U.S. Nuclear Strategy
After the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review

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Presentation to
Alternative Approaches to Future U.S. Strategy Panel
Public Policy and Nuclear Threats 2012 Summer “Boot Camp”
Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
University of California San Diego
August 10, 2012
Intensions to Change

“To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.”

President Barack Obama, Prague, 2009 (emphasis added)

In “making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions” the president has asked DOD “to review strategic requirements and develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile” and “potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures…."

Thomas Donilon, National Security Advisor, March 2011 (emphasis added)

“It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.”

Where Are We?

- Significant reductions in stockpile and deployed warheads compared with Cold War
- Stockpile reduction since peak in 1965 and 1974
- Deployed strategic warheads peaked in 1987
- Stockpile just below 5,000 with about 1,900 strategic and 200 tactical deployed
• STRATCOM "is changing the nation’s nuclear war plan from a single, large, integrated plan to a family of plans applicable in a wider range of scenarios."
• "Global Strike" mission assigned to STRATCOM
  • Major plan revision provides "more flexible options to assure allies, and dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat adversaries in a wider range of contingencies."
  • "a global deterrence plan" that represents "a significant step toward integrating deterrence activities across government agencies and with Allied partners."

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2012
Wider Strategic Threat Horizon

- Proliferation concern and 9/11 attacks triggered broadening of not only conventional but also nuclear planning to “regional states” armed with WMD
- Terminology changed from deterring “nuclear” adversaries to deterring “WMD” adversaries
- OPLAN 8044 Revision 03 included executable strike options against regional proliferators
- Based on NSPD-14 (2002)
- Effect: mission proliferation (do more with less); plan more complex

Source: STRATCOM OPLAN 8044 Revision 03 briefing slide obtained by FAS under FOIA
Smaller But Wider War Plan

- OPLAN 8010-08 Change 1 (Feb 2009): Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike
- Directed against six adversaries. Probably Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Syria and 9/11-type WMD scenario
- Half do not have nuclear weapons and four of them are NPT members
- Includes four types of nuclear attack options:
  - Basic Attack Options (BAOs)
  - Selective Attack Options (SAOs)
  - Emergency Response Options (EROs)
  - Directed/Adaptive Planning Capability Options
- There are no longer Major Attack Options (MAOs) in the strategic war plan

Source: STRATCOM OPLAN 8010 briefing slide obtained by FAS under FOIA
Nuclear War Plan Guidance

- Presidential guidance is but first step in long process
- April 2004: NUWEP-04 stated in part: “U.S. nuclear forces must be capable of, and be seen to be capable of, destroying those critical war-making and war-supporting assets and capabilities that a potential enemy leadership values most and that it would rely on to achieve its own objectives in a post-war world.”
- May 2008: NUWEP-08 Annex to Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), which combines half a dozen previously separate guidance documents into one document
- 2011-2012: Obama administration nuclear targeting review; finished but don’t expect anything until after election

“[The] president’s direction to me was less than two pages; the Joint Staff’s explanation of what the president really meant to say was twenty-six pages.”

STRATCOM Commander Admiral James Ellis, June 18, 2004
Nuclear War Plan Guidance

- **GAO, 2012**: Although “the structure of the nuclear war plan, and the categories and number of targets in the plan, have changed,” the “fundamental objectives of U.S. nuclear deterrence policy have remained largely consistent since 1991, even as the threat environment and the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile have changed. The current process for developing nuclear targeting and employment guidance has remained consistent.”

- **Strategic Advisory Group to Commander of STRATCOM, 1994**: “the core of U.S. targeting policy” is “to threaten that which the Russian leadership values most and to limit damage to the extent possible should deterrence fail.”

- **Damage limitation requirement is key to requirement to keep 900 warheads on alert**
Nuclear War Plan Targets

- Although significant adjustments have been made, the basic target categories haven’t changed that much:

### SIOP-5 (1976)
- Nuclear forces and storage locations
- Conventional forces
- Leadership and command and control
- Economic and industrial facilities

### OPLAN 8010 (2009)
- Military forces
- WMD infrastructure
- Military and national leadership
- War supporting infrastructure
Reducing Numbers

- W Bush administration cut stockpile nearly in half by 2007
- Modest but consistent reductions since
- New START limit nearly achieved for warheads; not yet for delivery vehicles
- Additional unilateral reductions to 3,000-3,500 warheads by mid-2020s expected
Reducing Role

Administration says NPR reduced role of nuclear weapons:

- The review “reduces the role of nuclear weapons in our overall defense posture by declaring that the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear forces is to deter nuclear attack….Our new doctrine also extends U.S. assurances by declaring that we will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.”

Thomas Donilon, March 2011 (emphasis added)

…but also says that it can’t reduce role yet because:

- “there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies and partners. The United States is therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that the ‘sole purpose’ of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States and our allies and partners.”

Nuclear Posture Review Report, April 2010

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2012 | Slide 11
Reducing Role

Not evident “new doctrine” reduces nuclear planning against six adversaries in the current war plan beyond normal adjustment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adversary</th>
<th>Not affected by “reduced role” because:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>it has nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>it has nuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>it has nuclear weapons and has withdrawn from the NPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>it is not considered in compliance with the NPT and it has WMD capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>it is not considered in compliance with the NPT and it has WMD capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11 scenario</td>
<td>involves non-state actor (not member of NPT) acting alone or in collusion with “rogue” state not in compliance with/ member of NPT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yet President Obama said in Hankuk University speech in March 2012: “We’ve narrowed the range of contingencies under which we would ever use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.”

And the administration has “committed to take concrete steps to make deterring nuclear use the sole purpose of our nuclear forces.”

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2012 | Slide 12
Modernizations

SSBNs: New class of 12 boats; deployed from 2029
ICBMs: Replacement study underway; deployed from 2030
Bombers: 80-100 new bombers planned; deployed from 2025
Fighters: F-35 JSF Block IV nuclear capability; deployed from 2020

B61-12: Modified B61-4 with new guided tail kit to increase accuracy
W76-1: Full-scale production underway; new fuze with enhanced options
W78: Possibly replacement by common warhead
W80: Possibly use on new ALCM on new bomber
W88: New AF&F; potential replacement by common warhead

Uranium Production Facility (UPF): Completion in mid-2020s
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-New Facility (CMRR-NF): Planned for mid-2020s but deferred for at least five years
“Putting an end to Cold War thinking” will require more than trimming edges of posture but changing core planning assumptions and principles against Russia and China:

• Reduce the number or scope of target categories
• Reduce requirement for warhead damage expectancy in strike options
• Reduce number of strike options
• Reduce or remove requirement to plan for prompt launch of nuclear weapons
• Reduce or remove requirement to plan for damage-limitation strikes
• Limit role to deter nuclear attack; “we have committed to take concrete steps to make nuclear use the sole purpose of our nuclear forces.” (Thomas Donilon, March 2011)
• Limit or end counterforce and force-on-force warfighting planning; “Counterforce is preemptive, or offensively reactive.” (DOD, Counterproliferation Operational Architecture, April 2002)
• Limit posture to secure retaliatory capability: core deterrence
QUESTIONS?

Further reading:

