Indispensable Outsider

Richard Garwin has helped advise U.S. presidents, IBM, and secret agencies on how to make things work

The first thing anybody says about the physicist/inventor/adviser Richard Garwin is that his graduate school adviser 60 years ago, Enrico Fermi, said that he was the only true genius he’d met. The next thing is that Garwin has advised, sometimes impolitically, every administration since Eisenhower’s on every possible technical issue. The third thing is the Garwin joke: It’s the French Revolution, an aristocrat is placed in the guillotine, the blade won’t drop, “God’s will,” says the guillotiner, and lets the aristocrat go free; next aristocrat, same thing, blade sticks, “God’s will,” goes free. The next in line is Garwin, who looks up at the blade and says, “Oh, I see the problem.”

Garwin himself agrees that the third, an old joke, could have been written for him. He is a compulsive problem-solver—although his solutions occasionally raise other problems. Prime example: In 1951, Garwin was 23 years old and the hydrogen bomb, which worked only in theory, needed proof. So in a few weeks, Garwin designed an experiment, and a year later Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico had built it and called it Mike, then had taken it to Eniwetok in the South Pacific and set it off. The 11-megaton explosion was 1000 times more powerful than the atomic bomb that flattened two-thirds of Hiroshima. Garwin didn’t watch it—he was busy working on more portable H-bombs—and in fact has never seen a nuclear explosion. “I don’t need it,” he told an interviewer. “I have a good imagination.”

Garwin went on to an astonishingly varied career that included fundamental contributions to particle physics, a 41-year career in industry, 47 patented inventions, and 60 years of advising multiple parts of the U.S. government on multiple technical issues. “He’s done so damn many things,” says Peter Zimmerman, formerly chief scientist at the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “that it’s hard to single out any one.”

Garwin advised then-Energy Secretary Steven Chu on alternatives for dealing with the Fukushima nuclear plant’s meltdown in 2011 and on plugging the BP oil well blowout in 2010. In 1981, Garwin pioneered gesture recognition for a touch screen, on the IBM color PC monitor. In 1969, he invented the tensioned cables that would hold a deep-water floating airport steady in large waves; floating airports were never built, but the approach was used for oil-drilling platforms. Since 1968, he’s been writing about handling data in health care. The upshot: He is one of 13 people in the world who is a member of all three U.S. National Academies: science, engineering, and medicine.

Nothing ties these fields and functions together, no single intellectual thread. Garwin just likes being useful, he says, and helps solve problems as they arise. And if his
solution to a problem causes another problem, then he solves that one, too. If a coherent narrative can be imposed on Garwin at all, it is that having solved the hydrogen bomb, he has spent the last 6 decades working to help governments control it.

**Precise design**

Richard Lawrence Garwin was born in 1928, in Cleveland, Ohio. He graduated from what is now Case Western Reserve University in 3 years, working in his father’s sound equipment repair business, and marrying a local girl. In 1947, he moved to the University of Chicago where, in 1949, he received his Ph.D. with Fermi on the radioactive decay of atomic nuclei.

Garwin stayed on at Chicago as an instructor and in 1950 began spending summers consulting at Los Alamos because, as he said, the university paid its faculty members for 9 months but his family ate for 12. In his second summer there, Edward Teller, also at Chicago and consulting at Los Alamos, told him that he and Los Alamos physicist Stanislav Ulam had a theory that an atomic bomb could be used to trigger a hydrogen bomb, but the theory needed a proof-of-principle. Garwin thought through the options—the configurations, dimensions, and materials that would focus the radiation of an atomic bomb “primary” and trigger thermonuclear fusion in the “secondary”—and decided that designing a real bomb would be just as easy. The Mike test worked, Teller said, “almost precisely” as designed. Later, when Teller got credit for fathering the H-bomb, Garwin didn’t argue: By then Garwin had learned, as he said, that when serving the government you could either get something done or get credit for it, but not both.

Meanwhile, particle physics was becoming a science of large teams, large machines, and long waits for experiments, none of which Garwin found agreeable. So in 1952, he took a job at IBM’s Watson Scientific Laboratory, then in New York City, where he could, he said, “decide one day what I was going to do the next day.” At IBM he worked on everything from the properties of materials under extremely cold conditions, to prototypes of computers controllable by gage, to the little accelerometer that protects the brains of laptops or other smart devices when they’re dropped. In 1957, he took leave from an IBM project to develop a superconducting computer, and with Leon Lederman conceived and conducted, in 4 days, an experiment on the radioactive decay of mu mesons that has become part of the modern view of particle physics.

The same year Garwin joined IBM, he was introduced for the first time to the cadre of academics advising the government on science and technology. Centered at Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, it included engineer Jerome Wiesner, John F. Kennedy’s science adviser, who in 1957 asked Garwin to join the newly forming President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). Garwin served an unusual two 4-year terms on PSAC and led several of its panels, in particular, those looking into ballistic missile threats and military aircraft. He helped lay the basis for GPS, drone aircraft, and the electronic battlefield. “I learned a lot,” he said.

PSAC also helped Garwin define his ideal job: sitting in a room for 8 hours while generals, admirals, scientists, and corporations explained their problems and he and the rest of the panel proposed answers. He later found the same congenial setting when he joined a secret government advisory group called JASON, also made up of mostly academic scientists. Garwin and IBM had agreed from the start that his job would include spending a third of his time giving advice to the government.

Often that time was devoted to highly classified “black” programs, which bypass open peer review or qualified congressional oversight, making the advice of independent scientists especially valuable. Since the early 1960s, Garwin worked on several types of spy satellites, though he won’t say exactly what he did or for whom. Some satellites, whose names haven’t been declassified and which Garwin talked National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger into backing, used charge-coupled devices that stored images and sent them back via radio. These satellites’ sensitivity to light needed improving. Still others, like the Poppy series, collected not images, but radar signals showing the locations, frequencies, and ranges of Soviet radars. Garwin helped Poppy “a lot,” he says, “because I asked, ‘Is this how it works?’ And they said, ‘No, that’s not how it works.’ And I said, ‘Why doesn’t it work that way?’ And they made it work that way.”

Garwin thinks he’s been most useful to black programs at the CIA and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Apparently they agreed: The CIA awarded him the R.V. Jones award, and NRO declared him one of the 10 Founders of National Reconnaissance. Garwin’s special contribution to

**A RESTLESS MIND**

- 1951–1952: Designs experiment for “Mike” H-bomb test
- 1952–on: IBM Watson Scientific Laboratory researcher
- 1957: With Leon Lederman, mu meson experiment
- 1960s: “Poppy” surveillance satellite work
- 1970: Faults supersonic transport while serving on President’s Science Advisory Committee
- 1973: NIXON AIDE SCORES SST TEST DESIGN
- 1995: Co-authors JASON review of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
- 2002: National Medal of Science
- 2010: Recruited by DOE to help with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill

Frequent visitor. Garwin has been a White House adviser off and on since the 1950s.
the intelligence community, says Robert A. McDonald, director of NRO’s Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance in Virginia, is that he pushed them to “stretch their technological limits,” and gave them, not the answers they wanted, but “independent, no-holds-barred assessments.”

Mass destruction
The issue on which Garwin has worked most intently is arms control—the natural consequence of an involvement with the hydrogen bomb. One way or another, he has helped shape all the treaties to ban nuclear weapons tests since the first treaty talks in 1958. He helped convince President Kennedy to put controls, called Permissive Action Links (PALs), on U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Europe so that they couldn’t be exploded without authority. (Talking later to a Russian scientist at CISAC, the National Academy of Sciences’ Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Garwin found out the Russians didn’t then have PALs on their bombs in Cuba either.)

Unlike his old friend and colleague Sidney Drell, now retired from the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory in Menlo Park, California, Garwin isn’t trying to take nuclear weapons down to zero: “I don’t see the elimination of nuclear weapons,” Garwin says, “or even a path in that direction.” He’s against proliferation of weapons to any countries that don’t have them. He’s for the immediate reduction in numbers of weapons and further reductions in the future, from the current 5000 in the United States and 17,000 or so worldwide—a point at which, he says, the weapons are more numerous than their targets—down to a few hundred, “enough for any conceivable purpose.”

Since 1992, Garwin has worked on nearly every JASON report on the health of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile, most notably the 1995 report certifying that the weapons were a reliable deterrent without having to be tested and that, yes, the country could sign the international Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Noting that he “had a lot to do” with nuclear weapons himself, Garwin said of the JASON report, “I am most pleased to be an author of this document.”

Garwin also works on the other half of controlling weapons: missile defense. He’s advised, written, and testified on its myriad aspects since 1968, when he and Hans Bethe wrote an article for Scientific American outlining the pros and cons that have been debated ever since. He continued arguing through the 1980s debates on Star Wars, the Reagan administration’s idea for space-based defenses. He helped write the so-called Rumsfeld report in 1998 on the missile threat from “rogue states,” which missile defense advocates later used to support their views—to Garwin’s annoyance but not astonishment. These days, he’s arguing with the National Academies’ 2012 report on missile defense. The report recommends new radars, which Garwin says would be inadequate to distinguish incoming missiles from decoys. “If you feel compelled to have a missile defense because you’ve always said missile defense is necessary,” he told an interviewer, “go ahead, have a missile defense. But don’t spend very much money on it, and don’t lie about its performance.”

Category of one
If Garwin’s advice has a flaw, some of his peers say, it’s a sporadic tone-deafness to human or institutional realities. For example, his proposal to intercept enemy missiles during their more targetable boost phase by basing the missile defenses close to potential attackers, such as North Korea, is probably not going to win Chinese or Russian approval. And testifying in Congress against the Nixon administration’s plan for a supersonic transport plane, as Garwin did in 1970 while sitting on PSAC, was never in the playbook for presidential advisers. It has been cited as a reason that Richard Nixon disbanded PSAC.

The occasional tone-deafness, says Raymond Jeanloz, a geophysicist and fellow arms-controller at the University of California, Berkeley, doesn’t mean that Garwin loses credibility among his advi-