SBA’s Office of Inspector General: Overview, Impact, and Relationship with Congress

Updated June 25, 2021
Summary

Congress created offices of inspector general (OIGs) to assist in its oversight of the executive branch. OIGs provide independent, nonpartisan analysis, conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, to identify and recommend ways to limit waste, fraud, and abuse in federal programs and enhance program and operational efficiency and effectiveness. OIGs’ activities supplement and complement those of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which serves a similar, though not identical, role in assisting congressional oversight of the executive branch. Together, OIGs and GAO provide Congress with information and analysis needed to conduct effective oversight and, in the process, help Congress maintain its balance of power with the presidency.

OIGs exist in more than 70 federal agencies, including all departments and larger agencies, numerous boards and commissions, and other entities. The U.S. Small Business Administration’s Office of Inspector General (SBA OIG) was created under authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-452, as amended). Its three primary statutory purposes are to

1. conduct and supervise audits and investigations of the SBA’s programs and operations;
2. recommend policies designed to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the SBA’s programs and operations and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse; and
3. keep both the SBA Administrator and Congress “fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action.”

During FY2020, the SBA OIG issued 20 audit reports containing 91 recommendations for improving the SBA’s programs and operations, and its investigations resulted in 63 indictments or informations and 32 convictions. The SBA OIG claimed that its recommendations resulted in monetary savings and recoveries of $142.5 million in FY2020. In addition, the SBA OIG’s annual Report on the Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges Facing the SBA focuses attention “on areas that are particularly vulnerable to fraud, waste, error, and mismanagement, or otherwise pose a significant risk and generally have been subject to one or more OIG or GAO reports.”

This report examines the SBA OIG’s statutory authorities; reporting requirements; funding ($68.6 million in FY2021); staffing and organizational structure; and recent activities (audits, investigations, etc.), including an examination of the SBA’s implementation of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). PPP was created to assist small businesses adversely affected by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

This report also examines the SBA OIG’s impact on monetary savings, SBA programs and operations, and legislation affecting the agency. The report concludes with observations concerning the SBA OIG’s relationship with Congress.

Some areas of possible congressional interest, other than SBA OIG funding and staffing issues, include exploring ways to more accurately quantify the SBA OIG’s claims of monetary savings and to determine if the SBA OIG should undertake additional tracking and monitoring activities to more accurately quantify the office’s impact on SBA programs, operations, and legislation.
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Introduction

Congress created offices of inspector general (OIGs) in 1978 (via P.L. 95-452, the Inspector General Act of 1978, or the IG Act) to assist in its oversight of the executive branch. At that time, Congress determined that there were serious deficiencies in the executive branch’s auditing and investigative activities designed to curb waste, fraud, and abuse and promote agency operational and program efficiency. For example, the House and Senate reports accompanying the bill that became the IG Act argued that

- auditing and investigative activities were scattered throughout the various federal departments and were often conducted in response to a complaint as opposed to having in place “affirmative programs to look for possible fraud or abuse”;
- investigators in some agencies (including the Small Business Administration, SBA) were not allowed to initiate investigations without clearance from officials responsible for the programs involved;
- many agency representatives engaged in auditing and investigative activities (including those within the SBA) reported that their office lacked sufficient budgets to do its job, many of the auditing and investigative offices (including those at the SBA) often reported to those who were responsible for the program being audited or investigated; and
- some auditors and investigators were unable to devote full time to their audit or investigative responsibilities.

The House report concluded that independent OIGs “are urgently needed.” The Senate report concluded that “with rare exceptions, the agencies have not adequately policed their own operations and programs.”

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1 Definitions of program efficiency vary. For example, the German sociologist Max Weber argued that organizations operate most efficiently when they are organized in a hierarchical fashion with established rules for making decisions and dividing the labor of the organization accordingly. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) incorporates in its definition of government efficiency how an agency spends money: a ratio of inputs (the cost of operating the government agency or program) to outcomes (the desired results of the program, such as events, occurrences, or changes in conditions, behaviors, or attitudes). See GAO, Streamlining Government: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen OMB’s Approach to Improving Efficiency, GAO-10-394, May 7, 2010, p. 3, at http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/304231.pdf. A congressional staff member (now-retired) suggested a hybrid of these definitions: “a government agency is efficient if it is properly structured to produce accountable decisions and desired results ...[that] use the least amount of federal tax dollars to achieve desired outcomes, i.e. are cost-effective in ensuring that performance objectives are achieved.” See Barry Pineles, chief counsel, House Committee on Small Business, “Hearing Memorandum: Reducing Duplication and Promoting Efficiency at the SBA: The Inspector General’s View,” June 3, 2013.


OIGs were designed to provide Congress and federal agency heads independent, nonpartisan analysis, conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, to identify and recommend ways to limit waste, fraud, and abuse in federal programs and enhance operational and program efficiency and effectiveness.

OIGs’ activities were to supplement and complement those of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), which serves a similar, though not identical, role in assisting Congress fulfill its oversight function. Together, OIGs and GAO (along with the Congressional Research Service [CRS] and the Congressional Budget Office [CBO]) provide Congress with information and analysis needed to conduct effective oversight and, in the process, help Congress maintain its balance of power with the presidency.

OIGs currently exist in more than 70 federal agencies, including all departments and larger agencies, numerous boards and commissions, and other entities. They are predominantly located in executive branch agencies, but several legislative branch entities—for example, the Library of Congress (LOC), GAO, and the Government Publishing Office (GPO)—also have OIGs.

The overwhelming majority of OIGs, including the U.S. Small Business Administration OIG (SBA OIG), are governed by the IG Act. It structures inspector general (IG) appointments and removals, powers and authorities, and duties and responsibilities. Other laws have established or amended IG powers and authorities in specified agencies or programs. As a result, IG statutory powers and authorities are not identical across the federal government and, in certain cases, these differences are significant. Nonetheless, in general, statutory OIGs follow the IG Act’s standards, guidelines, and directives.

For example, the IG Act provides IGs five statutory duties and responsibilities as follows:

1. Conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of their agency’s programs and operations.
2. Conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the government as a whole.
3. Conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the executive branch.
4. Conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the legislative branch.
5. Conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations of the judicial branch.

OIG audits are conducted in accordance with federal audit standards established by the Comptroller General, and other reviews generally are conducted in accordance with standards established by the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE). In addition, OIGs coordinate their activities with GAO to avoid duplicating federal audits. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Small Business, SBA Management and Performance Challenges: The Inspector General’s Perspective, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., March 16, 2016, H. Hrg. 114-049 (Washington: GPO, 2016), p. 22.

GAO-issued Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS) require that audit organizations performing audits and attestation engagements in accordance with GAGAS must have an external peer review performed by reviewers independent of the audit organization being reviewed (another OIG or GAO) at least once every three years.

In September 2014, the U.S. Department of Interior’s OIG reviewed the Small Business Administration OIG’s (SBA OIG’s) Investigations Division. “The final report, dated November 13, 2014, found the system of internal safeguards and management procedure for the investigative function of SBA OIG complied with CIGIE’s quality standards and
2. Review existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to their agency and make recommendations in mandated semiannual reports concerning the impact of such legislation or regulations on their agency’s programs and operations or on the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in those programs and operations.

3. Recommend policies to improve their agency’s administration of its programs and operations and prevent and detect fraud and abuse in those programs and operations.

4. Recommend policies to facilitate relationships between their agency and other federal, state, and local government agencies and nongovernmental entities to promote the economy and efficiency of their agency’s administration of its programs and operations and prevent and detect fraud and abuse in those programs and operations.

5. Keep both their agency head and Congress fully and currently informed concerning fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to their agency’s administration of its programs and operations and to report on the progress made in implementing recommended corrective action.  

This report examines the SBA OIG’s statutory authorities; reporting requirements; funding; staffing and organizational structure; and recent activities (audits, investigations, etc.), including examinations of the SBA’s implementation of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), the recent expansion of the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program, and implementation of several new small business grant programs authorized by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act, P.L. 116-136) and amending legislation.

The SBA OIG’s impact on monetary savings, SBA programs and operations, and legislation affecting the agency is also examined. The report concludes with some observations concerning the SBA OIG’s relationship with Congress.

Some areas of possible congressional interest, other than SBA OIG funding and staffing issues, include exploring ways to more accurately quantify the SBA OIG’s claims of monetary savings and to determine if the SBA OIG should undertake additional tracking and monitoring activities to more accurately quantify the office’s impact on SBA programs, operations, and legislation.


On December 10, 2015, the SBA OIG’s audit division received a peer review rating of pass (audit organizations can receive a rating of pass, pass with deficiencies, or fail) from the Smithsonian Institution’s Office of Inspector General. A sample of the SBA OIG’s audits were reviewed to determine if the SBA OIG’s “system of quality control” in effect for the period of April 1, 2012, through March 31, 2015, met governmental auditing standards (“A system of quality control encompasses SBA OIG’s organizational structure and the policies adopted and procedures established to provide it with reasonable assurance of conforming to Government Auditing Standards.”) See Smithsonian Institution, Office of Inspector General, “System Review Report,” at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/oig/SBA_OIG_Peer_Review_System_Report_FINAL_signed_508.pdf.

8 IG Act of 1978, Section 4(1)-(5); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §4(1)-(5).

9 For additional information and analysis of the small business provisions in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act, P.L. 116-136) and amending legislation, see CRS Report R46284, COVID-19 Relief Assistance to Small Businesses: Issues and Policy Options, by Robert Jay Dilger, Bruce R. Lindsay, and Sean Lowry.
SBA’s OIG

The SBA OIG is a separate, independent office that provides “independent, objective oversight to improve the integrity, accountability, and performance of the SBA.” The SBA IG (Hannibal “Mike” Ware) directs the office and is “appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.”

The SBA is a Cabinet-level agency. Although the SBA is one of the smaller Cabinet-level agencies (with an annual budget of about $1 billion, excluding supplemental funding for addressing the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic’s adverse economic impact on small businesses), it administers a relatively wide range of programs to support small businesses, including loan guaranty and venture capital programs to enhance small business access to capital; contracting programs to increase small business opportunities in federal contracting; direct loan programs for businesses, homeowners, and renters to assist their recovery from natural disasters; and small business management and technical assistance training programs to assist business formation and expansion. The SBA OIG is responsible for examining these programs and the various SBA offices that administer them.

IGs report to the head of their agency or establishment, but are provided various powers and protections that support their independence. For example, the SBA IG reports to the SBA Administrator, but

- may be removed from office only by the President, or through the impeachment process in Congress.
- has the authority to hire staff.
- determines priorities and projects (e.g., audits, reviews and investigations) without outside direction.


P.L. 95-452, the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act of 1978), Section 3(a); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §3(a). Peggy Elizabeth Gustafson was sworn in as the SBA IG on October 2, 2009, and became the Department of Commerce’s IG on January 9, 2017. Mike Ware, who had been the SBA Deputy Inspector General since April 2016, became SBA’s acting IG on January 9, 2017, was nominated by President Trump to be SBA IG on October 16, 2017, was confirmed by the Senate on April 26, 2018, and sworn in as SBA IG on May 24, 2018. He had served various roles within the Department of Interior’s OIG for 26 years prior to joining the SBA OIG.


For additional information concerning these SBA programs, see CRS Report RL33243, Small Business Administration: A Primer on Programs and Funding, by Robert Jay Dilger and Sean Lowry.

In addition, the President may transfer an inspector general (IG) to another position or location within the IG’s agency. If an IG is removed from office or transferred to another position or location “the President shall communicate in writing the reasons for any such removal or transfer to both Houses of Congress, not later than 30 days before the removal or transfer.” See, IG Act of 1978, Section 3(b); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §3(b).

IG Act of 1978, Section 6(a)(7); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(a)(7).

IG Act of 1978, Section 6(a)(2); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(a)(2). The SBA Administrator, President, Members of Congress, SBA employees, and members of the public may request that a project take place, but, unless otherwise required by law, the SBA IG is not obligated to do so.
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- cannot be prevented or prohibited “from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoena during the course of any audit or investigation.”

- must be provided “access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material available ... which relate to programs and operations with respect to which [the SBA] Inspector General has responsibilities under this Act.”

- must be provided “appropriate and adequate office space” and “such equipment, office supplies, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of” the SBA OIG, including any “necessary maintenance services for such offices and the equipment and facilities located therein.”

**Statutory Authorities**

The IG Act provides all IGs nine statutory authorities:

1. Access to all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other material available relating to the IG’s responsibilities under the IG Act.
2. Make such investigations and reports relating to their agency’s administration of its programs and operations as are, in the judgment of the IG, necessary or desirable.
3. Request such information or assistance as may be necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities provided by the IG Act from any federal, state, or local governmental agency or unit thereof.
4. Require by subpoena the production of all information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data in any medium necessary in the performance of the functions assigned by the IG Act; provided that procedures other than subpoenas shall be used by the IG to obtain documents and information from federal agencies.
5. Administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the functions assigned by the IG Act.
6. Have direct and prompt access to their agency head when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the performance of functions and responsibilities under the IG Act.
7. Select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary for carrying out the functions, powers, and duties of the Office subject to the provisions of title 5, *United States Code*, governing appointments in the

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17 IG Act of 1978, Section 3(a); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §3(a).
18 IG Act of 1978, Section 6(a)(1); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(a)(1).
19 IG Act of 1978, Section 6(c); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(c).
20 Access to records, reports, etc. may be limited under specified circumstances (e.g., if such access limits “the exercise of law enforcement powers established under any other statutory authority, including United States Marshals Service special deputation”). See IG Act of 1978, Section 6(e)(8); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(e)(8). There have also been instances where the executive branch has redacted information citing authority provided in other statutes. This practice is often challenged by OIGs and Congress as circumventing the IG Act’s intent for access to all records, reports, etc.
competitive service, and the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of such title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates.

8. Obtain services as authorized by Section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at daily rates not to exceed the equivalent rate prescribed for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule by Section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.

9. To the extent and in such amounts as may be provided in advance by appropriations acts, to enter into contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses, and other services with public agencies and with private persons, and to make such payments as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of the IG Act.21

In addition, the IG Act provides 25 OIGs, including the SBA OIG, direct law enforcement authority.22 It also authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to delegate law enforcement authority to other OIGs under specified circumstances.23

**Reporting Requirements**

The IG Act requires IGs to prepare and transmit semiannual reports (two per year) to their agency’s head, not later than April 30 and October 31 of each year, summarizing the OIG’s activities during the immediately preceding six-month periods ending on March 31 and September 30. Agency heads are to transmit these reports to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of Congress in unaltered form within 30 days after receipt. Agency heads may provide any additional comments deemed appropriate. Agency heads must also provide specified information, such as statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports, inspection reports, and evaluation reports for which final action had not been taken by the commencement of the reporting period; on which management decisions were made during the reporting period; and for which no final action had been taken by the end of the reporting period.24 Copies of the semiannual reports must be made available to the public upon request and at a reasonable cost within 60 days of their transmission to Congress.25

The OIG’s semiannual reports are required to include, but not limited to, 16 informational items. For example, the SBA OIG’s report must include, among other items, the following:

- A description of significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the SBA’s administration of programs and operations identified during the reporting period.

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21 IG Act of 1978, Section 6(a); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(a).
22 IG Act of 1978, Section 6(e)(3); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(e)(3). Five other OIGs have been provided law enforcement authority by other federal statutes.
23 See IG Act of 1978, Section 6(e)(1)-(2); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(e)(1)-(2). Law enforcement authority is generally defined as providing certain OIG employees the legal authority to carry a firearm while engaged in official duties, make an arrest without a warrant while engaged in official duties, and seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of premises, or seizure of evidence. See IG Act of 1978, Section 6(e)(1); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(e)(1). The specified circumstances are “(A) the affected OIG is significantly hampered in the performance of responsibilities established by this Act as a result of the lack of such powers; (B) available assistance from other law enforcement agencies is insufficient to meet the need for such powers; and (C) adequate internal safeguards and management procedures exist to ensure proper exercise of such powers.” See IG Act of 1978, Section 6(e)(2); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(e)(2).
24 IG Act of 1978, Section 5(b); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §5(b).
• A description of the SBA OIG’s recommendations for corrective action.
• An identification of each significant recommendation described in previous semiannual reports on which corrective action has not been completed.
• A summary of matters referred to prosecutive authorities and the prosecutions and convictions that have resulted.
• A summary of each report made to the SBA Administrator relating to instances when information or assistance requested has, in the IG’s judgment, been unreasonably refused or not provided during the reporting period.
• A listing of each audit report, inspection report, and evaluation report issued during the reporting period and for each report, where applicable, the total dollar value of questioned costs (including a separate category for the dollar value of unsupported costs) and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use.
• A summary of each audit report, inspection report, and evaluation report issued before the commencement of the reporting period for which no management decision has been made by the end of the reporting period (including the date and title of each such report), an explanation of the reasons such management decision has not been made, and a statement concerning the desired timetable for achieving a management decision on each such report.
• Information concerning any significant management decision with which the SBA IG is in disagreement.26

IGs are also required to report suspected violations of federal criminal law directly and expeditiously to the U.S. Attorney General, and any “particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies” relating to their agency’s operations and administration of programs immediately to the agency’s head.27

In addition, pursuant to P.L. 106-531, the Records Consolidation Act of 2000,28 and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-136,29 the SBA OIG issues an annual Report on the Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges Facing the SBA. This report is, arguably, the SBA OIG’s signature oversight document, focusing attention “on areas that are particularly vulnerable to fraud, waste, error, and mismanagement, or otherwise pose a significant risk and generally have been subject to one or more OIG or GAO reports.”30

26 IG Act of 1978, Section 5(a); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §5(a).
27 IG Act of 1978, Section 4(d) and 5(d); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §4(d) and §5(d).
28 P.L. 106-531 authorizes federal agency heads to consolidate any statutorily required reports (including financial and performance management reports) into an annual report and submit the consolidated report not later than 150 days after the end of the agency’s fiscal year. Not all OIGs are required to author this report.
Funding

The IG Act provides presidentially appointed IGs a separate appropriations account, known colloquially as a “line item,” for their offices. This provision prevents federal administrators from limiting, transferring, or otherwise reducing OIG funding once it has been specified in law.31 IGs are authorized to transmit a budget estimate and request to their respective agency head each fiscal year. Each IG’s request must include amounts for operations, training, and for the support of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE).32 The agency’s budget request to the President must include the OIG’s original budget request and any comments the affected IG has regarding the proposal.33 The President must include in the Administration’s budget submission to Congress the IG’s original request; the amount requested by the President for the OIG’s operations, training, and support for CIGIE; and any comments the affected IG has regarding the proposal if the IG concludes that the President’s budget would substantially inhibit the IG from performing the duties of the office.34

Each year, the SBA OIG transmits a budget justification document to the SBA Administrator, which is available online.35 That document includes the SBA OIG’s budget request, an overview of the SBA OIG’s mission and authorities, a list of critical risks facing the SBA, an accounting of the office’s oversight activities during the previous fiscal year, areas of emphasis for the coming fiscal year, and a table of statistical highlights and accomplishments for the previous fiscal year (such as the number of reports and recommendations issued, estimated amounts saved or recouped, number of indictments and convictions).

Table 1 shows the SBA OIG’s appropriations over the FY2010-FY2021 period. In FY2021, the SBA OIG received an initial appropriation of $23.611 million (including a $1.6 million transfer from the SBA Disaster Loan Program account for investigative costs related to SBA disaster loans), $20 million in supplemental appropriations for oversight of the SBA’s new, $20 billion Targeted EIDL (Economic Injury Disaster Loan) Advance Payment (grant) Program, and $25 million in supplemental appropriations to support the OIG’s oversight activities.36

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31 For additional information and analysis concerning OIG budgeting, see CRS Report R43814, Federal Inspectors General: History, Characteristics, and Recent Congressional Actions, by Michael Greene and Ben Wilhelm.

32 IG Act of 1978, Section 6(f)(1); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(f)(1). The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) is “an independent entity established within the executive branch to address integrity, economy and effectiveness issues that transcend individual Government agencies and aid in the establishment of a professional, well-trained and highly skilled workforce in the Offices of Inspectors General.” See CIGIE, “What is CIGIE?” at https://www.ignet.gov/. CIGIE also oversees the conduct of high-ranking employees in the inspector general community and investigates wrongdoing against those employees.

33 IG Act of 1978, Section 6(f)(2); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(f)(2).

34 IG Act of 1978, Section 6(f)(3); and 5 U.S.C. Appendix §6(f)(3).


36 The SBA OIG had requested $23.6 million for FY2021: $22 million in new budget authority (including $300,000 for training and $77,500 for CIGIE) and a $1.6 million transfer from the SBA Disaster Loan Program account for investigative costs related to SBA disaster loans. See SBA, OIG, “FY2021 Congressional Budget Justification,” pp. 228, 252, at https://www.sba.gov/document/report-congressional-budget-justification-annual-performance-report (hereinafter SBA, OIG, “FY2021 Congressional Budget Justification”).
## Table 1. SBA OIG’s Appropriations, FY2010-FY2021

($ in millions)

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**Notes:**

a. In FY2021, P.L. 116-260, the Economic Aid to Hard-Hit Small Businesses, Nonprofits, and Venues Act (Division N, Title III of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021) provided the SBA OIG $20 million to oversee the Targeted EIDL Advance payments grant program; and P.L. 117-2, the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, provided the SBA OIG $25 million for oversight.

b. In FY2020, P.L. 116-136 provided the SBA OIG $25 million for oversight of the CARES Act’s SBA lending provisions. The funding is available through September 30, 2024.

c. In FY2018, P.L. 115-123 provided the SBA OIG $7.0 million for investigative costs related to supplemental funding for SBA disaster loans.

d. In FY2013, P.L. 113-2 provided the SBA OIG $5.0 million to remain available until expended for expenses related to oversight of disaster loans following Hurricane Sandy. In addition, P.L. 112-25 and P.L. 113-6 imposed a federal government-wide sequestration process and a required 0.2% across-the-board rescission, resulting in a $1.101 million reduction from the SBA OIG’s budget.

e. In FY2011, P.L. 112-10 imposed a 0.2% rescission on federal agencies, resulting in a reduction of $0.033 million from the SBA OIG’s budget.
Staffing and Organizational Structure

As shown in Table 2, the SBA OIG’s FTEs have increased recently, largely reflecting its increased workload related to overseeing supplemental funding provided to the SBA to address COVID-19’s adverse economic impact on small businesses. Approximately 85% of the SBA OIG’s expenditures are attributed to payroll expenses.37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Full-Time Equivalent Employees</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 2013, then-SBA IG Peggy Gustafson testified that “resource constraints do sometime preclude us from initiating or continuing a number of investigations” and if she were provided additional resources, she would “target early defaulted loans, fraud, and lender negligence, and ... increase the capacity of our existing investigative personnel.”38

The SBA OIG’s staff is organized into three divisions and several support offices.

- The Auditing Division performs and oversees audits and reviews of SBA programs and operations, focusing on SBA business and disaster loans, business


development and government contracting programs, as well as mandatory and other statutory audit requirements involving computer security, financial reporting, and other work.

- The **Investigations Division** manages a program to detect and deter illegal and improper activities involving SBA’s programs, operations, and personnel. The division has criminal investigations staff who carry out a full range of traditional law enforcement functions and security operations staff who conduct name checks and, where appropriate, fingerprint checks on program applicants to prevent known criminals and wrongdoers from participating in SBA programs. Security operations staff also conduct required employee background investigations.

- The **Management and Administration Division** provides business support (e.g., budget and financial management, human resources, IT, and procurement) for the various OIG functions and activities.

- The **Office of Counsel** provides legal and ethics advice to all OIG components; represents the OIG in litigation arising out of or affecting OIG operations; assists with the prosecution of criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement matters; processes subpoenas; responds to Freedom of Information and Privacy Act requests; and reviews and comments on proposed policies, regulations, legislation, and procedures.

- The **OIG Hotline**, under the purview of the Chief of Staff, reviews allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, or serious mismanagement within the SBA or its programs from employees, contractors, and the public.  

The SBA OIG’s headquarters is located in Washington, DC. The SBA OIG’s Investigations Division has 12 field offices located across the United States.

The SBA OIG’s structure is shown in its organizational chart (see Figure 1).

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40 The SBA’s Investigations Division has 12 field offices: five in its eastern region: Atlanta, Georgia; Melville, New York; Miami, Florida; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Washington, DC; four in its central region: Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; Houston, Texas; and Kansas City, Missouri; and three in its western region: Federal Way, Washington; Lakewood, Colorado; and Norwalk, California. See SBA, “OIG Directory,” at https://www.sba.gov/oig/oig-directory.
Recent Activities

As mentioned, the SBA OIG conducts and supervises audits and investigations of the SBA’s programs and operations. As a complement to its criminal and civil fraud investigations, the SBA OIG also recommends to the SBA suspensions, debarment, and other administrative enforcement actions against SBA lenders, borrowers, contractors, and others who have engaged in fraud or have otherwise exhibited a lack of business integrity. The SBA OIG also conducts, supervises, and participates in various training activities to counter fraud in SBA programs.

Audit Reports

During FY2020, the SBA OIG issued 20 audit reports containing 91 recommendations for improving the SBA’s operations, including

- **Flash Report: Small Business Administration’s Implementation of the Paycheck Protection Program Requirements.** The OIG assessed the SBA’s regulations, guidance, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), and borrower application and other documentary materials for the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), as of April 30, 2020. The OIG found that the SBA’s regulations, guidance, FAQs, and borrower application and other documentary materials “mostly aligned” with P.L. 116-136, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES Act). However, four areas did not fully align with the act. Specifically, the SBA had (1) not issued guidance prioritizing underserved and rural markets, (2) added a requirement that at least 75% of PPP loan proceeds must be used for payroll to be eligible for full loan forgiveness, (3) not issued guidance to lenders on loan deferments within 30 days of enactment (March 27,
2020), and (4) had not registered the applicant’s Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) “no later than 15 days after the date on which a loan is made.”\textsuperscript{41} The OIG recommended that the SBA issue guidance requiring lenders to prioritize borrowers in underserved markets; revise borrower application and forgiveness forms to include the collection of optional demographic information; evaluate “the potential negative impact to borrowers regarding the specified percentage of loan proceeds eligible for forgiveness and update the requirements, as deemed necessary”; issue guidance to lenders on the PPP loan deferment process; and register PPP loans by Taxpayer Identification Number.\textsuperscript{42} As a flash report, the SBA was not asked to respond to the recommendations. The SBA subsequently took most of these recommended actions and P.L. 116-142, the Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, required the SBA to lower its requirement that 75% of PPP loan proceeds must be used for payroll costs to be eligible for full loan forgiveness to 60% of PPP loan proceeds.

- **Serious Concerns of Potential Fraud in EIDL Program Pertaining to the Response to COVID-19.** An OIG audit of the EIDL program revealed “strong indicators of widespread potential fraud in the program” and “indications of deficiencies with internal controls related to disaster assistance for the COVID-19 pandemic.”\textsuperscript{43} In addition to finding “hundreds of duplicate loan disbursements,” the OIG found, among other suspicious activities, accounts that were established using stolen identities, account holders unable to explain the origins of deposits or identify business names on loans, account holders claiming to use the funds to open a business, account holders attempting to transfer funds into investment or foreign accounts, and account holders attempting to withdraw loan funds in cash or transfer the funds to other newly established accounts.\textsuperscript{44} The OIG recommended that the SBA “take immediate action to reduce or eliminate fraud risks by strengthening existing controls and implementing internal controls to address potential fraud.”\textsuperscript{45} The SBA indicated in its response to the OIG’s findings that it “has composed rigorous system rules and controls to mitigate the risk of fraud” and has “saved taxpayers billions of dollars.”\textsuperscript{46} The SBA noted that its duplicate identification system had prevented “more than 2.5 million applications representing $78 billion in potential loan volume and $8.8 billion in


\textsuperscript{44} SBA, OIG, “Serious Concerns of Potential Fraud in EIDL Program Pertaining to the Response to COVID-19,” pp. 3-5.

\textsuperscript{45} SBA, OIG, “Serious Concerns of Potential Fraud in EIDL Program Pertaining to the Response to COVID-19,” p. 6.

\textsuperscript{46} SBA, OIG, “Serious Concerns of Potential Fraud in EIDL Program Pertaining to the Response to COVID-19,” p. 9.
Advances” from being approved. The SBA also provided additional details of its internal fraud detection and prevention systems.

- **Evaluation of Certify.SBA.Gov.** In 2015, the SBA approved an 11-year, $45 million project lifecycle for the development of certify.sba.gov to be the single electronic gateway to all of the SBA’s contracting programs. Its purpose is “to streamline the certification process and improve productivity by providing management views of in-progress applications, automate repetitive tasks, make document review straightforward, and provide tools for identifying fraud, waste, and abuse.” The OIG’s audit of certify.sba.gov’s development and implementation from FY2015 to the end of FY2019 found that it “has not accomplished its objectives.” The OIG issued nine recommendations for the SBA’s consideration. The SBA agreed with seven and partially agreed with two of the recommendations.

- **High Risk 7(a) Loan Review Program.** Since FY2014, the OIG has periodically reviewed early-defaulted 7(a) loans “to determine whether (1) high-dollar/early-defaulted 7(a) loans [loans approved for $500,000 or more that defaulted within the first 18 months of the initial disbursement] were originated and closed in accordance with the Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) rules, regulations, policies, and procedures and (2) material deficiencies existed that warrant recovery of guaranteed payments to lenders.” This audit of a $2,077,766 early-defaulted loan found that the lender “did not provide adequate documentation to substantiate reasonable assurance that it met requirements for equity injection” and recommended that the SBA “require the lender to bring the loan into compliance or, if not possible, seek recovery of $2,094,574 on the guaranty paid by the SBA.” After a preliminary review, the SBA agreed with the recommendation.

**Pandemic Response Audits**

On April 3, 2020, the SBA OIG published the first of a series of reports on the SBA’s implementation of programs responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. The first report was a white paper concerning risk awareness and lessons learned from prior audits of economic stimulus loans. That same day, the OIG published another white paper concerning risk awareness and

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lessons learned from prior audits of the EIDL program. The SBA’s website maintains a list of all of the OIG’s pandemic-related audits.

The CARES Act (P.L. 116-136) and subsequent small business relief acts have provided the SBA nearly $1 trillion in supplemental appropriations during FY2020 and FY2021 for programs to assist small businesses adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, the SBA has disbursed more lending through the $813.7 billion PPP since it opened on April 3, 2020, than it had previously disbursed since its formation in 1953. The SBA has also approved more than three times the amount of disaster loans through the expanded EIDL program since economic injury due to the COVID-19 pandemic was made an EIDL eligible expense by the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-123) on March 6, 2020, than it has in its entire history.

In recognition of the OIG’s responsibilities to oversee the SBA’s expanded activities, the OIG was provided $25 million in supplemental funding in FY2020 and $45 million in supplemental funding in FY2021. The OIG is using these funds to audit the SBA’s new and expanded programs.

**Investigations, Debarment Referrals, and Training Activities**

In FY2020, the SBA OIG’s investigations resulted in 63 indictments or informations and 32 convictions. For example,

- A Virginia man was “indicted on multiple counts of wire fraud, false statements to a financial institution, engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, and theft of government property” for defrauding the COVID-19 EIDL program.
- A North Carolina man was “indicted on multiple counts of aggravated identity theft, bank fraud wire fraud, concealment of money laundering, and false

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An *information* is a sworn written statement that charges that a particular individual has done a criminal act or is guilty of a criminal omission. Because the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution expressly creates a constitutional right to be indicted by a grand jury, an information is used in federal criminal procedure only when a defendant voluntarily pleads guilty (often as part of a plea bargain) and waives the right to an indictment. See The Free Dictionary, “Information,” at http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Information; and The Law Dictionary, “Information,” at http://thelawdictionary.org/information/.

statements to a bank in connection with his application for two SBA 7(a) loans totaling $845,200.60

- A Georgia reality television personality was indicted “on multiple counts of wire fraud, bank fraud, false statements, and money laundering ... in an elaborate Ponzi scheme” that persuaded approximately 20 individuals to invest more than $5 million in his trucking business. The man also applied for a $3,725,500 PPP loan, which he used for unauthorized personal expenses, including the purchase of a Rolls-Royce car and payments to associates assisting in the Ponzi scheme.61

The SBA OIG also sent 47 present responsibility actions (suspension and debarment referrals) to the SBA in FY2020. Acting on these, and previously submitted responsibility actions, the SBA proposed 24 debarments and issued 27 final debarments in FY2020.62 As discussed below, the SBA OIG also annually provides training and outreach sessions, attended by more than 1,000 government employees, lending officials, and law enforcement representatives, on topics related to fraud in government lending and contracting programs.63

As mentioned, the SBA OIG has been actively investigating reported PPP and EIDL fraud and regularly issues press releases related to its role in charging individuals for COVID-19-related loan fraud.64

**Monetary Savings and Recoveries**

The SBA OIG reports that its audits and investigations resulted in monetary savings and recoveries of about $142.5 million in FY2020 ($51.4 million from potential investigative recoveries and fines, $69,000 from asset forfeitures, $26.3 million for loans or contracts not approved or canceled, and $64.8 million in disallowed costs agreed to by management).65

Most OIGs, including the SBA OIG, quantify their monetary savings by identifying and reporting amounts affected by their activities. This methodological approach, arguably, provides a fairly good overview of the OIG’s activities’ scope, nature, and impact. However, this approach has limitations. For example, precise data concerning monetary savings are not always readily available. Also, from a budgetary perspective, the monetary savings identified is sometimes less than the actual monetary savings realized. For example,

- Savings from potential recoveries and fines ($51.4 million in FY2020) is derived from the actual amount imposed by courts in criminal sentencings (including fines and restitution), criminal settlements, and civil settlements. These

recoveries are deemed “potential” because the court ordered them in FY2018, but they may not have been collected yet. The SBA OIG does not track collections resulting from these orders. As a result, the SBA OIG is not able to report the final amount of money actually recovered.66

- Savings from loans or contracts not approved or cancelled ($26.3 million in FY2020) is “comprised of the sum of the amounts that would have been borrowed as loans or awarded via contracts had there been no involvement by the OIG Investigations Division.”67 From a budgetary perspective, the actual monetary savings generated by these actions is less than the amount cited.68

When a SBA loan is not approved, no funds are returned to the SBA because the loan amount has not been issued yet. When a SBA business loan is cancelled, the loan amount is ultimately returned to the lender, not to the SBA, because the SBA did not make the loan; it guaranteed a portion of it. When a small business contract is not approved, no funds are returned to the agency sponsoring the contract because the contracted amount has not been awarded yet. When a small business contract is cancelled, the contracted amount is typically made available to other contractors.

- Savings from disallowed costs agreed to by management ($64.8 million in FY2020) could result in actual budgetary savings, but the recovery process typically takes time. As a result, the final savings for disallowed costs is often not known during the fiscal year in which it is reported.

Finally, estimating the monetary savings from the SBA OIG’s activities is challenging because it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine what changes the SBA might have made to its programs and operations if the SBA OIG did not exist.

Perhaps indicative of these methodological challenges, the SBA OIG’s semiannual reports and annual congressional budget justification document’s statistical highlights sections refer to these figures as “office-wide dollar accomplishments” as opposed to monetary savings.69

**Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges Facing the SBA**

Pursuant to P.L. 106-531, the Records Consolidation Act of 2000, and OMB Circular A-136, the SBA OIG issues an annual *Report on the Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges Facing the SBA*. This report is, arguably, the SBA OIG’s signature oversight document, focusing attention “on areas that are particularly vulnerable to fraud, waste, error, and mismanagement, or otherwise pose a significant risk and generally have been subject to one or more OIG or GAO reports.”70

The FY2021 *Report on the Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges Facing the SBA* lists the following eight challenges:

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66 SBA, OIG, “Correspondence with the author,” June 23, 2016.

67 SBA, OIG, “Correspondence with the author.”

68 By promoting program efficiency, it could be argued that these actions cumulatively result in administrative cost savings. However, it is difficult to quantify these savings.

69 For example, see SBA, OIG, “FY2019 Congressional Budget Justification,” p. 220.

1. SBA’s COVID-19-related economic relief programs are susceptible to significant fraud risks and vulnerabilities.

2. Inaccurate procurement data and eligibility concerns in the small business contracting programs undermine the reliability of contracting goal achievements.

3. SBA needs to improve oversight of IT investment and reduce IT security risks.

4. SBA risk management and oversight practices need improvement to ensure the integrity of loan programs.

5. SBA needs to administer the Section 8(a) business development program effectively.

6. Identification of improper payments in SBA’s loan program remain a challenge.

7. SBA’s disaster assistance programs must balance competing priorities to deliver prompt assistance but prevent potential fraud.

8. SBA needs robust grants management oversight.

The SBA OIG provides a series of recommended actions within each of the reported challenges to enhance the effectiveness of the SBA’s programs and operations. The management challenges are “driven by SBA’s current needs” and based on the SBA OIG’s understanding of the SBA’s programs and operations, as well as challenges presented in other agency reports, principally GAO reports. Accordingly, the challenges presented each year may change based on the SBA’s actions or inactions “to remedy past weaknesses.”

For example, in its FY2021 report, the SBA OIG added a new challenge related to the oversight of COVID-19-related loan programs and removed a challenge concerning the SBA’s human capital management because the SBA “made substantial improvements to its human capital strategies,” “implemented plans that aligned talent needs and capability with its strategic plan,” and “implemented strategic workforce and succession plans to identify competency gaps, strengthen leadership capacity, and address challenges of its aging workforce.”

Impact on Program Efficiency and Effectiveness

OIGs are, arguably, best known for investigations addressing waste, fraud, and abuse and audits containing recommendations to enhance programmatic and operational efficiencies. However, a full and complete assessment of an OIG’s impact should address all of the office’s statutory responsibilities, including its efforts to

- enhance programmatic and operational efficiencies and the OIG’s agency’s effectiveness in achieving program goals through audits;
- reduce waste, fraud, and abuse through investigations;
- assist Congress and the OIG’s agency by making recommendations concerning the impact of legislation and regulations on programmatic and operational efficiencies and waste, fraud, and abuse;

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• assist the OIG’s agency by making recommendations to facilitate the agency’s relationships with other governmental and nongovernmental entities; and
• keep the OIG’s agency head and Congress fully and currently informed of its findings and the agency’s progress in implementing recommended corrective actions.

Enhancing Programmatic and Operational Efficiency and the Achievement of Program Goals Through Audits

As shown in Table 3, over the past 11 fiscal years, the SBA OIG

• issued 247 audit reports (an average of 22.5 audit reports per fiscal year);
• provided 1,196 recommendations for improving SBA operations, identifying improper payments, and strengthening controls to reduce fraud and unnecessary losses in SBA programs (an average of 108.7 recommendations per fiscal year), with the SBA taking action on 1,171 recommendations (an average of 106.5 recommendations addressed per fiscal year);
• generated $625.8 million in savings and efficiencies (an average of $56.9 million per fiscal year) in disallowed costs agreed to by SBA management and recommendations that funds be put to better use agreed to by SBA management;
• questioned $1,323.7 million in costs (an average of $120.3 million per fiscal year);74 and
• recommended that $141.1 million be put to better use (an average of $12.8 million per fiscal year).

Table 3. SBA OIG’s Audits, FY2010-FY2020

($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Fiscal Year</th>
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<th>Number of Recommendations Issued/Acted Upon</th>
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74 The SBA views questioned costs as those that are found to be improper. Unsupported costs may be proper, but lack documentation. The SBA considers unsupported costs a subset of questioned costs. See SBA, OIG, “Semiannual Report to Congress, fall 2016,” p. 25, at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/oig/SAR_Fall_2016_Publisha...
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<th>Number of Recommendations Issued/Acted Upona</th>
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<td>$1,323.7</td>
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a. The number of the SBA OIG’s recommendations acted upon by the SBA in a fiscal year may exceed the number of recommendations issued by the SBA OIG because the number acted upon may include recommendations issued in previous fiscal years.

b. Sum of disallowed costs agreed to by management and recommendations that funds be put to better use agreed to by management.

In terms of impact, the data presented in Table 3 suggest that the SBA has made hundreds of changes to its internal operating procedures and programs as a direct result of the SBA OIG’s audits. In addition, comments by members of the House Committee on Small Business and Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship during congressional oversight hearings suggest that they view the SBA OIG’s audits as helpful in their oversight of the SBA, especially in terms of identifying management weaknesses and recommending solutions to remedy those weaknesses. For example, in his opening remarks at a March 2016 congressional

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75 For additional information concerning the SBA OIG’s impact on the SBA’s 7(a) loan guarantee program, see CRS Report R41146, Small Business Administration 7(a) Loan Guarantee Program, by Robert Jay Dilger.

oversight hearing concerning the SBA’s management and performance challenges, Representative Steve Chabot, then-chair of the House Committee on Small Business, stated:

It is clear that the Inspector General plays a critical role in ensuring effective management of the SBA. By conducting audits to identify program mismanagement, by investigating fraud or other wrongdoing, or by recommending changes to increase the efficiency of SBA operations, she has provided independent and objective reviews of agency actions.77

However, some Members have also noted that the SBA OIG’s impact is limited because the SBA OIG has no enforcement authority and the SBA has chosen to ignore many of its recommendations. As Representative Nydia Velázquez noted during that March 2016 congressional oversight hearing, some of the management challenges reported in the SBA OIG’s annual Report on the Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges Facing the SBA “were first highlighted over a decade ago.”78 In addition, Peggy Gustafson (SBA IG from October 2, 2009 to January 9, 2017) testified at that hearing that the SBA had “144 open OIG recommendations pertaining to reviews conducted in recent years and not so recent years across SBA programs.”79 She also testified that the SBA

did demonstrate positive progress in resolving recommendations associated with five of the identified challenges [in the annual report on the most serious challenges facing the SBA]. However, they remained at status quo on four of the challenges and demonstrated no progress on one recommendation in an area related to information technology. Now, clearly these results I would say paint a very large picture relative to SBA’s commitment to addressing these challenges in earnest and their ability to overcome these challenges.

Having said that, I think it also has to be acknowledged that SBA has shown that with a sustained, committed effort over time, they can achieve successful results in these challenges. For example, they moved to green [implemented the SBA OIG’s recommendations concerning] … the very large challenge related to their LMAS [Loan Management and Accounting System Modernization] IT system. So I think that really shows that these are challenges that with the right effort can really be conquered and met.80

Others have suggested that OIGs in general, including the SBA OIG, focus their auditing efforts on identifying and addressing programmatic and operational inefficiencies and spend less time addressing “whether the agency program operations were providing the outputs intended by Congress.”81 In their view, Congress passed P.L. 103-62, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, and P.L. 111-352, the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010, to provide mechanisms to assess the effectiveness of federal programs in a way that supplements the efforts of OIGs (e.g., by establishing statutory

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requirements for most agencies to set goals, measure performance, and submit related plans and reports to Congress for its potential use). 82

In sum, the evidence suggests that the SBA OIG’s audits have helped to increase the efficiency of the SBA’s programs and operations. However, it could also be argued that the SBA OIG’s impact is muted because OIGs lack enforcement authority, meaning that the SBA may proceed with, or without, taking into account the recommendations presented in the SBA OIG’s audits.

Reducing Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Through Investigations

As shown in Table 4, over the past 11 fiscal years, the SBA OIG

- opened 1,026 cases (an average of 93.3 cases opened per fiscal year);
- issued 682 indictments or informations (an average of 62.0 indictments or informations per fiscal year), with 499 convictions (an average of 45.4 convictions per fiscal year);
- generated $1,212.5 million in investigative recoveries and fines, asset forfeitures attributed to OIG investigations, and loans or contracts not approved or cancelled as a result of investigations (an average of $110.2 million per fiscal year); and
- recommended 656 suspensions or disbarments (an average of 59.6 per fiscal year), with the SBA suspending or disbarring 330 of these firms or owners (an average of 30.0 firms/owners per fiscal year).

In addition, the SBA OIG anticipates having an active, growing caseload of criminal and civil investigations of potential fraud and other wrongdoing in the coming years due to the recent unprecedented expansion of the SBA’s lending and grant activities. 83

The data presented in Table 4 suggest that the SBA OIG’s investigations have resulted in hundreds of criminal convictions and millions of dollars in recovered funds. In addition, comments by members of the House Committee on Small Business and Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship suggest that, generally speaking, they acknowledge and value the SBA OIG’s investigations as a means to identify and reduce waste, fraud, and abuse. 84

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Number of Cases Opened</th>
<th>Number of Indictments and Informations</th>
<th>Number of Convictions</th>
<th>Recoveries and Management Avoidances$^b$</th>
<th>Number of Suspensions and Debarments Recommended/Issued$^c$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>$77.7</td>
<td>47/24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>$77.4</td>
<td>38/33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>$79.0</td>
<td>84/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>$79.9</td>
<td>106/33</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>$141.5</td>
<td>75/32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>$118.8</td>
<td>74/46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>$76.2</td>
<td>50/42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>$348.2</td>
<td>65/26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>$81.8</td>
<td>45/31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>$60.7</td>
<td>41/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>$71.3</td>
<td>31/16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,026</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>$1,212.5</td>
<td>656/330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

a. The number of convictions may exceed the number of indictments and informations in a fiscal year because a conviction in any fiscal year could result from an indictment or information issued in that fiscal year or a previous fiscal year.

b. Sum of potential investigative recoveries and fines, asset forfeitures attributed to OIG investigations, loans or contracts not approved or cancelled as a result of investigations, and loans not made as a result of name checks.

c. The number of suspensions and debarments issued by the SBA in response to a recommendation from the SBA OIG does not include the number of recommended suspensions and debarments pending at the end of the fiscal year.

Recommendations Concerning the Impact of Legislation and Regulations

The SBA OIG reports that it routinely reviews and comments on proposed changes to the SBA’s program directives. These changes “include regulations, internal operating procedures, policy notices, and SBA forms completed by lenders and the public.”

The SBA OIG also tracks, reviews, and comments on legislation affecting the SBA and participates in OMB’s Legislative Referral Memoranda (LRM) process for reviewing and coordinating agency recommendations on proposed, pending, and enrolled legislation. The SBA OIG also “receives, through the SBA Office of Congressional and Legislative Affairs, congress-related documents being circulated by OMB, including pending legislation for consideration of Administration views and perspectives.”

When the SBA OIG identifies “material weaknesses” in changes proposed by the SBA, it “works with the Agency to implement recommended revisions to promote controls that are more effective and deter waste, fraud, or abuse.” The SBA OIG provides the SBA with both formal and informal comments. Formal comments are provided “through the Agency’s internal document control process, the Correspondence Management System (CMS), and as a reviewing party in

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88 SBA, OIG, “Correspondence with the author,” July 5, 2016.
90 The SBA’s CRM-Correspondence Management (CRM-CM) system “will efficiently manage, organize, search, track, and report on correspondence and action plans... The CRM-CM will store and manage correspondence from the members of the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, the President, and SBA’s Administrator or Deputy Administrator.” See SBA, “Privacy Impact Assessment: Name of System/Application: CRM-Correspondence Management Program Office: Office of the Executive Secretariat,” at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/CRM_Correspondence_Management.pdf.
the Agency’s Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) process.” 91 Informal comments “occur in the context of program officials seeking SBA OIG guidance when preparing new guidance.” 92

In terms of legislation, the SBA OIG provides comments and suggestions “directly with congressional stakeholders” and shares its views with SBA officials and OMB if the legislation is being “circulated for solicited views by OMB through its LRM process, or if determined by the OIG to be a necessary course of action.” 93

As shown in Table 5, over the past 11 fiscal years, the SBA OIG

- conducted 1,287 reviews of legislation, regulations, standard operating procedures, and other issuances (an average of 117.0 reviews per fiscal year); 94

and

- submitted comments on 580 of these initiatives (an average of 52.7 initiatives commented on per fiscal year).

Table 5. Legislation, Regulations, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and Other Issuances Reviewed and Comments Provided, FY2010-FY2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Legislation, Regulations, SOPs, and Other Issuances Reviewed</th>
<th>Number of Initiatives for Which Comments Were Provided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>60</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,287</strong></td>
<td><strong>580</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

91 SBA, OIG, “Correspondence with the author,” July 5, 2016. “OIRA [the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs] was created within OMB [the Office of Management and Budget] by Section 3503 of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1980 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35) …With regard to paperwork reduction, the act generally prohibited agencies from conducting or sponsoring a collection of information until they had submitted their proposed information collection requests to OIRA and the office had approved those requests. The PRA’s requirements cover rules issued by virtually all agencies, including Cabinet departments, independent agencies, and independent regulatory agencies and commissions. Although the PRA gave OIRA substantive responsibilities in many areas, the bulk of the office’s day-to-day activities under the act were initially focused on reviewing and approving agencies’ proposed information collection requests.” For additional information and analysis concerning the PRA see CRS Report RL32397, Federal Rulemaking: The Role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, coordinated by Maeve P. Carey, and CRS Report RL32240, The Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview, coordinated by Maeve P. Carey.

92 SBA, OIG, “Correspondence with the author,” July 5, 2016.

93 SBA, OIG, “Correspondence with the author,” July 5, 2016.

94 Other issuances include policy notices, procedural notices, the SBA Administrator’s action memoranda, and other SBA initiatives, which frequently involve the implementation of new programs or policies.

Note: Other issuances include policy notices, procedural notices, the SBA Administrator’s action memoranda, and other SBA initiatives, which frequently involve the implementation of new programs or policies.

The data in Table 5 suggest that the SBA OIG actively reviews and comments on legislation and SBA program directives. However, it is difficult to determine the impact of these reviews and comments because the SBA OIG does not track or report data concerning the SBA’s response to these comments. The SBA OIG indicated that neither the dynamic nature of the informal comment process nor the collaborative follow-up procedures from formal comments are conducive to quantification. Our sense of these comments is that the Agency will generally act upon SBA OIG comments. Typically, the Agency modifies clearances and PRA packages in response to material SBA OIG concerns. An accurate tracking and quantification of these clearances, however, is unlikely to yield particularly useful data relative to the resource expenditure necessary for that collection.95

95 SBA, OIG, “Correspondence with the author,” July 5, 2016.
Facilitating the SBA’s Relationships with Other Governmental and Nongovernmental Entities

The SBA OIG provides training and outreach sessions on topics related to fraud in government lending and contracting programs. These training and outreach sessions are designed to facilitate the SBA’s relationships with other governmental and nongovernmental entities in identifying and ameliorating fraud.

The SBA OIG’s outreach and training sessions are attended by SBA and other government employees, lending officials, and law enforcement representatives. Topics include “types of fraud, fraud indicators and trends; how to report suspicious activity that may be fraudulent; suspension and debarment, the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act, and other topics related to deterring and detecting fraud in government lending and contracting programs.”

As shown in Table 6, the SBA OIG provided 968 outreach and training sessions from FY2010 to FY2020 (an average of 88 sessions per fiscal year) to 19,724 attendees (an average of 1,793 attendees per fiscal year).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Number of Sessions</th>
<th>Number of Attendees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>4,964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>1,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>3,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1,717</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,067</td>
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<td>2014</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,370</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>900</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>968</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,724</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The data presented in Table 6 suggest that the SBA OIG actively provides training and outreach sessions related to identifying and addressing fraud. The office also participates in a number of activities involving federal agencies and others with an interest in fraud prevention activities. It is difficult to measure the impact of these training and outreach activities on the SBA’s interaction with other federal agencies. The SBA OIG reports that these sessions are well-attended, and receive high ratings from attendees.

**Keeping the SBA Administrator and Congress Fully and Currently Informed**

As mentioned, the IG Act requires IGs to keep their agency’s administrator and Congress fully and currently informed concerning fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the agency’s administration of its programs and operations and to report on the progress made in implementing recommended corrective action. The SBA OIG’s informational role is conducted through both formal and informal communication.

Formal communication occurs through (1) the publication of audits, investigations, semiannual reports, and the annual Report on the Most Serious Management and Performance Challenges Facing the SBA; (2) correspondence with SBA officials, congressional staff, and Members of Congress; (3) briefings with SBA officials, congressional staff, and Members of Congress (as needed or as requested); (4) press releases; and occasionally (5) congressional testimony.\(^98\)

Informal communication occurs primarily through telephone consultation or by email with SBA officials, congressional staff, and Members of Congress (often facilitated by the SBA OIG’s chief of staff).\(^99\)

In terms of communication with Congress, the SBA OIG reports that it “has regular communications and meetings (as needed or requested) to keep the Congress apprised of significant findings or issues identified during our oversight of SBA” and that the “OIG has a staff member that is responsible for congressional relations.”\(^100\) In addition, because its semiannual reports to Congress are published every six months, the SBA OIG finds that those

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\(^{99}\) SBA, OIG, “Correspondence with the author,” June 23, 2016.

\(^{100}\) SBA, OIG, “Correspondence with the author,” June 23, 2016.
reports’ “utility as a viable means to make a recommendation for legislation advancing through the legislative process is limited in the context of current legislative affairs.” As a result, because “the legislative process is very dynamic,” the SBA OIG often relies on “frequent and informal” communication with congressional staff and Members of Congress to provide its input on legislation and other matters affecting the SBA, often by telephone and email.

The SBA OIG reports frequent and, in its view, meaningful consultation with both the SBA and Congress in an attempt to keep them fully informed of its activities and recommendations. It is difficult to determine the impact and/or extent of the SBA OIG’s communication with SBA officials, congressional staff, and Members of Congress because much of that communication occurs through informal means, is not tracked, and data concerning the SBA’s or congressional response to the provided comments and recommendations are not compiled or reported. However, at the aforementioned March 2016 congressional hearing on the SBA’s management and performance challenges, Representative Steve Chabot stated that

By clarifying the specific areas in which improvement is needed and highlighting possible paths forward for the agency, the insights offered by the Inspector General are invaluable as the Committee continues to work with the SBA to develop meaningful solutions to its management and performance challenges.

Relationship with Congress

Generally speaking, OIGs’ relationships with Congress tend to ebb and flow over time, varying with the personalities, interests, needs, and actions of the principals involved. One constant has been a genuine interest from Members of Congress of both political parties in OIGs’ efforts to identify and reduce waste, fraud, and abuse and enhance program efficiency and effectiveness. The congressional interest in these issues can take on a partisan, contentious tone, especially during periods of divided government. The House and Senate Committees on Small Business, however, have traditionally tried to avoid partisanship. For example, at a potentially contentious Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship hearing in 2007, then-Senate Committee Chair John Kerry stated, “Senator Snowe [then-ranking Member] and I and all Members of this Committee manage a Committee that works in a very bipartisan way and try very hard to keep the politics off the table.” More recently, Representative Steve Chabot stated the following during House floor consideration of H.R. 208, the Recovery Improvements for Small Entities After Disaster Act of 2015:

I want to offer a special thanks to our committee’s ranking member, Ms. Velazquez, for her insight and leadership on this issue and for working in a bipartisan, bicameral manner, as she does. I have seen that as chair of the Small Business Committee that I chair now, but I have also been the ranking member under her when she was chair, and it was always bipartisan. We have worked together in a very collegial manner, and I thank her for that.

101 SBA, OIG, “Correspondence with the author,” July 5, 2016.
102 SBA, OIG, “Correspondence with the author,” July 5, 2016.
The extent to which the small business committees have been able to avoid partisan conflict has varied somewhat over time, reflecting the personalities of committee leaders and the nature of the issues that have presented themselves at any given time. Nonetheless, the small business committees’ tradition of valuing bipartisanship has served to reduce the potential for conflict with the SBA OIG, primarily because committee members generally do not feel a need to question the SBA OIG’s motives when its investigations and audits find perceived weaknesses in the Administration’s implementation of the SBA’s programs or in the Administration’s efforts to identify and address waste, fraud, and abuse. The expectation that both committee members and the SBA IG do not, and should not, pursue a political agenda may help to explain why small business committee members rarely ask the SBA OIG to undertake specific studies. In their view, the SBA IG is expected to aggressively pursue perceived weaknesses in the SBA’s programs and operations regardless of potential political consequences. Requesting specific studies could be seen as suggesting that the SBA OIG is not doing its job well, or as a partisan effort to embarrass the Administration.

The SBA OIG’s relationship with Congress has not always been without controversy. For example, in October 2008, then-Senator John Kerry, chair of the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, criticized the SBA OIG on the Senate floor for issuing what he described as “a heavily redacted report” concerning the SBA’s oversight of one of the agency’s largest 7(a) lenders. Speaking on behalf of himself and then-Ranking Member Senator Olympia Snowe, he accused the SBA OIG of not exercising “independent authority on what was redacted and instead let the agency it was investigating dictate that large sections of the report be redacted ... contrary to the usual process that occurs with SBA OIG reports.” He argued that the SBA OIG’s action had “the potential to render the OIG useless,” and “prevented accountability in Government by keeping from the public information about the oversight capabilities of an agency that, though comparatively small, can have a huge impact on our economy.”

Senator Kerry’s comments illustrate how quickly an OIG’s relationship with Congress can change. Prior to the publication of that redacted report, the SBA OIG was generally praised by Members of both political parties for its efforts concerning the oversight of the SBA’s response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, audits of the SBA’s oversight of lenders, and investigations leading to numerous indictments and convictions of fraudulent SBA lenders and borrowers.

In sum, comments by House and Senate small business committee leaders seem to suggest that they view the SBA OIG and GAO as two valuable assets that can assist and enhance the committees’ oversight role. However, history has shown that an apparent harmonious relationship between an OIG and congressional committees can change quickly as circumstances change.

Some areas of possible congressional interest concerning the SBA OIG, other than funding and staffing issues, include exploring ways to more accurately quantify the SBA OIG’s claims of monetary savings and determining if the SBA OIG should undertake additional tracking and

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106 In FY2014, none of the 20 reports issued by the SBA OIG were undertaken due to a request from a Member of Congress or congressional staff, or a member of the public. One report was undertaken in response to a hotline complaint from SBA program officials. In FY2015, none of the 17 reports issued by the SBA OIG were undertaken due to a request from a Member of Congress or congressional staff, an SBA employee, or a member of the public. SBA, OIG, “Correspondence with the author,” June 23, 2016.


monitoring activities to more accurately quantify the office’s impact on SBA programs and operations and legislation.

Author Information

Robert Jay Dilger
Senior Specialist in American National Government

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