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Congressional Record: May 22, 2000 (House)
Page H3496-H3509


 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 506 and rule 
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill, 
H.R. 4392.

[...]

                 Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Roemer

  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Roemer.
       At the end of title III add the following new section (and 
     conform the table of contents accordingly):

     SEC. 306.  ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE EXPENDITURES FOR THE PRECEDING 
                   FISCAL YEAR.

       Section 14 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     404i) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
     subsection:
       "(c) Annual Statement of the Total Amount of Intelligence 
     Expenditures for the Preceding Fiscal Year.--Not later than 
     February 1 of each year, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit to Congress a report containing an unclassified 
     statement of the aggregate appropriations for the fiscal year 
     immediately preceding the current year for National Foreign 
     Intelligence Program (NFIP), Tactical and Intelligence and 
     Related Activities (TIARA), and Joint Military Intelligence 
     Program (JMIP) activities, including activities carried out 
     under the budget of the Department of Defense to collect, 
     analyze, produce, disseminate, or support the collection of 
     intelligence.".

  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the debate on this 
particular issue.
  First of all, I want to reiterate to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. 
Goss) and the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) that I rise in 
strong support and bipartisan support of this bill overall. I do, 
however, bring up one consideration as amendment on this bill, and that 
is we do not want to reveal agency operations, we do not want to reveal 
any individual agency budgets, and we do not want to reveal spending on 
any kind of specific programs.
  Given those parameters, what this amendment argues is for one ray of 
sunshine, one simple disclosure of the aggregate funding of all 
intelligence activities for fiscal year 1999. Not this year's request, 
not this year's budget, but 1999's budget.
  We do that in light of the fact, and I stress to my colleagues, that 
the intelligence community has voluntarily disclosed the 1998 and the 
1997 budgets, so we are simply saying that this one ray of sunlight 
comes down for the taxpayer to have some kind of sense of what the 
overall budget is for our intelligence community.
  Now, this amendment is cosponsored by my good friend the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Moran), it is cosponsored by my friend the gentleman 
from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer), it is cosponsored by my friend the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Smith), and, I think most importantly, 
it is supported by my ranking member, who I have the deepest respect 
for, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon).
  The organizations that are for this ray of sunshine, for a little bit 
of accountability in disclosure, the organizations that have written us 
letters on this, include the Taxpayers for Common Sense, Citizens 
Against Government Waste, the Council for a Livable World, the Center 
for Defense Information, the Center for International Policy, and the 
list goes on and on.
  But I think one of the most compelling, one of the most compelling 
reasons to do this, Mr. Chairman, is a report that came out in 1996 by 
people

[[Page H3499]]

who go over these individual budget levels throughout the intelligence 
community, line-by-line, program by program, SAP by SAP, special access 
program by special access program, and they have analyzed this. And 
they are such people as the former Defense Secretaries, Mr. Brown and 
Mr. Aspin. They recommended that we disclose not just the current year, 
but the next year's budget. This was in the Aspin-Brown report in 1996. 
So they asked for a few rays of sunshine on this report, when all I am 
simply asking for is one on the 1999 budget funding level.
  I think this is common sense, I think this will help us get a little 
bit more accountability with the intelligence community. I think this 
informs the taxpayer of an overall budget, what might be going on in 
terms of our intelligence operations. And I think one of the most 
really convincing arguments for this, Mr. Chairman, is that we have 
right here the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. And 
in this we have listed, which is a public document, Mr. Chairman, this 
is an unclassified document, they go through here and list Rivet Joint 
Mission Trainer, $15.5 million plus-up; the Manned Reconnaissance 
Systems, $8 million plus-up; the F-18 Shared Airborne Reconnaissance 
Pod, $18 million plus-up; and on down, over page after page after page, 
a public document.
  We are not even asking for that. We already disclose that in this 
report. We are asking for the aggregate level, not broken down by 
agency, for 1999. Not individual reports, not individual line items, 
like we do in the Defense Department budget, like we did last week, 
item by item, of helicopters and ships and personnel and operations and 
maintenance in our Defense budget. We are not calling for any of that 
in this budget; simply for an aggregate level.
  Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say that there are books out there that 
talk in explicit and sensitive detail about some of our very sensitive 
operations.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Roemer was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, there are books out there that you can pick 
up on the best seller list. I am not confirming, I am not denying what 
they say and what accuracy they have in a book written by Tom Clancy, 
or a book written called Blind Man's Bluff on submarines. But certainly 
some of these books that are written by former CIA people or are 
written by journalists and reporters, that talk in intimate detail 
about some of these programs, I do not support the release of that kind 
of information. But we are simply saying, Mr. Chairman, one ray of 
sunshine for disclosure, for public accountability and for information 
for the taxpayer, so that they have one grain of information to look at 
as they assess what our priorities should be with the intelligence 
budget as it relates to the overall budget.
  Mr. SISISKY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
  Mr. Chairman, I regret really having to oppose this amendment offered 
by my three very good friends and colleagues, but I do not believe it 
makes sense to force, and the word is "force," the executive branch 
to declassify the aggregate amount appropriated for intelligence 
activities each year. If there is one item of information a country 
should not disclose to its adversaries, it is the amount of effort 
being made each year to discover those adversaries' plans and 
intentions, their secrets and vulnerabilities.
  Much of the business of intelligence is expensive, especially when it 
comes to our government's amazing technical activities. Yet those 
capabilities can sometimes be defeated by comparatively simple 
countermeasures. If our adversaries can track the ups and downs of our 
intelligence budget over time, they may be able to figure out when new 
capabilities are coming on line and develop techniques to make the 
system less capable. We should keep our intelligence budget secret so 
we do not provide information to our adversaries about what we are 
working on and when.
  Furthermore, I do not believe disclosure of the aggregate 
appropriations amount will improve the debates on intelligence in this 
body. Every Member of the House of Representatives may have access to 
this information, and considerably more, by taking advantage of the 
opportunity to read the classified schedule incorporated in the 
intelligence authorization bill each year. Disclosure of the 
appropriations total will not provide more information about 
intelligence activities to Members of the House and Senate than is now 
available.
  Since disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget will not 
provide more information to Members of Congress but could assist those 
who seek advantages over the United States of America, I urge the 
defeat of this amendment.
  Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, the sponsors of this amendment are not being 
subversive, and I do not think we are being naive. I think we are being 
responsible to the taxpayers, to the extent that it is responsible.
  Now, I would certainly agree with my good friend who just spoke that 
we ought not disclose any kind of information that would jeopardize our 
ability to protect American citizens. But this does not do that.
  When my good friend, the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), said he 
was offering the amendment and would I like to be a cosponsor, I said, 
"Of course. Why not?" That is still my reaction. Of course, we will 
not disclose the cumulative amount. Why not? It is not an astronomical 
amount; it is a very reasonable portion of the Federal budget. In fact, 
when you compare it to anyone that might be considered a potential 
threat, it is a very minimal amount to protect this country.
  But we have a responsibility to the taxpayers. It is their money; it 
is not ours. It is one thing not to give the taxpayers a receipt or an 
accounting of how we might spend the money; it is quite another to ask 
for a blank check. Just sign the bottom line, we will fill in the 
amount.
  I do not think that is the way we do things, that we ought to do 
things in a democracy. We ought to have as much transparency as 
possible. We ought to do everything that we can to restore trust in 
government. This is not a totalitarian society. I could see it if we 
were operating under a fascist or certainly a communist system. You 
would never imagine disclosing these kinds of amounts. But we have 
nothing to hide. We have very responsible members of the Committee on 
Appropriations on both sides of the aisle, and certainly the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, and the gentleman from California 
(Mr. Dixon) is an extraordinarily responsible leader on our side, and 
the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) as well.

                              {time}  1900

  Now, the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) is supporting, but so 
is Warren Rudman, a former Senator, certainly not a subversive, 
certainly not someone that does anything in a radical kind of manner. 
General Harold Brown; we have the former CIA director Turner; we have 
any number of people that looked at this and decided this is not an 
irresponsible thing to do. In fact, this is a responsible thing to do 
in light of the requirement that we have to be responsive to the 
American taxpayer.
  So I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that this amendment ought to be 
included, and it probably ought to be included as a matter of course in 
each successive year. It is nice that the CIA or our intelligence 
agencies chose to disclose the amount in 1997 and 1998, and probably 
will be disclosed this year; but I think we ought to say as well that 
the legislative branch recognizes that this is an appropriate thing to 
do in light of the fact that it is not our money, it is the taxpayers' 
money.
  It was a recommendation, as the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) 
said, of the commission that was put together to look at these types of 
national security issues. They came up with a recommendation that the 
amount be disclosed to the public, the overall amount for the 
intelligence budget on a current basis. This is not on a current basis, 
this is the previous fiscal year. I think it is a very moderate piece 
of legislation, it is a reasonable thing to do, and I would hope

[[Page H3500]]

that we would not have much controversy over something like this and 
deal with more difficult, complex matters.
  Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, there is something that I think we are forgetting in 
this debate and that is that every Member of Congress can go up to the 
Select Committee on Intelligence room and see the entire content of the 
intelligence authorization bill. There is nothing that is kept from us 
as elected representatives, but there are things that are kept in every 
detail from our opponents and our potential enemies.
  That puts the responsibility on a small number of shoulders, and most 
of them are sitting in this room here now, the members of the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. It is our job to review the 
budgets and the sources and the methods and to provide oversight of all 
of the intelligence agencies, and we have to do this job in a way that 
is kind of uncommon for politicians. We have to do it quietly, without 
a lot of public hooha, in a closed room where the press is not there. 
Most of us are used to putting out press releases on everything and 
arguing about things in the media, but we do not have that privilege on 
this committee, and we should not, because this is a matter of national 
security.
  Declassifying the intelligence budget, whether as an overall number, 
or in smaller pieces, only helps our enemies to track trends in our 
spending and figure out what we are doing. My colleague from Indiana 
talks about books that have been published or articles that have been 
written, and none of us on this committee ever confirm or deny or say 
anything about what is right and what is wrong; and he well knows that 
a lot of it is complete wildness. But we do not comment on it, because 
it is our job not to.
  The problem with declassifying the whole number is that one cannot 
talk about the details, so it makes no sense in context with other 
parts of the budget. We cannot explain it, we cannot defend it, we 
cannot talk about the details and what it means and what we are buying; 
but we can refer our colleagues up to the intelligence room to look at 
those details, even though we cannot talk about it publicly. Even the 
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Moran) seemed to find it difficult to talk 
about comparisons here on the floor because this is a public forum. We 
would have that difficulty again and again and again if we try to 
justify a declassified total number without being able to talk about 
the specifics that make it up.
  I am also concerned that there are no exceptions in this amendment 
for time of war or national emergencies, and we are directing the 
President and the CIA to declassify numbers that, frankly, they already 
have the authority to do without direction of this Congress; and it 
concerns me when, as elected representatives, we tell the executive 
branch to declassify things and get proscriptive about how exactly that 
should be done. It is my view that that generally should be left up to 
the executive branch of government.
  Sometimes I think that we get a little bit complacent. The Cold War 
is over. We are all focused on things at home, on Social Security and 
taxes and education, and things that our constituents are facing every 
day. But just because the Cold War is over does not mean that there are 
not people out there that would take advantage of the United States and 
whose interests are contrary to our own, and I am ever mindful of what 
Churchill once said. The truth must be protected by a bodyguard of 
lies, and it is sometimes in the interests of the United States of 
America to deceive our enemies about what we are actually doing in 
order to protect our national security.
  My colleague from Indiana talks about one ray of sunshine. I see it a 
little differently. I think it is one piece of a puzzle, a piece of a 
puzzle that our enemies would very much like to have, and which I think 
is the obligation of this body to deny them.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Mrs. WILSON. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman, who is a very 
valuable member of the Committee on Intelligence, and I certainly 
respect her opinions on a host of different issues.
  However, as she started out the debate on this issue, she said, we as 
members of the committee have access, the 16 of us, and all 435 
members, have access if they want. This amendment is not about that 
access of Members of Congress. Sometimes we think we are pretty smart; 
we think we know and have a lot of the answers. This is about providing 
one simple piece of information to the people that work hard every day 
to fund the overall budget, and then they get one ray of sunshine to 
know how the intelligence budget fits into the overall budget.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. 
Wilson) has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mrs. Wilson was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, that really was not my point. My point was 
that there are times when we as elected representatives have to take on 
and shoulder tremendous responsibility, and that responsibility may 
include access to information that we cannot share with our 
constituents. That is the responsibility we have been given as members 
of this committee, and it is one that I think that we should continue, 
including this one piece of information.
  Mr. BLUMENAUER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, the point, as my colleague from Indiana was making, was 
what the public has a right to know. The fiscal year 1997 budget was 
revealed to the American public as $26.6 billion. That was not 
something that was probably a shock to our adversaries, who have pretty 
good estimates of what we are doing in this arena. There are experts 
that speculate on this. The Republic's foundations have not been 
shattered. The next year when it was revealed that it was $26.7 
billion, life went on, and if we were to give the American public what 
the figure is for this year and what is recommended in the aggregate 
for the following year, life as we know it will continue.
  I think that we in this body and in the Federal Government generally 
tend to draw a curtain of secrecy over things that are not going to be 
secret from our adversaries; but they are going to keep, and this 
happens time and time again, information that we do not want revealed 
to the American public for whatever reason.
  We are starting to see the history of what has happened with the FBI 
under J. Edgar Hoover under the guise of national security. We have 
seen the things that have been perpetrated by that agency under Mr. 
Hoover's regime.
  Mr. Chairman, I think that it is time for us to take a step back and 
look at this amendment, which gives the American public an opportunity 
to evaluate some of the trending. It is not going to be a great mystery 
to our adversaries who have access to some information from their 
sources. It is speculated upon in the academic community, but it will 
give the American public a little more information.
  I think it is appropriate for us to ask hard questions as a people 
about the resources that are being invested. How, given the tens of 
billions of dollars that were invested in our security apparatus, we 
could not predict the collapse of the former Soviet Union; that we 
somehow could not identify the Chinese embassy, which resulted in a 
tragic bombing, the impact of the repercussions we are still dealing 
with.
  Mr. Chairman, I think that we ought to be honest about the public 
realm and stop the charade here. There is an adequate amount of 
information that is available for very sophisticated people to be able 
to allow some tracking of this. I think taking an additional step so 
that the American public has it makes sense. I hope that we will be 
more rational about what we keep secret and what we do not. I am all in 
favor of trying to protect things that are truly important for national 
security, but not to protect people from embarrassment about things 
years after the fact, and not to protect the American public from 
knowing how their tax dollars were spent.
  Rumor has it that in about 1987 we had a peak of about $36 billion 
that were invested in all of these intelligence activities. Yet, today, 
13 years later, with a less sophisticated array of allied forces that 
we are contending

[[Page H3501]]

with, we are still investing huge sums of money that ought to give us 
all an opportunity for a constructive national debate.
  I think the approval of this amendment, with the recommendations of 
the commission that we had of other informed sources who want to pull 
this out into the light of day, as my friend, the gentleman from 
Indiana (Mr. Roemer) has indicated, would be an important step forward.
  Mr. Chairman, I hope that we as a body will be consistent in terms of 
wanting to make sure that the public has access to all of the positions 
that they have a right to have knowledge of and that does not 
compromise our security. We can start by at least going back and giving 
a third year's subject for what the total disclosure is.
  Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption of this amendment.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the gentleman's amendment, and I 
thank him for his courage and his leadership in offering it here. He is 
a very serious member of the committee, as has been noted, and all of 
us on the committee take our responsibilities very seriously.
  When a Member of the House receives the honor of serving on the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we assume a greater 
responsibility for our national security in that we have to be trusted 
with a great deal of information. We also take a responsibility to 
protect the sources and methods by which we obtain that information. 
That responsibility is a grave one for us, because lives are at stake.
  We also want our President and the administration to have the best 
possible information in the interest of our national security and to 
make the decisions and judgments that a President must make, regardless 
of what party he belongs to, or what opinions he has. We want him to 
have the best possible information.
  So we need to have, and again, as we are in a new world where it is 
not bipolar, but it is many serpents, as DCI Woolsey described it at 
one time, we need to have intelligence, but we ought to be careful 
enough to move in that direction with fiscal responsibility as well as 
responsibility for intelligence.

                              {time}  1915

  We are a very special country. The confidence that people have in our 
government is our strength. So it is hard to understand why, in this 
body, the House of the people, we would want to deprive the public of 
knowing what proportion of our budget is spent on intelligence.
  I happen to think that we are good enough at that, that the 
intelligence community is good enough at releasing that figure and at 
the same time having our adversaries not have access to what that 
figure is spent on or what any increase in spending would be spent on.
  I am certain that our intelligence community can meet that challenge.
  The accountability that the intelligence community must have is one 
of the main reasons that I am supporting the amendment of the gentleman 
from Indiana (Mr. Roemer). Some have said if we go through releasing 
this aggregate number, it starts us down a road to releasing other 
information. No, no, it does not have to be that way. We can say it is 
the aggregate number and that is that. We can make a decision, Congress 
can act, and that can be what the decision is.
  It does not mean we are starting down the road to anything, except 
better accountability to the American people, again for how this fits 
into our total budget. Our budget is what we spend most of our time 
working on here, whether it is in the authorizing committees to prepare 
the policy or the Committee on the Budget to do the allocations or the 
Committee on Appropriations to do the final appropriating. So it is 
what we spend most of our time on, and this amount of money, whatever 
it is, is a large percentage of that discretionary spending, a very 
large percentage of it.
  So as we have to make decisions about cuts here and there, I think it 
is perfectly appropriate that the public knows how this intelligence 
budget fits into the entire budget.
  It is difficult to believe that the aggregate budget figure for 
fiscal years 1997 and 1998 could be made public by DCI Tenet with no 
impact on national security and the figure for fiscal year 1999 could 
not be because national security would be harmed if it were disclosed.
  It is so sad, it is almost ludicrous, it is almost ludicrous, when 
what we are trying to do is to protect the community so that there is 
respect for the job that they do, but what we are trying to do is 
protect their sources and methods.
  By the way, I want to add here that there is much else that should be 
declassified that is in the realm of classified now, and that is a 
whole other subject and one that hopefully we will go into in a more 
serious way as declassification is taking place, but this one simple 
matter, which says to the American people we are not afraid for them to 
know the aggregate number that we spend on intelligence.
  The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) is doing a service to our 
country and to this Congress by proposing this amendment. Again, I 
commend him for his courage, his leadership and urge our colleagues to 
support his amendment.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, as most of my colleagues know, for a reasonably short 
time I have had the privilege of chairing the Committee on 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense that deals with national 
security. As some of my colleagues have mentioned, there are some of 
our individual military items that are in what we call the black world. 
They are kept secret.
  They are kept secret for a reason, and that is beyond just their 
technological potential and capability. There are a lot of things about 
those systems we would not want our enemies to know. I realize that 
this amendment has little to do with that, for we are not being asked 
to peel back the onion, even though the gentlewoman just suggested 
there are many things that are classified that she would prefer to be 
unclassified.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Let me continue my statement. I would like 
to continue my statement.
  Ms. PELOSI. I appreciate that, but that is not what I said. I am 
talking about information, and the gentleman knows I am respectful of 
his position.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. I understand what the gentlewoman from 
California (Ms. Pelosi) was saying, but I am just making a suggestion 
that there is a parallel here.
  One of the pieces of information that is largely public at this point 
has to do with our submarine force. There are people who would suggest 
that we do not need very many more submarines. There are others who 
suggest we ought to have at least as many as we have, and one of the 
reasons is because they go under the water and nobody really 
necessarily knows where they are.
  In the straits near China, it might be interesting to have leaders 
wonder whether we are there or not.
  Well, I make that point because there is a parallel here. Our 
intelligence effort is considerably smaller than some of us would like 
it to be and revealing that number might suggest to many as to why many 
of us are so concerned. On the other side of that, there is reason and 
value in suggesting that maybe our enemies or potential enemies think 
that we spend a lot more money than we do. I would like them to think 
that, frankly, and there is value in having them think that.
  Now, the point that I am making is that this fabulous democracy that 
we have the privilege of representing here involves the people sending 
us to this great forum, to sit in committees, to sit on this floor, 
argue pro and con, develop the information that leads to logical policy 
conclusions. The public sends us here because they cannot come here to 
do that detail work. They send us here also knowing full well that 
there are items relative to the national interest, that not only are 
they not able to participate day in and day out about but indeed they 
think we should do it with competence and sometimes in confidence.
  The fact is that there is not a ground swell of public outcry out 
there saying we have to have this number. It has

[[Page H3502]]

been debated here on the floor for several years, but the numbers of 
people who are really interested perhaps are reflected by the numbers 
of Members who have gone to our committee room to read these bills.
  Outside of our committee, I believe the number last year where 
someone came in was seven Members actually went in to read the bill, 
and I frankly wonder if they read the whole bill. The first page on 
there shows them what the number is. There are four so far this year.
  So there is this huge ground swell out there suggesting that the 
public has no confidence in us in this very delicate area. I would 
suggest that the public that actually studies this area knows there is 
value in not having our enemies or our potential enemies know how 
little we spend or how much we spend. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I 
strongly oppose this amendment
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. LEWIS of California. I yield to the gentlewoman from California.
  Ms. PELOSI. I just want to make sure it is clear that I completely 
agree with everything the gentleman said except for the aggregate 
number.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. I am making the point about the aggregate 
number.
  Ms. PELOSI. I understand that. The gentleman said I said there should 
be more things. What I am talking about is the Hinchey amendment, which 
talked about our U.S. involvement in Chile and Guatemala and those 
things.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman.
  Ms. PELOSI. Not the gentleman's budget, the gentleman is right.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California has the time.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, with that I believe I made the 
point that I do not want our enemies to know how much we are not 
spending as well as how much we are spending, and I think that is in 
the national interest, in the security of our country's interest and 
perhaps, well not perhaps but very much in the interest of peace.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, those who are watching have to be extraordinarily 
puzzled by this debate. Now since the year I was born, and as everyone 
can all see I am getting a little long in the tooth, that has been 
quite a few years, 1947, the United States has kept secret the amount 
of money that is spent well and the amount of money that is not spent 
so well on the intelligence services and agencies of the United States.
  This certainly could have been a rationale in 1947, the year I was 
born with the closing of the Iron Curtain, the fear of the Soviet Union 
and their growth across Europe and around the world; threats that we 
perceived, but that is history. The Soviet Union has collapsed. We are 
now confronted with rogue nations and others.
  Our defense budget, and the gentleman waxed eloquent about how few go 
to read it, I do not go to read it. Does anyone know why? It is a Catch 
22. If I go and read it, I cannot talk about it but if I do not read it 
then I can talk about it. I will say we are spending $30 billion, $30 
billion of hard-earned taxpayer dollars on the intelligence services.
  Now we had one agency a few years ago that lost $4 billion in 
bookkeeping. They did not know they had it. Well, they found it again 
after they were audited; and that money has been reallocated, I guess. 
I do not know. I have not gone up to check out the secret report.
  The only reason it is kept secret is to keep it secret from the 
American people, not from our enemies. This amount of money is more 
than the gross domestic product of virtually all of our enemies 
combined. They would be frightened to death if they knew we were 
spending $30 billion to sneak around in their countries or to look at 
them from satellites or however else it is we are monitoring their 
activities. But they do not know that and the gentleman says, well, we 
would not want them to know how little we are spending. Only $30 
billion, only $30 billion? This is extraordinary.
  The gentleman has not even proposed that we would tell them how much 
we are going to spend this year, which is more secret. It might be an 
increase of X percent of X which might be Y. Those who took math can 
follow that. But we do not know. We really do not know, and they would 
not know. They would only know what we spent last year.
  This is an incredibly modest amendment. It will let the taxpayers 
know how much money we spent last year. We are not going to audit how 
they spent it. We are not going to audit if they lost billions again 
like that agency unnamed did a few years ago. We are not going to audit 
to see if it was well spent, if it was spent on satellites or human 
information or other secret technologies to monitor every communication 
around the earth that I am getting a lot of e-mails about in my office. 
No. We would just know how much money we spent last year on this 
aggregate budget.
  I think it would scare the bejesus out of all of our enemies if they 
knew how much we were spending. They would be really scared. They 
cannot come near 1/100th of 1 percent of that for their intelligence 
budget. So let us reveal it.
  Like the gentleman has proposed, we are only going to reveal it for 
last year. I would go further. I would actually reveal it for this 
year. I do not think that would be a problem. In fact, we do have a 
report which came out, which I left over there, but a report in 1996 
where in fact, chaired by the Secretary of Defense and others, the 
commission said that there would be no harm, no threat possible to our 
national security to publish this year's and even projected years' 
numbers. In fact, I believe it would scare our enemies into submission.
  Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  I support the Roemer amendment. This is an amendment that I think the 
American people are owed today. Perhaps at one time it would not have 
been appropriate to disclose the aggregate amount of the past year's 
intelligence budget, but I think the time has come to do so.
  The first argument that we hear, it is either expressed or implied, 
is that if the American people knew the aggregate amount spent on 
intelligence they would demand that the amount be cut. The problem with 
this argument is that, even if that were true, that is not a reason to 
classify the amount.
  Executive Order 12958 makes clear that information may only be 
classified to protect national security and not hinder discussion or 
debate.
  The second argument we hear in one form or another is that making the 
aggregate figure public would provide no useful information, because a 
context for spending can only be provided at the program level. Because 
the public would be dissatisfied with this useless information, 
irresistible pressure would be brought to declassify more of the 
intelligence budget. This is called the slippery slope argument, and I 
disagree with it.
  I for one will oppose declassification even at the agency level. 
Moreover, fear of what might happen in the future plainly does not meet 
the classification standard in the executive order.
  The third argument is that America's enemies, by comparing year-to-
year aggregate intelligence budgets, and this is the argument we have 
heard mostly tonight, could figure out what specific new programs were 
being funded and the deficiencies these programs were meant to remedy.

                              {time}  1930

  It is difficult to believe that an adversary, no matter how strong 
its analytical skills, could use the top line number to determine 
program specifics. Several nations disclose their intelligence budgets, 
and I doubt if our analysts use solely those figures as a basis for a 
judgment on the specific programs in those budgets.
  Additionally, as the report accompanying this year's authorization 
makes clear, a great deal of information is already made public on the 
shortcomings of the intelligence community.
  Some of us will argue that this year's budget is at an appropriate 
level; others will argue that the administration has not provided 
enough money. The administration's budget request is 6.6 percent above 
last year's appropriation level. Others will argue that, in fact, we 
should cut it.
  If we are to make these arguments on the floor, the American public 
should

[[Page H3503]]

know what that inclusive figure is. It is entirely fighting with one's 
hands behind one's back to say that the President has offered up too 
much or too little, or we have provided too much or too little without 
the public knowing and being able to make the judgment on the aggregate 
number.
  Mr. Chairman, I believe this amendment will make an important 
contribution to the debate on the resources necessary to support our 
national security, and I would urge the Members of the House to reflect 
on this overnight and give the public the opportunity to know last 
year's aggregate number. I pledge support to resist opening up the 
budget further. But as we argue too much or too little, the public 
should know what that reference is.
  Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that we are having this debate again. 
We had it in committee. It was voted down in committee 11-5. In an 
abundance of fairness, the Committee on Rules has given us an open rule 
and done all these things, and we are getting to the point.
  I think there are a couple of points that need to be said. First of 
all, accountability is very important, and I believe our committee does 
a fabulous job on accountability. The point that has been made by 
several who have spoken on this, any Member can come upstairs and 
satisfy themselves on any aspect. The American people look to us for 
that accountability. We are pleased to invite our colleagues to come up 
to the committee to make sure we are doing our job properly. So far, it 
seems we are because, as the gentleman from California (Mr. Dixon) 
pointed out, there is not a huge groundswell on this subject.
  The second point that has been made as well it would be great to have 
some information out there. It might be confidence building. Well, it 
is true that the President of the United States who does have the 
authority to disclose this number, it does lie with the President of 
the United States to reveal it, chose to reveal it through the Director 
of Central Intelligence in 1997 and 1998. I do not believe there has 
been an uptick in confidence in the intelligence community because of 
that.
  But something else did happen that caused us a problem. When they got 
to 1999, they discovered, whoops, we are getting into a trend-line 
situation. And the President said, "I do not think it is in the 
national security interest to create these trend lines that our enemies 
can follow," and he chose not to disclose the number.
  In fact, the DCI was taken to court over the number, over the issue. 
When the DCI got through making his defense, at the appropriate time I 
will put this in the record, he came to the conclusion that the trend-
line fashion could be reasonably expected to damage national security. 
Judge Hogan for the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia 
sustained the DCI's conclusions and dismissed the lawsuit on the 
summary judgment.
  So I have the President of the United States, head of the 
intelligence community, and the courts all agreeing we have got 
something new, and it is different here.
  Now, some point has been made by the Aspin/Brown Commission. I do not 
claim infallibility for the Aspin/Brown Commission. I was on it. I can 
ensure the distinguished gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer), who has 
made the amendment, that we thought a consensus report was very 
important. We had quite a debate in Aspin/Brown. And rather than make a 
big issue over this, we said, let us have a unanimous report, and we 
put it out.
  I would not read too much in it. What I would read into it is that 
other reports done at the same time, the IC-21 report and the CFR 
report, does not exactly come to the same conclusions. I think what we 
found is that, of the many recommendations that came out of Aspin/
Brown, this one did not prove to be particularly useful. In fact, 
because of this trend-line problem, which we did not debate, 
incidentally, it did not turn out to be helpful.
  Another point that has been made tonight is sunshine. We need just 
one ray of sunshine. Here is 48 pages of sunshine with lots of numbers, 
disclosure of the things that will not damage our national security. 
That is important. We make the decisions, if we think it can be 
disclosed, it should be disclosed, and we try and do that. Of course 
the President has the final word on the question of classification. It 
lies with the executive.
  The final point I would make, I think, is this; and, again, I do not 
want this to be contentious, we have had the debate, and there are 
different views, and they are entirely legitimate, and I accept them. 
We work in a nonpartisan way upstairs, and we have come to a conclusion 
that this is not an amendment we wanted on our authorization, but we 
are bringing it to the Members because one of our Members did.
  I honestly believe that the President trusts Americans. We trust 
Americans. Our committee trusts Americans. Trusting Americans is not 
what this is about. I do not trust our enemies. I do not know whether 
they can get anything useful, but I do not want to take the chance if 
the President of the United States feels that we should not. I do not 
want to give to any terrorist, to any drug dealer, to any weapons 
proliferator any information that could be used against us.
  So perhaps it is an abundance of caution on my part. But those who 
have the first line of responsibility on this said, no, let us not 
reveal it. I think they have made the right judgment. I do not think we 
should override that judgment.
  It is for that reason that I think that we should not approve this 
amendment, and I will urge our colleagues to vote against the Roemer 
amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I include the following materials for printing in the 
Record.

       United States District Court for the District of Columbia

       Steven Aftergood, on behalf of the Federation of American 
     Scientists, Plaintiff, v. Central Intelligence Agency, 
     Defendant.
       Civ. No. 98-2107 (TFH)

                     Declaration of George J. Tenet


                              introduction

       I, GEORGE J. TENET, hereby declare:
       1. I am the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). I was 
     appointed DCI on 11 July 1997. As DCI, I serve as head of the 
     United States intelligence community, act as the principal 
     adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to 
     the national security, and serve as head of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency (CIA).
       2. Through the exercise of my official duties, I am 
     generally familiar with plaintiff's civil action. I make the 
     following statements based upon my personal knowledge, upon 
     information made available to me in my official capacity, and 
     upon the advice and counsel of the CIA's Office of General 
     Counsel.
       3. I understand that plaintiff has submitted Freedom of 
     Information Act (FOIA) requests for "a copy of documents 
     that indicate the amount of the total budget request for 
     intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal 
     year 1999" and "a copy of documents that indicate the total 
     budget appropriation for intelligence and intelligence-
     related activities for fiscal year 1999, updated to reflect 
     the recent additional appropr[Congressional Record
     supplemental' funding for intelligence." I also understand 
     that plaintiff alleges that the CIA has improperly withheld 
     such documents. I shall refer to the requested information as 
     the "budget request" and "the total appropriation," 
     respectively.
       4. As head of the intelligence community, my 
     responsibilities include developing and presenting to the 
     President an annual budget request for the National Foreign 
     Intelligence Program (NFIP), and participating in the 
     development by the Secretary of Defense of the annual budget 
     requests for the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) 
     and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). The 
     budgets for the NFIP, JMIP, and TIARA jointly comprise the 
     budget of the United States for intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities.
       5. The CIA has withheld the budget request and the total 
     appropriation on the basis of FOIA Exemption (b)(1) because 
     they are currently and properly classified under Executive 
     Order 12958, and on the basis of FOIA Exemption (b)(3) 
     because they are exempted from disclosure by the National 
     Security Act of 1947 and the Central Intelligence Agency 
     Act of 1949. The purpose of this declaration, and the 
     accompanying classified declaration, is to describe my 
     bases for determining that disclosure of the budget 
     request or the total appropriation reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security and 
     would tend to reveal intelligence methods.
       6. I previously executed declarations in this case that 
     were filed with the CIA's motion for summary judgment on 11 
     December 1998. Those two declarations described my bases for 
     withholding the budget request only. Since the CIA filed its 
     motion for summary judgment, plaintiff has filed an amended 
     complaint seeking release of the total appropriation also. 
     For the Court's convenience, the justifications contained in 
     my earlier declarations are repeated and supplemented in this 
     declaration and the accompanying classified declaration and 
     describe my bases for withholding both the budget request and 
     the total appropriation for fiscal year 1999.

[[Page H3504]]

                             Prior Releases

       7. In October 1997, I publicly disclosed that the aggregate 
     amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities for fiscal year 1997 was $26.6 billion. At the 
     time of this disclosure, I issued a public statement that 
     included the following two points:
       First, disclosure of future aggregate figures will be 
     considered only after determining whether such disclosure 
     could cause harm to the national security by showing trends 
     over time.
       Second, we will continue to protect from disclosure any and 
     all subsidiary information concerning the intelligence 
     budget: whether the information concerns particular 
     intelligence programs. In other words, the Administration 
     intends to draw the line at the top-line, aggregate figure. 
     Beyond this figure, there will be no other disclosures of 
     currently classified budget information because such 
     disclosures could harm national security.
       8. In March 1998, I publicly disclosed that the aggregate 
     amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities for fiscal year 1998 was $26.7 billion. I did so 
     only after evaluating whether the 1998 appropriation, when 
     compared with the 1997 appropriation, could cause damage to 
     the national security by showing trends over time, or 
     otherwise tend to reveal intelligence methods. Because the 
     1998 appropriation represented approximately a $0.1 billion 
     increase--or less than a 0.4 percent change--over the 1997 
     appropriation, and because published reports did not contain 
     information that if coupled with the appropriation, would be 
     likely to allow the correlation of specific spending figures 
     with particular intelligence programs, I concluded that 
     release of the 1998 appropriation could not reasonably be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security, and so I 
     released the 1998 appropriation.
       9. Since the enactment of the intelligence appropriation 
     for fiscal year 1998, the budget process has produced: 1) the 
     fiscal year 1998 supplemental appropriations; 2) the 
     Administration's budget request for fiscal year 1999 (a 
     subject of this litigation); 3) the fiscal year 1999 regular 
     appropriation (a subject of this litigation); and 4) the 
     fiscal year 1999 emergency supplemental appropriation (a 
     subject of this litigation). Information about each of these 
     figures--some of it accurate, some not--has been reported in 
     the media. In evaluating whether to release the 
     Administration's budget request or total appropriation for 
     fiscal year 1999, I cannot review these possible releases in 
     isolation. Instead, I have to consider whether release of the 
     requested information could add to the mosaic of other public 
     and clandestine information acquired by our adversaries about 
     the intelligence budget in a way that could reasonably be 
     expected to damage the national security. If release of the 
     requested information adds a piece to the intelligence jigsaw 
     puzzle--even if it does not complete the picture--such that 
     the picture is more identifiable, then damage to the national 
     security could reasonably be expected. After conducting such 
     a review, I have determined that release of the 
     Administration's intelligence budget request or total 
     appropriation for fiscal year 1999 reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security, or 
     otherwise tend to reveal intelligence methods. In the 
     paragraphs that follow, I will provide a description of 
     some of the information that I reviewed and how I reached 
     this conclusion. I am unable to describe all of the 
     information I reviewed without disclosing classified 
     information. Additional information in support of my 
     determination is included in my classified declaration.
       10. At the creation of the modern national security 
     establishment in 1947, national policymakers had to address a 
     paradox of intelligence appropriations: the more they 
     publicly disclosed about the amount of appropriations, the 
     less they could publicly debate about the object of such 
     appropriations without causing damage to the national 
     security. They struck the balance in favor of withholding the 
     amount of appropriations. For over fifty years, the Congress 
     has acted in executive session when approving intelligence 
     appropriations to prevent the identification of trends in 
     intelligence spending and any correlations between specific 
     spending figures with particular intelligence programs. Now 
     is an especially critical and turbulent period for the 
     intelligence budget, and the continued secrecy of the fiscal 
     year 1999 budget request and total appropriation is necessary 
     for the protection of vulnerable intelligence capabilities.

              Classified Information FOIA Exemption (b)(1)

       11. The authority to classify information is derived from a 
     succession of Executive orders, the most recent of which is 
     Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security 
     Information." Section 1.1(c) of the Order defines 
     "classified information" as "information that has been 
     determined pursuant to this order or any predecessor order to 
     require protection against unauthorized disclosure." The CIA 
     has withheld the budget request and the total appropriation 
     as classified information under the criteria established in 
     Executive Order 12958.


                        classification authority

       12. Information may be originally classified under the 
     Order only if it: (1) is owned by, produced by or for, or is 
     under the control of the United States Government; (2) falls 
     within one or more of the categories of information set forth 
     in section 1.5 of the Order; and (3) is classified by an 
     original classification authority who determines that its 
     unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to 
     result in damage to the national security that the original 
     classification authority can identify or describe. The 
     classification of the budget request and the total 
     appropriation meet these requirements.
       13. The Administration's budget request and the total 
     appropriation are information clearly owned, produced by, and 
     under the control of the United States Government. 
     Additionally, the budget request and the total appropriation 
     fall within the category of information listed at section 
     1.5(c) of the Order: "intelligence activities (including 
     special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or 
     cryptology."
       14. Finally, I have made the determination required under 
     the Order to classify the budget request and the total 
     appropriation. By Presidential Order of 13 October 1995, 
     "National Security Information", 3 C.F.R. 513 (1996), 
     reprinted in 50 U.S.C. Sec. 435 note (Supp. I 1995), and 
     pursuant to section 1.4(a)(2) of Executive Order 12958, the 
     President designated me as an official authorized to exercise 
     original TOP SECRET classification authority. I have 
     determined that the unauthorized disclosure of the budget 
     request or the total appropriation reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security. 
     Consequently, I have classified the budget request and the 
     total appropriation at the CONFIDENTIAL level. In the 
     paragraphs below, I will identify and describe the 
     foreseeable damage to national security that reasonably 
     could be expected to result from disclosure of the budget 
     request or the total appropriation.


                      damage to national security

       15. Disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to 
     the national security in several ways. First, disclosure of 
     the budget request reasonably could be expected to provide 
     foreign governments with the United States' own assessment of 
     its intelligence capabilities and weakness. The difference 
     between the appropriation for one year and the 
     Administration's budget request for the next provides a 
     measure of the Administration's unique, critical assessment 
     of its own intelligence programs. A requested budget decrease 
     reflects a decision that existing intelligence programs are 
     more than adequate to meet the national security needs of the 
     United States. A requested budget increase reflects a 
     decision that existing intelligence programs are insufficient 
     to meet our national security needs. A budget request with no 
     change in spending reflects a decision that existing programs 
     are just adequate to meet our needs.
       16. Similar insights can be gained by analyzing the 
     difference between the total appropriation by Congress for 
     one year and the total appropriation for the next year. The 
     difference between the appropriation for one year and the 
     appropriation for the next year provides a measure of the 
     Congress' assessment of the nation's intelligence programs. 
     Not only does an increased, decreased, or unchanged 
     appropriation reflect a congressional determination that 
     existing intelligence programs are less than adequate, more 
     than adequate, or just adequate, respectively, to meet the 
     national security needs of the United States, but an actual 
     figure indicates the degree of change.
       17. Disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation would provide foreign governments with the 
     United States' own overall assessment of its intelligence 
     weaknesses and priorities and assist them in redirecting 
     their own resources to frustrate the United States' 
     intelligence collection efforts, with the resulting damage to 
     our national security. Because I have determined it to be in 
     our national security interest to deny foreign governments 
     information that would assist them in assessing the strength 
     of United States intelligence capabilities, I have determined 
     that disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation reasonably could be expected to cause damage to 
     the national security. I am unable to elaborate further on 
     the bases for my determination without disclosing classified 
     information. Additional information in support of my 
     determination is included in my classified declaration.
       18. Second, disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation reasonably could be expected to assist foreign 
     governments in correlating specific spending figures with 
     particular intelligence programs. Foreign governments are 
     keenly interested in the United States' intelligence 
     collection priorities. Nowhere are those priorities better 
     reflected than in the level of spending on particular 
     intelligence activities. That is why foreign intelligence 
     services, to varying degrees, devote resources to learning 
     the amount and objects of intelligence spending by other 
     foreign governments. The CIA's own intelligence analysts 
     conduct just such analyses of intelligence spending by 
     foreign governments.
       19. However, no intelligence service, U.S. or foreign, ever 
     has complete information. They are always revising their 
     intelligence estimates based on new information. Moreover, 
     the United States does not have complete information about 
     how much foreign intelligence services know about U.S. 
     intelligence programs and funding. Foreign governments 
     collect information about U.S. intelligence activities 
     from their human intelligence sources; that is, "spies." 
     While the United States will never know exactly how

[[Page H3505]]

     much our adversaries know about U.S. intelligence 
     activities, we do know that all foreign intelligence 
     services know at least as much about U.S. intelligence 
     programs and funding as has been disclosed by the Congress 
     or reported by the media. Therefore, congressional 
     statements and media reporting of the fiscal year 1999 
     budget cycle provide the minimum knowledge that can be 
     attributed to all foreign governments, and serve as a 
     baseline for predictive judgments of the possible damage 
     to national security that could reasonably be expected to 
     result from release of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation.
       20. Budget figures provide useful benchmarks that, when 
     combined with other public and clandestinely-acquired 
     information, assist experienced intelligence analysts in 
     reaching accurate estimates of the nature and extent of all 
     sorts of foreign intelligence activities, including covert 
     operations, scientific and technical research and 
     development, and analytic capabilities. I expect foreign 
     intelligence services to do no less if armed with the same 
     information. While other sources may publish information 
     about the amounts and objects of intelligence spending that 
     damages the national security, I cannot add to that damage by 
     officially releasing information, such as the budget request 
     or the total appropriation, that would tend to confirm or 
     deny these public accounts. Such intelligence would permit 
     foreign governments to learn about United States' 
     intelligence collection priorities and redirect their own 
     resources to frustrate the United States' intelligence 
     collection efforts, with the resulting damage to our national 
     security. Therefore, I have determined that disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security. I am 
     unable to elaborate further on the basis for my determination 
     without disclosing classified information. Additional 
     information in support of my determination is included in my 
     classified declaration.
       21. In addition, release of both the budget request and the 
     total appropriation would permit one to calculate the exact 
     difference between the Administration's request and Congress' 
     appropriation. It is during the congressional debate over the 
     Administration's budget request that many disclosures of 
     specific intelligence programs are reported in the media. 
     Release of the budget request and total appropriation 
     together would assist our adversaries in correlating the 
     added or subtracted intelligence programs with the exact 
     amount of spending devoted to them.
       22. And third, disclosure of the budget request or the 
     total appropriation reasonably could be expected to free 
     foreign governments' limited collection and analysis 
     resources for other efforts targeted against the United 
     States. No government has unlimited intelligence resources. 
     Resources devoted to targeting the nature and extent of the 
     United States' intelligence spending are resources that 
     cannot be devoted to other efforts targeted against the 
     United States. Disclosure of the budget request or the total 
     appropriation would free those foreign resources for other 
     intelligence collection activities directed against the 
     United States, with the resulting damage to our national 
     security. Therefore, I have determined that disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security.
       23. In summary, I have determined that disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriation reasonably could be 
     expected to provide foreign intelligence services with a 
     valuable benchmark for identifying and frustrating United 
     States' intelligence programs. For all of the above reasons, 
     singularly and collectively, I have determined that 
     disclosure of the budget request or the total appropriation 
     for fiscal year 1999 reasonably could be expected to cause 
     damage to the national security. Therefore, I have determined 
     that the budget request and the total appropriation are 
     currently and properly classified CONFIDENTIAL.

              Intelligence Methods--FOIA Exemption (b)(3)

       24. Section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, 
     as amended, provides that the DCI, as head of the 
     intelligence community, "shall protect intelligence sources 
     and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriation would jeopardize 
     intelligence methods because disclosure would tend to reveal 
     how and for what purposes intelligence appropriations are 
     secretly transferred to and expended by intelligence 
     agencies.
       25. There is no single, separate appropriation for the CIA. 
     The appropriations for the CIA and other agencies in the 
     intelligence community are hidden in the various annual 
     appropriations acts. The specific locations of the 
     intelligence appropriations in those acts are not publicly 
     identified, both to protect the classified nature of the 
     intelligence programs themselves and to protect the 
     classified intelligence methods used to transfer funds to and 
     between intelligence agencies.
       26. Because there are a finite number of places where 
     intelligence funds may be hidden in the federal budget, a 
     skilled budget analyst could construct a hypothetical 
     intelligence budget by aggregating suspected intelligence 
     line items from the publicly-disclosed appropriations. 
     Release of the budget request or the total appropriation 
     would provide a benchmark to test and refine such a 
     hypothesis. Repeated disclosures of either the budget request 
     or total appropriation could provide more data with which to 
     test and refine a hypothesis. Confirmation of the 
     hypothetical budget could disclose the actual locations in 
     the appropriations acts where the intelligence funds are 
     hidden, which is the intelligence method used to transfer 
     funds to and between intelligence agencies.
       27. Sections 5(a) and 8(b) of the CIA Act of 1949 
     constitute the legal authorization for the secret transfer 
     and spending of intelligence funds. Together, these two 
     sections implement Congress' intent that intelligence 
     appropriations and expenditures, respectively, be shielded 
     from public view. Simply stated, the means of providing money 
     to the CIA is itself an intelligence method. Disclosure of 
     the budget request or the total appropriation could assist in 
     finding the locations of secret intelligence appropriations, 
     and thus defeat these congressionally-approved secret funding 
     mechanism. Therefore I have determined that disclosure of the 
     budget request or the total appropriation would tend to 
     reveal intelligence methods that are protected from 
     disclosure. I am unable to elaborate further on the bases for 
     my determination without disclosing classified information. 
     Additional information in support of my determination is 
     included in my classified declaration.

                               Conclusion

       28. In fulfillment of my statutory responsibility as head 
     of the United States intelligence community, as the principal 
     adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to 
     the national security, and as head of the CIA, to protect 
     classified information and intelligence methods from 
     unauthorized disclosure, I have determined for the reasons 
     set forth above and in my classified declaration that the 
     Administration's intelligence budget request and the total 
     appropriation for fiscal year 1999 must be withheld because 
     their disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage 
     to the national security and would tend to reveal 
     intelligence methods.
       I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the 
     foregoing is true and correct.
       Executed this 6th day of April, 1999.
                                                  George J. Tenet,
                                 Director of Central Intelligence.

                           Memorandum Opinion

       Pending before the Court is Defendant Central Intelligence 
     Agency ("CIA")'s Motion for Summary Judgment. After careful 
     consideration of Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff's Memorandum 
     in Opposition, Defendant's reply, the arguments presented at 
     the November 1 hearing, and upon a second review of both 
     classified affidavits as well as the unclassified affidavit 
     filed by Defendant in this case, the Court will grant 
     Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.


                               background

       Plaintiff Steven Aftergood, on behalf of the Federation of 
     American Scientists, seeks disclosure under the Freedom of 
     Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552, of the 
     Administration's total budget request for fiscal year 1999 
     for all intelligence and intelligence-related activities. 
     Defendant, the United States Central Intelligence Agency 
     ("CIA"), denied plaintiff's request on the basis that the 
     information is exempt from FOIA's disclosure requirements 
     because it is properly classified under Executive Order 12958 
     in the interest of national defense or foreign policy 
     (Exemption 1) and because release of this figure would tend 
     to reveal intelligence sources and methods that are 
     specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (Exemption 
     3). On December 11, 1998, the Defendant moved for summary 
     judgment on the basis of three declarations from George J. 
     Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence ("DCI"), one 
     unclassified filed as an exhibit to Defendant's Motion for 
     Summary Judgment, and two classified which were filed under 
     seal and ex parte for the Court's in camera review. These 
     declarations explain why DCI Tenet believes the release of 
     the figure requested by Plaintiff could reasonably be 
     expected to cause damage to the national security and would 
     tend to reveal intelligence methods and sources.


                               discussion

     I. FOIA Exemption 1
       Exemption 1 of FOIA exempts from mandatory disclosure 
     records that are: (A) specifically authorized under criteria 
     established by Executive Order to be kept secret in the 
     interest of national defense or foreign policy, and (B) are 
     in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive Order. 
     5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(1). The Executive Order currently in 
     effect is Executive Order ("E.O.") 12958, "Classified 
     National Security Information."
       Courts have prescribed a two-part test, part substantive 
     and part procedural, to be applied in determining whether 
     material has been properly withheld under Exemption 1. 
     Substantively, the agency must show that the records at issue 
     logically fall within the exemption, i.e., that an Executive 
     Order authorizes that the particular information sought be 
     kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign 
     policy. Procedurally, the agency must show that it followed 
     the proper procedures in classifying the information. 
     Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970-72 (D.C. Cir. 
     1982). If the agency meets both tests, it is then entitled to 
     summary judgment. See, e.g., Abbotts v. NRC, 766 f.2d 604, 
     606 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 
     (D.C. Cir. 1984).
       a. The Procedural Requirements of Exemption 1
       Based on the unclassified Declaration of DCI Tenet, the CIA 
     has demonstrated that it

[[Page H3506]]

     has followed the proper procedures in classifying the total 
     budget request for intelligence activities. Proper 
     classification must be made by an original classification 
     authority who determines that the information is owned by, 
     produced by or for, or is under the control of the United 
     States Government; that it falls within one or more 
     categories of information set forth in section 1.5 of the 
     Executive Order; and that the information's unauthorized 
     disclosure reasonably could be expected to result in damage 
     to the national security that the original classification 
     authority can identify or describe. See E.O. 12958, 
     Sec. 1.2(a); see also 32 C.F.R. Sec. 2001.10(b) (Information 
     Security Oversight Office directive explaining that agency 
     classifier must be able to identify and describe damage to 
     national security potentially caused by unauthorized 
     disclosure).
       DCI Tenet is an official authorized to exercise original 
     TOP SECRET classification authority. Tenet Declaration para. 
     13; see Presidential Order of 13 October 1995, "National 
     Security Information," 3 C.F.R. Sec. 513 (1996); E.O. 12958 
     Sec. 1.4(a)(2). Further DCI Tenet has determined that the 
     amount of the budget request for all intelligence activities 
     is owned by the United States Government, see Tenet 
     Declaration, para. 12; that it falls within the category of 
     information listed at section 1.5(c) of the Executive Order, 
     described as "intelligence activities (including special 
     activities), intelligence sources or methods, or 
     cryptology," see Id.; and that its disclosure reasonably 
     could be expected to cause damage to the national security, 
     see Id. at para.para. 13 et seq.
       Plaintiff contends that DCI's determination is at odds with 
     that of the President of the United States and that this 
     conflict renders DCI determination invalid. However, although 
     the President clearly has the authority to do so, the 
     President has never released or ordered the release of, 
     the Administration's budget request or the total 
     appropriated amount for intelligence activities for fiscal 
     year 1999. Therefore, the statement of a Presidential 
     spokesman, made three years earlier, that, as a general 
     matter, the President believed "that disclosure of the 
     annual amount appropriated for intelligence purposes will 
     not, in itself, harm intelligence activities," is neither 
     on point nor in any way legally binding. Plaintiff has 
     offered this Court no evidence that the President has ever 
     addressed the impact of disclosure of the Administration's 
     budget request or the total amount appropriated for 
     intelligence activities for fiscal year 1999. The fact 
     that the President encouraged release of similar 
     information in earlier years is not determinative here. 
     Unless or until the President explicitly orders the 
     release of this information or withdraws his authorization 
     of DCI Tenet to make these classified determinations, and 
     absent a finding by this Court that DCI Tenet was somehow 
     acting in bad faith in refusing to release this 
     information, the Court finds that TCI Tenet is authorized 
     to make this highly fact-dependent classification 
     determination at issue in this case, and that he has 
     properly done so here.
       b. The Substantive Requirements of Exemption I
       To demonstrate that the budget request for intelligence 
     falls within Exemption 1, the CIA must also explain why the 
     information at issue properly falls within one or more of the 
     categories of classifiable information, in this case 
     "intelligence sources or methods," see E.O. 12958 
     Sec. 1.5(c), and why its unauthorized disclosure could 
     reasonably be expected to result in damage to the national 
     security.
       When determining whether the records at issue are properly 
     within the scope of the exemption; this Court must 
     "determine the matter de novo." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(B). 
     In Exemption 1 cases, Congress has indicated and courts have 
     consistently recognized, that an agency's determination as to 
     potential adverse effects resulting from public disclosure of 
     a classified record should be accorded substantial weight. 
     See, e.g., Bowers v. Department of Justice, 930 F.2d 350, 357 
     (4th Cir. 1991) ("What fact or bit of information may 
     compromise national security is best left to the intelligence 
     experts."); Taylor v. Department of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 
     109 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (the agency's determination should be 
     accorded "utmost deference"); Washington Post v. DOD, 766 
     F.Supp. 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 1991) (judicial review of agency 
     classification decision should be "quite deferential"). The 
     agency's determination merits this deference because 
     "[e]xecutive departments responsible for national defense 
     and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what 
     adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result of public 
     disclosure of a particular classified record." Salisbury, 
     690 F.2d at 970 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1200, 93rd Cong., 2d 
     Sess. 12 (1974)). Thus, summary judgment for the government 
     in an Exemption 1 FOIA action should be granted on the basis 
     of agency affidavits if they simply contain "reasonable 
     specificity" and if they are not called into question by 
     contradictory evidence in the record or by evidence of agency 
     bad faith. Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 
     1980).
       DCI Tenet's Declarations meet this deferential standard. 
     Essentially, DCI Tenet explains that disclosure of the budget 
     request reasonably could be expected to cause damage to 
     national security in several ways: (1) disclosure 
     "reasonably could be expected to provide foreign governments 
     with the United States' own assessment of its intelligence 
     capabilities and weaknesses," Tenet Declaration para. 14; 
     (2) disclosure "reasonably could be expected to assist 
     foreign governments in correlating specific spending figures 
     with particular intelligence programs," Tenet Declaration 
     para. 16; and (3) official disclosure could be expected to 
     free foreign governments' limited collection and analysis 
     resources for other efforts targeted against the United 
     States, Tenet Declaration para. 18.
       Obviously, DCI Tenet cannot be certain that damage to our 
     national security would result from release of the total 
     budget request for 1999, but the law does not require 
     certainty or a showing of harm before allowing an agency to 
     withhold classified information. Courts have recognized that 
     an agency's articulation of the threatened harm must always 
     be speculative to some extent, and that to require an actual 
     showing of harm would be judicial "overstepping." See 
     Halperin, 629 F.2d at 149. In the area of intelligence 
     sources and methods, the D.C. Circuit has ruled that 
     substantial deference is due to an agency's determination 
     regarding threats to national security interests because this 
     is "necessarily a region for forecasts in which the CIA's 
     informed judgment as to potential future harm should be 
     respected." Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 
     1982). Further, the Court noted that "the CIA has the right 
     to assume that foreign intelligence agencies are zealous 
     ferret." Id.
       In this case, plaintiff has offered no contrary record 
     evidence undermining the validity of DCI Tenet's highly fact-
     dependent determination. First, the Brown Commission's 1996 
     recommendations in favor of disclosure are not binding on 
     this Court. The Brown Commission was a congressionally-
     charted commission made up of private citizens who lacked 
     classification authority and who made non-binding 
     recommendations to Congress and the President on intelligence 
     matters. Neither Congress nor the President ever enacted the 
     Brown Commission's recommendation on public disclosure of the 
     intelligence budget. Nor did the Brown Commission ever 
     consider the precise issue of classification presented here: 
     whether, in 1999, and under the circumstances described in 
     DCI Tenet's unclassified and classified declarations, it 
     would recommend disclosure of the budget figures for that 
     particular year.
       Second, the fact that DCI Tenet disclosed the total 
     intelligence budget in prior years is not necessarily adverse 
     record evidence. On the contrary, this Court finds that it 
     indicates DCI Tenet's careful, case-by-case analysis of the 
     impact of each disclosure and his willingness to accommodate 
     budget requests whenever possible. When he made these prior 
     disclosures, DCI Tenet emphasized that he would continue to 
     make that case-by-case determination in future year. Tenet 
     Declaration para. 7. Here, DCI Tenet has explained, in both 
     his classified and unclassified declarations, the rationale 
     underlying his predictive judgment that release of the 
     figures for fiscal year 1999 could reasonably be expected to 
     cause damage to national security. Therefore, the Court must 
     defer to DCI Tenet's decision that release of a third 
     consecutive year, amidst the information already publicly-
     available, provides too much trend information and too great 
     a basis for comparison and analysis for our adversaries.
     II. FOIA Exemption 3
       The CIA is also entitled to summary judgment on the basis 
     that the budget request is exempt from disclosure under FOIA 
     Exemption 3. Exemption 3 excludes from mandatory disclosure 
     information that is "specifically exempted from disclosure 
     by statute . . . provided that such statute requires that the 
     matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to 
     leave no discretion on the issue, or establishes particular 
     criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of 
     matters to be withheld." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(3)(A) & (B).
       In examining an Exemption 3 claim, a court must determine, 
     first, whether the claimed statute is a statute of exemption 
     under FOIA, and, second, whether the withheld material 
     satisfied the criteria of the exemption statute. CIA v. Sims, 
     471 U.S. 159, 167 (1985); Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 
     761 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In this case, the CIA has withheld 
     information from plaintiff because DCI Tenet has determined 
     that the budget request falls within Section 103(c)(6) of the 
     National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. 
     Sec. 403-3(c)(6) (formerly section 403(d)(3)), which requires 
     the DCI to "protect intelligence sources and methods from 
     unauthorized disclosure." It is well settled that section 
     403-3(c)(6) falls within Exemption 3. Sims, 471 U.S. at 167. 
     Thus, the Court need only consider whether the 
     Administration's budget request falls within that statute. 
     Id.
       There is no doubt that the scope of the statute is broad; 
     as the Supreme Court has commented, "[p]lainly the broad 
     sweep of this statutory language comports with the nature of 
     the [CIA's] unique responsibilities." Sims, 471 U.S. at 169. 
     The legislative history of Sec. 403-3(c)(6) also makes clear 
     that Congress intended to give the [DCI] broad authority to 
     protect the secrecy and integrity of the intelligence 
     process." Id. at 170. To establish that the budget request 
     is exempt under FOIA, therefore, the CIA need only 
     demonstrate that the information "relates" to intelligence 
     sources and methods. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 762. Like the 
     DCI's determination under Exemption 1, the DCI's 
     determination under Exemption 3 is entitled to "substantial 
     weight and due consideration." Id.
       One nexus between the Administration's budget request and 
     "disclosure of intelligence sources and methods" is found 
     in the

[[Page H3507]]

     special appropriations process used for intelligence 
     activities. Disclosure of the budget request would tend to 
     reveal "how and for what purposes intelligence 
     appropriations are secretly transferred to and expended by 
     intelligence agencies." Tenet Declaration para. 20.
       There is no single, separate appropriation for the CIA. 
     Appropriations for the CIA and other agencies in the 
     intelligence community are hidden in the various 
     appropriation acts. Id. para. 21. The locations are not 
     publicly identified, both to protect the classified nature of 
     the intelligence programs that are funded and to protect the 
     classified intelligence methods used to transfer funds to and 
     between intelligence agencies. Id. Sections 5(a) and 8(b) of 
     the CIA Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 403f, 403j, provide 
     the legal authorizations for the secret transfer and spending 
     of intelligence funds. Id. para. 23. DCI Tenet has asserted 
     that since there are a finite number of places where 
     intelligence funds may be hidden in the federal budget, a 
     budget analyst could construct a hypothetical intelligence 
     budget by aggregating suspected intelligence line items from 
     the publicly-disclosed appropriations and that repeated 
     disclosures of either the budget request or the budget 
     appropriation would provide more data with which to test and 
     refine the hypothesis. Id. Plaintiff denies the viability of 
     this argument but provides no conclusive evidence of its 
     implausibility.
       Several courts have held that information tending to reveal 
     the secret transfer and spending of intelligence funds is 
     exempt from disclosure under FOIA as an "intelligence 
     method." See e.g., Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 
     724, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Therefore, because DCI Tenet has 
     determined that release of the total budget request would 
     tend to reveal secret budgeting mechanisms constituting 
     "intelligence methods," it is also exempt from disclosure 
     under FOIA Exemption 3.


                               conclusion

       The Declarations of DCI Tenet logically establish that 
     release of the Administration's budget request for fiscal 
     year 1999 could reasonably be expected to result in harm to 
     the national security and to reveal intelligence "sources 
     and methods." On the basis of these declarations and the 
     entire record in this case as well as the discussion above, 
     this Court will grant the CIA's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
     An order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
       November 12, 1999.
                                                  Thomas F. Hogan,
                                     United States District Judge.

                                 Order

       In accordance with the accompanying memorandum opinion, it 
     is hereby
       ORDERED that Defendant Central Intelligence Agency's Motion 
     for Summary Judgment is granted. It is further hereby
       ORDERED that this case is dismissed with prejudice.
       November 12, 1999.
                                                  Thomas F. Hogan,
                                     United States District Judge.

  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer).
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending that, 
I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 506, further proceedings 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer) 
will be postponed.
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.

[...]


Congressional Record: May 23, 2000 (House)
Page H3535-H3537

 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001

[...]

           Sequential Votes Postponed in Committee of the Whole

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 506, 
proceedings will now resume on those amendments on which further 
proceedings were postponed in the following order: amendment No. 1 by 
the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Roemer); amendment No. 3 by the 
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant); amendment No. 4 by the gentleman 
from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
  The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote 
after the first vote in this series.


                 Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Roemer

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The unfinished business is the demand for a 
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Indiana 
(Mr. Roemer) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which 
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Roemer:
       At the end of title III add the following new section (and 
     conform the table of contents accordingly):

     SEC. 306. ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE EXPENDITURES FOR THE PRECEDING 
                   FISCAL YEAR.

       Section 114 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
     404i) is amended--
       (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
       (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new 
     subsection:
       ``(c) Annual Statement of the Total Amount of Intelligence 
     Expenditures for the Preceding Fiscal Year.--Not later than 
     February 1 of each year, the Director of Central Intelligence 
     shall submit to Congress a report containing an unclassified 
     statement of the aggregate appropriations for the fiscal year 
     immediately preceding the current year for National Foreign 
     Intelligence Program (NFIP), Tactical and Intelligence and 
     Related Activities (TIARA), and Joint Military Intelligence 
     Program (JMIP) activities, including activities carried out 
     under the budget of the Department of Defense to collect, 
     analyze, produce, disseminate, or support the collection of 
     intelligence.''.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 175, 
noes 225, not voting 34, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 214]

                               AYES--175

     Abercrombie
     Allen
     Baird
     Baldacci
     Baldwin
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Blagojevich
     Blumenauer
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Boyd
     Brady (PA)
     Brown (FL)
     Campbell
     Capps
     Carson
     Chabot
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Condit
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Crowley
     Cummings
     Danner
     Davis (FL)
     Davis (IL)
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Deutsch
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Duncan
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Ford
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Ganske
     Gephardt
     Gonzalez
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hill (IN)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoeffel
     Holden
     Holt
     Hooley
     Inslee
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind (WI)
     Kucinich
     LaFalce
     Lampson
     Lantos
     Leach
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney (CT)
     Maloney (NY)
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy (MO)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McKinney
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller, George
     Mink
     Moore
     Moran (VA)
     Morella
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Paul
     Payne
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Phelps
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Price (NC)
     Rangel
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanchez
     Sanders
     Sandlin
     Sawyer
     Schaffer
     Schakowsky
     Serrano
     Sherman
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Spratt
     Stabenow
     Stark
     Strickland
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Thompson (MS)
     Thurman
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Wexler
     Weygand
     Woolsey
     Wynn

                               NOES--225

     Aderholt
     Andrews
     Archer
     Baca
     Bachus
     Baker
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Bliley
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boswell
     Brady (TX)
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cannon
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chambliss
     Clement
     Coble
     Coburn
     Collins
     Combest
     Cook
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis (VA)
     Deal
     DeMint
     Diaz-Balart
     Doolittle
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fletcher
     Foley
     Fowler
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Granger
     Green (WI)
     Greenwood
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hansen
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Herger
     Hill (MT)
     Hilleary
     Hinojosa
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Isakson
     Jenkins
     John
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Kasich
     Kelly
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     Kuykendall
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas (KY)
     Lucas (OK)
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntyre
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller, Gary
     Mollohan
     Moran (KS)
     Murtha
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Northup
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Ose
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pease
     Peterson (PA)
     Pickering
     Pickett
     Pitts
     Portman
     Pryce (OH)
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Reyes

[[Page H3536]]


     Reynolds
     Riley
     Rogan
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Ryun (KS)
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Sherwood
     Shimkus
     Shows
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stump
     Sununu
     Sweeney
     Talent
     Tancredo
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Terry
     Thomas
     Thompson (CA)
     Thornberry
     Thune
     Toomey
     Traficant
     Turner
     Vitter
     Walden
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watkins
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wolf
     Wu

                             NOT VOTING--34

     Ackerman
     Armey
     Barton
     Blunt
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant
     Capuano
     Chenoweth-Hage
     Cooksey
     DeLay
     Dickey
     Forbes
     Fossella
     Jones (OH)
     Larson
     Lazio
     Martinez
     McCarthy (NY)
     McIntosh
     Meehan
     Minge
     Moakley
     Oberstar
     Pombo
     Regula
     Rodriguez
     Scarborough
     Stupak
     Tiahrt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Wise
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)

                              {time}  1050

  Messrs. SHIMKUS, WAMP, and BURTON of Indiana changed their vote from 
``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. CAMPBELL changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  Stated against:
  Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Chairman, I am not recorded on rollcall No. 214, an 
amendment to H.R. 4392. I was unavoidably detained and was not present 
to vote. Had I been present, I would have voted ``no'' on rollcall No. 
214.


 [...]

                          personal explanation

  Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably detained today and missed 
rollcall vote Nos. 214-216, Rollcall vote No. 214 was a Roemer 
amendment to H.R. 4392, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2001; rollcall vote Nos. 215 and 216 were Traficant amendments to 
H.R. 4392. Had I been present, I would have voted ``no'' on rollcall 
vote number 214 and ``aye'' on rollcall votes 215 and 216.


                          personal explanation

  Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, during the consideration of the 
Intelligence Authorization legislation (H.R. 4392) this morning, my 
vote was not recorded on several rollcall votes.
  Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye'' on rollcall 214; I 
would have voted ``aye'' on rollcall vote 215; and I would have voted 
``aye'' on rollcall vote 216.


                          personal explanation

  Mr. MINGE. Mr. Chairman, on rollcall Nos. 214, 215, and 216, I was 
physically ill and unable to vote. Had I been present, I would have 
voted ``aye'' on all said votes.
  The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. If there are no other amendments, the 
question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, 
as amended.
  The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, 
was agreed to.

                          ____________________




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