Preserving Homeownership: Foreclosure Prevention Initiatives

Katie Jones
Analyst in Housing Policy

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Summary

The home mortgage foreclosure rate began to rise rapidly in the United States beginning around the middle of 2006, and it has remained elevated ever since. Losing a home to foreclosure can harm households in many ways; for example, those who have been through a foreclosure may have difficulty finding a new place to live or obtaining a loan in the future. Furthermore, concentrated foreclosures can negatively impact nearby home prices, and large numbers of abandoned properties can negatively affect communities. Finally, elevated levels of foreclosures can destabilize housing markets, which can in turn negatively impact the economy as a whole.

There is a broad consensus that there are many negative consequences associated with rising foreclosure rates. Since the foreclosure rate began to rise, Congress and both the Bush and Obama Administrations have initiated efforts aimed at preventing further increases in foreclosures and helping more families preserve homeownership. These efforts currently include the Making Home Affordable program, which includes both the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) and the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP); the Hardest Hit Fund; the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) Short Refinance Program; and the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program (NFMCP). Two other initiatives, Hope for Homeowners and the Emergency Homeowners Loan Program (EHLP), expired at the end of FY2011.

While there is a broad consensus that there are many negative consequences related to foreclosures, there is less consensus over whether the federal government should have a role in preventing foreclosures and, if so, what that role should be. Furthermore, many existing federal foreclosure prevention initiatives have been criticized as being ineffective. This has led some policymakers to suggest that changes should be made to these initiatives to try to make them more effective, while other policymakers have argued that some of these initiatives should be eliminated entirely. For example, in the 112th Congress, the House of Representatives passed a series of bills that, if enacted, would have terminated several foreclosure prevention initiatives. However, these bills were not considered by the Senate.

While many observers agree that slowing the pace of foreclosures is an important policy goal, there are several challenges associated with designing and carrying out foreclosure prevention initiatives. These challenges include implementation issues, such as deciding who has the authority to make mortgage modifications, developing the capacity to complete widespread modifications, and assessing the possibility that homeowners with modified loans will default again in the future. Other challenges are related to the perception of unfairness in providing help to one set of homeowners over others, the problem of inadvertently providing incentives for borrowers to default, and the possibility of setting an unwanted precedent for future mortgage lending.
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Preserving Homeownership: Foreclosure Prevention Initiatives

Introduction

The home mortgage foreclosure rate in the United States began to rise rapidly around the middle of 2006 and has remained elevated since that time. The large increase in home foreclosures has negatively impacted individual households, local communities, and the economy as a whole. Consequently, an issue before Congress has been whether to use federal resources and authority to help prevent some home foreclosures and, if so, how to best accomplish this objective. This report provides background on the increase in foreclosure rates in recent years. It then describes existing initiatives intended to preserve homeownership that have been implemented by the federal government, and briefly outlines some of the challenges inherent in designing foreclosure prevention initiatives. Additional foreclosure prevention initiatives that were established since 2007 but are no longer active are described in the Appendix.

Foreclosure refers to formal legal proceedings initiated by a mortgage lender against a homeowner after the homeowner has missed a certain number of payments on his or her mortgage. When a foreclosure is completed, the homeowner loses his or her home, which is either repossessed by the lender or sold at auction to repay the outstanding debt. In general, the term “foreclosure” can refer to the foreclosure process or the completion of a foreclosure. This report deals primarily with preventing foreclosure completions.

In order for the foreclosure process to begin, two things must happen: a homeowner must fail to make a certain number of payments on his or her mortgage, and the mortgage holder or mortgage servicer must decide to initiate foreclosure proceedings rather than pursue other options, such as offering a repayment plan or a loan modification. (See the nearby text box explaining the role of mortgage servicers.) A borrower that misses one or more payments is usually referred to as being delinquent on a loan; when a borrower has missed three or more payments, he is generally considered to be in default. Servicers can generally begin foreclosure proceedings after a homeowner defaults on his mortgage, although servicers vary in how quickly they begin foreclosure proceedings after a borrower goes into default. Furthermore, the foreclosure process is governed by state law. Therefore, the foreclosure process and the length of time the process takes vary by state.

Mortgage Servicers

Mortgage lenders are the organizations that make mortgage loans to individuals. Usually, the mortgage is managed by a company known as a mortgage servicer. Servicers usually have the most contact with the borrower, and are responsible for actions such as collecting mortgage payments, communicating with troubled borrowers, and initiating foreclosures. The servicer can be an affiliate of the original mortgage lender or can be a separate company. Many mortgages are repackaged into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) that are sold to institutional investors. Servicers are subject to contracts with mortgage lenders or MBS investors that obligate them to act in the best interest of the lender or investor, and these contracts may limit servicers’ ability to undertake some loan workouts or modifications. The scope of such contracts and the obligations that servicers must meet vary.

1 For a more detailed discussion of the foreclosure process and the factors that contribute to a lender’s decision to pursue foreclosure, see CRS Report RL34232, The Process, Data, and Costs of Mortgage Foreclosure, coordinated by Darryl E. Getter.
Background on Home Mortgage Foreclosures

Foreclosure Trends

Home prices rose rapidly throughout some regions of the United States beginning in 2001. Housing has traditionally been seen as a safe investment that can offer an opportunity for high returns, and rapidly rising home prices reinforced this view. During this housing “boom,” many people decided to buy homes or take out second mortgages in order to access their increasing home equity. Furthermore, rising home prices and low interest rates contributed to a sharp increase in people refinancing their mortgages. Some refinanced to access lower interest rates and lower their mortgage payments, while many also used the refinancing process to take out larger mortgages in order to access their home equity. For example, between 2000 and 2003, the number of refinanced mortgage loans jumped from 2.5 million to over 15 million, and the Federal Reserve estimated that 45% of refinances included households taking equity out of their homes. Around the same time, subprime lending also began to increase, reaching a peak between 2004 and 2006. (See the nearby text box for a description of prime and subprime mortgages.)

Beginning in 2006 and 2007, home sales started to decline and home prices stopped rising and began to fall in many regions. The rates of homeowners becoming delinquent on their mortgages began to increase, and the percentage of home loans in the foreclosure process in the U.S. began to rise rapidly beginning around the middle of 2006. Although not all homes in the foreclosure process will end in a foreclosure completion, an increase in the number of loans in the foreclosure process is generally accompanied by an increase in the number of homes on which a foreclosure is completed. According to the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA), an industry group, about 1% of all home loans were in the foreclosure process in the second quarter of 2006. By the fourth quarter of 2009, the rate had more than quadrupled to over 4.5%, and it peaked in the fourth quarter of 2010 at about 4.6%. Since then, the percentage of mortgages in the foreclosure process has started to decrease, but still remains high by historical standards. In the first quarter of 2015, the rate of loans in the foreclosure process was about 2.2%.

Prime, Subprime, and Alt-A Mortgages

Prime mortgages are mortgages made to the most creditworthy borrowers who qualify for the best available interest rates.

Subprime mortgages are made to borrowers who are considered to be riskier than prime borrowers, and carry higher interest rates to compensate lenders for the increased risk. There is no standard definition of subprime mortgages, and the term is defined differently in different contexts. However, they are often defined as mortgages made to borrowers with credit scores below a certain threshold. Subprime mortgages are also more likely than prime mortgages to include certain non-traditional features.

Alt-A mortgages refer to mortgages that are closer to prime but for various reasons do not qualify for prime rates. For example, an Alt-A loan might be made to a borrower with a good credit history, but factors such as the debt-to-income ratio or the level of income and asset documentation prevent the mortgage from being considered prime.

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Figure 1 illustrates the trends in the rates of all mortgages, subprime mortgages, and prime mortgages in the foreclosure process over the past several years.

**Figure 1. Percentage of Mortgages in the Foreclosure Process**

Q1 2001–Q1 2015

Source: Figure created by CRS using data from the Mortgage Bankers Association.

Notes: The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) is one of several organizations that reports delinquency and foreclosure data. MBA estimates that its data cover between 80%-90% of outstanding first-lien mortgages on single-family properties.

The foreclosure rate for subprime loans has always been higher than the foreclosure rate for prime loans. For example, in the second quarter of 2006, just over 3.5% of subprime loans were in the foreclosure process compared to less than 0.5% of prime loans. However, both prime and subprime loans have seen increases in foreclosure rates over the past several years. Like the foreclosure rate for all loans combined, the foreclosure rates for prime and subprime loans both more than quadrupled after 2006, with the rate of subprime loans in the foreclosure process increasing to over 15.5% in the fourth quarter of 2009 and the rate of prime loans in the foreclosure process increasing to more than 3% over the same time period. As of the first quarter of 2015, the rate of subprime loans in the foreclosure process was about 9%, while the rate of prime loans in the foreclosure process was about 1.3%.

In addition to mortgages that were in the foreclosure process, an additional 2% of all mortgages were 90 or more days delinquent but not yet in foreclosure in the first quarter of 2015. These are mortgages that are in default, but for one reason or another, the mortgage servicer has not started the foreclosure process yet. Such reasons could include the volume of delinquent loans that the servicer is handling, delays due to efforts to modify the mortgage before beginning foreclosure, or voluntary pauses in foreclosure activity put in place by the servicer. Considering mortgages that are 90 or more days delinquent but not yet in foreclosure, as well as mortgages that are actively in the foreclosure process, may give a more complete picture of the number of mortgages that are in danger of foreclosure completions.
Impacts of Foreclosure

Losing a home to foreclosure can have a number of negative effects on a household. For many families, losing a home can mean losing the household’s largest store of wealth. Furthermore, foreclosure can negatively impact a borrower’s creditworthiness, making it more difficult for him or her to buy a home in the future. Finally, losing a home to foreclosure can also mean that a household loses many of the less tangible benefits of owning a home. Research has shown that these benefits might include increased civic engagement that results from having a stake in the community, and better health, school, and behavioral outcomes for children.4

Some homeowners might have difficulty finding a place to live after losing their home to foreclosure. Many will become renters. However, some landlords may be unwilling to rent to families whose credit has been damaged by a foreclosure, limiting the options open to these families. There can also be spillover effects from foreclosures on current renters. Renters living in buildings where the landlord is facing foreclosure may be required to move, sometimes on very short notice, even if they are current on their rent payments.5 As more homeowners become renters and as more current renters are displaced when their landlords face foreclosure, pressure on local rental markets may increase, and more families may have difficulty finding affordable rental housing. Some observers have also raised the concern that high numbers of foreclosures can contribute to homelessness, either because families who lose their homes have trouble finding new places to live or because the increased demand for rental housing makes it more difficult for families to find adequate, affordable units. However, researchers have noted that a lack of data makes it difficult to measure the extent to which foreclosures contribute to homelessness.6

If foreclosures are concentrated, they can also have negative impacts on communities. Many foreclosures in a single neighborhood may depress surrounding home values.7 If foreclosed homes stand vacant for long periods of time, they can attract crime and blight, especially if they are not well-maintained. Concentrated foreclosures also place pressure on local governments, which can lose property tax revenue and may have to step in to maintain vacant foreclosed properties.

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5 In 2009, Congress passed the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (PTFA), a temporary measure to provide certain federal protections for renters living in foreclosed properties. The law required that most tenants be given at least 90 days’ notice before being evicted, and in some cases allowed tenants to remain for the terms of their lease. The PTFA expired on December 31, 2014.
Why Might a Household Find Itself Facing Foreclosure?

There are many reasons that a household might become delinquent on its mortgage payments. Some borrowers may have simply taken out loans on homes that they could not afford. However, many homeowners who believed they were acting responsibly when they took out a mortgage nonetheless find themselves facing foreclosure. Factors that can contribute to a household having difficulty making its mortgage payments include changes in personal circumstances, which can be exacerbated by macroeconomic conditions, and features of the mortgages themselves.

Changes in Household Circumstances

Changes in a household’s circumstances can affect its ability to pay its mortgage. For example, a number of events can leave a household with a lower income than it anticipated when it bought its home. Such changes in circumstances can include a lost job, an illness, or a change in family structure due to divorce or death. Families that expected to maintain a certain level of income may struggle to make payments if a household member loses a job or faces a cut in pay, or if a two-earner household becomes a single-earner household. Unexpected medical bills or other unforeseen expenses can also make it difficult for a family to stay current on its mortgage.

Furthermore, sometimes a change in circumstances means that a home no longer meets a family’s needs, and the household needs to sell the home. These changes can include having to relocate for a job or needing a bigger house to accommodate a new child or an aging parent. Traditionally, households that needed to move, or who experienced a decline in income, could usually sell their existing homes. However, the decline in home prices that began around 2008 in many communities nationwide left many households in a negative equity position, or “underwater,” meaning that they owe more on their mortgages than the houses are now worth. This limits homeowners’ ability to sell their homes for enough money to pay off their mortgages if they have to move; many of these families are effectively trapped in their current homes and mortgages because they cannot afford to sell their homes at a loss.

The risks presented by changing personal circumstances have always existed for anyone who took out a loan, but deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, such as falling home prices and increasing unemployment, have made families especially vulnerable to losing their homes for such reasons. The fall in home values that has left some homeowners owing more than the value of their homes makes it difficult for homeowners to sell their homes in order to avoid a foreclosure if they experience a change in circumstances, and it increases the incentive for homeowners to walk away from their homes if they can no longer afford their mortgage payments. Along with the fall in home values, another macroeconomic trend accompanying the decrease in home values and increase in foreclosures was high unemployment. More households experiencing job loss and the resultant income loss made it difficult for many families to keep up with their monthly mortgage payments.

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8 According to CoreLogic, a real estate analytics firm, negative equity peaked in the fourth quarter of 2011, when over 12 million properties, or a quarter of households with mortgages, had negative equity in their homes. As of the fourth quarter of 2014, rising home prices had helped many households regain positive equity, but nearly 11% of households with mortgages, or nearly 5.5 million households, remained in negative equity positions. See CoreLogic, *Equity Report Fourth Quarter 2014*, p. 3, [http://www.corelogic.com/research/negative-equity/corelogic-q4-2014-equity-report.pdf](http://www.corelogic.com/research/negative-equity/corelogic-q4-2014-equity-report.pdf).
Mortgage Features

Borrowers might also find themselves having difficulty staying current on their loan payments due in part to features of their mortgages. In the years preceding the sharp increase in foreclosure rates, there had been an increase in the use of alternative mortgage products whose terms differ significantly from the traditional 30-year, fixed interest rate mortgage model. While borrowers with traditional mortgages are not immune to delinquency and foreclosure, many of these alternative mortgage features seem to have increased the risk that a homeowner will have trouble staying current on his or her mortgage. Many of these loans were structured to have low monthly payments in the early stages and then adjust to higher monthly payments depending on prevailing market interest rates and/or the length of time the borrower held the mortgage. Furthermore, many of these mortgage features made it more difficult for homeowners to quickly build equity in their homes. Some examples of the features of these alternative mortgage products are listed below.

- **Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs):** With an adjustable-rate mortgage, a borrower’s interest rate can change at predetermined intervals, often based on changes in an index. The new interest rate can be higher or lower than the initial interest rate, and monthly payments can also be higher or lower based on both the new interest rate and any interest rate or payment caps. Some ARMs also include an initial low interest rate known as a teaser rate. After the initial low-interest period ends and the new interest rate kicks in, the monthly payments that the borrower must make may increase, possibly by a significant amount.

ARMs make financial sense for some borrowers, especially if interest rates are expected to stay the same or go down in the future or if the gap between short-term and long-term rates gets very wide (the interest rate on ARMs tends to follow short-term interest rates in the economy). The lower initial interest rate on ARMs can help people own a home sooner than they may have been able to otherwise, or can make sense for borrowers who cannot afford a high loan payment in the present but expect a significant increase in income in the future that would allow them to afford higher monthly payments. Further, in markets with rising property values, borrowers with ARMs may be able to refinance their mortgages before the mortgage resets in order to avoid higher interest rates or large increases in monthly payments. However, ARMs can become problematic if borrowers are not prepared for increases in monthly payments that can accompany higher interest rates. If home prices fall, refinancing the mortgage or

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11 Even if the interest rate remains the same or decreases, it is possible for monthly payments to increase if prior payments were subject to an interest rate cap or a payment cap. This is because unpaid interest that would have accrued if not for the cap can be added to the principal loan amount, resulting in negative amortization. For more information on the many variations of adjustable rate mortgages, see The Federal Reserve Board, *Consumer Handbook on Adjustable Rate Mortgages*, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/arms_english.htm#drop.
selling the home to pay off the debt may not be feasible, leaving the homeowner with higher mortgage payments if interest rates rise.

- **Zero- or Low-Down Payment Loans:** As the name suggests, zero-down payment and low-down payment loans require either no down payment or a significantly lower down payment than has traditionally been required. These types of loans can make it easier for certain creditworthy homebuyers who do not have the funds to make a large down payment to purchase a home. This type of loan may be especially useful in areas where home prices are rising more rapidly than income, because it allows borrowers without enough cash for a large down payment to enter markets they could not otherwise afford. However, a low- or no-down payment loan also means that families have little or no equity in their homes in the early phases of the mortgage, making it difficult to sell the home or refinance the mortgage in response to a change in circumstances if home prices decline. Such loans may also mean that a homeowner takes out a larger mortgage than he or she would otherwise.

- **Interest-Only Loans:** With an interest-only loan, borrowers pay only the interest on a mortgage—but no part of the principal—for a set period of time. This option increases the homeowner’s monthly payments in the future, after the interest-only period ends and the principal amortizes. These types of loans limit a household’s ability to build equity in its home, making it difficult to sell or refinance the home in response to a change in circumstances if home prices are declining.

- **Negative Amortization Loans:** With a negative amortization loan, borrowers have the option to pay less than the full amount of the interest due for a set period of time. The loan “negatively amortizes” as the remaining interest is added to the outstanding loan balance. Like interest-only loans, this option increases future monthly mortgage payments when the principal and the balance of the interest amortizes. These types of loans can be useful in markets where property values are rising rapidly, because borrowers can enter the market and then use the equity gained from rising home prices to refinance into loans with better terms before payments increase. They can also make sense for borrowers who currently have low incomes but expect a significant increase in income in the future. However, when home prices stagnate or fall, interest-only loans and negative amortization loans can leave borrowers with negative equity, making it difficult to refinance or sell the home to pay the mortgage debt.

- **Low- or No-Documentation Loans:** As the name suggests, these types of loans did not require the full range of income and asset documentation that is usually required to obtain a mortgage. Traditionally, these types of loans were made to borrowers with good credit scores and, usually, high incomes or large amounts of personal wealth, but they began to be used more widely in the years preceding the increase in foreclosure rates. Low- or no-documentation loans may be useful for borrowers with income that is difficult to document, such as those who are self-employed or work on commission. However, because a lender does not have full income information, these loans may not be underwritten as rigorously as other types of mortgages. Furthermore, they have the potential to allow for more fraudulent activity on the part of both borrowers and lenders.

While all of these types of loans can make sense for certain borrowers in certain circumstances, many of these loan features began to be used more widely and may have played a role in the
recent increase in foreclosure rates. Some homeowners were current on their mortgages before their monthly payments increased due to interest rate resets or the end of option periods. Some built up little equity in their homes because they were not paying down the principal balance of their loan or because they had not made a down payment. Borrowers without sufficient equity find it difficult to take advantage of options such as refinancing into a more traditional mortgage if monthly payments become too high or selling the home if their personal circumstances change. Stagnant or falling home prices in many regions also hampered borrowers’ ability to build equity in their homes, and mortgage payment increases combined with house price declines resulted in limited options for some troubled borrowers.

**Types of Loan Workouts**

When a household falls behind on its mortgage, there are options that lenders or mortgage servicers may be able to employ as an alternative to beginning foreclosure proceedings. Some of these options, such as a short sale and a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, allow a homeowner to avoid the foreclosure process but still result in a household losing its home. This section describes methods of avoiding foreclosure that allow homeowners to keep their homes; these options generally take the form of repayment plans or loan modifications.

**Repayment Plans**

A repayment plan allows a delinquent borrower to regain current status on his loan by paying back the payments he or she has missed, along with any accrued late fees. This is different from a loan modification, which changes one or more of the terms of the loan (such as the interest rate). Under a repayment plan, the missed payments and late fees may be paid back after the rest of the loan is paid off, or they may be added to the existing monthly payments. The first option increases the time that it will take for a borrower to pay back the loan, but his or her monthly payments will remain the same. The second option may result in an increase in monthly payments. Repayment plans may be a good option for homeowners who experienced a temporary loss of income but are now financially stable. However, since they do not generally make payments more affordable, repayment plans are unlikely to help homeowners with unaffordable loans avoid foreclosure in the long term.

**Interest Rate Reductions**

One form of a loan modification is when the lender voluntarily lowers the interest rate on a mortgage. This is different from a refinance, in which a borrower takes out a new mortgage with a lower interest rate and uses the proceeds from the new loan to pay off the old loan. Unlike refinancing, a borrower does not have to pay closing costs or qualify for a new loan to get a mortgage modification with an interest rate reduction, which can make interest rate reductions a good option for borrowers who owe more on their mortgages than their homes are worth. The interest rate can be reduced permanently, or it can be reduced for a period of time before

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12 In a short sale, a household sells its home for less than the amount it owes on its mortgage. Often, the mortgage holder will accept the proceeds from the sale as payment in full on the mortgage even though it is taking a loss. A deed-in-lieu of foreclosure refers to the practice of a borrower turning the deed to the house over to the lender, which accepts the deed as payment of the mortgage debt. However, in some cases, the borrower may still be liable for the remaining outstanding mortgage debt when a short sale or a deed-in-lieu is utilized.
increasing again to a certain fixed point. Lenders can also freeze interest rates at their current level in order to avoid impending interest rate resets on adjustable rate mortgages. Interest rate modifications are relatively costly to the lender or mortgage investor because they reduce the amount of interest income that the lender or investor will receive, but they can be effective at reducing monthly payments to an affordable level.

**Extended Loan Term/Extended Amortization**

Another type of loan modification that can lower monthly mortgage payments is extending the amount of time over which the loan is paid back. While extending the loan term increases the total cost of the mortgage for the borrower because more interest will accrue, it allows monthly payments to be smaller because they are paid over a longer period of time. Most mortgages in the U.S. have an initial loan term of 30 years; extending the loan term from 30 to 40 years, for example, could result in a lower monthly mortgage payment for the borrower.

**Principal Forbearance**

Principal forbearance means that a lender or servicer removes part of the principal from the portion of the loan balance that is subject to interest, thereby lowering borrowers’ monthly payments by reducing the amount of interest owed. The portion of the principal that is subject to forbearance still needs to be repaid by the borrower in full, usually after the interest-bearing part of the loan is paid off or when the home is sold. Because principal forbearance does not actually change any of the loan terms, it resembles a repayment plan more than a loan modification.

**Principal Forgiveness**

Principal forgiveness, also called principal reduction or a principal write-down, is a type of mortgage modification that lowers borrowers’ monthly payments by forgiving a portion of the loan’s principal balance. The forgiven portion of the principal never needs to be repaid. Because the borrower now owes less, his or her monthly payment will be smaller. This option may be costlier for lenders or mortgage investors than other types of mortgage modifications, but it can help borrowers achieve affordable monthly payments, as well as increase the equity that borrowers have in their homes and therefore increase their desire to stay current on the mortgage and avoid foreclosure.13

**Current Foreclosure Prevention Initiatives**

There has been broad bipartisan consensus that the rapid rise in foreclosures has had negative consequences on households and communities.14 There has been less agreement among

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13 Historically, one impediment to principal forgiveness has been that borrowers were required to claim the forgiven amount as income, and therefore had to pay taxes on that income. In December 2007, Congress passed legislation that temporarily excluded mortgage debt forgiven prior to January 1, 2010, from taxable income; the exclusion has since been extended to mortgage debt forgiven prior to January 1, 2015. For more information about the tax treatment of principal forgiveness, see CRS Report RL34212, *Analysis of the Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income*, by Mark P. Keightley and Erika K. Lunder.

14 For example, in 2008, Representative Spencer Bachus, then-chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services, said that “[i]t is in everyone’s best interest as a general rule to prevent foreclosures. Foreclosures have a (continued...)
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policymakers about how much the federal government should do to prevent foreclosures. Proponents of enacting government policies and using government resources to prevent foreclosures argue that, in addition to assisting households experiencing hardship, such action may prevent further damage to home values and communities that can be caused by concentrated foreclosures. Supporters also suggest that preventing foreclosures may help stabilize the economy as a whole.

Opponents of government foreclosure prevention programs argue that foreclosure prevention should be worked out between lenders and borrowers without government interference. Opponents express concern that people who do not really need help, or who are not perceived to deserve help, could unfairly take advantage of government foreclosure prevention programs. They argue that taxpayers’ money should not be used to help people who can still afford their loans but want to get more favorable mortgage terms, people who may be seeking to pass their losses on to the lender or the taxpayer, or people who knowingly took on mortgages that they could not afford.

Despite the concerns surrounding foreclosure prevention programs, and disagreement over the proper role of the government in preserving homeownership, since 2007 the federal government has implemented a variety of temporary initiatives to attempt to address the high rates of residential mortgage foreclosures. Some of these initiatives have been enacted by Congress, while others were created administratively by the Bush and Obama administrations.

In addition to federal efforts to address mortgage foreclosures, many state and local governments have also implemented a range of initiatives to reduce the number of foreclosures in recent years. The private sector has also pursued foreclosure prevention efforts, including creating the HOPE NOW Alliance, a voluntary alliance of mortgage servicers, lenders, investors, counseling agencies, and others that formed in October 2007 with the encouragement of the federal government to engage in active outreach efforts to troubled borrowers.15 While many private lenders and mortgage servicers participate in federal foreclosure prevention initiatives, many also have their own programs or procedures in place to work with borrowers who are having difficulty making their mortgage payments. This report focuses on federal efforts to prevent foreclosure, and does not address these state, local, and private sector efforts.

This section describes federal foreclosure prevention initiatives that are currently active.16 The Appendix describes certain additional federal foreclosure prevention initiatives that were implemented in response to the increase in foreclosure rates but have since ended.

(...continued)


15 For a full list of current members of the HOPE NOW Alliance, see the HOPE NOW website at https://www.hopenow.com/members.php.

16 This section describes broad federal programs intended to assist troubled borrowers and reduce foreclosures. There have also been additional efforts to prevent unnecessary foreclosures, including amendments to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act to extend temporary foreclosure protections for servicemembers; legal settlements between the federal (continued...)
Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP)

On February 18, 2009, President Obama announced the Making Home Affordable (MHA) program. Making Home Affordable includes separate initiatives to make it easier for certain homeowners with little or no equity in their homes to refinance their mortgages and to help certain troubled borrowers obtain affordable loan modifications. These initiatives are known as the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP) and the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), respectively. HARP is described in this subsection, and HAMP is described in the following subsection.

Program Description

HARP allows certain homeowners with mortgages owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to refinance their mortgages in order to take advantage of lower interest rates, even if the amount owed on the mortgage exceeds 80% of the value of the home. Generally, borrowers who owe more than 80% of the value of their homes have difficulty refinancing their mortgages, and therefore benefitting from lower interest rates, because they do not have enough equity in their homes. By allowing borrowers who owe more than 80% of the value of their homes to refinance their mortgages, the plan is meant to help qualified borrowers lower their monthly mortgage payments to a level that is more affordable. Rather than targeting homeowners who are behind on their mortgage payments, HARP targets homeowners who have kept up with their payments but have lost equity in their homes due to falling home prices.

Originally, qualified borrowers were eligible to refinance under this program if they owed up to 105% of the value of their homes (that is, if the loan-to-value ratio, or LTV, was at or below 105%). In July 2009, the Administration announced that it would expand the program to include borrowers who owe up to 125% of the value of their homes. In October 2011, it was announced that the loan-to-value ratio cap would be removed entirely.

(...continued)

It allows banks that, in part, directed funding towards homeowners affected by foreclosures; administrative changes by federal housing agencies (like the Federal Housing Administration) and the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to address their loss mitigation policies; and rules promulgated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to establish national standards for mortgage servicers, including standards related to how they service troubled mortgages. These efforts are not included in this report.

17 The program details originally referred to the program as the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan, or HASP. Further program details released on March 4, 2009, began referring to the plan as Making Home Affordable. More information on Making Home Affordable can be found http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/Pages/default.aspx.

18 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that were chartered by Congress to provide liquidity to the mortgage market. Rather than make loans directly, the GSEs buy loans made in the private market and either hold them in their own portfolios or securitize and sell them to investors. The GSEs were placed in voluntary conservatorship by their regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) on September 7, 2008. For more information on the GSEs in general, see CRS Report RL33756, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: A Legal and Policy Overview, by N. Eric Weiss and Michael V. Seitzinger, and for more information on the conservatorship, see CRS Report R42760, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Financial Status: Frequently Asked Questions, by N. Eric Weiss.
Basic Eligibility Criteria

In addition to having a mortgage owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, other eligibility criteria apply. For example, a borrower must have a mortgage on a single-family home, the original mortgage must have been closed on or before May 31, 2009, and the borrower must be current on the mortgage payments, among other eligibility criteria. The program is voluntary, and lenders are not required to refinance mortgages through HARP even if the mortgages meet all of the eligibility criteria.

HARP 2.0

In October 2011, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) announced a number of changes to HARP designed to allow more people to qualify for the program. These changes are commonly referred to as “HARP 2.0.” One of these changes was removing the cap on the loan-to-value ratio, which had previously limited eligibility for the program to those with loan-to-value ratios up to 125%. Other changes included eliminating or reducing certain fees paid by borrowers who refinance through HARP, waiving certain representations and warranties made by lenders on the original loans (intended to make lenders more likely to participate in HARP by releasing them from some responsibility for any defects in the original loan), and encouraging greater use of automated valuation models instead of property appraisals in order to streamline the refinancing process.

HARP Results to Date

The Administration originally estimated that HARP could help up to between 4 million and 5 million homeowners. According to the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), nearly 3.3 million loans with loan-to-value ratios above 80% had refinanced through HARP as of February 2015. The majority of these mortgages (2.3 million) had loan-to-value ratios between 80% and 105%, while over 550,000 mortgages had loan-to-value ratios above 105% up to 125% and over.

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19 Borrowers can look up whether their loan is owned by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac at http://makinghomeaffordable.gov/loan_lookup.html.

20 Originally, the original mortgage must have been delivered to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on or prior to May 31, 2009. Because there is often a lag between when a mortgage closes and when it is sold and delivered to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, this meant that some mortgages that had closed on or prior to May 31, 2009, may not have been eligible if they had not also been delivered to Fannie or Freddie prior to that date. In October 2013, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac each announced that HARP would now be open to mortgages that closed on or prior to May 31, 2009, regardless of the date that the mortgage was delivered. See Fannie Mae Selling Guide Announcement SEL-2013-08, dated October 22, 2013, at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/announcement/sel1308.pdf; and Freddie Mac, “Revised Eligibility Date for Relief Refinance Mortgages,” October 22, 2013, at http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/news/2013/1022_revised_eligibility_date.html.


22 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac each released their own guidance governing how the HARP changes were implemented for loans that they own or guarantee. Fannie Mae’s detailed guidance on the program changes is at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/anltrs/pdf/2011/sell1112.pdf, while Freddie Mac’s is at http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/bill1122.pdf.

400,000 mortgages had loan-to-value ratios above 125%. Table 1 shows the number of HARP refinances completed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac since the program began.

### Table 1. Number of HARP Refinances
(as of February 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LTV over 80% up to 105%</th>
<th>Fannie Mae</th>
<th>Freddie Mac</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LTV over 105% up to 125%</td>
<td>315,879</td>
<td>251,186</td>
<td>567,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTV over 125%</td>
<td>250,740</td>
<td>170,782</td>
<td>421,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,945,718</td>
<td>1,346,000</td>
<td>3,291,718</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Federal Housing Finance Agency, Refinance Report, February 2015.

**Program End Date**

HARP is currently scheduled to be available until December 31, 2016.24

**Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)**

The mortgage modification piece of the Administration’s Making Home Affordable program is the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).25 It is primarily administered by the Department of the Treasury. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac each issue their own program guidance for the mortgages that they own or guarantee.26

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25 HAMP shares some features of earlier foreclosure prevention programs, such as Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Streamlined Modification Program and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s plan to modify loans held by the failed IndyMac Bank. These programs are described in the Appendix.

26 Treasury’s requirements governing HAMP for mortgages that are not backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are available in a handbook that is updated periodically to incorporate new guidance or changes to the program. That handbook is available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/index.jsp. HAMP guidance related to mortgages owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac can be found on those entities’ respective websites. In general, the HAMP guidance for GSE mortgages is broadly similar to the guidance for non-GSE mortgages, but there are some differences.
Program Description

Through HAMP, the government provides financial incentives to participating mortgage servicers that provide loan modifications to eligible troubled borrowers in order to reduce the borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments to no more than 31% of their monthly income. HAMP is voluntary for mortgage servicers, but once a servicer signs an agreement with Treasury to participate in the program, that servicer is bound by the rules of the program and is required to modify eligible mortgages that it services according to the program guidelines.

For mortgages that are modified under HAMP, servicers reduce borrowers’ payments by reducing the interest rate, extending the loan term, and forbearing principal, in that order, as necessary to reach the target payment ratio of 31% of monthly income. (Servicers are permitted to reduce mortgage principal as part of a HAMP modification, but are not required to do so.) Servicers can reduce interest rates to as low as 2%. The new interest rate must remain in place for five years; after five years, if the interest rate is below the market rate at the time the modification agreement was completed, the interest rate can rise by one percentage point per year until it reaches that market rate. (See the nearby text box on “HAMP Interest Rate Adjustments.”) Borrowers must make modified payments on time during a three-month trial period before the modification can be converted to permanent status.

The government provides financial incentives to servicers, investors, and borrowers for participation. Servicers receive an upfront incentive payment for each successful permanent loan modification and a “pay-for-success” payment for up to three years if the borrower remains current after the modification and the mortgage payment was reduced by at least six percent. The borrower can also receive a “pay-for-success” incentive payment (in the form of principal reduction) for up to five years if he or she remains current after the modification is finalized, as well as an additional principal reduction payment at the end of the sixth year after modification if the loan is in good standing. Investors receive the payment cost-share incentive (that is, after the investor bears the cost of reducing the monthly payment to 38% of monthly income, the government will pay half the cost of further reducing the monthly mortgage payment from 38% to 31% of monthly income). Investors can also receive incentive payments for loans modified before a borrower becomes delinquent and for modifications in areas with declining home prices (“Home Price Decline Protection” incentives), provided that the borrower’s monthly mortgage payment is reduced by at least 6%.

Treasury has made a number of changes to the rules governing HAMP since the program began. Some of these changes have been relatively minor, while others have been more significant. Treasury communicates changes to the HAMP requirements to servicers in documents called Supplemental Directives. In addition, Treasury has implemented several additional HAMP

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27 Servicers of mortgages backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are required to participate in HAMP for those mortgages. Companies that received funding through Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) or Financial Stability Plan (FSP) programs announced after the announcement of Making Home Affordable are also required to participate in HAMP. A list of participating servicers is available at http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/get-started/contact-mortgage/Pages/default.aspx.

28 Incentive payments and how they are calculated are described in Treasury’s Making Home Affordable Handbook, Chapter II, Section 13.

29 Archived Supplemental Directives, which have since been incorporated into the Making Home Affordable Handbook, are available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/guidance.jsp. More recent Supplemental Directives that have not yet been incorporated into the Handbook are at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/guidance.jsp.
components to attempt to assist certain groups, such as unemployed borrowers or borrowers with negative equity, which are described in the “Additional HAMP Components” section of this report.

## HAMP Interest Rate Adjustments

Under HAMP, one of the ways in which mortgages are modified to achieve a 31% mortgage payment-to-income ratio is by reducing the interest rate on the mortgage to as low as 2%. The modified interest rate remains in effect for five years from the date of the modification, at which point the interest rate can rise by up to one percentage point per year until it reaches the market interest rate that was in effect at the time of the modification. For example, say a borrower had an interest rate of 6% on his original mortgage, that the interest rate was reduced to 3% under a modification, and that the market interest rate in effect at the time of the modification was 4.5%. After five years, the modified interest rate would increase to 4% from 3%, and the year after that it would increase to 4.5% from 4%. At that point there would be no further interest rate increases for this particular borrower. (Average market interest rates fluctuate over the course of a year, but the average annual interest rates for the years between 2009 and 2013 range from under 4% to just over 5%).

The first interest rate increases began in the later quarters of 2014, but larger numbers of borrowers are expected to experience payment increases in 2015 and the following years. Treasury estimates that over 80% of borrowers who received a standard HAMP modification (that is, not a “Tier 2” modification) will experience interest rate increases, with an average overall increase in monthly mortgage payments of over $200 after all of the interest rate increases go into effect. However, expected average payment increases vary by state. For more information on the timing of interest rate increases and the median amount of payment increases by state, see Treasury’s *Making Home Affordable Program Performance Report through the Fourth Quarter of 2014*, pages 35-36.

Some housing advocates have expressed concerns that the interest rate increases and resulting payment increases could make it difficult for some borrowers to continue making their mortgage payments. In December 2014, Treasury announced that homeowners who remain current on their payments under HAMP through six years will be eligible for an additional financial incentive of $5,000 in the form of principal reduction. (Borrowers were already eligible for $1,000 per year in the form of principal reduction for each of the first five years of the modification if they remained current on their modified mortgages.) The additional financial incentive may, in part, be intended to mitigate the impact of the interest rate increases on borrowers.

### Basic Eligibility Criteria

The requirements governing HAMP are complex, and a number of factors can impact whether or not a specific borrower qualifies for the program. However, there are several basic eligibility criteria that a borrower must meet in order to qualify for a standard HAMP modification, including the following:

- a borrower must have a mortgage on a single-family (one-to-four unit) property that was originated on or before January 1, 2009,
- the borrower must live in the home as his or her primary residence (this criterion does not necessarily have to be met to qualify for a certain type of HAMP modification, described in the “HAMP “Tier 2”” section below),
- the unpaid principal balance on the mortgage must be no greater than $729,750 for a one-unit property,
- the borrower must currently be paying more than 31% of his monthly gross income toward mortgage payments,

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30 See Freddie Mac’s historical monthly data for 30-year fixed rate mortgages at http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms_archives.html.
the borrower must be experiencing a financial hardship that makes it difficult to remain current on the mortgage. Borrowers need not already be in default on their mortgages in order to qualify, but default must be “reasonably foreseeable,” and

the estimated net present value of a modification must result in greater value for the mortgage investor than the net present value of pursuing a foreclosure (this “net present value test” is described in more detail below).

More detailed eligibility criteria and program requirements are included in Treasury’s *Making Home Affordable Handbook* and related policy directives. Treasury’s requirements govern mortgages that are not backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; Fannie and Freddie issue their own program requirements for the mortgages that they own or guarantee.

Servicers participating in HAMP conduct a “net present value test” (NPV test) on eligible mortgages that compares the expected financial returns to investors from doing a loan modification to the expected financial returns from pursuing a foreclosure. If the expected returns from a loan modification are greater than those from foreclosure, servicers are required to reduce borrowers’ payments to no more than 38% of monthly income. The government then shares half the cost of reducing borrowers’ payments from 38% of monthly income to 31% of monthly income. Servicers are not required to modify mortgages with negative net present value results.

**HAMP Funding**

The Administration originally estimated that HAMP would cost $75 billion. Of this amount, $50 billion was to come from Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds, and $25 billion was to come from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for the costs of modifying mortgages that those entities own or guarantee.

Treasury later revised its estimate of the amount of TARP funds that will be used for HAMP, and has used some of the $50 billion originally allocated to HAMP to help pay for other foreclosure-

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31 The most recent version of the Making Home Affordable Handbook and any associated policy directives (called “Supplemental Directives”) can be found at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/hamp.jsp#. The handbook contains the requirements for mortgages that are not backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Guidance for mortgages backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can be found on their respective websites.

32 Servicers are allowed to use their own values for certain NPV inputs on the basis of their own portfolio experience, but such allowed changes are limited and must be approved by Treasury. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) required Treasury to make a net present value test available on the internet, based on Treasury’s NPV methodology, to help borrowers better understand the NPV test and their potential results. Treasury was also required to include a disclaimer stating that specific servicers’ NPV models may differ in some respects. The NPV calculator is available at https://checkmynpv.com/. The Dodd-Frank Act also requires that servicers provide borrowers with certain NPV inputs upon denying the borrowers for HAMP modifications; this differed from Treasury’s guidance at the time, in which borrowers had to ask servicers to see certain NPV inputs within a certain time period if the borrower was denied a modification due to a negative NPV result.


related programs (the Hardest Hit Fund and the FHA Refinance program, both described in later sections of this report). Ultimately, Treasury committed about $38 billion of TARP funds to its foreclosure prevention programs, rather than the initial $50 billion. Of this amount, nearly $30 billion is committed to HAMP and its related programs, $7.6 billion is committed to the Hardest Hit Fund, and just over $100 million is committed to the FHA Short Refinance Program.  

As of May 1, 2015, $15.9 billion of the TARP funding committed to these foreclosure prevention programs has been disbursed. Of that amount, $10.8 billion has been disbursed for HAMP and its related programs.

**HAMP Results to Date**

The Administration originally estimated that HAMP could eventually help up to between 3 million and 4 million homeowners. The Treasury Department releases quarterly reports detailing the program’s progress. These reports offer a variety of information, including the number of overall trial and permanent modifications made under HAMP and the number of each that are currently active, the number of trial and permanent modifications made by individual servicers, and the number of trial and permanent modifications underway in each state. (As noted earlier, borrowers must successfully complete a three-month trial period before the modification is converted to permanent status.)

According to the report for the fourth quarter of 2014, there were just over 1 million active HAMP modifications as of the end of 2014. Of these, about 40,000 were active trial modifications and about 968,000 were active permanent modifications. Table 2 shows the number of HAMP trial and permanent modifications that have started since the program began, along with the number of each that are currently active.

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37 Previously, Treasury published monthly HAMP performance reports. Beginning with the second quarter of 2014, the reports are published on a quarterly basis rather than a monthly basis. The last monthly report was published in May 2014.


Conversion of Trial Modifications to Permanent Status

After HAMP had been in place for several months, many observers began to express concern at the high number of trial modifications that were being canceled rather than converting to permanent status and the length of time that it was taking for trial modifications to become permanent. In response to these concerns, Treasury took a number of steps to attempt to facilitate the conversion of trial modifications to permanent modifications, including outreach efforts to borrowers to help them understand and meet the program’s documentation requirements and increased reporting requirements and monitoring of servicers.\(^41\) Most notably, since June 1, 2010, Treasury has required servicers to have documented income information from borrowers before offering a trial modification and to verify that information before a borrower can be approved for a trial period plan.\(^42\)

Prior to June 2010, Treasury had allowed servicers to approve borrowers for trial modifications on the basis of stated income information in order to get trial modifications started more quickly, but the servicers had to verify this information before a modification could become permanent. In cases where the borrowers’ stated income information differed from the documented information, servicers often had to re-evaluate borrowers for the program (for example, by running a new NPV test), which sometimes took additional time or resulted in borrowers who had been approved for a trial modification being denied for a permanent modification.

Requiring verified information before a trial modification could begin was expected to result in more trial modifications converting to permanent modifications going forward. As of the end of 2014, Treasury reported that 91,000 trial modifications had been canceled since the requirement for servicers to verify income upfront had gone into effect in June 2010. This is compared to nearly 700,000 trial modifications that were canceled prior to June 2010.\(^43\)

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\(^43\) U.S. Department of the Treasury, *Making Home Affordable Program Performance Report Through the Fourth* (continued...)
Treasury’s Assessments of Servicer Performance

In its April 2011 monthly report on HAMP, Treasury released comprehensive results of an examination of the performance of the ten largest servicers participating in HAMP, and indicated that it would continue to release the results of these servicer assessments on a quarterly basis. As a result of this first examination, Treasury announced that it was going to withhold incentive payments to three of the largest participating servicers due to findings that the servicers’ performance under the program was not meeting Treasury’s standards. The servicers, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo, were all found to need “substantial” improvement in several areas. Treasury said that it would reinstate the incentive payments when the servicers’ performance improved and was no longer found to need substantial improvement. The remaining six of the ten largest servicers were found to need moderate improvement, but Treasury did not withhold incentive payments from those servicers.

Treasury’s subsequent assessments of servicer performance generally showed improvement. The results of the second round of quarterly servicer assessments, included in the July 2011 monthly report, found that Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase continued to need substantial improvement, and the October 2011 monthly report found that only one servicer, JP Morgan Chase, was found to need substantial improvement. By the January 2012 monthly report, no servicers were found to need substantial improvement; seven were found to need moderate improvement, and two were found to need minor improvement. As of the end of 2014, seven servicers were included in the assessment. None were found to need substantial improvement, five were found to need moderate improvement, and two were found to need minor improvement.

Program End Date

Modifications can be made through HAMP until December 31, 2016, unless the program is terminated before that date.

(...continued)

Quarter of 2014, p. 5.

44 A fourth servicer, Ocwen, was found to need substantial improvement as well, but Treasury did not withhold incentive payments from Ocwen at that time due to a finding that its performance was partially due to a loan portfolio that it had bought from another company.


50 The program was originally scheduled to end on December 31, 2012. However, in January 2012 the Administration announced that it would extend the deadline to December 31, 2013; in May 2013 the Administration announced that it would extend the program until December 31, 2015; and in June 2014 the Administration announced that it would extend the program until at least December 31, 2016. See press releases from Treasury and HUD announcing the
Additional HAMP Components

Since the program’s announcement, Treasury has established a number of additional components or subprograms that operate under HAMP. The subprograms that operate under HAMP include the following:

**Second Lien Modification Program (2MP)**

Many borrowers have second mortgages on their homes. Second mortgages have the potential to make loan modifications more difficult because (1) modifying the first lien may not reduce households’ total monthly mortgage payments to an affordable level if the second mortgage remains unmodified, and (2) holders of primary mortgages may be hesitant to modify the mortgage if the second mortgage holder does not agree to re-subordinate the second mortgage to the first mortgage or to modify the second mortgage as well. Under 2MP, if the servicer of the second lien is participating in 2MP, then that servicer must agree either to modify the second lien in accordance with program guidelines, or to extinguish the second lien entirely in exchange for a lump sum payment, when a borrower’s first mortgage is modified under HAMP. (Servicers sign up to participate in 2MP separately from signing up to participate in HAMP.)

Participating servicers and investors can receive financial incentives for modifying or extinguishing second liens under 2MP, and borrowers who remain current on both their HAMP modification and 2MP modification can receive “pay-for-success” incentives payments for up to five years.

2MP was first announced in August 2009. Treasury reports that about 85,000 second-lien modifications were active under 2MP as of the end of 2014.

**Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program (HAFA)**

Through the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program (HAFA), when a borrower meets the basic eligibility criteria for HAMP, but does not ultimately qualify for a modification, does not successfully complete the trial period, or defaults on a HAMP modification, participating

(continued)


51 During the 112th Congress, the House passed H.R. 839, which, if enacted, would have terminated the program and rescinded unobligated funds. Borrowers who were currently participating in the program would not have been affected if this bill had become law. CBO estimated that H.R. 839 would have reduced direct federal spending by $1.4 billion over a 10-year period. (See Congressional Budget Office, H.R. 839 HAMP Termination Act of 2011, cost estimate, March 11, 2011, http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12097/hr839.pdf.) The bill was not considered by the Senate.

52 All of these subprograms are described in detail in Treasury’s Making Home Affordable Handbook.


servicers can receive incentive payments for completing a short sale or a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure as an alternative to foreclosure.\textsuperscript{56} Servicers can receive financial incentive payments for each short sale or deed-in-lieu that is successfully executed, and borrowers can receive financial incentive payments to help with relocation expenses. Investors can receive partial reimbursement if they agree to share a portion of the proceeds of the short sale with any subordinate lienholders.\textsuperscript{57} (The subordinate lienholders, in turn, must release their liens on the property and waive all claims against the borrower for the unpaid balance of the subordinate mortgages.) In order to attempt to streamline the process of short sales and deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure under HAFA, Treasury provides standardized documentation and processes for participating servicers to use.

HAFA went into effect on April 5, 2010, although servicers had the option to begin implementing the program before this date. Treasury reports that about 341,000 HAFA transactions had been completed as of the end of 2014.\textsuperscript{58} Most of these transactions have been short sales rather than deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure.

**Home Affordable Unemployment Program (UP)**

The Home Affordable Unemployment Program (UP) targets borrowers who are unemployed. Under UP, participating servicers are required to offer forbearance periods to unemployed borrowers who apply for HAMP and meet the UP eligibility criteria before evaluating those borrowers for HAMP. The forbearance period lasts for a minimum of twelve months, or until the borrower becomes re-employed.\textsuperscript{59} Borrowers’ mortgage payments are lowered to 31\% or less of their monthly income through principal forbearance during this time period.

After the forbearance period ends, it is expected that some borrowers will have regained employment and will not need further assistance. Other borrowers, such as those who are re-employed but at a lower salary, may be able to qualify for a regular HAMP modification. Still other borrowers may qualify for a foreclosure alternative such as a short sale or a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, and some borrowers ultimately may not be able to avoid foreclosure.

UP went into effect on July 1, 2010, although servicers could choose to implement the program earlier.\textsuperscript{60} Treasury reports that about 42,000 UP forbearance plans had been started as of the end of 2014.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{56} Short sales and deeds-in-lieu are described in footnote 12. Under HAFA, the lender must agree to accept the proceeds of the short sale or the deed and property as full payment of the mortgage debt, and may not pursue borrowers for any remaining amounts owed on the mortgage. Short sales and deeds-in-lieu have a negative impact on a borrower’s credit, but they may result in fewer negative consequences overall for the borrower than a foreclosure.


\textsuperscript{60} The original detailed guidelines on the Home Affordable Unemployment Program were released in Supplemental Directive 10-04 on May 11, 2010. These guidelines are available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/docs/hamp_servicer/sd1004.pdf. Updated guidance can be found in Treasury’s Making Home Affordable Handbook, (continued...)
Principal Reduction Alternative (PRA)

Under the Principal Reduction Alternative (PRA), participating servicers are required to consider reducing principal balances as part of HAMP modifications for homeowners who owe at least 115% of the value of their home. This applies to mortgages that are not backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie’s and Freddie’s regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), currently does not allow principal reduction for mortgages that Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac own or guarantee.

Under PRA, servicers run two net present value tests for borrowers who owe at least 115% of the value of their homes: the first is the standard NPV test, and the second includes principal reduction. If the net present value of the modification is higher under the test that includes principal reduction, servicers have the option to reduce principal. However, they are not required to do so. If the principal is reduced, the amount of the principal reduction will initially be treated as principal forbearance; the forborne amount will then be forgiven in three equal amounts over three years as long as the borrower remains current on his or her mortgage payments. Treasury offers additional financial incentives to investors when principal is reduced under PRA.

The PRA went into effect on October 1, 2010. According to Treasury, about 135,000 permanent PRA modifications were active as of the end of 2014. In addition, there were about 38,000 active HAMP modifications that included principal reduction outside of PRA.

HAMP “Tier 2”

In early 2012, Treasury announced that some borrowers who are not eligible for a standard HAMP modification may be eligible for an expanded version of HAMP, referred to as HAMP Tier 2. HAMP Tier 2 represents an alternative to the standard HAMP modification (now referred to as HAMP Tier 1), rather than a replacement of the standard HAMP modification.

Under HAMP Tier 2, borrowers still have to meet many of the basic HAMP eligibility criteria, including having a mortgage on a single-family property that was originated on or before January 1, 2009, experiencing a documented hardship, and having an unpaid principal balance below specified thresholds. However, borrowers might be able to qualify even if they do not meet other requirements to qualify for a standard HAMP modification, such as if they have a minimum mortgage payment-to-income ratio that is already below 31% or if they do not live in the home as a primary residence. In order for a mortgage secured by a rental property to be eligible for HAMP Tier 2, the borrower must be delinquent on the mortgage (mortgages in “imminent default” are not eligible), the property must be currently occupied by a tenant or be vacant, and the borrower

(...continued)


must certify that he or she intends to rent the property for at least five years (although at any point in that five year period the borrower can sell the home or choose to occupy it as a principal residence).

In addition to the eligibility requirements being different for HAMP Tier 2, the way in which servicers modify mortgages and the incentive payment structure also differ. Only mortgages that are not backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are eligible for HAMP Tier 2.65

HAMP Tier 2 went into effect in June 2012. According to Treasury, a total of about 110,000 HAMP Tier 2 trial modifications had been started, and about 85,000 HAMP Tier 2 permanent modifications had been started, as of the end of 2014.66

**Hardest Hit Fund**

On February 19, 2010, the Obama Administration announced that it would make up to a total of $1.5 billion available to the housing finance agencies (HFAs) of five states that had experienced the greatest declines in home prices. This program is known as the Hardest Hit Fund (HHF), and several additional rounds of funding have been announced since its inception. The funding comes from the TARP funds that Treasury initially set aside for HAMP. Therefore, all Hardest Hit Fund funding must be used in ways that comply with the law that authorized TARP, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343).67

The five states that received funding in the first round of the HHF are California, Arizona, Florida, Nevada, and Michigan.68 The Administration set maximum allocations for each state based on a formula, and the HFAs of those states were required to submit their plans for the funds to Treasury for approval in order to receive funds through the program. The participating states can use the funding for a variety of programs that address foreclosures and are tailored to specific areas, including programs to help unemployed homeowners, programs to help homeowners who owe more than their homes are worth, or programs to address the challenges that second liens pose to mortgage modifications.

On March 29, 2010, the Administration announced a second round of funding for the HHF. This second round of funding made up to a total of an additional $600 million available to five states that had large proportions of their populations living in areas of economic distress, defined as counties with unemployment rates above 12% in 2009 (the five states that received funding in the first round were not eligible). The five states that received funding through this second round are

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65 Although mortgages backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are not eligible for HAMP Tier 2, they may be eligible for a similar modification called the GSE Standard Modification, developed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as part of their Servicing Alignment Initiative started in October 2011. Information on Freddie Mac’s Standard Modification is at http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/service/standard_modification.html, and information on Fannie Mae’s Standard Modification is at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/servicing/d2/3.2/05.html.


North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. These states can use the funds to support the same types of programs eligible under the first round of funding, and are subject to the same requirements.69

On August 11, 2010, the Administration announced a third round of funding for the HHF.70 This third round of funding makes a total of up to $2 billion available to 18 states and the District of Columbia, all of which had unemployment rates higher than the national average over the previous year. Nine of the states that received funds through the third round of funding also received funding in one of the previous two rounds of Hardest Hit Fund funding.71 The states that received funding in the third round but not in either of the previous two rounds are Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Jersey, Tennessee, and the District of Columbia. Like the first two rounds of funding, states had to submit plans for the funds for Treasury’s approval. Unlike the first two rounds of funding, states have to use funds from the third round specifically for foreclosure prevention programs that target the unemployed.

In September 2010, Treasury announced an additional $3.5 billion of funding to be distributed to the 18 states and the District of Columbia that were receiving funding through earlier rounds, bringing the total amount of funding allocated to the HHF to $7.6 billion.

State Funding Allocations

Table 3 shows the total maximum allocation of funds, through all rounds of funding, for each state that is receiving funding through the Hardest Hit Fund, along with the amount that has actually been drawn down by each state as of March 2015. (Funds that have been drawn down by states may or may not have actually been spent by the states to date.72 In order to draw down additional amounts from Treasury, a state may not have more than 5% of its total allocation on hand.) States have until December 31, 2017 to spend their HHF allocations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total Funding Allocated</th>
<th>Amount Drawn from Treasury as of March 31, 2015</th>
<th>% of Total Allocation Drawn from Treasury as of February 28, 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>$162.5</td>
<td>$40.0</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>$267.8</td>
<td>$155.8</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>$1,975.3</td>
<td>$1,217.5</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>$1,057.8</td>
<td>$596.3</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


71 Except for Arizona, every state that received funding in one of the first two rounds of the Hardest Hit Fund also received funding in the third round.

72 For information on the amount of HHF funding that each state has actually disbursed, rather than the amount it has drawn from Treasury, see Treasury’s quarterly Hardest Hit Fund performance summaries at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/HHF.aspx.
Preserving Homeownership: Foreclosure Prevention Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total Funding Allocated</th>
<th>Amount Drawn from Treasury as of March 31, 2015</th>
<th>% of Total Allocation Drawn from Treasury as of February 28, 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>$339.3</td>
<td>$194.0</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>$445.6</td>
<td>$395.0</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>$221.7</td>
<td>$110.7</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>$148.9</td>
<td>$104.0</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>$498.6</td>
<td>$304.1</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>$101.9</td>
<td>$65.8</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>$194.0</td>
<td>$112.0</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>$300.5</td>
<td>$245.5</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>$482.8</td>
<td>$395.2</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>$570.4</td>
<td>$499.2</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>$220.0</td>
<td>$220.0</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>$79.4</td>
<td>$79.4</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>$295.4</td>
<td>$162.5</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>$217.3</td>
<td>$177.3</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>$20.7</td>
<td>$18.2</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7,600.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>$5,092.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>67%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As of the end of March 2015, $5.1 billion, or about 67%, of all HHF funds had been drawn down by states. The percentages of their allocations that individual states have drawn from Treasury range from a low of 25% (Alabama) to a high of 100% (Oregon and Rhode Island), with most states falling somewhere in between.

**State Hardest Hit Fund Programs**

As described, states had flexibility to design different types of programs using their Hardest Hit Fund allocations, as long as their programs met the purposes of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and were approved by Treasury. State HFAs may operate one or more programs with their HHF funds. (States that received funding in the third round are required to use those funds to assist unemployed homeowners.) In general, the types of programs that states have implemented fall under a few broad categories: standard mortgage modification programs, principal reduction programs, mortgage reinstatement programs (to help borrowers pay arrearages and late fees to bring a mortgage current again), programs to help unemployed homeowners with mortgage payments, programs to address second liens, programs to facilitate short sales or deeds-in-lieu of foreclosure, and, more recently, blight elimination programs (programs for demolishing vacant or abandoned homes that are contributing to blight).73

73 Brief descriptions of each participating state’s HHF programs are included in Treasury’s quarterly Hardest Hit Fund Performance Summaries, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/HHF.aspx. (continued...)
According to Treasury, there were over 70 Hardest Hit Fund programs operating in the 19 states (including DC) that received Hardest Hit Fund allocations as of December 2014, and these programs had assisted over 200,000 borrowers. About two-thirds of the HHF funding is being used for programs targeted to unemployed borrowers. States have continued to add or make changes to their Hardest Hit Fund programs.

**FHA Short Refinance Program**

On March 26, 2010, the Administration announced a new Federal Housing Administration (FHA) Short Refinance Program for homeowners who owe more on their mortgages than their homes are worth. Detailed program guidance was released on August 6, 2010. Under the program, certain homeowners who owe more than their homes are worth may be able to refinance into new, FHA-insured mortgages for an amount lower than the home’s current value. Specifically, the new mortgage cannot have a loan-to-value ratio of more than 97.75%. The original lender will accept the proceeds of the new loan as payment in full on the original mortgage; the new lender will have FHA insurance on the new loan; and the homeowner will have a first mortgage balance that is below the current value of the home, thereby giving him or her some equity in the home. Homeowners must be current on their mortgages to qualify for this program. Further, the balance on the first mortgage loan must be reduced by at least 10%. This program is voluntary for lenders and borrowers, and borrowers with mortgages already insured by FHA are not eligible.

The FHA Short Refinance Program is similar in structure to the Hope for Homeowners program (described in the Appendix), which was still active at the time that the FHA Short Refinance Program began but has since ended. However, there are some key differences between the two programs. First, Hope for Homeowners required that any second liens be extinguished. Under the FHA Short Refinance Program, second liens are specifically allowed to remain in place. Incentives are offered for the second lien-holder to reduce the balance of the second lien, and the homeowner’s combined debt on both the first and the second lien is not allowed to exceed 115% of the value of the home after the refinance. Second, under Hope for Homeowners, borrowers could be either current or delinquent on their mortgages and qualify for the program. Under the FHA Short Refinance Program, borrowers must be current on their mortgages. Finally, under Hope for Homeowners, borrowers had to agree to share some of their initial equity in the home with the government when the house was eventually sold. The FHA Short Refinance Program does not appear to require any equity or appreciation sharing.

(...continued)

More detailed information on state programs is included in each state’s HFA’s Hardest Hit Fund agreements with Treasury and their related amendments, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/housing/Pages/Program-Documents.aspx.


75 Treasury’s quarterly performance summaries on the Hardest Hit Fund and Treasury’s monthly reports to Congress on the Troubled Asset Relief Program generally include information on changes that states have made to their HHF programs. The monthly reports to Congress on the Troubled Asset Relief Program are available on Treasury’s website at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/Monthly-Report-to-Congress.aspx.

The FHA Short Refinance Program began on September 7, 2010, and is to be available until December 31, 2016, unless it is terminated before that date. As of the end of January 2015, FHA reported refinancing about 5,500 loans through the program. Treasury originally planned to use up to $8 billion of the TARP funds originally set aside for HAMP to pay for the cost of this program, but given the low volume of participation and the associated lower number of defaults expected under the program, it has since reduced the total maximum amount that it will spend on the program to just over $100 million. Any additional program costs would be borne by FHA.

Foreclosure Counseling Funding for NeighborWorks America

Another federal effort to slow the rising number of foreclosures has been to provide additional funding for housing counseling. In particular, Congress has provided funding specifically for foreclosure mitigation counseling to be administered by NeighborWorks America, a nonprofit organization created by Congress in 1978 that has a national network of community partners. NeighborWorks traditionally provides housing counseling to homebuyers and homeowners through its network organizations, and also trains other nonprofit housing counseling organizations in foreclosure counseling.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161) provided $180 million for NeighborWorks to distribute for foreclosure mitigation counseling, which it has done by setting up the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program (NFMCP). NeighborWorks competitively awards the funding to qualified housing counseling organizations. Congress directed NeighborWorks to award the funding with a focus on areas with high default and foreclosure rates on subprime mortgages. The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008

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78 During the 112th Congress, the House of Representatives passed a bill (H.R. 830) which, if enacted, would have terminated the FHA Short Refinance Program and rescinded unexpended funds. Borrowers whose loans had already been refinanced through the program would have been affected if this bill became law. CBO estimated that enacting H.R. 830 would have decreased the federal deficit by $175 million (see Congressional Budget Office, H.R. 830 FHA Refinance Program Termination Act of 2011, cost estimate, March 7, 2011, http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12089/hr830.pdf). The Senate did not consider the bill.

79 Data obtained from CRS communications with HUD.


81 For more information on housing counseling, see archived CRS Report R41351, Housing Counseling: Background and Federal Role, by Katie Jones.

82 Each year, Congress appropriates funding to HUD to distribute to certified housing counseling organizations to undertake various types of housing counseling, including pre-purchase counseling and post-purchase counseling. Congress also appropriates funding to NeighborWorks each year for neighborhood reinvestment activities, including housing counseling. The recent funding provided to NeighborWorks specifically for foreclosure mitigation counseling is separate from both of these other usual appropriations.

83 For more information on the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program, see the NeighborWorks website at http://www.nw.org/network/nfmcp/default.asp#/info.

84 HUD-approved housing counseling intermediaries, state housing finance agencies, and NeighborWorks organizations are eligible to receive funds through the NFMCP.
(HERA, P.L. 110-289) provided an additional $180 million for NeighborWorks to distribute through the NFMCP, $30 million of which was to be distributed to counseling organizations to provide legal help to homeowners facing delinquency or foreclosure.

Since HERA, Congress has continued to provide funding for the NFMCP through annual appropriations acts, in amounts ranging from $50 million to $80 million per year. These amounts are shown in Table 4. In FY2015, Congress provided $50 million for the NFMCP.

### Table 4. Funding for the National Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law</th>
<th>Date Enacted</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161)</td>
<td>December 26, 2007</td>
<td>$180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8)</td>
<td>March 11, 2009</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (P.L. 112-10)</td>
<td>April 15, 2011</td>
<td>$65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-55)</td>
<td>November 18, 2011</td>
<td>$80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6)</td>
<td>March 26, 2013</td>
<td>$76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76)</td>
<td>January 17, 2014</td>
<td>$67.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Notes:** The funds provided in P.L. 110-289 included funding for legal assistance for homeowners facing foreclosure. Funding for FY2013 takes into account reductions due to sequestration and a 0.2% across-the-board rescission.

### Selected Proposals for Additional Foreclosure Prevention Actions

Over the years, some policymakers and others have argued for certain additional actions to be taken to assist troubled borrowers. This section briefly outlines two prominent options that have been proposed in recent years for further action to help prevent foreclosures.
Preserving Homeownership: Foreclosure Prevention Initiatives

Changing Bankruptcy Law

One method that has been suggested to help more homeowners remain in their homes is to amend bankruptcy law to allow for the restructuring of residential mortgages as part of certain types of bankruptcy proceedings. Under current law, the restructuring of various debt obligations, including mortgages on second homes and vacation homes, is permissible under certain circumstances, but this authority does not extend to mortgages on primary residences.

Opponents of such a change argue that allowing these “cramdowns” would make lenders more hesitant to make mortgage loans in the future, or could raise the costs of mortgages for borrowers, since the possibility of a loan being modified in this way could make mortgage lending more risky. Supporters of amending bankruptcy law say that, in addition to helping a borrower in bankruptcy avoid foreclosure through a court-mandated loan modification, such a change might also encourage lenders to work with borrowers to modify loans before the bankruptcy process begins in the first place.

In each of the past several Congresses, bills have been introduced to amend bankruptcy law to allow for the modification of mortgages on primary residences. However, none of these bills have been enacted into law.\(^\text{85}\)

Increased Use of Principal Reduction

Some have called for more widespread use of principal reduction in loan modifications. In mortgage modifications that include principal reduction, some of the principal amount that the borrower owes is forgiven by the lender. Currently, mortgages that are not backed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac or government agencies such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) are eligible for principal reduction at the discretion of the mortgage holder. Programs such as the HAMP Principal Reduction Alternative (PRA), described earlier in this report, provide incentives for reducing principal for certain borrowers. However, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, has not allowed principal reduction on mortgages backed by those entities, either through the PRA or otherwise.

The use of principal reduction in modifications has increased somewhat in recent years, but is still used in a relatively small share of modifications. For example, according to data from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), principal reduction was used in less than 10% of modifications during the fourth quarter of 2014.\(^\text{86}\) Some policymakers and advocates have urged wider use of principal reduction, and have argued that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should be allowed or required to reduce principal on certain mortgages that they own or guarantee. Given that over 5 million households with mortgages currently owe more than their homes are worth,\(^\text{87}\) advocates of principal reduction argue that it could be an effective tool in preventing foreclosures.

\(^{85}\) For a discussion of bills of this type that were considered in the 111\(^{\text{th}}\) Congress, see archived CRS Report RL34301, The Primary Residence Exception: Legislative Proposals in the 111\(^{\text{th}}\) Congress to Amend the Bankruptcy Code to Allow the Strip Down of Certain Home Mortgages, by David H. Carpenter. Bills that included mortgage cramdown provisions have also been introduced in the 112\(^{\text{nd}}\), 113\(^{\text{rd}}\), and 114\(^{\text{th}}\) Congresses.


Preserving Homeownership: Foreclosure Prevention Initiatives

Proponents of principal reduction suggest that it might provide an advantage over other types of modifications because it better aligns the amount a borrower owes with the amount that the house is worth, possibly giving borrowers more of an incentive to remain current on the modified mortgage. Advocates also argue that reducing principal can be in the best interest of mortgage holders if the cost of principal reduction is less than the cost of foreclosure.

Opponents of more widespread use of principal reduction argue that monthly mortgage payments can be reduced without forgiving mortgage principal, that reducing principal for some borrowers is unfair to others who do not benefit from such relief, and that greater use of principal reduction could encourage some people to default on their mortgages to try to qualify for principal reduction.88

Issues and Challenges Associated with Preventing Foreclosures

There are several challenges associated with designing successful programs to prevent foreclosures. Some of these challenges are practical and concern issues surrounding the implementation of loan modifications. Other challenges are more conceptual, and are related to questions of fairness and precedent. This section describes some of the most prominent considerations involved in programs to preserve homeownership.

Who Has the Authority to Modify Mortgages?

Over the past several decades, the practice of lenders packaging mortgages into securities and selling them to investors has become more widespread. This practice is known as securitization, and the securities that include the mortgages are known as mortgage-backed securities (MBS). When mortgages are sold through securitization, several players become involved with any individual mortgage loan, including the lender, the servicer, and the investors who hold shares in the MBS. The servicer is usually the organization that has the most contact with the borrower, including receiving monthly payments and initiating any foreclosure proceedings. However, servicers are usually subject to contracts with investors which limit the activities that the servicer can undertake and require it to safeguard the investors' financial interest.

One question that has faced foreclosure prevention programs, particularly in the early stages of the response to rising foreclosure rates, has been the extent to which servicers have the authority to make certain loan modifications. Contractual obligations may limit the amount of flexibility that servicers have to modify loans in ways that could arguably yield a lower return for investors. In some cases, loan modifications can result in less of a loss for investors than foreclosure; however, servicers may not want to risk having investors challenge their assessment that a modification is more cost-effective than a foreclosure.

88 For a more detailed discussion of the arguments for and against more widespread use of principal reduction, as well as legislative proposals related to principal reduction from the 112th Congress, see CRS Report R42480, Reduce, Refinance, and Rent? The Economic Incentives, Risks, and Ramifications of Housing Market Policy Options, by Sean M. Hoskins.
One possible way to partially address the question of who can modify mortgages is to provide a
safe harbor for servicers. In general, a safe harbor protects servicers who engage in certain
mortgage modifications from lawsuits brought by investors. While proponents of a safe harbor
believe that a safe harbor is necessary to encourage servicers to modify more mortgages without
fear of legal repercussions, opponents argue that a safe harbor infringes on investors’ rights and
could even encourage servicers to modify mortgages that are not in trouble if it benefits their own
self-interest. The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-22) provided a safe
harbor for servicers who modified mortgages prior to December 31, 2012, in a manner consistent
with the Making Home Affordable program guidelines or the since-expired Hope for
Homeowners program. The legislation specified that the safe harbor does not protect servicers or
individuals from liability for any fraud committed in their handling of the mortgage or the
mortgage modification.

The existence of HAMP and other foreclosure prevention programs may have also helped to
standardize mortgage modifications to some extent, possibly providing a clearer set of guidelines
to servicers about what constitutes an appropriate mortgage modification. The net present value
test in programs such as HAMP is intended to help ensure that the modifications servicers make
are in the best interest of the investors in the mortgage.

Volume of Delinquencies and Foreclosures

Another issue facing loan modification programs is the high volume of delinquencies and
foreclosure proceedings that have been underway since 2007. Lenders and servicers have a
limited number of employees to reach out to troubled borrowers and find solutions, and this was
particularly true in the early years of the foreclosure response before servicers increased staffing
levels to address the volume of delinquent mortgages. Contacting borrowers—some of whom
may avoid contact with their servicer out of embarrassment or fear—and working out large
numbers of individual loan modifications can overwhelm the capacity of the lenders and servicers
who are trying to help homeowners avoid foreclosure. In addition, the complexity of mortgage
modification programs and changes in program requirements can stress servicing staff.
Streamlined plans that use a formula to modify all loans that meet certain criteria may make it
easier for lenders and servicers to help a greater number of borrowers in a shorter amount of time.
However, streamlined plans may be more likely to run into the contractual issues between
servicers and investors described above.

Servicer Incentives

Mortgage servicers are the entities that are often primarily responsible for making the decision to
modify a mortgage or to begin the foreclosure process. Concerns have been raised that mortgage
servicers’ compensation structures may provide incentives for them to pursue foreclosure rather
than modify loans in certain cases, even if a modification would be in the best interest of the
investor as well as the borrower.89

89 For example, see Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan
bitstream/handle/1773.1/1074/86WLR755.pdf?sequence=1.
Servicers’ actions are governed by contracts with mortgage holders or investors that generally require servicers to act in the best interests of the entity on whose behalf they service the mortgages, although, as described above, such contracts may in some cases also include restrictions on servicers’ abilities to modify loans. In addition to their contractual obligations, servicers have an incentive to service mortgages in the best interest of investors because that is one way that mortgage servicers ensure that they will attract continued business. However, some have suggested that servicers’ compensation structures may provide incentives for servicers to pursue foreclosure even when it is not in the best interest of the investor in the mortgage. For example, servicers’ compensation structures may not provide an incentive to put in the extra work that is necessary to modify a mortgage, and servicers may be able to charge more in fees or recoup more expenses through a foreclosure than a modification.90 Programs such as HAMP provide financial payments to servicers to modify mortgages, but some argue that these may not be large enough to align servicers’ incentives with those of borrowers and investors. In 2011, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and HUD announced a joint initiative to consider alternative servicer compensation structures.91

Possibility of Redefault

Another challenge associated with loan modification programs is the possibility that a homeowner who receives a modification will nevertheless default on the loan again in the future. This possibility might be of particular concern for lenders or investors if the home’s value is falling, because in that case delaying an eventual foreclosure reduces the value that the mortgage holder can recoup through a foreclosure sale. Furthermore, modified mortgages that default again in the future can potentially harm borrowers. If a borrower defaults again and eventually loses his home to foreclosure, he may have been better off going through foreclosure earlier rather than making modified mortgage payments for a period of time when that money could have been put to another use.

Data released quarterly by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) track the re-default rates of modified mortgages. Data from the fourth quarter of 2014 show that, for loans modified in the third quarter of 2013, 19% were 30 or more days delinquent again three months after the modification, 24% were 30 or more days delinquent six months after the modification, and 31% were 30 or more days delinquent 15 months after the modification. The same data show that a smaller percentage of modified loans were 60 or more days delinquent: 9% of loans were 60 or more days delinquent three months after the modification, 14% were 60 or more days delinquent six months after the modification, and 21% were 60 or more days delinquent 15 months after the modification.92

The OCC also reports data that show redefault rates according to whether the loan modification increased monthly payments, decreased monthly payments, or left monthly payments unchanged. The reports include such data for loans modified since the beginning of 2008. The report covering the fourth quarter of 2014 shows that, for loans modified in 2011, about 15% of loan modifications that resulted in monthly payments being reduced by 20% or more were 60 or more days delinquent twelve months after modification. This compares to a re-default rate of 27% for loans where monthly payments were reduced by between 10% and 20%; 34% for loans where payments were reduced by less than 10%; 17% for loans where payments remained unchanged; and 45% for loans where monthly payments increased. Similar patterns hold for mortgages modified in other years. While loan modifications that lower monthly payments do appear to perform better than modifications that increase monthly payments, a significant number of modified loans with lower monthly payments still become delinquent again after the loan modification.\textsuperscript{93}

**Possibility of Distorting Borrower Incentives**

Another challenge is that loan modification programs may provide an incentive for borrowers to intentionally miss payments or default on their mortgages in order to qualify for a loan modification that provides more favorable mortgage terms. While many of the programs described above specifically require that a borrower must not have intentionally missed payments on his or her mortgage in order to qualify for the program, it can be difficult to prove a person’s intention. Programs that are designed to reach out to distressed borrowers before they miss any payments, as well as those who are already delinquent, may minimize the incentive for homeowners to intentionally fall behind on their mortgages in order to receive help.

**Fairness Issues**

Opponents of some foreclosure prevention plans argue that it is not fair to help homeowners who have fallen behind on their mortgages while homeowners who may be struggling to stay current receive no help. Others argue that borrowers who took out mortgages that they knew they could not afford should not receive federal government assistance. Supporters of loan modification plans point out that many borrowers go into foreclosure for reasons outside of their control, and that some troubled borrowers may have been victims of deceptive, unfair, or fraudulent lending practices. Furthermore, some argue for foreclosure prevention programs because foreclosures can create problems for other homeowners in the neighborhood by dragging down property values or putting a strain on local governments.

To address these concerns about fairness, some loan modification programs reach out to borrowers who are struggling to make payments but are not yet delinquent on their mortgages. Most programs also specifically exclude individuals who provided false information in order to obtain a mortgage.

\textsuperscript{93} OCC Mortgage Metrics Report, p. 36-38.
Precedent

Some opponents of government efforts to provide or encourage loan modifications argue that changing the terms of a contract retroactively sets a troubling precedent for future mortgage lending. These opponents argue that if lenders or investors believe that they could be required or encouraged to change the terms of a mortgage in the future, they will be less likely to provide mortgage loans in the first place or will only do so at higher interest rates to counter the perceived increase in the risk of not being repaid in full. Most existing programs attempt to address this concern by limiting the program’s scope. Often, these programs apply only to mortgages that originated during a certain time frame, and end at a pre-determined date, although the end dates for several programs have been extended multiple times.
Appendix. Expired Foreclosure Prevention Initiatives

In addition to the foreclosure prevention initiatives described earlier in this report, several other foreclosure prevention initiatives were created or announced in recent years but are no longer active. Many of these programs were precursors to the programs that are in place today.

This Appendix briefly describes some of these initiatives, beginning with those that most recently ended. The programs discussed in this Appendix include the Emergency Homeowners Loan Program, Hope for Homeowners, FHA Secure, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Streamlined Modification Program, and the FDIC’s program for modifying loans that had been held by IndyMac Bank. All of these programs expired several years ago, although some borrowers may be continuing to receive assistance through these programs if they began participating in the program prior to the program’s end date.

Emergency Homeowners Loan Program

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), which was signed into law by President Obama in July 2010, included up to $1 billion for HUD to use to administer a program to provide short-term loans to certain troubled borrowers who had experienced a decrease in income due to unemployment, underemployment, or a medical emergency, in order to help them make their mortgage payments. HUD chose to provide this funding to the 32 states (and Puerto Rico) that did not receive funding through the Administration’s Hardest Hit Fund (described in the “Hardest Hit Fund” section of this report). By statute, HUD was not able to enter into new agreements under this program, called the Emergency Homeowners Loan Program (EHLP), after September 30, 2011.

EHLP funds were used to provide five-year, zero-interest, non-recourse loans secured by junior liens on the property to help pay arrearages on the mortgage and to assist the borrower in making mortgage payments for up to 24 months going forward. An individual borrower was eligible to receive up to a maximum loan of $50,000.

To qualify for the EHLP, borrowers had to meet certain conditions, including the following:

- Borrowers must have had a household income of 120% or less of area median income prior to the unemployment, underemployment, or medical event that made the household unable to make its mortgage payments;


95 In the 112th Congress, the House passed H.R. 836, which would have terminated the EHLP and rescinded any unobligated program balances. Any borrowers who had already received loans through the program would not have been affected if the bill had become law. CBO estimated that enacting H.R. 836 would have decreased the federal budget deficit by $840 million. (See Congressional Budget Office, H.R. 836 Emergency Mortgage Relief Program Termination Act of 2011, cost estimate, March 7, 2011, http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12090/hr836.pdf.)

96 Information on program requirements can be found in HUD’s “Emergency Homeowner Loan Program – Summary,” available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hce/msgs/EHLP100810.pdf.
Borrowers must have had a current gross income of at least 15% less than the household’s income prior to the unemployment, underemployment, or medical event;

- Borrowers must have been at least three months delinquent and have received notification of the lender’s intent to foreclose;
- Borrowers must have had a reasonable likelihood of being able to resume making full monthly mortgage payments within two years, and had a total debt-to-income ratio of less than 55%; and
- Borrowers must have resided in the property as a principal residence, and the property must have been a single-family (one- to four-unit) property.

Borrowers were required to contribute 31% of their monthly gross income at the time of their application (but in no case less than $25) to monthly payments on the first mortgage, and were required to report any changes in income or employment status while they were receiving assistance. The assistance ends when one of the following events occurs: (1) the maximum assistance amount has been reached; (2) the household regains an income level of 85% or more of its income prior to the unemployment or medical event; (3) the homeowner no longer resides in or sells the property or refines the mortgage; (4) the borrower defaults on his portion of the first mortgage payments; or (5) the borrower fails to report changes in employment status or income.

Borrowers are not required to make payments on the loans for a five-year period as long as the borrowers remain in the properties as their principal residences and stay current on their first mortgage payments. If these conditions are met, the balance of the EHLP loan declines by 20% annually until the debt is extinguished at the end of five years. However, the borrower will be responsible for repaying the loan to HUD under certain circumstances.\textsuperscript{97}

HUD has not released final data on how many borrowers participated in the program. Media reports from the time the program ended suggested that between 10,000 and 15,000 borrowers may have been assisted, with only about half of the funding allocated to the program ultimately being spent.\textsuperscript{98} Participation may have been lower than initially anticipated in part because of delays in getting the program started and borrowers having difficulty meeting the eligibility criteria to qualify for assistance.

\textsuperscript{97} Participating borrowers must repay the EHLP assistance if (1) the borrower retains ownership of the home but no longer resides in it as a principal residence; (2) the borrower defaults on his or her first mortgage payments; or (3) the borrower receives net proceeds from selling the home or refinancing the mortgage. In the third case, if the proceeds of the sale or refinance are not sufficient to repay the entire remaining balance of the loan, the remaining balance will be considered to have been paid in full and the lien on the property will be released.

Hope for Homeowners

Congress created the Hope for Homeowners (H4H) program in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-289), which was signed into law by President George W. Bush on July 30, 2008. The program, which was voluntary on the part of both borrowers and lenders, offered certain borrowers the ability to refinance into new mortgages insured by FHA if their lenders agreed to certain loan modifications. Hope for Homeowners began on October 1, 2008, and ended on September 30, 2011.99

In order to be eligible for the program, borrowers were required to meet the following requirements:

- The borrower must have had a mortgage that was originated on or before January 1, 2008.
- The borrower’s mortgage payments must have been more than 31% of gross monthly income.
- The borrower must not have owned another home.
- The borrower must not have intentionally defaulted on his or her mortgage or any other substantial debt within the last five years, and he or she must not have been convicted of fraud during the last ten years under either federal or state law.
- The borrower must not have provided false information to obtain the original mortgage.

Under Hope for Homeowners, the lender agreed to write the mortgage down to a percentage of the home’s currently appraised value, and the borrower received a new loan insured by the FHA. The new mortgage was a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage with no prepayment penalties, and could not exceed $550,440. Homeowners paid upfront and annual mortgage insurance premiums to FHA, and any second lien-holders were required to release their liens. When the homeowner sells or refines the home, he or she is required to pay an exit premium to HUD. The exit premium is a percentage of the initial equity the borrower has in the home after the H4H refinance; if the borrower sells or refines the home during the first year after the H4H refinance, the exit premium is 100% of the initial equity. After five years, the exit premium is 50% of the initial equity.100

Congress authorized certain changes to the Hope for Homeowners program in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343) and the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-22). HUD used the authority granted in both of these laws to make changes to H4H from its original form. For example, HUD lowered the mortgage insurance premiums charged to borrowers; made changes to the maximum loan-to-value ratio on the refinanced loan; offered immediate payments to certain second lien-holders to release their liens; eliminated a


100 See FHA Mortgagee Letter 09-43, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/2009ml.cfm. Initially, borrowers had to share a portion of both their equity and any appreciation in the home’s value with HUD when the home was sold or refinanced. P.L. 111-22 provided the authority to change this requirement.
requirement for a borrower to share any home price appreciation with HUD when the home was sold or refinanced; and replaced a requirement for a borrower to share equity in the home with HUD with the exit premium.\footnote{For the most recent comprehensive guidance on Hope for Homeowners, including these changes, see FHA Mortgagee Letter 09-43, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/2009ml.cfm.} Furthermore, eligibility for the program was limited to borrowers with a net worth below a certain threshold.

The Congressional Budget Office originally estimated that up to 400,000 homeowners could be helped to avoid foreclosure over the life of H4H.\footnote{Congressional Budget Office, Cost Estimate, Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008, June 9, 2008, p. 8, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/93xx/doc9366/Senate_Housing.pdf.} In total, about 760 borrowers refinanced through the program.\footnote{See Federal Housing Administration, FHA Outlook, September 2010 and FHA Outlook, September 2011, both available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/rmra/oe/rpts/ooe/olmenu.cfm.} Some have suggested that more borrowers and lenders did not use Hope for Homeowners because the program was too complex. The legislative and administrative changes described above were intended to address some of the obstacles to participating in the program.

\section*{FHASecure}

FHASecure was a program announced by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) on August 31, 2007, to allow delinquent borrowers with non-FHA adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) to refinance into FHA-insured fixed-rate mortgages.\footnote{FHA already offered refinancing options for homeowners who were current on their existing fixed- or adjustable-rate mortgages and continued to do so after the adoption of FHASecure.} The new mortgage helped borrowers by offering better loan terms that either reduced a borrower’s monthly payments or helped a borrower avoid steep payment increases under his or her old loan. FHASecure expired on December 31, 2008.


- The borrower had a non-FHA ARM that had reset.
- The borrower became delinquent on his or her loan due to the reset, and had sufficient income to make monthly payments on the new FHA-insured loan.
- The borrower was current on his or her mortgage prior to the reset.
- The new loan met standard FHA underwriting criteria and was subject to other standard FHA requirements (including maximum loan-to-value ratios, mortgage limits, and up-front and annual mortgage insurance premiums).

In July 2008, FHA expanded its eligibility criteria for the program, such as allowing borrowers who were delinquent due to circumstances other than the mortgage reset to participate and relaxing the definition of being current on the mortgage.\footnote{For a description of the changes, see FHA Mortgagee Letter 08-13, “Expansion of FHA Secure,” available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=program_offices/administration/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/2008ml.}
Preserving Homeownership: Foreclosure Prevention Initiatives

_FHASecure_ expired on December 31, 2008. In the months before its expiration, some housing policy advocates called for the program to be extended; however, HUD officials contended that continuing the program would be prohibitively expensive, possibly endangering FHA’s single-family mortgage insurance program. HUD also pointed to the Hope for Homeowners program as filling the role that _FHASecure_ did in helping households avoid foreclosure.\(^{107}\) Supporters of extending _FHASecure_ argued that the statutory requirements of Hope for Homeowners may have offered less flexibility in the face of changing circumstances than _FHASecure_, which could have been more easily amended by HUD.

When _FHASecure_ expired at the end of 2008, about 4,000 loans had been refinanced through the program.\(^{108}\) Critics of the program point to the relatively stringent criteria that borrowers had to meet to qualify for the program as a possible reason that more people did not take advantage of it.

**IndyMac Loan Modifications**

On July 11, 2008, the Office of Thrift Supervision in the Department of the Treasury closed IndyMac Federal Savings Bank, based in Pasadena, CA, and placed it under the conservatorship of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). In August 2008, the FDIC put into place a loan modification program for holders of mortgages either owned or serviced by IndyMac that were seriously delinquent or in danger of default, or on which the borrower was having trouble making payments because of interest rate resets or a change in financial circumstances. Many of the features of the IndyMac loan modification program were later included in HAMP.

In order to be eligible for a loan modification, the mortgage must have been for the borrower’s primary residence and the borrower had to provide current income information that documented financial hardship. Furthermore, the FDIC conducted a net present value test to evaluate whether the expected future benefit to the FDIC and the mortgage investors from modifying the loan would be greater than the expected future benefit from foreclosure.

If a borrower met the above conditions, the loan would be modified so that he or she had a mortgage debt-to-income (DTI) ratio of 38%. The 38% DTI could be achieved by lowering the interest rate, extending the period of the loan, forbearing a portion of the principal, or a combination of the three. The interest rate would be set at the Freddie Mac survey rate for conforming mortgages, but if necessary it could be lowered for a period of up to five years in order to reach the 38% DTI; after the five-year period, the interest rate would rise by no more than 1% each year until it reached the Freddie Mac survey rate.

Then-FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair estimated that about 13,000 loans were modified under this program while IndyMac was under the FDIC’s conservatorship.\(^{109}\) The FDIC completed a sale of IndyMac to OneWest Bank on March 19, 2009. OneWest agreed to continue to operate the loan

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modification program subject to the terms of a loss-sharing agreement with the FDIC. Currently, OneWest is a participating servicer in HAMP, described earlier in this report.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Streamlined Modification Program

On November 11, 2008, James Lockhart, then the director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, announced a new Streamlined Modification Program for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and certain private lenders and servicers. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had helped troubled borrowers through individualized loan modifications for some time, but the SMP represented an attempt to formalize the process and set an industry standard. The SMP took effect on December 15, 2008, but was soon replaced by the HAMP, which was announced in February 2009 and is described in the “Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP)” section of this report.

In order for borrowers whose mortgages were owned by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac to be eligible for the SMP, they had to meet the following criteria:

- The mortgage must have originated on or before January 1, 2008.
- The mortgage must have had a loan-to-value ratio of at least 90%.
- The home must have been a single-family residence occupied by the borrower, and it must have been the borrower’s primary residence.
- The borrower must have missed at least three mortgage payments.
- The borrower must not have filed for bankruptcy.

Mortgages insured or guaranteed by the federal government, such as those guaranteed by FHA, the Veterans’ Administration, or the Rural Housing Service, were not eligible for the SMP.

The SMP shared many features of the FDIC’s plan to modify troubled mortgages held by IndyMac, and many of these features were also later included in HAMP. Qualified borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments were lowered so that the household’s mortgage debt-to-income ratio (DTI) was 38% (not including second lien payments). After borrowers successfully completed a three-month trial period (by making all of the payments at the proposed modified payment amount), the loan modification automatically took effect.

In order to reach the 38% mortgage debt-to-income ratio, servicers were required to follow a specific formula. First, the servicer capitalized late payments and accrued interest (late fees and penalties were waived). If this resulted in a DTI of 38% or less, the modification was complete. If


the DTI was higher than 38%, the servicer could extend the term of the loan to up to 40 years from the effective date of the modification. If the DTI was still above 38%, the interest rate could be adjusted to the current market rate or lower, but to no less than 3%. Finally, if the DTI was still above 38%, servicers could offer principal forbearance. The amount of the principal forbearance would not accrue interest and was nonamortizing, but would result in a balloon payment when the loan was paid off or the home was sold. Principal forgiveness was not allowed under the SMP.

To encourage participation in the SMP, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac paid servicers $800 for each loan modification completed through the program. If the SMP did not produce an affordable payment for the borrower, servicers were to work with borrowers in a customized fashion to try to modify the loan in a way that the homeowner could afford.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac completed over 51,000 loan modifications between January 2009 and April 2009, when Fannie and Freddie stopped using the SMP and began participating in the Making Home Affordable program instead. However, it is unclear how many of these loan modifications were done specifically through the SMP.

Author Contact Information

Katie Jones
Analyst in Housing Policy
kmjones@crs.loc.gov, 7-4162