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Congress's Power Over Courts: Jurisdiction Stripping and the Rule of *Klein*

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Summary

Article III of the Constitution establishes the judicial branch of the federal government. Notably, it empowers federal courts to hear “cases” and “controversies.” The Constitution further creates a federal judiciary with significant independence, providing federal judges with life tenure and prohibiting diminutions of judges’ salaries. But the Framers also granted Congress the power to regulate the federal courts in numerous ways. For instance, Article III authorizes Congress to determine what classes of “cases” and “controversies” inferior courts have jurisdiction to review. Additionally, Article III’s Exceptions Clause grants Congress the power to make “exceptions” and “regulations” to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Congress sometimes exercises this power by “stripping” federal courts of jurisdiction to hear a class of cases. Congress has gone so far as to eliminate a court’s jurisdiction to review a particular case in the midst of litigation. More generally, Congress may influence judicial resolutions by amending the substantive law underlying particular litigation of interest to the legislature.

Congress has, at times, used these powers to influence particular judicial outcomes, raising concerns about whether Congress is acting in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers by interfering with the judiciary’s power to resolve cases and controversies independently. In *Marbury v. Madison*, the Supreme Court announced that the Constitution, by granting the judicial branch the power to decide “cases” and “controversies,” in turn grants the judiciary the power to “say what the law is.” Sometimes competing with this principle is the understanding that the Constitution empowers a democratically elected branch—Congress—to decide what classes of cases the federal courts may review, as well as to enact legislation that courts may need to interpret.

This report highlights a series of Supreme Court rulings that have examined separation-of-powers-based limitations on the Exceptions Clause, congressional jurisdiction stripping, and the ability of Congress to amend laws with the purpose of directly impacting litigation. The Court’s jurisprudence largely begins with the Reconstruction-era case *United States v. Klein*, and leads to *Patchak v. Zinke*, which is scheduled for oral argument before the Supreme Court in November 2017.

In *Klein*, the Supreme Court generally held that Congress may not, by limiting appellate jurisdiction, dictate a “rule of decision” that undermines the independence of the judiciary. But in the 2016 opinion *Bank Markazi v. Peterson*—the Court’s latest ruling interpreting *Klein*—the Court appeared to minimize *Klein*’s significance, noting that while Congress cannot invade the judicial role by dictating how courts rule in a particular case, Congress is still permitted to amend the substantive law in a manner that may alter the outcome of pending litigation. *Patchak* highlights the potential for tension between the judiciary’s and legislature’s powers when Congress removes a class of cases from federal jurisdiction in a way that impacts pending litigation. Accordingly, *Patchak* may require the Supreme Court to re-examine *Klein* and its progeny and, perhaps, clarify this complex area of the law.

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Article III of the Constitution establishes the judicial branch of the federal government.¹ Notably, it empowers federal courts to hear “cases” and “controversies.”² Additionally, the Constitution creates a federal judiciary with significant independence, providing federal judges with life tenure and prohibiting diminutions of judges’ salaries.³ In presiding over cases and controversies, federal courts possess significant power over the citizenry’s life, liberty, and property,⁴ and that power can be exercised in a manner that could be in tension with the interests of the legislative branch. One way Congress potentially can temper the judiciary’s influence is by regulating federal court jurisdiction. The Exceptions Clause in Article III grants Congress the power to make “exceptions” and “regulations” to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.⁵ And more generally, with the power to create lower federal courts, Congress possesses the power to eliminate the jurisdiction of the lower courts.⁶ Congress sometimes exercises this power by “stripping” federal courts of jurisdiction to hear a class of cases. Indeed, Congress has even eliminated a court’s jurisdiction to review a particular case in the midst of litigation.⁷ More generally, Congress may influence judicial outcomes by amending the substantive law underlying particular litigation of interest to the legislature.⁸

These practices have, at times, raised separation-of-powers concerns about whether the legislative branch is impermissibly interfering with the judicial power to resolve cases and controversies independently.⁹ Long ago in *Marbury v. Madison*, the Supreme Court announced that the Constitution, by granting the judicial branch the power to decide “cases” and “controversies,” necessarily grants the judiciary the power to “say what the law is.”¹⁰ Sometimes butting up against this principle is the understanding that “Congress has the power (within limits) to tell the

¹ U.S. CONST. art. III.

² *Id.* § 2.

³ *Id.* § 1 (“The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”).

⁴ See, e.g., *Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.* 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982) (“The exercise of judicial power ... can ... profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of those to whom it extends.”).

⁵ See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

⁶ See *Sheldon v. Sill*, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) (“Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”).

⁷ See Tara Leigh Grove, *The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction*, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 888-916 (2011) (describing various congressional jurisdiction-stripping efforts).

⁸ See, e.g., *Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y*, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (upholding law that replaced legal standards underlying particular litigation).

⁹ See, e.g., *Bank Markazi v. Peterson*, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1334-35 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Applying a retroactive law that says ‘Smith wins’ to the pending case of *Smith v. Jones* implicates profound issues of separation of powers.”); Leonard G. Ratner, *Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court*, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 158-59 (1960) (noting concerns if Congress were to have “plenary control over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court”). But see Ralph A. Rossum, *Congress, the Constitution, & the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter & the Spirit of the Exceptions Clause*, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385, 413-19 (1983) (dismissing arguments that the Exceptions Clause is limited by separation of powers, noting that “[i]n our constitutional system, the judiciary is not supposed to be entirely independent “and that “[s]eparation of powers does not entail complete independence”).

¹⁰ *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also *Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.*, 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995) (“[T]he Framers crafted this charter of the judicial department with an expressed understanding that it gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to *decide* them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy.”).

courts what classes of cases they may decide,”¹¹ as well as to enact legislation that may have an effect on pending cases being adjudicated by the federal courts.¹² But the limits of Congress’s power to legislate may be tested when Congress enacts measures that target individualized concerns and small subsets of individuals, as opposed to legislating for the country as a whole and the general welfare.¹³

This report examines a series of Supreme Court rulings that have considered separation-of-powers-based limitations on the Exceptions Clause, congressional jurisdiction stripping, and the ability of Congress to amend laws with the purpose of directly impacting litigation,¹⁴ beginning with the Reconstruction-era case *United States v. Klein*,¹⁵ and culminating in *Patchak v. Zinke*,¹⁶ which is scheduled for oral argument in November 2017.¹⁷ In *Klein*, the Supreme Court generally held that Congress may not, by limiting appellate jurisdiction, dictate a “rule of decision” that undermines the independence of the judiciary.¹⁸ But in the 2016 opinion, *Bank Markazi v. Peterson*—the Court’s latest ruling interpreting *Klein*—the Court seemed to minimize the import of *Klein*, noting that while Congress cannot invade the judicial role by dictating how courts rule in a particular case, Congress is permitted to amend the substantive law in a manner that may alter the outcome of pending litigation.¹⁹ *Patchak* further highlights the potential for tension between the judiciary’s and legislature’s Article III powers when Congress removes a class of cases from federal jurisdiction and the new measure necessarily will impact pending litigation. In particular, *Patchak* raises questions about the constitutionality of a law that strips the courts of jurisdiction to hear disputes over a specific parcel of land, when litigation concerning the disputed land was pending in federal court at the time the law was enacted.²⁰ Thus, when the Supreme Court reviews *Patchak* during the October 2017 term, it is poised to revisit the limits of *Klein*. Accordingly, this report concludes by analyzing the potential implications of *Patchak* and by providing general guidance for crafting jurisdiction-stripping legislation and measures designed to impact pending litigation.

¹¹ *City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC*, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013).

¹² *Plaut*, 514 U.S. at 226 (“When a new law makes clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law in reviewing judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted, and must alter the outcome accordingly.”).

¹³ *See INS v. Chadha*, 462 U.S. 919, 966 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The only effective constraint on Congress’ power is political, but Congress is most accountable politically when it prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of specific persons, those rights are subject to ‘the tyranny of a shifting majority.’”); *Fletcher v. Peck*, 10 U.S. 87, 136 (1810) (“It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those rules would seem to be the duty of other departments.”).

¹⁴ Jurisdiction stripping can raise other difficult constitutional questions that are not relevant to the issues raised by *Klein* and its progeny, such as other internal Article III constraints and external constraints imposed by other provisions within the Constitution. *See generally*, RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., *HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM* 295-345 (Robert C. Clark, et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015). This report is focused on the *Klein*-based limits on jurisdiction stripping, and, thus other limits on the power of Congress concerning the control of federal court jurisdiction are beyond the scope of this report.

¹⁵ 80 U.S. 128 (1871).

¹⁶ 137 S. Ct. 2091 (2017).

¹⁷ *See* SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ARGUMENT CALENDARS, https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalNovember2017.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).

¹⁸ *United States v. Klein*, 80 U.S. 128 (1871).

¹⁹ *Bank Markazi v. Peterson*, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).

²⁰ *Patchak v. Jewell*, 828 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

Congressional Power over “Cases” and “Controversies”: Separation-of-Powers Analysis

The Constitution does not mention “separation of powers.” But it is generally considered inherent in the Constitution’s tripartite division of federal power to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches that each branch of government has discrete powers that no other branch can invade.²¹ Furthermore, it is evident that the Founders envisioned a separation of the three branches of government as an “essential precaution in favor of liberty.”²² Furthermore, the Framers viewed the need to separate the legislative and judicial powers as a “sharp necessity.”²³ In the days before the Constitution, the Framers had observed that many states did not separate the judiciary from the legislature and, as a result, the adjudication of individual rights was subject to a “tyranny of shifting majorities.”²⁴ For instance, in designing an independent judiciary, the Framers, at least in part, were reacting to a common practice in the colonies, and then the states, of “legislative correction of judgments,” in which legislative bodies would set aside judgments through legislation.²⁵

Still, the Framers recognized that separation of the three branches of government would not be perfect or complete.²⁶ Indeed, this concession is evinced in the powers granted to Congress in Article III of the Constitution. For example, Article III’s Exceptions Clause, which allows Congress to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction,²⁷ traditionally has been viewed as authorizing Congress to remove a class of cases from federal jurisdiction.²⁸ And because Article III grants Congress the power to establish inferior federal courts,²⁹ those inferior courts have only the jurisdiction that Congress affirmatively grants by statute.³⁰

²¹ See, e.g., *Miller v. French*, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (“The Constitution enumerates and separates the powers of the three branches of Government in Article I, II, and III, and it is this ‘very structure’ of the Constitution that exemplifies the concept of separation of powers.”); Jonathan Turley, *Madisonian Tectonics: How Form Follows Function in Constitutional & Architectural Interpretation*, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 305, 332-33 (2015) (“The separation of powers frames Madison’s vision of the tripartite system.... [T]he separation of powers was not mentioned in the text of the Constitution ... [but] the absence of an explicit reference to separation of powers is not surprising when placed in the context of the contemporary views of the time.”).

²² THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).

²³ See *Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.*, 514 U.S. 211, 221 (1995).

²⁴ See *INS v. Chadha*, 462 U.S. 919, 961 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also *Plaut*, 514 U.S. at 219 (“The Framers of our Constitution lived among the ruins of a system of intermingled legislative and judicial powers, which had been prevalent in the colonies long before the Revolution, and which after the Revolution had produced factional strife and partisan oppression.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (asserting that, in states where the judicial branch was not independent of the legislature, “in many instances” the legislative body “decided rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy”).

²⁵ See *Plaut*, 514 U.S. at 219-20.

²⁶ See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (“[T]he degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.”).

²⁷ U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also *Ex Parte McCordle*, 74 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1868) (“It is quite true ... that the appellate jurisdiction of this court is not derived from acts of Congress. It is, strictly speaking, conferred by the Constitution. But it is conferred ‘with such exception and under such regulations as Congress shall make.’”).

²⁸ See *Ex Parte McCordle*, 74 U.S. at 513-14.

²⁹ U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).

³⁰ See *Sheldon v. Sill*, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) (“Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”).

Additionally, Congress's power to regulate federal court jurisdiction and to enact substantive laws that the judiciary must then apply, in practice, allows Congress to control the work of the courts.³¹ This principle extends to laws that retroactively change legal rights, as the Supreme Court has long recognized that courts generally must apply retroactive laws to pending cases, even when the law was different at the litigation's outset.³² Thus, Congress "can always revise the judgments of Article III courts in one sense: When a new law makes clear that it is retroactive, an appellate court must apply that law in reviewing judgments still on appeal that were rendered before the law was enacted, and must alter the outcome accordingly."³³ Similarly, Congress can lawfully influence litigation by enacting legislation that necessarily impacts the effect, going forward, of injunctions issued by a federal court.³⁴ Thus, the tension in Article III, which creates an independent federal judiciary but also subjects the judicial branch, at times, to legislative control, generates difficult questions related to separation of powers, and the Court has had to determine when Congress's powers impermissibly invade the powers of the judiciary.

United States v. Klein

The Supreme Court first recognized the separation-of-powers limitations on jurisdiction-stripping legislation in the Reconstruction-era case *United States v. Klein*.³⁵ That lawsuit had been brought according to procedures that allowed persons who had participated in the rebellion by the southern states to receive compensation for certain property that the government had seized and sold off during the Civil War.³⁶ Under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of 1863,³⁷ special agents appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury could seize abandoned or captured property in rebel territories, sell it, and deposit it into the U.S. treasury.³⁸ Under that act, individuals who had not "given any aid and comfort" to the rebellion could obtain the proceeds from any captured property.³⁹ Several presidential proclamations declared that a person could become eligible to receive the proceeds of his property after receiving a full presidential pardon (which restored all property rights, except as to slaves) and taking an oath of loyalty to the United States.⁴⁰ Once pardoned, that person could petition the U.S. Court of Claims for the proceeds.⁴¹ Klein, as the administrator of the estate of a deceased participant in the Confederacy—who had taken this oath in 1864—filed a claim on the decedent's behalf, seeking the proceeds of cotton

³¹ *Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.*, 514 U.S. 211, 226 (1995); *United States v. Klein*, 80 U.S. 128, 145 (1871).

³² *See United States v. Schooner Peggy*, 5 U.S. 103, 109 (1801) ("[I]f subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed."). The Constitution imposes other limits on retroactive legislation, including the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Takings Clause, prohibitions on Bills of Attainder, and the Due Process Clause. *See Bank Markazi v. Peterson*, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1324-25 (2016); *Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.*, 511 U.S. 244, 266-67 (1994)

³³ *Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.*, 514 U.S. 211, 226 (1995).

³⁴ *See id.* at 222; *Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.*, 59 U.S. 421 (1855).

³⁵ 80 U.S. 128 (1871).

³⁶ *Id.*

³⁷ Abandoned Property Collection Act, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820 (1863), available at <http://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/37th-congress/session-3/c37s3ch120.pdf>.

³⁸ *Id.*; *see also* Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, *Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, & the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein*, 100 *Nw. U. L. Rev.* 437, 441-42 (2006) (describing the 1863 act).

³⁹ 12 Stat. 820, § 3; *Klein*, 80 U.S. at 131.

⁴⁰ *Klein*, 80 U.S. at 131-32.

⁴¹ *Id.* at 131.

that had been confiscated and sold by the government.⁴² The Court of Claims, in a May 1869 ruling, concluded that the estate was entitled to receive the cotton's proceeds.⁴³ The government appealed to the Supreme Court.⁴⁴

While Klein's case was pending, the Supreme Court reviewed a similar case, *United States v. Padelford*, which involved a person who, like the decedent in *Klein*, had participated in the rebellion, taken the loyalty oath, and sought the proceeds of captured property.⁴⁵ The Court held that taking the oath and receiving the pardon made him "innocent in law as though he had never participated," and so the claimant's "property was purged of whatever offence he had committed and relieved from any penalty that he might have incurred."⁴⁶ As a result, the Court held that Padelford was entitled to the proceeds from the government's sale.⁴⁷

Shortly after the *Padelford* ruling, Congress added a proviso (i.e., a rider or amendment) to a pending appropriations bill related to the payment of judgments in the Court of Claims.⁴⁸ As relevant here, the proviso stated that, whenever a person who had participated in the rebellion introduces evidence of a presidential pardon in a suit brought in the Court of Claims for proceeds of abandoned or captured property taken according to laws enacted during the Civil War, the court shall treat it as "conclusive evidence" that the person aided the rebellion, and, upon such proof, "the jurisdiction of the court in the case shall cease, and the court shall forthwith dismiss the suit of such claimant."⁴⁹ The proviso further stated that in all cases where the Court of Claims had rendered a favorable judgment for a claimant based solely on a presidential pardon—without additional proof of loyalty to the United States—"the Supreme Court shall, on appeal, have no further jurisdiction of the cause, and shall dismiss the same for want of jurisdiction."⁵⁰ Accordingly, after the appropriations bill became law in July 1870, the government asked the Supreme Court to remand Klein's case with instructions for the Court of Claims to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction.⁵¹

The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the way in which Congress stripped the courts of jurisdiction in this circumstance was unconstitutional. The Court acknowledged that "the legislature has complete control over the organization and existence of [the Court of Claims] and may confer or withhold the right of appeal from its decisions."⁵² And had Congress "simply denied the right of appeal in a particular class of cases," the Court continued, "there could be no doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise of the power of Congress to make 'such exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction' as should seem to it expedient."⁵³ But, in the Court's view, Congress had gone further by purporting to remove jurisdiction only when certain evidence is furnished—that a pardon was granted—without allowing the court to rule on the meaning of the

⁴² *Id.* at 132.

⁴³ *Id.*

⁴⁴ *Id.*

⁴⁵ *United States v. Padelford*, 76 U.S. 531 (1869).

⁴⁶ *Id.* at 543.

⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸ *Klein*, 80 U.S. at 133

⁴⁹ *Id.* at 134 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

⁵⁰ *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

⁵¹ *Id.* at 133-34.

⁵² *Id.* at 145.

⁵³ *Id.*

pardon but, instead, requiring the suit's dismissal.⁵⁴ In so doing (in language that would invite centuries of debate over its exact meaning)⁵⁵ the *Klein* Court held that Congress had "prescribe[d] a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way,"⁵⁶ and thus "passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power."⁵⁷

The Court also emphasized the questionable nature of the jurisdiction-stripping proviso, which required a favorable verdict for the government:

Congress has already provided that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction of the judgments of the Court of Claims on appeal. Can it prescribe a rule in conformity with which the court must deny to itself the jurisdiction thus conferred, because and only because its decision, in accordance with settled law, must be adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor? This question seems to us to answer itself.⁵⁸

Since *Klein*, no congressional enactment related to federal court jurisdiction appears to have been struck down under the separation-of-powers principles announced in *Klein*.⁵⁹ Meanwhile, legal scholars have wrestled with *Klein*'s language, trying to decipher what, precisely, the 19th century Court meant.⁶⁰ The general consensus, though, is that *Klein* holds that Congress's authority to regulate federal court jurisdiction is limited by principles of separation of powers, in that it may not direct a court how to rule in a particular case or how to apply the law to the facts in the case at hand.⁶¹ Others, though, interpret *Klein*'s holding more narrowly. For instance, one view is that *Klein* forbids Congress only from "dictat[ing] substantively unconstitutional results in a category of cases over which the courts have been given jurisdiction."⁶² Another view is that *Klein* prohibits Congress from conditioning the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear certain matters on the Court eschewing the application of certain constitutional provisions.⁶³ Still another view is

⁵⁴ *Id.* at 145-46.

⁵⁵ See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 323 (Robert C. Clark, et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015) ("[T]he Court's [*Klein*] opinion raises more questions than it answers, and it can be read to support a wide range of holdings.").

⁵⁶ *Klein*, 80 U.S. at 146. The Supreme Court also opined that Congress had infringed on the Executive's pardon power by nullifying the full effect of certain presidential pardons. *Id.* at 147-48.

⁵⁷ *Id.* at 147.

⁵⁸ *Id.*

⁵⁹ See Howard M. Wasserman, *The Irrepressible Myth of Klein*, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 70 (2010) ("But such blatantly violative enactments seem unlikely, which perhaps explains why no actual laws have been invalidated under this principle."). In *Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.*, discussed later in the report, the Supreme Court invalidated a law based on separation-of-powers concerns that were related to, but distinct from, those at the heart of *Klein*. 514 U.S. 211, 265-66 (1995) (concluding that the statute at issue does not violate the constitutional restrictions *Klein* imposed but, nevertheless, "offends a postulate of Article III just as deeply rooted in our law as those we have mentioned").

⁶⁰ See, e.g., Redish & Pudelski, *supra* note 38, 437-48 ("*United States v. Klein* ... is a case whose importance to the shaping of American political theory has never been fully grasped or articulated by scholars, and whose meaning has been comprehended by the federal judiciary—including the Supreme Court itself—virtually not at all."); Gordon G. Young, *Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdiction & Processes: United States v. Klein revisited*, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1981) ("[T]he *Klein* opinion combines the clear with the delphic.").

⁶¹ See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, *Why Klein (Still) Matters: Congressional Deception & the War on Terrorism*, 5 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 251, 252 (2011) ("[V]irtually all observers agree that *Klein* bars Congress from commanding the court to rule for a particular party in a pending case."); Wasserman, *supra* note 59, 69-70 ("What really is going on under *Klein* is a prohibition on Congress using its legislative power to predetermine litigation outcomes through explicit commands to courts as to how to resolve particular factual and legal issues or telling courts who should prevail on given facts under existing law.").

⁶² See, e.g., Gordon G. Young, *A Critical Reassessment of the Case Law Bearing on Congress's Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts*, 54 MD. L. REV. 132, 157 (1995).

⁶³ See J. Richard Doidge, Note, *Is Purely Retroactive Legislation Limited by the Separation of Powers?* "Rethinking (continued...)

that *Klein*'s holding spoke to congressional attempts to "use its jurisdictional powers to compel a court to take jurisdiction of case and to decide it in a way which was at odds with the pardon provisions of the Constitution."⁶⁴ Relatedly, another view is that *Klein* forbids Congress from telling the courts how the Constitution must be interpreted.⁶⁵

United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians

More than a century elapsed before the Supreme Court meaningfully discussed the separation-of-powers principles announced in *Klein* related to congressional control over federal court jurisdiction. In its 1980 ruling, *United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians*, the Court addressed *Klein*'s implications on legislation that directly impacted a lawsuit related to treaty and property disputes between the Sioux Nation of Indians and the United States dating back to 1868.⁶⁶

The Sioux Nation and the United States entered into the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, which established the Great Sioux Reservation for the "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the tribe.⁶⁷ Among other things, the Sioux Nation agreed to relinquish its right to occupy permanently any territory outside the reservation, and, in exchange,⁶⁸ the United States agreed that no unauthorized persons would be permitted to "pass over, settle upon, or reside in" the reservation.⁶⁹ The parties further agreed that any future cessation of reservation land to the United States would be legally binding only if a new treaty were executed and signed by at least three-fourths of the adult male tribe members.⁷⁰

The United States sought to renegotiate the Fort Laramie Treaty after an army expedition confirmed that the Black Hills region of the Sioux Reservation contained large quantities of gold.⁷¹ Eventually, in 1876, a U.S. commission and Sioux leaders agreed in the Manypenny Agreement⁷² that the tribe would cede the Black Hills region to the United States in exchange for government provision of subsistence rations.⁷³ Congress codified the agreement the following year, thus abrogating the original treaty.⁷⁴ But the agreement had been signed by only 10% of the adult male Sioux population—in violation of the Fort Laramie Treaty's terms—and many members of the Sioux Nation viewed the United States' occupation of the Black Hills as "a breach of [the United States'] solemn obligation to reserve the Hills in perpetuity for occupation by the Indians."⁷⁵

(...continued)

United States v. Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 910, 923 (1994).

⁶⁴ See Young, *supra* note 60, at 1223 n.179.

⁶⁵ See Redish & Pudelski, *supra* note 38, at 443.

⁶⁶ United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 374 (1980).

⁶⁷ Treaty of Fort Laramie, art. II, U.S.-Sioux Nation of Indians, May 25, 1868. To view the full text of the treaty, see *Transcript of Treaty of Fort Laramie (1968)*, OUR DOCUMENTS, <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=42&page=transcript> (last visited Sept. 7, 2017).

⁶⁸ Treaty of Fort Laramie, art. XI, *supra* note 67.

⁶⁹ *Id.*, art. II.

⁷⁰ *Id.*, art. XII.

⁷¹ See *Sioux Nation of Indians*, 448 U.S. at 376-83.

⁷² This agreement is referred to as the "Manypenny Agreement," as the commission had been headed by George Manypenny. See *id.* at 381.

⁷³ *Id.* 381-82.

⁷⁴ *Id.* at 383.

⁷⁵ *Id.* at 382-83.

The Sioux Nation had no legal means to redress their grievances about the Black Hills cessation until, decades later in 1920, Congress provided jurisdiction in the U.S. Court of Claims for the tribe to bring claims against the United States “under any treaties, agreements, or laws of Congress, or for the misappropriation of any funds or lands of” the Sioux Nation tribe.⁷⁶ The Sioux Nation then brought a lawsuit alleging that the United States had committed a “taking” of the Black Hills without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.⁷⁷ But the Court of Claims ultimately dismissed the lawsuit after concluding that the claim fell outside of the grant of jurisdiction.⁷⁸

Congress later created the Indian Claims Commission in 1946 to provide a forum for all past tribal grievances.⁷⁹ The Sioux Nation renewed its claims before the Commission, which ultimately found in its favor.⁸⁰ But on appeal, the Court of Claims partially reversed on the ground that the doctrine of *res judicata*—the legal doctrine that bars re-litigating certain matters⁸¹—precluded the Sioux Nation from re-litigating its takings claims about the Black Hills.⁸² However, the Court of Claims affirmed the Commission’s other ruling that “a want of fair and honorable dealings in this case was evidenced, and ... the Sioux would be entitled to an award of at least \$17.5 million for the lands surrendered and for the gold taken by trespassing prospectors prior to passage of the 1877 Act.”⁸³

While the case was pending before the Indian Claims Commission to resolve other related disputes, Congress, in 1978, amended the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 to grant the Court of Claims jurisdiction to review the merits of the Commission’s initial ruling that the 1877 Act amounted to a taking of the Black Hills *despite* the *res judicata* bar.⁸⁴ Acting under that statute’s authority, the Court of Claims (sitting en banc) affirmed the Commission’s merits ruling.⁸⁵ Because the government’s actions were now considered to be a taking, the Sioux Nation was entitled to interest on the \$17.5 million judgment since it started accruing a century earlier in 1877.⁸⁶

The Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for certiorari to address whether Congress, in amending the Indian Claims Commission Act, had “inadvertently passed the limit which

⁷⁶ Act of June 3, 1920, ch. 222, 41 Stat. 738.

⁷⁷ *Sioux Nation of Indians*, 448 U.S. at 384. The Takings Clause of the Constitution states that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST., amend. V.

⁷⁸ *Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States*, 97 Ct. Cl. 613, 666 (Ct. Cl. 1942).

⁷⁹ Indian Claims Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1049 (1946).

⁸⁰ *Sioux Nation v. United States*, 33 Ind. Cl. Comm’n 151 (1974).

⁸¹ *Res judicata* (sometimes called claim preclusion) advances the finality of judgments by barring a party from relitigating any claims that were raised, or could have been raised, in an earlier action between the same parties. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13(1982); see also *ASARCO, L.L.C. v. Mont. Res., Inc.*, 858 F.3d 949, 955 (5th Cir. 2017); *United States v. Beane*, 841 F.3d 1273, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2016); Alexandra Bursak, Note, *Preclusions*, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1651, 1653 (2016).

⁸² *United States v. Sioux Nation*, 518 F.2d 1298, 1305-06 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (“It is elementary that in Indian Claims Commission Act proceedings a former decision on the merits by a court having jurisdiction is a *res judicata* bar to further litigation of the same claim.”).

⁸³ *United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians*, 448 U.S. 371, 388 (1980).

⁸⁴ *Id.* at 389 (citing P.L. 95-243, 92 Stat. 153 (1978)).

⁸⁵ *Id.* at 389-90.

⁸⁶ *Id.* at 387-90; see also *Milens of Cal. v. Richmond Redev. Agency*, 665 F.2d 906, 909 (1982) (“It is well established that just compensation in eminent domain is the full value of the property taken at the time of the taking plus interest from the date of taking.”).

separates the legislative from the judicial power” by “prescribing a rule for decision that left the court no adjudicatory function to perform,” as *Klein* had prohibited.⁸⁷ The Court ultimately distinguished *Klein* and answered in the negative.⁸⁸ The Court reasoned that the amendment removed only a single issue from the court’s review—the res judicata bar—and otherwise “left no doubt that the Court of Claims was free to decide the merits of the takings claim in accordance with the evidence it found and applicable rules of law.”⁸⁹ Additionally, the Court relied on other precedents holding that Congress may “waive the res judicata effect of a prior judgment entered in the Government’s favor on a claim against the United States” without violating the separation of powers by intruding into the judiciary’s sphere.⁹⁰ Further, the Court distinguished *Klein* on its facts, finding that in *Klein*, “Congress was attempting to decide the controversy in the Government’s own favor,” whereas in this case, Congress had only waived a defense so that the legal claim could be resolved on the merits in the first instance.⁹¹

Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society

In *Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society*, decided 12 years later, the Supreme Court explored the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches in another instance of Congress enacting a law purposefully designed to impact pending legislation.⁹² *Robertson* involved consolidated cases in which environmental and timber-harvesting industry groups had contested the Bureau of Land Management’s and Forest Service’s management of certain federal lands in Oregon and Washington that were home to the endangered northern spotted owl.⁹³ In general, the environmental groups asserted that the owl was not being adequately protected, whereas the industry groups maintained that the owl’s level of protection overly restricted timber harvesting.⁹⁴ The parties invoked several environmental statutes to advance their claims, including the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,⁹⁵ the National Environmental Policy Act,⁹⁶ the National Forest Management Act,⁹⁷ the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,⁹⁸ and the Oregon-California Railroad Land Grant Act.⁹⁹

While the lawsuits were pending, Congress, as part of an appropriations package, enacted the “Northwest Timber Compromise,” which established harvesting rules for timber in the contested lands inhabited by the northern spotted owl.¹⁰⁰ Section 318(b)(6)(A) directly mentioned the pending cases:

⁸⁷ *Sioux Nation of Indians*, 448 U.S. at 391-92 (quoting *United States v. Klein*, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1872)).

⁸⁸ *Id.* at 391-407.

⁸⁹ *Id.* at 392.

⁹⁰ *Id.* at 396-402 (citing *Cherokee Nation v. United States*, 270 U.S. 476 (1926), *Nock v. United States*, 2 Ct. Cl. 451 (Ct. Cl. 1867), and *Pope v. United States*, 323 U.S. 1 (1944)).

⁹¹ *Id.* at 405.

⁹² *Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y*, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).

⁹³ *Id.* at 431-33.

⁹⁴ *Id.* at 431-32.

⁹⁵ 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712.

⁹⁶ 83 Stat. 852, P.L. 91-190 (1970), as amended.

⁹⁷ 90 Stat. 2949, P.L. 94-588 (1976), as amended.

⁹⁸ 90 Stat. 2744, P.L. 94-579 (1976), as amended.

⁹⁹ 50 Stat. 874, 43 U.S.C. § 1181a.

¹⁰⁰ Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, § 318, 103 Stat. 745; see *Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y*, 503 U.S. 429, 433 (1992).

[T]he Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section on the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington and Bureau of Land Management lands in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases captioned *Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson*, Civil No. 89-160 and *Washington Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson*, Civil No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary injunction) and the case *Portland Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr.*, Civil No. 87-1160—FR.¹⁰¹

The environmental and industry plaintiffs interpreted this language as instructing courts to conclude that, if the federal parties complied with the newly enacted Northwest Timber Compromise, then they will have satisfied the statutory requirements central to the lawsuits.¹⁰² Consequently, the environmental and industry plaintiffs challenged the provision, contending that Section 318(b)(6)(A) violated Article III of the Constitution “because it purported to direct the results in two pending cases.”¹⁰³ The district courts disagreed, principally concluding that Section 318(b)(6)(A) modified the relevant environmental laws, and, under that statutory interpretation, the provision was constitutional.¹⁰⁴

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,¹⁰⁵ upon consolidating the cases for review, reversed, holding that Section 318(b)(6)(A) was unconstitutional under *Klein*. The appellate court concluded that “Section 318 does not, by its plain language, repeal or amend the environmental laws underlying th[e] litigation,” but rather “seeks to perform functions reserved to the Courts by Article III of the Constitution” by “direct[ing] the court to reach a specific result and make certain factual findings under existing law in connection with two cases pending in federal court.”¹⁰⁶ This result is achieved because, the Ninth Circuit continued, “[t]he clear effect of subsection (b)(6)(A) is to direct that, if the government follows the plan incorporated in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5), then the government will have done what is required under the environmental statutes involved in these cases.”¹⁰⁷

The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with the district and appellate court’s interpretations of Section 318(b)(6)(A). The Court, without opining on the Ninth Circuit’s application of *Klein*, held that Section 318(b)(6)(A) *replaced* the legal standards underlying the lawsuits and did so without directing the courts how to apply the new standards.¹⁰⁸ The Court reasoned that, in enacting the Northwest Timber Compromise, Congress created new standards for complying with the five statutes underlying the lawsuits: Rather than having to comply with those statutes, the contested land could, instead, be managed according to the new law.¹⁰⁹ As a result, the Court in

¹⁰¹ Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990 § 318(b)(6)(A); see *Robertson*, 503 U.S. at 434-35.

¹⁰² See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990 § 318(b)(6)(A).

¹⁰³ *Robertson*, 503 U.S. at 436.

¹⁰⁴ *Id.*

¹⁰⁵ This report references a number of decisions by federal appellate courts of various regional circuits. For purposes of brevity, references to a particular circuit in the body of this report (e.g., the Ninth Circuit) refer to the U.S. Court of Appeals for that particular circuit.

¹⁰⁶ *Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Robertson*, 914 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990).

¹⁰⁷ *Id.*

¹⁰⁸ *Robertson*, 503 U.S. at 437-38 (“We conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A) compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law.”).

¹⁰⁹ *Id.*

Robertson concluded that the provision did not present a *Klein*-like separation-of-powers problem, suggesting that Congress has the power to target particular cases so long as the new legislation makes changes to the law applicable to those cases that the courts, in turn, can independently apply.¹¹⁰

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.

A few years later the Supreme Court considered in *Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.* a corollary to the rule of *Klein*: whether legislation that directs courts to reopen a final judgment unconstitutionally intrudes on the judiciary.¹¹¹ *Plaut* involved an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that Congress enacted after a duo of Supreme Court opinions announced a time limit for bringing civil actions seeking damages under Section 10(b) of the act.¹¹² The first of the Supreme Court rulings was *Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson*, which established a statute of limitations for bringing Section 10(b) claims.¹¹³ That same day, in *James B. Beam Distilling Company v. Georgia*, the Court held that when a case announces a new rule and applies that rule to the parties in that case—which happened in *Lampf*—the new rule also must be applied to all pending cases.¹¹⁴

Six months after the Supreme Court issued the *Lampf* and *Beam Distilling* opinions, Congress added Section 27A to the Securities Exchange Act.¹¹⁵ Section 27A functionally nullified the Court's ruling that the statute of limitations announced in *Lampf* must be applied to pending Section 10(b) civil claims. In particular, Section 27A directed courts to reinstate cases (upon a timely filed petition) that had been dismissed because of *Lampf* and *Beam Distilling* but would have been timely under the governing statute of limitations when initially filed.¹¹⁶

The *Plaut* litigation involved a group of investors who had filed a Section 10(b) suit for securities fraud before *Lampf* and *Beam Distilling* but, after those rulings, had their suits dismissed.¹¹⁷ After Section 27A became law, the *Plaut* plaintiffs timely filed a motion to reopen.¹¹⁸ But the district court nevertheless dismissed their suit on the ground that Section 27A's reopening provision violates the doctrine of separation of powers.¹¹⁹ The Sixth Circuit,¹²⁰ and ultimately the Supreme Court, affirmed the judgment of the district court.¹²¹

The Supreme Court held that Section 27A, by applying retroactively to *final decisions*, “reverses a determination once made, in a particular case,” and thus violates the separation of powers.¹²² The Court distinguished the command in Section 27A from other retroactive laws that mandate

¹¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹¹ *Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.*, 514 U.S. 211 (1995).

¹¹² *Id.* at 213-14.

¹¹³ *Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson*, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991).

¹¹⁴ *James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia*, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991); *see Plaut*, 514 U.S. at 214.

¹¹⁵ Congress did so through Section 476 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act of 1991, P.L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236.

¹¹⁶ *See id.* § 476.

¹¹⁷ *See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.*, 1 F.3d 1487, 1489 (6th Cir. 1993).

¹¹⁸ *Plaut*, 514 U.S. at 215.

¹¹⁹ *Spendthrift Farm*, 1 F.3d at 1490.

¹²⁰ *Id.*

¹²¹ *Plaut*, 514 U.S. at 240.

¹²² *Id.* at 225 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 545).

“an appellate court [to] apply [the new] law in reviewing judgments *still on appeal* that were rendered before the law was enacted.”¹²³ By directing courts to reopen non-pending, previously decided cases, the Court continued, Congress violates the separation of powers by “depriving judicial judgments of the conclusive effect that they had when they were announced.”¹²⁴

The Court noted that the separation-of-powers concerns in *Plaut* were related to, but distinct from, those at the heart of *Klein*.¹²⁵ Like the Supreme Court’s concerns in *Klein*, the Court in *Plaut* appeared leery of Congress legislating to curb the judiciary’s reserved Article III powers, particularly those related to rendering final, dispositive judgments.¹²⁶ And also like the Supreme Court in *Klein*, the Court in *Plaut* expressed the need for an independent judiciary, noting that the Framers, who “lived among the ruins of intermingled legislative and judicial powers, which had been prevalent in the colonies long before the Revolution, and which after the Revolution had produced factional strife and partisan oppression” were thus keenly aware of the need for a judicial branch independent from the legislature.¹²⁷ However, the Supreme Court emphasized that its ruling did not disturb its long-held view that the Congress, by enacting new legislation, may “alter[] the prospective effect of injunctions entered by Article III courts.”¹²⁸

Miller v. French

Miller v. French begins where *Plaut* left off, by examining Congress’s ability “to alter the prospective effect of previously entered injunctions.”¹²⁹ The case involved a challenge to a provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA)¹³⁰ that requires courts to automatically stay a court-ordered injunction for a specified period upon receiving a motion to terminate the injunction.¹³¹ In general, the PLRA governs lawsuits brought by prisoners challenging conditions of confinement.¹³² The statute spells out the requirements for obtaining¹³³ and terminating prospective relief¹³⁴ (i.e., relief designed to prevent ongoing or future injuries), such as an injunction.¹³⁵ At issue in *Miller* was 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2), which, as relevant here, mandates that any motion to terminate the injunction “shall operate as a stay” beginning 30 days after the motion is filed and lasting until the court rules on it.¹³⁶

¹²³ *Id.* at 226 (emphasis added).

¹²⁴ *Id.* at 227-28.

¹²⁵ *Id.* at 265-66 (concluding that the statute at issue does not violate the constitutional restrictions *Klein* imposed but, nevertheless, “offends a postulate of Article III just as deeply rooted in our law as those we have mentioned”).

¹²⁶ *Id.* at 218.

¹²⁷ *Id.* at 219-24.

¹²⁸ *Id.* at 222 (citing *State of Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.*, 59 U.S. 421 (1855)).

¹²⁹ *Miller v. French*, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000).

¹³⁰ P.L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, Title VIII (1995).

¹³¹ 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (e)(2) (“Any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief made under subsection (b) shall operate as a stay during the period ...”).

¹³² 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.

¹³³ 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).

¹³⁴ *Id.* § 3626(b).

¹³⁵ *See, e.g., Colo. Cross Disability Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co.*, 765 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 2014) (“When prospective relief—such as an injunction—is sought, ‘the plaintiff must be suffering a continuing injury or be under a real and immediate threat of being injured in the future.’” (quoting *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983))).

¹³⁶ 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2). There is an exception, however, allowing the court to postpone the effective date of the automatic stay for no more than 60 days “for good cause.” *Id.* § 3626(e)(4).

In the *Miller* lawsuit, inmates at an Indiana prison had obtained an injunction in the mid-1980s requiring the prison to rectify prison conditions that violated the Eighth Amendment, including conditions related to overcrowding, use of mechanical restraints, and the quality of food and medical services.¹³⁷ In 1997, the state moved to terminate the injunction under the proceedings set forth in the PLRA and codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b).¹³⁸ The inmates objected and asked the district court to enjoin application of the PLRA's automatic stay provision (Section 3626(e)(2)) on the ground that it violates separation-of-powers principles.¹³⁹ The district court agreed and enjoined the stay, which the Seventh Circuit affirmed.¹⁴⁰ The appellate court first construed the language in Section 3626(e)(2), which instructed that motions to terminate prospective relief “shall operate as a stay,”¹⁴¹ as unequivocally “restrict[ing] the equitable powers of the federal courts.”¹⁴² So construed, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the provision violated the separation-of-powers principle announced in *Plaut* that Article III “gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to *decide* them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy.”¹⁴³ The Seventh Circuit further concluded that Section 3626(e)(2) violates the principles of *Klein* because, according to the court, it mandated a rule of decision by requiring the previously ordered prospective relief to be terminated.¹⁴⁴

The Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's constitutional holding.¹⁴⁵ Contrary to the Seventh Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that Section 3626(e)(2) comports with *Plaut* because, in that case, the Supreme Court had been “careful to distinguish the situation before the Court in [*Plaut*]—legislation that attempted to reopen the dismissal of a suit *seeking money damages*—from legislation that ‘altered the prospective effect of *injunctions* entered by Article III courts.’”¹⁴⁶ The Supreme Court in *Miller* further explained that “[p]rospective relief under a continuing executory decree,” like the district court's injunction against the prison, “remains subject to alteration due to changes in the underlying law.”¹⁴⁷ The Court concluded that the automatic stay provision in Section 3626(e)(2) “helps implement the change” in the underlying law for prisoner litigation, which “restricted courts’ authority to issue and enforce prospective relief concerning prison conditions, requiring that such relief be supported by findings and precisely tailored to what is needed to remedy the violation of a federal right.”¹⁴⁸ Thus, Section 3626(e)(2), “[b]y establishing new standards for the enforcement of prospective relief” in PLRA lawsuits, “Congress has altered the relevant underlying law.”¹⁴⁹ Nor, the Supreme

¹³⁷ *Miller v. French*, 530 U.S. 327, 332 (2000); *French v. Owens*, 777 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1985).

¹³⁸ *French v. Duckworth*, 178 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 1999).

¹³⁹ *Miller*, 530 U.S. at 334.

¹⁴⁰ *Id.* at 334-35.

¹⁴¹ 18 U.S.C. 3626(e)(2) (emphasis added).

¹⁴² *Duckworth*, 178 F.3d at 443.

¹⁴³ *Id.* at 446 (quoting *Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.*, 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995)). According to the Seventh Circuit, “[Section 3626](e)(2) places the power to review judicial decisions outside of the judiciary” because “it is a self-executing legislative determination that a specific decree of a federal court—here the decree addressing conditions at [the Indiana prison]—must be set aside at least for a period of time, no matter what the equities, no matter what the urgency of keeping it in place”, thus “amount[ing] to an unconstitutional intrusion on the power of the courts to adjudicate cases.” *Id.*

¹⁴⁴ *Id.*

¹⁴⁵ *Miller v. French*, 530 U.S. 327, 350 (2000).

¹⁴⁶ *Id.* at 344 (quoting *Plaut*, 514 U.S. at 232) (emphasis added).

¹⁴⁷ *Id.*

¹⁴⁸ *Id.* at 347-48

¹⁴⁹ *Id.* at 347.

Court concluded, did Section 3626(e)(2) run afoul of *Klein*'s admonishment that Congress cannot dictate a rule of decision because "later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold when Congress amends applicable law."¹⁵⁰

Bank Markazi v. Peterson

The Supreme Court's latest word on separation-of-powers limitations on Congress's authority to regulate federal court jurisdiction was in its 2016 opinion, *Bank Markazi v. Peterson*.¹⁵¹ The lawsuit involved an amendment to the "terrorism exception" to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).¹⁵² Under the FSIA, foreign governments are generally immune from suit in U.S. courts.¹⁵³ But the terrorism exception lifts that immunity for suits seeking monetary damages for personal injury or death caused by state-sponsored terrorism.¹⁵⁴ Still, claimants filing suit under that exception often face difficulties enforcing favorable judgments because (1) initially, only foreign-state property located in the United States that was used for commercial activity could be used to satisfy judgments;¹⁵⁵ and (2) the FSIA exempts property of a "foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its own account."¹⁵⁶

To ease difficulties in enforcing judgments, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA),¹⁵⁷ which authorizes judgments to be satisfied using "blocked assets" of a terrorist party or instrumentality that the Executive Branch seized under the authority of either the Trading with the Enemy Act¹⁵⁸ or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.¹⁵⁹ Both authorities allow the President "to freeze the assets of foreign enemy states and their agencies and instrumentalities."¹⁶⁰ President Obama exercised this authority in February 2012 by issuing an Executive Order designed to block "[a]ll property and interests in property of an Iranian financial institution, including the Central Bank of Iran, that are in the United States."¹⁶¹

Nevertheless, difficulties enforcing judgments against Iranian financial institutions persisted, and, as a result, Congress enacted Section 502 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8772¹⁶²—a standalone measure not tied to TRIA or the FSIA—that was the subject of the *Bank Markazi* litigation.¹⁶³ In particular, Section 8772 mandates that, upon specified court findings related to the ownership of certain contested assets, particular Iranian financial assets "shall be subject to execution ... in order to satisfy any judgment ... awarded against Iran for damages for personal injury or death caused by" acts of terrorism

¹⁵⁰ *Id.* at 349 (internal alteration, quotation marks, and citations omitted).

¹⁵¹ 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). For additional analysis of *Bank Markazi*, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1566, *Congress May Tilt the Scales without Upsetting Separation of Powers Vis-à-vis Courts (Especially Where Foreign Affairs Are Concerned)*, by Jennifer K. Elsea.

¹⁵² See *Bank Markazi v. Peterson*, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1317 (2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605A).

¹⁵³ 28 U.S.C. § 1604.

¹⁵⁴ *Id.* § 1605A

¹⁵⁵ *Id.* § 1610(a); see *Bank Markazi*, 136 S. Ct. at 1318.

¹⁵⁶ 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1); see *Bank Markazi*, 136 S. Ct. at 1318.

¹⁵⁷ Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, P.L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322; see *Bank Markazi*, 136 S. Ct. at 1318.

¹⁵⁸ P.L. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411, (1917).

¹⁵⁹ P.L. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977).

¹⁶⁰ *Bank Markazi*, 136 S. Ct. at 1318 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

¹⁶¹ Exec. Order No. 13,599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 8, 2012).

¹⁶² P.L. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1258 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 8772).

¹⁶³ See *Bank Markazi*, 136 S. Ct. at 1318.

covered by FSIA terrorism exception.¹⁶⁴ Section 8772 explicitly defines the financial assets to be made available as those that had been identified in the *Bank Markazi* litigation.¹⁶⁵ The law also clarifies that it does not apply to any other assets or other lawsuits outside of the *Bank Markazi* litigation.¹⁶⁶

The claimants in *Bank Markazi* were a group of more than 1,000 victims of Iran-sponsored acts of terrorism, largely in connection with the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon.¹⁶⁷ They invoked Section 8772 to seek satisfaction of unpaid judgments totaling \$1.75 billion from assets held in a New York bank for the Central Bank of Iran, also known as Bank Markazi.¹⁶⁸ The district court made the applicable statutory findings and ordered Bank Markazi to turn over the requested bond assets.¹⁶⁹

Relying on *Klein*, Bank Markazi contested this ruling on the ground that Section 8772 violated the separation of powers by “effectively dictat[ing] specific factual findings in connection with a specific litigation—invading the province of the courts.”¹⁷⁰ But the district court disagreed, reasoning that under Section 8772, courts still may independently make the ownership findings that the statute requires, free of congressional interference.¹⁷¹ The Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that Section 8772 “does not usurp the judicial function,” but “rather, it retroactively changes the law applicable in this case.”¹⁷² Doing so, the Second Circuit added, is “a permissible exercise of legislative authority.”¹⁷³

The Supreme Court agreed, rejecting Bank Markazi’s argument that *Klein* mandated otherwise. Bank Markazi had principally argued that Section 8772, by “purport[ing] to alter the law for a single pending case concerning the payment of money from one party to another,” allows Congress to “commandeer the judiciary and dictate how courts must decide individual cases before them.”¹⁷⁴ This, Bank Markazi said, was foreclosed by *Klein*, given the Court’s command that Congress cannot “prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it.”¹⁷⁵ And the required statutory factfinding did not cure this deficiency because, Bank Markazi asserted, the underlying facts were undisputed and thus left nothing for the court do to other than compel Bank Markazi to pay the judgment award.¹⁷⁶

But the Supreme Court did not similarly interpret *Klein*. Rather, the Court declared that “[o]ne cannot take the language from *Klein*” about Congress’s inability to prescribe a rule of decision “at face value” given the legitimate “congressional power to make valid statutes retroactively applicable to pending cases.”¹⁷⁷ Thus, the Court appeared to minimize the import of *Klein* while

¹⁶⁴ 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a); see *Bank Markazi*, 136 S. Ct. at 1318-19.

¹⁶⁵ 22 U.S.C. § 8772(b); see *Bank Markazi*, 136 S. Ct. at 1319.

¹⁶⁶ 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c).

¹⁶⁷ *Bank Markazi*, 136 S. Ct. at 1319-20.

¹⁶⁸ *Id.* at 1316, 1320-21.

¹⁶⁹ *Id.* at 1321.

¹⁷⁰ *Id.* at 1322 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

¹⁷¹ *Id.*

¹⁷² *Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 758 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2014).

¹⁷³ *Id.*

¹⁷⁴ Brief for Petitioner at 11, *Bank Markazi v. Peterson*, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 13-770).

¹⁷⁵ *Id.* at 43 (quoting *United States v. Klein*, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871)).

¹⁷⁶ *Id.* at 47-48.

¹⁷⁷ *Bank Markazi v. Peterson*, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1324 (2016).

confirming Congress's power to "direct courts to apply newly enacted, outcome-altering legislation in pending civil cases."¹⁷⁸ Further, the Court added that Congress "does not impinge on judicial power when it directs courts to apply a new legal standard to undisputed facts," as Congress did when enacting Section 8772.¹⁷⁹ In other words, the Court is unlikely to find a *Klein* violation when Congress creates a new substantive law for courts to apply in one specific set of cases, even when, functionally, only one outcome could be likely given the undisputed facts. With these principles in mind, the Court concluded that Section 8772 lawfully "provides a new standard clarifying that, if Iran owns certain assets, the victims of Iran-sponsored terrorist attacks will be permitted to execute against those assets."¹⁸⁰ However, in doing so, the Court also "stress[ed] ... that § 8772 is an exercise of congressional authority regarding *foreign affairs*, a domain in which the controlling role of the political branches is both necessary and proper."¹⁸¹

Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented.¹⁸² In the dissent's view, Section 8772 was akin to Congress enacting a law that said "respondents win" and thus unconstitutionally invaded the judiciary by "enacting a bespoke statute tailored to this case that resolves the parties' specific legal disputes to guarantee respondents victory."¹⁸³ The dissent acknowledged that courts "generally must apply a retroactively applicable statute to pending cases," but if that retroactive law reads as "respondents win" in a pending lawsuit, that hypothetical law—like Section 8772—would "implicat[e] profound issues of separation of powers."¹⁸⁴ Further, the dissent warned that, "[h]ereafter, with this Court's seal of approval, Congress can unabashedly pick the winners and losers in particular pending cases."¹⁸⁵

Patchak v. Zinke

Underlying Litigation: *Patchak v. Jewell*

The Supreme Court will revisit separation-of-powers-based limitations on congressional jurisdiction stripping when it reviews *Patchak v. Zinke* during the October 2017 term.¹⁸⁶ In particular, the Court will examine the following question as posed by the petitioners:

Does a statute directing the federal courts to "promptly dismiss" a pending lawsuit following substantive determinations by the courts (including the Court's determination that the "suit may proceed")—without amending underlying substantive or procedural laws—violate the Constitution's separation of powers principles?¹⁸⁷

¹⁷⁸ *Id.* at 1325.

¹⁷⁹ *Id.*

¹⁸⁰ *Id.* at 1326.

¹⁸¹ *Id.* at 1328 (emphasis added). The Court further noted that "[i]n pursuit of foreign policy objectives, the political branches have regulated specific foreign-state assets by, *inter alia*, blocking them or governing their availability for attachment," and "[s]uch measures have never been rejected as invasions upon the Article III judicial power." *Id.*

¹⁸² *Id.* at 1329-38 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

¹⁸³ *Id.* at 1330.

¹⁸⁴ *Id.* at 1334-35. The majority agreed that a law directing judgment for a particular party upon certain findings "would be invalid" but concluded that Section 8772 did not actually do that. *Id.* at 1326 (majority opinion). Rather, in the majority's view, Section 8772 "suppl[ies] a new legal standard effectuating the lawmakers' reasonable policy judgment." *Id.*

¹⁸⁵ *Id.* at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

¹⁸⁶ *Patchak v. Zinke*, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (2017).

¹⁸⁷ Order Granting Writ of Certiorari, *Patchak v. Zinke*, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (No. 16-498) (limiting grant of certiorari to (continued...))

Patchak involves a challenge to the Department of the Interior's (DOI) decision in 2005 to place a tract of land in Wayland Township, Michigan—known as the “Bradley Property”—in trust under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) for the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (known as the “Gun Lake Tribe”).¹⁸⁸ After the Gun Lake Tribe began building a casino on the Bradley Property, David Patchak, who lives in Wayland Township, sued officials from the Bureau of Indian Affairs under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), asserting that the DOI lacked authority under the IRA to place the Bradley Property in trust for the Gun Lake Tribe.¹⁸⁹ He additionally claimed that the casino would cause him injury by “irreversibly chang[ing] the rural character of the area, increas[ing] traffic and pollution, and divert[ing] local resources away from existing residents.”¹⁹⁰ The district court initially dismissed the suit, concluding that Patchak lacked prudential standing—i.e., that his asserted interests did not fall within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the underlying statute.¹⁹¹ The matter reached the Supreme Court in 2012, and the Court reversed, concluding that Patchak, indeed, had prudential standing to sue.¹⁹² With prudential standing ensured, the case was remanded to the district court for resolution on the merits.¹⁹³

Meanwhile, on September 26, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (“Gun Lake Act”), which ratified and confirmed the DOI's decision to place the Bradley Property in trust for the Gun Lake Tribe.¹⁹⁴ Additionally, the act stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear claims related to the Bradley Property:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action (including an action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment of [the] Act) relating to the [Bradley Property] shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.¹⁹⁵

The legislation was necessary, according to a House Report on the Gun Lake Act, out of concern that the underlying DOI decision may have been unlawful under then-existing precedent.¹⁹⁶ The Report even referenced Patchak's lawsuit, noting that the legislation would “void [the] pending lawsuit.”¹⁹⁷

Because *Patchak* was still pending in the district court at the time of the enactment of the Gun Lake Act, the district court concluded that it no longer had jurisdiction to hear the case because of

(...continued)

question one in the petition), *available at* <https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/qp/16-00498qp.pdf>.

¹⁸⁸ *Patchak v. Jewell*, 828 F.3d 995, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

¹⁸⁹ *Id.* at 999-1000.

¹⁹⁰ *Id.* at 1000.

¹⁹¹ *Patchak v. Salazar*, 646 F. Supp. 2d 72 (D. D.C. 2009), *rev'd* 567 U.S. 209 (2012); *see Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1997) (describing prudential standing and its zone of interests).

¹⁹² *Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak*, 567 U.S. 209, 212, 224-28 (2012).

¹⁹³ *Id.* at 228.

¹⁹⁴ Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, P.L. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913, § 2(a) (Sept. 26, 2014). Aside from the jurisdiction-stripping provision, the statute principally reads as follows:

The land taken into trust by the United States for the benefit of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians and described in the final Notice of Determination of the Department of the Interior (70 Fed. Reg. 25596 (May 13, 2005)) is reaffirmed as trust land, and the actions of the Secretary of the Interior in taking that land into trust are ratified and confirmed. *Id.*

¹⁹⁵ *Id.* § 2(b).

¹⁹⁶ H.R. REP. NO. 113-590 (2014).

¹⁹⁷ *See id.* at 2.

the new law and dismissed the suit.¹⁹⁸ The D.C. Circuit affirmed, explaining that so long as the act is not otherwise unconstitutional, “[t]he language of the Gun Lake Act makes plain that Congress has stripped the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits” of Patchak’s complaint.¹⁹⁹ Noting that “federal courts have ‘presumptive jurisdiction ... to inquire into the constitutionality of a jurisdiction-stripping statute,’” the court next considered—and rejected—each of Patchak’s constitutional challenges to the act.²⁰⁰

As relevant here, Patchak contended in the lower court the Gun Lake Act violates the separation-of-powers doctrine by encroaching on the judiciary’s Article III powers.²⁰¹ The D.C. Circuit concluded otherwise, principally relying on *Klein* and its progeny. For instance, the court reasoned that *Bank Markazi*’s pronouncement that “a statute does not impinge on judicial power when it directs courts to apply a new legal standard to undisputed facts,”²⁰² is equally applicable to “when the newly enacted legislation in question removes the judiciary’s authority to review a particular case or class of cases,” as Congress did with the Gun Lake Act.²⁰³ Patchak protested, contending that “the Gun Lake Act did not provide any new legal standard to apply, but rather impermissibly directed the result of his lawsuit under pre-existing law.”²⁰⁴ But the court disagreed, concluding that Congress, indeed, supplied a new legal standard to apply when it enacted the Gun Lake Act, even though the act did not directly amend the APA or IRA (the substantive laws underlying the lawsuit).²⁰⁵ The circuit court explained that it was sufficient that the Gun Lake Act “provide[d] a new legal standard that we are obligated to apply: If an action relates to the Bradley Property, it must promptly be dismissed.”²⁰⁶ Because Patchak’s lawsuit related to the Bradley Property, the court concluded, federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear it.²⁰⁷

Upcoming Supreme Court Proceedings: *Patchak v. Zinke*

Patchak sought Supreme Court review, which the Court granted on May 1, 2017.²⁰⁸ Before the Supreme Court, Patchak reiterates his contention that the Gun Lake Act unconstitutionally violates the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary.²⁰⁹ Patchak likens the

¹⁹⁸ Patchak v. Jewell, 109 F. Supp. 3d 152, 165 (D.D.C. 2015).

¹⁹⁹ Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

²⁰⁰ *Id.* at 1001-07.

²⁰¹ *Id.* at 1001

²⁰² Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1325 (2016).

²⁰³ Patchak, 828 F.3d at 1002.

²⁰⁴ *Id.*

²⁰⁵ *Id.* at 1002-03.

²⁰⁶ *Id.* at 1003.

²⁰⁷ *Id.* at 999, 1001-03, 1008. The D.C. Circuit also relied on its previous ruling in *National Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton*, which addressed whether a statute removing judicial review for statutory challenges to the placement of the World War II Memorial—enacted in the midst of pending litigation—violated Article III. Nat’l Coal. to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The court in *National Coalition* concluded that the statute under review was constitutional and, in doing so, “emphasized that there is no ‘prohibition against Congress’s changing the rule of decision in a pending case, or (more narrowly) changing the rule to assure a pro-government outcome.’” Patchak, 828 F.3d at 1003 (quoting *Nat’l Coal. to Save Our Mall*, 269 F.3d at 1096).

²⁰⁸ Patchak v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (2017). The Supreme Court has scheduled oral argument for November 7, 2017. See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ARGUMENT CALENDARS, https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalNovember2017.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).

²⁰⁹ Brief for Petitioner at 12-31, Patchak v. Zinke, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (2017) (No. 16-498).

Gun Lake Act to the statute deemed unconstitutional in *Klein*, contending that both directed the judiciary to dismiss litigation without altering the underlying legal landscape.²¹⁰ Further, Patchak invokes Chief Justice Roberts's dissent in *Bank Markazi* to argue that the Gun Lake Act impermissibly directs a favorable judgment for a particular party, which the full court had agreed "'would be invalid.'"²¹¹ And according to Patchak, Congress unlawfully directed a favorable outcome for the Gun Lake Tribe when it enacted the Gun Lake Act by "direct[ing] the federal courts to 'promptly dismiss' a pending lawsuit following substantive determinations by the courts ... without amending underlying substantive or procedural laws"—here, the APA or IRA.²¹²

In response, the government has characterized Patchak's reliance on *Klein* as "misplaced," arguing that the D.C. Circuit's analysis fits squarely within the Supreme Court's more recent interpretations of *Klein* and its limitations.²¹³ The government distinguishes the statute struck down in *Klein* from the Gun Lake Act's jurisdiction-stripping provision.²¹⁴ In *Klein*, the government contends, "it was the predicate for the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction ... that rendered the statute unconstitutional," because Congress had directed the courts to find that a pardon has a particular effect and, *upon that finding*, dismiss a lawsuit.²¹⁵ Whereas the Gun Lake Act, in the government's view, does not "rest on a predicate determination that Congress was without authority to make" and, thus, Congress was acting within its "authority to withdraw its grant of jurisdiction to the federal court ... with respect to a particular subject matter—here, the Bradley Property."²¹⁶ Further, the government asserts that, contrary to Patchak's contention, the Gun Lake Act does not direct a favorable outcome for a particular party.²¹⁷ Rather, the government asserts, the Gun Lake Act "ensures that *no* party receives a judgment on the merits" by removing the court's jurisdiction to review the merits of the lawsuit.²¹⁸

Conclusion

Despite the recent trend to limit the scope of *Klein*, the 1871 case and its progeny provide useful guideposts for Congress in fashioning jurisdiction-stripping legislation and measures that target pending litigation. Based on the language of *Klein*, Congress cannot "prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way."²¹⁹ Cases interpreting *Klein* appear to interpret this passage to mean that Congress cannot impede the judiciary's power to decide cases independently, for example, by telling a court how it should rule in a specific case or how to

²¹⁰ *Id.* at 16.

²¹¹ *Id.* at 17 (quoting *Bank Markazi v. Peterson*, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1326, 1335-36 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).

²¹² *Id.*

²¹³ Brief for Federal Respondents Opposing Grant of Certiorari at 9-17, *Patchak v. Zinke*, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (2017) (No. 16-498).

²¹⁴ Brief for Federal Respondents at 36-38, *Patchak v. Zinke*, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (2017) (No. 16-498).

²¹⁵ *Id.* at 37.

²¹⁶ *Id.* at 38.

²¹⁷ *Id.* at 40-41.

²¹⁸ *Id.* at 40.

²¹⁹ *See* *United States v. Klein*, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871).

apply the law to the facts in a given case.²²⁰ In this vein, Congress cannot interfere with the finality of judgments by requiring courts to reopen finally decided lawsuits.²²¹

Still, it appears that there are ways in which Congress may influence how the judiciary resolves lawsuits without violating the separation of powers. Congress can do this by regulating a court's jurisdiction²²² or by enacting substantive measures that the judiciary must apply to resolve a legal dispute.²²³ For instance, Congress may create or amend a law that retroactively applies to lawsuits that began before the new law was enacted.²²⁴ Moreover, the new substantive law can target a specific case or set of cases that are relevant to a small subset of the population.²²⁵ Additionally, legislation can be designed in a manner that ensures victory for a particular party, so long as the reviewing court may still independently apply the new law to the facts of the case.²²⁶ This principle applies even if the new law largely predetermines the outcome for a pending lawsuit.²²⁷ Legislation designed to ensure a particular judicial outcome may be accomplished, for example, by enacting a procedural rule, such as eliminating a defense like *res judicata*.²²⁸ Finally, Article III's Exceptions Clause allows Congress to regulate federal court jurisdiction by removing certain matters altogether from consideration by the federal courts.²²⁹

Patchak may require the Supreme Court to determine the outward bounds of Congress's ability to enact legislation that amends the substantive law underlying particular litigation without impeding the judiciary's power to decide cases independently. If the Court adopts the government's views in *Patchak*, the rule of *Klein* potentially would be limited to forbidding Congress from using its jurisdiction-stripping powers to obstruct other constitutional provisions, like the executive's pardon power.²³⁰ In that event, Congress would gain more leeway in enacting legislation that strips courts of jurisdiction to hear matters that are being litigated at the time of the enactment. If the Court were to adopt *Patchak*'s views that the Gun Lake Act unconstitutionally directs a verdict for a particular party by commanding a pending case to be promptly dismissed, however, Congress may be more restricted in its ability to remove jurisdiction for a class of pending cases without altering the substantive laws that are being litigated in the lawsuit.²³¹

²²⁰ See *Bank Markazi v. Peterson*, 136 S. Ct. 13010, 1323 n.17; *id.* at 1330 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); *Klein*, 80 U.S. at 145-48.

²²¹ *Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.*, 514 U.S. 211, 225-32 (1995).

²²² See *Sheldon v. Sill*, 49 U.S. 441, 449 (1850) ("Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.").

²²³ See, e.g., *Miller v. French*, 530 U.S. 327, 349 (2000).

²²⁴ See *Bank Markazi*, 136 S. Ct. at 1324-26; *Miller*, 530 U.S. at 346-49; *Plaut*, 514 U.S. at 226; *Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y*, 503 U.S. 429, 437-39 (1992).

²²⁵ *Bank Markazi*, 136 S. Ct. at 1327-28; *Plaut*, 514 U.S. at 239 n.9.

²²⁶ *Bank Markazi*, 136 S. Ct. at 1324-26 (2016).

²²⁷ *Id.* at 1325 ("Congress may indeed direct courts to apply newly enacted, outcome-altering legislation in pending civil cases.").

²²⁸ See *United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians*, 448 U.S. 371, 397-402 (1980).

²²⁹ U.S. CONST. art. III; *United States v. Klein*, 80 U.S. 128, 145 (1871).

²³⁰ See Brief for Federal Respondents at 36-38, *Patchak v. Zinke*, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (2017) (No. 16-498) ("[I]t was the predicate for the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction—the alteration of the effect of a pardon that Congress had no power to make—that rendered the statute unconstitutional [in *Klein*].").

²³¹ Brief for Petitioner at 12-18, *Patchak v. Zinke*, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (2017) (No. 16-498) ("When Congress directed the federal courts to 'promptly dismiss' a pending lawsuit ... without amending underlying substantive or procedural laws, it violated the separation of powers by both impairing the judiciary 'in the performance of its constitutional duties' and 'intrud[ing] upon the central prerogatives' of the judicial branch." (citations omitted)).

At this stage in the proceedings, though, the fate of *Patchak v. Zinke*—and, thus, the precise scope of *Klein*—is unclear. *Patchak* may turn on the particulars of how the Court views the Gun Lake Act, either as a change in the substantive law governing the property in question, or as a law that aims to direct the courts to rule in a particular way.²³² Regardless of how the Supreme Court resolves *Patchak*, the Court's forthcoming opinion likely will clarify Congress's power to regulate federal court jurisdiction and legislate with a retroactive effect. Thus, Congress may in the near future receive Supreme Court guidance on the extent of its power to influence cases and controversies, with particular regard for its ability to amend laws with the purpose of directly influencing pending litigation.

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²³² Compare Brief for Federal Respondents at 36, *Patchak v. Zinke*, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (2017) (No. 16-498) (Section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act does not run afoul of the rule announced in *Klein* because it does not ‘direct any particular findings of fact or applications of law, old or new, to fact. It creates new law for the courts to apply: an action that related to the Bradley Property may not be filed or maintained in federal court.’ (citation omitted)), and Brief for the U.S. House of Representative as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12, *Patchak v. Zinke*, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (2017) (No. 16-498) (“Section 2(b) falls well within the broad confines of Congress’s power to define and limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.”), with Brief for Petitioner at 17, *Patchak v. Zinke*, 137 S. Ct. 2091 (2017) (No. 16-498) (“Section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act did precisely what [the Supreme] Court said had been impermissible in *Klein*: it ‘infringed the judicial power ... because it attempted to direct the result without altering the [applicable] legal standards.’” (citation omitted)).