The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Regional Counterproliferation and Global Strike Scenarios

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Overview

- End of Cold War and Proliferation
- Silver Books and Regional WMD Planning
- WMD Counterproliferation in New SIOP
- Global Strike: Preemption and Integration
- Concluding observations
End of Cold War and Proliferation

- **JCS Joint Military Net Assessment, March 1990**: Pointed to "increasingly capable Third World threats" as a justification for maintaining U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. Also, "The possibility that several emerging powers will develop nuclear capabilities in the coming years underscores the potential need for [non-strategic nuclear forces] in other theaters" than Europe.

- **January 1991**: Dick Cheney signs NUWEP, which formally tasked the military to plan for nuclear operations against regional WMD proliferators.

- **Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and Congress, February 1992**: "the possibility that Third World nations may acquire nuclear capabilities have led the Department to make adjustments to nuclear and strategic defense forces and to the policies that guide them." U.S. nuclear strategy "must now also encompass potential instabilities that could arise when states or leaders perceive they have little to lose from employing weapons of mass destruction."

- **National Military Strategy, 1992**: Calls for maintaining a strategic nuclear arsenal partly due to "the threat posed by the increasing number of potentially hostile states developing weapons of mass destruction."
STRATCOM adjustment of planning:

- **December 1992**: Begins development of “a flexible, globally-focused, war-planning process" to build "a living SIOP" that allows daily automated targeting changes against a variety of potential adversaries in addition to Russia.

- **February 1993**: According to General Butler, "Our focus now is not just the former Soviet Union, but any potentially hostile country that has or is seeking weapons of mass destruction.”

- **April 1993**: General Butler tells Congress the previous operational planning capability was "tailored to the Cold War, and, therefore, was not well-suited to the far more dynamic environment of the emerging era." Instead, STRATCOM would be "developing a flexible, adaptive operational planning capability that will be much more responsive to the potential for spontaneous threats that defy precise preplanning. This will provide senior decision makers with an array of options to apply in acute crises requiring a prompt exacting response.”

- **New Triad Planning Anno 1993**: According to General Butler, "Adaptive planning challenges the headquarters to formulate plans very quickly in response to spontaneous threats which are more likely to emerge in a new international environment unconstrained by the Super Power stand–off. We can accomplish this task by using generic targets, rather than identifying specific scenarios and specific enemies, and then crafting a variety of response options to address these threats. To ensure their completeness, these options consider the employment of both nuclear and conventional weapons. Thus, by its very nature, adaptive planning offers unique solutions, tailored to generic regional dangers involving weapons of mass destruction."
1993-94 Nuclear Posture Review

- **Working Group 5**: The Relationship Between Alternative Nuclear Postures and Counterproliferation Policy. Tasked to examine
  - Potential for mutual reinforcement between counterproliferation policy and nuclear policy.
  - Nuclear posture best suited to deterring proliferation including CTB, role of NUCs against proliferating countries, viability of classic deterrence strategy against lesser aggressors, etc.
  - How does what we do affect what they do, where there are countries with probability of proliferating, including but not limited [deleted]?
  - How does what we don't do affect what they do, where they are countries with an inclination not to proliferate including [deleted]?

- **Members**: An October 1993 roster identifies 34 individuals from a wide range of departments, Services and agencies: OSD, JCS, STRATCOM, Air Force, Navy, Army, DNA and DIA. Guests occasionally participated in meetings to brief on specific issues. Chair was Mitchel Wallerstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy. Aston Carter took part in several meetings.
October 1993–July 1994: Working Group 5 held several dozen meetings to analyze and provide recommendations for the NPR Steering Group.

STRATCOM functioned as “nuclear Oracle” by answering questions from group about how deterrence works:

- Nuclear forces have a role in deterring proliferators' use of WMD and should be thought of as “tools in our ‘toolbox’ of deterrence options.”
- “At lower levels [than a large Russian scenario], a marriage of national policy and various attributes of our nuclear forces enhance our deterrence strategy across many possible WMD scenarios. Weapon system responsiveness, flexibility, ability to deploy, survivability, and overwhelming firepower are among these attributes. The characteristics, tied with a national policy implying the U.S. will retaliate appropriately at a time of its choosing, are important considerations in deterring Nth country actors in their calculations to use or threaten WMD use.”
- Theater weapons have a particular role against proliferators and can be more responsive than CONUS–based deployment.
- "Within the context of a regional single or few warhead detonation, classical deterrence already allows for adaptively planned missions to counter any use of WMD."
Dozens of declassified documents describe that consensus (or near-consensus) conclusions on key issues included:

- The full range of nuclear options is desirable to deter proliferant nations.
- The unique contribution of nuclear weapons to counter-proliferation should be stated more forcefully.
- The nuclear posture is unlikely to affect terrorist use of WMD, unless tied to state sponsorship.
- While nuclear weapons deter WMD use, they are unlikely to have an effect on acquisition of such weapons.
- Forward deployed nuclear systems send strong political signals.

Additional analysis and copies of declassified documents:
http://www.nukestrat.com/us/reviews/wg5.htm
SILVER Books and Regional WMD Planning

- STRATCOM effort in 1993-1995 to provide counterproliferation target planning and execution support to regional commanders.

- Part of JCS directed attempt to transfer planning responsibilities for employment of nuclear weapons in theater conflicts from regional commanders to STRATCOM.

SILVER: Strategic Installation List of Vulnerability Effects and Results

Involved "the planning associated with a series of 'silver bullet' missions aimed at counterproliferation."
Command and operational planning

- **January 1994**: STRATCOM says EUCOM in “substantial agreement with the Theater Nuclear Support model.”

- **Early 1994**: STRATCOM’s Strategic Advisory Group begins analysis of regional target sets and weapons capabilities needed for SILVER Book strikes:
  - Centered on defeat mechanisms for chemical/biological and buried targets.
  - Analyzed six facilities using conventional, unconventional, and nuclear weapons appropriate for the attack.
  - Focused on fixed installations.

- **February 1994**: Directives drafted to support DCA planning and promulgate mission plans to the CINCs, including:
  - Update of the Theater Support STRATCOM Administrative Instruction (SAI) to formalize internal procedures for theater nuclear support.
  - Assignment of STRATCOM as manager of the worldwide SAS/PAL system for non-strategic nuclear forces.
**SILVER Books and Regional WMD Planning**

- **Spring 1994**: EUCOM–STRATCOM planning for use of European nuclear assets in CENTCOM area:
  - Deployment of EUCOM command and control aircraft.

- **June 1994**: Change 4 to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan nuclear Annex C (JSCP CY 93–95)
  - Formally assigned the Theater Nuclear Support mission to STRATCOM.
  - Included guidance for CINCs “requesting preplanned targeting outside their own Area of Responsibility (AOR).”

- **Late 1994**: Prototype SILVER Book ready for EUCOM
  - Supported deliberate planning, crisis planning (adaptive planning), and contingency planning.
  - Contained menu of options for striking known, fixed WMD sites in region.
March 1995: JCS Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study final report recommended:
- SILVER Books concept should not be implemented as envisioned by STRATCOM.
- Yet, regional commanders should ensure that their counterproliferation concept plans (CONPLANs) and counterproliferation–related portions of OPLANs address the types of considerations highlighted by the SILVER Books prototype.

STRATCOM failed to get ownership of counterproliferation mission, but got Theater Nuclear Support mission, endorsement of SILVER Book planning principles, and modernization of nuclear war planning system to accommodate scenarios.

April 1995: STRATCOM’s Strategic Advisory Group conduced in–depth review of post–Cold War deterrence to provide Terms of Reference for use as a baseline “to expand the concept of Deterrence of the Use of WMD.”
Regional WMD Guidance and Planning

- **1996**: In preparation for Helsinki Agreement and reductions below START II, STRATCOM Commander was advised that deeper cuts are impossible without change to presidential guidance in part because of a requirement to maintain enough nuclear weapons for both Russia, China and a “broader base to address WMD.”

- **November 1997**: Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 60.
  - Removed requirement to plan for protracted nuclear war with Russia.
  - Broadened the list of sites to be held at risk in China.
  - Identified specific regional adversaries as targets.

- **October 1998**: SIOP–99
  - Allowed STRATCOM to provide a more flexible response to the Theater Commanders.
  - China back in SIOP planning after hiatus of 17 years.
2001 NPR and post-9/11 guidance result in replacement of old SIOP with new “Operations Plan:” OPLAN 8044 Revision 03.

- Transitional step toward “new triad” with nuclear/nonnuclear mix
- Attack structure changed to increase execution flexibility
- Groom weapons to optimize performance
- Series of new executable strike options added against regional states armed with weapons of mass destruction
- Names deleted, but…
Names of regional states deleted, but not images illustrating:
- North Korea: Taepo Dong launch.
- Libya: Tarhuna underground facility.
- Scud: Iran / Iraq / Syria.

Scenario driven approach.
- “Target Base” developed; indicates broad counterforce targeting.
- Result: expansion of targeting policy with regional WMD counterproliferation mission incorporated in strategic plan.

Hans M. Kristensen / Federation of American Scientists, 2008
Global Strike: WMD Preemption

OPLAN 8044 Revision 03 not enough; separate plan needed to provide:

- Rapid execution timelines (minutes to hours):
  - “...many Global Strike scenarios involve threatened (or actual) preemptive attacks on very-high value targets that will only be exposed for brief periods...”
  - “provide options to rapidly escalate attacks on strategic centers of gravity without lengthy preparatory theater operations.”

- High-value targets: WMD production, storage, and delivery systems, decision-makers, critical command and control facilities, and leadership power bases.

- “Because of the potentially urgent employment timelines, Global Strike will primarily rely upon long-range, high-speed, kinetic (advanced conventional and nuclear) and non-kinetic effects, unmanned systems, cyber systems, and/or small numbers of special operations forces employed over extended distances.”
  - Forces can be pulled from all platforms, including strategic and tactical.

- Also applicable against larger adversaries:
  - “Simultaneous attacks against all the major targets in a given category (e.g., all division headquarters, all WMD facilities) may be required against more capable adversaries, although the total scope and duration of operations will remain dramatically less than those associated with major combat.”
Global Strike: WMD Preemption

Major Milestones:

- **January 2003**: Unified Command Plan (change 2) assigns four emerging missions to STRATCOM. One of these, Global Strike, is defined as:
  - "a capability to deliver rapid, extended range, precision kinetic (nuclear and conventional) and non-kinetic (elements of space and information operations) effects in support of theater and national objectives."
- **Summer 2003**: Presidential Decision Directive orders STRATCOM to "extend Global Strike to counter all HDBTs to include both tactical and strategic adversarial targets."
- **March 2004**: STRATCOM informs congress Global Strike is “on schedule to achieve full operational capability this year. Global Strike will enable us to hold at risk emerging target sets not included in a deliberate plan, where timeliness is critical.”
- **June 30, 2004**: CJCS issues ALERTORD to activate Global Strike (CONPLAN 8022).
- **Aug 17, 2004**: STRATCOM issues Global Strike Interim Capability Operations Order (OPORD) to implement ALERTORD; CONPLAN 8022 activated.
- **Fall 2004**: CONPLAN 8022 “withdrawn.”
- **2006–2007**: CONPLAN 8022 is formally canceled. Mission capabilities “migrate” to other plans.
Global Strike: WMD Preemption

Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Joint Pub 3–12):

- **Objective:** Published by JCS with STRATCOM as lead agent.
  - The document “provides guidelines for the joint employment of forces in nuclear operations. It provides guidance for the employment of US nuclear forces; command and control relationships; and weapons effect considerations.”
  - “The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.”

- **Important Features of 2005 Final Draft:**
  - Merged strategic and non-strategic (theater) operations into a single doctrine.
  - Incorporated four specific preemptive scenarios into JP 3–12 for the first time:
    - An adversary intending to use WMD against U.S., multinational, or allies forces or civilian populations;
    - Imminent attack from adversary biological weapons that only effects from nuclear weapons can safely destroy;
    - Attacks on adversary installations including WMD, deep, hardened bunkers containing chemical or biological weapons or the command and control infrastructure required for the adversary to execute a WMD attack against United States or its friends and allies;
    - To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of WMD.
  - STRATCOM proposed renaming countervalue to “critical infrastructure targeting,” but this was rejected by the other commands.

Coinciding with cancelation of CONPLAN 8022, nuclear strike capabilities and Global Strike merged in deterrence doctrine:

2004 JOC “Direct Means” list:
- Force Projection
- Nuclear Strike Capabilities
- Active and Passive Defenses
- Global Strike
- Strategic Deterrence Information Operations
- Inducement Operations
- Space Control

2006 JOC “Direct Means” list:
- Force Projection
- Active and Passive Defenses
- Global Strike (nuclear, conventional, non-kinetic)
- Strategic Communication
2005 Concept of Operations for Joint Functional Component Command Space and Global Strike (later Global Strike Integration; JFCC-GSI).

- No apparent distinction between Global Strike and OPLAN 8044 tasks.
- JFCC-GSI also in charge of building, maintaining and executing OPLAN 8044.
- Targets for Global Strike and OPLAN 8044 taken from same overall target database: the National Target Database (NTD).
- Weapons for Global Strike and OPLAN 8044 pulled from same platforms, strategic or tactical.
- Rather than a self-standing plan, Global Strike appears to exist as a sub-plan of OPLAN 8044 and regional OPLANs.
Global Strike: Integration

- RISOP canceled to tone down Russia focus and allow broader strike planning:
  - **December 2004**: CJCSI 3110.04B (or JSCP–N) published:
    - Canceled requirement for JCS to maintain RISOP; canceled February 2005.
    - Instructed STRATCOM to “perform **broader** campaign level analysis than the previous requirement which focused on the RISOP.”
    - STRATCOM’s new “red attack plan” would **be broader than the scope of the RISOP.**
  - Instead of supporting JCS RISOP build, JSCP–N directs that DIA and DISA “will support USSTRATCOM directly by providing data for red analysis.” STRATCOM will perform three levels of analysis for the strike plans:
    - Phase I: Consequence of Execution Analysis.
    - Phase II: Campaign Level Analysis.
    - Phase III: Intelligence Assessment Analysis.
  - Campaign Analysis is “a campaign level analysis to provide a stochastic check of the deterministic models used for the revision report consequences of execution analysis and to assess OPLAN 8044, REVISION XX’s [formerly SIOP] capability to comply with approved guidance. Such analysis will encompass various scenarios and may include the potential contribution of SACEUR’s MCOs [Major Combat Operations] as required.”
OPLAN 8044 Revision today include full range of strategic and regional missions, whether again against Russia, China or regional proliferators of WMD. Transition long in the making:

- **September 1992 (Gen. Butler):** the SIOP is “evolving to a collection of far more differentiated retaliatory choices, tailored to a threat environment of greater nuance and complexity.”
- **January 2003 (Adm. Ellis):** STRATCOM “is changing the nation’s nuclear war plan from a single, large, integrated plan to a family of plans applicable to a wider range of scenarios.”
- **April 2005 (Gen. Myers):** OPLAN 8044 now includes “more flexible options to assure allies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries in a wider range of contingencies.”

Major revisions to OPLAN 8044 has not occurred since October 2004, breaking with decades of near-annual revision of the strategic war plan.

- Migration to other plans: CONPLAN 8099 and regional plans as necessary.
- Incorporation of conventional weapons whenever possible.
Concluding Observations

- Two decades of changes to guidance and planning have significantly changed and broadened the scope of US nuclear policy with more strike options in a wider range of contingencies against a wider range of adversaries.

- Nuclear counterproliferation mission emerged quickly after end of Cold War and was deepened in early part of Bush administration.

- Broad effort spanning guidance, doctrine, war plans, weapons capabilities.

- STRATCOM spent considerable efforts to articulate and plan for nuclear deterrence and preemption missions against regional WMD proliferators.

- Integration of nuclear and conventional capabilities in strategic strike planning began in early 1990s and was later recast in the New Triad in 2001.

- Global Strike, initially triggered by 9/11 as a separate preemptive mission, is increasingly being incorporated as a niche-capability into strategic and regional plans.

- Global Strike now described as synonymous with offensive leg of New Triad.