Anatomizing Non-State Threats to Pakistan’s Nuclear Infrastructure: The Pakistani Neo-Taliban

By CHARLES P. BLAIR
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About the Report

The Federation of American Scientists’s Terrorism Analysis Project (TAP) is conducting a multi-year study of nuclear weapon and fissile material security in South Asia. The researchers’ intention is to highlight specific elements of the nuclear fuel-cycles and nuclear weapon infrastructures of both Pakistan and India that warrant the international community’s greatest concern. TAP's overarching methodological approach involves quantitative analyses of the specific violent non-state actors most likely to exploit nuclear weapons-related opportunities in Pakistan and India. Thus, while TAP researchers accept that the issue of nuclear security is partially a “supply-side” problem, they strive to identify and assess the “demand-side” of the situation as well. “After all,” terrorism expert Jeffrey Bale has rightly noted, “if violence-prone extremist groups had no interest in acquiring or employing such materials, it would not matter, insofar as terrorism is concerned, whether those materials were accessible or whether the groups in question had sufficient technical capabilities to be able to deploy them.”*

The greatest threat to Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure emanates from jihadists both inside Pakistan and South and Central Asia, generally. While there is a broad appreciation of this danger, there are few substantive studies that identify and explore specific groups motivated and potentially capable of acquiring and employing Pakistani nuclear weapons and/or fissile materials. This report fills that gap by exploring the Pakistani Neo-Taliban (PNT) and the dozens of groups that compositely fill its ranks. Originally this report was to be a section of TAP’s South Asian Nuclear Security Report—scheduled for release by FAS in winter 2011-2012. However, when Usama bin Laden was killed in Pakistan on May 2, 2011, and with ongoing concerns about Pakistan’s links to jihadist organizations targeting the U.S. and her interests, FAS decided to immediately release the section that explores the PNT as well as its constituent groups and allies.

About the Author

Charles P. Blair joined FAS in June 2010 as director of the Terrorism Analysis Project. An expert in radiological and nuclear weapons and specializing in terrorism, Blair’s work focuses on the nexus of violent non-state actors and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He is also an instructor at Johns Hopkins University where he teaches graduate students the technologies underlying WMD. Before joining FAS, he was a research associate with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism where, among other projects, he managed the Global Terrorism Database, the largest open-source compilation of terrorist events in the world.

Since 2005, Blair has co-directed the research organization Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies. CETIS studies terrorist targeting and decision making as they relate to critical infrastructure vulnerability. U.S. governmental agencies rely on this group’s pioneering research. Previously, Blair worked with the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Nuclear Cities Initiative and has served as a research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ (CNS) Monterey Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Research Program. Subsequently, he was an investigative researcher for the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) where he researched and interacted with a variety of domestic extremist groups, including components of the so-called “militia” movement, white supremacists, neo-Nazis, millenarian Christian Identity adherents, and radical environmental and ecological activists.
Acknowledgements

The author thanks Jeffrey M. Bale for his feedback on a draft of this report, Monica Amarelo for her work formatting the report, and Dena Nishek for her assistance in its final editing. The author alone, however, is responsible for any mistakes and, unless otherwise indicated, all opinions are his. Elements of this report previously appeared in Anatomizing Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries: Identifying the Adversary, report prepared for the Science and Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security, grant number N00140510629.
About FAS

Founded in 1945 by many of the scientists who built the first atomic bombs, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) is devoted to the belief that scientists, engineers, and other technically trained people have the ethical obligation to ensure that the technological fruits of their intellect and labor are applied to the benefit of humankind. The founding mission was to prevent nuclear war. While nuclear security remains a major objective of FAS today, the organization has expanded its critical work to issues at the intersection of applied science and security.

FAS Terrorism Analysis Reports are produced to increase the understanding of policymakers, the public, and the press about threats to national and international security from terrorist groups and other violent non-state actors. The reports are written by individual authors—who may be FAS staff or acknowledged experts from outside the institution. These reports do not represent an FAS institutional position on policy issues. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in this and other FAS-published reports are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.

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Glossary and Abbreviations

FATA  Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GTD  Global Terrorism Database
HuJI  Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami (Movement of Islamic Holy War)
HuM  Harakat ul-Mujahidin (The Movement of the Mujahidin)
HuMA  Harkat-ul-Mujahidin-al-Alami (The International Movement of the Mujahidin)
ISI  Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence
JeM  Jaysh-e-Muhammed (Army of Muhammed)
JI  Jamaat-e-Islami
JUI  Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam
JUI-F  Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman)
JUI-S  Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Sami ul-Haq)
IMU  Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa  The province of north-western Pakistan formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)
LeJ  Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Army of Jhang)
LeT  Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Pure)
MMA  Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Council of Action)
OEF  Operation Enduring Freedom
PA  Political Agents (of the Pakistani Government)
PNT  Pakistani Neo-Taliban
SSP  Sipah-e-Sahaba (Army of the Companions of the Prophet)
TNSM  Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shari’a t-e-Mohammadi (Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Shari’a)
TTP  Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Movement of the Pakistani Taliban)
WITS  World Incidents Tracking System
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PREFACE

As president of the Federation of American Scientists, I often wonder what my predecessors would think of today’s global security environment. Founded in 1945, the leaders of FAS (then known as the Federation of Atomic Scientists) had a profound awareness that atomic weapons presented a seminal—yet largely unpredictable—challenge to humanity. That the 1947 partition of the British Indian Empire would result, fifty years later, in two opposing nuclear-armed states—India and Pakistan—would have been inconceivable to them. Yet here we are: two of the world’s nine nuclear powers are in South Asia, and their combined arsenals now most likely exceed more than one hundred warheads.

With a well established interest in the security of all nuclear stockpiles, FAS is currently engaged in a multi-year study of fissile materials and nuclear arms in the Indian Subcontinent. There has long been concern over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. The killing of Usama bin Laden this May, questions about Pakistan’s sympathies to terrorist groups that target the United States and its ongoing civil war against many of these same groups have only exacerbated these apprehensions. In this rapidly evolving environment, I thought it prudent to release an initial assessment by Charles Blair, Director of FAS’s Terrorism Analysis Project, of Pakistan’s complicated relationship to violent Islamists. This report contains a detailed exploration of the actors that compositely form the Pakistani Neo-Taliban (PNT)—arguably the greatest single threat to Pakistani security today. Readers must be cautioned, however, that—like so much of North Africa and the Middle East today—the situation in Pakistan is extraordinarily fluid. Thus, elements of this analysis may soon be overtaken by events. Mr. Blair will make updates to the FAS.org website as such developments warrant. Part two of his study, scheduled for release in winter 2011/2012, uses this report as a cornerstone as he investigates under what specific circumstances nuclear materials and weapons could come under the control of extremist groups in Pakistan.

While Mr. Blair still believes that it is unlikely Pakistan will lose control of its nuclear materials or weapons, this report makes it clear that the security situation in Pakistan is only getting worse. Ironically, this fact arguably makes Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure more secure: extremists are generally able to meet their tactical requirements and strategic objectives without the perceived need for weapons of mass destruction. This situation, however, could quickly reverse.
Nor is Pakistan the only country conceivably vulnerable to internal extremist forces seeking its nuclear arms. Just as the grimly complicated South Asian milieu was unforeseen by FAS’s progenitors—many of whom were prescient veterans of the Manhattan Project—our nuclear futures remain largely unknown. If the events in Pakistan presage a future global nuclear dystopia, then the contents of this report deserve the attention of all who would wish to avoid this fate.

Charles D. Ferguson  
President  
Federation of American Scientists  

June 2011
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“I believe that we are now deeply injured by the simplifications of this time.”

J. Robert Oppenheimer

The discovery and subsequent killing of Usama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, raises several troubling questions. With regard to the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, commentators note the U.S.’ airborne raid on bin Laden’s compound—undetected by radars in Pakistan, the world’s fifth largest military power—lends credence to the belief that state actors might be capable of successfully seizing and exfiltrating Pakistan’s nuclear assets. As serious a security breach as the raid may have been, of far greater importance is what it reveals about Pakistan’s nuclear insecurities with regard to non-state actors. Indeed, while much attention has rightfully refocused on senior components of Pakistan’s military that aid and abet the Afghan Taliban, elements of al-Qa’ida, and other jihadist groups that actively oppose the U.S., recent events are also a strong reminder that Pakistan is in the midst of a civil war against many of these same forces. While it is likely that some senior Pakistani officials were aware of bin Laden’s location in Abbottabad prior to the U.S. assault, one should not entirely dismiss the recent comments of Prime Minister Gilani, especially those in which he notes Pakistan’s own war against terrorism has cost it


3 The incident is similar in some ways to Mathias Rust’s landing of a Cessna 172 near Moscow’s Red Square in 1987. The ensuing irreparable damage precipitated by the nineteen-year-old amateur pilot’s single-engine plane flight resulted in the largest single turnover of Soviet military leaders since Stalin’s purges in the 1930s. See, for example, Tom LeCompte, “The Notorious Flight of Mathias Rust,” Air and Space Magazine, July 2005. Available at: http://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/rust.html?c=v&page=1
“some 30,000 men, women, and children and more than 5,000 armed forces personnel [and] billions of dollars lost as economic costs.”

Pakistan may well be attempting to play all sides with its Janus-faced policies. Yet Pakistani leaders believe its policies—costly as they may be—are in harmony with their primary goals of blunting Indian influence in Central Asia and ensuring that the geopolitical endgame in Afghanistan conforms to their perceived interests. Fully aware that the U.S. will likely not remain in Afghanistan until it is favorably stabilized, and apprehensive that the power-vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal will invite meddling by Iran and India, from late 2001 onward Pakistan’s military viewed the Taliban as a tool held in reserve, one that could blunt and counter Indian influence in Central Asia, generally, and offset mounting Indian influence in Kabul, specifically. For example, during the early post-9/11 era Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) not only passively allowed the Afghan Taliban and its jihadist allies to fortify their position in Pakistan’s Waziristan Agencies, but implemented specific plans “to create a broad ‘Talibanized belt’ in its [Federally Administered Tribal Areas – FATA] that would keep the pressure on [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai to bend to Pakistani wishes, keep U.S. forces under threat while maintaining their dependence on Pakistani goodwill, and create a buffer zone between Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns.”

Ahmed Rashid has summarized the ISI’s perception of this post-2001 Pakistani strategy as one that would ensure “a Talibanized Pashtun population along the border [that] would pose a threat to Karzai and the Americans but no threat to Pakistan, which would be in control of them.”

Pakistan gravely miscalculated in this regard. For four primary reasons Pakistan’s Talibanized Pashtuns and their allies—collectively referred to in this report as the Pakistani Neo-Taliban (PNT)—challenge not only the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan but also pose a distinct threat to Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure;


indeed, in the words of General David Petraeus, the PNT is now a “threat to the very existence of Pakistan … supplanting even India.”\textsuperscript{7} Pakistan’s first miscalculation—shared by the U.S.—was a failure to foresee the violent revolt in its tribal areas as a result of the Pakistani military’s unprecedented incursion into FATA. This military campaign—halfheartedly advanced by Pakistani forces against al-Qa’ida after the latter escaped from Tora Bora in December 2001—was irresolutely advanced only at the insistence of the U.S. and the latter’s concomitant and intertwined promise of generous military aid packages. As armed engagements increased, local tribal leaders in FATA came to believe that Pakistan was allowing U.S. forces to operate unfettered within Pakistan.\textsuperscript{8} Fearing subjugation by a U.S.-Pakistani cabal, it was only a matter of time before FATA’s tribal chieftains organized their own militias and began to battle Pakistani forces—the civil war had begun.

Second, at the same time indigenous tribal militias battled the Pakistani military, the Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida ruthlessly consolidated their hold in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Their ultimate success in relocating and rebuilding their forces, replenishing materials, and reconstituting command and control capabilities resulted partially from renewed and strengthened ties with sympathetic local tribesmen and erstwhile colleagues from the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad that had remained in the area, married into local families, and become full community members.\textsuperscript{9} The newest arrivals to the Waziristan agencies also brought with them money and, consequently, loans and employment opportunities for many of the region’s young men. By 2004, al-Qa’ida had established 15 training camps in the area and recruitment was booming.\textsuperscript{10} The Afghan Taliban cemented the transplantation by eradicating local representatives of state power.


\textsuperscript{8} Brian Cloughley, “Insurrection in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” \textit{Pakistan Security Research Unit (PRSU)}, Brief No. 29. January 24, 2008, \textit{passim}.


\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
and many of the area’s religious leaders who opposed their presence. In time these killings created a profound power vacuum that the PNT largely filled. In its early stages this void allowed surviving local Pakistani Pashtun leaders—whose acquiescence to the Afghan Taliban was only exceeded by their determination to resist Islamabad’s perceived efforts to subjugate their tribes—to assume the role of the state, thus further legitimizing their growing power. By 2003-2004 they had created sizable militias to not only police local areas but, more significantly, to engage the Pakistani military in a far more organized and effective manner than before.\textsuperscript{11}

Third, following the events of 9/11 and subsequent military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistani-backed Kashmiri militant groups, erroneously believing that closer U.S.-Pakistani relationship would help drive India to the negotiation table, intensified their insurgency in hopes of influencing any settlement in their favor. Coupled with increasing Pakistani-supported terrorist actions within India itself, these events led to the 2002 war footing by India.\textsuperscript{12} With the Indian military initiating massive-scale troop movements toward its border, Pakistan responded by relocating tens of thousands of its troops from its Afghanistan border to its Indian border, largely abandoning its lackluster efforts to capture bin Laden and


\textsuperscript{12} The most serious of these Pakistani-supported terrorist actions was the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian Parliament. Carried out by members of Jaysh-e-Muhammed (JeM: Army of Mohammed), the attack “was aimed at \textit{wiping out the Indian political leadership} and delivering a message of strength and resolve by attacking a symbolic target.” This event occurred during the crescendo of the battle of Tora Bora. Gary A. Ackerman, Jeffrey M. Bale, Charles P. Blair, et al, “Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, UCRL-TR-227068, December 4, 2006, p. 58. Emphasis added. Available at: http://www.llnl.gov/tid/lof/documents/pdf/341566.pdf For an excellent account of Tora Bara and how it dovetailed with the 2001-2002 India – Pakistan crisis, see Peter Bergen, “The Battle for Tora Bora (How Osama bin Laden slipped from our grasp: The definitive account),” \textit{The New Republic} (December 22, 2009). Available at: http://www.tnr.com/article/the-battle-tora-bora
dislodge al-Qa‘ida from its new sanctuary in western Pakistan.\textsuperscript{13} Deeply concerned about the effects these developments would have on U.S. efforts to neutralize al-Qa‘ida, the Bush administration reportedly placed enormous pressure on Pakistan to stop its support of anti-Indian fighters, defuse the crisis with India, and refocus military efforts on its western border.\textsuperscript{14} Such pressure was compounded by U.S. allegations that many of these groups—for example, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT: Army of the Pure), Jaysh-e-Muhammed (JeM: Army of Muhammed), and Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM: The Movement of the Mujahidin)—provided active moral and material backing to members of al-Qa‘ida.\textsuperscript{15} After more than six months of negotiation, tensions were eased and the crisis was largely defused. This 2003 rapprochement between New Delhi and Islamabad initiated the latter’s abrupt abandonment of Kashmiri and pan-Islamist jihadists that it had been supporting for years.\textsuperscript{16} Their Weltanschauung now further radicalized by their abandonment by Islamabad, these jihadists embraced the idea of the present Pakistani government being Washington’s puppet.\textsuperscript{17} With no relocation or recompense plan in place, they were left adrift,

\begin{quote}
“The Afghan Taliban cemented the transplantation by eradicating local representatives of state power and many of the area’s religious leaders who opposed their presence.”
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}


\textsuperscript{16} Author’s interview with Shuja Nawaz, December 14, 2009. See also Hussain, \textit{Frontline Pakistan}, pp. 111-112.

\end{flushleft}
largely moved by the currents of jihadist movements in other areas.\textsuperscript{18} Naturally, large numbers of these fighters were drawn toward their ideological counterparts in the tribal areas and, once established, showed little compunction about targeting the Pakistani state that once embraced them.\textsuperscript{19}

Finally, Islamists with long-standing grievances against the Pakistani government were able to graft their struggle to those of local tribal communities, the Afghan Taliban, al-Qa’ida, displaced jihadists from Kashmir, and other foreign fighters against Pakistan. Pakistan’s Malakand region, which includes the Swat district, is home to Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM: Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Shāri’a). After almost a decade of struggle with Pakistan’s federal leadership, the events in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, allowed the group an extraordinary opportunity to redefine its narrative of strict Shāri’a implementation in the context of resisting the post-9/11 U.S. military and “Western” presence in Central and South Asia. Under the leadership of Maulana Fazlullah, TNSM battled against the Pakistani military, demonstrating, according to one Pakistani military observer, “mind-boggling” tactics and defenses that resembled state military capabilities.\textsuperscript{20} Described as both an “army” and a “satellite of al-Qaeda,” TNSM was able to inflict significant losses on the Paki-

\textsuperscript{18} Peter Chalk correctly observes, “Moves to limit jihadist attacks have clearly been interpreted by groups such as JeM and HuJI as a sell-out of the Kashmiri cause and confirmation that Islamabad, under the present government, is no more than a puppet of Washington. Certain analysts also believe that the strategy has prompted renegade factions within the armed forces and intelligence services—whose raison d’être for most of their existence has been wresting control of [Jammu and Kashmir] from India—to side with and actively support organizations seeking to redirect their ideological fervor against the Pakistani state.” Chalk, “The Re-Orientation of Kashmiri Extremism.”

\textsuperscript{19} Shuja Nawaz noted in 2010 that when Islamabad “turned its back” on militant groups fighting in Kashmir, it simultaneously lost control of them. “Similar to the disbanding of the Iraqi Army after the U.S. invasion when thousands of trained soldiers and officers were let go,” Nawaz observes, “the LeT was cut loose without a comprehensive plan to disarm, retrain, and gainfully employ the fighters.” Statement of Shuja Nawaz Director, South Asia Center The Atlantic Council of the United States, Committee on House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, March 11, 2010. See, http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1163

stani army and in doing so displaced millions of civilians. In April 2009, in exchange for a ceasefire, Pakistan’s central government acquiesced to TNSM and established a rigid form of Shāri’a law in the Malakand region—the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation. Since then sporadic violence has erupted and there is growing apprehension that TNSM will once again challenge Pakistan’s authority not only in the Malakand region, but also in some of Pakistan’s metropolitan centers. Islamized students of Islamabad’s Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), for example, took inspiration from TNSM’s message of Shāri’a supremacy and attempted to implement it in the Pakistani capital. Authorities challenged these efforts and the resulting confrontation spiraled out of control. The episode reached a violent crescendo when Pakistani paramilitary units stormed Lal Masjid in July 2007. Casualty figures are inconsistent but at least 73 students died in the siege. Fazlullah, foreign fighters (the IMU: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, for example), and several leading Pakistani mullahs used the Lal Masjid incident to instigate an armed uprising against the Pakistani state. Some observers reported that Fazlullah’s broadcasts were, in part, intended to activate “certain ‘dormant’


22 For a detailed account of the incident and how it directly related to the PNT, see Siddique, “The Red Mosque Operation and its Impact on the Growth of the Pakistani Taliban.” The militants directly associated with Lal Masjid not only had strong ideological and social links to well-known and banned terrorist groups throughout Pakistan, as well as al-Qa’ida and Taliban members in the tribal areas, but their goals essentially mirrored those of the PNT and their jihadist allies as a whole. Such ideological confluence can be seen from their four primary demands:
- “Immediate declaration of Shāri’a in Pakistan by the government.”
- “Immediate promulgation of Quran and Sunnah in the courts of law.”
- “Removal of un-Islamic clauses of the Women Protection Bill.”
- “Immediate discontinuation to declaring jihad as terrorism by the government as it is the great sacred religious duty of Muslims.”

As quoted in Ibid.


jihadi outfits … to rise in the aftermath of Lal Masjid.”25 Several students who survived the Lal Masjid siege moved to Swat and Waziristan to join the PNT, and with the phrases, “every mosque in the country is Lal Masjid,” and “Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden are our heroes,” they joined other jihadists in an unprecedented campaign of terrorism.26

Collectively PNT-linked forces have conducted dozens of highly sophisticated terrorist operations. Attacks include three sophisticated assaults on Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) Regional Headquarters in Lahore, a massive bombing at Islamabad’s Marriott Hotel (“Pakistan’s 9/11”), an ambush of the Sri Lankan Cricket Team, attacks on Lahore’s Police Academy and ISI Provisional Headquarters, partial seizure of Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi (“Pakistan’s Pentagon”), the likely assassination of Benazir Bhutto, a shocking assault in Afghanistan that was the second deadliest attack against the U.S.’s CIA in its history, and dozens of other complex operations (see Table 1: Summary of Notable PNT Related Attacks). Significantly, several attacks were conducted on or near areas believed to house nuclear materials and/or weapons. Indeed, at the time of this writing PNT operatives have finally been neutralized after seizing parts of one of Pakistan’s most secure military bases, Pakistan Naval Station Mehran.27 The attack—likely the most sophisticated PNT undertakings since the October 2009 assault on Pakistan’s GHQ appears to have benefitted from insider collusion.28 The well-fortified Naval Station Mehran is


26 As quoted in Ibid, p. 19.

27 See incident 26, page 150.

located 15 miles from Masroor Air Base, a facility believed to house intact nuclear weapons.29

As this report makes clear, the PNT is clearly the greatest non-state threat to Pakistan’s overall security and, more specifically, its nuclear assets. The PNT’s unique combination of ideology, strategic objectives, organizational structure, relations with other groups (including elements of the Pakistani state), and general resources and capabilities make it unique among the global milieu of violent non-state actors. Although the death of bin Laden has raised questions about Pakistan’s commitment to the U.S. and the latter’s efforts in Afghanistan; equal, if not greater concern, is warranted with regard to Pakistan’s internal and multi-faceted struggle against extremism.

INTRODUCTION

“The movement did embody a paradox: its followers sought to destroy the despised present in order to recapture an idealized past in an imaginary future.”

“Ideas, logistics, and cash come from the Gulf. Arab guys, mainly Egyptians and Saudis, are on hand to provide the chemistry. Veteran Punjabi extremists plot the attacks, while the Pakistan Taliban provides the martyrs.”


In less than a decade Pakistan has witnessed terrorist incidents increase by almost a fifty-fold (see Figure 1: *Incidents of Reported Terrorism in Pakistan 2001 - 2010*).\(^{32}\) Since 2002 only Afghanistan and Iraq underwent more attacks.\(^{33}\) In addition, it is generally recognized that Pakistan is the epicenter of global jihadist activity. Indeed, “it is clear,” write scholars Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, “that armed conflict carried on by the jihadists is the affair of Pakistan alone.”\(^{34}\) Central among these Pakistani jihadists are Taliban militants who, having previously enjoyed sponsorship from key elements of Pakistan’s political and military coteries, presently seek to overthrow that state and, arguably, extend their power globally (see Figure 2: *Number of Reported Taliban Related Attacks in Pakistan 2001-2010*). This Pakistani-based Taliban—one whose composition, strategy, and targeting preferences are distinct from its Mullah Omar-led Afghan counterparts—has been identifiable as a distinct entity since 2002.\(^ {35}\)

This report uses the term “Pakistani Neo-Taliban” (PNT) to describe a

\(^{32}\) A 2009 Gallup survey found that 80 percent of Pakistanis “feel that visiting a public place is unsafe.” “Pakistan Security Report 2009,” Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2010. p. 4.

\(^{33}\) Data for January 2002 – December 2008 accessed from The National Consortium for the Study and Response to Terrorism’s (START) Global Terrorism Database (hereafter GTD) and the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (hereafter WITS), No single open-source database offers a full accounting of Pakistani terrorism incidents in the 2000s. The GTD only releases data through 2008. WITS’ data goes back only as far as 2004. Despite both data sets employing broadly similar definitions of terrorism, their differences are potentially significant enough so that the two databases cannot reliably “fill-in” for years that the other is lacking. Thus, the combination of both databases in Figure 1 and 2 (and, unless otherwise noted, other figures in this report that combine data from the GTD and WITS) is for trend discernment purposes only. With regard to incidents of “terrorism” in 2009, the figure given—1,916 incidents— is likely higher. The Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) cites 2,586. However, their data set offers additional incidents that are often conflated with terrorism in both the GTD and WITS. For example, 209 “clashes between security forces and militants;” 130 “political violence” incidents; 217 “inter-tribal clashes,” and 596 “operational attacks.” When taken in sum, PIPS proposes 3,816 incidents of violence involving non-state actors that might be considered terrorism by either the GTD or WITS. “Pakistan Security Report 2009,” p. 4.


\(^{35}\) Progenitors of the Pakistani Neo-Taliban can be discerned as far back as the late 1970s. When appropriate this report identifies these forerunners.
phenomenon that by 2007 was widely referred to as “the Pakistani Taliban.”

Subsequent to this introduction, **Section II** of this report addresses the challenge of “Defining the Pakistani Neo-Taliban” and concludes that the PNT is better understood as a movement than a distinct entity. **Section III** accounts for the “Historical Evolution of the PNT.” Beginning with the post-9/11 period and ending in mid-2011, it describes the multitude of actors drawn to the PNT and its phenomenal rise to power in much of N-West Pakistan in less than nine years. Drawing on much of the discussion found in previous sections, **Appendix I** offers a summary of notable PNT-related attacks. In doing so, it vividly displays the PNT’s ability to successfully strike high-security facilities (including at least three related to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons infrastructure), its frequent use of disguises and very large improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and obvious insider collusion with Pakistani security agencies (i.e., Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence—the ISI). Scheduled for release in winter 2011/12, this report’s companion piece—“PNT Nuclear Attack Elements”—will use findings from these sections to inform likely routes the PNT would use to acquire a nuclear capability and what its targeting preferences and nuclear command and control arrangements might be.
DEFINING THE PAKISTANI NEO-TALIBAN

A precise definition of the Pakistani Neo-Taliban (PNT) is elusive and will likely remain so. As regional expert Qandeel Siddique has observed, the word “Taliban” is being used “indiscriminately by the media, to describe just about any act of terrorism in Pakistan’s context.”\(^36\) The undergirding problem, Siddique observes, is that “in Pakistan’s context it remains unclear what the Taliban actually is.”\(^37\) Despite the challenges of over-inclusiveness and definition, it is possible to identify many of the PNT’s more salient characteristics. This study contends that the PNT is an amalgamation of foreign and domestic non-state and state actors with few composite strategic aims. Typically, intra-group cooperation exists only when tactical interests dovetail.\(^38\) However, the strategic and tactical intra-group harmony that does exist revolves around a core commitment to the violent removal of secular authority; it is the scope of change sought and the degree of violence sanctioned in its pursuit that often differentiates the various groups that jointly comprise the PNT. As is illustrated below and in this reports’ forthcoming companion piece, delineation of the PNT’s intra-group characteristics can also be achieved by highlighting the ebb and flow of alliances, hostilities, betrayals and competition for resources that exist between its component organizations. In some cases, elements of the PNT are principally linked to the establishment of a Pashtun state, or emirate, in the Afghan-Pakistani tribal areas—compelling violent actions to obtain full independence from rulers in Islamabad, expel all NATO – International Security Assistance


\(^37\) Ibid.

Forces [ISAF] and U.S. forces (henceforth U.S.-led coalition\textsuperscript{39}) from Afghanistan, and return a Taliban government to Kabul.\textsuperscript{40} Other elements of the PNT fundamentally seek to revoke the rights of Shi’ite and Barelvi (i.e. Sufi) Muslims, and blunt and roll back Indian influence in South and Central Asia. Still others within the PNT primarily endeavor to enforce their perception of Shāri’a in all of Pakistan and, in some cases, may arguably seek to establish a global caliphate.\textsuperscript{41} Despite these varied aspirations, collectively the PNT can be seen as a violent, often Islamized network rooted in the Deobandi

\textsuperscript{39} U.S. forces partially operate in Afghanistan under the ISAF–NATO rubric. They also function under sole U.S. command. The Afghan army is also active. Thus, an accurate description of state forces confronting the Taliban in Afghanistan is “ISAF–NATO/U.S./Afghan Army.” However, for the sake of simplicity and flow of narrative, this report uses the term “U.S.-led coalition.”

\textsuperscript{40} Pashtuns are Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, making up 42 percent of the population (roughly 15 million inhabitants); Pakistani-based Pashtuns are greater in number at approximately 28 million, yet constitute a smaller percentage of the population—20 percent. For an overview of the Pashtuns see, for example, Shuja Nawaz, \textit{FATA – A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan} (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2009), pp. 1-5.

\textsuperscript{41} These various aspirations—fighting internal sectarian jihads, regional jihads, and an external jihad against the West—are examined in depth in, “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” \textit{Asia Report No 164}, International Crisis Group (March 13, 2009), passim. It should be noted that a Taliban “takeover” of Pakistani central authority was reportedly first pursued in 1995. In that event a group of military officers led by Qari Saifullah Akhtar, a key PNT militant whose exploits are recorded throughout this report, made a serious but unsuccessful bid to destroy the top echelons of the Pakistani military, overthrow the government of Benazir Bhutto, and pave the way for a Taliban takeover similar to Pakistan.” See Arif Jamal, “The Growth of Deobandi Jihad in Afghanistan,” \textit{Terrorism Monitor} Vol. 8, Issue 2 (January 14, 2010). Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35911&cHash=e851fcd028
school of Sunni Islam, strongest in the south-central areas of Asia that historically have been beyond the yoke of centralized powers: what is today Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province [NWFP]), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), northern Balochistan, northern areas of the Punjab province, and sections of southern and eastern Afghanistan.

In sum, the Pakistani Neo-Taliban is an idea constructed primarily to give an anatomy to a movement that can be termed as “Talibanization.” It targets “un-Islamic” (e.g., Shi’ites and Sufis) or “Westernized” groups that are perceived as seeking social and political dominance. The PNT’s broad aspirations largely consist of creating alternative or new centers of political, judicial, and social power grounded in retrograde principles that are characterized as representing Islam in its purest manifestation.

With its basic outline now established, it is possible to explore and grasp the PNTs’ specific components—an exercise that is best achieved by reviewing its brief but extraordinary history.

**HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE PAKITANI NEO-TALIBAN**

While its Deobandi ideological roots go back more than a century and some its leaders have relevant (jihadi) military experience dating to the late 1970s, the

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42 Sunnis are often categorized into four broad categories: Ahle Hadith, Barelvis, Deobandis, and revivalist modernist movements (for example, JI: Jamaat-i-Islami). For purposes of this report, Deobandis and Ahle Hadith can usually be seen as allies; they often violently oppose the Barelvis.

43 Many of the groups discussed in this study have been proscribed by the Pakistani government only to appear under a different name. Unless otherwise noted, this study employs the group names that are likely to be most familiar to the reader. For accounts of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s (i.e., the NWPF’s) pre-PNT history see Shaheen Sar Ali, *Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities of Pakistan: Constitutional and Legal Perspectives*, Nias Monographs, 84 (New York: Rutledge, 2001), and Stephen Rittenberg, *Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Pakhtuns: The Independence Movement in India’s North-West Frontier Province* (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1998).

history of the PNT can be best understood by examining three recent time periods:

• Late 2001 – mid 2004: The escape of al-Qa’ida and significant elements of the Afghan Taliban’s leadership to the Waziristan agencies (located in FATA) from U.S. and Coalition forces in 2001/2002, internal military actions by the Pakistani military, and the PNT’s formation.

• Late 2004 – late 2007: The aggregation of the PNT, a period marked by the spread of Talibanization to the other agencies of FATA; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s southern districts; further to the north, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Malakand region and into the heartland of Pakistan’s largest cities.45

• Late 2007 – mid 2011: The transformation of the PNT, in the words of Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), General David Petraeus, into a “threat to the very existence of Pakistan … supplanting even India.”46

A. Late-2001 -- Mid-2004

Although several analysts predicted an eventual resurgence of Taliban activity in post-2001 Afghanistan, the rise of a Pakistani Taliban—one with leadership, cadres, and aspirations distinct from their Afghan counterparts—was largely, if not entirely, unforeseen.47 The dire nature with which the PNT is presently perceived is in sharp contrast to how its precursors were originally viewed. The PNT’s genesis was originally mistaken by most observers as simply the temporary existence of reactionary and transient jihadists on Pakistani soil; a passing event entirely precipitated by events in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early

45 In some key legal ways, FATA is technically a part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. However, unless otherwise indicated, when this study refers to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the author does so without the inclusion of FATA.


2002.\(^{48}\) Indeed, until 2008 it was common among many pundits to simply explain the PNT away as “after-effect of the Afghan Jihad.”\(^{49}\) Originally, this perception of an ephemeral passing of jihadists was largely accurate. Following their 2001 routing in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), al-Qa‘ida\(^{50}\), the Afghan

\[\text{“The PNT’s genesis was originally mistaken by most observers as the temporary existence of reactionary and transient jihadists on Pakistani soil; a passing event entirely precipitated by events in Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002.”}\]

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\(^{50}\) After al-Qa‘ida’s escape from Tora Bora (described by Peter Bergen as “one of the greatest military blunders in recent U.S. history”), its ranks in Pakistan were described as a “multilayered terrorism cake. At its base were Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen, soon to become Taliban in their own right [e.g., the PNT], who provided the hideouts and logistical support. Above them were the Afghan Taliban who settled there after 9/11, followed by militants from Central Asia, Chechnya, Africa, China, and Kashmir, and topped by Arabs who forged a protective ring around bin Laden.” Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, p. 265.

\(^{51}\) This author uses the term “Afghan Taliban” primarily as a method for identifying members of the Taliban that fled Afghanistan in 2001/2002 either to take up temporary asylum in Pakistan prior to engaging in a renewed effort to take control of Afghanistan or to establish long-term residence in Pakistan. It also indicates individuals who joined with the Taliban after 2002. It is not intended as an indicator of national origin or citizenship. This is the case because many “Afghan” Taliban fighters that retreated into Pakistan in 2001/2002 were not Afghan-born fighters but Pakistani-born Pashtun militants. At some point in the 1990s or early 2000/2001, their madrassa-directed studies in FATA or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had been completed or, more likely, abandoned and these Pashtuns traveled over the border to join “their Afghan brethren.” It would be the eventual leaders emerging from these Taliban fighters of Pakistani origin that would create their own cells and would eventually join forces with local (Pakistani) mullahs to form the most critical components of the PNT.
Taliban, and thousands of non-Arab foreign fighters found sanctuary in Pakistan’s FATA, areas of Balochistan and, in a limited way, the southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These fleeing militants were able to secure refuge, weapons, and other logistics largely by paying off the local tribesmen.

Note as well that many of the Taliban that were ethnic Afghans were also "returning home" to Pakistan. In the words of Ahmed Rashid:

“The Taliban did not just slip back across the border in the winter of 2001/2002; they arrived in droves, by bus, taxi, and tractor, on camels and horses, and on foot. As many as ten thousand fighters holed up in Kandahar with their weapons. For many, it was not an escape but a return home—back to the refugee camps in Balochistan where they had been brought up and where their families still lived; back to the madrassas where they had once studied; back to the hospitality of the mosques where they had once prayed. For those with no families to receive them, militants from Pakistani extremist groups and the [Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)] in Pakistan—like benevolent charity workers—welcomed them at the border with blankets, fresh clothes, and envelopes full of money. [Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI] officials, standing with the Frontier Constabulary guards and customs officials [at the border] waved them in. [President Pervez] Musharraf was not about to discourage or arrest these Taliban fighters who had been nurtured for two decades by the military. For Pakistan they still represented the future of Afghanistan, and they had to be hidden away until their time came.” Rashid, Descent in to Chaos, p. 240.

For statistics on Pakistani students abandoning their madrassa studies and relocating to Afghanistan in the 1990s see Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, p. 147.

For more on the “returning home” theme, see Schmidt, “The Unraveling of Pakistan,” pp. 35-36. For Peter Bergen’s Tora Bora quote see Bergen, “The Battle for Tora Bora.”

Bolochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are two of four provinces in Pakistan, the others being Punjab and Sindh. FATA is one of two federally administered territories, the other being the Federally Administered Northern Areas. The final two major administrative units in Pakistan are the Islamabad Capital Territory and Azad Kashmir. In 1998, the last year that a census was conducted, the population of FATA was 3,176,331. It is roughly the size of Massachusetts. See Nawaz, FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, p. 2. For early accounts of the Afghan militants’ enormous exodus into the tribal areas see Shyam Bhatia, “How bin Laden’s Huge Convoy Gave American Forces the Slip, The Times (London), July 22, 2002.
Local Pakistani clerics (henceforth mullahs, see Box 1: Maliks, Mullahs and Political Agents: Changing Roles amid FATA’s Tumult) have reportedly affirmed this view that initial support to the jihadists was “not for jihad but revolved around economic and financial gains from foreign terrorists.” However, through the years these jihadists—al-Qa’ida, the Afghan Taliban, and other foreign fighters—were able to integrate themselves into local communities in Pakistan’s tribal areas without the need for large sums of money; scores of them were eventually accepted as permanent members of one of the dominant tribes, well-defined sub-tribes, or clans. In no way, however, is any of this meant to imply that foreign jihadists were forced to reestablish themselves in “distant lands.”

53 From 1979 forward Pakistan’s mullahs have assumed a more powerful role in the tribal areas. Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, mullahs were traditionally excluded from a given tribe’s political decision-making process. Subsequent to the invasion and the Iranian Revolution, Pakistan’s leaders sought to blunt perceived Soviet territorial ambitions (the well-known idea of a “warm-water port” for Soviet naval vessels) and a Shi’ite revival in Pakistan (energized by Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolution in Iran) by investing the local mullahs with more power. According to Shuja Nawaz, an expert on the Afghan – Pakistan border region, “President Zia wanted to bring the fight to them [the Soviets and the Shi’ites] instead of waiting for them to come to Pakistan; Zia wanted to use Islam as the first line of defense.” The primary source of the mullahs’ newly acquired power was money and with it they greatly expanded the system of madrassas in Pakistan—eventually leading to the rise of the Taliban in the early 1990s. Author’s interview with Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, October 16, 2009.


56 According to a 2007 report by the RAND Corporation, many of these fighters eventually, “married local women and acquired status as members of local clans and extended families.” The RAND report explores the case of Abu Farraj al-Libbi, al-Qa’ida’s head of internal operations in Pakistan from 2002 until May 2005. RAND reports that al-Libbi “typifies the so-called Afghan Arab that has been at the forefront of Western attention since 9/11.
OVERVIEW

The socio-political system governing Pakistan’s tribal areas — one that remained essentially unchanged since British annexation of the region in the nineteenth century — has been completely and irrevocably altered in the last nine years. a Political Agents (PA), the primary political link Islamabad had with its agencies in the tribal regions, have been largely eliminated and their role has only partially been assumed by the army. The *maliks* are largely irrelevant because *mullahs* and warlords now run FATA’s political system. As the traditional socio-political system crumbled around them, and as the region increasingly attracted criminal elements because of a thriving arms and narcotics trade, the tribal society increasingly insulated itself within the confines of the Taliban. Offering strict yet effective rule in place of lawlessness, the Taliban’s appeal is further enhanced by its ability to offer jobs and financial advancement exceeding what could be expected under the corrupt rule of most *maliks* and their PA allies. Finally, the Taliban offer religious legitimacy for all of their sanctioned actions via a strong relationship with the newly empowered *mullahs* and their mosques. In short, the Taliban offer many in the region an alternative and inviting power structure. Such sweeping changes are not without precedent. The loss of governmental writ and traditional tribal authority in rural areas of Afghanistan in the 1990s greatly accelerated the trajectory and success of the Afghan Taliban.

MALIKS & POLITICAL AGENTS

A *malik* was traditionally a powerful local leader and arbitrator appointed by either Pakistani government representatives —typically a PA, or members of a tribe or sub-tribe. In contrast, the titular head of a tribe—a “chief”—was not usually as powerful as the local *malik*; the chief was only rarely a *primus inter pares*. Beyond his area of direct responsibility the *malik* acted as an interlocutor between other *maliks*, *mullahs* and secular state authorities (e.g., PAs and tax collectors). Collectively, *maliks* and PAs were responsible for regional governance in FATA. However, Pakistan’s military occupation of FATA that began in 2004 eventually made the role of the PA superfluous (each tribal agency is still nominally headed by a PA). b

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* The British gained control of FATA, Quetta and western Balochistan from the Afghan monarch Amir Yaqub Khan in the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879.
BOX 1 continued

As for the *maliks*, their numbers varied in each of FATA’s agencies—North Waziristan alone had some 1,600. They were widely viewed as corrupt even by regional customs. For example, *maliks* commonly divert resources to their own ranks rather than address the needs of the tribe they represent. In addition, because PAs frequently appoint them, the *maliks* usually advance Islamabad’s agenda at the expense of local interests. Not surprisingly, the *maliks* increasingly became the target of the PNT as it sought to wrest control over the tribal areas and beyond. During 2007 and 2008, more than 600 FATA *maliks* were assassinated, thus shifting the traditional *malik*-centered power structure in FATA to regional warlords—the same leaders that were largely responsible for *malik* assassinations.

MULLAHS

Pakistan’s Muslim religious leaders—Islamic clergy or *mullahs*—traditionally had little political strength in the tribal areas. Political power in these regions was usually monopolized by the *maliks*, and, to a lesser degree, other tribal elders. Several recent developments have altered this system allowing, for the first time, a shift in political power from the *hurja* (“the guest house of the leaders”) to the *mullahs* and the mosques they are associated with. This shift—one that has proven pivotal in the Talibanization of the tribal areas—was accelerated in 1996 as Islamabad introduced adult franchise to FATA.

Rather than reaffirming the power of the *maliks*, the 2002 elections saw charismatic and powerful *mullahs* elected to parliament. As the Afghan Taliban, al-Qaeda and other groups brought money into the tribal areas and mosques, and as the *malik*’s power-base was violently dissolved, the *mullahs* were able to create a robust political network of patrons. “The writ of the state, always fragile in FATA,” notes one regional expert “has now vanished.”

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For example, since late 2001—more than nine years of the U.S.’s “War on Terror”—al-Qa’ida has only moved its headquarters about 200 miles—the distance from the Darunta camp complex (near bin Laden’s former retreat at Milawa near Jalalabad, Afghanistan), to FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan\(^\text{57}\) (bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan was approximately 150 miles from the Jalalabad retreat).\(^\text{58}\)


The Afghan Taliban’s entrenchment in the tribal areas was essentially formalized by political developments in 2002. Capitalizing on anti-U.S. sentiment and support from President Musharraf as he sought to gain domestic legitimacy by

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\(^\text{56}\) con’d Although he was arrested in the Northwest Frontier [presently Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] town of Mardan, he had been hiding in Waziristan for eight years, had married a local Pakistani, was fluent in Pashto, Urdu, and Arabic and had been fully integrated into the communal structure of the tribal areas.” Angel Rabasa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Theodore W. Karasik, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kevin A. O’Brien, and John E. Peters, Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2007), pp. 54-55, emphasis added; See also Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa’ida 1989-2006, Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (September 2007), p. 19 and 22. Available at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/ag/pdf/Harmony_3_Schism.pdf and Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, “Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Vol. 31, Issue 9 (September 2008), p. 776. Note as well that more than a decade earlier many Afghan and foreign veterans that battled Soviet forces similarly integrated themselves in the Pakistani tribal areas following the Red Army’s withdrawal in 1988-89. See Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, pp. 142-145. For more on al-Libbi see footnote 165.


\(^\text{58}\) From 2002 onward, senior Pakistani officials repeatedly asserted that bin Laden was not in Pakistan. “Certainly he is not in Pakistan.” Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani maintained, “Our military actions are very successful… [h]e would have been arrested or… I even don’t know whether is alive or not.” “PM Doubts Laden in Pakistan,” Arab Times, April 13, 2010. Available at: http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/152408/t/Crimes-con-Qaeda-with-bogus-nuclear-material/Default.aspx
weakening his sectarian political opponents, a coalition of religious parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA: United Council of Action) was able to win enough seats in Pakistan’s National Assembly to form a new provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Despite losing many of its gains in the subsequent 2008 election, during its tenure the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI)-dominated MMA was able to pursue pro-Taliban policies, specifically, “creating the ideological and religious atmosphere for the [Afghan and Pakistani tribal area] insurgency, and in teaching and training [jihadist]

59 Musharraf’s aim with the 2002 election primarily revolved around legitimizing the army’s role as head of the government giving it a “permanent political role.” To accomplish this Musharraf devised a stratagem (that the ISI actualized) of weakening the secular parties while strengthening the religious parties. Ultimately, Musharraf hoped to create “a hung parliament in which the military would become the main power broker.” Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 157.

60 These MMA election victories occurred in the lower house of Pakistan’s bicameral Parliament. Pakistan’s Parliament consists of an upper house, the Senate, and the more powerful lower house, or National Assembly. The third component to Pakistan’s Parliament is the President of Pakistan. The National Assembly has 342 seats. Of these, 272 are filled by direct election with the remaining seats reserved for women (60) and non-Muslims (10). See the election laws for more details.

61 For purposes of, inter alia, the National Assembly’s political representation, FATA is considered part of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In order to take power in Balochistan, the MMA had to form an alliance with Musharraf’s Pakistan Muslim League (PMLQ: Quaid-i-Azam).

62 Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) is a Pakistani Sunni Islamist (Deobandi) political party that dominates the MMA. JUI consists of two factions, both of which are independent political parties: Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (Fazlur Rehman) (JUI-F) and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Sami ul Haq) (JUI-S). The four other parties of the MMA (all of which can also be described as Islamist) are: Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith, Pakistan Isami Tehrik (ITP) (formerly TeJ: Tehriq-e-Jafaria), and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). This last group, JI, demonstrated again the MMA’s pro-jihadist nature when Khalid Sheik Mohammad was captured in a house reportedly owned by the JI women’s wing. See Magnus Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2007), p. 71. For more on JUI and JI see pages 115-116 of this report.
recruits.” Although none of its coalition parties have officially admitted to assisting the Taliban, the MMA has made little attempt to hide its support. For example, it has engaged in recruitment and fund raising to assist the Afghan Taliban’s efforts against U.S.-led coalition forces. The MMA’s pro-Taliban nature is hardly surprising: most of the Taliban’s leadership attended madrassas run by its two primary leaders, Samiul Haq and Fazlur Rehman. In addition, during its time in power, the MMA was able to significantly legitimize the PNT by championing several of its social platforms, for example, legally adopting and enforcing stricter Shari’a implementation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and supporting the establishment of a “vice and virtue” police, along the lines of the Taliban’s Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Finally, it is significant that all of the pro-Taliban political activities associated with the MMA during its time of politically legitimized power in the tribal areas undoubtedly desensitized many in Pakistan to the ideological extremism of the PNT and al-Qa’ida.

As the years passed, and as U.S. policymakers failed to abandon their perception that these jihadists were simply passing through the tribal areas, inaction against the nascent PNT would have mounting consequences. While U.S. and Pakistani military forces had continued to pursue al-Qa’ida forces since late 2001, it was not until 2004—with the initiation of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV – henceforth “drone”) attacks in Pakistan—that U.S. leaders began to fully appreciate the threat posed by displaced jihadists other than al-Qa’ida, namely the Afghan Taliban and foreign fighters now semi-legitimized and fully entrenched in the tribal areas. From that point forward the U.S. increasingly sought to target

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63 Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),” passim. From 2002-2008 MMA held the balance of power in the National Assembly with 68 seats (up from two previously). As a result of the 2008 elections the MMA’s National Assembly seats went down to six and it consequently lost its leadership.


65 Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),” p. 70. As explored later in this report, Fazlur Rehman is now a target in the inter-PNT sectarian war. In April 2011, for example, he was reportedly the target of two PNT-related suicide bombings. Technically the plural of madrassa is madaris. This study uses the more familiar “madrassas” for simplicity.

66 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 159-161.
Taliban expatriates, other foreign fighters, and militarized Pashtun tribal natives living in the tribal areas.\textsuperscript{67}

**SUPPORT FROM THE ISI (2001–2004)**

As is explored throughout this report, a clear understanding of the role played by the Pakistani military in such seemingly contradictory activities as enabling and combating the PNT is often elusive. Such dichotomies illustrate that the Pakistani military, much like the PNT, is not monolithic. Also, remember not only did the Pakistani state collectively foster the Afghan Taliban, at times giving it direct military support in its efforts take control of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, but it also willingly harbored, financed and armed elements of its leadership and their allies after they fled Afghanistan in 2001.\textsuperscript{68} This latter assistance, which continues to this day, is the logical, yet arguably short-sighted, outcome of the ISI’s support of the Afghan Taliban as a means to establish a Pashtun-dominated and pro-Islamabad government in Kabul.

\textsuperscript{67} During this time period (the first three to four years of OEF) army generals in charge of the FATA region, the ISI, and Musharraf reinforced the myth to Washington that, “the Taliban were just Pashtun nationalists opposed to foreign occupying armies but with no connections to al-Qaeda.” Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, p. 277. Then-President Musharraf continues this delusory narrative in his autobiography. See Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire* (New York: Free Press, 2006), pp. 264-274.

\textsuperscript{68} From 1994-1998, Pakistani Army officers provided most of the technical services for the Taliban including logistics, medical support, ordinance, combat planning, and intelligence; “Pakistani servicemen dressed in Afghan clothing remained indistinguishable from the Taliban during the conduct of tactical and staff operations.” Rizwan Hussein, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan* (Hampshire England: Ashgate, 2005), p. 204. See also Anthony Davis, “How the Taliban Became a Military Force,” in William Maley (ed.), *Fundamentalism Reborn: Afghanistan and the Taliban* (London: Hurst, 1998). For Pakistan’s harboring of Taliban officials after 9/11 see Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, p. 221. Some observers do not go as far as Rashid and other critics with regard to the level of support the ISI gave to the Taliban as it fled Afghanistan in late 2001. John R. Schmidt, for example, refers to their actions as “turning a blind eye to the thousands of defeated Taliban who, along with remnants of al-Qaeda, were streaming into [FATA] and Baluchistan in the hopes of finding safe haven.” Schmidt, “The Unraveling of Pakistan,” p. 35. Emphasis added.
In short, a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan is perceived by the ISI as one that brings stability to the region, is a useful counter against Pakistan’s bête noire India in contested regions of Kashmir, and simultaneously offsets mounting Indian influence in Kabul. Largely distracted by the war in Iraq, during this time period the U.S. tacitly endorsed this policy by not pressing Pakistan to confront the Taliban’s relocation into Pakistan’s tribal areas. Such inaction would inevitably produce profound domestic and international dangers.


During this same time period—the first few years of OEF and the Taliban and Arab-Afghan Diaspora into Pakistan—there were critical developments in Indian Administered Kashmir. Since the mid-1980s, with the commencement of a significant rebellion against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir (the presently disputed region of the former princely state that India assumed control of in 1947), the ISI began training Kashmiri insurgents in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Originally these fighters were secular and nationalistic. Quickly, however, the ISI switched its support to Kashmiri Islamic groups who, explains Ahmed Rashid, “drew their inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood and described their struggle as an Islamic war of national liberation, but not as a jihad.” In 1995-1996 the ISI once again refocused its support, this time to primarily non-indigenous

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69 Strategic “depth” had been a top priority for Pakistan far earlier than the post-Cold War era. Afghanistan, it was believed, could be used as a base for Pakistani military personnel and assets, beyond the reach of the Indian military. Since the end of the Cold War Pakistan has come to see Afghanistan as the gateway to land-locked Central Asia (the new “Great Game”). By indirectly controlling Afghanistan, Pakistan sought to profitably place itself as the interlocutor between Central Asia and the U.S. and other industrialized nations; for example with gas/oil pipelines emanating from Central Asia, crossing Afghanistan (thus bypassing problematic Iran) and, finally, reaching the sea via Pakistan’s ports on the Arabian sea. See Hussein, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, pp. 172-176.


72 Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, p. 111. Italics added.
(i.e., militants not native to Kashmir) jihadist groups seeking to overthrow Indian rule and Islamize Kashmir. Generously financed by Saudi Arabia, these non-Kashmiri native fighters belonged, in part, to the Deobandi strain of Sunni Islam; thus, many of these groups were ideologically similar to the Afghan Taliban. Following the events of 9/11 and subsequent military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistani-backed Kashmiri militant groups, erroneously perceiving that a closer U.S.-Pakistani relationship would help drive India to the negotiation table, intensified their insurgency with the hopes of influencing any settlement in their favor. Coupled with increasing Pakistani-supported terrorist actions within India itself, these events led to the 2002 war-footing by India. With the Indian military initiating massive-scale troop movements toward its border, Pakistan responded by relocating tens of thousands of its troops from its border with Afghanistan to its eastern border adjoining India, largely abandoning its lackluster efforts to capture bin Laden and dislodge al-Qa’ida from its new sanctuary in western Pakistan. 

73 “As the attention of the Pakistani security services shifted away from the western front [with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan] and the mujahidin became increasingly motivated by their victory in Afghanistan, the secular dimension of the struggle fell into the shadows. By the beginning of the 1990s, radical Islamist groups used their ties to the ISI and the military to supplant the secular rhetoric of the pro-independence movement with Pakistani nationalism and, above all, the symbols of jihad.” Nicholas Howenstein, “The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir,” Pakistan Security Research Unit (PRSU) Research Report 1, February 2008, p. 11. See also Peter Chalk, “Pakistan Role in the Kashmir Insurgency,” Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1, 2000.

74 For a description of these 1995-1996 events see Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, pp. 26-27. Deobandi-influenced Sunni factions were militarily active in Kashmir—without direct Pakistani support—from approximately 1992 forward; most prominent among them were Harakat-ul-Ansar and Harakat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM). See Hussein, Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan. pp. 171-175.

75 The most serious of these Pakistani-supported terrorist actions was the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament. Carried out by members of Jaysh-e-Muhammed (JeM: Army of Mohammed), the attack “was aimed at wiping out the Indian political leadership and delivering a message of strength and resolve by attacking a symbolic target.” This event occurred during the crescendo of the battle of Tora Bora. See Ackerman, Bale, Blair, et al, “Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure,” p. 58. For the most recent account of Tora Bora and how it dovetailed with the 2001/2002 India – Pakistan crisis, see Bergen, “The Battle for Tora Bora.”
Pakistan. Deeply concerned about the effects these developments would have on U.S. efforts to neutralize al-Qa’ida, the Bush administration reportedly placed enormous pressure on Pakistan to stop its support of anti-Indian fighters, defuse the crisis with India and refocus military efforts on its western border. Such pressure was compounded by U.S. allegations that many of these groups—for example, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT: Army of the Pure), Jaysh-e-Muhammed (JeM: Army of Muhammed), and Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM: The Movement of the Mujahidin)—provided active moral and material backing to members of al-Qa’ida. After more than six months of negotiation tensions were eased and the crisis was largely defused. This 2003 rapprochement between New Delhi and Islamabad initiated the latter’s abrupt abandonment of Kashmiri and pan-Islamist jihadists that it had been supporting for years. Their Weltanschauung now further radicalized by their abandonment by Islamabad, these jihadists embraced the idea of the present Pakistani government being Washington’s puppet. With no relocation or recompense plan in place, these jihadists were left adrift, largely moved by the currents of jihadist movements in other areas. It was natural, therefore, for large numbers of these fighters to be drawn toward


80 Author’s interview with Shuja Nawaz, December 14, 2009. See also Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, pp. 111-112

81 Chalk, “The Re-Orientation of Kashmiri Extremism.”

82 Peter Chalk correctly observes that, “Moves to limit jihadist attacks have clearly been interpreted by groups such as JeM and HuJI as a sell-out of the Kashmiri cause and confirmation that Islamabad, under the present government, is no more than a puppet of Washington. Certain analysts also believe that the strategy has prompted renegade factions within the armed forces and intelligence services—whose raison d’être for most of their existence has been wrestling control of [Jammu and Kashmir] from India—to side with and actively support organizations seeking to redirect their ideological fervor against the Pakistani state.” Chalk, “The Re-Orientation of Kashmiri Extremism.”
their ideological counterparts in the tribal areas and, once established, to show little compunction about targeting the state that once embraced them.83

REVOLT IN PAKISTAN’S FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (2002 – 2004)

Many of the estranged Kashmiri jihadists eventually sought refuge in South and North Waziristan—two of the seven tribal agencies that constitute Pakistan’s FATA.84 In July 2002, a year prior to that migration, the regime of General Pervez Musharraf, assuming its new role as American’s partner in “the war on terrorism,” irresolutely moved Pakistan’s military into FATA for the first time since the Army’s post-independence withdrawal in 1947.85 After negotiations, Waziristan’s tribal elders (hereafter maliks—see Box 1 above) largely acquiesced to the unprecedented military presence that was nominally intended to seal Pakistan’s

83 Shuja Nawaz noted in 2010 that when Islamabad “turned its back” on militant groups fighting in Kashmir, it simultaneously lost control of them. “Similar to the disbanding of the Iraqi Army after the US invasion when thousands of trained soldiers and officers were let go,” Nawaz observes, “the LeT was cut loose without a comprehensive plan to disarm, retrain, and gainfully employ the fighters.” Statement of Shuja Nawaz, Committee on House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.

84 An essential geo-political reality of the Afghan – Pakistan frontier region is that its borders are, for all intents and purposes, imaginary. Tribes living in the region do not differentiate between one another based on which side of the border they inhabit and the random and under-manned checkpoints that do exist on the border are only viewed as a physical obstacle, not as gateways into a new state. Shuja Nawaz has elaborated on this reality and notes that “the so-called refugees from the Afghan – Soviet War, some 1.5 million of whom still reside on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line, resent being called ‘refugees,’ as they believe they are living in their own…homeland.” Nawaz, FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, p. 12.

85 Pakistani special forces did drop into the border region of the FATA’s Khyber and Kurram agencies in 2001 (both of which adjoin Tora Bora) but it was reported by RAND that their “military presence was confined to the frontier [the Tirah Valley] only and did not entail any territorial intervention into either agency.” Moreover, the ISI did use bases in FATA to train jihadists after Kashmiri training camps were shut down. Finally, it should be remembered that FATA was the main conduit of arms from Pakistan to the Afghan mujahidin during the Soviet occupation (1979 – 1989) and then to the Taliban during the subsequent Afghan civil war (1989 – 2001).
borders with Afghanistan and assist in the search for bin Laden.\textsuperscript{86} While Pakistani forces did go after al-Qa'ida elements that had relocated to FATA,\textsuperscript{87} the military resisted any engagement with the Afghan Taliban forces that now lived and operated from these areas.\textsuperscript{88} Unconvinced that the U.S. would remain in Afghanistan until it was favorably stabilized and apprehensive that any power-vacuum left by a sudden U.S. withdrawal would invite meddling by New Delhi and Tehran, Pakistan’s military continued to view the Taliban as a tool held in reserve, one that could blunt and counter Indian influence in Central Asia generally and Afghanistan specifically.\textsuperscript{89} Some regional experts believe the ISI not only passively allowed the Afghan Taliban and its jihadist allies to fortify their position in Waziristan, but implemented specific plans “to create a broad ‘Talibanized belt’ in FATA that would keep the pressure on [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai to bend to Pakistani wishes, keep U.S. forces under threat while maintaining their dependence on Pakistani goodwill, and create a buffer zone between Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns.”\textsuperscript{90} Ahmed Rashid has summarized the ISI’s perception of this post-2001 Pakistani strategy as being one that would ensure


\textsuperscript{87} The Pakistani military also moved, in a limited way, on Quetta, the capitol of Balochistan province. See Rashid, \textit{Descent into Chaos}, p. 265.

\textsuperscript{88} From 2002 – 2004 Pakistan’s ISI reportedly “looked the other way as arms and men flowed into Afghanistan from FATA and Balochistan. Only after Taliban attacks on US forces in Afghanistan increased in the summer of 2004 did Washington force Musharraf to send troops into FATA [to] clear them out.” Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink.”

\textsuperscript{89} This fear of U.S. abandonment was initiated by earlier U.S. actions in 1989 and 2002 – 2003. In this regard the Center for Strategic and International Studies has noted, “the United States shifted its focus from Afghanistan to Iraq soon after the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 in the quest to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein...This move created despondency in the region, especially in Pakistan, which saw this move as a reprise of the U.S. withdrawal from the region following the 1989 retreat from Afghanistan of the [Soviet Army], leaving behind a messy civil war that affected Pakistan’s border regions as well as drew its intelligence service into action on behalf of favored surrogates inside Afghanistan.” Nawaz, \textit{FATA – A Most Dangerous Place}, p. 10. As for the ISI’s use of the Taliban to counter India, the July 2008 attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul is widely believed to have been the joint work of the Taliban and Pakistan’s ISI. See, for example, “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say,” \textit{The New York Times}, August 1, 2008.

\textsuperscript{90} Rashid, \textit{Decent in Chaos}, p. 269.
BOX 2: NEK MOHAMMAD WAZIR: PASHTUN PARAGON OF THE PNT

In several key aspects Nek Mohammad Wazir (1975-2004) was an archetypal representative of future PNT leaders. He was a member of the Yargul Khai, a sub-clan of the Ahmedzai Wazirs tribe (one of the two dominant tribes of South Waziristan, the other being the Mehsuds). Having dropped out of his madrasa-based studies at an early age, Nek Mohammed ultimately joined the Afghan Taliban in the mid-1990s and eventually commanded a force of several thousand fighters that battled the Northern Alliance. During his time in Afghanistan he reportedly became acquainted with Usama bin Laden (running an al-Qa’ida training camp near Kabul), Ayman al-Zawahiri and other leading jihadi militants from Central Asia and western China. Under the guidance of his friend and Afghan Taliban commander Saif Rahman Mansour, Nek Mohammed reportedly facilitated al-Qa’ida’s escape at Tora Bora and helped them establish their initial sanctuary in South Waziristan. A proponent of global jihad, he was killed in a U.S. drone attack in June 2004, less than two months after he joined in negotiating a ceasefire with Pakistani authorities at Shakai (ending the First Battle of Waziristan). Salient features of Nek Mohammad—born in Waziristan, educated in a madrasa, drawn to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban, instrumental in the 2001 exodus of al-Qa’ida and other jihadists from Afghanistan and keen to be seen as a “dual Emir” (leading in a military and a religious sense) paradigmatic of Mullah Omar—would be found in all of the PNT’s future leadership.

### BOX 3: AGREEMENTS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND WAZIRI-BASED ELEMENTS OF THE PNT

**April 2004: Shakai Agreement (South Waziristan).** This unwritten deal was technically between the Pakistan State and, representing the incipient PNT, the Taliban and the Ahmedzai Wazir Tribe. Part of the agreement involved the PNT not using Pakistani soil to launch attacks against any other country (i.e., Afghanistan). The Pakistani state agreed to “reimburse” several tribal leaders, ostensibly for debts they owed al-Qa’ida but more likely to allow tribal leaders to return funds given to them as “rent” for their loyalty to al-Qa’ida.

**February 2005: Sargodha Agreement (South Waziristan).** A formal follow-up to the November 2004 cease-fire, this written agreement was signed by Mehsud tribal leaders and, *inter alia*, pledged the PNT not to attack military and administrative targets.

**September 2006: North Waziristan Agreement.** Among other things, the PNT agreed not to attack state security forces, not to establish parallel administrations, and not to engage in “target killings.” In contrast to former agreements, foreign fighters were essentially allowed to stay in the tribal areas.

“a Talibanized Pashtun population along the border [that] would pose a threat to Karzai and the Americans *but no threat to Pakistan*, which would be in control of them.”

The uneasy peace established in 2002 between the Pakistani military and FATA’s tribesmen was short-lived. In October 2003, the Pakistani army allegedly broke its agreement with the tribes by moving more than 2,500 commandos into a South Waziristan village. The helicopters used for this deployment reportedly

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91 Ibid, pp. 269-270. Emphasis added. See also Schmidt, “The Unraveling of Pakistan,” p. 34. Pakistani hubris, vis-à-vis perceptions that its ISI could always control the Taliban’s various incarnations, is a leitmotif that permeates many open-source Western assessments of the current situation in the tribal areas. See, for example, Ibid, *passim*, and Rashid, *Decent in Chaos*, *passim*.
Many of the Afghan Taliban operating out of FATA against U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan reportedly perceived this as indicative of a tight alliance between the dominant U.S. and submissive Pakistani military units. The latter, it was widely believed, were now allowing U.S. forces to operate unfettered within Pakistan. Traditionally reluctant to engage the military that had helped them take over Afghanistan in the 1990s—and continued to facilitate the movement of arms and other supplies into their hands—significant elements of the Taliban now began to treat the U.S. and Pakistani militaries as two faces of a single secular threat. Consequently, for the first time since their inception in the 1990s the Taliban began to systematically target key elements of the Pakistani state.

By almost all accounts the Pakistani military—generally unfamiliar with Waziristan’s terrain, customs and languages—acted in a disorganized and often unnecessarily brutal manner as it responded to the growing number of PNT-led attacks. Inaccurate bombs, many dropped from airplanes in the first use ever of aerial bombardment by the Pakistani military against insurgents, resulted in widespread collateral damage. Yet the most important development vis-à-vis the genesis of the PNT was a growing perception among Waziri sub-tribes that the Pakistani military, acting under the dictates of the U.S., was attempting to subjugate them. Some of FATA’s tribal leaders began to arm and train their own militias and draft political and military plans to “liberate” FATA and, in some cases, all of Pakistan. An open revolt ensued and what had been described by


93 Cloughley, “Insurrection in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” passim.


97 Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink.” Rashid puts the creation of Pashtun tribal militias in FATA as having begun in 2003. Ibid.
Pakistani military leaders as a battle against a “handful of foreign militants and some local miscreants” soon became a grim and complicated campaign. In short, what began as an uninspired military outing against al-Qa’ida militants in 2002 (reluctantly undertaken to appease Washington and to ensure billions of dollars in support) had, by the beginning of 2004, transposed into a wholly unpredictable civil war between the Pakistani state and radicalized tribesmen that would still be raging more than seven years later.

At the same time indigenous tribal militias battled the Pakistani military, the Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida ruthlessly consolidated their hold in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Their ultimate success in relocating and rebuilding their forces, replenishing materials, and reconstituting command and control capabilities resulted partially from renewed and strengthened ties with sympathetic local tribesmen and erstwhile colleagues from the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad that had remained in the area, married into local families, and become full community members. The newest arrivals to the Waziristan agencies also brought with them money and, consequently, loans and employment opportunities for many of the region’s young men. By 2004, al-Qa’ida had established 15 training camps in the area; local recruitment was getting into high gear. The Afghan Taliban cemented the transplantation by eradicating local representatives of state power and many of the area’s religious leaders who opposed their presence. In time these killings created a profound power vacuum that the PNT largely filled. In its early stages this void allowed surviving local Pakistani Pashtun leaders—whose acquiescence to the Afghan Taliban was only

98 Islamabad and especially Washington both seriously underestimated the resentment that Pashtun tribal leaders felt towards the U.S. for its invasion of Afghanistan and the sympathy that the tribes people felt for the Afghan Taliban, al-Qa’ida and their jihadist allies. For this and a description of the 2003-2004 military campaign in FATA, see, for example, Bokhari, “Waziristan – Impact on the Taliban Insurgency and the Stability of Pakistan,” passim.


100 Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*, pp. 142-145.

101 According to one report, "A chicken worth 60 rupees (a dollar) would be sold to Al-Qaeda for 900 rupees ($15) and a bag of sugar worth 950 rupees ($16) would be provided for 9,000 rupees (around $150)," Owais Tohid, “Cash Weans Tribes from Al-Qaeda,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, February 16, 2005. Al-Qa’ida’s financial reserves continued to be resupplied by Arab donors throughout this period.

102 Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*, pp. 142-145.
exceeded by their determination to resist Islamabad’s perceived efforts to subjugate their tribes—to assume the role of the state, thus further legitimizing their growing power. By 2003-2004 they had created sizable militias to not only police local areas but, more significantly, to engage the Pakistani military in a far more organized and effective manner than before.\textsuperscript{103}


As political leaders in Washington geared up for the 2004 presidential election and as violence against U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan increased (a direct consequence of developments in Pakistan’s tribal area), Islamabad came under renewed pressure from the U.S. to act against al-Qa’ida elements and Taliban “remnants” in the tribal areas—specifically the South Waziristan agency.\textsuperscript{104} By this time it was widely understood by a growing number of Pakistani leaders that the situation in FATA was now a direct threat to domestic security. Any inclinations to the contrary were largely erased by the December 2003 assassination attempts on President Musharraf—attacks linked to al-Qa’ida’s burgeoning training camps in South Waziristan and the nascent PNT.\textsuperscript{105} Thus, on March 16, 2004, Pakistani security forces launched their first large-scale military operation in the area with the goal of directly intimidating radicalized Waziri tribesmen and foreign fighters into submission.

\textsuperscript{103} Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink.”

\textsuperscript{104} According to a July 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) implicitly addressing this critical time-period, the Taliban was quickly regrouping and al-Qa’ida, operating out of FATA, was rapidly regenerating “key elements of its homeland attack capability.” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” July 2007, p. 6. Available at: http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070717_release.pdf

\textsuperscript{105} The PNT’s involvement reportedly came via the group Harkat-ul-Mujahidin-al-Alami (HuMA). For more on HuMA, see pages 95-96. Three other assassination plots against President Musharraf were foiled in 2002.
In their initial large-scale movement, the Pakistani forces, made up of the Frontier Corps (FC), were ambushed a few miles from Wana in South Waziristan. The twelve days of intense fighting that ensued reportedly “shocked” Pakistan’s military command as it discovered the Pashtun tribal, al-Qa’ida and foreign fighters they engaged were far more numerous, experienced, motivated, and

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106 Considered the least funded and poorest trained soldiers in the Pakistani military, the Frontier Corp (FC) is composed of soldiers recruited from the tribal areas and officers drawn from the Pakistani army (its deployment to the tribal areas included elements of the army’s 11th Corps). Traditionally they were the armed extension of the Political Agent’s (PA) writ in the tribal areas. There have been reports that the ISI knew of the planned ambush on the FC in March 2004 but chose not to issue a warning. See Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan – Afghanistan Frontier,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring 2008), pp. 47-77. See also Eric Schmitt, Mark Mazzetti, and Carlotta Gall, “U.S. Hopes to Arm Pakistani Tribes against Al Qaeda,” The New York Times, November 18, 2007. For details on the ISI’s alleged foreknowledge of the ambush, see Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 271.

107 From October 2003 (the beginning of violent clashes between the Pakistani state and what would become the PNT) until April 2004 (the conclusion of initial hostilities and the signing of the first peace agreement), the primary Pakistani tribe involved in the hostilities was the Ahmedzai Wazir. The Mehsuds and the Ahmedzai Wazirs are South Waziristan agency’s two primary tribes—the former is in the majority with 60 percent of the population. The latter controls the border areas between South Waziristan and Afghanistan. Three smaller tribes also inhabit South Waziristan: the Suleman Khel, Dottani, and Urmar (sometimes referred to as the Burkis). South Waziristan’s border with Tank (one of the 25 districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) is inhabited by the latter agency’s dominant tribe, the Bhittani. The North Waziristan agency is dominated by the Utmanzai Wazirs tribe, a close but contentious relative to the Ahmedzai Wazirs. Sub-clans to these primary tribes number in the hundreds. Regional scholar Ambassador Akbar S. Ahmed has explained that North and South Waziristan are, “In name and in fact…the land of the Wazirs…Other agencies in the tribal areas, like Malakand, Khyber, and Kurram are named after geographical features.” Waziristan’s tribal identifications have rarely been explored in depth. However, the works of Akhar S. Ahmed are excellent exceptions. See Akhar S. Ahmed, Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and Conflict in Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), passim and esp. pp. 11-35. For an updated version of this seminal study see Akhar S. Ahmed, Resistance and Control in Pakistan (New York: Rutledge, 2004), esp. pp. 11-97. Quotation is taken from p. 11. For useful maps delineating Waziristan’s tribes and sub-tribes see Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, Naval Post Graduate School. 2009. Available at: http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pakistan/Maps/Waziristan.pdf

108 The “foreign fighters” in this series of battles were predominately made up of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). For more details on the IMU, see pages 101-104.
better supplied than expected. Attempting to avoid total failure, the military made an impromptu decision to employ helicopter gunships and fixed-wing bombers to subdue the militants. Failing to destroy their armed opposition, the military succeeded primarily in generating widespread collateral damage, displacing more than 50,000 terrified civilians, and further radicalizing the native population.

These hostilities ended with the April 2004 Shakai Agreement between PNT elements (dubbed by the Pakistani media as the “Wana Five”) and the Pakistani government, nominally represented by provincial leaders of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Although they referred to it as a “withdrawal,” it was clear to all observers that the Pakistani army had been thoroughly outmatched by a force whose size and composition they had yet to fully comprehend. Slowly, however, observers were beginning to recognize emerging leaders. One of the first of these leaders was the PNT’s representative at the Shakai Agreement, Nek Mohammad (See Box 2: Nek Mohammad Wazir: Pashtun Paragon of the PNT).

Generally unschooled in the art of counter-insurgency and still perceiving itself as a conventional army whose cardinal role was to battle India, the Pakistani

109 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, pp. 148.

110 Ibid.

111 Despite Pakistan’s military losses and its perceived humiliation, it did succeed in giving al-Qa’ida doubts about the long-term feasibility of using South Waziristan as their base. Thus, al-Qa’ida made “the strategic decision,” according to al-Qa’ida expert Rohan Gunaratna, “to move and preserve their depleted strength”—they relocated to North Waziristan in the fall of 2004. In contrast to al-Qa’ida’s move (due largely to their “long held practice of preserving its strength to fight the real enemy—the United States and its Western allies”), hundreds of Chechen, Uighur, Uzbek and Tajik jihadists stayed in South Waziristan to fight alongside the local Pakistani Taliban. See Gunaratna and Nielsen, “Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, p. 787-789.

army was, until mid-2009, ill-prepared for battle in the Waziristan agencies. Adding to its ineffectiveness was an overall reluctance by army soldiers to engage fellow Muslims. From that point forward—April 2004—Islamabad engaged in a series of ill-fated peace agreements that ultimately allowed the PNT to largely control FATA until partial dislodgement in late 2009 (see Box 3: Agreements between Pakistan and Waziri-Based Elements of the PNT).

B. LATE-2004—LATE-2007


With Pakistani military pressure in South Waziristan increasing, the PNT responded by simply packing up and moving its operations base to North Waziristan, in the area of the agency dominated by the Mehsud tribe. As a new crop of leaders began to emerge and network with one another (up until this point the Mehsuds had largely stayed away from the 2003/2004 South Waziris–tan uprising led by the Wazir, Nek Mohammad) heavy fighting broke out in September 2004 and once again the Pakistani government, having lost control of the region entirely amid heavy losses, was forced to call for a cease-fire that November. The subsequent Sargodha Agreement of February 2005 nominally halted this round of violence. However, the agreement formalizing the government’s de facto capitulation clearly favored the PNT. Having now circumvented defeat by a truly sizable state force, it was clear to the PNT that their martial successes were in large part due to the growth of their network.

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113 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, pp. 148. It should be noted that even as the Pakistani army adopted itself to the type of combat necessary for success in the tribal areas, it has become significantly preoccupied responding to natural disasters like the 2010 Pakistani floods.

114 Ibid.

115 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 274-275.

116 Nawaz, FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, p. 18 and Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 274-275.
The PNT quickly reneged on the Sargodha Agreement and continued to target Pakistani military personnel and uncooperative local leaders.\(^{117}\) Despite the abrogation of the agreement, the government essentially ignored the PNT by cordonning off all of FATA.\(^{118}\) For the next year the Pakistani military limited its presence to a few enconced fort-retreats in South Waziristan.\(^{119}\) Through targeted killings and general intimidation, the unchallenged PNT implemented their version of *Shāri’a* in South Waziristan and extended its writ throughout most of North Waziristan, Bajaur, and Mohmand agencies.\(^{120}\) The killing of *maliks* and other uncooperative (“pro-Western”) tribal leaders went into full gear, as did incidents of terrorism in general (see Figure 3: *FATA’s Terrorism Related Deaths 2005 – 2010*). The violence resulted in permanent eradication of traditional mechanisms of local and regional power.\(^{121}\) In its place the PNT erected “parallel governments” whose form of governance, explained one informed regional commentator, “was based on the pattern of their Afghan predecessors and role models.”\(^{122}\)

\(^{117}\) The agreement was disavowed by the PNT’s strongest leader at the time, Abdullah Mehsud. Captured by U.S. forces in 2001, the one-legged jihadist was transferred from Afghanistan, where he had been since the mid-1990s, to U.S. facilities at Guantánamo Bay. After reportedly “playing dumb and [convincing] his U.S. interrogators that he was a simpleton,” he returned to his homeland of Waziristan and rejoined the Taliban. Rashid, *Descent into Chaos*, p. 274. See also Salman Masood, “Taliban Leader is said to Evade Capture by Blowing Himself Up,” *The New York Times*, July 25, 2007..

\(^{118}\) Ibid, p. 275.


\(^{122}\) Ibid. Adding to the destabilization during this time period were increased activities by criminal elements. Furthermore, a central pillar of Pashtun culture exemplified in the tribal areas, according to regional experts, is the need to enable “local leaders to provide protection to their communities and to provide an environment in which they can live according to their own laws and practices.” This reality further empowered the PNT in its successful effort to create an alternative power structure. Shahid Javed Burki, as quoted in Nawaz, *FATA – A Most Dangerous Place*, p. 6.
BOX 4: SUFI MUHAMMAD AND TNSM

Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM: Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Sharia) is a Sunni (Deobandi) Muslim, violent Islamist, pro-Taliban organization based in the Malakand region of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA’s Bajaur agency. TNSM was founded in 1992 and has since pursued one overarching goal: the implementation of Shāri’a, in its most austere actualization, in the Malakand region. The founder of TNSM, Maulana Sufi Muhammad, was a notable member of JI, drawn to their hard-line platform by his belief that society had to be regulated via Shāri’a and that those who disagreed with this stance were apostates deserving death. Sufi Muhammad broke with JI in 1981 and subsequently joined in Afghanistan’s anti-Soviet jihad before returning to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and establishing TNSM. Despite action by the leadership of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that nominally gave in to TNSM’s demand for a revised judicial system, Sufi Muhammad’s aspirations for a Shāri’a-based society were, in his view, impeded by secular regional and federal leaders. Following the U.S. incursion into Afghanistan in 2001, numerous sources report that Sufi Muhammad led an “army” of 10,000 young TNSM followers into Afghanistan to battle the U.S.-led coalition. The U.S. Air Force promptly obliterated the group. Sufi Muhammad was one of only a few thousand men to return, at which point Pakistani authorities incarcerated him. Several months after intense fighting in Swat between TNSM and the Pakistani military in 2007 (the “First Battle for Swat”), Sufi Muhammad was released under an agreement in which he renounced violence and assisted in negotiations to resolve the conflict. However, he reneged on both pledges; an action that precipitated another round of fighting in the Malakand region (the “Second Battle of Swat”) and in April 2009, at the age of 78, Sufi Muhammad was reincarcerated. Appearing before an anti-terrorism court in January 2011, Sufi Muhammad denied any links to the TTP. As of May 23, 2011, his trial is still on-going.

Unencumbered by the Pakistani military, cross-border attacks into Afghanistan escalated, prompting the U.S. to expand its use of drones. The first open-source reported U.S. airstrike—resulting in the death of Nek Mo ham mad—was in 2004. One additional U.S. attack was reported in 2005, three in 2006, five in 2007, 36 in 2008, 53 in 2009 and 118 in 2010. Some of these attacks resulted in high numbers of civilian deaths; for example, on October 31, 2006, a madrassa was struck in Bajaur agency killing eighty people—mostly students and faculty. The attack, however, did succeed in killing Maulana Liaquat, reportedly “a key leader of TNSM (Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-

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123 It is likely that the U.S. engaged in previous drone attacks in Pakistan, the details of which are still classified.

124 As of June 16, there have been 40 reported drone attacks in Pakistan in 2011. An excellent source for statistics and details of U.S. drone attacks can be found at the New America Foundation’s Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative. Available at: http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones. The results of U.S. drone attacks since January 2009 were reportedly revisited in the wake of the December 30, 2009 suicide attack by Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi against the CIA’s Forward Operating Base Chapman (“Camp Chapman”), located in the south-eastern province of Khost, Afghanistan. For details of the incident, see Table 1: Summary of Notable PNT-Related Attacks, p. 134).

125 “80 die in air attack on Bajaur seminary,” The News (Islamabad), October 31, 2006.
Shariat-e-Mohammadi: Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Shāri‘a—a PNT-related group discussed below) and a wanted man suspected of harboring foreign militants and Afghan Taliban.”126 U.S. officials viewed the drone attacks as effective in weakening al-Qa‘ida and the PNT. However, such successes were criticized for having a large price. Reports allegedly link U.S. drone attacks to the increase of suicide bombings in Pakistan, beginning in 2007, and increased support for both al-Qa‘ida and the PNT in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.127 In addition, the October 2006 drone attack mentioned above scuttled a Pakistani peace initiative with the Bajaur agency’s leading PNT representatives. The drone reportedly targeted the latter as they made their way to meet with government officials.128

THE THIRD BATTLE OF WAZIRISTAN (2006)

Ever reluctant to take on the PNT, Pakistan’s military only received orders to renew its Waziristan offensive shortly before President Bush’s visit to Pakistan in March 2006.129 Again casualties were high on both sides with civilians suffering the greatest losses. Seeking to wash itself entirely of the conflict and hoping that a Taliban unmolested in Pakistan would focus its energy on targets in Afghanistan, Islamabad essentially ceded control of North Waziristan to the PNT in an August 2006 agreement. For example, the government agreed to disband all


128 On-Scene at Blasted Pakistan Madrassa,” NBC News (online), October 31, 2006. Available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15486181/ Initially the attack was erroneously attributed to Pakistani forces; it was later confirmed to have been undertaken by a U.S. drone.

129 From 2003 – 2010, there has been a clear link between the arrival of a top U.S. official in Pakistan and renewed military actions in the tribal areas.
checkpoints in the area, return all prisoners, and remove any bans on the display of public arms. More importantly, unlike the two earlier agreements of 2004 and 2005 which specifically addressed foreign fighters in the region in an effort to repatriate them to their homelands, the 2006 bargain allowed foreign fighters to remain in Waziristan if they had “genuine reasons to stay” and would “respect the laws and regulations of Pakistan.”

C. LATE-2007 – MID-2011


Emboldened by their repeated successes against the Pakistani military and their ability to extract key concessions from Pakistani political authorities, the PNT accelerated its internal consolidation of likeminded jihadi groups and radicalized tribesmen. By December 2007 they were loosely coalesced under the name Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP: Movement of the Pakistani Taliban). A command structure was agreed upon with Baitullah Mehsud heading the TTP from South Waziristan agency. Beneath him were several regional commanders (discussed below). The rise to power by these leaders partially filled the void created by the destruction of the malik and community council (hereafter jirga) systems described earlier. Mehsud, later killed in a U.S. drone attack, represented a new type of Taliban leader increasingly distinct from Afghan manifestations. Less educated in religious matters than his Afghan counterparts, Mehsud reportedly pledged himself to Mullah Omar in 2005 and was subsequently appointed governor of the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan (Mehsuds comprise 60 percent of South Waziristan’s population). He and the thousands of armed fellow tribesmen he directly commanded assumed key responsibilities for the area, including


civil administration (e.g., law and order and development work).\footnote{Ibid.} It was Mehsud who signed the 2005 peace agreement with the Pakistani Army—a pact he correctly interpreted as a Pakistani surrender.

Baitullah Mehsud and his associates were blamed by the Pakistani government for the increase in suicide attacks.\footnote{Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban” \textit{CTC Sentinel} Vol. 1, Issue 2 (January 2008), p. 3.} As seen in Figure 4: \textit{Suicide Attacks in Pakistan: 2004-2010}, the year 2007 dramatically marks the takeoff point for suicide attacks in Pakistan. Of 56 suicide attacks in 2007, 44 occurred after the seminal Lal Masjid incident (i.e., between July-December 2007—an event explored below).\footnote{“Post-Lal Masjid Suicide Attacks Claim 4,300 Lives,” \textit{The News} (Islamabad), July 5, 2008. Available at: \url{http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=122261}} Included in these attacks in Pakistan is the first female suicide bomber.\footnote{“Country Reports on Terrorism 2008: Pakistan: U.S. Department of State (April 30, 2009). Available at: \url{http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/122434.htm}} Hassan Abbas reported that of the 56 suicide bombings in Pakistan in 2007, 36 were against military-related targets, including two against the ISI; two against the army headquarters in Rawalpindi; one aimed at the air force in Sargodha; and one directed at the facility of the Special Services Group (SSG) in Tarbela.

The debut of Mehsud’s TTP, and the concomitant exponential increase in number of suicide bombings, coincided with significant PNT advancements in other areas of the Pakistan. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s southern districts of Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Bannu, and Kohat were all under at least partial PNT control
by late 2007. More significantly, vis-à-vis the Afghan war theatre, FATA’s Khyber agency had also fallen to the PNT. However, it would be PNT advances in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s district of Swat, as well as the capital city of Islamabad itself, that alarmed Pakistani leaders the most.


139 Like the rest of the tribal areas, Swat, presently a district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, was essentially independent from any centralized authority when the Pakistani state was created in 1947. Under the Instrument of Accession, the ruler of Swat agreed to abdicate Swati control of its foreign affairs, defense and state communication to the Pakistani state. In exchange the ruler of Swat retained domestic sovereignty. Thus, Swat, like the rest of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, became a “Special Area” – a legal status described by the Pakistani Constitution of 1962 as being exempt from “central or provincial law…unless the [Pakistani] president and the [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] governor (with the approval of the president) so directed.” Even through Pakistan’s period of Martial Law and despite its subsequent loss of “state” status in 1969 and formal merger with Pakistan, Swat remained a “Special Area” with its status alterable only with the consent of the president, governor and the “consent of the tribal people, represented in a tribal jirga.”
TNSM AND KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA’S MALAKAND REGION (2007)

After almost a decade of struggle with Pakistan’s federal leadership, the group Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM: Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Shāri‘a) was at an impasse in their bid to implement a rigid form of Shāri‘a in significant sections of Pakistan’s Malakand region (composed of the Malakand district, Upper and Lower Dir Districts, Chitral District, Swat district, Shangla district, and Buner district). TNSM’s fortunes took a turn with the events in Afghanistan in 2001/2002, eventually allowing the group an opportunity to redefine its narrative of Shāri‘a implementation in the context of resisting the post 9/11 U.S. military and “Western” presence in Central and South Asia. Initially the group’s fate was in

\[\text{139 con’d} \text{ However, following the merger of 1969, contradictions in how its legal status was interpreted by provincial and federal authorities led to violent conflicts with federal authorities as Swat sought to enforce a set of judicial (Islamic) laws that differed from those that governed the rest of Pakistan. As leaders in Swat struggled to enforce their perceived judicial rights (e.g., full implementation of } Shāri‘a\text{) the role and popularity of TNSM) grew. Since its creation by Maulana Sufi Muhammad in 1992, TNSM has continually sought to return the Malakand region to its perceived existence prior to the 1969 merger of Swat with the rest of Pakistan. Specifically TNSM demands the imposition of their interpretation of } Shāri‘a\text{. See Sultan-i-Rome, “Swat, A Critical Analysis,” IPCS Research Paper No. 18 (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, January 2009), passim; Imtiaz Ali, “Militant or Peace Broker? A Profile of the Swat Valley’s Maulana Sufi Muhhamad,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue, 7 (March 26, 2009). Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34758; Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink” and Siddique, “The Red Mosque Operation and its Impact on the Growth of the Pakistani Taliban.”}\]
question as its leader, Maulana Sufi Muhammad, was imprisoned by Pakistani authorities after he issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the U.S. and disastrously led thousands of volunteers to their death as they attempted to engage U.S. forces in Afghanistan (see Box 4: Sufi Muhammad and TNSM). In 2002, Pakistani authorities banned the group. However, TNSM had gained support from key jihadist groups and, with Sufi Muhammad in detention, its leadership was transferred to his son-in-law, the younger and more strategically minded Maulana Fazlullah.

In less than five years Fazlullah transformed the moribund TNSM he inherited into a disciplined, skilled, and fierce army that Pakistan’s leaders eventually came to regard with greater trepidation than Waziristan’s militants. Fazlullah’s success was attributed in large part to his use of propaganda, the related ability to graph TNSM’s struggle to a Taliban-like movement in Islamabad, charitable acts that differentiated TNSM from what the region viewed as a distant and uncaring federal government, and finally, a far-reaching communication network that, in addition to bolstering Fazlullah’s public campaign of “selling” TNSM, allowed him to command all TNSM forces from one central location.

TNSM’s new leader used radio programs to promote pro-Taliban ideology in general and their conception of Shari‘a specifically (Fazlullah adopted the moniker of “Maulana Radio”). An effective relief effort for victims of the mammoth October 2005 Great Pakistan Earthquake, which stood in contrast to the Pakistani government’s inept handling of the crisis, enhanced TNSM’s profile and

140 Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink” and Siddique, “The Red Mosque Operation and its Impact on the Growth of the Pakistani Taliban.”


142 For an analysis of why TNSM’s action in northern FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were seen by Pakistani leaders as a greater threat than that posed by Waziristan’s militants see Franco, “The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Bajaur Case,” passim, especially pp. 5-7.

143 For example, Fazlullah was able to convince many in the Malakand Region to forego polio vaccines; he claimed they were part of the West’s conspiracy. See “Anti-polio Campaign Thwarted by Clerics,” Dawn, April 27, 2007.

legitimacy in Pakistan’s Malakand region. The earthquake’s larger effect, vis-à-vis the acceleration of the region’s Talibanization, may have been TNSM’s ability to convince locals that the earthquake’s cause was “punishment for their misdeeds,” namely a failure to fully embrace TNSM’s version of Shari’a. The group also benefitted from the ongoing conflict in FATA’s tribal areas as militants—seeking refuge and new challenges—heeded Fazlullah’s radio calls to join the group.

Maulana Radio also had a strong following in some of Pakistan’s major cosmopolitan centers. Islamized students of Islamabad’s Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) took inspiration from TNSM’s message of Shari’a supremacy and attempted to implement it in the Pakistani capital. Authorities challenged these efforts and the resulting confrontation spiraled out of control. The episode reached a violent

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crescendo when Pakistani paramilitary units stormed Lal Masjid in July 2007.148 Casualty figures are inconsistent but at least 73 students died in the siege.149 Fazlullah, foreign fighters (e.g., the IMU: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), and several leading Pakistani mullahs used the Lal Masjid incident to instigate an armed uprising against the Pakistani state.150 Some observers have reported that Fazlullah’s broadcasts were, in part, intended to activate “certain ‘dormant’ jihadi outfits...to rise in the aftermath of Lal Masjid.”151 Several students that survived the Lal Masjid siege moved to Swat and Waziristan to join TNSM and the TTP respectively and with the phrases, “every mosque in the country is Lal Masjid,” and “Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden are our heroes,” they joined other jihadists in an unprecedented campaign of terrorism (see Figure 4: Suicide Attacks in Pakistan 2002 – 2010).152

THE FIRST BATTLE OF SWAT (2007)

Fazlullah’s call for violent action was answered emphatically and al-Qa’ida and the TTP channeled weapons and men into Swat to assist in the revolt. Bolstered by hundreds of Chechen, Tajik, and Uzbek jihad veterans, identifiable by their use of languages other than Pashtu, TNSM had gained de facto control over

148 For a detailed account of the incident and how it directly related to the PNT see Siddique, “The Red Mosque Operation and its Impact on the Growth of the Pakistani Taliban.” The militants directly associated with Lal Masjid not only had strong ideological and social links to well-known and banned terrorist groups throughout Pakistan, as well as al-Qa’ida and Taliban members in the tribal areas, but their goals essentially mirrored those of the PNT and their jihadist allies as a whole. Such ideological confluence can be seen from their four primary demands:

1. “Immediate declaration of Shāri’a in Pakistan by the government;”
2. “Immediate promulgation of Quran and Sunnah in the courts of law;”
3. “Removal of un-Islamic clauses of the Women Protection Bill;”
4. “Immediate discontinuation to declaring jihad as terrorism by the government as it is the great sacred religious duty of Muslims.”

As quoted in, Ibid.


151 Ibid, p. 20.

152 As quoted in Ibid, p. 19.
much of the Swat district by October 2007. When the Pakistani army finally entered Swat in November 2007 (the First Battle of Swat or Operation Rah-e-Rast), some observers described TNSM as both an “army” and a “satellite of al-Qaeda.” After more than a month of combat, and the temporary loss of much of the adjacent Khyber Pakhtunkhwa district of Shangla to TNSM, the Pakistani military was able to temporarily reassert control in Swat’s major cities and town. This was followed up by a “peace deal” brokered between TNSM and the Pakistani government in February 2009. Although the First Battle of Swat was over, all that had been established was a temporary ceasefire.

In sum, the PNT was now expanding in a way that Pakistani authorities would have deemed impossible only four years earlier. TNSM’s growth from 2001 until 2007’s First Battle of Swat demonstrated that Talibanization extended further east in Pakistan, away from the “ungoverned” regions of FATA that bordered Afghanistan, and into what are considered the “settled” areas of Khyber

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153 Prior to the large-scale military entry, the Pakistani army already had a force of 2,000 in the area, mainly as a hold-over from earthquake relief efforts two years earlier. See Jane Perlez and Ismail Khan, “Militants Gain Despite Decree by Musharraf,” The New York Times, November 16, 2007.


Pakhtunkhwa.\textsuperscript{157} The PNT, furthermore, was now able to use large cities such as Islamabad as staging grounds for revolt and propaganda.\textsuperscript{158}

BENAZIR BHUTTO ASSASSINATED (2007)

Attempts to gain a more acute understanding of the grim ramifications of the First Battle of Swat were interrupted by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in late December 2007. Unconfirmed claims of responsibility from al-Qa’ida, reportedly received the day of the attack,\textsuperscript{159} stand in contrast to the 40 percent of Pakistanis and many foreign observers who believe that the ISI, either working with President Musharraf’s guidance or independently, was responsible.\textsuperscript{160} Several regional experts have attributed the assassination to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ: The Army of Jhang, examined below), usually acting under the direction of al-Qa’ida.\textsuperscript{161} However, the Musharraf government as well as several intelligence agencies including the CIA believed Baitullah Mehsud’s TTP was behind the


\textsuperscript{158} Perlez and Khan, “Militants Gain Despite Decree by Musharraf.” It should be noted as well that President Musharraf’s declaration of martial law in Pakistan on November 3, 2007 was linked in several ways to the state’s struggle against the PNT and the former’s relationship with the United States, especially in combating the Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida. For an in-depth consideration of Musharraf’s declaration see “Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan,” \textit{Asia Briefing No 70}, The International Crisis Group (November 12, 2007). Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_asia/b70_winding_back_martial_law_in_pakistan.pdf

\textsuperscript{159} See, for example, Syed Saleem Shahzad “Al-Qaeda Claims Bhutto Killing,” \textit{Asia Times Online}, December 29, 2007.


killing. Not swayed by the TTP’s denial of involvement in the attack, then-CIA Director Michael Hayden reported in January 2008 that “[t]his was done by that network around Baitullah Mehsud …We have no reason to question that.”

Despite these seemingly contradictory assertions, it is conceivable that responsibility lies with all of these groups acting loosely under the umbrella of the PNT. This study has already detailed strong links between militant groups in the Waziristan agencies (e.g., al-Qa’ida and the TTP) and the ISI. LeJ, after fleeing the Punjab in the late 1990s, established refuge with the Taliban’s blessing in Afghanistan and, with the onset of OEF, joined its jihadist allies in fleeing to Pakistan’s tribal areas, eventually working closely with the TTP. Elements within all of these groups could easily have perceived that their interests would be enhanced with the eradication of Bhutto. Regardless of who was responsible, the incident demonstrates the centrality of the PNT in all the attack scenarios. Coupled with the formal establishment of the TTP and the First Battle of Swat just weeks earlier, the assassination of Bhutto signified the PNT’s arrival as a serious threat to regional and international security. (For more information on the assassination see Table 1: Summary of Notable PNT-Related Attacks, incident 4, p.137.)

PAKISTAN’S EVOLVING MILITARY STRATEGY (2008)

Despite the calamitous manner in which 2007 ended, events in 2008 began to foreshadow a slowing of the PNT’s rapid trajectory towards a state-like presence. These changes were partially precipitated by the Pakistani military’s growing conviction that the TTP’s Waziristan factions and TNSM were the two primary enemies in a single war against the PNT. The FATA agency of Bajaur was the sole location where these two groups’ primary operational territories were geographically affixed. Through this area retreating and reinforcing troops could alternate between the PNT’s two major operational theatres: FATA’s Waziristan agencies and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Malakand region. Consequently, Pakistan’s Bajaur offensive of August 2008 sought to sever this geographic nexus, allowing the Pakistani military to first pacify Swat and subsequently do the same with the

162 Khan, “Baitullah Mehsud: Scapegoat or Perpetrator in Benazir Bhutto’s Assassination?”

Mehsud tribal area of South Waziristan—the TTP’s headquarters.164

Having played a significant role in the transport and supplying of mujahidin in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), the Bajaur agency’s physical terrain and sympathetic tribes were similarly central in channeling thousands of militants fleeing Afghanistan in 2001/2002. Bajaur’s unique status, with regard to its history with the Taliban, is further underscored by its links to TNSM—most of Bajaur’s PNT leaders are former TNSM members—and its reported status as a large

“The Pakistani military’s conviction grew that the TTP’s Waziristan factions and TNSM were the two primary enemies in a single war against the PNT. The FATA agency of Bajaur was the sole location where these two groups’ primary operational territories were geographically affixed.”

164 Franco, “The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Bajaur Case.”

165 Ibid, 3. As noted earlier, Bajaur was the scene of the January 2006 U.S. drone attack targeting Ayman al-Zawahiri. The area, like the Waziristan agencies, has a history of hosting Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida fighters as well as possessing thousands of radicalized tribesmen. See, for example, Bill Roggio, “Pushing Forward with the Bajaur Accord,” The Long War Journal (November 2, 2006).
In addition, the PNT’s efforts to establish broad areas under parallel governance, already noted as having been largely implemented in several of the FATA agencies, was arguably most successful in the Bajaur agency. Despite these conditions, until 2008 Bajaur was not used as a front line by the PNT but rather as a conduit, via the Nawa Pass, for launching anti-U.S. coalition operations into the Kunar Province of Afghanistan. Because of its relative calm and remoteness, Bajaur was reportedly also used as a base for planning transnational terrorist attacks—for example, the successful London bombings in July 2005 and the plots to launch suicide attacks in the Barcelona metro, intercepted by Spanish and French authorities in December 2007.

In short, Bajaur is a hub of PNT, al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban activity.

165 Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/11/pushing_forward_with.php Summing up Bajaur’s unique role in the evolution—and, implicitly, the future—of the PNT, Claudio Franco, an investigator who has spent years in the Malakand region, has written:

Where the evolution of the Taliban phenomenon is concerned, the peculiarity of Bajaur is rooted in the role ‘assigned’ by the militants to the agency in the early post-9/11 years. As mentioned, if Waziristan emerged immediately as the primary frontline of the low intensity confrontation between Taliban militants and the federal government, Bajaur was initially intended to be a logistical base and provide a safer hiding place for fleeing foreign militants, far away from the Army’s spotlights and with the added benefit of a well trodden path leading directly to one of the most inaccessible areas of Afghanistan, the Kunar-Nuristan triangle. As a consequence, local Taliban sympathizers and militants found themselves better equipped than others to operate training camps and offer sanctuary to high profile al Qaida affiliated leaders. For years, the northern FATA have played a critical role in relation to the presence of foreign terrorist operatives on Pakistani soil.” Ibid, p. 5

166 Al-Qaeda’s Abu Farraj al-Libbi reportedly told authorities, after his arrest in May 2005, that he “had lived in Bajaur for some time.” Hassan Abbas, “Profiles of Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, Issue 20 (October 2, 2006). Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=891 For more on al-Libbi see also footnote 56.

167 Recall, however, that Bajaur was the site of several deadly U.S. air-strikes, one almost succeeding in killing Ayman al-Zawahiri. See also footnote 147.

168 For information on the Barcelona plot, see Douglas Farah, “Analysis of the Spanish Suicide Bombers Case,” The Nefa Foundation (February 22, 2008). Available at: http://www1.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaspainmartyrs08.pdf
in northwestern Pakistan and northeastern Afghanistan. Not surprisingly the U.S. had been pressuring Pakistan to intervene militarily in Bajaur for years.

THE BATTLE OF BAJAUR (2008)

The aforementioned strategic shift in its perception of the PNT, and how best to counter it, facilitated the Pakistani military’s acquiescence to Washington’s demands for decisive measures in Bajaur. Major engagements between the PNT—composed almost entirely of TNSM’s ranks, Afghans, and Arabs—and the Pakistani military began in August 2008 and continued for more than seven months (the Battle of Bajaur or Operation Sherdil [“Lion Heart”]). Both U.S. and Pakistani officials viewed the Battle of Bajaur as a critical test. The latter’s anxiety was prompted by a well-founded perception that a Shārī’a-linked uprising in Bajaur agency could herald Pakistan’s complete loss of control over Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Success in Bajaur, it was perceived, would subsequently facilitate Pakistan’s endeavors to contain and defeat the PNT in Swat and the Waziristan agencies. The U.S. hoped victory would more effectively seal

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170 Ibid.

171 Claudio Franco has opined that the “ideological rigor of the Bajauri militants is explained by the fact that most of the clerics hailing from the agency are educated at Madaris run by Ishaat-ul-Tawheed, including TTP leader [Maulana Fazlullah]. The organization is modeled around the madrassa founded by Maulana Mohammed Tahir Panjpir, in Panjpir, Swabi District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Panjpiris are linked to the Jemaat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), both Sami ul Haq and Fazlur Rehman groups, and are close to the Ahl-e-Hadith ideology [i.e., they are Wahabists]. The Panjpiri madaris network was a crucial influence for the Taliban movement in the Pak-Afghan region. Maulana Faqir Mohammed perfectly epitomizes the type of leader favored by the Panjpiris, a dual Amir that leads both from the religious and the military point of view, in orchestrated continuity with paradigmatic figures such as Mullah Mohammed Omar and the early Sufi Mohammed for example.” Franco, “The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Bajaur Case, Part I,” p. 4.
off the Bajaur-Afghanistan border and decrease attacks on U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan.\footnote{172}{Khan and Gall, “Battle of Bajaur: A Critical Test for Pakistan’s Military.}}

The Pakistani military reportedly operated with unprecedented vigor and determination; the intensity of battle exceeded anything seen domestically since Pakistan gained independence sixty-one years earlier.\footnote{173}{Claudio Franco, “The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Bajaur Case, Part II,” The Nefa Foundation (July 2009), p. 3. Available at: \url{http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefa_ttp0709part2.pdf}} TNSM, despite its losses in the First Battle of Swat, was still operating like an army. “They have good weaponry and a better communication system [than ours],” a Pakistani officer reportedly told an investigator. The same officer also revealed that “[e]ven the sniper rifles they use are better than some of ours. Their tactics are mind-boggling and they have defences that would take us days to build. It does not look as though we are fighting a ragtag militia; they are fighting like an organised force.”\footnote{174}{As quoted in, Ismail Khan and Carlotta Gall, “Battle of Bajaur: A Critical Test for Pakistan’s Military, \textit{The New York Times}, September 23, 2009. This quote also appears in Franco, “The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Bajaur Case, Part II,” p. 3-4.}} Much of the PNT’s success was attributable to its ability to “blend in” with the civilian population (i.e., conduct an attack and then hide their weapons and return home) and by situating their attack positions in the middle of population clusters. With such tactics and materials the PNT was able to prolong resistance until February 2009.\footnote{175}{Ibid, \textit{passim}.} The \textit{de facto} peace deal, leaked publically in March 2009, had been brokered by Fazlullah and was far more “granular” than earlier settlements negotiated in the Waziristan agencies. It apparently yielded greater concessions from TNSM than had earlier agreements with the PNT.\footnote{176}{The Pakistani military signed a 28-point peace agreement with three prominent Bajauri tribes the Salarzai, Utmankhel and Khar. See, Anwar Ullah Khan, “Dozen Freed After Signing of Bajaur Deal,” \textit{The Nation} (Islamabad), March 12, 2009.}

Although the PNT’s defeat in Bajaur agency resulted in the deaths of more than 1,500 of its fighters and an overall debilitation of the organization writ large, the victory, as explored below, has not resulted in the long-term outcomes that both
the U.S. and Pakistan had hoped for. The PNT’s presence in Bajaur agency, claimed by the Pakistani military to have been almost entirely eliminated in March 2009, remains robust years later and the area is still being used as a key conduit to sustain the Taliban’s operations in the Afghan theatre. The TTP’s commander in Bajaur, Maulana Faqir Mohammed (profiled below) is known to favor an “Afghanistan first” strategy with regard to targeting priorities. Accordingly, he has reportedly negotiated arrangements with Pakistan’s military allowing them access to areas of Bajaur with certain restrictions. In this vein, Faqir Mohammed claims to have “abdicated our positions and chose not to fight with security forces following an understanding that our people will not be harmed. But the government appears to be continuing with its repressive policies. We will have no other option but to resume our attacks if such policies are not reversed.” Thus, while Pakistan’s military is able to declare victory for its international audiences, the reality is that the PNT is only temporarily cooperating.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF SWAT (2009)

The end of the Battle of Bajaur came just as the February 2009 agreement ending the First Battle of Swat was unraveling. As part of the deal, Pakistani authorities released TNSM’s founder and former leader, Sufi Mohammed, from prison. Charging that the government was breaking its pledges, the ideologue immediately joined Fazlullah in denouncing the deal and together they resumed TNSM’s longtime efforts to nominate their own Shāri‘a judges. These moves again put TNSM at odds with the government’s System of Shāri‘a Justice


(Nizam-e-Adl); the new crisis reached a breaking point as TNSM rapidly and illegally rearmed itself. However, TNSM had been significantly weakened with its losses in the Battle of Bajaur. The reinvigorated Pakistani military was aware of this and quickly exploited the opportunity by moving on the group’s remaining strongholds in Swat.

Beginning in late-April 2009, the subsequent Second Battle of Swat lasted until mid-June 2009. By all open-source accounts, while not utterly destroyed, TNSM was soundly defeated and its leadership forced to decamp the Malakand region. In a detailed report of the offensive, the semi-autonomous Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) recorded that 1,635 “terrorists” were killed. Moreover, “a majority of the Taliban leaders and commanders belonging to the banned TNSM and the Swat TTP,” the IPRI report detailed, were “killed, captured or fled.” The cost of “victory” was high for civilians: an estimated 2.5 to 3 million fled Swat and their return took months to complete. With Sufi Mohammed re-imprisoned and Fazlullah reportedly recuperating from serious battle wounds in Afghanistan, the current status of TNSM is difficult to assess. Some reports indicate that TNSM is likely to stage a comeback. Meetings between Taliban and TNSM leaders have increased since early 2011 with one resident of the Swat area noting that, “They [TNSM] seem to be putting in a lot of planning to avoid failure. They believe if they succeed this time, the army will not be able to dislodge them this time.” Some analysts have gone so far as to suggest that the Pakistani military would welcome a rejuvenated TNSM presence in Swat. “As the Western pressure on Pakistan to launch a [2011] military operation in North Waziristan grows,” they suggest, “the army may be tempted to let Swat fall to the extremists once more to deflect the attention away from

182 Ibid.


Waziristan.” TNSM’s likely fate, as well as that of other key groups within the PNT, is arguably akin to a defeated state actor [or “semi-state” actor] in that its calamitous reverses on the battlefield and loss of political space will precipitate its return in the guise of a more “traditional” non-state jihadist organization employing asymmetric warfare tactics. In short, the army-state that was TNSM in the late-2000s is gone. Its return will likely be in a form more closely resembling terrorists whose targets and goals exceed the confines of a small region.

THE FOURTH BATTLE OF WAZIRISTAN (2009)

With Bajaur agency no longer a viable large-scale transit route for the PNT and with the Malakand region’s major cities loosely controlled by the Pakistani state, the military turned its attention back to South Waziristan, specifically its Mehsud tribal area. This fourth major offensive against the PNT’s logistical and operational center since 2004 (Operation Rah-e-Nijat or “Operation Path to Salvation”) was known well ahead of time; planning for the offensive was announced in June 2009, four months before it began in earnest. Hoping to intimidate the state as well as demonstrate that it was still a viable group after the death of its leader Baitullah Mehsud, the PNT launched an unprecedentedly large terrorist campaign throughout much of Pakistan before and during the military offensive. As is explored later in this report, this part of the PNT’s (counter) offensive—attacks that, by and large were not conducted in an insurgency or guerilla counterforce-type fashion but, rather, as attacks primarily meant to carry

\[\text{188 Ibid.}\]

\[\text{189 Baitullah Mehsud, along with his wife and several other associates, was killed by a U.S. drone launched missile on August 5, 2009. Salman Masood, “Taliban in Pakistan Confirm That Their Leader is Dead,” The New York Times, August 25, 2009.}\]
a message—demonstrated levels of tactical planning and execution that exceeded the PNT’s previously known capabilities. One example of this was the October 10, 2009, attack on the Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi. The facility—headquarters for the entire Pakistani army often referred to as “Pakistan’s Pentagon”—was infiltrated by ten disguised militants who, with intermittent killing of their high-ranking hostages, were able to control key sections of the highly fortified facility for nearly twenty-four hours (see Table 1: Summary of Notable PNT-Related Attacks, incident 14, p. 144).

Despite the PNT’s successful terrorist attacks outside of South Waziristan, the group’s Waziri contingents that fought in their homeland were largely defeated by the Pakistani military in less than two months. Pakistani authorities reportedly employed more than 30,000 troops along with fighter jets and helicopter gunships against 10,000 “hard core” militants in an offensive that was widely supported by Pakistanis, including opposition political parties (excluding those, like the MMA, that explicitly support the Taliban). Significantly, Pakistanis reportedly perceived the offensive, as well as the Second Battle of Swat months before, as having originated with Pakistan, as opposed to being an operation that was instigated at the behest of the U.S. Ultimately, the military was able to gain control of most of the Mehsud tribal area. On December 12, 2010 the

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190 The reader should recall that terrorism is defined, in part, by the existence of this third party: an audience. As Jeffrey M. Bale has explained:

“[It] can be said that the best way to distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violence is to recognize that most acts of violence are dyadic, i.e., they involve only two parties or protagonists—the perpetrator(s) and the victim(s):

Perpetrator(s) → Victim(s) [= Violence]

In marked contrast, bona fide acts of terrorism are triadic, i.e., they involve three parties or protagonists—the perpetrator(s), the victim(s), and a wider target audience (or audiences):

Perpetrator(s) → Victim(s) → Wider Target Audience(s) [= Terrorism]

In short, terrorism is violence that is consciously carried out by the perpetrator(s) in order to influence the attitudes and behaviors of a wider target audience (or multiple target audiences).”

Ackerman, et al., Anatomizing Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries: Identifying the Adversary, p.14

191 Ali, “Military Victory in South Waziristan or the Beginning of a Long War?”

192 Ibid.
government declared the military operation a success; after more than six years of conflict, the PNT had, at least temporarily, lost its operational base in South Waziristan.

**ORAKZAI AND KURRAM OFFENSIVE (2010)**

Within months of their perceived success in South Waziristan the Pakistani military moved its locus of activity north to the Orakzai and Kurram Agencies (operation *Khwakh Ba De Sham* (“I Will See You”). Having fled the previous assault on South Waziristan, scores of PNT fighters sought refuge in these agencies, often encountering resistance from local tribesmen.\(^\text{193}\) Again miscalculating the strength of the PNT, the Pakistani Army originally planned for a two-week assault. The operation eventually lasted four months, temporarily displaced almost half of Orakzai’s civilian population and generated higher than expected casualties before officials declared victory on June 1, 2010.\(^\text{194}\) Similarly, a “successful conclusion” was declared by officials against the PNT in Kurram Agency in early June as well; Army Chief of Staff Kayani visited the two agencies shortly after the declaration.\(^\text{195}\) As with areas of the Malakand region and the Waziristan agencies, however, it is clear that both Orakzai and Kurram are far from pacified. Casualty figures from the offensives in Orakzai offensive reveal a growing trend in Pakistan’s tactical engagements: “virtually the entire campaign,” notes Pakistani-based researcher Tushar Ranjan Mohanty, “has relied on long range artillery and air attacks, with ground engagements between troops and TTP cadre the exception.” Note how overall deaths continue to rise with Pakistani army deaths remaining relatively constant. The apparent decline in civilian deaths in 2008, framed by a higher rate of “militant” death has been explained as the result of “no separate account of civilians killed. Apparently, everyone killed by the [Pakistani Army] is a ‘militant’.”\(^\text{196}\) In short, the military is likely utilizing ham-fisted tactics that allow it short-term gains while ensuring long-term radicalization of the local populations. The PNT, capitalizing on these sentiments, is simply able to move into a different area of FATA, wait out Pakistani forces, and return to fight another day. Indeed, since the declared victories


\(^{194}\) See Mohanty, “Operation Orakzai: Conjuring ‘Victories’.”


\(^{196}\) Mohanty, “Operation Orakzai: Conjuring ‘Victories’.”
of June 2010, both Orakzai and Kurram Agencies have been restive (for example, more than 500 people were killed from June 2 to July 21). Comparing the army’s assertions of victory to U.S. President George W. Bush’s 2003 “mission accomplished” moment, renowned Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai noted that “The military operation is not yet over in Orakzai, I think they (the army) made the announcement of victory in haste.”

Such a statement could be made about most official proclamations of victory against the PNT to date.


THE PNT 2.0

The PNT has regrouped from the setbacks of 2010 and reemerged as a leaner and more clandestine—yet more factionalized—terrorist network—“PNT 2.0.” Despite repeated claims that Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in 2010, he is apparently alive and remains the de jure leader of the TTP.\(^\text{198}\) Reports now indicate that the TTP has regrouped in South and North Waziristan (with their headquarters in the former) as well as the other FATA agencies and southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa districts.

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Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell asserted in April 2010 that Mehsud “clearly is not running the Pakistani Taliban anymore.” However, other Pentagon officials reportedly disagree with Morrell’s assessment: “While we may not have communications intercepts or other intelligence to confirm he is alive, it isn’t accurate to say that is evidence he is no longer in command.” Bill Roggio, “Hakeemullah Mehsud – Not Dead Yet,” *The Long War Journal* (April 29, 2010). Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/04/a_senior_pakistani_i.php

It has been reported that “Mehsud’s leadership has been challenged by other figures, too, including his rival Wali-ur-Rehman.” Walsh, “Pakistan Taliban Chief Hakimullah Mehsud Still Alive, Says Spy Agency.” As of May 2011, there is a general consensus the Hakimullah is alive and running the TTP. A video released in March 2011 shows him directing the execution of a former ISI official. See, Bill Roggio, “Video: Pakistani Taliban Execute Colonel Imam,” *The Long War Journal*, February 20, 2011. Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/02/video_pakistani_tali.php
Never a homogenous or unified movement, the PNT has always been marked by factionalization.\(^{199}\) Recently, however, it is likely that factionalization has grown as the various rival components of the PNT compete for resources and as the issue of whether to target the Pakistani state, and how, becomes more acute (discussed below). Typical of most violent extremist groups that go through such a process, emerging factions of the PNT are increasingly “extreme.”\(^{200}\) While a violent non-state actor’s operational objectives (e.g., targets) are usually largely shaped by their ideology, factionalization can drive them to more brutal and destructive acts because of the perceived “need to produce attack results that boost group morale, serve to differentiate the group from other terrorist groups, or demonstrate leadership will and commitment.”\(^{201}\) A 2006 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report, that this author was part of, exploring terrorist targeting hypothesizes that, “in groups where factionalization occurs or is imminent, a ‘challenger’ faction may push for greater scale or more extreme desired effects than other-wise as part of a power play. Also, a ‘status quo’ faction may feel the need to increase the scale or effects of an attack in order to bolster their position within the group and undermine challengers.”\(^{202}\) This may partially explain why elements of the PNT have increasingly targeted Sufi (i.e., Barelvi) Muslims (see, for example, Table 1: Summary of Notable PNT-Related Attacks, incidents 21 and 25, p. 148 and p.150).

In addition to an increase in attacks against Sufi targets, the PNT’s factionalization has also given rise to attacks against fellow Deobandi Muslims. While a degree of rancor always percolated within various PNT factions, twin suicide attacks against Maulana Fazlur Rehman (the Amir of JUI-F, profiled below) indicate that the PNT is now at war with itself. Similarly, PNT factions have

\(^{199}\) Factionalization can be defined as, “the extent to which competing centrifugal and centripetal pressures affect the stability of, and the exercise of authority within, the organization. Extremist groups, unlike established bureaucratic organizations, tend to undergo a kaleidoscopic process of fission and fusion that results in considerable organizational instability, frequent schisms, and the periodic establishment of entirely new groups by breakaway factions. Ackerman, Bale, Blair, et al, “Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure,” p. 20.

\(^{200}\) For an overview of this trend of greater extremism emerging from factionalization see, for example, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “Terrorist Factions,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Vol. 3 (2008), pp. 399-418.

\(^{201}\) Ackerman, Bale, Blair, et al, “Assessing Terrorist Motivations for Attacking Critical Infrastructure, p. x.

\(^{202}\) Ibid, p. 155.
increasingly targeted the Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI, profiled below), legendary for its founder, Syed Abul A'ala Maududi, and support of the Afghan Taliban.\textsuperscript{203}

The increased extremism precipitated by the TTP's ongoing factionalizing is exacerbated by the generational shift toward younger leaders and fighters in the PNT. Writing about the TTP's execution of Colonel Imam, a retired ISI operative, Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai notes that, “In the previous decade, Colonel Imam would have been welcomed and honored by Islamist militants in the border region. Today, however, TTP militants considered him an enemy, and saw his status merely as a tool to bargain for a ransom and the release of imprisoned TTP fighters.”\textsuperscript{204} Hakimullah Mehsud reportedly took custody of Colonel Imam from members of the Punjabi Taliban after internecine violence broke out in the latter group. Significantly, numerous Taliban religious leaders and Sirajuddin Haqqani himself appealed for the release of Colonel Imam.\textsuperscript{205} Such appeals, however, did not alter Hakimullah’s belief that Colonel Imam was a U.S. spy; the latter’s execution was videotaped (with Hakimullah seen supervising) in late January 2011.\textsuperscript{206} Yusufzai notes that, the execution may have placed a wedge between the TTP and other Islamist militants, particularly the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network. Jihadist leaders who used to operate with Colonel Imam during the anti-Soviet jihad were clearly unhappy with the TTP and Hakimullah Mehsud, privately criticizing him for executing the former ISI operative. In fact, some significant doubts have arisen about Hakimullah’s agenda after the incident. Although the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network have refrained from publicly

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\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., p. 18-20.

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condemning Hakimullah for killing the former operative, they are unlikely to trust him in the future.\textsuperscript{207} 

In sum, the PNT 2.0 appears poised for increasingly violent internecine feuds that will only exacerbate Pakistan’s civil war. Commenting on the state of the PNT mid-2010, Arif Jamal, an author and visiting fellow at New York University, warned that:

Pakistan seems to be entering a period similar to that which Afghanistan went through between the fall of Dr. Najibullah and the advent of the Taliban in the 1990s, when different factions of the mujahideen fought to eliminate their rivals. As the Pakistani Taliban spread their jihad to rival Islamist groups, the possibility of other Islamist militias being drawn into a civil war between extremist groups is looking more and more probable. If this happens, it will be bloodier than the mujahideen battles in 1990s Afghanistan, with an unimaginable international impact.\textsuperscript{208}

This aspect of Pakistan’s growingly dystopic future should not, however, obscure the fact that all of the PNT is still committed to evicting U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. Moreover, most elements of the PNT are similarly aligned in their opposition to the Pakistani government, specifically with regard to blunting its actions in the tribal area.\textsuperscript{209}

**BEHAVIORAL ELEMENTS OF THE PAKISTANI NEO-TALIBAN**

Many observers in the West perceive the PNT and the Afghan Taliban as two sides of the same coin. Consequently, it is tempting to assume that experiences with, and knowledge of, the latter provides sufficient data to accurately predict significant future actions of the former. While this may arguably be the case with regard to ideology or overarching ethnic identification, there are key differences between the two groups. Such contrasts appear sharpest when exploring the

\textsuperscript{207} Yusufzai, “The Implications of Colonel Imam’s Murder in Pakistan,” 20.

\textsuperscript{208} Jamal, “Pakistani Taliban Widen Jihad with Strikes on Fellow Muslims.”

PNT’s organizational structures as well as its relations with other groups, capabilities, and decision-making processes.

A. IDEOLOGY

A collective PNT ideology, in the broadest sense, can be conceptualized as having two components. First, PNT members generally grant the worldwide community of Muslims (henceforth the umma) precedence over national or ethnic affinity or interests. This is a characteristic shared by all violent global Islamist organizations. However, when contrasted with these other groups (such as al-Qa’ida or the Afghan Taliban), the PNT’s relative priority to the umma is arguably the weakest since regional identification defines and guides the movement at periodic critical moments, superseding consideration of the broader umma. Regardless, concerns for the umma are central to the PNT’s ideology and they are violently actualized in the PNT’s second central ideological component, jihad. The PNT is committed to an offensive jihad that liberates the umma from perceived apostate rule and purges it of elements understood to be impure (for example, customs and cultures not based on their perception of the Qur’an, the Sunna and Shari’a). However the PNT does have ideological leanings toward defensive jihad. Olivier Roy notes that such proclivities stem from their conviction “that Muslims must first return to the true faith before it becomes possible to issue any call to jihad.” Groups belonging to this “preaching” movement include the Afghan Taliban and, arguably, TNSM. Clearly, however, these two paths of jihad are not mutually exclusive. When their threat perception is altered, Roy notes, “[m]any member of preaching organizations go to

210 This view stands in partial contrast to what Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy have argued (however, they based their opinion on the PNT milieu circa 2004. Given events over the last half-decade Abou Zahad and Roy would arguably revise their sentiments to one that is more in harmony with this author): “Even if movements have identified themselves with a precise territorial area, in the way that the Taliban always wished to be recognized the legitimate government of Afghanistan, or as the Pakistani groups insisted on a Pakistani identity, they have nevertheless refused to be constricted by a regional identifications.” Abou Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, p. 2.

211 Of course, most jihadists claim that theirs is a defensive jihad. See, for example, ‘Azam Tariq, “The Reality of the Waziristan operation,” Nawai Afghan Jihad (January/February 2010), as found in, Qandeel Siddique, “Justifying Jihad against Pakistan,” jihadica, February 19, 2010. Available at: http://www.jihadica.com/

212 Abou Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, p. 4. Emphasis added.
[offensive] jihad. The most celebrated instance is that of Mullah Omar.”213 Both of these broad elements of the PNT’s _weltanschauung_—general priority for the _umma_ and _jihad_—can further be broken down into three, often overlapping and more precisely manifested, ideological components: 1) **Deobandi Islamism**, the most unifying element of the PNT’s ideology that, nonetheless, allows for collaboration with groups from the two other predominant Islamist ideologies: Salafists and, at times, South Asian Wahhabi (Ahl-i Hadith) groups; 2) **anti-Shi’ism**, another synthesizing ideological characteristic and 3) **apocalyptic eschatology**, an integrative paradigm that allows the PNT and its allies to view their tactical and strategic efforts as complementary, preordained, and in fulfillment of divine prophecy.

**DEOBANDISM & ISLAMISM**

Despite the PNT’s deep and ongoing internal fractures, bonds with the Afghan Taliban have remained unbreakable because of the PNT’s overall adherence to contemporary Deobandi principles.214 Beginning with the Soviet–Afghan War (1979-1989) and extending into the subsequent Afghan civil war (1989-present) Pakistan has undergone a proliferation of _madrassas_.215 Most of these schools were founded and administered by Jami’at Ulema-e-Islam (JUI),216 a guardianship ensuring that the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam guided the _madrassas_’ curricula.217 **Traditional** Deobandi teachings—aligned with the Hanafi School of

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213 Ibid. Abou Zahab and Roy describe the fundamental nature of the Afghan Taliban movement as having “no political project beyond ‘the Shari’a, the whole Shari’a and nothing but the Shari’a.” Ibid, p. 13.


215 Pakistan has five distinct types of _madrassas_. They are dominated by, first and second, the Deobandi and Bareli (or, Barelvis) schools. Third, the puritanical Salafi and, fourth, the Ahle Hadith minority Pakistani Muslims have their own schools. Finally, fifth, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) has its own school. See “Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military,” _Asia Report No 36_, International Crisis Group (July 29, 2002), p. 1. See also Barbara D. Metcalf, “Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs,” Social Science Research Council, after September 11 Archive, 2002. Available at: [http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/](http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/)

216 For a vignette of JUI, see pages 114-116.

217 Rashid, _Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia_, p. 88-89. Of the estimated 13,000 _madrassas_ in Pakistan, over 8,300 are reportedly Deobandi in nature. “Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military,” p.6.
Islamic law, considered the most liberal of the four schools—were described as “forward-looking” and committed to harmonizing “the classical Sharia texts with current realities.” However, beginning in the early 1980s with Zia al-Haq’s efforts to Islamize Pakistan, this tradition was abandoned as semi-educated mullahs running madrassas expounded a form of Islam that was unrecognizable to their Deobandi progenitors. Students were indoctrinated into a system that revolved around a fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur’an and thus a narrow and rigid application of Shārī’a. The broad goals of these teachings promote beliefs perceived as representing “pure” Islam and actions intended to restore it to its pristine nature—that which supposedly existed during the “Golden Age” of Islam (610-850 C.E.). The metamorphosis of Deobandism via the madrassa was manifest in three broad phases:

- **Soviet–Afghan War.** Between 1982 and 1990, Pakistan’s madrassas fused an Islamic fundamentalist education with the active support and facilitation of the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad to non-Pakistanis. During this time madrassas typically acted as an interim stop for Islamic militants on their way to Afghanistan. The CIA, working with Saudi Arabia’s intelligence service and the ISI, financed the movement of more than 35,000 such militants from 43 different Muslim countries. More importantly, during this time madrassas increasingly radicalized Pakistan’s boys and young men. Several future leaders of the PNT and their allies (for example, JeM’s Maulana Masood Azhar) went through Pakistan’s madrassa system during this time. Some of these schools rose in prominence and, ultimately, many future leaders of the Afghan Taliban (and, to a lesser degree, the PNT) hailed from the same madrassas, thus further...

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integrating the various militants with a common experience of their ideological genesis.\textsuperscript{221}

- **Rise of the Taliban.** Displaced by the Soviet invasion and subsequent war, millions of Afghans relocated to Pakistan. The number of Pakistan’s JUI-dominated madrassas grew exponentially through the years. From these Deobandi institutions emerged the nascent Taliban. Ahmed Rashid sums up this era as one that implanted “radical ideas in impressionable poverty-stricken children” who, having then emerged as the Taliban “set about to enact a basic agenda: restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Shāri’a…and defend Islam in Afghanistan.”\textsuperscript{222}

- **Madrassas as Factories of Jihad.** From the mid-1990s forward, the already narrow scholastic programs of many madrassas contracted into a curriculum entirely geared toward generating ideologically inspired militants and committed jihadists. In thousands of cases, recruits (including British Pakistanis) underwent less than a few months of ideological Deobandi indoctrination, “before,” Ahmed Rashid notes, “being sent to the front line by Taliban recruits, who often arrived with ISI officers.”\textsuperscript{223} These recruits subsequently fought in Afghanistan or Indian-administered Kashmir against the Northern Alliance, U.S. forces, NATO–ISAF forces, each other, and/or the Pakistani military.

Although the PNT’s leadership has ties to all three of the time-periods explored above, extant and emerging leaders were predominantly spawned from the last


\textsuperscript{222} Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos*, p. 13, 155, 235, 249-250, 281 and 364.

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid, p. 249-250.
two phases—Afghanistan’s post-Soviet era. In the earlier of these two periods—when Pakistani militants fought and rose through the Taliban ranks prior to their eviction 2001—future PNT commanders were exposed to non-Afghan jihadists, specifically those practicing a violent and globally oriented form of Islamism. Consequently, much of the ideology that was imparted in Afghanistan was more political (and international) in nature than what had been the case in the Deobandi-dominated madrassas of Pakistan. This nexus of retro-grade Deobandi principles with political inclinations, it can be argued, resulted in an ideological “maturing” of the Pakistani fighters, one that gave them a decidedly more global vision than their erstwhile more parochial madrassa colleagues. This merging—specifically the neo-fundamentalist global jihad radicalization brought forth by al-Qa’ida—resulted in the emergence of true

Recall that Hafiz Gul Bahadar and Maulavi Nazir both fought in the Soviet-Afghan War, while leaders like Nek Mohammad fought with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance. Hakimullah Mehsud, born in 1981, is not believed to have fought in Afghanistan before 2002—he gained his military experience combating the Pakistani military and other PNT factions in the tribal areas.

“Islamism” has been accurately and succinctly defined as, “pronounced hostility towards less committed and militant Muslims (who are often denounced as ‘apostates’), a radically anti-secular and anti-Western Islamic political ideology with both revolutionary and revivalist elements. The principal ideological characteristics of Islamism in all of its forms are an outright rejection of Western secular values, an intransigent resistance to ‘infidel’ political, economic, social, and cultural influence over the Muslim world, a pronounced hostility towards more moderate Muslims, and an insistence on the creation of an Islamic state governed by a rigid, puritanical application of the shā‘rī’a.” Ackerman, et al., Anatomizing Radiological and Nuclear Non-State Adversaries: Identifying the Adversary, pp. 18-19. Emphasis in the original. As noted above, in Afghanistan many Pakistani madrassa-educated militants encountered Islamists that had global goals and endorsed violence to achieve them. Apart from the “global” and “violent” schools of Islamist thought, the two other variants of Islamism are described by some experts as “regional” and “gradualist.” The former have a national, as opposed to global agenda; the latter advocate grass-roots level changes—i.e., a conversion from below as opposed to one that is imposed from above. Author’s correspondence with Sammy Salama, January 10, 2006.

As opposed to Arab Salifists (e.g., Usama bin Laden) and their goal of establishing an eventual global Islamic caliphate, Pakistani jihadists during the 1980s and 1990s had objectives, according to Zahid Hussain, “more in line with the regional strategy of the Pakistani military establishment: the liberation of Kashmir from India and the installation of a Pashtun Islamist government in Afghanistan.” In sum, as Hussain cogently observes, “Almost all Islamic militant groups [during the 1980s and 1990s] served as instruments of Pakistan’s regional policy.” Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, pp. 52-53.
extremism in the Afghan and Pakistani theaters of jihad (for example, mass casualty suicide bombings, see Figure 5: Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan 1970-2010).227

IDEOLOGY & STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Since early-2009, when President Barack Obama began articulating a revised strategy for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan,228 pundits have increasingly addressed the ideology of the Afghan Taliban, usually by contrasting it with that of the PNT.229 The conventional wisdom that emerged viewed the PNT as global in its ambitions while the Afghan Taliban was por-

227 Developed by Olivier Roy, this category of “neo-fundamentalism” is considered something separate from Islamism. As Jeffrey Bale has noted, “All Islamists are Islamic fundamentalists, but the reverse is not true. An example of a non-Islamist fundamentalist group is the Tabligh-i Jama’at.” Author's correspondence with Jeffrey M. Bale, May 18, 2011.


trayed as having more measurable nationalistic goals—involving Afghanistan only.230

A globally expansionist conception of the PNT is at odds with the historical record. As was demonstrated earlier, the PNT, despite increasingly promoting international agendas, has operated almost exclusively in Pakistan and, to a far less degree, eastern Afghanistan.231 While terrorist plots and attempted attacks within the U.S. have occurred—the most notable being the May 2010 Time Square bombing attempt—they highlight largely autonomous undertakings that arguably do not represent a strategic campaign against the U.S. homeland by the PNT. Indeed, “it is a two-track jihad,” a PNT-commander told an interviewer in 2005. “The external enemy is known, his intentions against Islam and Muslims are no secret. But the internal enemy posing as Muslim, as Shias and others do, is more dangerous. Stopping internal enemies is our priority.”232 The real doctrinal issue within the PNT currently is not between regional and international goals; rather, it revolves around the degree to which their Afghan jihad takes precedence over targeting the Pakistani state.233 Thus, in reality, the PNT’s “two-track jihad” only involves Pakistan and Afghanistan (although it clearly gives inspiration and, on occasion, instruction, for others that intend to carry out jihad operations against the West).

230 It is important to appreciate that many experts believe that the Afghan Taliban have adopted a global jihadist agenda as well. I thank Jeffrey Bale for reminded me of this fact. The idea of an “Afghanistan only” focused Afghan Taliban is a narrative that goes along well with President Barak Obama’s policy of negotiating, and even compromising, with the Afghan Taliban. This policy stands in contradiction to that of the Bush Administration’s nominal commitment to a “comprehensive victory over the Taliban and other [Afghan] paramilitaries. Rogers, “The Al-Qaida Movement – Status and Prospects.” See also, “Pakistani Taliban Commander Favors Regional, Not Global Jihad,” Madrid ABC, May 11, 2011. Translation via the Open Source Center (EUP20110511178005).

231 To the degree that one considers JeM, LeT and Pakistan’s ISI as within the PNT’s sphere, attacks in India might also warrant inclusion.


233 Some experts disagree with this view. They see the PNT as global in their ambition; a movement that is strategically targeting not just Afghanistan and Pakistan but the West as well.
ANTI-SHI’ISM

Violently combating the perceived heretical nature of Shi’ism is the *raison d’etre* for some of the PNT’s most prominent allies. While less passionate in their disdain, the PNT’s grounding in Deobandism—whose senior ulama have, since 1940, endorsed a fatwa declaring Shi’ites infidels—ensures a consistent attitude of belligerence towards Shi’ism. Anti-Shi’ite violence, as noted earlier, grew markedly in the late 1970s and 1980s as General Zia sought to blunt Shi’ite revanchism in the wake of the Iranian revolution. Under the aegis of Pakistan’s ISI, militants—exemplified by groups like LeJ—organized themselves with the “sole aim” of killing Shi’ites. Since the late 1990s, such groups have added to their doctrine an anti-Western animus. Having largely turned on the Pakistani state, groups including LeJ and Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP: Army of the Companions of the Prophet) are now PNT allies and, consequently, their anti-Shi’ite fierceness is presently being actualized in the tribal areas. Reports indicate captured Shi’ite Pakistani security members are now routinely and “casually” beheaded by their PNT captors while their Sunni counterparts are often released.

234 As discussed earlier in this report, factions of the PNT also target Sufis, a trend that has grown in 2010-2011.

235 The *ulama*, plural of “*alim,*” are doctors and scholars of Muslim law.


237 Abou Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, p. 64.

238 Some of the PNT’s allies are not known to be strongly anti-Shi’ite, for example, LeT. Moreover, it has been reported that, HuM and HuJI “strongly share the anti-Shia feelings of [LeJ], but they do not indulge in *targeted* attacks on Shias and their places of worship. Many of the leaders of these organisations, including Maulana Masood Azhar, the Amir of the JEM, started their jihadi career in [Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP: Army of the Companions of the Prophet)], but later drifted away from it since they felt uncomfortable with its targeted attacks on Shias and their places of worship.” B. Raman, “The Punjabi Taliban,” *International Terrorism Monitor*, Paper No. 566. October 12, 2009. Emphasis added.

239 Ibid.
Moreover, Shi’ite civilians living in the tribal areas—especially those in the Kurram agency’s Parachinar region—are being indiscriminately targeted.\textsuperscript{240}

**APOCALYPTIC ESCHATOLOGY**

While scholars have explored the apocalyptic worldviews of jihadist groups such as Hizballah and al-Qa’ida,\textsuperscript{241} less has been written about the Taliban’s similar eschatology.\textsuperscript{242} Although their millenarian outlook is not as well articulated as other jihadist groups, the Taliban’s apocalyptic eschatology is a unifying factor in relation to the facilitation of links between the PNT and other jihadist groups.

Elements of the PNT and some of their allies are bound by a belief that the Taliban’s resurgence heralds the prophesied “End Times.” Specifically, the geographic regions—historically referred to as Khurasan—they seek to “liberate”

\textsuperscript{240} In contrast, there are reports of the Sunni minority of Parachinar being victims of the Shi’ites “reign of terror.” See, for example, Farah Taj, “The Punjabi and Pakhtun IDPs of Parachinar,” *Daily Times* (Lahore), January 16, 2010.


\textsuperscript{242} Strong apocalyptic eschatologies exist as well in the world’s other two monotheistic traditions, Christianity and Judaism. Moreover, millennialism can be found in several secular movements. See, for example, Robert Ellwood, “Nazism as a Millennialist Movement,” in *Millennialism, Persecution, and Violence: Historical Cases*, ed. Catherine Wessinger (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, 2000), pp. 241-260; and Martha F. Lee, “Environmental Apocalypse: The Millennial Ideology of Earth First!,” *Millennium, Messiahs, and Mayhem: Contemporary Apocalyptic Movements*, ed. Thomas Robbins and Susan J. Palmer (New York: Routledge, 1997), 119-137
are believed to be the focal point from where the Mahdi\textsuperscript{243} will arise.\textsuperscript{244} Hadith\textsuperscript{245} traditions depict the Mahdi leading his followers from combat victory in Khurasan—perceived by some militants to be those battles that are now taking place in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan—before moving through Iran, Iraq, Syria and, ultimately, battling the anti-Christ in Palestine.\textsuperscript{246} While it is unlikely that all members of the PNT and their allies perceive of their struggle as part of this larger campaign, there is arguably a general belief that a precursor to the

\begin{footnotesize}
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    \item \textsuperscript{243} Jeffrey M. Bale has explained that, “[t]he term *mahdi* (literally ‘the [rightly] guided one’) applies above all to the prophesied redeemer of Islam who is destined to emerge and transform the world into a perfect Islamic society before the Day of Resurrection (*yawm al-qiyama*), at which point he will fight alongside the returned Jesus … against the Dajjal (the Deceiver, i.e., Antichrist or false messiah). The word does not appear first in the Qur’an itself, but rather in early collections of *hadith* that are considered reliable.” Bale, “Jihadist Ideology and Strategy and the Possible Employment of WMD,” p. 48. Although Muslim eschatology is typically associated with Shi’ism, the ‘signs of the times,’ the Antichrist and the coming of the Madhi are all part of accepted Sunni fundamentalist discourse (although fewer Sunnis perceived that their activities are part of the “end-time” scenario). Prominent Sunni militants have explained that they have “no doubt that the awaited Mahdee will come forth from among the Ummah of the Prophet at the end of time. We believe in the Signs of the Hour. The appearance of ad-Dajjal. The descent from heaven of ‘Isa, son of Mary. The sun rising from the West. The emergence of the Beast from the earth. And other signs mentioned in the Qur’an and the authentic Hadeeth of the Prophet.” Najeh Ibrahim, Asim Abdul-Maajid and Esam ud-Din Darbaalah, *In Pursuit of Allah’s Pleasure* (London: Azzam Publishers, 1997), pp. 30-31. As quoted in David Zeidan, “A Comparative Study of Selected Themes in Christian and Islamic Fundamentalist Discourses,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (May, 2003), p. 71
    
    \item An area that includes Afghanistan, parts of Iran, Pakistan’s tribal areas, Turkmenistan and parts of Uzbekistan.
    
    \item The *Hadith* is an oral tradition that delineates the words and acts of Muhammad. An exploration of how the Mahdi was handled, vis-à-vis transmission of the Hadith, can be found in Wilferd Madelung, “‘Abd Allāh B. Al-Zubayr and the Mahdi,” *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (October, 1981), pp. 291-305.
    
    \item See David Cook, *Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, 2005), p. 173. See also Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Plot to Divide the Taliban Foiled,” *Asia Times Online*, July 23, 2008. Available at: [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JG23Df01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JG23Df01.html)
\end{itemize}
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liberation of Jerusalem is the liberation of Kabul. Based on this latter notion,” explains Syed Saleem Shahzad, “jihadi websites are calling on Muslims to support the Afghan jihad.”

B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

To date there exist no known in-depth open-source investigations into the PNT’s organizational structure. This is undoubtedly because, as evidenced throughout this report, the PNT is a movement without single leadership or collective tactical and strategic vision. It is not within the scope of this report to outline the organizational structure of all the groups associated with the PNT; therefore, this report primarily considers the TTP’s command configuration.

Details of the TTP’s organizational structure are sparse. This is largely the result of its status as an umbrella organization for dozens of independent groups and factions. Because the TTP conceives of itself as part of the larger Taliban struggle, and is thus active in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, all its leaders are believed to have sworn an oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar and bin Laden.

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248 Ibid.

249 See, for example, A. Acharya et al, “Making Money in the Mayhem,” p. 96 and Bruce Riedel, “Obama’s Afghan Gamble,” Yale Global Online, December 3, 2009. Available at: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/obama%E2%80%99s-afghan-gamble See also Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan and Afghan Taliban Close Ranks,” The New York Times, March 26, 2009. Such an oath is in harmony with the Wahhabist doctrine that requires Muslim males to “present a bayah, or oath of allegiance, to a Muslim ruler during his lifetime to ensure his redemption after death. The ruler is conversely owed unquestionable allegiance from his people so long as he leads the community according to the laws of God, The whole purpose of the Muslim community is to become the living embodiment of God’s laws, and it is the responsibility of the legitimate ruler to ensure that the people know God’s laws and live in conformity with them.” M.J. Gohari, The Taliban: Ascent to Power (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 39.
As of early May 2011, no reports exist of TTP members offering oaths to al-Qa'ida's post-bin Laden leader—whatever that ultimately is verified to be.\(^{250}\) When operating with the Afghan Taliban against U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, the TTP reportedly operates within the command structure of Mullah Omar (himself now rumored to be dead\(^ {251}\)).\(^ {252}\) However, operations within Pakistan are commanded by TTP leaders—a group whose constituent elements are not in agreement on many key issues.\(^{253}\)

The TTP's acephalic structure is one of its more important attributes. Whereas the genesis and ascent of the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s was in good measure the result of events and actions initiated and fostered in a neighboring country, namely Pakistan with its madrassas and the ISI, the birth and evolution of the TTP is overwhelmingly a localized—that is, a Pakistani tribal—phenomenon.\(^ {254}\) As such, the TTP reflects the disunited nature of the tribes living in FATA and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (there are more than 60 Pashtun tribes in the area; the number increases to more than 400 if sub-clans are included\(^ {255}\)). In South and North Waziristan, for example, several tribes have historically vied for dominance and today clan and sub-clan identification transcends any allegiance to larger tribal units, Waziristan, other tribal areas and agencies of FATA, and, most

\(^{250}\) Al-Qa'ida expert Jarret Brachman has rightly observed that bin Laden, “is not likely to be replaced by one person.” See Cronus Global, “Let 1,000 (U)Bloom,” May 9, 2011. Available at: [http://jarretbrachman.net/?p=1476](http://jarretbrachman.net/?p=1476)


\(^{252}\) A. Acharya et al, “Making Money in the Mayhem,” p. 96-97. Elements of the TTP from South and North Waziristan provide the Afghan Taliban with their largest source of material and human resources.

\(^{253}\) Ibid.


\(^{255}\) Abbas, “Profiles of Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies.”
certainly, any conception of being a part of the Pakistani polity as a whole. Thus, the TTP’s presence in the Waziristan agencies is reportedly represented by numerous independent Taliban factions in all of the major tribes and sub-tribes. What unity the TTP does possess is, in part, the result of the presence of Waziristan’s majority Mehsud tribe. Other FATA agencies are similarly disunited. In Khyber, for example, one researcher notes that the “savage feud” between the Deobandi and Barelvi sects occludes all but the most temporary and uneasy alliances between tribes. Thus, all the various TTP factions in FATA, as well as those in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, are believed to operate independently to the degree that, according to one group of researchers writing in late 2008, “Taliban militants of one tribe do not operate on the territory of the other tribe, which is the exclusive domain of that tribe only.” While there is nonetheless widespread cooperation between the various factions in the collection and distribution of revenue and the coordination of combat and supply lines, the fissiparous nature of the TTP’s leadership, examined next, is a critical attribute that separates it from the Afghan Taliban. Notable TTP leaders include Hakimullah Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, and Maulana Faqir Mohammed and Maulavi Nazir.

HAKIMULLAH MEHSUD

Hakimullah is the current leader (Amir) of the TTP. Born in 1981 into South Waziristan’s dominant Mehsud tribe, Hakimullah (“one who has knowledge”) differs from most other PNT leaders in that his post-madrassa jihadi endeavors

256 Cloughley, “Insurrection in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” passim.


258 Ibid, p 7.


were conducted in Pakistan’s tribal areas, not with the Taliban in Afghanistan. At age 24 he was named spokesman for Baitullah Mehsud’s growing militia. Within four years Hakimullah had risen to commander rank within the TTP in a portfolio that included three of FATA’s agencies (Orakzai, Khyber, and Kurram). In August 2009, after a violent dispute over who would succeed Baitullah Mehsud, he emerged as the TTP’s new leader. Similar to the challenges faced by his predecessor, Hakimullah’s tenure as head of the TTP has been marked by his struggle with other leading PNT figures to maintain leadership. His command style is considered unusually high in risk tolerance; he reportedly also employs a “showy cruelty.” Although he has allegedly appeared on video as recently as March 2011, Hakimullah’s last confirmed video appearance was alongside a Jordanian physician, Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi. The latter subsequently blew himself up at the CIA’s Forward Operating Base Chapman, located in Afghanistan’s southeastern province of Khost. The attack,

261 Alex Rodriguez and Zulfiqar Ali, “Pakistani Taliban Names New Leader, The Los Angeles Times, August 23, 2009. An obvious and significant trend is that the younger emerging generation of the PNT’s leadership was born too late to have fought in Afghanistan before the Taliban was ejected in 2001/2002.

262 “Hakimullah Cultivates Ruthless Reputation.”


264 In order to maintain his power, Baitullah reportedly engaged in targeted killings of Pakistani Taliban rivals, demonstrating no compunction about targeting fellow Mehsud tribesmen. The death of Abdullah Mehsud was believed to have been the result of his whereabouts being made known to the Pakistani military by Baitullah. (Abdullah was the head of the eponymous organization: the Abdullah Mehsud Group. Abdullah Mehsud’s successor, his younger brother, Masadur Rahman, died in an incident believed to be linked to Baitullah. Most recently, Masadur Rahman’s successor, Qari Zainuddin Mehsud, was similarly killed by assassins dispatched by Baitullah. See Mukhtar A. Khan, “A Profile of the Late Qari Zainuddin Mehsud –Waziristan Militant and Opponent of Baitullah Mehsud ,” Terrorism Monitor Vol. VII, Issue 19 (July 2, 2009), p. 5-6. See also Bill Roggio, “Anti-Baitullah Taliban Groups Merge, Appoint New Leader,” The Long War Journal (July 22, 2009). Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/07/antibaitullah_taliba.php


266 Walsh, “Pakistan Taliban Chief Hakimullah Mehsud Still Alive, Says Spy Agency,”

267 See Roggio, “Video: Pakistani Taliban Execute Colonel Imam.”
on December 30, 2009, killed seven CIA agents, Abu Mulal’s Jordanian intelligence contact, and injured six others.\textsuperscript{268} Both Hakimullah and Abu Mulal stated the (forthcoming) attack would be in reprisal for the August 2009 (CIA-operated drone) attack that killed Baitullah Mehsud.\textsuperscript{269} As mentioned earlier in this report, several sources indicate that Hakimullah barely escaped a drone attack in mid-January 2010 and, in February 2010 unconfirmed reports again claimed that he had died from injuries sustained in the January attack.\textsuperscript{270} However, he is still believed to be leading the TTP, having likely appeared in a video (described earlier) in early 2011.

**HAFIZ GUL BAHADAR**

“Perhaps no one has greater stature or importance in the [TTP’s] leadership,” reported the Jamestown Foundation in April 2009, “than Hafiz Gul Bahadur, supreme commander of the North Waziristan Taliban.”\textsuperscript{271} In his late-40s, Bahadar comes from the Deobandi school and is a member of North Waziristan’s Uthmanzai Wazir tribe. After leaving his madrassa-based studies in the 1980s, he fought in the Soviet–Afghan War before returning to North Waziristan.\textsuperscript{272} His rise as a local leader began in 2005 when he commanded forces in battle against the Pakistani army that entered North Waziristan (as was detailed earlier in this report, the military’s engagements with the nascent PNT from October 2003 until February 2005 had been limited to South Waziristan).\textsuperscript{273} Bahadar was a negotiator at the September 2006 North Waziristan Agreement, temporarily ending that phase of the war. As commander of all Taliban forces


\textsuperscript{269} For more on Abu Mulal, (see Table 1: \textit{Summary of Notable PNT-Related Attacks}, incident 19, p. 147).

\textsuperscript{270} See “US Drone Targets Hakiimullah Mehsud,” “Taliban Confirms Hikimullah Mushud Injured,” and “At Least 20 Killed in Drone Strike in South Waziristan.”


\textsuperscript{272} “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” pp. 4-6.

\textsuperscript{273} Ibid.
in North Waziristan, he joined in the creation of the TTP in 2007 and was appointed “first deputy head”—the second in command behind then-leader Baitullah Mehsud. Bahadar subsequently demonstrated that he did not consider himself subordinate to Baitullah. Their rift, symptomatic of the TTP’s larger internecine conflict, resulted in Bahadar’s temporary abandonment of the TTP and the formation of a new alliance with other Taliban leaders. Although he ultimately rejoined with Baitullah, in the interim Bahadar struck independent deals with both Mullah Omar and the Pakistani government. Bahadar allegedly provides shelter to “top al Qaeda leaders as well as to operatives from numerous Pakistani and Central Asian terror groups.” Relations between Bahadar and the Haqqani network are reportedly close.

274 Ibid


276 Ibid. Bahadar’s cooperation (and “signed peace agreement”) with the Pakistani government has not resulted in U.S. targeting changes. For Bahadar’s “signed peace agreement” with the Pakistani government, see Bill Roggio, “US Airstrikes Kills 15 in North Waziristan,” The Long War Journal (March 10, 2010). Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/us_airstrike_kills_1.php


Despite deep involvement against U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, Bahadar is classified as a “militant” by Pakistani officials (as opposed to a “terrorist” classification). Perceived as a “good” Taliban—those who do not carry out attacks inside Pakistan—the Pakistani military has repeatedly suspended any type of serious military action in North Waziristan against him and his forces. Indeed, as noted earlier, there is evidence that the Pakistani military is purposely allowing TNSM to reassert itself in the Malakand region as a means of diverting its “response” to that region as opposed to acquiescing to U.S. demands for action in North Waziristan.279

Adding to the complexity of Bahadar’s relations to Pakistan’s military are U.S. drone attacks. Since the CIA’s drone campaign began in 2004, 74 of the 253 total attacks—almost a third—have been against targets specifically related to Bahadar.280 Always under the perception that U.S. military actions are conducted in close consultation with the Pakistani military, each attack moves Bahadar further away from cooperating with Pakistani officials. For example, in March 2011, a CIA drone strikes killed, along with 43 other people, Sherabat Khan, one of Bahadar’s top commanders.281 Described as Bahadar’s “right-hand man,” the killing of Khan precipitated an unusually strong reaction from Bahadar.282 The latter threatened to withdraw from any peace agreements he had with the Pakistani government and likely hinted at a resumption of at least


tacit approval of re-targeting Pakistani facilities and leaders. Hoping to placate Bahadar and pressure the U.S. to abandon his targeting, Pakistani leaders responded by strongly rebuked the U.S. The attack, according to Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani, was “carelessly and callously targeted with complete disregard to human life.” Despite claims by the U.S. that “all the dead were militants or sympathizers,” Pakistan added to its démarche by withdrawing from upcoming U.S./Afghan talks. The episode exemplifies how U.S. targeting in its Afghanistan campaign of “good Taliban”—rightly perceived of as legitimate due to their strong support to the Afghan Taliban—compels the Pakistani government to employ obfuscation and express outrage as it seeks to placate a force that it simultaneously perceives as a means toward their goals in Afghanistan and a potential threat to their internal security.

MAULANA FAQIR MOHAMMED

The December 2007 public unveiling of the TTP was accompanied by the naming of Maulana Faqir Mohammed as “Deputy Chief” (or “Deputy Amir”), the third in command of the organization, behind Hafiz Gul Bahadar and then-leader Baitullah Mehsud. Already well known because of his military leadership during the Battle of Bajaur and his close friendship with Ayman al-Zawahiri, Faqir Mohammed was one of the first PNT leaders to emerge from the tribal revolts in FATA (2002–2004). Since then he has grown in stature and is

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283 “Gen Kayani Condemns ‘Unjustifiable’ Drone Attack,” The Express Tribune, March 18, 2011. Available at: http://www.webcitation.org/5xGFsnCAV


arguably one of the PNT’s most powerful leaders.⁸⁸⁸ Omnipresent since 2008, rumors of Faqir Mohammed’s death have never been confirmed.⁸⁸⁹

Born circa 1970 in the Bajaur agency—just twelve miles from the border of Afghanistan’s Kunar Province—he is from the locally dominant Mommand tribe.⁹⁰ Faqir Mohammed is better educated than most of his Taliban counterparts; he studied under the renowned Maulana Abdus Salam and, consequently, displays a Deobandi ideology with the militant world-view of Salafism. Upon graduation from his madrassa studies, he was given the title of Maulana (our teacher) and subsequently studied the Qur’an at the highly respected Darul-Uloom (religious school/seminary) in Panjpir, Swabi District Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.⁹¹

Faqir Mohammed is one of the few PNT leaders to address nuclear weapon use directly. He reportedly told an interviewer in 2008 that if “we get hold of nuclear

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⁸⁸⁸ There are perennial reports of Faqir Mohammed’s death, the latest being on March 5, 2010. However, it is believed that he is still alive and uninjured. See Faisil Aziz, “Suspect Arrested in Pakistan not Gadahn: Officials,” Reuters, March 8, 2010. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6261SB20100308


⁹¹ For more on the Panjpiris see footnote 171.
weapons, which we hope to get very soon, then we will safeguard them until Allah Almighty guides us when and against whom to use them.”

As highlighted earlier, Bajaur agency is unique among the PNT’s FATA strongholds because of its proximity to Afghan provinces Kunar and Nuristan (the three areas collectively form the “Kunar-Nuristan triangle.” Strategic Kunar is where the Soviets engaged in some of their heaviest fighting during the Soviet–Afghan war). As an Afghan Taliban conduit into and out of Afghanistan, and as the PNT’s key logistical base and sanctuary, Bajaur’s status has forced the Pakistani government to engage the PNT to an unprecedented degree and has given the former strong incentives to reach regional accommodations with the latter. It is this high level of willingness by the Pakistani government to negotiate with the TTP in Bajaur (which Faqir Mohammed commands) that has led to his controversial status within the PNT. To fully appreciate why this is the case it is useful to recall that one of the PNT’s primary characteristics is its lack of a unified threat perception with regard to the Pakistani military. On one hand, some components of the PNT, for example, the Mehsud faction, treat the U.S. military and Pakistani security forces as one in the same; on the other hand, other factions of the PNT, such as those of Faqir Mohammed, are primarily committed to evicting foreign forces from Afghanistan and reestablishing the Taliban’s political control from Kabul.

MAULAVI NAZIR

Maulavi Nazir is emblematic of those elements within the PNT generally, and the TTP specifically, who have been reluctant to expand their struggle to Pakistani targets, prioritizing the Afghan jihad instead. In short, Nazir is considered “good Taliban,” by Pakistani officials. Born in 1975 into South Waziristan’s Kakakhel tribe, which is a sub-clan of the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe, Nazir followed the similar route of a madrassa education followed by a journey to Afghanistan (when barely a teenager) to join in the anti-Soviet jihad. Staying in post-Soviet Afghanistan and eventually joining the Taliban, Nazir’s experience was relatively unique in that he established strong relations with Gulbuuddin Hekmatyar’s

292 Carol Grisanti, “Face-To-Face with a Taliban Commander,” NBC News (online), May 6, 2008. Available at: http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/05/06/984755.aspx

293 Recall that, among others, Nek Mohammad and Haji Omar were also from the Ahmedzai sub-tribe of Wazir tribe.
Hezb-e-Islami\textsuperscript{294}, Pakistan’s ISI and the JUI-F.\textsuperscript{295} He returned to Pakistan’s South Waziristan in November 2001. Nazir positioned himself to receive significant amounts of money that al-Qa’ida was pouring into the Waziristan agencies.\textsuperscript{296} His stature within the PNT was firmly established by his enforcement of a rigged application of \textit{Shāri’a} in areas of South Waziristan. Complicating matters was Nazir’s initial acquiesce to Mullah Omar’s demand that the PNT focus its military efforts solely on targets in the Afghan theatre. Adherence to Mullah Omar’s strategic targeting preferences allowed for close ties between Nazir and the Pakistani government (specifically the ISI, an organization he had come to know well during his time in Afghanistan). Linked to this was Nazir’s violent opposition to the presence of some foreign jihadists in South Waziristan, specifically the Members of the IMU and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU).\textsuperscript{297} Consequently, Pakistani authorities saw Nazir as a “new type” of PNT leader, one that could be drawn away from al-Qa’ida and those PNT elements that were violently targeting the Pakistani state. Through overt support, the Pakistani government hoped to funnel Nazir’s martial operations into Afghanistan;\textsuperscript{298} his reportedly strong links to the Haqqani network are, therefore, natural.\textsuperscript{299} Not surprisingly, Nazir’s actions brought him and his group into violent conflict with, among others, Baitullah Mehsud. In the August 2009 power struggle that followed Baitullah Mehsud’s death, Nazir was reportedly killed. However, as noted earlier, his death has not been confirmed.\textsuperscript{300}

\textsuperscript{294} Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (the Islamic Party of Afghanistan) was founded


\textsuperscript{296} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{298} Ibid. In addition to providing Nazir with finances and material, during his battles with the IMU, the Pakistani military reportedly also supplied “medical cover to Nazir’s forces and also helped him secure the bases vacated by the Uzbeks.” Abbas, “South Waziris-tan’s Maulvi Nazir: The New Face of the Taliban.”


C. RELATIONS WITH OTHER GROUPS

Oversimplified in many ways, Figure 6 (Groups Linked to or Part of the PNT) illustrates the diverse actors that are either a part of the PNT or have demonstratively strong connections with it. Not surprisingly, most of these groups have organizational structures distinct from one another to varying degrees. However, by visually identifying the PNT’s primary factions, it is possible to discern common structural relationships that might likely exist when large-scale operations are being planned and carried out. Although it is beyond the scope of this report to examine in detail each group represented in the PNT, it is essential to appreciate the larger actors linked to and, in some cases, comprising part of this amalgam.
The figure portrays the PNT’s general elements beginning with a distinction between domestic and foreign actors. As was previously explored, the PNT’s foreign elements can be disaggregated into four primary groupings. First and second are the primary bodies of the PNT’s foreign component, the Afghan Taliban and al-Qa’ida. The former supplies personnel because of its strong Deobandi and Pashtun tribal links, while the latter often provides logistics and finances. Third is the role of current and former Kashmiri fighters in the PNT’s ranks—many of whom, like al-Qa’ida, have strong links to well established Pakistani- and Afghan-based terrorist groups. Finally, the PNT is known to have strong connections with “foreign fighters,” many of whom were linked to al-Qa’ida and the Taliban during their time of safe-haven and rule, respectively, in Afghanistan. Al-Qa’ida’s relationship with the PNT has already been illuminated in this report. Before examining relevant Kashmiri groups, it is first necessary to return briefly to the PNT’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban.

MULLAH OMAR AND THE AFGHAN TALIBAN

Although much of the Afghan Taliban’s relevance vis-à-vis the PNT is explored in other areas of this report, three additional observations are warranted for this section. First, readers should recall that the Afghan Taliban has not been officially designated as a terrorist group by the U.S., the UK, the EU, Canada, Pakistan or, among other relevant countries, India. Second, seeking to maintain a common front in Afghanistan, Taliban supreme leader Mullah Omar has endeavored to keep the TTP’s unity intact. For example, the aforementioned conflict between, on one side, Baitullah Mehsud and, on the other side, Bahadar and Maulavi Nazir, was resolved by a delegation from Mullah Omar during negotiations from December 2008 to January 2009. Prior to these negotiations the TTP had split into two governing factions; however, with Mullah Omar’s intervention, the TTP’s primary rivals reportedly overcame their differences and established a new alliance, the Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahidin (Council for United Holy Warriors).

301 Many of these actors can arguably be seen as both domestic and foreign yet they are bifurcated in the graphic for illustrative purposes.

302 Russia has specified the Taliban as terrorists.

303 Ibid.

arrangement, in Mullah Omar’s view, was its commitment to focusing resources on the Afghan war theatre.

Third, Mullah Omar has sought to control the broader scope of the PNT’s strategic violence. While calling for actions that would lead to the full Talibani-

zation of the tribal areas, Mullah Omar has asked the PNT’s Waziri factions “not to fight against Pakistan, since this is in the interest of the U.S.” Moreover, the Afghan Taliban clearly places a priority on militant actions within Afghanistan, even if this entails PNT losses in Pakistan. For example, during the Second Battle of Swat, it was reported that the Afghan Taliban refused to allow Pakistani Pashtun fighters to return to the Malakand region to engage the military. “The Pakistani Taliban are here in Afghanistan to fight Americans and do jihad,” the Taliban’s spokesman told an interviewer in June 2009. “They are under our direct command,” he emphasized, “and will never go back to Pakistan until they have been killed or the Americans pull out from Afghanistan.” These two areas of Mullah Omar’s Afghan Taliban presence in the PNT’s affairs—resolving internecine conflicts and attempting to channel its targeting away from the Pakistani military and toward the Afghan theatre—are interconnected. Although much of its rancor is due to inherent tribal feuds, the PNT’s most profound and violent rifts stem from differences in strategic targeting. Following Mullah Omar’s dictates, several of the PNT’s Waziri groups (both Uthmanzai in North Waziristan and Ahmedzai in the Wana area) allegedly diminished or entirely abandoned targeted violence against Pakistani forces. For example, both Hafiz Gul Bahadar and Maulavi Nazir have, at times, fully channeled their military operations into Afghanistan. In response to continued U.S. drone attacks, however, both Bahadar and Nazir resumed attacks against Pakistan’s military.


307 Ibid.

308 Another significant group that has redirected its armed-struggle to the Afghan theatre is the Abdullah Mehsud group, see, for example, Roggio, “Anti-Baitullah Taliban Groups Merge, Appoint New Leader.”

309 Wadhams and Cookman, “Faces of Pakistan’s Militant Leaders.”
FORMER ANTI-SOVIET AND (SUBSEQUENTLY) KASHMIRI GROUPS AND THE PNT

In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s first jihadist group emerged in 1980. Shortly after 9/11, Pakistan’s jihadist terrain had at least 24 groups, all of them, as is explored below, originating from the same source. All of these organizations, to one degree or another, were nurtured by the ISI and never thought of themselves as “terrorists,” but rather as having some kind of official state sanction for their actions. “For all those 25 years in Afghanistan and 12 years in Kashmir,” notes Jamiat-e-Islami’s leader Munawar Hussain, the ISI “patronized” jihad through these organizations. As long as they restricted their actions to Afghanistan or Kashmir and did not engage in domestic violence (with the exception of some targeted killings of Shi’ites, the perceived fifth column for “Iranian infiltration”), Islamabad was willing to show great flexibility and continually shielded these jihadists from domestic or international persecution. However, by 2001 it was becoming clear to some that “their ambitions were exceeding the goals of the ISI” and their continued presence was hindering Pakistan’s foreign policy pertaining to India and the West. Since then Pakistan has witnessed the extremely complicated and painful interplay of the state and their erstwhile jihadist dependents as the former attempts to distance and, indeed, protect itself from the latter.

310 In many instances these groups underwent their genesis as Kashmiri fighters before growing into transnational jihadist organizations. Such groups are referred to as “Kashmiri” for the sake of simplicity.

311 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, p. 52.

312 As quoted in Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 118.

313 Abou Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, p. 27

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT: Army of the Pure).\textsuperscript{315} LeT is a member of Usama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jewish People.\textsuperscript{316} Although it is believed that LeT has no formal alliance with PNT groups, the former does have a long history of cooperation with the Afghan Taliban.\textsuperscript{317} In this vein it is not surprising that LeT, which was founded in 1988, was traditionally more acquiescent to the ISI than most other Pakistan-based militant organizations\textsuperscript{318} and until at least early 2009, according to South Asian terrorism specialist C. Christine Fair, “never targeted the Pakistani state or international targets within Pakistan.”\textsuperscript{319} There have been reports of LeT assisting the Taliban and al-Qa’ida in both its escape from Afghanistan in 2001 and their 2002 resettlement in Quetta and South


\textsuperscript{318} Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, pp. 53.

Moreover, it is likely dozens of individuals from LeT have joined key PNT groups—most significantly the TTP. PNT personnel with LeT origins are likely to be more highly educated than their PNT counterparts—it has been reported that “LeT draws recruits from universities and colleges as well as from among unemployed youth,” while reportedly only ten percent of LeT’s makeup has gone through a madrassa.

**Harakat ul-Jihad al-Islami** (HuJI: Movement of Islamic Holy War). Credible reports confirm that HuJI was the Pakistan’s first jihadist organization to be based in country. While these sources agree that HuJI emerged from two of the earliest Afghan-based jihadist groups combating the Soviets, they vary as to the year that HuJI actually appeared (see Figure 6: Conceptualizing Harakat Groups: HIIA, HuJI, HuM, HuA and HuMA). Regardless, there is no doubt that HuJI is in many aspects “the progenitor of the Deobandi jihadi groups.” Consequently, it has an extremely strong bond with the Afghan Taliban as well as close ties to, among others, al-Qa’ida, the TTP, LeT, HuM, Harkat-ul-Mujahidin-al-Alami (HuMA: The International Movement of the Mujahidin), LeJ, SSP, and JeM. Experts disagree on who founded HuJI,

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320 Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*, p. 60.


322 Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*, p. 56.


although all credible accounts place Qari Saifullah Akhtar\textsuperscript{328} and Maulana Fazlur Rehman at the center of its genesis. From the mid-1980s and through the 1990s, HuJI was considered a heavy weight in the jihadi milieu with reported links to jihadist movements in 24 countries.\textsuperscript{329} In addition to providing thousand of fighters for the Afghanistan theatre, HuJI is thought to have supplied the conflict in Kashmir with its greatest number of mujahidin “sacrifices.”\textsuperscript{330}

As is broadly the case with the PNT as a whole, significant conflicts have erupted within HuJI regarding strategic targeting. Rather than the TTP’s internecine battles about whether or not to only target forces fighting the Afghan Taliban or to also engage Pakistani security forces in Pakistan, HuJI’s internal battles have regarded whether or not to only operate in Indian Administered Kashmir, or to also engage in jihad in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Qari Saifullah Akhtar’s links to the Afghan Taliban, which came to light after he was forced to flee Afghanistan in 2001, reportedly eroded the cooperation between Jamait-ul-Mujahidin, wedded to a Kashmir-only strategy, and the internationalist HuJI.\textsuperscript{331} HuJI is perceived by some to have become largely dormant since 2002.\textsuperscript{332} Researcher Nicholas Howenstein has advanced the idea that “the collapse of the Taliban also augured the demise of HuJI.”\textsuperscript{333} Without its Deobandi allies to provide sanctuary, Howenstein continues, “many of the group’s foreign cadres dispersed, and Pakistani mujahidin in

\textsuperscript{328} For more on Qari Akhtar, a seminal PNT figure, see Amir Mir, “HUJI Chief Still at Large,” \textit{The News} (Islamabad), September 23, 2008. See also “Significance of Qari Saifullah Akhtar’s Arrest,” \textit{Daily Times} (Lahore), August 9, 2004. Available at: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_9-8-2004_pg3_1

\textsuperscript{329} Hussain \textit{Frontline Pakistan}, p. 73.

\textsuperscript{330} Howenstein “The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan,” p. 25.

\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{332} However, Qari Saifullah Akhtar has been active since 2002. See footnote 41. See also “TTP Leadership’s Names Missing from FIA ‘Red Book,'” \textit{Dawn}, March 3, 2010. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-fia-redbook-qs-08

\textsuperscript{333} Howenstein “The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan,” p. 25.
Pakistan-administered Kashmir have been instructed to cooperate with other militant groups.\footnote{334}

**Harakat ul-Mujahidin** (HuM: The Movement of the Mujahidin).\footnote{335} Consistent narratives of HuM’s history are rare. This is partly because of HuM’s ever-shifting name, its close association and conflation with other Kashmiri jihadist groups, and attempts by both state actors (i.e., Pakistan’s ISI) and non-state actors to obfuscate HuM’s role in acts of violent extremism. There is a general consensus that HuM was established in 1985, the result of a power struggle within HuJI over leadership succession following the death of Maulana Irshad Ahmed (see Figure 6). Failing in his bid to outmaneuver Qari Saifullah Akhtar and gain control of HuJI, Maulana Fazlur Rehman instead established HuM.\footnote{336} Its initial mission was combating Soviet forces in Afghanistan.\footnote{337} The group reunited with HuJI in 1993 to form Harakat ul-Ansar (HuA).\footnote{338} Despite another rupture that caused HuJI and HuM to again part ways in 1997, HuA was considered an effective fighting force in Kashmir with attacks increasing dramatically in its four years of existence.\footnote{339} Moreover, HuA is considered a key component in the transformation of the Kashmiri conflict from an “Islamic war of national liberation”—being fought primarily by Kashmiri Islamic groups—into a *jihad* being waged by primarily non-indigenous fighters (i.e., militants not native to Kashmir).

\footnote{334}{Ibid.}

\footnote{335}{In 2003 HuM changed its name to Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA), however, post-2003 accounts of JuA actions still frequently refer to the group as HuM. Unless otherwise indicated, this report refers to the group as HuM to avoid confusion.}


\footnote{337}{Ibid. For overviews of HuM see Howenstein, “The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan,” and Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan*, pp. 60-74.}

\footnote{338}{A reunification largely brokered by Maulana Masood Azhar—the founder, in 2000, of Jaysh-e-Muhammed (JeM: Army of Muhammed).}

\footnote{339}{Howenstein, “The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan,” p. 26.}
A member of Usama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, HuM supported the Taliban regime in Afghanistan with men, material, and finances. One of its former leaders, Maulana Masood Azhar, founded JeM. Not surprisingly, the group has strong bonds with dozens of jihadist groups and has enjoyed unprecedented ties to elements within the ISI and other elements of the Pakistani military in general. In 2000, Maulana Fazlur Rehman stepped down as leader of HuM and was replaced by Forooqi Kashmiri. Banned in late 2001 by the Pakistani government, some members of HuM reportedly relocated to the Waziristan agencies to join components of the PNT, eventually emerging as members of the TTP.

Following its proscription, HuM is believed to have followed a variety of possible courses. Some observers believe that HuM’s banning coincided with an internal conflict—the result of both occurrences led to the founding of Harkat- ul-Mujahidin-al-Alami (HuMA) by members of HuM. However, some commentators believe the split within HuM could have been fabricated to allow it to operate under the moniker of HuMA. Others, for example the U.S. State Department, propose HuM simply renamed itself Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA) in 2003. Under whatever sobriquet it is operating under, HuM has been active. It was part of the 2003 failed assassination attempts against Pakistani

340 See, for example, “International Islamic Front,” South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) and Raman, “The Punjabi Taliban.”

341 Some reports have its banning as having occurred in 1999.


343 Howenstein, “The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan,” p. 27.

President Musharraf. In addition, it has connections with LeJ, PNT elements in FATA and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and with Afghan Taliban divisions that are active against U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. The group has also had a long history of involvement with al-Qa‘ida; some of its members were among the 21 militants killed in the August 1998 U.S. cruise-missile attack against al-Qa‘ida in Khost, Afghanistan.

In 2005, two American citizens were arrested in the U.S. for their suspected participation in an al-Qa‘ida plot. They reportedly confessed to having received training at a HuM camp in 2003-2004. HuM reportedly supplies the PNT with a steady and large stream of currency. In 2009, researchers at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) reported that “groups like [LeJ] and HuM … are giving money that they are collecting in Sindh and Punjab provinces to the Pakistan Taliban as gifts … in return for sanctuary, training, and ideological support.”

Well publicized attempts were made against the life of then-President Musharraf on December 14 and December 25, 2003. One of HuM’s leaders that was active in the plots was the infamous Amjad Hussain Farooqi, “a key suspect in almost every terrorist attack in Pakistan after 9/11.” Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, p. 68. Musharraf wrote in his autobiography that “[h]e was the planner of the attempts to assassinate me.” For Musharraf’s account of the assassination attempts see Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, pp. 245-263. For quote see p. 225. Farooqi was killed in September 2004. HuJI subsequently established a brigade named the “Amjad Farooqi Group.”


Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, p. 44. The actual attack on August 20, 1998—involving 75 cruise missiles –took place at the Zawhar Kili camp complex seven miles south of Khost. This was the same location where bin Laden, six months earlier, had announced his jihad against “Crusaders and Jews.” In total twenty-one militants were killed. See Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), pp. 410-411.


Ibid.

FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND THE PNT

Foreign fighters associated with the PNT represent dozens of countries. Not surprisingly, Central Asian countries provide the PNT with the overwhelming bulk of its foreign combatants. Most import among these groups are:

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Members of the IMU constitute the majority of the foreigners in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Forced into hiding because it violently opposed Uzbekistan’s secular and despotic leaders in the 1990s, active in Tajikistan’s civil war (1992-1997), and funded in part by the ISI and Saudi Arabia, the IMU reportedly seeks “to rid the Central Asian Republics (CAR) and the Xinjiang region of China of the lingering influence of Communism and make them part of an Islamic Caliphate.” In late 1999, finally routed from their Uzbek bases, they relocated to Afghanistan and gained additional combat experience while assisting the Taliban and al-Qa’ida in their battles against Northern Alliance and, in late 2001, U.S. forces. Between 2000 and 2001, the IMU reportedly established training camps in Waziristan. Together with the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, the IMU subsequently

351 The term “foreign fighter,” in this report’s context, refers to non-Afghan, non-Arab fighters.

352 Central Asian militants have been a feature of the tribal areas landscape since before 2001/2002. Hassas Abbas has pointed out that “military guests of the yore from Arab and Central Asian states have largely become part and parcel of [Pashtun] society through marriages.” Abbas, “Profiles of Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies.”


355 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp. 67-70. Brian Glyn Williams has advanced the idea that “[a]s the IMU increasingly came under bin Laden’s influence, it gradually morphed from an organization narrowly focused on toppling [Uzbekistan’s leadership], to a Wahhabi – Salafite movement with a macro-perspective.” Williams, “Talibanistan: History of a Transnational Terrorist Sanctuary,” p. 45.

fled Afghanistan, relocating to Pakistan’s tribal areas where they were joined by other foreign jihadists, for example Chechens and Uighur Muslims from eastern China. In time, the group became known for their savage and effective fighting skill against civilian and military targets in Pakistan. Above all else, they were renowned for their deep loyalty to bin Laden, morphing into what Imtiaz Gul has termed “a lethal non-Arab al Qaeda entity.” The 2007 Lal Masjid incident appears to have particularly galvanized the group. The IMU’s Amir, Tahir Yuldashev, was quoted as saying “we consider them (Lal Masjid) a part of us before, during and after the incident... their wounds are our wounds, their shaheed are our shaheed... their prisoners are our prisoners.... Every member of the Harakat [i.e. IMU] will stand up against the terrorist act that took place on Lal Masjid. ... After Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan ranks 3rd in the ... (‘jihadi operations’) launched on its territory.” Videos capturing such sentiments were reportedly widely distributed as part of IMU’s recruitment activities in the tribal areas.  

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359 Ibid.

360 Tahir Yuldashev is also known as Qari Farooq and Tahir Farooq.


362 Ibid.
Along with its current strong presence in the northern Afghan provinces\textsuperscript{363}, it was estimated that by mid-2008, three to four thousand Uzbek and other Central Asian militants were under the command of the IMU in the Waziristan agencies.\textsuperscript{364} The South Asia Analysis Group has reported that “[r]eliable police and tribal sources in [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] say that many, if not most, of the acts of suicide terrorism and attacks on the Pakistani Armed Forces since the Pakistan Army’s commando action in the Lal Masjid [incident] ... were carried out by angry tribals motivated and trained by the IMU.”\textsuperscript{365} However, more recent reports indicate the IMU has lost some of its strength and prestige in the tribal areas. Failing “to integrate itself into the local Taliban movement and join the jihad in Afghanistan or Pakistan in any meaningful way,” the Jamestown Foundation reports, has caused some of the IMU’s “exiled fighters [to turn to] crime, including those who hire themselves out as assassins.”\textsuperscript{366} Jamestown goes on to report that “[a]lthough they continue to find hospitality from some tribal elements in North Waziristan, the Uzbek militants have suffered steady attrition in numbers from attacks by tribal lashkars [i.e., an armed force usually raised with a specific objective] and government security forces.”\textsuperscript{367} Moreover, the IMU’s standing with the TTP is varied. While generally supported by the Mehsud factions, the group has been violently opposed

\textsuperscript{363} It is widely understood that together with the Afghan Taliban, the IMU forms the “Taliban shadow government in the northern provinces.” See, Bill Roggio, “ISAF Captures Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s Top Commander for Afghanistan,” \textit{The Long War Journal}, April 22, 2011. Available at: \url{http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/04/isaf_captures_top_is.php}

\textsuperscript{364} Rashid, \textit{Descent into Chaos}, p. 347. A figure of 3,000 IMU fighters in North Waziristan was given in early 2011.

\textsuperscript{365} Raman, “Uzbeks to the Fore.”


\textsuperscript{367} Ibid.
by elements of the TTP aligned with Maulavi Nazir. The group was further weakened by the loss of its Amir, Tahir Yuldashev, in a U.S. airstrike in South Waziristan on August 27, 2009. Presently believed to be led by Usman Jan, the IMU reportedly has strong links to the Haqqani network.

The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) also has a presence in the tribal areas. Originating in 2002, the IJU is reportedly “dedicated to [the] over-all objective of a global Islamic Caliphate, [and] projects itself as a global jihadi organisation and not a basically Uzbek organization.” The scholar Cerwyn Moore has described the IJU “as an umbrella term used to link a network of affiliated Jamoat [jamoat is the Uzbek version of the Arabic jama’at, or ‘community’] groups from Central Asia, comprised of Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Kazakh radicals, linked to, but not formerly associated with, the IMU.”

368 In just three days in March 2007, Nazir’s militiamen reportedly killed over 80 IMU fighters in fierce combat that utilized heavy weapons, rockets and mortars. Total IMU losses at the hands of Nazir’s forces have been estimated at 200. These numbers are significant: when the IMU finally escaped U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2001, their numbers were estimated to be from 600 to 1,000. Ismail Khan “100 Dead in Militant Clashes in Pakistan,” The New York Times, March 21, 2007. For total losses see Abbas, “South Waziristan’s Maulvi Nazir: The New Face of the Taliban.” For an estimate of the IMU’s strength in 2002, see Williams, “Talibanistan: History of a Transnational Terrorist Sanctuary,” p. 45. See also, Iqbal Khattak, “Wazir Tribes Ratify New Militant Bloc,” Daily Times (Lahore), July 8, 2008. Available at: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\07\08\story_8-7-2008_pg7_1


370 See, for example, Dan Witter “Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region,” Institute for the Study of War, Backgrounder, January 27, 2011, p. 8 and passim.


372 B. Raman, “Uzbeks to the Fore.”

373 Moore, “Uzbek Terror Network: Germany, Jamoat, and the IJU.”
reportedly enjoying close relations with bin Laden prior to his death, and Mullah Omar,\textsuperscript{374} the IJU’s Pakistani sanctuaries are primarily in FATA’s Bajaur and Waziristan agencies.\textsuperscript{375} In addition to using Pakistan’s tribal areas as a command center for launching well-coordinated and deadly attacks in Uzbekistan,\textsuperscript{376} the group has plotted and carried out several attacks against Pakistani leaders and security forces throughout northwestern Pakistan.\textsuperscript{377} In December 2007, they joined with the other PNT factions in battling Pakistan’s military forces during the First Battle of Swat.\textsuperscript{378} Like the IMU, the group is thought to excel at the paramilitary training of PNT’s cadres.\textsuperscript{379} According to the U.S. State Department, the IJU was the first terrorist group to employ female suicide bombers in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{380} The group reportedly has “strong linkages” with the Haqqani network.\textsuperscript{381}

Finally, it should be noted that the IJU, which projects the U.S. as the main enemy of Islam, reportedly has cells outside of Central and South Asia, including Turkey and Europe. Most notable of these cells was one in Germany that


\textsuperscript{375} Khan, “Bajaur Agency: The New Landscape of Insurgency in FATA.”

\textsuperscript{376} From March 29, 2004 to July 30, 2004, the IJU undertook a campaign of terrorist attacks (often suicide) against state and foreign targets in Tashkent. In at least nine incidents the IJU killed 20 and injured another 63 police officers and civilians. Two of these incidents targeted the U.S. and Israeli embassies. For these two attacks see GTD (ID numbers 200407300002 and 200407300001 respectively). For the other seven incidents see WITS (ICN numbers: 200458344, 200458911, 200458345, 200464115, 200458913 and 200459604).

\textsuperscript{377} Sandee, “The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU),” pp. 14-15. The IJU also has one confirmed attack against U.S. forces in Khost, Afghanistan—a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in March 2008 that killed two U.S. soldiers and wounded 1 other. See WITS, ICN number 200807293.

\textsuperscript{378} Ibid, p. 15

\textsuperscript{379} B. Raman, “Uzbeks to the Fore.”

\textsuperscript{380} “U.S. Department of State Designates the Islamic Jihad Group Under Executive Order 13224.”

\textsuperscript{381} Witter “Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan’s Tribal Region,” p. 36.
was partially apprehended prior to an attack on the U.S. military base at Ramstein (the IJU cell had successfully acquired “700 kilos of chemicals capable of being converted into explosives”). This 2007 plot allegedly also involved the targeting of NATO offices in Germany and Turkey.

DOMESTIC AGENTS

Domestic agents that are linked to, or constitute part of, the PNT, include the previously explored roles of the TTP, TNSM, and relevant principal tribes of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There is also the important role that non-state actors from Punjab play in the PNT, as well as various licit groups and coalitions that have links to the PNT, for example the ISI and the MMA.

**Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan** (TTP: Movement of the Pakistani Taliban). Explored throughout this report, the TTP is the largest and most powerful faction of the PNT. It is frequently, and erroneously, considered to represent the Pakistani Taliban in its entirety. Since its debut in December 2007, it has typically been described as an “umbrella organization” representing some 40 senior Taliban leaders and their 27 groups. The same *shura* (consultation body) that nominally created the TTP reportedly also determined its top

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382 B. Raman, “Uzbeks to the Fore.” For more on the plot and a general backgrounder on IJU, see Moore, “Uzbek Terror Network: Germany, Jamoat, and the IJU.”


384 Even U.S. General Stanley McChrystal, perhaps to simplify matters for his civilian audience, has strengthened this misconception: “I think that it’s critical that as they deal with their internal insurgency –which is significant, and people call it the Pakistani Taliban or TTP, and it’s creating great pain for Pakistanis…” “A Conversation on Strategy and Teamwork with General McChyrstal - Part 1,” Charlie Rose Show Transcripts, December 9, 2009.


commanders.\textsuperscript{387} As noted earlier, Baitullah Mehsud (deceased and succeeded by Hakimullah Mehsud) was announced as the central leader with Hafiz Gul Bahadur as second commander and Faqir Mohammad as third commander.\textsuperscript{388} Despite effective U.S. drone assassination attacks and setbacks on the battlefields of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as of June 2011 the TTP is still a formidable fighting force.

**Punjabi Taliban** (Tehrik-e-Taliban Punjab: Movement of the Punjabi Taliban). Since 2007 observers have increasingly pointed toward terrorist attacks attributed to the “Punjabi Taliban” network as evidence that violent Talibanization efforts in Pakistan are now countrywide.\textsuperscript{389} Others commentators reverse this implicit perception of cause and effect by asserting that the Punjabi Taliban are enablers of core PNT groups (e.g., the TTP); they provide the latter with “weapons, recruits, finances and other resources,” allowing them to expand their influence throughout Pakistan.\textsuperscript{390} In other words, according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), the rise of extremism in Pakistan “is not an outgrowth or ‘carry over’ of the Pakistani Taliban.” Rather, the ICG contends, “violent Deobandi networks in Punjab lie at the root of Pakistan’s militancy problem.”\textsuperscript{391} Regardless of origin, concerns today naturally revolve around the degree to which the Punjabi Taliban and FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Taliban groups (e.g., the TTP) have adopted similar agendas. In that regard,

\textsuperscript{387} Ibid. Reportedly also present at the meeting were key Taliban leaders of the five other non-Waziri FATA agencies (from south to north: Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber, Mohmand and Bajaur) as well as key Taliban representatives from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa districts (also roughly from south to north) of Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Bannu, Kohat, Peshawar, Malakand, Buner, Swat and Dir. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{388} See Siddique, “The Red Mosque Operation and its Impact on the Growth of the Pakistani Taliban,” p. 27


\textsuperscript{390} “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” p. i.

\textsuperscript{391} In Punjab as a whole the Deobandi sect does not have predominance. The largest Sunni following belongs to the Barelvi component of Sufi Islam. “The State Of Sectarianism in Pakistan, p. 14.
some observers posit “the TTP and Punjabi militants are part of the same front and have one mission.”

Although the major groups in the Punjabi Taliban network—LeJ, SSP, and JeM—are typically associated with sectarian violence and, in some cases, the struggle for control of Kashmir, they increasingly reflect the growing trend in domestic Pakistani terrorism away from the targeting of religious marches, mosques, and Shi’ite leaders, to what has been called “increasingly bold strikes against the symbols of the state.” Hassan Abbas has identified five key features of the Punjabi Taliban. First, the organizations within the network all act independently, without an intra-group command or organization structure. In addition, only factions or individuals that have had close collaboration with the TTP, TNSM, or other PNT militants from the Pakistani tribal areas are part of the network. In other words, no Punjabi-based terrorist group is wholly a part of the Punjabi Taliban. Second, several of these groups benefitted from high-level state military training and combat experience because Pakistan sought to use them to challenge India in the contested sections of Kashmir in the 1990s. Consequently, many of these groups are highly proficient in sabotage, guerilla tactics, and asymmetrical warfare in general. Third, the groups are all Sunni and are rigidly committed to Deobandi doctrines with a Salafist orientation. Fourth, many of these groups’


393 Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” p. 3. This is not meant to assert that terrorist attacks against sectarian targets have necessarily decreased in Pakistan. While this may be the case, it is far more likely that sectarian terrorist attacks have risen (just as has been the case with all major types of terrorist targets in Pakistan as a whole). However, sectarian attacks have risen at a slower proportional pace than other non-secular targets—for example, symbols of the Pakistani state. The author bases these assertions on trends emerging in the GTD and WITS.


395 Ibid.

396 Ibid.

397 Ibid.
members were part of the madrassa system, yet in contrast to their Pashtun counterparts, “the Punjabi Taliban are comparatively more educated, better equipped and technologically savvier.” Finally, Abbas notes that Punjabi Taliban operatives typically tend to have criminal backgrounds and while fully accepting their own death as part of an operation, they endeavor to fight until killed by an opponent as opposed to a strict suicide attack.

Although the Punjabi Taliban is often a blanket term used to describe several Punjab-based jihadi organizations, at its core it is three groups:

- **Lashkar-e-Jhangvi** (LeJ: The Army of Jhang). A member of Usama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, LeJ exclusively reflects the Deobandi current of Sunni Islam. Prior to 9/11 the group was associated with targeted attacks on Shi’ites. An offshoot of SSP discussed next, some analysts have gone as far as positing that “the Tehrik-e-Taliban Punjab (i.e., the Punjabi Taliban) is a newly-created united front of LeJ.” Although such a strong link is doubtful, like SSP and JeM, the group undoubtedly maintains close links to al-Qa’ida, the Afghan Taliban, and the TTP. Like the TTP and

398 Ibid, p. 3. Ahmed Rashid has noted that some of these former Kashmiri fighters, after having made links with the Pakistani Taliban, “were able to mount suicide attacks in Pakistani cities where the Taliban themselves had little access.” Rashid, “Pakistan on the Brink.”

399 Ibid.


401 “The State Of Sectarianism In Pakistan,” p. 3. For IIF membership see Raman, “The Punjabi Taliban.”


403 Raman, “The Punjabi Taliban.”

al-Qa‘ida, LeJ has been connected to the September 2008 bombing
of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad\(^{405}\) (see Table 1: Summary of Notable
PNT-Related Attacks, incident 11, p. 142). There are also reports that
significant elements of LeJ are now located in FATA’s Orakzai agency
where, according to one report, they serve as “the muscle” for larger
terrorist attacks.\(^{406}\) In short, LeJ has planned (and, at times, assisted
in the execution) of attacks attributed to FATA-based PNT groups.\(^{407}\)
Although all of the Punjabi Taliban engage in sectarian violence to
some extent, LeJ is the most violently anti-Shi‘ite group active in the
world.

In examining LeJ, it is useful to explore where it has been active
during the last several years (as measured by confirmed attacks, see
Figure 8: LeJ Confirmed Attacks in Pakistan by Administrative Units
2004-2010). What is immediately evident from LeJ’s confirmed attack
pattern in that time frame is its clear preference for targets located in
very large cities. Of LeJ’s 13 attacks in Balochistan, all of them
occurred in Quetta, the provincial capital that has roughly 1.2 million
inhabitants.\(^{408}\) As for Sindh, eight of the ten attacks occurred in its
provincial capital of Karachi, a mega-city with more than 18 million
denizens. Of the four confirmed attacks occurring in Punjab, three
were in large cities: Lahore and Rawalpindi, population 10 million and
3.3 million, respectively. Two of the four attacks in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa occurred in Peshawar, its capital with more than
3 million inhabitants. Both attacks in FATA took place in Bara, a town
just six miles southwest of Peshawar. LeJ’s apparent proclivity for
metropolitan fixed targets is in harmony with its reputation as a master
of logistics and the types of complicated attack planning inherent in

\(^{405}\) Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda-linked suspects emerge in Islamabad Marriott attacks,”
The Long War Journal (September 25, 2008). Available at:
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/09/al_qaedalinked_suspects_emerge_in
_islamabad_marriott_attacks.php See alsoWilliams, “Talibanistan,” p. 51.

\(^{406}\) Roggio, “Pakistani Military Hits Taliban in Arazkai,”

\(^{407}\) “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge,” p. i.

\(^{408}\) Quetta is the location of the Mullah Omar’s Afghan Taliban’s headquarters—what is
called the “Quetta Shura.” The city is also the home to some 300,000 Shi‘ite Hazaras,
a group that is despised and targeted for violence by, among others, LeJ and SSP.
most urban operations. LeJ has learned its skills from the best. The group was one of the first to move many of its members to Afghanistan during the Taliban era of 1996–2001. There they received specialized training amid a network of highly skilled jihadists, most notably al-Qa‘ida. Following the exodus of jihadists from Afghanistan

409 “Given their knowledge about Punjabi cities and security structure, [LeJ has proven] to be valuable partners for the TTP as it targets cities in Punjab, such as Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad.” Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” p. 2.

410 LeJ and SSP relocated to Afghanistan when Pakistan’s civilian government of Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League (PMLN), took significant steps against Deobandi militant groups during Sharif’s second term (February 1997 to October 1999). “The State Of Sectarianism in Pakistan, passim.”
in 2001-2002, LeJ was able to reverse host roles by assisting the Taliban and al-Qa’ida in resettling some of their forces in the Punjab. The International Crisis Group has described LeJ’s present role as “the lynchpin of the alignment between al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and sectarian groups.”

- **Sipah-e-Sahaba** (SSP: Army of the Companions of the Prophet). The second of the Punjabi Taliban’s three vanguard groups, SSP has reportedly been governed wholly by Deobandi clerics since its inception in 1985. Like LeJ, which arose from the SSP, the group is most closely associated with anti-Iran and anti-Shi’ite activities. Given its Deobandi underpinnings and anti-Iranian program, it is not surprising that the SSP has strong links to the ISI, most notably with the Zia regime and the second government of Benazir Bhutto (1993-1996). A member of Usama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, the SSP is strongly linked to JUI-F and JI. SSP recruited thousands of its members from *madrassas* run by the JUI-F and subsequently sent them to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan from the mid-1990s.

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414 Pakistan, it should be recalled, has the world’s second largest Shi’ite population; Iran has the largest.


416 For IIF membership see “International Islamic Front” (SATP).

until late 2001. Throughout the 1990s, the SSP was responsible for complex and lethal attacks against Iranian interest, namely the killing of Iranian diplomats, cultural attachés, and air force cadets. The group was banned in 2002 but simply remerged under a different name. Since then it has conducted sophisticated and deadly attacks against Shi’ite civilians operating at times with the PNT. The International Crisis Group has estimated that some “5,000 to 6,000 SSP activists have undergone jihadi training.”

• **Jaysh-e-Muhammed** (JeM: Army of Muhammed). JeM is a member of Usama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad against the Crusaders and the Jewish People. Founded in 2000, JeM is led by Maulana Masood Azhar, whose links to the ISI, the Taliban, HuM, and al-Qa’ida go back to at least the mid-1990s. Although JeM is nominally wedded to the struggle in Kashmir, its post-9/11 enmity toward the Pakistani government led to attacks against state targets, including the December 2003 plot to assassinate then-President Musharraf. JeM was a key player in the 2007 Lal Masjid incident and it subsequently joined forces with elements of

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419 The new name was Milat-e-Islamia Pakistan (MIP). The group is still commonly referred to as SSP.


421 For IIF membership see Raman, “The Punjabi Taliban.”


423 “Half-way through the Lal Masjid siege, on 8 July 2007 it was reported that members of the outlawed radical organization, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) were in actual control of the Red Mosque.” Siddique, “The Red Mosque Operation and its Impact on the Growth of the Pakistani Taliban,” p. 38.
the TTP to strike against Shi’ite targets.\textsuperscript{424} Reportedly, JeM was also well represented during the First Battle of Swat.\textsuperscript{425} More recently it is believed that JeM is focusing on actions in Afghanistan. Yet the group is still active in Pakistan, for example, likely spearheading the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in March 2009 (see Table 1: \textit{Summary of Notable PNT-Related Attacks}, incident 12, p. 143).

Pakistan’s Religious Political Parties and the PNT

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, founder of Pakistan, originally conceived of it as a secular and democratic state.\textsuperscript{426} “You may belong to any religion or caste or creed,” Jinnah declared in his first presidential speech in 1947, “that has nothing to do with the business of the State.”\textsuperscript{427} After his death in 1948, Jinnah’s goals were abandoned and since then the army—the true seat of power in Pakistan—has been principally guided by an Islamic, as opposed to

\textsuperscript{424} With regard to JeM’s ties to the TTP, scholar Qadeel Siddique has written that “[i]t is therefore not too farfetched to speculate that—based on the sharing of ideology and evidence of JeM presence in Swat—the two organizations are working towards the same goal and hence, most likely pooling resources.” Siddique adds that “[t]he interface between JeM and militants of the tribal areas appears to be a relatively recent development. Hitherto JeM’s agenda has revolved around the ‘jihad’ in Kashmir and Afghanistan, but having joined forces with the Pak-Taliban to fight the Pakistani military (in the case of Swat, for example), indicates a broadening of its activities. This development seems to have taken place after July 2007, further implicating the role of the Lal Masjid operation in pushing for a union of different extremist groups in Pakistan. Considering the bonds between the administration of Lal Masjid and its madrassas, and JeM, it could be reasoned that the group sought to seek revenge against the Pakistani [security forces] for [the raid on Lal Masjid], and in this pursuit joined the Pak-Taliban (with whom it now shares a common enemy).” Ibid, p. 38 and 50.

\textsuperscript{425} Ibid, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{426} Hector Bolitho, Jinnah, \textit{Creator of Pakistan} (London: J. Murray Publisher, 1954), passim.

a solely nationalistic, orientation. As a consequence, Pakistan’s religious groups, notes scholar Vali Nasr, are “opposed to civil society [but] not to army rule, and periods of military rule have seen the expansion of Islamization.” Some of these parties, JUI for example, draw their vision from the conservative religious traditions found in the Deobandi school. Others, such as JI, have their roots in more modern associations like the Muslim Brotherhood. During the Afghan civil war, Pakistani Islamist parties, especially JI and JUI accumulated immense financial resources, weapons, and trained cadres of fighters. They also gained access to international arms markets and developed transnational links with scores of militant groups. As explored at the beginning of this report, JI and JUI form the backbone of the MMA and, during that organization’s time as a major political power (2002-2008) it was credited with “creating the ideological and religious atmosphere for the [Afghan] insurgency, and in teaching and training [jihadist] recruits.” JUI and JI have been able to significantly legitimize the PNT by championing several of its socio-political platforms.

- Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). Founded in 1945 by Deobandis strictly as a religious movement to disperse their articles of faith and muster the sect’s followers, JUI became a political party in 1962. During the Soviet–Afghan War, JUI was excluded from directly working with the ISI in recruiting and supplying mujahidin (in contrast to the central roles played by JI and Hizbe-Islami). As noted earlier, beginning in the early 1980s, JUI took the lead in establishing madrassas in Pakistan’s tribal areas; most of the Afghan Taliban’s leadership attended madrassas run by JUI’s two branches.

428 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p. 35.


432 For example, as noted earlier in this report, “by legally adopting and enforcing stricter Shāri‘a implementation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and supporting the establishment of a ‘vice and virtue’ police, along the lines of the Taliban’s Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.”

433 Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, p. 88-89.

These two organizations, both of which are members of the MMA, are:

- **Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F).** Headed by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the JUI-F reportedly has “profound links” to SSP\(^ {435} \) yet it claims only to support SSP's ideology and not its methods.\(^ {436} \) Although Rehman was a signator to Usama bin Laden’s 1998 International Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders,\(^ {437} \) since at least 2005, JUI-F has reportedly distanced itself from al-Qa’ida.\(^ {438} \) As noted earlier, several unsuccessful assassination attempts have recently been made against Rehman; TNSM-linked elements of the PNT are believed to be behind them.\(^ {439} \)

- **Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-S).** Headed by Maulana Sami ul-Haq. As head of the *madrassa* Darul uloom Haqqania—the *madrassa* that produced Mullah Omar and many other early Taliban leaders—Sami ul-Haq is sometimes referred to as “the father of the Taliban.”\(^ {440} \) A former Senator said to be “virulently” anti-American, Sami ul-Haq is reported to have strong ties with the contemporary leadership of the Afghan Taliban.\(^ {441} \)

\(^ {435} \) Magnus Norell, “The Taliban and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),” p. 73.  
\(^ {436} \) Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, p. 23.  
\(^ {437} \) “International Islamic Front” (SATP).  
\(^ {438} \) “The State Of Sectarianism in Pakistan, p. 21.  
\(^ {439} \) See, “Suicide Bomber Attacks JUI-F Chief’s Convoy, 12 Killed,” *Daily Times* (Lahore), April 1, 2011. Available at: [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\04\01\story_1-4-2011_pg1_1](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\04\01\story_1-4-2011_pg1_1) See also, Jamal, “Pakistani Taliban Widen Jihad with Strikes on Fellow Muslims.”  
**Jamaat-e-Islami (JI).** Prominent experts regard JI’s founder, Syed Abul A’ala Maududi (1903-1979), along with Hassan al-Banna, as the founder of Islamism.\(^{442}\) Maududi founded JI in 1947 and, thus, it is Pakistan’s oldest religious party. Moreover, until the 1980s, JI was Pakistan’s most prominent religious party, “enjoying,” according to Olivier Roy, “a virtual monopoly on political Islam.”\(^{443}\) The best-organized party in the MMA coalition, JI has direct ties to the Taliban. During the Afghan–Soviet War, JI “established at least two mujahidin training camps in Afghanistan.”\(^{444}\) It is reportedly a staunch ally of the Afghan commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.\(^{445}\) Another group with “profound links” to SSP, JI was a primary force behind the insurgency in Kashmir.\(^{446}\) The party has links to al-Qa’ida;\(^{447}\) the latter’s “attacks after 9/11 in Pakistan and abroad,” writes Ahmed Rashid, “would have been impossible without the support ... provided by ... mainstream Islamic parties such as Jamiat-e-Islami.”\(^{448}\) Despite links to jihadists, to date JI has not directly entered into the realm of domestic violence and is presently hoping to acquire power via a political route.\(^{449}\) As noted earlier, this position has generated considerable enmity from factions of the PNT. JI leaders have been the targets of several suicide bombing and targeted assassinations. Several of these attacks have reportedly originated with TNSM; Sufi Mohammad has “accused the JI leaders of deviating from Maududi’s example” and numerous TNSM commanders have reportedly portrayed JI “as a bigger threat than the Americans.”\(^{450}\)

\(^{442}\) For Hassan al-Banna, see author’s discussion with Sammy Salama January 10, 2006.


\(^{444}\) Ibid, p. 49.


\(^{446}\) “The State Of Sectarianism in Pakistan, p. 12.

\(^{447}\) Reportedly several al-Qa’ida members have been protected and supported by JI. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, for example, was given refuge in Rawalpindi by JI after 9/11. Rashid, *Descent in to Chaos*, p. 226.

\(^{448}\) Ibid, p. 227.

\(^{449}\) One of its political platforms is opposition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). See Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks*, p. 20.

\(^{450}\) Jamal, “Pakistani Taliban Widen Jihad with Strikes on Fellow Muslims.”
In sum, Pakistan’s Sunni religious parties, especially JUI and JI, have historically acted as enablers of the Taliban and other jihadists. Their support from the Pakistani army in general and the ISI specifically has been robust and, despite perennial declarations by Pakistani authorities to the contrary, there are no indications that its benefaction has diminished since 2001. Previously, this author has argued that JUI and JI “enjoy little backing from the key military and political coteries necessary to successfully take power” in an Islamist coup.\footnote{Charles P. Blair, “Jihadists and Nuclear Weapons,” in Ackerman and Tamsett, ed., 
*Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Growing Threat*, p. 208.} While this is still presently the case, it is now the opinion of this author that should certain conditions arise—for example, the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan\footnote{It is possible that such an eventuality could arise under the guise of a “coalition”-type government that included “moderate” Taliban. Karen De Young and Joshua Partlow, “In Afghanistan, Karzai’s Invitation to Taliban Creates Discord and Confusion, The Washington Post, March 3, 2010. See also Carlotta Gall, “As U.S. Weighs Taliban Negotiations, Afghans are Already Talking,” The New York Times, March 11, 2009 and Mariam Safi, “Talking to ‘Moderate’ Taliban,” IPCS Issue Brief, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (New Delhi), December 2007. Available at: http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/976449506IPCS-IssueBrief-No57-Mariam-Afg.pdf} along with the continued deterioration of state authority in FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, northern Balochistan, and northern areas of the Punjab province—JI and/or JUI could come to the forefront of Pakistani power as a “civilian face” to a military coup. Although an improbable likelihood, such a scenario could imaginably lead to transfers of fissile materials and/or intact nuclear weapons to jihadist groups linked to JUI or JI, such as elements of the PNT or HuM.

**D. GENERAL RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES**

The PNT’s structure of decentralized leadership makes it impossible, at least via open-sources, to accurately determine its overall capability level. Unquestionably, this reality is largely the product of the PNT being more of a general *movement* (e.g., Talibanization) than it is an *entity*—a tangible manifestation that is measurable, capable of being fully understood, etc. Even if the calculus determining its capabilities excludes its “allies” (a risky assumption in itself because allies may in fact be components that significantly constitute and define the PNT’s behavior and capabilities) it is often impossible to disaggregate localized Pashtun tribal groups principally in armed...
opposition to Islamabad over issues related to perceived attempts to subjugate them, versus those that are fundamentally moved toward organized violence by their (often Islamized) Deobandi ideology. For example, Sunni groups whose goals revolve around the destruction of Shi’ites or Hindus, or criminal groups seeking to make “money from mayhem” may have interests that strongly dovetail with core Taliban ideology and they could, at times, actually be considered a part of the PNT. However, when viewed from a variety of different angles, their inclusion into a formula aimed at determining the PNT’s capabilities appears fuzzier and, consequently, is unlikely to precipitate estimates accurate or useful for the purposes of this report.\footnote{An example of this is the PNT relationship with the Afghan Taliban. While in some ways the goals of both parties appear similar there is a clear emphasis by the latter, or course, on the Afghan theatre. If taken as fact, the Taliban’s spokesman has summarized the Afghan Taliban’s view of the PNT by noting that “the conflicts in Pakistan and Afghanistan are different…the Pakistani Taliban are fighting the government to receive their rights, but in Afghanistan it is a holy war and the aim is to free Afghanistan from the Americans and other ‘heathens.’” See Mohammad, “Reaction to the Afghan Taliban to the Pakistani Government’s Offensive in Swat.”}

One way to solve the challenge of determining the PNT’s capabilities is to limit the bounds of consideration chiefly to the TTP and its closest allies. Such delineation puts the emphasis principally on South and North Waziristan and the Malakand region. What follows, therefore, is an analysis of the PNT’s capabilities determined primarily by actors in these two Waziristan agencies but includes, when appropriate, consideration of other groups and geographic areas.
HUMAN CAPABILITIES

An understanding of the PNT’s human resources is achieved quantitatively via the number of personnel in its three primary echelons—top leadership, mid-level commanders, and rank and file. Qualitative assessments of the PNT’s human capabilities reflect the education, training, experience, health, and commitment its ranks possess. There are no open-source estimates of the PNT’s human strengths as a whole. However, some credible mid-2009 assessments put the numbers of the TTP at 20,000 to 30,000 core members and that of TNSM at 5,000 to 10,000 members. Significant combat losses occurred after these estimates were made. For instance, the Battle of Bajaur was estimated to have resulted in thousands of TNSM casualties, including more than 3,000 fatalities. Moreover, on-going actions in FATA have reportedly killed hundreds within the TTP’s ranks—likely far more. To what degree these deaths encompass the PNT’s leadership is generally unknown. While U.S. drone attacks, Pakistani military maneuvers, and internecine conflicts have resulted in the deaths of dozens of top leaders, the PNT has no difficulty rapidly restocking these upper ranks. The issue, of course, is the quality and targeting predilections of newer leadership juxtaposed to those of earlier periods.

Open-source data that might be used to determine the PNT’s ability to replenish its fighters is scarce. However, one thing is clear: the tribal areas have an abundance of (largely idle) male youths. In late 2007, a former high-ranking Pakistani official estimated that in the Waziristan agencies alone there were “80,000


males in the age bracket 18 to 25 who seek employment,”457 A study that extrapolated this figure to FATA's other five agencies concluded that “as many as 200,000 young men are available to fight against what they have been persuaded to believe is an invading and anti-Islamic force [i.e., the Pakistani military and U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan].”458 In short, given that the tribal areas are known to have dozens of sophisticated training camps, it seems likely that the PNT (in this case being the TTP and TNSM) can maintain its

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**BOX 5: PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR-RELATED EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS**

Pakistan’s numerous universities and research centers have nuclear-related curricula and other scientific programs that can be applied, in part, to nuclear weapon fabrication. When assessed *individually*, some of these institutions do not have the knowledge base or technological infrastructure to administer an understanding of physics (and other related fields) robust enough to graduate students theoretically capable of constructing an improvised nuclear device (IND). However, some do. Moreover, when evaluated collectively, all of these institutions could offer key individual recruitment possibilities for the PNT as they assemble a team of nuclear weapon engineers. These institutions include:

- **KANNUP Institute of Nuclear Power Engineering (KINPOE).** Founded by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), KINPOE offers three academic programs: 1) Masters of engineering in nuclear power, 2) Post Graduate Training Program (PGTP), and 3) Post Diploma Training Program (PDTP)

- **Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science & Technology (PINSTECH)**

- **Laboratories housed at KINPEO include:** the Health Physics and Radiation Detection


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457 As quoted in Cloughley, “Insurrection in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” p. 6.

previous force levels of 20,000 to 40,000 men.\textsuperscript{459} Given certain conditions, moreover, it seems entirely plausible that these ranks could be enlarged several fold.

Open sources typically portray elements of what is collectively the PNT as having a qualitatively poor education.\textsuperscript{460} Estimates made in 2003 of male literacy rates in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were 51 percent; in FATA male literacy rates were estimated to be 30 percent.\textsuperscript{461} (Pakistan’s male literacy rates as a whole were estimated to be 53 percent.\textsuperscript{462} Out of 177 countries analyzed by the United Nations in 2009, only 17 had lower national literacy rates [based on both genders].\textsuperscript{463}) Even with relatively robust scientific facilities available for students (see BOX V: Pakistan’s Nuclear-Related Educational Programs) Pakistan produced only 50 Ph.D.s in 2001.\textsuperscript{464} Although this number increased to 300 annually by 2008, the integrity of the curricula—especially those in the “hard sciences”—has been sharply criticized.\textsuperscript{465}

Despite low overall educational standards, some experts have highlighted the relatively advanced formal educations that some jihadists have, specifically those linked to struggles against Indian control of parts of Kashmir and (usually related) Punjabi Taliban organizations.\textsuperscript{466} As has been made clear throughout

\begin{footnotes}
\item[459] For numbers of training camps ostensibly available to the PNT see Howenstein “The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir.”
\item[461] Nawaz, \textit{FATA – A Most Dangerous Place}, p. 8.
\item[462] Ibid.
\item[464] Rashid, \textit{Descent into Chaos}, p. 235.
\item[466] Fair, “Who Are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?”
\item[466] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
this report, this has certainly not been the case with the TTP or TNSM leadership. Those leaders and commanders typically abandoned their *madrassa* studies while still in their teens to pursue violent exploits outside of a formal educational system. In sum, it seems likely that any conceivable radiological and/or nuclear (RN) weapon pursuit by the PNT necessitates the involvement of its educated components from the periphery, for example the Punjabi Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and/or former jihadists active in Kashmir.

**FINANCIAL CAPABILITIES**

The PNT uses three principle revenue streams to finance its personnel, various strongholds, interstate and cross-border operations, formulation of future enterprises, and research and development. Taken as a whole these financial resources likely add up to at least $50 million to $75 million (these are estimated *total* assets not annual figures). The PNT’s first and most profitable monetary conduit stems from its creation of parallel governance in much of Pakistan’s tribal area. Having weakened, and in some cases eradicated, the legitimate provincial authorities, the PNT is now able to collect taxes, exact financial penalties, and charge protection fees in their stead. These collection methods are reportedly administered in a “very systematic” manner—reported to be “even more efficient that the government system.”

Taxes are levied on public transit and trucking enterprises that pass through PNT controlled areas, requiring passage on the heavily traveled Rahdaari corridor system. Penalties are collected as part of the PNT’s system of punishment against those judged to have broken *Shāri‘a* mandates. Moreover, the PNT is able to reap large sums of money by charging drug smugglers protection fees for safe transit. Pakistan’s Anti-Narcotics Force has estimated “as much as a quarter of the unrefined, refined, and morphine-based opiates produced in Afghanistan pass through FATA, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan province before exiting through points scattered along the Makran coast and the land frontier with Iran.”

In February 2010, the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Owais Ghani, noted that 93 percent of the world’s supply of opium was smuggled out of Afghanistan. The TTP, the Governor stated, was able to tap into these illegal revenues and was consequently able to pay more than 3.6 billion rupees (Rs)—about $42 million—in support of an army of TTP fighters.

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468 Ibid, p. 98.


470 As quoted in Rabasa, et al., *Ungoverned Territories*: p. 56
Thus, by having established itself as the de facto government in the Waziristan agencies and other parts of FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the PNT is able to net tens of millions of dollars annually.

Second, blatant criminal enterprises, sometimes linked to other terrorist groups or criminal gangs, add much to the PNT’s coffers. For example, the Islamist group Jundallah reportedly has links to the TTP and has engaged in robberies with the sole purpose of aiding in their anti-Islamabad jihadist struggle. In 2008, a captured Jundallah operative reportedly stunned investigators by revealing that then-TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud had aided the latter’s group in several bank robberies and that Mehsud had “sent trained people from Wana [the summer capital and largest city of South Waziristan] to acquire jobs in security companies for committing robberies at the main business hub and generating funds for [the TTP].” In the first two full months that the TTP was officially in operation (January and February 2008), robberies involving these methods reportedly netted the TTP 150 million Rs—approximately $2.75 million. The PNT’s ability to raise revenue through links to criminal networks has also been reported. For example, many of the 400 cars that were stolen in Lahore in the first quarter of 2008 were allegedly sold to dealers in the tribal areas, with the profits reportedly going to the TTP. Kidnapping and vehicular hijackings have also been used to generate large amounts of cash.

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471 “TTP Spending Rs. 3.6 Billion on its Fighters,” Dawn, February 6, 2010. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/03-ttp-spending-rs3-6-billion-on-its-fighters-ss-06. It was not clear if the Governor was referring to an annual or aggregate budget. The former would make sense given the context of his remarks. The exchange rate is based on the International Monetary Fund exchange rates February 2010. Available at: www.imf.org/external/np-fin/rates/rms_five.cfm


474 Shahnawaz Khan, “More Than 400 Cars Stolen from City in 3 Months,” The Times (Pakistan), March 29, 2008. Available at: http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\03\29\story_29-3-2008_pg13_5


476 Ibid.
Third, significant TTP revenue comes from foreign terrorist organizations that have relocated to Pakistan’s tribal areas. As investigated earlier in this report, since 2002 al-Qa’ida’s central operational headquarters have been hosted in the Waziristan agencies (reportedly at the outset South Waziristan and subsequently in North Waziristan).\textsuperscript{477} Initially, as al-Qa’ida sought to reassemble itself following its eviction from Afghanistan, several tribal leaders (many of whom eventually became key players in the PNT) derived large profits by renting buildings and convenient areas for training, selling materials, and providing logistics to the desperate, yet financially well-supplied, bin Laden-led jihadists.\textsuperscript{478} In time these same tribal leaders also capitalized, in essence, by renting their loyalty to al-Qa’ida for hundreds of millions of Rs, specifically with manpower for armed engagements with the Pakistani military and U.S.-led coalition forces operating in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{479} More recently, with al-Qa’ida ensconced in North Waziristan, the PNT is allegedly able to continue its pecuniary pursuits with foreign terrorist groups by rendering sanctuary, material, and training to groups other than al-Qa’ida—for example, LeJ and HuM.\textsuperscript{480} Some reports also claim that Uzbek and other Central Asian jihadists that are parts of the PNT are being financed by India and Russia “to degrade the Pakistani Army,” with additional funds reportedly coming from individual

\textsuperscript{477} It wasn’t until 2003 that al-Qa’ida’s relocation to FATA was undeniable. In September 2003, three months after President Bush and President Musharraf announced at a joint news-conference at Camp David the successful dismantlement of al-Qa’ida, Al-Jazeera aired footage of Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri walking in an area later determined to be in North Waziristan. Hussain, \textit{Frontline Pakistan}, pp. 132-133. It is now known that al-Qa’ida was firmly entrenched in South Waziristan by mid-2002. Rohan Gunaratna puts al-Qa’ida relocation from South Waziristan to North Waziristan as happening in late 2004. Gunaratna and Nielsen, “Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond, p. 787–789.


\textsuperscript{479} Recall that part of the April 2004 Shakai peace agreement involved the Pakistani government reimbursing several tribal leaders to allow the them to pay back al-Qa’ida the amount still owed by the former in their “loyalty rental” agreement. See Ismail Khan, “Militants Were Paid to Repay Al-Qaeda Debt,” \textit{Dawn}, February 9, 2005. Available at: \url{http://www.dawn.com/2005/02/09/top1.htm}

non-state patrons from the Middle East and Central and South Asia.\textsuperscript{481} Finally, Afghanistan’s former leader, Mullah Omar, reportedly provides the PNT with substantial revenue.\textsuperscript{482} While most of this is in exchange for PNT’s assistance in the Afghan theatre, some of it is payment for more obscure operations; for example, “to mastermind attacks on diplomats of countries involved in the publication of sacrilegious cartoons” of the Prophet Mohammed\textsuperscript{483}—an operation that reportedly earned the TTP the equivalent of $70,000.\textsuperscript{484}

When considered collectively, the PNTs financial revenue sources—parallel governance, criminal undertakings, and interactions with other terrorist organizations and state institutions—add up to possibly as much as $100 million or more in total [non-annual] assets. Even when accounting for revenue sources that were transient (e.g., relocation of those militants fleeing Afghanistan in 2001-2002) or perennial income streams that can diminish (such as the loss of de facto governing status in areas temporarily reclaimed by Pakistani authorities), it is highly likely that the PNT still has at least tens of millions of dollars at its disposal, most of it under the command of the TTP and its closest allies.

WEAPONS CAPABILITIES

With the exception of tanks and airplanes, the PNT has immediate access to virtually any conventional weapon a militant might seek. Military-grade weapons are reportedly available in major towns and cities in all of FATA and growing sections of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The city of Darra Adam Khel, for example, reportedly had more than 1,200 shops selling guns in 2005.\textsuperscript{485} Only 20 miles from Peshawar—Darra, to locals—is reportedly devoid of police. The PNT has fought to control the city and has ruthlessly destroyed opposition. In March of 2008, for instance, “tribal elders gathered seeking to strategize a way to purge the city of the PNT and were struck by a suicide bomber.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{481} Ibid.
\bibitem{482} Ibid.
\bibitem{483} Shahzad, “Why is Pakistan Army Scared of This Man.”
\bibitem{484} Ibid.
\bibitem{485} Imtiaz Ali, “Pakistan’s Taliban Battle Military for Frontier Arms Bazaar and Strategic Tunnel,” \textit{Terrorism Focus}, Vol., 5, Issue 6 (February 13, 2008).
\end{thebibliography}
Forty people and most of the elders were killed.486 A month earlier, on a highway a few miles from Darra, “jihadists” car-jacked five Pakistani Army trucks transporting weapons and ammunition.487 These supplies likely made it to the bazaars of Darra. However, the PNT is not dependent on the Pakistani military for all of its munitions; it may in fact be able to manufacture its own to some extent. “You bring us a Stinger missile,” bragged one the city’s merchants to a reporter in 2006, “and we will make you an imitation that would be difficult to tell apart from the original.”488 Finally, it should be noted that the PNT does not evidence any difficulties in obtaining large quantities of military-grade explosives, for example the 2008 Marriot Hotel bombing employed 600 kg of an RDX – TNT mix, the 2009 attack on the ISI’s Lahore headquarters involved a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) with 125 kg of C4 explosives, and the March 2010 attack on the Federal Investigation Agency’s (FIA) Lahore headquarters used 400-500 kg of high explosive (see Table 1: Summary of Notable PNT-Related Attacks, incidents 11 and 20—pp. 142 and 148, respectively). There were reports that some of the more lethal of weapons were unavailable after governmental crackdowns; however, with the growth of the PNT and the concomitant dissolution of legitimate authority in the region, that is likely no longer the case.

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

As an amalgamation of several groups, the PNT has demonstrated a variety of operational capabilities. Apart from straightforward terrorist acts, the PNT has operated as an effective army (e.g., the First and Second Battles of Swat) and as a formidable insurgency movement (e.g., the first four Battles of Waziristan). It is these capabilities that would likely serve the PNT well when attempting to acquire fissile materials or intact nuclear warhead components. PNT operations that have involved far fewer men—more traditional acts of “terrorism”—have highlighted three themes of operational capability. First, the PNT is capable of penetrating targets that ostensibly incorporate some of Pakistan’s highest security measures. This includes, then-President Musharraf’s motorcade, Benazir Bhutto’s entourage, the Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, the ISI’s provisional headquarters in Lahore, the CIA’s Camp "Terrorism Analysis Report 1                                                                                                   June 2011
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Chapman location, Pakistan Naval Station Mehran, etc., (see Table 1: Summary of Notable PNT-Related Attacks, pp. 134-160). Second, core PNT groups have, with the exception of one attack (Camp Chapman), limited their operations to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{489} This does not indicate an inability to conduct transnational operations; however, it does highlight the PNT’s proclivity for using domestic disguises (typically Pakistani police or military) and its likely links to at least mid-level members of the ISI vis-à-vis its ability to successfully infiltrate highly secure targets. Finally, having accessed various targets, the PNT is typically capable of successfully employing relatively sophisticated and very large explosive devices.

- **Pre-Existing Tribal Capabilities**
  A major catalyst to the PNT’s assembly and ascension were the clashes between the Pakistani Army and FATA’s tribal militants that began in earnest in late 2003. The quick defeats dealt to Pakistan’s military were caused in large part by its own disorganization and commitment. For their part, tribal fighters displayed a keen use of the region’s geography for tactical advantage, accompanied by essentially a traditional war culture.

  Pashtuns take enormous pride in their independence. In their 3000-year history they have only witnessed brief subjugation by two conquerors—Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. “Pre-Islamic Pashtun tribal code,” writes Hassan Abbas, “demands hospitality, generosity when someone asks for pardon or protection, and an absolute obligation to avenge any slights.”\textsuperscript{490}

- **Adaptation/Diffusion of Basic Afghan Taliban and Al-Qa’ida Tactics**
  Since 2002, the Afghan Taliban has been using Waziristan for recruitment and training. Up until 2004, however, their efforts were almost entirely aimed at retaking Afghanistan with no desire to engage the

\textsuperscript{489} It can be argued that the PNT is operational in the West as well; this is at least the case with “inspired” individuals and cells that may have been trained in Pakistan. Faisal Shahzad, who attempted the Time Square car bombing in May 2010, would be an example of this.

\textsuperscript{490} Abbas, “Profiles of Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies.”
Pakistani military. Focused on the fight in Afghanistan as well was al-Qa’ida, whose leaders assisted their Afghan Taliban colleagues by training new recruits. Still reeling from the temporary defeat in Afghanistan, al-Qa’ida initially offered only basic training: new recruits were taught how to conduct ambushes and to be proficient with AK47s, grenades, and basic explosives. Increasingly, however, al-Qa’ida’s leadership began to see a confrontation with the Pakistani state as essential. Al-Qa’ida ideologue Sheikh Essa was, according to a knowledgeable Pakistani source, “convinced that unless Pakistan became the Taliban’s (and al-Qaeda’s) strategic depth, the war in Afghanistan could not be won.” Thus, al-Qa’ida increasingly sought to transform the local tribal youth they trained from Taliban sympathizers to jihadists with a regional, if not global, agenda.

- Adaptation of Kashmiri Jihadist Tactics
  As was explored in the historical narrative of the PNT, the influx into FATA of jihadists formerly active in the Kashmiri struggle significantly altered the PNT’s composition. These battle-hardened jihadists, many of whom were extensively trained in guerilla operations by the ISI, brought with them the skills and will to alter the struggle from a local defensive jihad against the Pakistani military into an offensive regional jihad against the Pakistani state and, perhaps, a global jihad. Principal among the tactics brought to the PNT by the Kashmiri jihadists were those related to waging a prolonged war against India as well as target-oriented missions within that country. Such tactics and skills were easily transferable to the struggle against the Pakistani state (see BOX VI: Potentials in Kashmiri Capability Transference: The Case of Ilyas Kashmiri).

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491 Recruitment for the Afghan jihad was largely being led by Mullah Dadullah and Jalauddin Haqqani.


BOX 6: POTENTIALS IN KASHMIRI CAPABILITY TRANSFERENCE: THE CASE OF ILYAS KASHMIRI

An example of capability transference from non-Pashtun jihadists to the PNT is the case of Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri. Some reports have Kashmiri as a former member of Pakistan’s elite Special Service Group (SSG) while other accounts of his life deny he was ever formally a part of the Pakistani military. Regardless, there is agreement that in the 1980s Kashmiri fought in Afghanistan while training Afghan mujahidin in their struggle against the Soviets (he would lose an eye in combat). As a native of Azad Kashmir, he returned to Kashmir after the Soviet-Afghan war and, with the direct support of the ISI, joined, and later led elements of HuJI, a member of Usama bin Laden’s International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People. It was within HuJI that he created the feared “313 Brigade.” (Legend has it that “313” Muslims, under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad, defeated 10,000 infidels in the first Jihad). Despite early notoriety and success, including a meeting with then-Army Chief Pervez Musharraf in which the future Pakistani president presented him with a cash reward, Kashmiri fell out of the favor with the ISI. With Pakistan’s rapprochement with India in 2002, he—like so many other Kashmiri jihadists—found himself largely abandoned by his State backers. Kashmiri responded by aiming his deadly skills and ample resources directly at the Pakistani state; he and his 313 Brigade were linked to the assassination attempts on President Musharraf in December 2003. In 2005, he allegedly worked with the Afghan Taliban in the tribal areas, revitalizing their insurgency with battle strategies based on the actions of famed North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap. After his subsequent capture, incarceration, and eventual release, Kashmiri—reportedly outraged by the July 2007 Lal Masjid incident—relocated to North Waziristan. Under the auspices of al-Qa’ida he resumed guerrilla training, reorganized the 313 Brigade, reportedly recruited dozens of former Pakistani Army officers, and ultimately created a force of jihadi fighters reputed to number more than 3,000.

Kashmiri and his 313 Brigade were subsequently linked to dozens of terrorist attacks in Pakistan. These incidents include the September 2008 attack on the Marriot Hotel in Islamabad and the November 19, 2008, assassination of General Amir Faisal Alvi, a former head of the SSG. Some reports have suggested that the 313 Brigade was directly involved in the Mumbai, India, attacks of 2008. In an October 2009 interview with Pakistani journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad, Kashmiri explained that his actions against forces in Afghanistan and terrorist attacks in Pakistan and India were all intended to bring the battle back to Kashmir.

“The defeat of American global hegemony [perceived by Kashmiri to have corrupted Pakistan’s leaders] is a must if I want the liberation of my homeland Kashmir,” he insisted, concluding, “therefore, it provided the reasoning for my presence in this war theater.”
BOX 6 CONTINUED

In several ways Ilyas Kashmiri can be seen as a microcosm of the PNT. His origins—obscure and debated—are directly linked to Pakistan’s ISI and the struggle to blunt Indian influence in the region while promoting the violent spread of globalized violent Islamism. He literally carries the scars of his battles against the Soviets, has a natural affinity for the Afghan Taliban, and was once the darling of the Pakistani military elite. America’s “War on Terror” prompted his abandonment by the Pakistanis as they yielded to U.S. pressure and refocused their efforts from Kashmir to the tribal areas. Musharraf’s perceived acquiescence to U.S. dominance in the region and concomitant military foray into FATA provoked Kashmiri’s final metamorphosis into a neo-jihadist leader committed to the destruction of Pakistan’s secular government and its Western enablers.

Of seminal importance is the type of knowledge and resources Kashmiri brings to the PNT. In that regard it is interesting to note that he is a “prime suspect” in coordinating the December 2009 suicide attack on Forward Operating Base Chapman in Afghanistan’s Khost province.\(^k\)

Kashmiri was reportedly killed by a U.S. drone strike in South Waziristan on June 4, 2011.

\(^a\) See, for example, Bill Roggio, “Ilyas Kashmiri was a Pakistani Army commando,” The Long War Journal, September 20, 2009. Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/09/ilyas_kashmiri_was_a_pakistani.php


\(^d\) It was widely reported that at this meeting Ilyas Kashmiri presented Musharraf with the head of an Indian Army officer he had killed and decapitated himself. See, for example, Hamid Mir, “How an Ex-Army Commando Became a Terrorist,” The News (Pakistan), September 20, 2009.

\(^e\) Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays Out Strategy.”


\(^g\) B. Raman, “The 313 Brigade.”

\(^h\) Ibid.

\(^i\) See, for example, Amitabh Sinha, “‘313 Brigade’ May Hold Fresh Clues, Say Investigators,” Express India, February 27, 2009; and Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda’s Guerrilla Chief Lays out Strategy.”

\(^j\) Ibid. Paul Rogers has noted, “The attack was particularly serious because it indicated a major lapse in security as well as casting doubt on the reliability of the Jordanian intelligence community that had previously been seen as a trusted source of cooperation. Furthermore, the station chief was one of the most highly regarded CIA specialists on al-Qaida. It suggested that the al-Qaida movement had the capability to penetrate deeply into the US intelligence machinery. As such, this was far more serious than Taliban infiltrators into the Afghan police or Army or even some of the Pakistani Taliban attacks on Army and ISI facilities in Islamabad, Peshawar, and elsewhere across Pakistan. As a large forward operating base, Chapman was a key location for intelligence gathering and the planning of raids against al-Qaida personnel across the border. That a bomber could get inside the base and kill such significant CIA officers was of great concern.” Rogers, “The Al-Qaida Movement – Status and Prospects.”

E. DECISION MAKING WITHIN THE PAKISTANI NEO-TALIBAN

Clearly the PNT does not have the unity to engage in decision-making exercises that involve all of its discordant and virtually unquantifiable components. Similar to approaches taken in other areas of this report, therefore, this section will largely consider decision making within the TTP.

When considering decision making in the PNT prior to the formal emergence of TTP in December 2007, the open-sources reveal only three episodes—all of which are directly related to the “peace agreements” negotiated with the Pakistani military and political authorities.495 Two trends emerge from these dealings: 1) The PNT knows how to extract large concessions from an army that cannot publically admit defeat, and 2) The PNT is skilled at negotiating concessions that cost them nothing up front and can be reneged on without any immediate penalty. Little else of topical relevance can be discerned from the meetings other than the PNT was able to coordinate itself to the degree necessary to collectively negotiate with the Pakistani authorities. However, it should be recalled that in at least two of these negotiations (the April 2004 Shakai Agreement and the February 2005 Sararogha Agreement), the PNT was negotiating for al-Qa’ida and other foreign fighters as much as it was for its true neo-Taliban components. Recollect as well that the collapse of the Shakia Agreement was widely considered to be the responsibility of the PNT’s (Ahmedzai) Wazir tribal representative, Nek Mohammad.496

495 The April 2004 Shakai Agreement, the February 2005 Sararogha Agreement and the September 2006 North Waziristan Agreement.

496 Kanchan Lakshman, “Waziristan: Deal with the Devil.”
### Summary of Notable PNT-Related Attacks

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<tr>
<th>INCIDENT, LOCATION &amp; DATE</th>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
<th>PERPETRATOR (S)</th>
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<tr>
<td>INCIDENT 1 ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF BENAZIR BHUTTO Karachi, Pakistan October 18, 2007</td>
<td>A motorcade carrying Benazir Bhutto—the former Prime Minister who was returning to Pakistan after an eight-year absence—was attacked in a complex operation that involved two suicide bombers, a sniper, a car bomb, and possibly a grenade thrower. Although Bhutto was uninjured, the attack resulted in 139 fatalities and at least 450 injuries—Pakistan’s most lethal suicide attack to date (as of May 2011). Among the dead were 20 police officers and nine political affiliates (from the Pakistan Peoples Party: PPP). Despite two security rings—reportedly “an outer cordon of 20,000 police and an inner cordon of 5,000 volunteers from Bhutto’s political party, as well as police”—the attackers were able to strike within feet of Bhutto. Several of the casualties were from the entourage that was in immediate proximity to her.</td>
<td>Culpability for the attack remains unresolved via open-sources. It is likely that several jihadist organizations were involved. Bhutto herself noted that there “[i]t was one suicide squad from the Taliban elements, one suicide squad from al-Qaeda, one suicide squad from Pakistani Taliban and a fourth— a group I believe from Karachi.” The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has reiterated the conventional wisdom that, “Al-Qaeda and/or the Taliban were responsible.” A more nuanced view of the incident reveals that it is likely that HuJI operative Qari Saifullah Akhtar was part of the plot, as were PNT members that would soon form the TTP.</td>
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499 Roggio, “Sophisticated Attack Targeted Bhutto in Pakistan.”

500 “Day After, Bhutto Names Suicide Squads, Says She Was Warned,” Indian Express, October 20, 2007.


502 In Benazir Bhutto’s memoirs, published after her death, she specifically names HuJI’s Qari Saifullah Akhtar when observing:

> “I was informed of a meeting that had taken place in Lahore where the bomb blasts [of October 18, 2007] were planned. According to this report, three men belonging to a rival political faction were hired for half a million dollars. They were, according to my sources, named Ejaz, Sajjad and another whose name I forgot. One of them died accidentally because he couldn’t get away fast enough before the detonation. Presumably this was the one holding the baby. However, a bomb maker was needed for the bombs. Enter Qari Saifullah Akhtar, a wanted terrorist who had tried to overthrow my second government [in 1995, see footnote 41]. He had been extradited by the United Arab Emirates and was languishing in Karachi central jail. According to my second source, the officials in Lahore had turned to Akhtar for help. His liaison with elements in the government, according to this source, was a radical who was asked to make the bombs and himself asked for a fatwa making it legitimate to oblige. He got the edict.”

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<td>INCIDENT 2</td>
<td>SARGODHA AIR BASE BOMBING (Nuclear Materials Likely Present)</td>
<td>Pakistan’s largest airbase and the head-quarters of its Central Air Command came under attack as a suicide bomber drove his motorcycle into a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) bus, detonating a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). The attack killed seven airmen and three civilians, wounding 40 others. In addition to demonstrating the PNT’s ability to strike Pakistani military targets at will, the attack was met with great concern because the PAF airbase at Sargodha is believed to house surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear warheads for squadrons of F-16s that are based there. The incident is one of four attacks (available via open-sources) in which the PNT is thought to have struck near nuclear warheads and/or other nuclear materials. The three other incidents are: 1) the bombing at Kamra Airbase, December 10, 2007; 2) Pakistan’s Wah Ordinance Factory bombings, August 20, 2008 and; 3) Naval Station Mehran on May 23, 2011. (See incidents 3, 9, and 24 respectively.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sargodha, Pakistan</td>
<td>November 1, 2007</td>
<td>Although no group was reported to have claimed responsibility, it was widely understood to be the work of the PNT.</td>
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## INCIDENT, LOCATION & DATE

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<th>INCIDENT 3</th>
<th>SUMMARY</th>
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<td>BOMBING NEAR KAMRA AIRBASE</td>
<td>A suicide bomber drove his vehicle into a bus carrying children of PAF employees detonating a VBIED. The attack, which occurred near Pakistan’s Kamra Airbase in Kamra, Pakistan (about 40 km west of Wah), injured nine civilians. The incident is notable because it occurred adjacent to one of Pakistan’s chief assembly sites for nuclear weapons. The attack could have been one of opportunity or, more likely, it could have been undertaken to demonstrate the PNT’s ability to penetrate highly secure facilities associated with Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal. Additionally, the attack could have been conducted to deduce Pakistan’s security measures and responses, pre- and post-blast, respectively.</td>
<td>While no group reportedly claimed responsibility, the PNT was generally assumed to have conducted the attack, possibly working with elements of al-Qaeda.</td>
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(Nuclear Materials Likely Present)  
Kamra, Pakistan  
December 10, 2007

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<td><strong>INCIDENT 4</strong></td>
<td>Pakistan’s garrison city of Rawalpindi has not been kind to Pakistan’s civilian leaders. In 1951, Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated in the city. In 1979, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, father of Benazir Bhutto, was hung there. In December 2007, having just finished addressing a large crowd of supporters for her presidential bid at Rawalpindi’s Liaquat Bagh (park), Benazir Bhutto fell victim to an attack that left her and 20 others dead. Although debate exists over just how she died, the attack involved both gunfire (including, it has recently been reported, sniper fire) and a large explosion (delivered by a suicide bomber). Following the October 18 attempted assassination, it is unclear what, if any, security upgrades Benazir Bhutto’s staff implemented. Generally, security was perceived as “poor” and, consequently, the attack was likely not as operationally complex as other incidents linked to the TTP.</td>
<td>Although the TTP denied involvement, the CIA has asserted that responsibility for the attack lies with “that network around Baitullah Mehsud.” Having already threatened to kill Bhutto (“My men will welcome Bhutto on her return”) a post-attack telephone intercepts—attributed to Mehsud and one of his underlings involved in the assassination—implies the TTP. Al-Qa’ida is also suspected. However, like the TTP, it never claimed responsibility; an act, if it was responsible, that runs counter to al-Qa’ida’s operational pattern. LeJ has also been linked to the attack. Involvement by elements of the ISI is a strong possibility, either working alone or under the direction of President Musharraf. “You should know something,” Musharraf allegedly told Bhutto during a phone conversation in 2007, “your security is based on the state of our relationship.”</td>
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| **ASSASSINATION OF BENAZIR BHUTTO** | **Rawalpindi, Pakistan** | **December 27, 2007** | **INCIDENT 4** |


513 Kahn, “Baitullah Mehsud: Scapegoat or Perpetrator in Benazir Bhutto’s Assassination?”


515 “CIA Boss Names Bhutto ’Killer.’”

516 “Text of Alleged Al-Qaeda Phone Call,” The London Daily Telegraph, December 28, 2007. Available at: [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1573885/Text-of-alleged-al-Qaeda-phone-call.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1573885/Text-of-alleged-al-Qaeda-phone-call.html) The tape has never been publically shown nor has the voice attributed to Baitullah Mehsud been verified as being his. See, for example, Kahn, “Baitullah Mehsud: Scapegoat or Perpetrator in Benazir Bhutto’s Assassination?”

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A suicide bomber driving a pickup truck rammed through a security gate, detonating a VBIED at the Federal Investigation Agency’s (FIA) regional headquarters in Lahore. Moments later, in a linked attack, a second truck driven by a suicide bomber struck a commercial building also detonating a VBIED.\(^{521}\) The blasts, which reportedly each employed 30 to 50kg of high explosives, collectively killed 30, including 13 police officers.\(^{522}\) Another 335 were wounded.\(^{523}\) While FIA’s mission is often described as being broadly similar that of the U.S.’ FBI (with a recent focus on immigration and human trafficking) the agency’s Lahore complex reportedly housed the offices of a special U.S.-trained counter terrorism unit—the Special Investigation Agency (SIA).\(^{524}\) A report in 2010 claims that the attack may have been targeting U.S. intelligence officials putatively present in the complex.\(^{525}\) The second blast struck an advertising agency adjacent to a house that had reportedly been recently used by Pakistan’s Special Investigation Unit (SIU) of the Crime Investigation Department (CID).\(^{526}\) The PNT would again strike Lahore’s FIA two more times in as many years (see incidents 14 and 17).

Although no group claimed responsibility, it was widely believed that either al-Qa’ida or the TTP were responsible for the attack.\(^{527}\)

\(^{517}\) (con’d) However, in late April 2010 the tape was reportedly being supplied to officials at the Anti Terrorist Court Rawalpindi preceding the trial of Ms. Bhutto’s murder. See “Baitullah’s Tape to be Produced in ATC,” \(Dawn\), April 30, 2010. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/12-baitullahs+tape+to+be+produced+in+atc--bi-06. For Mehshud’s putative responsibility see also “My men will welcome Bhutto on her return” quote, see “Mehsud Says His Bombers are Waiting for Benazir Bhutto,” \(Daily Times\) (Lahore), October 5, 2007. See also Bill Roggio, “Sophisticated Attack Targeted Bhutto in Pakistan,” \(The Long War Journal\) (October 19, 2007). Available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/sophisticated_attack.php


\(^{519}\) Kahn, “Baitullah Mehsud: Scapegoat or Perpetrator in Benazir Bhutto’s Assassination?” Roggio, “Pakistan: Benazir Bhutto Assassinated,”

\(^{520}\) As quoted in Suskind, \(The Way of the World\), p. 268. Emphasis in the original. Suskind reports that when the conversation between Bhutto and Musharraf ended “she [hung] up the phone feeling as though she might be sick.” Ibid. Bhutto reportedly emailed CNN’s Wolf Blitzer with the message that, “If it is God’s will, nothing will happen to me. But if anything happened to me, I would hold Pervez Musharraf responsible.” Loudon, “Growing Questions on Death of Bhutto,”


\(^{523}\) Ibid.

\(^{524}\) Tahir and Shakeel, “Bombers Sow Terror.”

### INCIDENT 6
**SUICIDE ATTACK/ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN MADRASSA**

**Landi Kotal, Khyber Agency, Pakistan**  
**May 1, 2008**

**SUMMARY**

In an example of the factious and fratricidal nature of militant Sunni Islamic groups in Pakistan’s tribal areas, Haji Namdar Khan, Amir of the group Amr Bil Maruf Wa Nahi Anil Munkar (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice), was targeted in a suicide IED attack at the mosque he led in FATA’s Khyber agency. Thirty civilians were injured, yet Namdar escaped uninjured. The teenage suicide assassin was reportedly dispatched by Baitullah Mehsud (acting as a lieutenant to then-TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud) because Namdar had allegedly betrayed pro-Mehsud/al-Qa’ida factions of the PNT for the “princely sum of about U.S. $150,000” (reportedly paid by Pakistani intelligence and the CIA).

The incident is notable because it illustrates how the tribal area’s diversity of motivations, ideologies, and loyalties often leads to violent internal conflict—a reality not widely appreciated by Western observers who tend to see all militant tribal actors as simply being one consolidated group of federated “Taliban.”

The incident also reveals that the agencies and districts that compose Pakistan’s tribal areas are also diverse with regard to their Islamic practices. Khyber, for example—possessing the central border link for vehicles resupplying U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan—is representative primarily of the Barelv school and, consequently, Khyber tribes people have traditionally been “opposed to the Taliban’s Deobandi and al-Qaeda’s Salafi ideology.” Moreover, Syed Saleem Shahzad has pointed out that Khyber’s unique historical role as a cross-roads for armies and traders has aided in creating a population that is relatively “politically liberal and pragmatist, not easily swayed by idealist and Utopian ideology such as the Taliban’s and al-Qaeda’s.”

**PERPETRATOR (S)**

The TTP reportedly claimed responsibility for the bombing."
## INCIDENT, LOCATION & DATE

### INCIDENT 7
**ATTACK ON PAF VAN**

Peshawar, Pakistan  
August 12, 2008

A suicide bomber drove his vehicle into a PAF Van, detonating a VBIED. Ten airmen and three civilians died in the blast; at least 14 more were wounded. The attack, which occurred just as the 2008 Battle of Bajaur was beginning, employed approximately 30 to 40 kg of explosives.

**PERPETRATOR (S)**

JeI (Jaish-e-Islami, a splinter group of the TTP that traditionally operates out of Bajaur) claimed responsibility, asserting the attack was in response to military operations in FATA’s Bajaur agency. “It is an open war between us and them,” a spokesman said.

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527 See, for example, Ibid and Roggio, “Dual Suicide Bombing in Lahore Kill 28.” The latter source does not implicate al-Qaeda.  
528 “17 injured in Mosque Suicide Attack,” *Dawn*, May 2, 2008. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/2008/05/02/top3.htm  
531 Ibid.  
534 Bacha, “Militants Attack PAF Van.”  
536 WITS, ICN: 200808254.  
537 Bacha, “Militants Attack PAF Van.”  
538 Shah, “Bomb Rips through PAF Bus: 13 Slain.”  
540 Ibid.  
542 As quoted in Ibid.  
543 Ibid.
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<td>INCIDENT 9</td>
<td>Taking advantage of the increase in human targets afforded by a shift change, two suicide bombers detonated IEDs at two gates of the Pakistan Ordinance Factory (POF). Killing at least 70 people and injuring more than 100, the dual blasts were the most lethal attack on a Pakistani military site to date (as of June 2011). POF is one of three sprawling facilities that collectively comprise the Wah Cantonment Ordinance Complex. The complex’s two other facilities—Kamra’s Air Weapon Complex and Taxila—have been cited as likely to engage in nuclear “warhead production, disassembly and dismantlement.” POF, one of Pakistan’s most sensitive installations, is the country’s primary arms and ammunition producing facility, employing more than 40,000 workers. The TTP reportedly claimed responsibility for the bombings.</td>
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Wah, Punjab, Pakistan  |
August 20, 2008       |


546 Levi, Wah Cantonment, Pakistan Ordinance Factories (POF), Uranium Conversion Facility.


549 Ibid.

**INCIDENT 10**

**ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF PAKISTANI PRIME MINISTER**

Highway Connecting Rawalpindi and Islamabad, Pakistan

September 3, 2008

Snipers from the TTP fired on the motorcade of Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani. Although Gilani’s vehicle was struck with three rounds, he was reportedly not in it—the motorcade was on its way to the Chaklala military airbase in Rawalpindi to pick him up.531 No casualties were reported. Pakistani officials termed the attack “a highly-skilled sniping attempt because the vehicles were moving at high speed.”552 It is entirely plausible that the shooters knew that Gilani was not in the motorcade (although some reports suggest he may actually have been a passenger553) and, consequently, their attack was meant to carry a non-lethal message.

The TTP reportedly claimed responsibility for the incident.554

**INCIDENT 11**

**MARRIOTT HOTEL BOMBING**

Islamabad, Pakistan

September 20, 2008

In a likely bid to kill Pakistan’s top civilian and military leaders gathered for a state dinner, the PNT detonated an enormous truck bomb outside of Islamabad’s Marriott hotel. A last minute venue change prevented newly inaugurated Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Gilani, and several top-ranking military officials from being present at the scheduled gathering.555 The incident—sometimes referred to as “Pakistan’s 9/11”—killed 62 people and injured another 270.556 The VBIED used in the attack reportedly employed 600 kg of an RDX–TNT mix and was believed by authorities to have been configured to “detonate explosives at intervals” (i.e., delay switches).557

Mystery surrounds the attack. Pakistani sources initially blamed the TTP. Also implicated in the attack was HuJi.558 Pakistani officials officially placed blame for the attack on LeJ.559 Specifically, LeJ’s Qari Mohammad Zafar, now deceased, was said to have been involved in the attack.560 In a subsequent twist three months after the attack, a top Pakistani official said the attack targeted American marines as opposed to Pakistan’s leadership.561

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<th>INCIDENT, LOCATION &amp; DATE</th>
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<td>INCIDENT 12</td>
<td>In a well-coordinated ambush, twelve gunmen fired on a convoy carrying players from the Sri Lankan national cricket team outside of Lahore’s main stadium. Six players were injured; six policemen in an escort van and two civilian bystanders were killed. The commando-style attack reportedly employed rifles, hand grenades, and antitank missiles. All of the attackers escaped uninjured via motorized rickshaws. Pakistan was scheduled to host the World Cup cricket tournament in 2011. It was subsequently hosted by India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.</td>
<td>Responsibility for the attack is still debated. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT: Army of the Pure) was reported by some sources to have been responsible for the attack. In addition, Pakistan’s Prime Minister has stated that Sri Lanka’s LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) financed the operation. Dr. Muhammad Usman—a member of LeT with strong links to the TTP—was said to be “chief coordinator” of the attack. Reportedly, in 2006 he joined JeM and subsequently paired with Ilyas Kashmiri and HuJI (see BOX 6, p. 130). Dr. Usman is suspected of planning two assassination attempts against then-President Pervez Musharraf in 2004 and was reportedly behind the 2008 suicide bombing that killed Pakistan’s Army Surgeon General. He was detained for his suspected involvement in the Marriott Hotel attack (see incident 11 above) and would be part of the forthcoming October 10, 2009, attack on Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) (see incident 16 below).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

563 Ibid. Amateur video of the assault verifies the presence of antitank missiles.
564 Ibid.
565 Pakistan Counts Cost of Cup Shift,” BBC, April 18, 2009. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/cricket/other_international/pakistan/8004684.stm
566 Wilkinson, “Bungled Raid Raises Doubts about Pakistan’s Will to Fight Extremism.”
570 Niaz, “Who is Dr. Osman.”
571 Asghar, “Four Marriott Accused Linked to Suicide Network, ATC told.”
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<td>INCIDENT 13</td>
<td>Lahore Police Academy Attack</td>
<td>At least ten militants, some disguised as police officers, stormed one of Pakistan’s key police facilities—the Manawan Police Training Centre—in the Punjab’s capital city of Lahore. Despite the presence of more than 1,000 police personnel, mostly recruits undergoing training, there were reportedly “only five semi-automatic rifles and 50 bullets available” to respond to the attack initially. It took more than eight hours for Pakistan’s security forces—led by the Punjab police’s “Elite Force”—to secure the training center. By that time, having penetrated the outer security cordon to the facilities, the militants were stopped at a guarded entry point by security personnel. However, the attackers subsequently detonated their VBIED, killing 29 and wounding 316. The attackers, all three of whom were killed, reportedly used 125 kg of C4 explosives for their VBIED. Its detonation—which reportedly broke windows in a two-kilometer radius and was heard many kilometers away—left a 15-foot-wide, eight-foot-deep crater. Although the CCPO and an adjacent two-story police rescue headquarters (Rescue 15 Police Service) were heavily damaged in the attack, the ISI was reportedly the primary target. Of the 35 police officers that were present in the CCPO at the time of the blast, only three escaped uninjured.</td>
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<td>INCIDENT 14</td>
<td>Attack on ISI Provisional Headquarters</td>
<td>The provincial headquarters of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lahore’s capital city police officer (CCPO) and a police rescue headquarters were all struck in an attack reportedly involving three to four AK-47 firing and grenade throwing militants. Having penetrated the outer security cordon to the facilities, the militants were stopped at a guarded entry point by security personnel. However, the attackers subsequently detonated their VBIED, killing 29 and wounding 316. The attackers, all three of whom were killed, reportedly used 125 kg of C4 explosives for their VBIED. Its detonation—which reportedly broke windows in a two-kilometer radius and was heard many kilometers away—left a 15-foot-wide, eight-foot-deep crater. Although the CCPO and an adjacent two-story police rescue headquarters (Rescue 15 Police Service) were heavily damaged in the attack, the ISI was reportedly the primary target. Of the 35 police officers that were present in the CCPO at the time of the blast, only three escaped uninjured.</td>
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574 The Punjab’s Elite Force headquarters would itself be targeted by the PNTI on October 15, 2009. See incident 17.
577 “Lahore Braves Terror.”
578 “Lahore Braves Terror.”
**INCIDENT 15**  
**PESHAWAR PEARL CONTINENTAL HOTEL BOMBING**  
Peshawar, Pakistan  
June 9, 2009

Militants stormed Peshawar’s most luxurious hotel, first shooting security guards and hotel workers and then lowering a security barrier so that a suicide bomber could drive an explosive-laden mini-truck to the main entrance. They then detonated the massive VBIED—reportedly weighing 500 kg—killing scores of hotel guests, destroying most of the five-star hotel, damaging buildings for blocks, and mangling nearly 100 automobiles. The surviving attackers reportedly continued to fire their rifles after the explosion. Altogether, the attack killed 23 and wounded 69.

The TTP reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack. Also claiming credit was the Abdullah Uzzaam Brigade, reportedly stating that the attack was in response to Pakistan’s military action in Swat. [The Second Battle of Swat lasted from late-April 2009 until mid-June 2009. See pp. 59 - 61 for more details.]

**INCIDENT 16**  
**ASSAULT OF PAKISTAN ARMY’S GENERAL HEADQUARTERS (GHQ) IN RAWALPINDI**  
Rawalpindi, Pakistan  
October 10, 2009

Disguised as soldiers, a ten-man assault team attacked the Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi—Pakistan’s “Pentagon.” The ensuing 18-hour siege resulted in 42 hostages taken (39 were eventually released alive), the deaths of 19 Pakistani troops, and the killing of nine of the ten terrorists. Among the dead senior military personnel were a brigadier general and a lieutenant colonel. The highly organized attack on Pakistan’s military nerve-center involved automatic weapons, grenades, and rocket launchers and was remarkably brazen even by the standards of Pakistan’s contemporary terrorism milieu. Reportedly leaving U.S. military officials “astonished,” the attack occurred while Pakistan’s military was preparing to launch the Fourth Battle of Waziristan—it demonstrated that the PNT could strike the army first.

The TTP reportedly claimed responsibility for the siege. A tenth terrorist—Muhammad Aquil (alias Dr. Usman)—was apprehended. Dr. Usman was suspected of involvement in, among other attacks, the Marriott hotel attack and the assault on the Sri Lankan cricket team (incidents 11 and 12 explored above). With regard to the Marriott hotel incident, he was arrested and subsequently released; after the latter Dr. Usman reportedly evaded authorizes by fleeing to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Note that an assault on the Army’s GHQ had been planned in the foiled 1995 coup attempt by, among others, HuJI’s Qari Saifullah Akhtar.

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580 Ali, “Carnage at Lahore as Suicide Squad Sets off Car Bomb at ‘High Security’ Target.”
583 Ibid.
### INCIDENT, LOCATION & DATE

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<th>INCIDENT 17</th>
<th>LAHORE’S FEDERAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY AND MANAWAN POLICE ACADEMY ATTACKED AGAIN</th>
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<td>Lahore, Pakistan</td>
<td>October 15, 2009</td>
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| PERPETRATOR (S) | PAKISTAN’S GEO NEWS REPORTED THAT THE TTP CLAIMED CREDIT FOR ALL THREE ATTACKS. |


**589** WITS, ICN: 200904898.

**590** Ibid.


**595** Wilkinson, “Bungled Raid Raises Doubts about Pakistan’s Will to Fight Extremism.”

**596** See footnote 41 for coup plot of 1995.


**601** Walsh and Gabbatt, “Dozens Killed As Militants Attack Pakistan Police Building.”

**602** Ibid.
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<tr>
<td>INCIDENT 18</td>
<td>An explosive device concealed in a metal box “meant for keeping sacred prayers,” detonated during the Shi’ite religious procession of Ashura. The blast killed 45 worshipers and wounded 200 more.</td>
<td>The TTP originally claimed responsibility. However, that claim was later reversed and a “faction” of the TTP, a group led by Asmatullah Shaheen, declared responsibility for the bombing.</td>
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<td>SECTARIAN ATTACK: SHI’ITE ASHURA PROCESSION</td>
<td>Karachi, Pakistan December 28, 2009</td>
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<td>INCIDENT 19</td>
<td>Having deceived U.S. intelligence operatives into believing that he was willing to work with them, Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi gained access to, and subsequently detonated an IED at, the gates of the CIA’s Forward Operating Base Chapman (“Camp Chapman”) in a suicide bombing that again demonstrated the PNT’s operational sophistication and unprecedentedly brazen targeting choices. The attack, which took place in the southeastern province of Khost, Afghanistan, killed al Balawi’s Jordanian handler, the base’s Afghan security director and seven CIA employees (including its highly esteemed station chief)—the largest single loss-of-life incident for the CIA since Hizballah’s 1983 Beirut bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks. Six other CIA employees were reportedly &quot;gravely wounded&quot; in the attack. A physician by training, Abu Mulal was reportedly an informant for Jordanian intelligence but, unbeknownst to U.S. intelligence operatives until the attack, he was a double agent working with either al-Qa’ida, the Afghan Taliban (e.g., the Haqqani Network), the PNT, or a combination of the three. Open-sources contend that he supplied the CIA data on the results of their drone attacks, specifically whether or not the intended target(s) had been eliminated.</td>
<td>The TTP was clearly involved: A pre-attack video by Al Balawi and Hakimullah Mehsud stated the forthcoming attack was in retribution for the August 2009 (CIA-operated drone) attack that killed Baitullah Mehsud. Al-Qa’ida and the Afghan Taliban also claimed responsibility for the attack. U.S. officials reportedly confirmed al-Qa’ida’s involvement in the bombing.</td>
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<td>BOMBING OF CIA FORWARDING BASE</td>
<td>Khost Province, Afghanistan December 30, 2009</td>
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604 The holiest day in Shi’ite Islam, Ashura commemorates the death of Hussain, Prophet Mohammad’s grandson, in 680 CE.
606 For TTP claim see, “Karachi Ashura Procession Bombing: TTP claims responsibility,” Paktribune, December 31, 2009. For alternative PNT claims see, “TTP Denies Carrying out Karachi Attack,” Daily Times (Lahore), January 1, 2010. Asmatullah Shaheen (from the Bhitanni tribe which dominates the Tank region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and its border region with South Waziristan) is considered to be a commander within the TTP and one of its spokesmen; blame for the blast likely rests with the TTP in general and he simply made the claim. See, “Karachi Ashura Procession Bombing: TTP claims responsibility.”
The Federal Investigation Agency’s Lahore headquarters was struck for the third time in two years (see incidents 5 and 17 above). As was the case in the penultimate attack, the suicide bomber used a VBIED, estimated to employ at least 500 kg of explosives. The blast—which left a crater fifteen feet deep—killed at least 13 people and left another 75 wounded (some as far away as 1,100 feet). Included in the dead were seven FIA officials and a police constable.

The TTP claimed responsibility for the attack.

Detonating IEDs, three suicide bombers attacked a Sufi shrine. Popularly known as Data Gunj Bakhsh, the shrine is of Lahore’s patron saint Syed Ali Hajwairi. Each explosive reported used 10-15 kg of explosive along with ball bearing. A total of 40 people were killed with another 171 wounded. The shrine was heavily damaged in the triple blast.

Although they denied responsibility, the TTP was suspected in the attack.

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### Footnotes


611 Ibid.


615 Ibid.


618 “Triple Suicide Attacks Kill 40 at Data Darbar,” *Daily Times (Lahore)*, July 2, 2010. Available at: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=20100702story_2-7-2010_pg1_1

619 Ibid and WITS, ICN: 201011358.


621 WITS, ICN: 201011358.
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<td>INCIDENT 22</td>
<td>Two suicide bombers—one on a motorcycle and the other at the wheel of a large truck—detonated their explosives at the offices of Yakka Ghund tehsil's political and peace office. The blast and resulting collapse of the office’s building killed 106 and wounded an additional 98.</td>
<td>The TTP (Mohmand chapter) claimed responsibility. A spokesman for the TTP reported claimed that the attacks were in response to a planned anti-Taliban jirga. “We have no enmity with the people,” the spokesman stated, “Our intentions were to stop the holding of the anti-Taliban jirga.”</td>
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<td>DOUBLE VBIED ATTACK ON OFFICES OF LOCAL POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION AND PEACE OFFICE</td>
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<td>Yakka Ghund, Mohmand Agency, Pakistan July 9, 2010</td>
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| INCIDENT 23 | An attacker threw grenades from a rooftop causing a stampede of worshippers in a Shi’ite procession. Moments later two suicide bombers detonated their explosive vests. Outraged at what they perceived to be inadequate police protection, hundreds of surviving Shi’ites subsequently went on an anti-police rampage. Forty civilians died in the blasts and stampede, another 272 were injured. | TTP and LeJ both claimed responsibility. |
| SECTARIAN ATTACK: GRENADE AND IED ASSAULT ON SHI’ITE PROCESSION | | |
| Lahore, Pakistan September 1, 2010 | | |

| INCIDENT 24 | A female suicide bomber—appearing in full veil—threw grenades and subsequently detonated an IED affixed to her body. The explosions occurred in the midst of a large group of Salarzai tribe members in line for food from the United Nations World Food Program. At least 43 people were killed and another 100 injured in the blasts. | The TTP claimed responsibility for the attack; a TTP spokesman said it “was retaliation for the Salarzai tribe’s activities against the Taliban.” |
| TRIBAL ATTACK: BURQA-CLAD WOMAN HURLS GRENADES AT ANTI-TALIBAN TRIBAL GATHERING | | |
| Khar, Bajaur Agency, Pakistan December 25, 2010 | | |

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622 “65 Killed in Twin Suicide Attacks in Mohmand Agency,” *Daily Times (Lahore)*, July 10, 2010. Available at: [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\10\story_10-7-2010_pg1_1](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\10\story_10-7-2010_pg1_1)

623 WITS, ICN: 201011610.

624 “65 Killed in Twin Suicide Attacks in Mohmand Agency.”

625 “Triple Blasts in Lahore,” *Daily Times (Lahore)*, September 2, 2010. Available at: [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\09\02\story_2-9-2010_pg1_1](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\09\02\story_2-9-2010_pg1_1)

626 WITS, ICN: 201014275

627 Ibid.

628 WITS, ICN: 201018159


630 Ibid.
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<td><strong>INCIDENT 25</strong></td>
<td>The shrine of Sufi Saint Ahmed Sultran (popularly known as Sakhi Sarwar) was attacked by suicide bombers on foot. Two attackers detonated their vests, a third—reportedly a “15- to 16-year-old Afghan refugee from tribal area” was captured. At least 41 worshippers were killed; more than 100 were wounded.</td>
<td>The TTP claimed responsibility for the bombings. A TTP spokesman reportedly explained by phone that, “Our men carried out these attacks and we will carry out more in retaliation for government operations against our people in the northwest.”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SECTARIAN ATTACK: DOUBLE SUICIDE BOMBING ATTACK AGAINST SUFI SHRINE</strong></td>
<td>Dera Ghazi Khan, Punjab, Pakistan</td>
<td>April 4, 2011</td>
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<td><strong>INCIDENT 26</strong></td>
<td>Heavily armed intruders penetrated into a naval airbase near Karachi, putatively one of Pakistan’s most fortified military installations. The terrorist assault team, thought to number between 15-20 men, used ladders to scale the base’s outer perimeter. The attackers subsequently set off “seven high intensity explosives,” and subsequently engaged security forces in a firefight for several hours. The attack reportedly killed at least four members of the navy and destroyed a 36 million dollar P-3C Orion aircraft, provided for by the U.S. in 2010. Two attackers escaped. Some analysts contend that the success of the raid—a deep humiliation to the Pakistani military occurring just weeks after the killing of bin Laden—was likely due to insider collusion. Nine Pakistani Naval personnel were previously killed in three prior TTP-related incidents in Karachi in late April 2011.</td>
<td>The TTP reportedly claimed responsibility. “We claim responsibility for this attack in Karachi,” a spokesman for the group claimed, explaining that, “We had already warned after Osama’s (bin Laden) martyrdom that we will carry out even bigger attacks.”</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ATTACK ON PAKISTAN NAVAL STATION MEHRAN</strong></td>
<td>Karachi, Pakistan</td>
<td>May 23, 2011</td>
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631 “41 Killed in Sakhi Sarwar Shrine Blasts,” *Daily Times (Lahore)*, April 4, 2011. Available at: http://www.dailymarine.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\04\04\story_4-4-2011_pg1_1
632 Ibid.
633 Ibid. See also, “Three Held in Connection with DG Khan Blasts,” *Daily Times (Lahore)*, April 5, 2011. Available at: http://www.dailymarine.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\04\06\story_5-4-2011_pg7_5
634 “41 Killed in Sakhi Sarwar Shrine Blasts,” *Daily Times (Lahore)*.
638 Roggio, “Taliban Assault Team Attacks Pakistani Navy Base.”