B61-12: America’s New Guided Standoff Nuclear Bomb

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B61-12: The Concept

- Consolidate four existing B61 versions into one type
- Retain nuclear bombs for U.S. strategic bombers and fighter-bombers deployed in NATO.
- Add new safety and security features
- Use smaller warhead (B61-4) to reduce HEU available to theft
- Reduce total stockpile
- Save money

Graphics: Hans M. Kristensen/FAS 2012
B61-12: Claims

**Official Explanation:**
- Not a new nuclear bomb but simply a life-extension of an existing version
- No new military capabilities
- Will result in cost savings
- Will result in reduction of stockpile
- Needed to improve nuclear surety
- Full LEP Urgently needed

**My Explanation:**
- It is a new “new” nuclear bomb type that is not currently in the nuclear stockpile
- It has improved military capabilities
- It is the most expensive nuclear bomb project ever
- Yes it will reduce stockpile some
- It is already one of the most secure warheads in the stockpile
- A simpler LEP can fix urgent aging issues
B61-12: Improved Military Capabilities

- First guided standoff nuclear bomb
- B61-12 will be more accurate and capable than the B61s currently deployed in Europe
- New guided tail kit “will provide a modest standoff capability, for safe aircraft escape, and sufficient delivery accuracy so that the lower yield of the B61-12 can achieve the same military effect as the original B61.”
- Lower yield options can be used against targets that today require higher yield
- Lower yield means less radioactive fallout and more “useable” weapon
B61-12: Integration

- Integration on six different platforms: B-2A, B-52H, F-15E, F-16, F-35A, Tornado
- F-35A will replace F-16 and Tornado in nuclear mission
- From late-2020s, also integration on the next-generation bomber (LRS-B)
**B61-12: Cost**

- NNSA B61 LEP cost estimate doubled between 2010 and 2012 from $4 billion to $8 billion
- DOD CAPE study in 2012 projected $10.4 billion
- Guided tail kit assembly estimated at $1.4 billion
- Plan for approximately 400 B61-12 makes this the most expensive bomb project ever: each bomb will cost more than its own weight in solid gold
- Add to that the cost of integrating the B61-12 on bombers and fighter-bombers
B61-7: A Less Costly Alternative

- Triple-ALT LEP of B61-7: fixing only three most urgent aging components
- Estimated cost: $1.5-2 billion vs. $10.4 billion
- Several hundred millions already spent on B61-7 life-extension in 2004-2006
- B61-7 also has low-yield options
- Already integrated on B-2A
- Avoid undercutting Prague pledge by improving military capability of B61 bomb
- Enable withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe

The triple-ALT alternative would avoid wasting several hundred million dollars spend on the B61-7 only a few years ago.
B61 Locations

- B61 bombs estimated at 10 locations in Europe and United States:
  - 6 bases in 5 NATO countries
  - 4 bases in United States
- 8 other facilities have no B61s present but nuclear-capable aircraft or storage vaults in caretaker status

Strategic Bomber Bases
- Minot AFB (ND): B-52H and B61-7
- Whiteman AFB (MO): B-2A and B61-7/B61-11
- Barksdale AFB (LA): B-52H

Tactical Fighter Bases
- Volkel AB: B61s for Dutch F-16s
- Kleine Brogel AB: B61s for Belgian F-16s
- Buchel AB: B61s for German Tornados
- Ghedi Torre AB: B61s for Italian Tornados
- Aviano AB: B61s for US F-16s
- Incirlik AB: B61s for US and Turkish F-16s
- Lakenheath AB: US F-15Es
- Seymour-Johnson AFB: F-15Es
B61 Numbers

- Roughly 950 B61 bombs left in stockpile
- Some 430 in active stockpile
- B61-12 would include about 400 weapons

**Estimated B61 Nuclear Bombs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Active Stockpile</th>
<th>Inactive Stockpile</th>
<th>Total Stockpile</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B61-3</td>
<td>100*</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B61-4</td>
<td>100*</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B61-7</td>
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<td>204</td>
<td>419</td>
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<tr>
<td>B61-10</td>
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<tr>
<td>B61-11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>B61-12</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>(~400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Approximate 90 B61-3 and 90 B61-4 bombs are deployed in Europe

The number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has declined dramatically since the Cold War. The Bush W administration unilaterally cut the stockpile by more than half.

- Nearly 200 B61 bombs in Europe
- Deployment reduced by more than half since 2004 – unilaterally
- Deployment no longer needed but continued by Cold Warriors and outdated fear of Russia
B61 Sharing

“NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons”

U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010 (emphasis added)

Surrogate Nuclear Powers:
Belgium: F-16s, 10th Tactical Wing, Kleine Brogel AB
Germany: Tornados, 33rd Fighter-Bomber Squadron, Buchel AB
Italy: Tornados, 6th Wing, Ghedi Torre AB
Netherlands: F-16s, 1st Fighter Wing, Volkel AB
Turkey: F-16s, 9th Wing, Balikesir AB

NPT Article II: “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly….”

U.S. interpretation: Weapons at national bases are under control of U.S. military “unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the treaty would no longer be controlling.” (Emphasis added) U.S. State Department, 1968

NATO interpretation: When the NPT was negotiated, nuclear sharing arrangements were already in place. Their nature was made clear to key delegations and subsequently made public. They were not challenged

Legal arguments aside: the nuclear sharing arrangement undercuts the non-proliferation norms NATO and the United States promote elsewhere

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2013
Conclusions

• B61 LEP is expensive and in excess of national and international security needs
• B61-12 improved military capabilities contradict Nuclear Posture Review promise not to add military capabilities during LEPs and undermine Prague pledge to reduce role of nuclear weapons
• Simpler and cheaper life-extension of B61-7 would meet security needs
• Improved capabilities of B61-12 bomb and F-35 stealth fighter undercuts efforts to make Russia reduce its non-strategic nuclear weapons
• Cancelation of B61-12 would facility withdrawal of remaining nuclear weapons from Europe