The Islamic State and U.S. Policy

Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs

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The Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da’esh) is a transnational Sunni Islamist insurgent and terrorist group that controls large areas of Iraq and Syria, has affiliates in several other countries, has attracted a network of global supporters, and disrupts international security with its campaigns of violence and terrorism. The U.S.-led coalition military campaign against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria has adapted since 2014, as Administration officials and coalition partners have implemented changes in strategy and tactics that have reduced the area controlled by the group and eliminated thousands of its personnel. While the Islamic State has suffered losses on the ground in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, a series of terrorist attacks attributed to the group or to individuals it has inspired have claimed hundreds of lives on four continents since November 2015, including in the United States. A number of countries, including the United States, share an interest in further weakening the group and preventing future attacks.

Members of Congress, executive branch officials, and their international counterparts continue to debate a range of proposals for extending battlefield gains made to date and preventing the Islamic State from succeeding in its stated objectives of “remaining and expanding.” President Obama’s goals for U.S. strategy were to “degrade and ultimately defeat” the Islamic State through U.S. direct military action and support for local partner forces. The U.S. military has conducted operations against the group in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Parallel U.S. diplomatic efforts have promoted political reconciliation in each country among local factions. In other countries, such as Egypt and Nigeria, the United States provides security assistance to partner governments in support of operations against Islamic State affiliates. Evolving counterterrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing efforts among a wider network of concerned governments seek to further limit the ability of IS supporters to carry out transnational terrorist attacks. President Donald Trump has directed his Administration “to develop a comprehensive plan to defeat” the group.

The interdependent nature of conflicts and political crises in Iraq, Syria, and other countries where the Islamic State operates complicates efforts to address and durably eliminate the threats posed by the group. Military operations may eliminate IS fighters and liberate IS-held territory, but underlying political disputes and development challenges that have been exploited by the Islamic State and other extremist groups may remain unaddressed or become amplified if post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction needs go unmet. Governments may continue to share fears about IS-related transnational terrorist threats, but leaders also may continue to face difficult decisions about the potential risks and rewards of military, law enforcement, surveillance, intelligence sharing, financial, border security, refugee admission, and consular countermeasures.

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The Islamic State

The Islamic State organization (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS, or the Arabic acronym Da’esh) emerged as a major international security threat amid more than a decade of conflict in Iraq and the outbreak of conflict in Syria (see Appendix A). The group’s core membership remains in Iraq and Syria, and its efforts have been bolstered by a network of foreign fighters and affiliate groups in several countries across the Middle East, Africa, and Asia (see Appendix B). The Islamic State’s apocalyptic ideology, its revolutionary intent toward the strategically important Middle East, and its embrace of transnational terrorism have alarmed policymakers around the world and spurred global debate over strategies and policy options for defeating the group.

Posture and U.S. Threat Assessments

As of January 2017, the Islamic State continues to occupy areas of northern and western Iraq and northern and eastern Syria (see Figure 1). It has lost large amounts of territory since mid-2015, and its remaining territories have become increasingly isolated from each other in the face of ongoing and planned operations by the U.S.-led international military coalition and a number of U.S.-backed local forces. From a military standpoint, U.S. officials argue that the Islamic State is in decline, having ceded approximately 60% of the populated territory it once held in Iraq, and approximately 30% of the populated territory it once held in Syria. U.S. officials estimate that tens of thousands of IS fighters have died in battle, with their numbers reduced to an estimated force strength of 12,000 to 15,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria. U.S. officials also state that morale among IS fighters has worsened and that the group’s finances, recruitment streams, communications, public outreach, and leadership have been substantially disrupted.

In particular, U.S. officials suggest that patterns of travel by IS sympathizers have evolved, with fewer foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq and some seeking to exploit refugee flows to Europe. In April 2016, U.S. officials reported that fighters were increasingly travelling to IS-held

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1 Formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq, the group changed its name to the Islamic State in Iraq and Al Sham in 2013. In conjunction with its summer 2014 military offensive in Iraq and its declaration of the establishment of a caliphate in areas under its control, the Islamic State organization (IS) dropped prior references to “Iraq and Al Sham” in its formal communications. On June 29, Islamic State Spokesman Abu Muhammad Al Adnani said, “the ‘Iraq and Al Sham’ in the name of the Islamic State is henceforth removed from all official deliberations and communications, and the official name is the Islamic State from the date of this declaration.” In line with this statement, the group has since referred to itself simply as “the Islamic State,” although U.S. government officials, some international media entities, and some members of the public continue to refer to the group by English-language acronyms for its previous name “the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham”—ISIS/ISIL. The difference in English-language acronyms stems from distinct interpretations of the geographic scope of the term Al Sham. Some observers insist that the term Al Sham refers to a broad, if imprecisely defined geographic area commonly referred to in English as “the Levant;” others insist that Al Sham refers specifically to Syria. Still others, including some senior U.S. officials, refer to the group by an Arabic acronym for its 2013-2014 name—Da’esh (often pronounced ‘da-esh’, for Dawla Islamiyya fi Iraq wal Sham). The acronym Da’esh does not correspond to an Arabic word, but may be seen as derogatory by IS supporters because it does not acknowledge the group’s chosen name or its ambitions.

2 White House Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Brett McGurk, December 13, 2016.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. and CICS Dunford, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 28, 2016.

5 Anthony Faiola and Souad Mekhennet, “Tracing the path of four terrorists sent to Europe by the Islamic State,” Washington Post, April 22, 2016.
areas of Libya, but a U.S.-backed Libyan campaign completed the recapture of the main IS stronghold in the country in December, presumably reducing Libya’s attractiveness as a destination for IS volunteers. These reported changes in foreign fighter travel patterns overlie a broader and longer running phenomenon that, according to a February 2016 estimate by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), has seen as many as 36,500 individuals from more than 100 countries travel to Syria to engage in combat as members of various armed groups since 2012. This figure includes more than 6,600 Westerners, including Europeans and some U.S. citizens. According to the ODNI, hundreds of these Western foreign fighters, including dozens of U.S. citizens, have joined the ranks of the Islamic State.

Transnational terrorist attacks perpetrated by trained IS operatives or attributed to individual IS supporters have underscored the group’s lethality and tempered international optimism about its potential defeat. Following IS claims of responsibility for attacks, including the November 2015 assault in central Paris, CIA Director John Brennan publicly described the Islamic State as having embraced an “external operations agenda that it is now implementing with lethal effect.” In February 2016, the U.S. intelligence community described the Islamic State as the “preeminent terrorist threat” worldwide. In June 2016, Brennan said that the group “remains a formidable adversary” and that the CIA expects it to rely more on high profile attacks outside its own territory to compensate for territorial losses. Non-government analysts have similarly characterized IS forces as “on the run” and analyzed challenges that may present themselves in the wake of the group’s defeat.

The Obama Administration’s objectives stated objectives included weakening the group’s hold on its core remaining areas of control in Iraq and Syria (Figure 1), preventing new infusions of support from affiliates and foreign fighters, and redoubling efforts to prevent IS-supported and -inspired terrorist attacks outside of IS-held areas. U.S. military strategy in Iraq and Syria aims at further disrupting the group’s ability to operate freely within and between the two countries and isolating and eventually recapturing IS strongholds at Mosul, Iraq and Raqqah, Syria.

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8 Ibid.
9 Remarks of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Brennan before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, November 16, 2015.
10 DNI Clapper, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2016.
11 CIA Director John Brennan, Testimony before the Select Senate Committee on Intelligence, June 16, 2016.
13 White House Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Brett McGurk, December 13, 2016.
14 Ibid., and Secretary of Defense Carter, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, April 27, 2016.
Figure 1. Syria and Iraq: Areas of Influence

Sources: All areas approximate. Areas of influence subject to change. Areas of influence based on data from IHS Conflict Monitor, adapted by CRS. Boundary and basemap sources include UN OCHA, U.S. State Department, and Esri.
The Obama Administration’s strategy was predicated on the principle of working “by, with, and through” U.S.-supported local partners as an alternative to large and direct applications of U.S. military force and/or large investments of U.S. personnel and resources. The Obama Administration approved the deployment of additional U.S. military personnel to both Iraq and Syria over time, but it did not alter its overarching approach.

It remains to be seen how the Trump Administration might specifically redefine U.S. strategy toward the Islamic State and related policy issues. On January 28, 2017, President Trump issued a memorandum directing his Administration to develop “a new plan to defeat ISIS,” with a “preliminary draft due in 30 days.” In his nomination hearing, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson described defeating the Islamic State as “the most urgent step in thwarting radical Islam” and said, “defeating ISIS must be our foremost priority in the Middle East.”

U.S. military leaders stated in January that the Defense Department was prepared to discuss options for more direct and accelerated U.S. military operations against the Islamic State. Press reports also suggest that the Trump Administration may seek to reorganize elements of the State Department to focus more on counterterrorism, including efforts to combat violent Islamist extremism.

Key 2016 Developments

Figure 1 presents the approximate areas of influence, presence, and control by various forces in Syria and Iraq as of January 3, 2017.

In Syria, IS fighters lost territory in the northeast to a mixture of Kurdish and allied Arab forces backed by coalition airpower and, north of Aleppo to anti-Asad forces backed by the Turkish military. IS forces have proven resilient in central Syria, where Syrian government and Russian military forces had succeeded in recapturing Palmyra but later withdrew amid pro-Asad forces’ campaign against opposition-held areas of Aleppo. U.S.- and Turkish-backed local forces have severed the Islamic State’s remaining access to the Turkish border and evicted its fighters from much of the enclave of northwest Syria once referred to by U.S. officials as the “Manbij pocket.”

U.S.-backed local forces also have advanced southward on the east bank of the Euphrates river as part of the campaign to retake the IS-held city of Raqqa.

In Iraq, IS fighters suffered a series of losses to various Iraqi forces in Tikrit, Baiji, Sinjar, Ramadi, Hit, Haditha, Rutbah, Fallujah, and surrounding areas. Iraqi officials declared the city of Fallujah in Anbar Province liberated in late June 2016, and in October Iraqi forces, with U.S. and coalition backing, launched a campaign to retake Iraq’s second largest city—Mosul. At the end of 2016, Iraqi forces had isolated Mosul and were fighting to recapture the eastern half of the city amid fierce IS resistance. Iraqi forces announced they had retaken control of eastern Mosul in January 2017, with Islamic State fighters in control of the more populous western half of the city and isolated areas of Salahuddin, Ninawa, and Anbar Provinces.

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17 Nahal Toosi and Josh Dawsey, “Trump’s team weighs retooling State to focus on terror,” Politico, January 18, 2017.
18 This corresponds to the area north of Aleppo bounded by the Turkish border on the north, the Euphrates River on the east, and the Azaz-Aleppo road corridor on the west.
The interdependent nature of the crises in Syria and Iraq and the associated lack of security and governance in large areas of those countries provided a ripe opportunity for the Islamic State organization to grow, and have complicated efforts to counter its rise. Efforts to seek a negotiated solution to the conflict in Syria have continued, although a series of failed cessation-of-hostilities agreements during 2016 were unable to generate sufficient confidence in U.N.-facilitated talks between Syria’s warring parties. Iraq remains mired in political and fiscal crises, with Iraqi leaders and factions competing for advantage amid popular demands for improved security, service delivery, and an end to corruption.

While progress has been made in reducing the amount of territory held by IS fighters in Iraq and Syria, competition and discord between and among local actors in both countries continue to create some complications for U.S. officials, as does intervention by and competition among regional and extra-regional actors, including Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf States. These complications have become more immediate and relevant as IS forces have ceded territory, and, in some places, struggles have commenced over who will define the future of liberated areas. In his January 2017 confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said that defeating the Islamic State globally may be “extremely challenging” and said that depriving the group of its so-called caliphate in the Middle East “will not defeat ISIS once and for all, it will simply morph to its next version.”

Responding to the Islamic State’s Global Expansion Efforts

The Islamic State’s motto—“remaining a nd expanding”—signals the group’s defiance of efforts to destroy it and its ambition to spread its authority widely. In this regard, it has hailed pledges of support from affiliated groups in far flung regions and the attraction of a global cadre of supporters as confirmations of its success. Nevertheless, some U.S. officials and observers suggested in 2016 that the group’s efforts to establish new footholds and to pursue transnational terrorist attacks may signify an acknowledgment by IS leaders that the group’s significant territorial losses in Syria, Iraq, and Libya have placed them at a growing disadvantage.

Statements by IS leaders in 2016 acknowledged the group’s loss of territory, while denying it would sap the group’s will to fight.

A survey of regions and countries where the Islamic State has sought and gained support since 2014 suggests that while the group has demonstrated some global appeal and reach, its ambitions, tactics, and demands of obedience on its supporters have thus far limited its ability to attract a mainstream following.

Specific factors that have facilitated the group’s growth and appeal in different regions include the following preexisting conditions:

- conflicts based on ethnic, sectarian, and/or political disputes;
- foreign fighter recruitment and travel networks related to such conflicts;
- the weakness of state security forces and the availability of arms;
- limited international counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation; and,

20 Long a feature of IS leaders’ statements, the slogan was featured on the cover of Dabiq magazine in November 2014.
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- armed groups and individuals to whom the Islamic State’s specific ideology appeals or for whom affiliation with the Islamic State offers potential material advantages.

Specific factors that have limited the group’s growth and appeal in different regions include

- the group’s extremist ideology, which has alienated most Muslim communities
- the group’s targeting of civilians, including the use of violence against Muslims and religious minorities;
- its broad and uncompromising claims of religious/political authority;
- opposition from local or foreign security forces, other non-state actors, and/or rival salafi-jihadist groups;
- improvements in international counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation; and,
- the existence of competing identities, loyalties, and agendas among potential recruits.

IS-related considerations shape U.S. policy approaches to several countries of long-standing U.S. national security interest, including Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Turkey, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Russia, and Indonesia. U.S. and partner efforts against IS-affiliated groups in some of these countries intensified in 2016, but also were undertaken on case-by-case bases that reflected the unique prevailing circumstances in each locale.

### Transnational Terrorism as a Strategy and Tactic

The Islamic State and its predecessor groups have threatened to attack the United States since 2012. They routinely describe the United States and its non-Muslim allies as “crusaders” and encourage Islamic State supporters to attack U.S. and allied persons, facilities, and interests by any means possible overseas and at home.21 The group’s leaders may see such attacks as a means to provoke direct military confrontation with the United States and U.S. partners, which its propaganda suggests that it welcomes and views as a harbinger of apocalyptic battles described in some Islamic religious materials.22 IS leaders have challenged the United States and others to “come down and meet us on the ground,” and they presumably view such confrontation as likely to end in the exhaustion and destruction of their enemies.

In this regard, IS leaders may view transnational terrorist attacks as an instrumental tactic in a broader strategic effort to draw adversaries, including the United States, into more direct conflict, even as limited U.S. military operations and U.S.-backed local forces continue to seriously degrade the group in Iraq and Syria. A statement released in the wake of the November 2015 Paris attacks contained these types of goading sentiments, in spite of the fact that at the time, the group was already widely considered to be on the defensive on multiple fronts.23 U.S. officials also argue that transnational attacks allow the group to signal its defiance of the campaign against it and to convince potential supporters of its viability in the face of limited progress and battlefield setbacks in Iraq and Syria since late 2014.

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Responding to the Islamic State’s Transnational Terrorist Attacks

Although Islamic State leaders have claimed and endorsed attacks across a widening geographic area since 2014, the role of IS leaders in planning, aiding, or directing such attacks has varied according to publicly available accounts.\(^{24}\) IS leaders have repeatedly encouraged and sought to provide ideological justifications for independently organized and executed attacks by individuals who seek to support the organization but are unable to travel to Syria or Iraq to join its ranks. Most IS claims in the wake of such attacks have described the perpetrators as its “soldiers,” whether or not the individuals in question have been publicly shown to have a demonstrable operational link to or history with the organization.\(^{25}\) In May 2016, then-IS spokesman Abu Mohammed al Adnani urged IS supporters in Europe and the United States to carry out such attacks, and subsequently released IS propaganda material containing both encouragement and instruction for supporters on methods for improvised attacks.\(^{26}\) The Defense Department confirmed Adnani was killed by a U.S. airstrike in September 2016.

U.S. officials and observers continue to debate the extent to which elements of the Islamic State organization based overseas have the capability to direct, support, or conduct attacks inside the United States. In March 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said that, “ISIL has aspirations to strike outside [Iraq and Syria], either by inspiration or varying degrees of direction and enabling.”\(^{27}\) Secretary Carter further stated that the influence IS leadership has on external attacks ranges from fighters who have trained in and participated in ISIL operations in Iraq and Syria, returning to their countries of origin [ ... ] Right through to those who are simply inspired by, maybe get some sort of general instructions from ISIL, but are otherwise self-motivated and self-radicalized.\(^{28}\)

\(^{24}\) In March 2016, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for deadly bombings in Brussels, Belgium, that involved individuals associated with the perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris attacks. According to investigators, the December 2015 San Bernardino, California terrorist attack was perpetrated by IS supporters but not directed or assisted by overseas elements of the group. In June 2016, a reported IS supporter perpetrated the most deadly mass shooting in U.S. history, killing 49 people in Orlando, Florida.

\(^{25}\) For example, President Obama described the San Bernardino shootings as an act of terrorism in his December 6, 2015, address to the nation, and IS elements overseas praised the attack but did not claim to have directed or supported it. The group’s official Arabic news broadcast described the attackers as “supporters” of the Islamic State, while an English language version described them as “soldiers of the caliphate.” An Arabic language pro-IS news account and the Arabic and French language versions of the official IS news broadcast for December 5 described the San Bernardino terrorists as “supporters of the Islamic State.” The Arabic news broadcast used the term “ansar.” The English language version described them as “soldiers of the caliphate.” OSE Report TRO2015120626199441, December 5, 2015. The terrorist responsible for the June 12 Orlando attack reportedly pledged his loyalty to IS leaders, and the group’s media outlets have described him as one of the group’s “soldiers.” OSE Report TRR2016061346270514, “Revision: Alert: Transcript of ISIL’s Al-Bayan News Bulletin for 13 June, Including Orlando Attack Claim,” June 13, 2016; and, OSE Report TRR2016061267145725, “Alert: Pro-ISIL A’maq News Agency Claims Perpetrator of Orlando Attack ‘An Islamic State Fighter,’” June 12, 2016.


In April 2016, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said that U.S. and allied intelligence officials face challenges in monitoring and disrupting IS-related plots in part because of “very, very security conscious” IS supporters’ efforts to evade detection. U.S. intelligence officials have described attempted attacks by IS supporters as “inevitable” and have stated that the size and scope of the global network of individuals mobilized to support the group suggests that related terrorist threats may persist for years to come.

On June 16, 2016, CIA Director John Brennan told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that,

To compensate for territorial losses, ISIL will probably rely more on guerrilla tactics, including high profile attacks outside the territory in Syria and Iraq that it currently holds. Unfortunately, despite all of our progress against ISIL on the battlefield and in the financial realm, our efforts have not reduced the group’s terrorism capability and global reach. The resources needed for terrorism are very modest, and the group would have to suffer even heavier losses on territory, manpower and money for its terrorist capacity to decline significantly. Moreover, the group’s foreign branches and global networks can help preserve its capacity for terrorism, regardless of events in Iraq and Syria. In fact, as the pressure mounts on ISIL, we judge that it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda. We judge that ISIL is training and attempting to deploy operatives for further attacks. ISIL has large cadre of western fighters who could potentially serve as operatives for attacks in the West. And the group is probably exploring a variety of means for infiltrating operatives into the West, including in refugee flows, smuggling routes and legitimate methods of travel. Furthermore, as we have seen in Orlando, San Bernardino and elsewhere, ISIL is attempting to inspire attacks by sympathizers who have no direct links to the group.

In September 2016, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey warned that “hundreds of very, very dangerous people” could emerge from Syria and Iraq, forming “a terrorist diaspora sometime in the next two to five years like we've never seen before.” National Counterterrorism Center Director Nicholas Rasmussen added, “we don't think that battlefield or territorial losses alone will be sufficient to completely degrade the group’s terrorism capabilities.”

U.S. Strategy, Policy Options, and Related Issues

The Obama Administration led a multilateral coalition in support of its stated goal to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the Islamic State organization by progressively reducing the geographic and political space, manpower, and financial resources available to it. The Obama Administration’s strategy to achieve this objective consisted of a number of “lines of effort,” including, in partnership with several European and Arab states: direct military action, support for Iraqi and Syrian partner ground forces, intelligence gathering and sharing, and efforts to restrict flows of foreign fighters, disrupt the Islamic State’s finances, and eliminate its leaders. In 2016,

30 Testimony of DCIA John Brennan before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, June 16, 2016.
31 Testimony of FBI Director James Comey before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, September 27, 2016.
32 Testimony of NCTC Director Nicholas Rasmussen before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, September 27, 2016.
33 White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” September 10, 2014.
34 The Obama Administration’s White House and State Department websites identified five “lines of effort”: (continued...
Administration officials expressed increasing confidence in the implementation of U.S. and allied military strategy in Iraq and Syria, but IS-directed and inspired terrorist attacks highlighted the dangers that the weakened Islamic State organization still poses.

As noted above, President Donald Trump and leading national security officials in his Administration have articulated their desire to destroy the Islamic State organization, with the White House saying in its overarching description of the President’s foreign policy approach that “defeating ISIS and other radical Islamic terror groups will be our highest priority.” As ground has been gained against the Islamic State on multiple fronts and by various forces since 2014, observers and policymakers have more frequently discussed challenges related to the governance and reconstruction of recaptured areas, with U.S. officials and some Members of Congress expressing their desire to ensure that gains achieved to date can be consolidated and that the emergence or renewal of other conflicts can be avoided.

Combatting the Islamic State in Complex Contexts

To date, the Islamic State organization and its regional adherents have thrived in ungoverned or under-governed areas of countries affected by conflict or political instability. These permissive environments provide resources and safe-haven for IS operations and in some cases offer recruits from among disaffected local groups. In places such as Iraq, Syria, Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, Libya, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Nigeria, the prospects and options for undermining IS supporters have been shaped by the relative success or failure of efforts to restore security, address political grievances, boost economic growth, and promote effective governance. The Islamic State also threatens U.S. partners, such as Jordan, where there were several possible IS-directed or inspired attacks in 2016.

In Iraq, the Obama Administration emphasized the importance of providing support to inclusive security forces under central government command, maintained support for forces affiliated with the Kurdistan Regional Government on these terms, and sought to preserve Iraq’s political and territorial unity pursuant to its constitution. In Syria, the Obama Administration sought a negotiated settlement to the conflict that would see President Asad and some of his supporters leave office while preserving the institutions and security structures of the Syrian state. U.S. support for a predominantly Kurdish coalition of forces in northern Syria has raised some parties’ concerns about relations between Arabs and Kurds in the country, relations between Syrian Kurds and Kurds in neighboring countries, and Syria’s long term political and territorial integrity.

In some settings, such as Egypt and Nigeria, U.S. counterterrorism partnership with national governments and military forces may test U.S. commitments on political reform and human rights. In other settings that have lacked credible, broadly accepted governments in recent years such as Libya or Yemen, dependable partners may remain elusive and the United States and other actors may reserve the option of pursuing unilateral military action against IS affiliates and other extremist groups.

(...continued)

(1) Providing military support to our partners; (2) Impeding the flow of foreign fighters; (3) Stopping ISIL’s financing and funding; (4) Addressing humanitarian crises in the region; and (5) Exposing ISIL’s true nature. See archived sites at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/isil-strategy and https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/sect/index.htm.


To the extent that U.S. and coalition strategy remains predicated on the cooperation of partner forces on the ground and the coordination of multinational efforts in the region and beyond, U.S. officials may continue to be challenged to accommodate the complimentary and competing interests of other local, regional and global actors in the pursuit of shared goals.

**U.S. Military Operations against the Islamic State**

As of January 11, 2016, U.S. and coalition forces had used combat aircraft, armed unmanned aerial vehicles, and sea-launched cruise missiles to conduct more than 17,370 strikes against Islamic State targets in Iraq and Syria since August 8, 2014, and September 22, 2014, respectively. As of October 15, 2016, the total cost of military operations related to the Islamic State since the beginning of kinetic operations on August 8, 2014, was $10.06 billion. The FY2017 Continuing Appropriations act (Division B of P.L. 114-254, H.R. 2028) provides an additional $4.83 billion in military personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement, and research funding “to support counterterrorism operations,” including funds to meet the military’s request for an additional $1.7 billion in operations costs for Iraq and Syria.

As of early 2017, U.S. strikes support defensive and offensive military operations by Iraqi military and Kurdish forces in Iraq and seek to weaken the Islamic State organization’s control over its remaining strongholds inside Syria. In particular, U.S. strikes and Special Forces operations support local forces in their efforts to recapture Mosul, Iraq, and Raqqah, Syria. The U.S. military also has assisted local militia forces in recapturing territory from the Islamic State’s affiliate in Libya, where Operation Odyssey Lightning has included a campaign of airstrikes since mid-2016, as well as the deployment of small numbers of U.S. military personnel to gather information and build relationships with local anti-IS groups.

**Partnership Programs**

**Training, Equipping, and Advising U.S. Partners in Iraq**

U.S. military personnel have deployed to Iraq to advise and train Iraqi forces, gather intelligence on the Iranian threat, and secure U.S. personnel and facilities. About two thirds are advisers and trainers for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Kurdish peshmerga, and the rest support these forces and provide protection for U.S. personnel in country. The “force management level” for the U.S. military in Iraq was 5,262 as of December 2016, although the number of U.S. forces in Iraq may exceed that number periodically. Coalition partners had deployed about 3,500 advisers and trainers for the ISF as of early 2016. As of December 2016, U.S. officials reported that more than 65,000 Iraqi personnel had received training, including Iraqi Security Forces, police, Kurdish peshmerga, and Sunni tribal fighters.

U.S. contributions to training efforts in Iraq are made in part through the Iraq Train and Equip program originally authorized in late 2014. Congress authorized and provided $1.6 billion in funding for the U.S. training efforts in Iraq in the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act

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38 White House Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Brett McGurk, June 10, 2016; and, Department of Defense Press Briefing by Colonel Christopher Garver, Operation Inherent Resolve spokesman via teleconference from Baghdad, Iraq, June 8, 2016.
39 White House Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest and Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, Brett McGurk, December 13, 2016.

Congress also has authorized the President to provide U.S. assistance to the Kurdish peshmerga and certain Sunni and other local security forces with a national security mission under certain circumstances. In March 2016, the Administration submitted a required report to Congress, stating that the Iraqi government had taken meaningful steps toward integrating minorities into military and political structures and was governing more inclusively. In coordination with the Iraqi government, the United States has offered more than $400 million in defense funding and in-kind support to the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq, deliverable in smaller monthly installments. H.R. 2028 included an additional $289.5 million in FY2017 Iraq training program funds to continue support for peshmerga forces.

Efforts to Train, Equip, and Advise Syrians

Congress authorized and funded a train and equip program for vetted Syrians in 2014 for select purposes, including supporting U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria and promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to Syria’s civil war (Section 1209 of H.R. 3979, P.L. 113-291). The program’s limited results as of September 2015, Russian military intervention in Syria, and support by some Members of Congress for broader civilian protection missions led the Obama Administration to alter the program beginning in October 2015. Obama Administration officials described their intended overall approach to the redesigned program as “transactional” and performance-based, with Syrian beneficiaries receiving U.S. support as opportunities present themselves and relative to their effectiveness on the battlefield and the alignment of their actions with U.S. interests.

The revamped train and equip program has since shifted away from training and equipping “New Syrian Force” units of vetted new recruits and toward “equipping and enabling ...a select group of vetted leaders and their units” inside Syria who are fighting the Islamic State organization under the rubric of a Kurdish-Arab coalition force in northern Syria known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and a force known as the “New Syrian Army” (NSA) in the southeast. Equipment, including some weaponry and ammunition, has been provided to SDF and NSA forces, and U.S.

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40 Under the FY2015 NDAA, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, is authorized to provide assistance, including training, equipment, logistics support, supplies, and services, stipends, facility and infrastructure repair and renovation, and sustainment, to military and other security forces of or associated with the Government of Iraq, including Kurdish and tribal security forces or other local security forces, with a national security mission, through December 31, 2016, for the following purposes: (1) Defending Iraq, its people, allies, and partner nations from the threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and groups supporting ISIL; and (2) Securing the territory of Iraq.

41 The first CR for FY2017—H.R. 5325—provided budget authority through December 9, 2016, and was extended by H.R. 2028, the Further Continuing and Security Assistance Appropriations Act, 2017, until April 28, 2017. Both CRs provided funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) at the FY2016 appropriated levels.

42 For more on this program and related legislation, see CRS Report R43727, Train and Equip Program for Syria: Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Amy Belasco.
special operations personnel have been deployed to Syria to advise and assist the SDF in operations against the Islamic State.

Appropriations acts for FY2015 and FY2016 did not provide funds specifically for a Syria train and equip program account, but Congress has reviewed and approved Administration requests to reprogram more than $1.25 billion in monies from other accounts for the program since 2014.

The omnibus appropriations act for FY2016 allows the Secretary of Defense to use funds from the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund for efforts to assist appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition, if the Secretary outlines a detailed and clear plan for the use of such funds and provides such justification to the congressional defense committees in a reprogramming request.43

The FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-328) extends the authorization for the Syria training program through December 31, 2018, and authorizes $1.16 billion for the Iraq and Syria training programs in a new combined “Counter-ISIL” fund.

The State Department also requested more than $480 million in FY2016 and FY2017 funding to provide nonlethal support to vetted, moderate armed opposition groups, other opposition actors, and communities in opposition-held areas of Syria. Section 7041(h) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, allows certain accounts to fund “non-lethal assistance for programs to address the needs of civilians affected by conflict in Syria.” The same terms and conditions apply to FY2017 funds made available by the continuing resolutions enacted in 2016.

**Humanitarian Funding and Post-IS Stabilization and Reconstruction**

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) made more than $2.1 billion available for Migration and Refugee Assistance-OCO and $1.9 billion available for International Disaster Assistance-OCO to respond to the Iraq-Syria crises and others around the world. Division B of FY2017 CR (H.R. 2028) provides an additional $916 million for these accounts and purposes in FY2017, beyond the continuing FY2016 levels provided.

Division B of the FY2017 CR also provides an additional $1.03 billion in Economic Support Fund-OCO monies to remain available through FY2018 for programs “to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, other terrorist organizations, and violent extremism, and address the needs of populations impacted by such organizations.”

**Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS)**

Section 1224 of the FY2017 NDAA provides that funds available to the Department of Defense for FY2017 may not be used to provide MANPADS to vetted Syrian opposition forces until the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State jointly submit a report on the determination and 30 days elapse after the date of the report submittal. The FY2016 defense appropriations act (Division C of P.L. 114-113) did not include a Syria-related prohibition on MANPADS procurement or transfer, but provided in Section 9013 that “none of the funds made available by this Act under the heading ‘Iraq Train and Equip Fund’ may be used to procure or transfer man-portable air defense systems.” This prohibition was carried forward by reference in the terms of the FY2017 continuing resolutions.

The 114th Congress further considered and the House adopted a proposal for FY2017 that would have prohibited the use of funds made available by the act in a proposed “Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Train and Equip Fund” to procure or transfer MANPADS (Section 9013 of the House-passed version of the FY2017 defense appropriations act H.R. 5293). The House also adopted an en bloc floor amendment during its consideration of the FY2017 defense authorization bill (incorporated as Section 1229 of H.R. 4909) that included an amendment to prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds authorized to be appropriated for or otherwise available to the Department of Defense for FY2017 “to transfer or facilitate the transfer” of MANPADS to any entity in Syria. The Senate versions of the FY2017 defense authorization (S. 2943) and the FY2017 defense appropriation (S. 3000) did not contain similar provisions.

Legislative Debates in the 114th Congress

FY2017 Appropriations Requests and Legislation

The U.S. military’s continuing efforts to respond to the evolving nature of the IS threat prompted an original request for $7.5 billion in FY2017 defense funding, including funds for military operations. The request included $630 million—slightly less than the amount requested in FY2016—for the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) to enhance the Iraqi Security Forces’ ability to liberate and secure lost territory, secure borders, protect the population, and further improve the quality of provincial and national defenses. The request was amended in November 2016 to include additional funds for military operations, force protection, and related issues, as well as additional funds for support to Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga forces as described above.

The Obama Administration’s original FY2017 defense appropriations request also included $250 million in defense funding to train, equip, and/or sustain appropriately-vetted Syrian forces engaged in the fight against the Islamic State. Of the amount requested, $210.8 million would support the procurement and provision of weapons, ammunition, and equipment; $18.6 million would support lift and transportation costs; and $20.6 million would support trainee stipends and operational sustainment.

Defense appropriators proposed a combined fund for partnership programs related to the Islamic State threat, with the House proposing in its version of the FY2017 defense appropriations bill an $880 million Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Train and Equip Fund (H.R. 5293), and Senate appropriators proposing a $930 million Counter-ISIL Train and Equip Fund (S. 3000).

Foreign operations appropriations legislation considered in the 114th Congress extend and/or add and amend existing authorities governing the use of State-department administered funds for FY2017. The House version of the FY2017 foreign operations appropriations bill (H.R. 5912) would have extended existing notwithstanding authority for Economic Support Fund monies and amended some authorized purposes of assistance. The Senate version (S. 3117) would have extended notwithstanding authority for the ESF account and others, and would have amended and added to the authorized purposes of assistance. For more information, see CRS Report RL33487, *Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response*, coordinated by Carla E. Humud.

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The Islamic State and U.S. Policy

FY2017 Authorization Legislation

The pre-conference Senate- and House-approved versions of the FY2017 NDAA (H.R. 4909 and S. 2943) differed over their proposals for the duration of the extension of the Iraq and Syria train and equip programs; the terms for determinations and required plans concerning both countries; and requirements for congressional approval of funding reprogrammings for the Syria train and equip program. They also would have authorized different amounts of funding for training and equipping efforts.

Select Issues for the 115th Congress

Members of Congress continue to debate the proper means and ends for U.S. efforts to combat the Islamic State organization while exercising oversight over U.S. military operations and a wide array of other counter-IS programs. Since 2014, Congress has authorized and appropriated billions of dollars for military operations and new types of nonlethal and lethal assistance for select groups and forces in Iraq and Syria, but has not passed a new authorization for the use of military force against the Islamic State. Key questions in ongoing executive and legislative policy debates include the following:

- How should the United States balance the use of diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic, and law enforcement tools in responding to various IS-related threats? How can the United States best undermine the appeal of the Islamic State’s ideology? Should the United States prioritize the fight against the Islamic State, prioritize efforts to stabilize Syria and other countries where IS forces operate, or pursue counter-IS and stability simultaneously?

- How might military operations that recapture territory from the Islamic State affect the threat that the group poses? Which forces should carry out specific military operations against the group, and what support or direction should the U.S. government provide? If such operations succeed—what political and military arrangements would best keep extremists from returning to recaptured areas or drawing new support?

- Does lasting progress against the Islamic State depend on durably altering the political dynamics of Iraq, Syria, and other locations where the Islamic State has attracted supporters? How should the IS threat shape overall U.S. policy toward Syria and Iraq, the provision of assistance to U.S. partners there, and policies toward displaced persons?

- What effects might U.S. assistance for government security forces and select subnational actors in the fight against the Islamic State have on broader and longer term security and political conditions in various countries of interest?

Debating Overall U.S. Strategy

Some critics of the Obama Administration’s strategy highlighted the Islamic State’s apparent success in planning, executing, and inspiring terrorist attacks outside of Syria and Iraq and argued that the United States should more aggressively use military force to degrade the Islamic State’s capabilities and weaken its control over territory.46 These critics argued that, given the limited

46 See for example, James F. Jeffrey, “The U.S. Must Send Ground Forces to Eliminate the Islamic State,” Washington Post, November 16, 2015; and, Matthew Levitt, “How to Beat ISIL without 50,000 Troops,” Politico, November 18, (continued...)
capabilities of local U.S. partners, rapidly accomplishing the stated U.S. goal of defeating the Islamic State requires greater direct military commitment than the Obama Administration and its coalition partners expressed willingness to provide. Proposals made by such critics tended to differ over the end states they envisioned, the pace and scope of operations proposed, the extent to which they prescribed post-conflict arrangements, and their views on potential U.S. partners and adversaries.

Other critics of the Obama Administration’s policy argued that the United States should state as its policy goal the “containment” of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, rather than continuing to pursue its outright defeat. Those who took this view maintained that accomplishing the stated goal of completely defeating the Islamic State was likely beyond U.S. and partner capabilities given the resources and risks that the United States and partner countries appeared to be willing to bear. Prior to the string of terror attacks attributed to IS supporters in 2015 and 2016, advocates for an explicit containment strategy tended to assess the linkage between the Islamic State’s success or staying power in the Middle East and terrorist threats beyond the region as tenuous. Critics of a military or security driven approach argue that operations to degrade or destroy the Islamic State as an organization may do little to undermine the appeal of its ideology and could in some cases strengthen that appeal by fulfilling predictions made by IS leaders.

Through late 2015, President Obama and other Administration officials argued that either drastically increasing or drastically reducing U.S. and allied military pressure on the Islamic State could serve the group’s interests and do little to alter underlying political and security conditions that have helped give rise to the group. In the wake of IS-claimed terrorist attacks in several countries, President Obama restated that he did not believe the introduction of large-scale U.S. ground forces for combat operations was necessary in order to achieve U.S. objectives. Rather, he has stated that U.S. efforts to reverse Islamic State gains on the ground should pair continued airstrikes and special operations missions with expanded efforts to advise and strengthen local Iraqi and Syrian partner forces.

As the Obama Administration ends its tenure, U.S. officials appear confident that the United States and its coalition partners have succeeded in placing increased military pressure on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and they have not publicly suggested that the incoming Administration change the “by with and through” partner-based strategy pursued by the Obama Administration to date. In sum, the Obama Administration has “accelerated” what its officials have viewed as “sustainable” efforts against the Islamic State—namely those that build the capacity of partners, place targeted multi-directional military pressure on Islamic State forces, address persistent regional and local political disputes, and avoid potentially costly or counterproductive U.S. military interventions in light of wider U.S. global commitments.

Beyond U.S. efforts to restrict the Islamic State’s room for maneuver in the Middle East, governments around the world continue to reassess whether and how to participate in anti-IS...
military efforts and how they can best counter the radicalization of members of their own populations and protect “soft targets” from terrorist attacks. In many countries, debates over counter-IS strategies are refocusing on means for countering the appeal of violent extremism (CVE) and balancing civil liberties and immigration policies with domestic security requirements.

Outlook

As of early 2017, U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic officials believe that the U.S.-led coalition and its local partners have seized the military initiative from the Islamic State on several fronts, but they continue to warn that the confrontation between the Islamic State organization and its adherents on the one hand and the United States and its partners on the other may nevertheless be protracted, costly, violent, and challenging. U.S. officials and Trump Administration nominees have observed some weakening of the group in Iraq and Syria, but portray it as a still formidable opponent. The group’s transnational appeal and its supporters’ violent fanaticism pose considerable threats to international security. These threats appear likely to continue to pose complex questions for policymakers in the United States and other countries regarding the use of military force, privacy and civil liberties, intelligence sharing, immigration, identity, religious liberty, diplomatic negotiation, and national strategic priorities.

The complex crises that have fueled the Islamic State’s rise and facilitated its spread show little sign of abating, and patterns of Russian, Iranian, Turkish, European, and Arab state involvement in Syria and Iraq significantly shape the context in which U.S. leaders consider related strategy and policy options. As U.S. diplomats have sought a negotiated settlement to the Syrian civil war, they have remained cognizant that changes in the balance of forces in Syria may provide opportunity for the Islamic State and/or Al Qaeda-affiliates to expand. Similarly, divisions among or setbacks experienced by various Iraqi forces may create opportunities for the Islamic State to exploit, in spite of U.S. advocacy for a pan-sectarian, democratic and united Iraq.

The long term prospects for the Islamic State are uncertain at best. Its uncompromisingly stringent views, universal hostility to critics and outsiders, and promises of perpetual survival and expansion to its followers suggest that only a narrow path to strategic success may exist for the group. The Islamic State’s structure, ideology, and actions reflect its followers’ uniquely uncompromising worldview, the broad scope of their ambitions, and the immediacy of their goals. These factors place them in contrast to and, at times, at odds with other violent salafi-jihadist groups, not to mention with moderate Islamists and secular groups in most of the countries where they operate. The Islamic State’s rivals challenge it from multiple ideological perspectives and include groups with similar but opposing religiously-informed views. Competing local, regional, religious, and ethnic identities limit the group’s mass appeal and may bolster the appeal of rivals.

Compared to the numbers of military and security forces that could potentially be arrayed against them, the Islamic State’s forces are numerically small and have suffered considerable attrition since 2014. While the Islamic State organization has demonstrated its ability to seize and hold territory in some places, the military capabilities of its enemies vastly outweigh its own. Political and strategic limits on cooperation among the Islamic State’s adversaries may contribute to the group’s survival, but such limits may also erode, particularly if the group shifts further in the direction of sponsoring transnational terrorist attacks. Aversion among opponents of the Islamic State to the use of military force against the group’s strongholds may decline if the group regains its offensive strength or if it carries out further high-profile attacks outside its core areas.

In the short to medium term, if the Islamic State fails to restore its momentum in core areas of operation or continues to suffer military setbacks at the hands of coalition and allied local forces, it may have difficulty in fulfilling its promises to supporters and attracting new recruits. Many
observers are now debating how the organization may react if its momentum in the Iraq-Syria theatre of operations remains relatively blunted or if its territorial holdings are further reversed under expanded coalition pressure. Some observers, including U.S. intelligence officials, have suggested the group could continue to seek to conduct high-profile attacks in neighboring countries and beyond as a means of demonstrating viability and success to its followers/recruits and drawing outside forces deeper into battle. Judging by the course of the international community’s struggle against the Al Qaeda organization, IS terrorist attacks may restore a sense of pride and accomplishment among its members but also may galvanize new patterns of multilateral cooperation against the group that could ultimately threaten its survival, if not that of its ideology and apocalyptic vision.

Over the longer term, two durable challenges confront the international community as a result of the insurgent and terrorist campaigns launched by the Islamic State. First, the mobilization of armed groups to combat the Islamic State may complicate efforts to resolve political disputes over the governance of areas recently regained or now under the Islamic State’s control in various countries. Such disputes may provoke future conflicts among groups now nominally joined in opposition to the Islamic State and may provide opportunities for the Islamic State or successor organizations to exploit. Second, the international community must consider how it will respond to security and social challenges posed by the thousands of individuals who have travelled to various battlefields in support of the Islamic State and other extremist groups in recent years. If the patterns established by participants in prior transnational conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and the Balkans are repeated, it could take decades to resolve the threats posed by the global network of individuals that the Islamic State has already inspired and mobilized.
Appendix A. Emergence and Organizational Development

Roots in Iraq and Syria

The Islamic State’s direct ideological and organizational roots lie in the forces built and led by the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq from 2002 through 2006—Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) and Al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers (aka Al Qaeda in Iraq, or AQ-I). Zarqawi took advantage of Sunni animosity toward U.S. forces and feelings of disenfranchisement at the hands of Iraq’s Shia and Kurds to advance a uniquely sectarian agenda that differed from Al Qaeda’s in important ways. Some experts attribute Sunni resentment to the use by some Shia of the democratic political process to monopolize political power in Iraq. Following Zarqawi’s death at the hands of U.S. forces in June 2006, AQ-I leaders repackaged the group as a coalition called the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISI lost its two top leaders in 2010 and was weakened, but not eliminated, by the time of the U.S. withdrawal in 2011. The precise nature of ISI’s relationship to Al Qaeda leaders from 2006 onward is unclear.

Under the leadership of former U.S. detainees Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra’i (aka Abu Bakr al Baghdadi), Taha Subhi Falaha (aka Abu Mohammed al Adnani), and others, the Islamic State of Iraq rebuilt its capabilities from 2010 onward. By early 2013, the group was conducting dozens of deadly attacks a month inside Iraq and had begun operations in neighboring Syria. In April 2013, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced his intent to merge his forces in Iraq and Syria with those of the Syria-based, Al Qaeda affiliated group Jabhat al Nusra (Support Front), under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS). Jabhat al Nusra and Al Qaeda leaders rejected the merger, underscoring growing tensions among Sunni extremists.

Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri sought to remind IS leaders of previous pledges of loyalty to Al Qaeda made by deceased IS figures, but IS leaders rejected his claims. Al Qaeda’s general command issued a statement disavowing the Islamic State in early 2014. Islamic State leaders declared that their group “is not and has never been an offshoot of Al Qaeda,” and said that since they viewed themselves as a sovereign political entity, they had given leaders of the Al Qaeda organization deference over time rather than full pledges of obedience.

Declaration of Caliphate

In June 2014, Islamic State leaders declared their reestablishment of the caliphate (khilafa, lit. succession to the prophet Mohammed), dropped references to Iraq and the Levant in their name, demanded the support of believing Muslims, and named Abu Bakr al Baghdadi as caliph and imam (leader of the world’s Muslims). IS leaders have highlighted Baghdadi’s reported descent from the Quraysh tribe—the same tribe as the Prophet Muhammad—as well as his religious training, as qualifications for his position as caliph. Islamic State spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani describes Baghdadi as, “the mujahid shaykh, the learned, the active, and the devout, the

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warrior and the renewer, the descendant of the Prophet’s house.” The group cites its implementation of several of the historical requirements of the caliphate/imamate as further grounds for the religious legitimacy of its actions.

U.S. officials suggest that the concept of reviving or renewing the caliphate has attracted some followers to the Islamic State organization, Baghdadi’s self-appointment as caliph has been rejected by many Islamic scholars and has yet to inspire mass political support. In one open letter to Baghdadi, a group of prominent Muslim scholars questioned the legitimacy of his appointment, asking “Who gave you authority over the ummah (community of believers)? Was it your group? If this is the case, then a group of no more than several thousand has appointed itself the ruler of over a billion and a half Muslims.” Rather than debate Baghdadi’s credentials, most Muslim critics simply reject the entire premise of an Islamic State-led caliphate. In particular, they condemn the group’s unilateral announcement of a caliphate without consultation or consensus in the broader Muslim community.

Some jihadist groups, including Al Qaeda, also have rejected Baghdadi’s appointment as caliph, arguing that he is simply another military commander and is owed no special loyalty. Al Qaeda leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri viewed the late Taliban leader Mullah Omar as the rightful leader of faithful Muslims and pledged loyalty (bay’a) to him, although their views about the wisdom and legitimacy of declaring a caliphate under his leadership or Al Qaeda’s differ from those of the Islamic State. In the wake of Mullah Omar’s death, Zawahiri has pledged loyalty to his successors, first to the late Mullah Akhtar Mansoor and then to Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, urging other Muslims to do so. The apparently limited appeal of Al Qaeda and Islamic State demands for leadership recognition suggests that their violent agenda remains popular only among a relatively small, if dangerous, minority of the world’s Sunni Muslims.

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52 OSE Report TRR2014062966139093, Abu Muhammad al Adnani, “This is the Promise of God,” June 29, 2014.
54 Ibid. The same critics argued: “If you recognize the billion and a half people who consider themselves Muslims, how can you not consult them regarding your so-called caliphate? Thus you face one of two conclusions: either you concur that they are Muslims and they did not appoint you caliph over them—in which case you are not the caliph—or, the other conclusion is that you do not accept them as Muslims, in which case Muslims are a small group not in need of a caliph, so why use the word ‘caliph’ at all? In truth, the caliphate must emerge from a consensus of Muslim countries, organizations of Islamic scholars and Muslims across the globe.”
Figure A-1. Timeline: The Roots of the Islamic State

Source: Prepared by CRS using U.S. Government Open Source Center reporting and other open sources.
Appendix B. IS Affiliates and Adherents

Since 2014, some armed groups have recognized the Islamic State caliphate and pledged loyalty to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Groups in Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Afghanistan, and Nigeria have used the Arabic word “wilayah” (state/province) to describe themselves as constituent members of a broader IS-led caliphate. The implications of such pledges of loyalty to the Islamic State on groups’ objectives, tactics, and leadership structures appear to vary and may evolve. The Obama Administration considered groups and individuals associated with the Islamic State and participating in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners to be legitimate military targets pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force against Al Qaeda, subject to executive branch discretion.

As of 2017, experts consider the following IS adherents to be the most significant and capable:

The Islamic State in Egypt (Sinai Province, SP, Wilayah Sinai)  

The Islamic State’s local affiliate in the northern Sinai Peninsula was formerly known as Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House or Partisans of Jerusalem). It emerged after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and affiliated with the Islamic State in 2014. Estimates of its membership range from 500 to 1,000, and it is comprised of radicalized indigenous Bedouin Arabs, foreign fighters, and Palestinian militants. On social media, the group has displayed various pictures of its weaponry, specifically man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) such as the 9K338 Igla-S and Kornet anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems. It has claimed credit for destroying Metrojet Flight 9268, which exploded in mid-air over the Sinai Peninsula on October 31, 2015, killing all 224 passengers aboard. In June 2016, CIA Director John Brennan estimated the group’s size at “several hundreds if not over a thousand hard-core fighters” and described the group as “the most active and capable terrorist group in all of Egypt.” The group is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C §1189) and is listed as a Specially Designated National (SDN) by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

The Islamic State in Saudi Arabia (Wilayah Najd/Hijaz/Haramayn)  

IS leaders have threatened the kingdom’s rulers and state clerics directly and called on the group’s supporters there to attack Shia Muslims, Saudi security forces, and foreigners. IS supporters have claimed responsibility for several attacks in the kingdom since 2014, including suicide bombing attacks on Shia mosques in different parts of the country and attacks targeting Saudi security forces. In June 2015, an IS-affiliated Saudi suicide bomber blew himself up in a Kuwaiti mosque, killing more than two dozen people and wounding hundreds. Saudi officials have

56 Prepared by Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard, Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs.
58 Prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. For more information, see CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
arrested more than 1,600 suspected IS supporters and claim to have foiled several planned attacks. U.S. diplomatic facilities closed temporarily in March 2015 in connection with threat information, and U.S. officials continue to warn of the potential for attacks on U.S. persons and facilities in the kingdom, along with other Western and Saudi targets. Islamic State affiliates in Saudi Arabia are listed as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

The Islamic State arguably poses a unique political threat to Saudi Arabia in addition to the tangible security threats demonstrated by a series of deadly attacks inside the kingdom since late 2014. IS leaders claim to have established a caliphate to which all pious Sunni Muslims owe allegiance, directly challenging the legitimacy of Saudi leaders who have long claimed a unique role as Sunni leaders and supporters of particular Salafist interpretations of Sunni Islam. IS critiques of Saudi leaders may have resonance among some Saudis who have volunteered to fight for or contributed on behalf of Muslims in several conflicts involving other Muslims over the last three decades. Saudi leaders argue that it is the Islamic State that lacks legitimacy, and some Saudi observers compare the group’s ideology to that of other violent, deviant groups from the past and present.

**The Islamic State in Libya (Wilayah Tarabalus/Barqa/Fezzan)**

Supporters of the Islamic State (IS) in Libya announced three affiliated wilayah (provinces) corresponding to the country’s three historic regions—Wilayah Tarabalus in the west, Wilayah Barqa in the east, and Wilayah Fezzan in the southwest. Nevertheless, the group does not appear to have created corresponding organizational infrastructure to back its claims. U.S. military officials estimated the number of IS supporters at approximately 3,500 fighters in late 2015, but later estimated that figure had grown to as many as 6,000, among a much larger community of Libyan Salafi-jihadist activists and militia members. In February 2016, the U.S. intelligence community described the IS presence in Libya as “one of its most developed branches outside of Syria and Iraq,” and said the group was “well positioned to expand territory under its control in 2016.”

Nevertheless, the group’s stronghold in the central coastal city of Sirte came under siege in May and June 2016 by fighters from the nearby city of Misrata and neighboring towns. IS losses in and around Sirte have been facilitated by a U.S. military campaign (Operation Odyssey Lightning) since mid-2016 and have raised questions about estimates of the group’s strength and its future in Libya. IS members who sought to impose their control on the eastern city of Darnah also faced resistance from other armed Islamist groups that do not recognize Baghdadi’s leadership.

In November 2015, the U.S. military conducted an airstrike thought to have killed the Iraqi leader of IS operations in Libya, the first such U.S. strike on IS operatives outside of Syria and Iraq. A February 2016 U.S. strike on the western Libyan town of Sabratha targeted an IS-camp and killed dozens of IS fighters, including many from Tunisia. Islamic State supporters in Libya are

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63 Prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs. For more information, see CRS Report RL33142, *Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy*, by Christopher M. Blanchard.

64 DNI Clapper, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2016.
designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C §1189) and are listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

The Islamic State in Nigeria (West Africa Province, Wilayah Gharb Afriqiyya)\(^65\)

This northeast Nigeria-based Sunni insurgent terrorist group widely known by the name *Boko Haram* ("western education is forbidden") and formerly known as *Jama'a Ahl as-Sunna Li-da'wa wa-al Jihad* ("People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad") pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in March 2015. The Islamic State replaced the group’s leader Abubakar Shekau and recognized Abu Musab al Barnawi as its new head in August 2016, highlighting a rift in the movement and apparent disapproval of Shekau’s leadership (Shekau has rejected the decision). More than 15,800 deaths have been attributed to the group since 2011 (more than 6,500 in 2015 alone), and more than two million people have been displaced by related violence, which spread into neighboring Cameroon, Chad and Niger (an area collectively known as the Lake Chad Basin) in 2015. The group threatens civilian, state and international targets, including Western citizens, in the region; in 2011 it bombed the United Nations building in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja. The State Department designated Boko Haram and a splinter faction, Ansaru, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C §1189) in 2013. Counterterrorism cooperation with Nigeria has been constrained by various factors. U.S. counterterrorism assistance to the Lake Chad Basin countries has grown substantially since 2014, and the region has been a priority for U.S. Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) programs.

The Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP, Wilayah Khorasan)\(^66\)

The Islamic State has increased its influence in Afghanistan since mid-2014, acting under the name of Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP, often also referred to as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan, ISIL-K), named after an area that once included parts of what is now Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The group is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C §1189) and is listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

The group’s presence in Afghanistan has crystallized from several small Afghan Taliban and other militant factions—such as Da Fidayano Mahaz and Tora Bora Mahaz—that announced affiliation with the organization in early 2013. The Islamic State presence grew further as additional Taliban factions broke with the Taliban and declared allegiance to the group, including capturing some small areas primarily in eastern Afghanistan. In late 2015, press reports indicated that Afghan affiliates of the Islamic State have begun receiving financial assistance from the core organization located in the self-declared “caliphate” in parts of Iraq and Syria.\(^67\)

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\(^{65}\) Prepared by Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10173, *Boko Haram (The Islamic State’s West Africa Province)*, by Lauren Ploch Blanchard.


U.S. commanders estimated in late 2015 that there were 1,000-3,000 ISKP fighters in Afghanistan and estimated that U.S. and Afghan military efforts had reduced ISKP fighting strength by 15%-20% as of October 2016 to roughly 1,000 personnel. A U.S. strike killed ISKP’s leader Hafiz Saeed Khan in July 2016. U.S. officials say the Islamic State’s goal in Afghanistan is likely to expand its presence further in northeastern Afghanistan as well as in areas east of Qandahar. To address the threat from ISKP, President Obama authorized U.S. commanders to combat ISKP fighters by affiliation, i.e., whether or not these fighters pose an immediate threat to U.S. forces, partners, or the Afghanistan National Defense Forces. In October 2016, U.S. Brigadier General Charles Cleveland said that the United States had conducted “about 240” counter-terrorism strikes from January-October 2016, of which about “two thirds to three quarters” were targeted against ISKP. In April 2016, Brigadier General Cleveland said that U.S. action had reduced the ISKP presence to two to three provinces, from six to eight provinces at the start of 2016.

The Islamic State in Yemen
(Wilayah Yemen/Sanaa/Al Bayda/Aden-Abyan/Shabwah/Hadramout)

In Yemen, militants who claim allegiance to the Islamic State have taken advantage of ongoing war to repeatedly bomb mosques known for attracting worshippers of Zaydi Islam, an offshoot of Shia Islam (with legal traditions and religious practices which are similar to Sunni Islam). Islamic State terrorists have targeted supporters of the Houthi Movement, a predominately Zaydi armed militia and political group that aims to rule wide swaths of northern Yemen and restore the “Imamate,” or Zaydi-led monarchical rule that intermittently governed northern Yemen from 893 AD to 1962. The Houthis are currently at war with a coalition of predominately Sunni Arab states led by Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic State may see this war as an opportunity to increase sectarian hatred in Yemen. Though wracked by war, Yemen has not traditionally had the same kind of sectarian animosity as other Arab states such Iraq and Lebanon. Leadership and tactical disputes appear to have limited the Yemen-based IS affiliates’ success to date, as has competition from rivals in the larger and more deeply rooted Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula organization. The group is listed as a Specially Designated National (SDN) by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

The Islamic State in the Caucasus (Wilayah Kawkaz)

The Islamic State recognized Wilayah Kawkaz in June 2015 after IS supporters purportedly drawn from several predominantly Muslim Russian republics in the Caucasus pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Reports suggest that commanders once affiliated with the Al Qaeda-aligned Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, established in 2007 and declared a terrorist organization

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68 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
72 Prepared by Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard, Specialists in Middle Eastern Affairs.
73 Prepared by Christopher Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.
by the United States in 2011, make up the leadership of the IS affiliated organization. Russian officials claimed to have killed the emir of Wilayah Kawkaz in December 2016. Foreign fighters from Russia reportedly make up an influential component of the Islamic State’s fighting force in Iraq and Syria, and late IS leader Abu Omar al Shishani may have helped cultivate deeper ties between IS forces and individuals in the North Caucasus.
Appendix C. Ideology and Operations

The ideology of the Islamic State organization can be described as a uniquely hardline version of violent jihadist-Salafism—the group and its supporters are willing to use violence in an armed struggle to establish what they view as an ideal society based on their understanding of Sunni Islam. Their vision is based on their specific understanding of the life of the prophet Mohammed, the example of his earliest followers, and select events in Islamic history. The group’s beliefs are a particularly activist, violent, and uncompromising expression of broader ideological trends that have developed over a period of centuries and have fueled extremism and conflict across the Sunni Muslim world for much of the last 40 years. While IS supporters may share some of the views of nonviolent Salafist Sunnis, Islamic State adherents differ from them, from most non-Salafist Sunnis, and even from other violent jihadist-Salafists in two key respects. One is their chosen creed (aqidah)—their perspectives on the requirements of true Islamic faith—and the other is their chosen approach (manhaj, lit. path)—their method for interpreting and applying their view of Islamic religious tenets. Islamic State figures describe their organization as the successor to and defender of the prophet Mohammed’s approach, a view that many other Sunni Muslims reject. The Islamic State’s supporters further hold an apocalyptic vision of their organization and its role in instigating a broad clash between true Muslims and all those they consider non-believers.

 Creed and Approach

Like other Salafists, the Islamic State organization seeks the elimination from Islam of what it views as idolatry, the promotion of strict monotheism, and the protection of those it views as true Muslim believers from threats posed by idolaters, apostates, and other non-believers. IS leaders argue that many individuals who would describe themselves as Sunni Muslims have strayed from the creed and path defined by the prophet Mohammed and his companions. The Islamic State rejects criticism from other Sunnis who argue that the group too easily or broadly declares the infidelity of other Muslims (an act referred to as takfir), arguing instead that the Islamic State only attacks those whose infidelity can be demonstrated. Nevertheless, IS ideologues dictate

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74 For background on Salafism, see Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, Oxford University Press, 2009; and Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 29, pp. 207–239, 2006. According to Meijer’s volume, Salafism “refers to the movement that believes that Muslims should emulate the first three generations of Islam referred to as the pious forefathers (al salaf al salih) as much as possible in all areas of life.”

75 In the words of one observer, the Islamic State’s ideology can be seen as an “acutely severe” and “unforgiving” example of violent jihadist-Salafism, a broader movement which itself “is predicated on an extremist and minoritarian reading of Islamic scripture that is also textually rigorous, deeply rooted in a premodern theological tradition, and extensively elaborated by a recognized cadre of religious authorities.” See Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, The Brookings Institution Center for Middle East Policy Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper No. 19, March 2015.

76 Terms frequently used in IS members’ explanations of their ideology include Arabic words for idolatry (shirk); monotheism (tawhid); believers (muamminin); non-believers (kuffar); idolaters (mushrikin); apostates (murtadd); faith (iman); and disbelief (kafr).

77 For example, in the midst of jihadist infighting in northern Syria in early 2014, Islamic State religious official Mohammed Sannuh al Rashid (aka Abu Ubadah al Maghribi) released a statement saying “nobody should issue takfiri [declaring the non-belief of Muslims] rulings” against other Muslim groups, because “declaring their non-belief for the sake of fighting them is closer to the opinion of the Kharijites whom we hate.” OSC Report TRR2014012180009989, “Syria: Islamic State of Iraq, Levant Sharia Official Calls Factions to Stop Infighting,” January 21, 2014. Abu Mohammed Al Adnani rejected similar criticism from a Jabhat al Nusra official in a March 2014 audio statement entitled “Then Let Us Earnestly Pray, and Invoke the Curse of Allah on Those Who Lie.”
strict conditions for determining whether other Muslims have nullified their faith through certain acts, and they describe a wide range of groups and individuals as idolaters (i.e., those who worship other gods or associate others with god) or apostates (believers who reject or stray from Islam).

For example, the group considers individuals that support democratic governance and participate in elections, including Sunni Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to be idolaters for elevating man-made law and political order alongside or above religious law prescribed by God. The group is especially uncompromising in its condemnation of and violence toward Shia and Alawites, whom it considers irredeemable apostates subject to punishment by death for their veneration of the prophet Mohammed’s family and for other beliefs and practices. 78

IS materials welcome the so called “extinction of the gray zone” (see Figure C-1) in a black and white struggle between faith and disbelief; they often use these and other stark terms to describe what they see as binary tests of Muslim faith created by conflicts in Syria and Iraq and other world events, including IS terrorist attacks and actions taken by others to counter the group.

The Islamic State’s methods for deriving these views and applying them through action place the group at odds with other self-identified Sunni Muslims, including some other violent jihadist-Salafists such as various prominent ideologues and members of Al Qaeda. In contrast to most traditional schools of Sunni religious opinion and consensus, the group defines itself and justifies its actions through selective reference to certain Sunni Islamic religious texts, including passages from the Qur’an, the attributed sayings and practices (hadith/Sunna) of the prophet Mohammed and his companions, and some subsequent religious scholarship. The group’s dogma disregards some historical events and elides some authoritative Islamic sources that contradict its extreme views. 79

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Figure C-1. “The Extinction of the Gray Zone”
Cover of IS English Language Magazine, February 2015

Source: U.S. Government Open Source Center (OSC).

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78 Islamic State propaganda regularly refers to Shia derogatorily as rejectionists (rawafid) and Safavids, a reference to the 16th-18th century Persian dynasty that ruled large parts of modern day Iraq. Alawites are referred to derogatorily as Nusayris, or followers of a key 9th century figure in the sect’s history, Mohammed ibn Nusayr.

79 For example, the group’s materials selectively cite parts of Surah al Tawbah from the Quran, emphasizing verse 5’s call to fight and kill polytheists wherever they are found and ignoring calls in immediately adjacent verses 6 and 7 to grant asylum and conversion to those who seek it and to respect treaties with non-Muslims as long as non-Muslims respect treaties with the faithful (Al Tawbah, 9:5-7). Similarly, the group ignores the injunction in Surah Al Anfal to prepare for war but to favor peace with those who favor peace (Al Anfal, 8:61). More broadly the group rejects (continued...)
Bernard Haykel, an expert on Salafism at Princeton University, argues that the Islamic State’s approach amounts to “denying the legal complexity of the [Islamic] legal tradition over a thousand years.” Haykel describes the group’s view of Islam as “ahistorical” and links its extreme views to the group’s “very particular reading of that tradition and those texts.”

Nevertheless, statements and public outreach materials suggest that Islamic State leaders seek to convince other Muslims that the group’s actions and views are consistent with historic Islamic practices and are supported by Islamic religious texts and jurisprudence. In this regard, IS figures make frequent reference to other minority, hardline Sunni perspectives on the complex history of Islamic faith and practice, especially the works of the 14th century scholar and polemicist Taqi Ad-din Ahmed Ibn Taymiyyah, the 18th century leader of the Arabian Salafist revival movement Mohammed ibn Abd al Wahhab, and their supporters. Some of their rivals label IS members as Kharijites, a reference to a violent movement from Islam’s first century that rejected Mohammed successors and declared other Muslims to be apostates.

The extent to which commitment to the group’s professed ideology consistently permeates the group’s membership is debatable. Senior leaders and ideologues appear highly committed, but their public statements may mask opportunism or insecurities. Similarly, many lower ranking operatives in the group profess deep commitment to the group’s ideology, but it is unlikely that such commitment is universal among the complex combination of foreign and local forces in the Islamic State’s ranks. Some local supporters appear to have made pragmatic calculations of survival in pledging fealty to the group or have sought to settle local scores with rivals opposed to the Islamic State’s rise.

To date, controversy surrounding the strategy and tactics of the Islamic State have divided jihadist-Salafists and prevented the group from drawing support from what might be a much larger population of prospective adherents. In late 2006 and early 2007, the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the outlining of its ideology by then-leader Abu Umar al Baghdadi provoked serious controversy in jihadist-Salafist circles, with some groups and figures rejecting the group’s calls for attacks on Sunni security force personnel and describing the establishment of the state premature.

Similar controversy has raged since 2013, when the group rejected Al Qaeda’s demands that it withdraw from Syria and declared the establishment of its caliphate. As circumstances evolve, future IS actions may lead to additional controversy and internal divisions that might weaken the group or contribute to its defeat. The group’s embrace of transnational terrorism against civilians is one such development. Alternatively, the group’s staying power might be bolstered by the firm convictions of its core members that they constitute an elite vanguard of believers tasked with a unique religious and historical mission. Islamic State leaders show disregard for popular opinion (continued)

(...continued)

traditional Islamic legal approaches that have sought to explain these and other apparently contradictory impulses in the Qur’an and the hadith through analysis of their chronological development, chains of transmission, and applicability outside their original historical context.


81 At the time, the Islamic Army of Iraq and other Sunni Islamist insurgents criticized ISI’s views, and Saudi scholars intervened to urge unity over insistence on divisive doctrines. Kuwaiti Salafist cleric Hamid al Ali called for ISI to rescind its declaration of an Islamic state.
and do not shy away from controversy with their critics, including disputes with fellow Sunni Muslims and other leading jihadists, like Al Qaeda.82

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is the “Islamic State” Islamic?</th>
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<td>Interest in the roots and ideas of the Islamic State organization has prompted debates over the group’s relationship to the Islamic faith and over the merits of different ways of describing the group, its beliefs, and its goals in public policy discourse. Participants in these debates may approach the question — “Is the ‘Islamic State’ Islamic?” — from different perspectives and draw different conclusions.</td>
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Those who understand the question “Is the Islamic State Islamic?” to focus on whether or not the group’s members view themselves as Muslims or whether they make reference to Islam as a religion and Islamic history in describing their goals might answer the question affirmatively—e.g. — “The ‘Islamic State’ is Islamic because it defines itself through references to Islam and because it seeks a series of goals linked directly to its views of the requirements of Islam as a religion.”

Those who understand the question “Is the Islamic State Islamic?” to focus on whether or not the group’s members and actions are authentically Islamic in the sense of reflecting the religion’s core tenets or representing how most other Muslims would define their faith might answer the question negatively—e.g. — “No, the ‘Islamic State’ is not Islamic because it selectively draws from Islamic texts and traditions, because its actions are predicated on its rejection of what it sees as the wayward beliefs of other Muslims, and because its views on faith, theology, and violence are at odds with those that many other Muslims would describe as ‘Islamic.’”

Those who are critical of statements such as “The Islamic State is not Islamic” or “The Islamic State has nothing to do with Islam” may reject what they view as a failure to acknowledge religious aspects of the group’s identity, ideology, and goals. These critics may fear that deemphasizing or misunderstanding the group’s religious beliefs could lead to mistakes in policy.

At the same time, those who argue that “The Islamic State is not Islamic” or “The Islamic State has nothing to do with Islam” may be seeking to signal to Muslim and non-Muslim audiences that they do not view the beliefs and actions of the Islamic State as authoritative or authentically Islamic or that opponents of the Islamic State are not at war with Muslims writ large. They may further be seeking to signal that they do not see the Islamic State organization as representative of most Muslims.

William McCants, director of the Brookings Institution Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World and author of an in-depth profile of the Islamic State and its ideology, argues that “Ultimately, it’s for Muslims to decide whether the Islamic State is being faithful to scripture. For the nonbelievers, it’s enough to recognize that Islamic scripture is contradictory when it comes to violence and to rejoice that most Muslims make sense of these contradictions in a very different way than ISIS.”83

82 For example, in April 2014, Abu Mohammed al Adnani said:

Al-Qa’ida has become a follower of the majority, whom it calls the ummah [community of believers], flattering them at the expense of religion. The tyrants of the [Muslim] Brotherhood [MB], who fight the mujahideen and do not rule by the sharia of the Merciful, have become an entity being promoted for and being worthy of leniency. They [the MB] are described as the hope of the ummah and one of its heroes. We have no idea about which ummah they are talking about, or what bitter harvest they are seeking. [They say] ‘The Christians, who are fighting the ummah, and the people of the idols such as the Hindus, Sikh, and others, have become partners in the homeland, in which it has become mandatory to coexist with them in peace and stability.’ No, by God this had never been the belief of the ISIL for one day and it will never be. The ISIL cannot go along with the people: If they do right, it does the same, and conversely if they do wrong, it does the same. The methodology of the ISIL will continue to be the disbeliever in tyranny, disavowal from it and its people, and waging jihad against them with the sword, arrowheads, argument, and evidence. Subsequently, The ISIL will welcome those who agree with it and shall ignore those who disagree with it, even if they called themselves ‘the ummah.’ This will certainly be the case, even if that means that the ISIL is alone on one side and the entire world is on the other. O Muslims, this is our methodology that, God willing, we will never depart from, even if Al-Qa’ida is going to fight us over it, and even if we were annihilated, but for one person who will follow it.”

Abu Mohammed al Adnani—This is Not and Will Never Be Our Path, OSC Report TRN2014041833830660, “Iraq: ISIL Spokesman’s Audio Attacks Al-Qa’ida’s Ideology, Calls For Establishing Islamic Caliphate,” April 17, 2014.

Treatment of Religious Minorities, Jews, Christians, and Shia

Religious minority communities living in Islamic State territory have faced expulsion, the destruction or seizure of their property, forced conversion, kidnapping, assault, sexual slavery, and death. The United Nations has stated that “the targeting of ethnic and religious communities by the Islamic State appears to be part of a deliberate and systematic policy that aims to suppress, permanently cleanse or expel, or in some instances destroy those communities within areas of its control.” This approach has been justified by IS leaders based on the designations of groups and individuals as polytheists or apostates as outlined above (“Creed and Approach”).

The Islamic State makes selective reference to the Qur’an and Islamic legal traditions to justify its treatment of non-Muslims, including Jews and Christians who as groups are afforded unique status under Islamic law. In general terms, the Islamic State views Jews and Christians as having violated terms of agreement with Muslims that would require their protection. Like Al Qaeda leaders and other jihadist-Salafist ideologues, IS leaders often refer to their enemies as part of a Jewish and Crusader-led conspiracy against Islam. In classifying Jews and Christians as hostile parties, the Islamic State seeks to justify violence against them. In basic terms, the Islamic State offers Jewish and Christian enemies three choices—conversion, the payment of a protection tax known as jizyah, or death.

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84 Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in Iraq: 6 July–10 September 2014, published jointly by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

85 According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam, “the term dhimma is used for the obligation of Muslims in general and of Muslim rulers in particular to grant protection to non-Muslims living under their rule. The religious communities granted this protection were designated ‘protected people’ (ahl al-dhimma, or dhimmīs). In most periods of Islamic history, dhimmīs were allowed to continue practising their religion on the condition that they paid a special tax (jizya), recognised the exaltedness of Islam, and lived according to the Islamic laws pertaining to them. The subject is usually discussed as part of a general consideration of the treatment of minorities, but non-Muslims under Muslim rule were not always a minority: because the process of conversion to Islam proceeded slowly after the conquests, the Middle East remained a Christian-majority area for at least five hundred years, and the laws concerning dhimmīs developed during a period when a Muslim elite ruled a largely non-Muslim population. ... Most non-Muslims living under Islamic rule in the early Muslim centuries thus came to be considered dhimmīs, although the rules concerning Jews and Christians [the ahl al-kitāb, or People of the Book] differed from those concerning Zoroastrians and non-Arab polytheists. The ahl al-kitāb are not identical to the ahl al-dhimma. The term ahl al-kitāb refers to Judaism and Christianity as religions possessing divine books, whereas the term ahl al-dhimma refers to the relationship between the Muslim government and its non-Muslim subjects.” Yohanan, Friedmann, “Dhimma.” Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE. Edited by: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson, Brill Online, 2016.

86 In 2007, then Islamic State of Iraq leader Abu Umar al Baghdadi said, “We consider that the people of the book [Christians and Jews] and others among the non-believers within the Islamic State today are enemies with no rights as dhimmis [rights guaranteed to non-Muslims according to Islamic law under Muslim government]. They have violated the pact with them on countless occasions and if they wish to have safety and security they must renew the pact with the Islamic State according to the Umari conditions they violated [conditions attributed to the second caliph Umar].” OSC Report FEA20070314102073, “New Al-Baghdaadi Statement Warns U.S. Against Agreements With Other Jihad Groups, March 13, 2007.

87 In March 2015, IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani said, “O Jews and Crusaders, if you want to protect yourselves, save your money, and live a secure life away from our swords, you have only two options: either you join Islam and declare God as the only god and no other, and thus live a good life in this world, gain the next one, and be doubly rewarded, [and] this is what we are calling on you to do and advising you to accept ... The other option would be for you to contently pay us the jizyah [capitation tax collected from non-Muslims in states ruled by Islamic law], after you depart from the Arabian Peninsula of Muhammad, blessings and peace be upon him, as well as Jerusalem and all the nations of Muslims. The jizyah you will be paying us is one tenth of the tenth of what you are currently paying to fund your failing war. So save your money, and lift our swords from your [own] throats. If you choose the third option, and insist on your arrogance, pride, and stubbornness, you will deeply regret it soon, God willing.”
After taking control of the Iraqi city of Mosul in 2014, the Islamic State demanded that Christians and other minorities there convert to Islam or leave the city but did not offer them the opportunity to remain after paying jizyah. Most members of minority communities fled, but some who did not were detained. The Islamic State reportedly bulldozed or otherwise destroyed remaining Christian churches and shrines in Mosul. Similar actions have been reported in Syrian Christian communities seized by IS fighters. These actions have been criticized by some Islamic scholars, who argue that, “these Christians are not combatants against Islam or transgressors against it, indeed they are friends, neighbors and co-citizens. From the legal perspective of shari’ah they all fall under ancient agreements that are around 1400 years old, and the rulings of jihad do not apply to them.”

Baghdadi’s and Adnani’s statements regarding the elimination of groups considered apostates also focuses on fighting Shia Muslims. As part of its campaign to depose the Shia-led government in Baghdad, the Islamic State has supplemented its conventional military offensive with repeated bombings of Shia gathering places in Baghdad and some other majority Shia cities, killing numerous Shia civilians. While the Islamic State justifies the targeting of Shia through a selective and extremist reading of religious texts, its actions are likely also influenced by the sectarian political context out of which the group emerged. The group and its supporters describe years of repression and injustice against Sunnis perpetrated by Iraq’s U.S.-backed, Shia-led government.

As they seek to motivate their followers, Islamic State leaders intone both religious references and allusions to historical incidents of perceived Sunni disenfranchisement. Assessing which parts of the group’s message resonate most with individual IS followers is extremely challenging. In addition to religious convictions and individuals’ sense of identity, the appeal of taking decisive action, a desire for adventure or glory, financial expediency, or violent personality disorders also may come into play in some cases.

**Threatening U.S. Partners and Allies**

Like Al Qaeda, the Islamic State identifies a range of U.S. partners in the Middle East and Europe as hostile targets and considers them agents in a broad U.S.-led conspiracy against Sunni Muslims. As a matter of priority, Al Qaeda leaders have largely focused their efforts on targeting the United States, its interests, and its allies in Europe, viewing insurgent campaigns against U.S. partners in the Middle East such as the governments of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt as potentially harmful or counterproductive distractions that could alienate potential Muslim supporters.

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90 In his announcement of the creation of the Islamic State caliphate in June 2014, IS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani declared, “the time has come for those generations that were drowning in oceans of disgrace, being nursed on the milk of humiliation, and being ruled by the vilest of all people, after their long slumber in the darkness of neglect—the time has come for them to rise.” OSE Report TRR2014062966139093, June 29, 2014. In March 2015, Adnani called on Sunnis to rise up in similar terms, citing a long list of grievances: “O Sunni people, the rejectionists have come to take your homes, your money, and your land. They have come to kill your men and imprison your women. The Iranians have come demanding revenge from the Iraqis for the 1980s. The rejectionists have come to exact revenge from the Sunni people for Hussayn, may God the Glorified be satisfied with him, whom they killed and then mourned and for whom they have flagellated themselves for hundreds of years. So wake up, O Muslims. …O ummah of Muhammad, blessings and peace be upon him, we warned you before and we warn you again that this war is a Crusader-Safavid war against Islam, monotheism, and the Sunni people.” OSC Report TRR2015031285993616, “ISIL Spokesman Celebrates Boko Haram Allegiance, Issues Ultimatum, Threatens Attacks on West,” Twitter, March 12, 2015.
supporters. In contrast, the Islamic State organization has primarily sought to eliminate local and regional opposition to its existence, including among fellow Muslims, in the service of its broader hostility toward the United States, Europe, and others. By seeking to consolidate control over territory in Iraq and Syria and declaring itself a sovereign political-religious authority to which Sunni Muslims owe allegiance, the Islamic State has defined itself to date as a more direct and fundamental challenge to regional governments than Al Qaeda has historically done. Its attacks outside its strongholds reflect its long-held hostility to the West, but are a new development in its approach.

IS leaders continue to urge their supporters to attack and undermine governments supporting U.S. and coalition operations. European partners receive particular attention, as does the government of Saudi Arabia among Middle Eastern states. As noted above, IS supporters have carried out several terrorist attacks inside Saudi Arabia since 2014, and Saudi authorities have arrested hundreds of suspected supporters of the Islamic State and other terrorist groups. The Islamic State’s capture and graphic murder of Jordanian Air Force pilot Muath al Kassasbeh in early 2015 and ongoing IS affiliate operations against the Egyptian government in Sinai demonstrate the group’s broader hostility to regional governments that it rejects.

The Islamic State’s anti-Israel rhetoric also is noteworthy. In late 2015, IS subgroups across the globe issued missives encouraging Palestinians and others to attack Jews generally and Israelis specifically in conjunction with a wave of violence driven by non-IS related disputes in Israel and the West Bank—largely concentrated on Jewish-Muslim tensions over Jerusalem’s holy sites. Although the Islamic State has not directly attacked targets in Israel or territories it controls, possible IS-inspired attacks in Europe over the past two years against Jewish targets have killed some Israeli citizens. Israeli officials have routinely expressed concern about potential IS-inspired or -directed threats.

Author Contact Information

Christopher M. Blanchard
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
cblanchard@crs.loc.gov, 7-0428

Carla E. Humud
Analyst in Middle Eastern and African Affairs
chumud@crs.loc.gov, 7-7314