Dear Secretary General,

It is with great pleasure that we would like to share with you the Non-paper submitted at the Berlin NATO foreign ministers meeting by Poland, Norway, Germany and the Netherlands on increasing transparency and confidence with regard to tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Luxemburg and Slovenia express their support for this initiative.

We are looking forward to discussing the ideas in the non-paper shortly at NAC, including SACEUR’s suggestion raised at the minister’s dinner on April 14 on holding ‘loose nukes’ exercise with Russia.

We are copying this letter to all colleagues on the Council.

Boguslaw WINID  Vegard ELEFSEN  Martin ERDMANN  Frank MAJOPR
Ambassador of Poland to NATO  Ambassador of Norway to NATO  Ambassador of Germany to NATO  Ambassador of the Netherlands to NATO

Rudolf HUYGELEN  Martin POVEJSIL  Istvan KOVACS
Ambassador of Belgium to NATO  Ambassador of the Czech Republic to NATO  Ambassador of Hungary to NATO

Thorsteinn INGOLFSSON  ALPHONSE BERNS  Blazka KEPIC
Ambassador of Iceland to NATO  Ambassador of Luxemburg to NATO  Charge d’affaires a.i. of Slovenia to NATO

H.E. Anders Fogh RASMUSSEN
Secretary General
NATO HQ
Non-paper submitted by Poland, Norway, Germany and the Netherlands on increasing transparency and confidence with regard to tactical nuclear weapons in Europe *

With the new START in force, and in the “Spirit of Lisbon”, Poland, Norway, Germany and the Netherlands have elaborated a set of concrete proposals that we hope will contribute to a more systematic dialogue between NATO and Russia on how to achieve greater transparency, mutual trust and confidence regarding tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. A common understanding of the role that tactical nuclear weapons play in the strategic doctrines of NATO and the Russian Federation is important in order to build the confidence required for further reductions and the ultimate elimination of these weapons.

The purpose of this non-paper, which builds on the previous Polish-Norwegian initiative of April 2010, is also to provide input to NATO Defence and Deterrence Posture Review, as well as the future work of the new WMD Control and Disarmament Committee. More generally, these ideas should contribute to the debate on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO and NATO’s role in the broader disarmament agenda. Allied consultations may facilitate the engaging of Russia in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council.

A substantial number of tactical nuclear weapons are still stationed in Europe. There is need for increased transparency concerning numbers, types, locations, command arrangements, operational status, and level of storage security. The lack of transparency is a source of insecurity, and adds to the risk of proliferation represented by these weapons. Our emphasis is first and foremost on transparency and confidence building, which we consider crucial to paving the way for concrete reductions. Such reductions should not be pursued unilaterally or be allowed to weaken the transatlantic link. The inclusion of NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons in any arms control process should be subject to consultations within the Alliance. The process should furthermore be based on the principle of indivisibility of security within the Alliance and on the assumption of reciprocity between NATO and the Russian Federation.

* For the purpose of this non-paper the term tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) is understood as comprising all nuclear weapons commonly referred to as short-range and/or tactical nuclear weapons.
Proposals on increasing transparency and promoting confidence with regard to tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

1. We encourage the use of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as the primary framework for transparency and confidence-building efforts concerning tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

2. NATO and the Russian Federation should exchange information on tactical nuclear weapons. Starting with declaring numbers, the exchange should successively also include locations, operational status and command arrangements, as well as level of warheads storage security. The NRC Defence Transparency, Strategy and Reform Working Group should be involved in this process.

Experience could be drawn from the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, which was used before 1999 as a forum for exchange of information on the implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives commitments of 1991/1992.

3. NATO and the Russian Federation could seek to agree on a standard reporting formula for the tactical nuclear weapons inventories.

4. With the aim of building confidence and trust, NATO and the Russian Federation should consider, on a voluntary basis and in good faith, notify within the NRC, of any plans to move tactical nuclear weapons.

5. NATO and the Russian Federation could also consider an exchange of visits by military officials.

6. Initial exchanges on conditions and requirements for gradual reductions of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe could be initiated as part of the process of enhancing transparency. In a first phase it would be useful to clarify the number of weapons that have already been eliminated and/or put into storage by the US and the Russian Federation as a result of the PNIs of 1991–1992.

7. We propose to hold a NRC seminar on nuclear doctrines, with special emphasis on the role of tactical nuclear weapons. Such a seminar could take place in Poland in the first quarter of 2012.