Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
After the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives

Hans M. Kristensen
Director, Nuclear Information Project
Federation of American Scientists
Phone: 202-454-4695
Email: hkristensen@fas.org

Presentation to
Panel on Next Steps After New START: A Treaty on Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Federal Legislation and Administrative Clinic
& Center on National Security and the Law
Georgetown University Law Center
March 1, 2011
Overview

• Statements: US and Russian statements about inventories
• Numbers: Estimated US-Russian inventories 1991-2010
• Locations: Where the weapons are
• Sites: Examples of Russian and US storage sites
• Observations

Acknowledgements: research and satellite imagery analysis with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York, MacArthur Foundation and Ploughshares Fund
Statements

Neither country provides details about numbers or locations.

Russia:

"the Russian arsenal of nonstrategic nuclear weapons is reduced four times in comparison with the USSR arsenal."


United States:

"The number of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons declined by approximately 90 percent from September 30, 1991 to September 30, 2009."

Numbers

Combined US-Russian inventory cut 74-79 percent since 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons category</th>
<th>Reduction since 1991</th>
<th>Warheads remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Russia:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense/ABM</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>1120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>2270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>~6000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* There are unconfirmed rumors that Russia still has a limited number of army nuclear weapons.

** The 2010 NPR retired the nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles (TLAM/N), the last naval nuclear weapon.
Locations

Russia: ~20 air bases, 5 naval base areas, 5+ ABM sites, ? air-defense sites, ~12 national storage sites (co-stored with strategic warheads)

United States: 9+ air bases (6 in Europe with bombs), 2 naval sites (retiring); 2 central storage sites (co-stored with strategic warheads)
Sites: Soltsy Air Base, Russia

Location: 165 km east of Estonia
Nuclear-capable aircraft: Tu-22M Backfire
Possible nuclear weapons: AS-4 Kitchen / bombs
Sites: Soltsy Air Base, Russia

Tu-22M Backfire medium-range nuclear-capable bombers
Sites: Soltsy Air Base, Russia

Possibly AS-4 Kitchen dual-capable missiles
Sites: Soltsy Air Base, Russia

Possibly AS-4 Kitchen dual-capable missiles
Sites: Soltsy Air Base, Russia
Sites: Belgorod-22 Storage Facility

6-7 nuclear weapons storage igloos
Each with multiple security fences
Located 18 km from Ukrainian border
Sites: Büchel Air Base, Germany

10-20 U.S. B61-3/4 bombs (custody of USAF 702 MUNSS)
For delivery by German Tornado of 33rd squadron
Sites: Büchel Air Base, Germany
Sites: Aviano Air Base, Italy

~50 B61-3/4 bombs for delivery by USAF F-16s of 31st Fighter Wing
Sites: Aviano Air Base, Italy
Sites: Kirtland Underground Facility, NM

Kirtland Underground Munitions Storage Center (KUMSC), one of two central Air Force joint central nuclear weapons storage facilities. Stores more than a thousand nuclear weapons (both strategic and nonstrategic)
Sites: Kirtland Underground Facility, NM

Approximately 40 nuclear weapons storage bays
Observations

- Approximately 6,000 U.S.-Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons left; 74-79 percent reduction since 1991

- Remaining weapons at more than 55 deployment and storage sites, often co-located with strategic warheads

- Nonstrategic nuclear forces are not “balanced” or “inter-related” like strategic nuclear forces; significant differences in numbers, types, locations

- Tit-for-tat approach problematic: most Russian nonstrategic nuclear forces are not tied to US/NATO nonstrategic nuclear posture, and vice-versa

- “Disparity” angle misses the point: would Baltic states feel secure if there were parity of nonstrategic nuclear forces?

- Unilateral Presidential Nuclear Initiatives proven sound; still best option ahead?