendment the text of H.R. 2451, which requires withdrawing most United States forces from Iraq by June 28, 2008, when the House considers supplemental appropriations for military operations in Iraq or Afghanistan for FY2008.\textsuperscript{149}

\begin{verbatim}
Provisions from the Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-161

The Senate on December 18, 2007,\textsuperscript{150} and the House the following day\textsuperscript{151} passed H.R. 2764, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161),\textsuperscript{152} which the President signed on December 26, 2007. The act provides $70 billion in supplemental appropriations for military activities in Iraq. Language requiring redeployment of U.S. armed forces from Iraq is not included, but Section 609 of Division L of the act mandates that the Secretary of Defense should report to Congress on progress toward stability in Iraq within 60 days after enactment and every 90 days thereafter. The Secretary's reports should address several matters including measures of political stability, primary indicators of the degree of security in Iraq, estimated strength of the insurgency, criteria for assessing capabilities and readiness of Iraqi military forces and police, and an assessment of U.S. military requirements, including planned force rotations through the end of calendar year 2008. The supplemental funds for these military activities and the report requirement were part of a floor amendment that the Senate agreed to by a vote of 70 to 25 on December 18.\textsuperscript{153}

Earlier that day, the Senate rejected an amendment that would have expressed the sense of the Senate that the missions of U.S. armed forces in Iraq should change to more limited ones announced by the President in a September 13, 2007, address to the nation — counterterrorism operations; training, equipping, and supporting Iraqi forces; and the necessary mission of force protection, with the goal of completing that
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{147} (...continued)
respectively.
\textsuperscript{148} See 153 CONG. REC. H4796 and H4807 (daily ed. May 10, 2007) for the text and vote on H.R. 2337, respectively.
\textsuperscript{149} The House agreed to H.Res. 438 by a vote of 218 to 201. See 153 CONG. REC. H 5730 and 5748 for the text and vote on H.Res. 438, respectively.
\textsuperscript{150} 153 CONG. REC. S15888 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2007).
\textsuperscript{151} 153 CONG. REC. H16913 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007).
\textsuperscript{153} 153 CONG. REC. S15927 and S15860-S15861 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2007) for the text and vote, respectively.
transition by the end of 2008. The vote was 50 to 45, with 60 votes required for passage. An amendment that would have directed the President to commence redeploying U.S. armed forces from Iraq within 90 days after enactment and prohibited funding continued deployments in Iraq after nine months from the enactment date except for limited missions also did not pass by a vote of 24 to 71. Because these amendments did not get 60 votes, they were withdrawn under the terms of the unanimous consent agreement.

On November 14, 2007, the House by a vote of 218 to 203 and 1 present passed H.R. 4156, the Orderly and Responsible Iraq Redeployment Appropriations Act, 2008, that would have provided $50 billion in supplemental funds for military activities in Iraq. A provision would have directed the President within 30 days after enactment to commence an immediate and orderly redeployment of U.S. armed forces from Iraq with a goal of completing a transition to a limited presence and missions not later than December 15, 2008. After concluding the transition, the Secretary of Defense would have been able to deploy or maintain U.S. armed forces in Iraq only to protect U.S. diplomatic facilities, U.S. armed forces, and American citizens; to conduct limited training, equipping, and providing logistical support to Iraqi security forces; and to engage in targeted counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda infiltrated groups, and other terrorist organizations in Iraq.

Other provisions of House-passed H.R 4156 would have prohibited using funds for any treatment or technique not authorized in the Army Field Manual or in contravention of some statutes enacted to implement the U.N. Convention Against Torture and denied funds to deploy any U.S. armed forces unit to Iraq unless the President certified it as fully mission capable or waived the certification requirement for national security reasons. They also would have mandated reports on plans to achieve the transition of the U.S. mission in Iraq, on performance measures for military and political stability in Iraq, and on a comprehensive regional stability plan for the Middle East.

The Senate on November 16, 2007, rejected a motion to close further debate on a motion to proceed to H.R. 4156 by a vote of 53 to 45, with 60 needed for passage.

IV. Limiting Deployment of Military Personnel

The Constitution accords Congress with ample authority to regulate the use of military personnel. Among other things, Congress is designated with the power “To raise and support Armies;” “To provide and maintain a Navy;” “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;” and “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them

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154 Id. at S15929 and S15860 for the text and vote, respectively.
155 Id. at S15845 and S15853 for the text and vote, respectively.
156 See 153 CONG. REC. H13917 and 13943 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2007) for the text and vote, respectively.
157 153 CONG. REC. S14591 (Nov. 16, 2007).
as may be employed in the Service of the United States.”

In the 110th Congress, several legislative proposals have been introduced that would limit the deployment of certain military personnel to Iraq. Some have argued that congressional action limiting the use of particular troops during wartime would, at least in certain circumstances, infringe upon the President’s authority as commander in chief to conduct a military campaign in a manner that he deems appropriate.

As a matter of historical practice, Congress has occasionally imposed limitations and other requirements on the deployment of U.S. troops, including during wartime. These limitations have been effectuated either through the statutory prohibition on the use of military personnel for a particular purpose, or via the denial of appropriations in support of a particular operation. The following are examples in which Congress has limited the President’s ability to use particular military personnel for certain purposes:

- **1915** — The Army appropriations act restricted Army tours of duty in the Philippines to two years and tours in the Canal Zone to three years, unless the servicemember requested otherwise or in cases of insurrection or actual or threatened hostilities. The restriction was amended in 1934 to provide for two-year tours and in both areas as well as certain other foreign duty stations. The restriction was repealed in 1945, and replaced with a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to report twice annually to the Armed Services committees regarding regulations governing the lengths of tours of duty for the Army and Air Force outside the continental United States.

- **1933** — The Treasury and Post Office Appropriation Act for FY1934, provided that “Assignments of officers of the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps to permanent duty in the Philippines, on the

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159 See, e.g., H.R. 1591 (as passed by both Houses and vetoed by the President), §§ 1902-1903 (limiting deployment of U.S. troops to Iraq); S.Amdt. 2012 to H.R. 1585 (requiring minimum periods between deployment for units and members of the armed forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom); H.R. 1234 (barring funds from being appropriated for further deployment of U.S. military personnel to Iraq); S. 670 (limiting funds for deployment of additional U.S. troops to Iraq unless Secretary of Defense certifies that troops are adequately trained and prepared).

160 See Rivkin and Casey, supra note 4 (“Congress cannot, in other words, act as the president’s puppet master, and so long as currently authorized and appropriated funding lasts, the president can dispatch additional troops to Iraq with or without Congress’s blessing.”).

161 38 Stat. 1078.


Asiatic Station, or in China, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, or the Panama Canal Zone shall be for not less than three years. No such officer shall be transferred to duty in the continental United States before the expiration of such period unless the health of such officer or the public interest requires such transfer, and the reason for the transfer shall be stated in the order directing such transfer.”

- **1940** — The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 provided that “Persons inducted into the land forces of the United States under this Act shall not be employed beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere except in the Territories and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands.”

- **1945** — In an act extending the Selective Training and Service Act until the end of World War II, as determined by the earlier of dates proclaimed by the President or by concurrent resolution by both Houses of Congress, provided that no inductee under the age of nineteen “shall be ordered into actual combat service until after he has been given at least six months of [appropriate] military training.”

- **1948** — The Selective Service Act of 1948 provided that eighteen- and nineteen-year old enlistees for one-year tours could not be assigned to land bases outside the continental United States.

- **1951** — The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 required inductees, enlistees, and other persons called to active duty to receive at least four months’ “full and adequate” training prior to deployment overseas, and prohibited the expenditure of funds to transport or maintain a servicemember overseas in violation of the provision.

- **1956** — 10 U.S.C. § 6015 prohibited assignment of female servicemembers to duty on combat aircraft and all vessels of the Navy. 10 U.S.C. § 6018 prohibited the assignment of Navy officers to shore duty not explicitly authorized by law.

- **1985** — The National Defense Authorization Act, 1985 prohibited the expenditure of funds to support an end strength of U.S. Armed Forces personnel stationed in NATO countries above a level of

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165 P.L. 76-783, § 3(e), 54 Stat. 885, 886.
168 P.L. 82-51, § 1(d), 65 Stat. 75, 78.
169 70A Stat. 375-76.
170 70A Stat. 376.
The measure was later modified to reduce the level further but to provide waiver authority to the President to increase the force level to up to 311,855, upon notification to Congress, if he determined the national security interests required exceeding the ceiling.172

- **1992** — The National Defense Authorization Act for FY1992 prohibited the use of appropriated funds to support an end strength level of members of the Armed Forces of the United States assigned to permanent duty ashore in nations outside the United States at any level in excess of 60 percent of the end strength level of such members on September 30, 1992, with exceptions in the event of declarations of war or emergency.173

The precise scope of Congress’s ability to limit the deployment of U.S. military forces has not been ruled upon by the courts, and it is therefore unclear whether legislative measures limiting the use of particular military personnel during wartime would ever be deemed to be an unconstitutional infringement upon the President’s authority as Commander in Chief.174 Nonetheless, historical practice suggests that, at least in some circumstances, Congress may oblige the President to comply with certain requirements on the deployment of particular military personnel, including during periods of armed conflict.

**Analysis and Conclusion**

Much of the historical debate over war powers has taken place in the context where a President has initiated the use of military force with ambiguous or no congressional authorization, which is not the case here. There is no obvious reason, however, to suppose that Congress’s constitutional power to limit hostilities depends on whether the hostilities were initiated with Congress’s express approval at the outset.175 Likewise, it does not seem consistent to suggest that Congress’s authority to limit the scope of hostilities may be exercised validly only at the initiation of hostilities, without opportunity for changing course once troops are engaged.

In modern times, federal courts have been reticent to decide cases involving war powers on the merits,176 including those involving appropriations measures.177

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171 98 P.L. 525, § 1002(c)(1), 98 Stat. 2575.
174 For example, some have suggested that Congress could not bar the President from using military force to respond to a foreign invasion. See Sidak, supra note 85, at 51-55.
175 See Tiefer, supra note 4, at 310-12 (outlining possible arguments for differentiating between authorized and unauthorized wars).
176 See Jonathan L. Entin, The Dog That Rarely Barks: Why the Courts Won’t Resolve the (continued...)
However, in discussing whether a particular challenge raises non-justiciable political questions involving matters textually committed to the political branches by the Constitution, courts have generally reiterated the understanding of a shared allocation of war powers. That is, it is generally agreed that Congress cannot “direct campaigns,” but that Congress can regulate the conduct of hostilities, at least to some degree, and that Congress can limit military operations without the risk of a presidential veto by refusing to appropriate funds.

In 1970, in response to a challenge related to the Vietnam conflict, a federal district court expanded on the theme of congressional authority, with particular reference to Congress’s appropriations power:

The power to commit American military forces under various sets of circumstances is shared by Congress and the Executive.... The Constitutional expression of this arrangement was not agreed upon by the Framers without considerable debate and compromise. A desire to facilitate the independent functioning of the Executive in foreign affairs and as commander-in-chief was tempered by a widely shared sentiment opposing the concentration of unchecked military power in the hands of the president. Thus, while the president was designated commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Congress was given the power to declare war. However, it would be shortsighted to view Art. I, § 8, cl. 11 as the only limitation upon the Executive’s military powers.... [I]t is evident that the Founding Fathers envisioned congressional power to raise and support

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176 (...continued)


177 See Stith, supra note 9, at 1387 (noting that courts have declined to enforce executive compliance with appropriations limitations, “particularly in areas where the Executive’s powers constitutional are significant”).


179 Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1971) (“The Congress may without executive cooperation declare war, thus triggering treaty obligations and domestic emergency powers. The executive may without Congressional participation repel attack, perhaps catapulting the country into a major conflict. But beyond these independent powers, each of which has its own rationale, the Constitutional scheme envisages the joint participation of the Congress and the executive in determining the scale and duration of hostilities.”). Another court found justiciable the question of whether military operations were constitutional, proclaiming the test to be “whether there is any action by the Congress sufficient to authorize or ratify the military activity in question,” Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). The same court, however, found a determination of the effects of Congress’s repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to be a non-justiciable political question. DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 979 (1972).

military forces as providing that body with an effective means of controlling presidential use thereof. Specifically, the House of Representatives ... was viewed by the Framers as the bulwark against encroachment by the other branches. In *The Federalist* No. 58 (Hamilton or Madison), we find:

> The House of Representatives cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold the purse — that powerful instrument by which we behold in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.

Despite Congress’s well-established authority over appropriations, it has been argued that the power of the purse cannot be wielded in such a way as to fetter the discretion of the Commander in Chief.\(^{181}\) Congress’s power of the purse is subject to the same constitutional restrictions as any other legislative enactment, including those that affect allocation of powers among the three branches.\(^{182}\) That is, Congress cannot use appropriations measures to achieve unconstitutional results, although it might, in some circumstances, achieve a similar result simply by failing to appropriate money.\(^{183}\) The doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions,” most frequently applicable to laws conditioning benefits for states or private citizens on their relinquishment of constitutional rights, is said to apply as well to legislation authorizing presidential

\(^{181}\) *See* Rivkin and Casey, *supra* note 4; *see also* Rosen, *supra* note 15, at 14-18 (outlining theories but questioning their validity).

\(^{182}\) *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803)(Congress may not enlarge the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court); *United States v. Klein*, 80 U.S. (8 Wall.) 128 (1872) (Congress may not nullify effects of a presidential pardon or prescribe a rule of decision in a court case); *United States v. Lovett*, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)(Congress may not create a bill of attainder by means of an appropriations measure denying money to pay salaries of named officials); *Reid v. Covert*, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)(Congress may not displace judicial role by subjecting civilians to military courts-martial during time of peace); *INS v. Chadha*, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)(Congress may not invalidate executive decisions by one-house “legislative veto”).

\(^{183}\) For example, in *United States v. Klein*, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that prohibited the Court of Claims from receiving evidence of a presidential pardon in support of a claim against the government, finding the law interfered with the judicial power and the President’s pardon power. However, the Court upheld a statute that prohibited payment of the same claims out of the Treasury. *Hart v. United States*, 118 U.S. 62 (1886). Congress’s failure to appropriate funds for constitutionally mandated activities might itself be unconstitutional, but neither the courts nor the President would have the authority in such a case to mandate the expenditure of funds from the Treasury for the activity. *See* Stith, *supra* note 9, at 1351.
This notion, however, adds little to the analysis. Congress has ample constitutional authority to enact legislation that restricts the scope of military operations. If Congress can enact a limitation on the conduct of military operations directly, it can do so through appropriations. The larger question remains whether the limitation enacted amounts to an unconstitutional usurpation of the actual conduct of war.

Some commentators agree that Congress has the authority to cut off funds for military operations entirely, but assert that a partial cut-off or limitation on the use of funds would amount to an unconstitutional condition by interfering with the President’s authority to conduct battlefield operations. There has been some suggestion in the past that the President’s responsibility to provide for troops in the field justifies further deployments without prior authorization from Congress, with some arguing that the President has an independent implied spending power to carry out these responsibilities. These arguments do not easily square with Congress’s established prerogative to limit the scope of wars through its war powers, and do not conform with Congress’s absolute authority to appropriate funds.

Congress has frequently, although not invariably, acceded to presidential initiatives involving the use of military force. While a history of congressional acquiescence may create a gloss on the Constitutional allocation of powers, such a gloss will not necessarily withstand an express statutory mandate to the contrary. It does not appear that Congress has developed a sufficiently consistent or lengthy historical practice to have abandoned either its war power or its authority over appropriations. The executive branch has objected to legislative proposals it views as intrusive into presidential power, including conditions found in appropriations measures. And it remains possible to construe the function of “conducting military operations” broadly to find impermissible congressional interference in even the most mundane statutes regulating the armed forces. To date, however, no court has invalidated a statute passed by Congress on the basis that it impinges the

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184 See, e.g., John Norton Moore, Do We Have an Imperial Congress?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 139, 145 & n25 (1988) (“Congress cannot condition funding or authority for the President to act in the foreign affairs arena upon the President’s surrender of his own constitutionally grounded duties and privileges.”).

185 See Rivkin and Casey, supra note4 (“Under our constitutional system ... the power to cut off funding does not imply the authority to effect lesser restrictions, such as establishing benchmarks or other conditions on the president’s direction of the war.”).

186 See Tiefer, supra note4, at 314-15 (describing the Nixon Administration’s legal rationale for expanding the Vietnam conflict into Cambodia and Laos).


188 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (executive agreements settling claims with Iran subsequent to the 1979-1981 hostage crisis held to be within President’s power, in part because of unbroken historical practice of Congress acceding to Presidential settlement of foreign claims by executive agreement).

constitutional authority of the Commander in Chief,\textsuperscript{190} whether directly or indirectly through appropriations. In contrast, presidential assertions of authority based on the Commander-in-Chief Clause, in excess of or contrary to congressional authority, have been struck down by the courts.\textsuperscript{191}

On the other hand, Presidents have sometimes deemed such limitations to be unconstitutional or merely precatory, and have at times not given them the force of law.\textsuperscript{192} In other words, Administrations have relied on an argument based on the doctrine of “unconstitutional conditions” to justify the President’s authority to reject a limitation on national security spending while continuing to spend the funds.\textsuperscript{193} Whether or not the President is constitutionally entitled to spend funds without

\textsuperscript{190} In one case, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Claims that a law passed pursuant to Congress’s authority to regulate the armed forces could not restrict a President’s commander-in-chief powers, and interpreted the statute accordingly. In \textit{Swaim v. United States}, 165 U.S. 553 (1897), an officer challenged his court-martial on the grounds that it had been ordered by the President himself, where contemporary statute provided for the convening of courts-martial by certain commanders. The Court held the President had the inherent authority to convene courts-martial, citing with approval the legislative record describing the Articles of War as “not [intended] to exclude the inherent power residing in the president of the United States under the Constitution.” \textit{Id.} at 557. The Senate Committee explained further

\textit{In this state of the history of legislation and practice, and in consideration of the nature of the office of commander in chief of the armies of the United States, the committee is of opinion that the acts of congress which have authorized the constitution of general courts-martial by an officer commanding an army, department, etc., are, instead of being restrictive of the power of the commander in chief, separate acts of legislation, and merely provide for the constitution of general courts-martial by officers subordinate to the commander in chief, and who, without such legislation, would not possess that power, and that they do not in any manner control or restrain the commander in chief of the army from exercising the power which the committee think, in the absence of legislation expressly prohibitive, resides in him from the very nature of his office, and which, as has been stated, has always been exercised.}

\textit{Id.} at 557-58. Even recognizing the inherent power of the president to convene courts-martial, however, the Court proceeded to explore whether the Articles of War had been properly applied. The case appears to demonstrate that Congress may regulate the exercise of inherent commander-in-chief powers as long as it does not extinguish them completely.


\textsuperscript{192} See Powell, supra note 181, at 552-53.

\textsuperscript{193} See Tiefer, supra note 4, at 312 (providing examples of the “say no, but keep the dough” approach for circumventing appropriations limitations viewed as unconstitutional); Powell, supra note 181, at 553 (describing executive branch formula for determining the effect on an appropriation of an invalid condition to be based on “whether Congress’s main purpose in enacting the appropriation was to create a means of forcing the congressional policy embodied in the condition on the President”).
adhering to relevant legislative conditions appears to be an issue unlikely to be resolved by the courts.

In sum, it seems that under the constitutional allocation of powers Congress has the prerogative of placing a legally binding condition on the use of appropriations to regulate or end the deployment of U.S. armed forces to Iraq. Such a prohibition seems directly related to the allocation of resources at the President’s disposal, and would therefore not appear to interfere impermissibly with the President’s ability to exercise command and control over the U.S. armed forces. Although not beyond question, such a prohibition would arguably survive challenge as an incident both of Congress’s war power and of its power over appropriations.