Publications

Will Iran Give Up Twenty Percent Enrichment

Since February 2010, Iran has been enriching uranium to concentrations of 20 percent U-235. A stockpile of 130 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium would reduce, by more than half, Iran's time to develop a bomb. A key unknown is whether Tehran will stop the higher enrichment and, if so, under what circumstances.

Read more

The Twenty Percent Solution: Breaking the Iranian Stalemate

President Obama’s deadline to address concerns about Tehran's nuclear program passed at the end of 2009, so the White House is moving to harsher sanctions. But the U.S. is having trouble rallying the needed international support because Iranian intentions remain ambiguous.

Read more

Eight Recommendations for Improving Transparency in US Arms Transfers

Transparency is essential for effective congressional and public oversight of arms exports. Without complete and accurate data on the quantity, type and recipients of exported defense articles and services, it is impossible to assess the extent to which arms transfers further national security and foreign policy.

Read more

Calculating the Capacity at Fordow

While the construction and the announcement of Iran’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, does not prove an intention to deceive the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it raises troubling questions.

Read more

The Stockpile Stewardship Program: Fifteen Years On

Nuclear weapons, while simple in principle, are technically complex devices with a multitude of components. As with any complicated piece of equipment, there may be concern that, over time, a weapon’s reliability could decline. To coordinate efforts to maintain the nation’s existing nuclear weapons, the Department of Energy developed a Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). This report reviews the status of the experimental devices that support the SSP, describes how each experiment is supposed to work, and identifies the problems that have been encountered.

Read more