Source: DoD IG personnel - October 2007.

(U) Figure 3. U.S.-supplied M-16A4 Rifles Arrive at
Taji National Depot.

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██

(U) There were other delivery processes in place at other Iraqi ports of entry
(Umm Qsar), but we did not examine those during this assessment because of
time constraints.

In-Country Delivery Process to Baghdad Police College (U)

(U) We observed a problem with the chain of custody for arms and ammunition
during our visit to the BPC.

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Source: DoD IG personnel - October 2007.

(U) Figure 4. Weapons Storage Warehouses at Baghdad
Police College.

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Accountability for Weapons in the Delivery Process (U)

(U) By regulation, weapons are sensitive items within DoD. Serial number accountability and joint weapons inventories provide a higher level and more precise chain of custody control.

(U) **Serial Number Lists.** The containers (such as pallets or cases) holding the weapons shipped to ISF did not include lists of serial numbers. Moreover, lists of serial numbers were almost never provided by the shipper in advance. Vendors and shippers were not normally required by contracts to provide those lists.

(U) Serial number lists for weapons shipments should be provided in advance (preferably electronically) to the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan contracting officer, the MNSTC-I logistics function, and the Logistics Movement Coordination Center (Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). Having access to a list of serial numbers provided in advance by the shipper greatly improves the visibility over weapons.

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[12] (U) The Baghdad Police College is the national police arms and ammunition depot for the Iraqi police forces and is under the control of MoI.

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(U) Serial number lists should also be posted on the outside of weapons shipping containers, along with other shipping documents, and on the inside of weapons shipping containers to be available for those involved in the delivery and storage process. A comparison of weapons serial numbers recorded at the time of a joint inventory to those shown on the serial number lists accompanying the containers improves the accountability and control for the weapons. Those lists of serial numbers provide the precision required for a strong chain of custody for a DoD-controlled sensitive inventory item.

(U) **Joint Weapons Inventories.** The delivery of weapons to TND and BPC without an immediate joint U.S. forces and ISF inventory (by weapon count, weapons type, and serial number) prior to formal handover broke the U.S. chain of custody. Once the chain of custody for weapons has been broken, there is no assurance that weapons were not or could not be misplaced, lost, or stolen between the time the weapons were placed under ISF control and a formal joint inventory was performed.

Recommendations (U)

(U) G.1. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq:

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(U) **Assessment Response.** The management comments meet the requirements of Recommendation G.1.a.

(U) The initial comments only partially met the intent of Recommendation G.1.b. During out follow-up assessment, MNSTC-I provided documentation requiring arms and ammunition to be in a secured facility and/or under a 24-hour guard by U.S. personnel until formal transfer to the Iraqis. In the case of weapons, the formal transfer to the Iraqis required a joint serial number inventory. These

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actions met the intent of recommendation G.1.b.

(U) G.2. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, with advice and assistance from the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, jointly develop formal procedures for the delivery, joint inventory, and formal handover of U.S.-controlled arms and ammunition provided to the Iraq Security Forces, requiring that:

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(U) c. A 100 percent joint inventory of weapons (by weapons count, weapons type, and serial number) be performed with authorized Iraq Security Forces officials at the time of delivery and formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces.

(S) [redacted]

(U) **Assessment Response.** The management comments meet the intent of the Recommendation G.2.

(U) G.3. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan review all their contracts issued to procure and deliver arms and ammunition to ensure that clauses are included requiring vendors and shippers:

(U) a. Deliver arms and ammunition to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq. The contract procedures and the procurement contracts should comply with the procedures issued by the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, as discussed in Recommendation G.1.a.

(U) b. Provide serial number lists electronically in advance of any weapons shipments to Iraq and post serial number lists on the outside of weapons shipping containers along with other required shipping documents and also on the inside of weapons shipping containers.

(U) c. Provide enroute visibility to include the arrival dates and times of arms and ammunition cargo being delivered to Iraq.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation G.3.

(U) MNF-I concurred. They reported that Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan has been including serial number instructions for weapons as of September 2007. Additionally, sensitive item shipping instructions are included in contracts IAW Gulf Region Division memorandum dated May 18, 2007. Those instructions provide tracking and accountability controls up to acceptance by the Government from the contractor or its shipper.

(U) Assessment Response. The initial management comments did not meet the intent of the Recommendation G.3.a. However, during our follow-up assessment, the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan provided a response indicating that vendors and shippers would only deliver arms and ammunition to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq. This action met the intent of recommendation G.3.a.

(U) The management comments meet the intent of Recommendations G.3.b and G.3.c.

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Observation H.

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Database of Weapons Serial Numbers (U)

(U) The process to populate the MNSTC-I centralized database of weapons serial numbers for weapons issued to ISF by U.S. forces lacked sufficient internal data input controls. Errors identified included partial weapons serial numbers, extraneous characters within the weapons serial numbers that rendered the entry unusable, mislabeled weapon manufacturer identification, and data entered into the wrong database columns.

Centralized Database of Weapons Serial Numbers (U)

(U) MNSTC-I has maintained a centralized database of serial numbers for weapons issued to ISF since early 2006 and at the same time initiated a process for providing those serial numbers to the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program. The U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity manages the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program and maintains standards for data input quality controls for the database.

(U) Since 2006, MNSTC-I has been recording serial numbers from new weapons distributed to ISF. MNSTC-I is also collecting hand receipts for weapons previously issued to the ISF from 2003 through 2005 in order to record the serial numbers.

Recommendations (U)

(U) H.1. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq install data input quality controls in their centralized database of weapons serial numbers using a trained database programmer.

(U) H.2. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity assist/support the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq with installing data input quality controls in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq centralized database of weapons serial numbers to ensure system compatibility.

(U) **Management Comments to Recommendation H.** The Army and MNF-I concurred. MNSTC-I requested U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity assistance. A Logistics Support Activity representative visited MNSTC-I in February 2008, identifying necessary corrections that have been implemented. MNSTC-I is now sourcing a contracted solution for a commercial database to further enhance data integrity and provide continuity.

(U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of the Recommendation H.

Observation I.

Management of Iraqi Arms and Ammunition at Taji National Depot and Baghdad Police College (U)

(U) We performed a physical count of three selected Iraq military weapon types and compared those counts to the inventory database maintained at Taji National Depot (TND). The physical count of the three types of weapons did not match the numbers of weapons recorded in the inventory database. In addition, the team was unable to locate all of the three types of weapons in TND because of the disorganized manner in which the weapons were physically stored. Further, the BPC did not have sufficient storage capacity for the anticipated volume of arms and ammunition shipments procured through the ISFF and FMS.

Weapons Inventory Sample Results (U)

(U) A judgment sample inventory of AK-47 rifles (Kalashnikov Model Automatic Rifle of 1947) at Taji National Depot showed that rifles in storage exceeded the number listed in the inventory database by a count of 16,841. Judgment sample inventories of RPG-7 (Rocket Propelled Grenade) Launchers and Kalashnikov Machine Guns-Modernized (also know as PKM machine guns) determined that the numbers counted were less than the amounts recorded in the inventory database by 5,664 and 3,988, respectively. Figure 5. shows DoD IG personnel inspecting and counting weapons at TND.

Source: DoD IG personnel - October 2007.

(U) Figure 5. DoD IG Personnel Manually Inspect Weapon Inventories at Taji National Depot.

Weapons Storage (U)

(U) Iraqi weapons and ammunition of the same type were randomly stored in multiple warehouses at TND. There was no particular storage order or system to allow for their efficient retrieval.

(U) BPC did not have sufficient warehouse capacity for the secure storage of anticipated FMS arms and ammunition shipments.

Recommendations (U)

(U) I.1. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in:

(U) a. Performing a 100 percent joint U.S. forces and Iraq Security Forces inventory that will establish a baseline for Iraqi military weapons and ammunition stored at Taji National Depot and will record serial numbers of U.S.-provided weapons.

(U) b. Performing a 10 percent sample inventory of Iraqi military weapons and ammunition on a monthly basis to maintain data integrity of the inventory database.

(U) c. Establishing effective warehouse management and organization processes at Taji National Depot for the storage of weapons and ammunition and requesting help from U.S.-based logistics organizations as needed.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation I.1.

(U) MNF-I concurred, noting that MNSTC-I is conducting a 100 percent inventory check of all procured weapons (from either Iraq Security Forces Fund [ISFF] or Foreign Military Sales [FMS] funds) held at TND in coordination with the Iraqis. MoD is conducting checks of ammunition at Taji each week and reports stocks on hand to MNSTC-1. A 100 percent inventory of ammunition has not yet been completed by MNSTC-I personnel. Once weapons are transferred to the ISF, MNSTC-I does not have the manpower required to conduct monthly 10 percent checks, but will recommend to ISF Commanders that such an inventory be included in their regulations.

(U) The Coalition Army Advisory Training Team (CAATT) is focusing on the mentoring of the TND leadership to effectively manage warehouse operations, stock control procedures and inventory management. CAATT's goal is to have the Iraqis accurately receive, store, and inventory stocks. Additionally, the Iraqis must also manage the workload to pick, pack, and ship stocks to the Location Commands and the ISF. The Logistics Management Advisory Team (LMAT) will oversee the progress of the Iraqis in those areas to enable the Iraqis to execute supply depot operations. The purpose of that process is the successful transition to MoD control.

(U) Assessment Response: The management comments meet the intent of the Recommendation I.1.

(U) I.2. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to construct sufficient capacity for arms and ammunition storage at Baghdad Police College and other sites as necessary for the anticipated volume of arms and ammunition shipments.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation I.2. MNF-I concurred. The MoI is constrained for storage space for inbound weapons and ammunition and employs a 3-pronged approach to alleviate this problem. The first step is to increase the rate of throughput to subordinate organizations. The second step is to use temporary container storage in the newly constructed container yard. The third step is to divert ammunition to the Abu Gharaib warehouse complex, where MoI is planning on establishing a permanent workforce within the next 60 days. The Coalition is funding the construction of 12K square meters of storage space under a K-span design on BPC. This project is estimated to be completed by May 28, 2008. Once complete, all of the hardened warehouses will be freed up for ammunition storage.

(U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation I.2.

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Observation J.

Management of Iraqi Army Ammunition at Bayji National Ammunition Depot (U)

(U) The Bayji National Ammunition Depot was operated by a U.S. contractor under the supervision of the Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. There were no Iraqi military or civilian personnel assigned to the depot or present. In addition, the depot lacked adequate materiel handling equipment for the loading and unloading of ammunition containers. Further, the depot also contained a large stockpile of outdated and unserviceable Iraqi military ammunition.

Bayji National Ammunition Depot Operations (U)

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Source: DoD IG personnel - October 2007.

(U) Figure 6. Weapons Stored in the Open at Bayji
National Ammunition Depot.

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(U) The management comments meet the intent of recommendations J.1 and J.2.

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Observation K.

Serial Number Accountability for Iraq Security Forces Weapons (U)

(U) Data gathered from U.S. military transition teams supporting four Iraqi Divisions on the accountability of arms and ammunition indicated that approximately 85 percent of the Iraqi Army units in those divisions were accounting for weapons by serial number, with plans to attain 100 percent. Further, the MoI started recording serial numbers of weapons issued to police forces in January 2007.

(U) Although the MoI has begun to develop a centralized database to record serial numbers of MoI weapons, we found no indication of a similar effort underway in the MoD.

Serial Number Accountability in the Ministry of Defense (U)

(U) U.S. M16A4 and M4 rifles purchased and supplied through the FMS program were being issued to Iraqi Army soldiers by serial number. Iraqi Army units used biometric technology to link together the soldier's fingerprints, photographs, an iris scan, and other personal identifying information.

(U) The Iraq Assistance Group (a subordinate organization of MNC-I) queried U.S. military transition teams assigned to four Iraqi Army Divisions about the accountability and control of arms and ammunition. That data indicated that approximately 85 percent of the Iraqi Army units in those divisions were accounting for weapons by serial number. The remaining 15 percent of units accounted for weapons by type and quantity, not by serial number. The transition teams planned to work with their Iraqi counterparts to reach the goal of 100 percent serial number accountability in all units down to company level.

(U) In addition, the transition teams assigned to the Iraqi 4th Division reported that all Iraqi weapons in that unit were accounted for by serial number. They also noted that the serial numbers of the 4th Division's weapons had been forwarded up the U.S. chain of command. A full serial number inventory of all weapons in the Iraqi 4th Division was completed every 90 days in each subordinate unit.

Visits to Iraqi Army Units (U)

(U) We inspected arms rooms in four Iraqi Army units in different Iraqi Army Divisions. We found that all the weapons stored were being accounted for by serial number in their respective property books and arms room log books.

(U) We also visited four of the five Iraqi Army Regional Base Support Units.

One of the units visited was newly organized and had no arms or ammunition on hand, but personnel were aware of the requirement to account for weapons by serial number. Two of the remaining three units had accounted by serial number for the weapons in storage at their locations. The fourth unit visited had accounted for the weapons at that location by quantity and type, but had not yet completed a serial number inventory. That unit subsequently reported completion of the serial number inventory after the assessment team visit.

(U) Further, we tracked a direct issue of 258 Glock 9mm pistols from TND to the 4th Brigade, 9th Iraqi Division. The pistols were recorded by serial number on the unit property books at the appropriate organizational levels. We specifically followed 33 of the pistols down to a company arms room. The arms room had 30 of the pistols stored and accounted for by serial number. The three other pistols were signed out for the day, by serial number, on the arms room log book.

Serial Number Accountability in the Ministry of Interior (U)

(U) Since January 2007, the MoI Director General of Logistics has controlled the issuance of arms and ammunition to the police forces. The MoI received arms and ammunition at the MoI central warehouse facilities located at the BPC for the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police, and the Border and Ports Police, which included more than 40,000 weapons and 27 million rounds of ammunition issued from January through August 2007.

(U) MoI and U.S. Civilian Police Assistance Training Team officials conducted a joint inventory of the weapons by serial number the day after the shipment arrived at BPC physically opening the crates and manually recording serial numbers onto a standard form. Civilian Police Assistance Training Team officials scanned that form and sent it to Civilian Police Assistance Training Team headquarters and MNSTC-I J4 for processing into the MNSTC-I weapons serial number database. The serial numbers were also entered into the MoI centralized weapons database.

(U) The MoI weapons database has been in existence since January 2007. The MoI Director General for Logistics stated that the database accounted for 100 percent of the weapons issued since then (by serial number, the name of policeman, and the activity to which the weapon was issued). He also stated that he has automated archived records of previously issued weapons that he believed to be about 50 percent complete for years before 2007. He hoped to have 75 percent of the serial numbers in the archived database by the end of 2007.

(U) The logistics officers for the National Police, Department of Border Enforcement and each of the Provincial Directors of Police submitted a formal memorandum to the MoI to request additional weapons. Each request was compared against the central weapons database to determine whether the receiving organization or unit had a requirement for the weapons. The MoI Logistics Section then submitted the request to the MoI Deputy Minister of Administration for ultimate approval. Once approved, the weapons were issued and signed for by the issuing official and the receiving unit's logistics officer and senior officer.

(U) Individual weapons were issued only to policemen who had a MoI identification badge. The individual policeman who signed for the weapon had to be properly vetted, which is a 4-month process. The MoI would not issue weapons to any subordinate unit until they had received a comprehensive listing of the unit name and of the policeman for whom the weapon was intended. The listing must also include a signature of a fiscally responsible agent who accepted personal responsibility for the officer's reliability. The individual police officer must sign a form indicating receipt of the weapon at the time of issue.

(U) All police officers who were authorized to receive an individual weapon were required to submit a vetting file through their chain of command to the MoI. The file included a guarantee to repay the MoI 5 million dinars[13] in the event the weapon was lost or stolen. That guarantee was intended to ensure that the police officer would not sell the weapon on the black market. The MoI maintains the records of all police who have been issued weapons. Unit weapons, such as AK-47 rifles, are issued from the station armory on an ad hoc basis. Inventories and log books are maintained for weapons issued and returned at the unit level.

Visits to Iraqi Police Organizations (U)

(U) We interviewed National Police Transition Team (NPTT) and Iraqi National Police logistics personnel at the National Police headquarters in Baghdad. The NPTT logisticians have been working toward total inventory accountability of National Police equipment since July 2006, including recording of serial numbers of all weapons the National Police maintain. However, the NPTT had not been instructed to send recorded serial numbers to MNSTC-I for entry into the MNSTC-I weapons serial number database.

(U) **Requisitioning Arms and Ammunition by National Police Units.** National Police units requisitioned arms and ammunition directly from their national headquarters. The requests were forwarded to the MoI headquarters. Once approved, the National Police logistics function picked up the weapons from the BPC depot for delivery to the National Police units. When the weapons were issued, the National Police logistics function reportedly received and recorded the name of the specific policeman who had received the weapon, along with the weapon serial number. Although the procedures were being followed at the police organizations we visited, we can not necessarily project that result to all other police organizations.

(U) We interviewed the NPTTs embedded with the 5th Brigade, 2nd National Police Division, and confirmed that weapons in the 5th Brigade were accounted for by serial number and linked to the individual policemen to whom the weapon had been issued. Weapons not yet issued were kept in the unit arms room and inventoried, by serial number, on a monthly basis. However, we did not see any written regulation concerning weapons accountability at the National Police headquarters and no NPTT members we interviewed were aware of any written policies or regulations.

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[13] Unit of currency issued by the Government of Iraq.

(U) Requisitioning Arms and Ammunition by Police Service Stations. We interviewed the Provincial Director of Police for the Iraqi Police Service in Ninawa Province and his logistics director. We also visited a local police station in Mosul. The Iraqi Police Service followed a similar procedure for requisitioning and accounting for weapons as did the National Police. A formal request for the issue of an individual handgun to a policeman was made by the local station chief. The request contained a number of documents clearly identifying the individual who was to receive the weapon.

(U) Once approved, the weapon was issued by serial number and that information was recorded at the local police station and in the MoI weapons database. Only those policemen who had undergone this lengthy and formal vetting and identification process and who possessed a MoI identification badge were issued handguns. Rifles and larger weapons were kept in the local police station arms room and issued only for specific operations. They were also accounted for in the unit's weapons property book by serial number.

Recommendations (U)

(U) K.1. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior and their subordinate military and police organizations in attaining and maintaining 100 percent accountability and control of Iraq Security Forces weapons by serial numbers.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation K.1. MNF-I concurred, noting that they will continue to direct MNSTC-I to advise and assist MoD and MoI with regard to directing their subordinate organizations to gain and maintain 100 percent accountability of all weapons by serial number.

(U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation K.1.

(U) K.2. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq instruct all Coalition Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq military transition teams to assist/mentor the appropriate Iraqi personnel in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in development of their own centralized database of weapons serial numbers.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation K.2. MNF-I nonconcurred with the recommendation as it was initially written, because it implied that MNSTC-I should register all Iraqi weapons in the MNSTC-I weapons serial number database. MNSTC-I reported that its database only covers and tracks ISFF procured weapons, those re-issued under the Captured Enemy Weapon (CEW) program (through TND), and those procured through the U.S. FMS program. Tracking weapons procured by the Government of Iraq directly from non-U.S. sources is a Government of Iraq responsibility. MNSTC-I noted that it did not have the manpower to track that subset of weapons, even if the Government of Iraq were to provide the serial numbers.

(U) **Assessment Response.** On the basis of these comments, we modified our recommendation K.2 to read as written above, encouraging the MoD and MoI to develop their own weapons serial number databases.

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Part III (U)

DoD Personnel Resources (U)

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Observation L.

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Staffing and Oversight Functions (U)

(U) The MNSTC-I J4 (logistics function) did not have sufficient personnel and those they had did not have the requisite skills and experience levels to carry out its logistics mission (including arms and ammunition oversight). Further, MNSTC-I program oversight was hindered because the command did not have an Inspector General and had only one internal audit liaison officer.

Logistics Organization – Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq J4 (U)

(U) The MNSTC-I J4 logistics support function had 64 personnel assigned as of September 2007. It appeared that those 64 personnel were insufficient for the scope of the mission and did not always have the right mix of skills or experience levels.

Oversight Organization Comparison (U)

(U) Authorized personnel assigned to MNSTC-I and DoD equivalent commands.

DoD Organization	Authorized IG Personnel	Authorized Audit Personnel	Fiscal Year 2007 Budget
MNSTC-I	0	1	$5.5 billion
TRADOC*	18	8	$3.2 billion
TACOM**	11	7	$3.6 billion

* (U) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
** (U) U.S. Army Tank, Automotive, and Life Cycle Management Command

Recommendations (U)

(U) L.1. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq:

(U) a. Approve a Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document that provides for sufficient numbers of personnel and identifies the requisite skills and experience levels to

successfully execute its logistics mission.

(U) b. Establish an Office of Inspector General and an Office of Internal Review in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document that provides for sufficient numbers of personnel and identifies the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute their oversight mission.

(U) Management Comments L.1. MNF-I concurred. MNSTC-I completed a comprehensive personnel manning review in the fall of 2007 which resulted in the recommendation to modify the JMD in order to source the requirements shortfalls identified above. In February 2008, the Commander, MNF-I approved the MSNTC-I JMD change proposal. If approved and sourced by the Joint Staff, that JMD change increases overall manning in the MNSTC-I J4 by 46 percent (an increase from 64 to 94 personnel). The proposed JMD also reflects a net increase of five personnel within the MNSTC-I Office of the Inspector General, to include an internal review function.

(U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of the recommendation L.1.

(U) L.2. We recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, U.S. Central Command, expedite:

(U) a. Approval of the proposed Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document and request the necessary funding to accomplish the actions cited in recommendations L.1.a. and L.1.b.

(U) b. Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience level, and rank to fill the positions designated in the Joint Manning Document for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq logistics function, the Office of Inspector General, and the Office of Internal Review.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation L.2.

(U) USCENTCOM concurred, noting they received the MNF-I out-of-cycle request to modify the MNSTC-I JMD in March 2008. USCENTCOM Directors are in the process of validating the MNSTC-I JMD for submission to the Combatant Commander for approval. USCENTCOM expects to submit an approved document to the Joint Staff not later than June 1, 2008.

(U) The Joint Staff concurred, noting that they actively pursued the staffing of all JMDs that had been validated and forwarded by the combatant commands. The Joint Staff reports that MNSTC-I is currently manned at 95 percent. As a subset of that manning, MNSTC-I's individual augmentation billets show a Service commitment to sourcing of 94 percent.

(U) **Assessment Response.** The management comments meet the intent of the recommendation L.2.

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Part IV (U)

Foreign Military Sales (U)

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Observation M.

Foreign Military Sales Program Performance (U)

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Foreign Military Sales - Background (U)

(U) The FMS program has historically functioned primarily as a peacetime security assistance organization. A well-established FMS program enables the U.S. to further develop and maintain close bilateral political and interoperable military ties with other countries and, therefore, supports key U.S. national security interests abroad.

(U) Prior to 2007, funding for the ISF equipment and training was funded primarily through the ISFF. As Iraq begins to use its national funds for self-support, the U.S. FMS program forms the centerpiece for Government of Iraq purchases of equipment and training for ISF. We must work hard to keep it that way, for many reasons.

(U) FMS shipments to Iraq will sharply increase over the next few years as several billion dollars in Iraqi purchases, already made or anticipated, surge through the system. Responsive support beyond the norm is essential for rapid ISF force generation, replacement of combat losses, and force modernization. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) reports that approximately $1 billion in equipment has already been delivered to ISF under FMS.

(U) The Commander, MNC-I pointed out in January 2008 that Iraq's most significant problem remains equipping and sustaining ISF. To achieve that objective, the Government of Iraq is also considering purchasing arms and ammunition from other foreign suppliers, in addition to the United States.

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(U) Therefore, it is urgent that in 2008, the FMS program matures and demonstrates it can meet the ISF requirements for force expansion, modernization, and replacement of combat losses.

(U) The MNSTC-I security assistance office will eventually transition into an Office of Security Cooperation under Chief of Mission authority as MNSTC-I phases out.

Recent Accomplishments in Iraqi FMS Program (U)

(U) **Foreign Military Sales Task Force.** The Deputy Secretary of Defense formed a Task Force in 2007 that proposed a number of constructive actions, some of which have already been implemented, to increase the effectiveness of the FMS program. That initiative includes providing additional staffing and training, both for U.S. personnel in the Security Assistance Office (SAO) in MNSTC-I and U.S.-based organizations; developing a multi-year equipment requirements plan; training Iraqi MoD and MoI personnel on FMS; working to eliminate transportation backlogs; providing transportation visibility; and seeking U.S. legislative changes to improve FMS responsiveness.

(U) **Security Assistance Office.** The Task Force determined that the SAO in MNSTC-I was not adequately staffed to manage the critical FMS equipping mission. The Egypt and Saudi Arabia SAOs, for example, have staffs with 57 and 77 personnel, respectively, but each manages a smaller security assistance program in dollars than that of the program anticipated in Iraq, and they are not supporting a war. To provide the SAO more senior leadership, a general officer deployed to Iraq in January 2008 to lead the office. Also, the SAO will receive additional personnel spaces in a revised Joint Manning Document.

(U) **Intensive Management Office.** An Intensive Management Office was established in the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command in 2006 to support Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The additional staff allocated as a result provided experienced FMS personnel that were essential in supporting case processing for Iraq.

(U) **Transportation and Deliveries.** The FMS port of embarkation was shifted from Charleston Air Force Base to Dover Air Force Base in late 2007 to improve transport efficiency. Radio Frequency Identification tags are now mandatory on all FMS shipments to increase in-transit visibility. And, over 80 percent of Iraq-funded FMS defense articles are now air transported from the U.S. through the Defense Transportation Service.

(U) **Diversions.** Using diversion authority, high priority FMS items for Iraq are being selectively diverted from other intended uses. In these instances, delivery time to Iraq has been substantially reduced.

(U) **Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management.** Mobile training teams from the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management have deployed to Iraq over the past year and a half. They have trained 120

Government of Iraq personnel and 61 U.S. personnel, which is greatly enhancing their ability to use FMS as the principal means to equip and sustain ISF.

Iraqi Foreign Military Sales Issues and Opportunities (U)

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(FOUO)

(U). **Defense Coalition Support Account.** The acquisition process is a fundamental element of the FMS program. Difficulty in achieving more responsive equipment deliveries to Iraq can be partly traced to the long lead time in acquisition. An FMS process known as the Defense Coalition Support Account, not currently in use, could provide the necessary authority to pre-purchase critically needed equipment and high volume items, such as certain weapons, radios, body armor, and ammunition, and place them in stock. If that fund were established, thus making equipment immediately available, the ISF train and equip mission in Iraq would receive more timely deliveries.

(U) **Security Assistance Office Staffing.** USCENTCOM and MNSTC-I have not been able to make the progress required to increase the manning requirements of the SAO. Experienced and trained individuals are essential not only for case processing and execution, but also for mentoring ISF officials on FMS program tracking, controlling and accounting for the arrival of cargo, including sensitive items such as arms and ammunition. Only by thoroughly understanding all phases of the security assistance program can SAO officials make a significant difference.

b(2)

(U) Iraq Security Forces Mentoring. Additional and continuous mentoring is needed for ISF personnel who work with the FMS program. While field teams from the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management have been to Iraq to conduct training, the first line effort must be made by the SAO team in-country. MNSTC-I and its SAO team, along with other senior training and mentoring officials, should be educating ISF on FMS processes and expectations and building strong relationships based on mutual trust and confidence.

(U) Planning Cases. Planning cases provide the customer/requestor advance budget planning data. Planning cases also serve as information to the security assistance community about items of interest that may become formal Letters of Request. Therefore, the use of price and availability cases (planning cases) could improve the security assistance effectiveness provided to the Iraqi FMS program by projecting multi-year planning assumptions, with prices and availability information to support the FMS process in Iraq. That forecasting would facilitate FMS planning by providing the Iraqis assurances for a period of time regarding U.S. price and availability of Defense articles and services.

Recommendations (U)

(U) M.1. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense appoint a Department of Defense Executive Agent for the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales program. Consideration should be given to designating the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent. The Executive Agent will activate a Joint Program Management Office that will focus full-time on support for ISF, seven days per week to:

(U) a. Integrate, expedite, coordinate and drive the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales program in the United States, increase the responsiveness of the support effort for the U.S. commanders, and meet the wartime requirements of the Iraq Security Forces. This is an operational, not a policy, office or another bureaucratic layer. The office's only mission is to ensure the support in the security assistance area is provided to U.S. Central Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.

(U) b. Ensure U.S. Central Command, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq have the support needed, as required and on-time, to better assist MoD and MoI to build combat ready military and police forces.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation M.1.

(U) The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD[P]) nonconcurred, noting that

an Executive Agent for FMS already exists.[14] DoD Directive 5106.65, paragraph 3, provides: "the DSCA (Defense Security Cooperation Agency) shall direct, administer, and provide overall policy guidance for the execution of security cooperation and additional DoD programs in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended,...and this Directive."

(U) Establishment of a formal Joint Program Management Office for the Iraq FMS program would create unneeded bureaucracy and is not necessary in view of actions already taken to improve the responsiveness of Iraq FMS. The Deputy Secretary of Defense created an Iraq FMS Task Force in August 2007 to assist the DoD leadership to monitor the implementation of Iraq's FMS program, ensure coordination among relevant organizations, and improve the processing and delivery of Iraq FMS cases. Further, DSCA has established an internal Iraq Integrated Project Team and assigned an experienced FMS manager, whose sole job is to lead the Iraq FMS team.

(U) Moreover, the establishment of a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration and coordination of a country's FMS program would, in general, need to be requested by the government of that country and funded by it. Under the Arms Export Control Act, the President may sell defense services or contract services. Section 21(a)(1)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act states that for defense services, the purchaser must agree to pay in U.S. dollars, "the full cost to the U.S. Government of furnishing such service."

(U) The Secretary of the Army nonconcurred with the last sentence in Observation M (page 59) about the responsiveness of the FMS program to the ISF's urgent need, stating that the observation required additional analysis. He also nonconcurred with Recommendation M.1.b, noting that the Defense Technology Security Administration was already performing the function of the proposed Joint Program Management Office. He also noted that the Army had diverted thousands of items from inventory and accelerated delivery of numerous commodities. The Army reports that it has sufficient processes in place to achieve and maintain operational awareness with MNSTC-I, DSCA, and Army stakeholders.

(U) **Assessment Response.** We did not modify our recommendation, based on the following analysis.

    (U) **DoD Guidance.** DoD Directives (DoDD) 5111.1, 5106.65 and 5101.1 provide relevant guidance concerning the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]), the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and the appointment of a DoD Executive Agent, respectively.

    (U) **DoD Directive 5111.1.** DoDD 5111.1, "USD(P)," December 8, 1999, states that USD(P) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense

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[14] The USD(P) response is included with the USD(AT&L) response signed by the Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense, Joseph A. Benkert. See Appendix E.

policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. The Directive also states that USD(P) shall develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of DoD policy and plans for defense security assistance.

(U) **DoD Directive 5106.65.** DoDD 5106.65, "Defense Security Cooperation Agency," October 31, 2000, states DSCA is an agency of DoD under the authority, direction, and control of USD(P) and that the Director, DSCA, shall be appointed by and report to USD(P) through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (DSCA now reports through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (ASD[GSA]), who, under USD(P), shall exercise authority, direction, and control over DSCA.

(U) **DoD Directive 5101.1.** DoDD 5101.1 defines a DoD Executive Agent as the Head of a DoD Component to whom SECDEF or DEPSECDEF has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD Components. DoDD 5101.1 also states only SECDEF or DEPSECDEF may designate a DoD Executive Agent.

(U) **Defense Security Cooperation Agency as Foreign Military Sales Executive Agent.** The USD(P) comments noted that an executive agent for FMS already exists. However, DoDD 5106.65 established DSCA as an agency of DoD, not as an "executive agent" of FMS. The Directive further states that the Director, DSCA, shall be appointed by USD(P). As the Director, DSCA is appointed by USD(P), rather than by SECDEF or DEPSECDEF; the Director, DSCA is not an executive agent until and unless so designated by the SECDEF or DEPSECDEF.

(U) **Foreign Military Sales Management Teams.** The USD(P) comments discussed the ASD(GSA) Iraq FMS Task Force and the DSCA Integrated Project Team.

(U) **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs Iraq Foreign Military Sales Task Force.** According to the July 2007 charter of the Iraq FMS Task Force, the group was to provide recommendations to DEPSECDEF within 30 days of activation on how to substantially improve the procurement and delivery cycle of FMS procured defense articles and services supporting Iraq. No clear end-state objective was established for the existence of the Task Force, although the goal of halving the time required to process FMS cases from Letter of Request to Letter of Offer and Acceptance was mentioned. The core Task Force is currently comprised of members from USD(P), USD(AT&L), the Joint Staff, and DSCA. This is apparently an additional duty for the members. The Task Force as currently organized does not represent the permanence, breadth, or authority we believe is necessary to meet the priority challenge of managing and coordinating the Foreign Military Sales to support the war-time equipping and training requirements of U.S. commanders and ISF.

(U) **Defense Security Cooperation Agency Integrated Project Team.** The Integrated Project Team does not currently have a charter, goals, objectives, standards, completed membership, or other written direction, and is an additional

duty for the members. The Integrated Process Team as currently organized does not represent the permanence, breadth, or authority we believe is necessary to drive the FMS program until it can provide the responsive wartime support that is currently demanded.

(U) Executive Agent and Joint Program Management Office. The management of FMS programs is challenging and complicated in a peacetime environment. However, those tasks are exceedingly more difficult in a war-time situation, particularly one that requires an urgent responsiveness to the requirements of U.S. commanders establishing and maintaining the combat readiness of ISF. As stated in this report, the FMS program needs to be fully supportive of the war-time equipping and training requirements of U.S. commanders in support of the ISF. Once the SECDEF, DEPSECDEF, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are satisfied that the program is performing to their expectations, the JPMO would be disestablished.

(U) The Task Force and its participating organizations have made improvements in case processing and delivery response times. However, we continue to believe that the FMS program has not yet demonstrated that it can fully meet the standard of U.S. commanders and Iraqi government to urgently build and sustain the training and equipping of the Iraq Security Forces. Therefore, we maintain that a DoD Executive Agent as a Joint Program Management Office is still required to accomplish this mission until the desired standards are met.

(U) For example, the Iraq FMS Task Force identified in an attachment to its charter certain Iraq FMS bottlenecks. Notable among them, applying to the United States, are that "no one organization [is] accountable," "lack of in-country personnel with appropriate experience," "competition for scarce material resources-industrial capacity," "diversion," and "transportation." These bottlenecks are the problems we envision that a Joint Program Management Office/DoD Executive Agent would address and work to resolve for the war-time FMS process supporting Iraq. The Joint Program Management Office would be a unifying, integrating organization in support of USCENTCOM, MNF-I, and MNSTC-I. It would not alter the current organizations supporting FMS.

(U) After considering all of management's comments, we still recommend that consideration be given to appointing an Executive Agent according to provisions of DoDD 5101.1, specifically, paragraphs 4.1 and 4.1.1, which state that the DoD Executive Agent designation shall be conferred when no existing means to accomplish DoD objectives exists. We believe that a security assistance community organized over decades to operate in a generally peacetime environment may not be fully effective in a war-time situation and, therefore, not be able to provide the timely response required to accomplish DoD objectives in this area. The security assistance community does not currently possess a single entity with the management permanence, breadth, or authority necessary to energize both security assistance organizations and DoD non- security assistance organizations (e.g. contracting, procurement, and transportation organizations) and integrate them into a fully coordinated, effective, and responsive DoD team to meet the war-time equipping and training requirements of U.S. commanders in Iraq as they support ISF to become fully operational and independent.

(U) Further, we believe that an organization, such as a Joint Program Management Office, led by a senior General Officer or Senior Executive Service Officer, dedicated solely to the war-time FMS process (including the assigned personnel), is the best solution for removing the bottlenecks that exist in the United States for the support of the Iraq FMS program. Further, although Afghanistan was not discussed in this report, a Joint Program Management Office (JPMO) supporting (pseudo) FMS operations there would also address similar problems that exist in the FMS process supporting the Afghan National Security Forces. As such, the JPMO could become the means to address how a peacetime organization and process can meet the train, equip, and sustain requirements of a combatant command and assist a host nation in building combat ready security forces during the war-time situations that we now face in Iraq and Afghanistan.

(U) Funding for a Joint Program Management Office. The USD(P) response states that the establishment of a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration and coordination of a country's FMS program would, in general, need to be requested and funded by the government of that country. We disagree with this response for several reasons.

(U) For example, the Iraq FMS Task Force was established to provide recommendations on how to substantially improve the procurement and delivery cycle of FMS procured defense articles and services supporting Iraq. To the best of our knowledge, host nation support funds were not requested for this mission, which was supported by DoD appropriated funds. Further, there appears to be no legal or statutory basis for any DoD program management office, such as a Joint Program Management Office, to be funded by a foreign nation. Moreover, a foreign government should not be permitted to influence a DoD program management office by funding it.

(U) The Joint Program Management Office would serve as a central point of contact for the coordination and integration of U.S.-based organizations providing support for the FMS and pseudo FMS processes used to train and equip ISF. The mission of the Joint Program Management Office would be to independently oversee, trouble-shoot, resolve problems, and eliminate bottlenecks in providing flexible and responsive security assistance support to Iraq.

(U) In conclusion, the only intent for establishing this office is to improve support to the field so ISF can become fully combat ready and able to plan, conduct, and sustain independent combat operations at the earliest possible date.

(U) Because we believe that the success of the FMS program for Iraq is so critical, we recommend that DoD senior management reconsider their nonconcurrence with the proposal to establish an Executive Agent to drive this program and address the areas that still need improvement.

(U) M.2. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense, with appropriate congressional approval, establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to acquire a pool of high priority, high demand, urgently needed equipment that will be immediately available for shipment to the Iraq Security Forces to expand forces,

modernize forces, and replace combat losses.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation M.2. USD(P) concurred, stating that DoD included the establishment of a Defense Coalition Support Account in its package of legislative proposals, which is currently pending Congressional action.

(U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation M.2.

(U) M.3. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq establish and approve authorized positions for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq security assistance office in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document that provides sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute its security assistance mission.

(U) Management Comments to recommendation M.3. MNF-I concurred, noting that MNSTC-I J1, with support from MNF-I C1, worked extensively with USCENTCOM J1 to add 18 positions to the MNSTC-I JMD. These positions were approved in November 2007. Total manning of the security assistance office is currently at approximately 90%; however, officers who have had any FMS experience prior to being assigned to MNSTC-I continue to be a challenge. The Joint Staff J5 continues to be a strong advocate and provides invaluable assistance in identifying experienced personnel to fill these positions.

(U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation M.3.

(U) M.4. We recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, U.S. Central Command expedite:

(U) a. Approval of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document to accomplish the actions cited in Recommendation M.3.

(U) b. Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions designated in the Joint Manning Document for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq security assistance function.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation M.4.

(U) USCENTCOM concurred, noting that the additional JMD positions for the MNSTC-I Security Assistance Office were forwarded to the Joint Staff on 27 August 2007, and approved by SECDEF on 5 November 2007. The military services are working to fill these new positions with personnel possessing requisite skills and experience levels.

(U) The Joint staff concurred, noting that the MNSTC-I FMS division has a current manning of 32 of 36 positions. The remaining four billets have Service commitment for sourcing. The Secretary of Defense recently approved five additional billets to support the MNSTC-I division as a Functional Capability Team. These billets will be manned by July 2008. U.S. Joint Forces Command, as the force provider, will ensure that the appropriate Service identifies military/civilian personnel that meet the requisite skills, experience, and rank/rate necessary to meet the requirements.

(U) **Assessment Response.** The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation M.4.

(U) M.5. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior in establishing a requirements planning process that forecasts the Iraq Security Forces equipment and training needs on a multi-year basis to stabilize and improve the responsiveness of the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales program.

(U) **Management comments to Recommendation M.5.** MNF-I concurred, noting that MNSTC-I will continue to work with both MoD and MoI to refine their processes for identifying, prioritizing, and resourcing requirements.

(U) **Assessment Response.** The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation M.5.

Part V (U)

Iraq Security Forces Logistics Capabilities (U)

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Observation N.

Iraq Security Forces Logistics Capabilities (U)

(U) The ISF logistics system was in the early stages of development; the system was fragile and not capable of totally sustaining independent ISF military operations. MNSTC-I and MNC-I do not have sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to carry out their logistics mentoring mission and assist ISF in establishing its logistical sustainment base. Establishing this sustainment capability is a U.S. and Iraqi top priority.

(U) The expeditious approval of the proposed MNSTC-I JMD and the assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions for the logistics mentoring functions will greatly enhance ISF efforts to become self sufficient and increasingly take over battle space. This result will greatly reduce the demands on Coalition forces.

Multi-National Force-Iraq Joint Campaign Plan (U)

(U) The revised MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan, November 2007, contains an annex specifically dedicated to resources and sustainment during 2008 and makes logistics a strategic priority. The Joint Campaign Plan focuses on developing and maturing existing ISF logistics functions and processes to be able to purchase, deliver, and maintain end items and services in support of ISF combat units.

Status of Iraq Security Forces Logistics Capabilities (U)

(U) In its September 14, 2007 report to Congress, "Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq," DoD stated that "Iraqi MoD logistics from tactical to strategic levels, and MoI logistics at the strategic level, are fragile and not capable of independent execution."

(U) The DoD report further states:

> The MoD, and to a lesser extent, the MoI, have shown some improvements in logistics capabilities. The notable exception is an inability to adequately forecast life-support requirements and to promptly take action when contracts are expiring.

> The construction of national-level maintenance and warehousing facilities at the Taji National Maintenance and Supply depots should be completed by 2009. Training enough personnel in critical logistics trades to fully staff these depots will take longer.

Both ministries [MoD and MoI] still receive substantial
logistics support from the Coalition, mostly in the form of
U.S.-funded contracts, but to some degree direct support.

(U) The report also notes that ISF are partially dependent on Coalition support to
move supplies and, at times, to provide fuel for Iraqi vehicles and generators.

(U) Further, the Commander, MNSTC-I stated during testimony to Congress in
January 2008, that ISF have made much progress, but "the truth is that they
simply cannot fix, supply, arm, or fuel themselves completely enough at this
point." Figure 7 shows U.S. contracted trucks parked at Abu Ghraib Warehouse
that are used to transport munitions to the Iraq national munitions depots at Taji
National Depot and Baghdad Police College.

Source: DoD IG personnel - October 2007.

(U) **Figure 7. Contracted Transport Vehicles Parked
at Abu Ghraib Warehouse.**

(U) In our opinion, the U.S. forces and contractor support provided the backbone
of the Iraqi logistics system. The fragile logistical infrastructure hinders the
development of a stronger arms and ammunition accountability and control
system. As the size of the ISF expands and the operations tempo picks up, this
situation could get worse if we do not improve the Iraqi logistics sustainment
capability. We need to expedite assistance to the ISF now.

Resources to Mentor the Iraq Security Forces (U)

(U) The timely achievement of the Iraqi and MNF-I objective of building Iraq's
national logistics sustainment base requires the proper level of experience, skill
sets, rank, understanding and mutual respect to assist in training and mentoring
ISF logistics' leadership. In this regard, we need to accelerate the arrival of
personnel who are properly trained for this mission. They are badly needed.

(U) U.S. military and police transition teams and senior logistics advisors must

play a key role in assisting ISF in building its logistics sustainment base and its capabilities. These logistics mentors are needed to provide advice and assistance to Iraqi logistics officials in planning, building, and operating their logistics sustainment base.

(U) Achieving logistics sustainment objectives for ISF remains a major challenge and a top strategic priority for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, USCENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I. It is a necessary pre-condition for achieving Iraqi self-sufficiency and national security.

Recommendations (U)

(U) N.1. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense appoint a Department of Defense Executive Agent to integrate, coordinate, and expedite the support needed by the U.S. Central Command, the Multi-National Force-Iraq, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq as they advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in planning and building their logistics sustainment base for the Iraq Security Forces. The Executive Agent would drive the support needed from the United States to support the U.S. Commanders as they assist the Iraq Security Forces build their ability to conduct totally independent operations and expand their battle space.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation N.1.

(U) USD(P) and USD(AT&L) concurred with the importance of developing ISF logistics capabilities, agreeing to explore options and mechanisms to assist the Government of Iraq in that effort. They did not explicitly support or reject the "Executive Agent" proposal.

(U) Assessment Response. On the basis of the management comments and our assessment of those comments, we continue to believe appointing a DoD Executive Agent is the preferred option to ensure USCENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I have the support needed to assist ISF build their capacity to fully support combat operations. MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I must have quick reach back capability, through USCENTCOM, to a single operational point of contact so that timely support will be provided to USCENTCOM and MNF-I for developing ISF logistics capacity. The DoD Executive Agent must be available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week and have this as the only mission. This Executive Agent must be able to expedite assistance in providing (not all-inclusive):

- (U) mentors with appropriate rank and experience at the national level to work with top leaders in the MoD and MoI;

- (U) logistics sustainment;

- (U) acquisition contracting;

- (U) transportation;

- (U) training teams; and

- (U) training for U.S. and Coalition logistics mentors and trainers.

(U) Therefore, we have not changed the recommendation. In our opinion, an Executive Agent would ensure that MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I get the support required to expedite building an Iraqi logistics sustainment base that would become self-sufficient at the earliest possible date.

(U) Because we believe that the success of the logistics sustainment program for Iraq is so critical and the USD(P) and USD(AT&L) response did not clearly indicate concurrence or nonconcurrence with the Executive Agent proposal, we recommend that senior management reconsider the proposal to establish an Executive Agent to drive this program.

(U) If USD(P) and USD(AT&L) disagree with recommendation N.1., we ask that they develop and provide options other than appointing an Executive Agent, as they committed to in their response. We request that they coordinate these options with USCENTCOM. We also request this information within 30 days so that we can evaluate the options independently.

(U) N.2. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq:

(U) a. Establish and approve the required positions for senior logistics mentors and military and police transition team logistics mentors in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq through the Joint Manning Document or Request for Forces processes so as to provide sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute the logistics mentoring mission.

(U) b. Ensure that senior logistics mentors and military transition team logistics mentors assigned to Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq via the Joint Manning Document/Request for Forces are further assigned to advise/mentor the appropriate offices in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, and Iraq Security Forces, as needed.

(U) c. Establish a logistics training program in Iraq, comparable in comprehensiveness to that currently provided by the Counter-Insurgency Academy, to train U.S. military and police transition team logistics mentors. This could be a block of instruction taught at the Counter Insurgency Academy itself. We need to ensure that logistics mentors/advisors are prepared to perform this critical mission.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation N.2.

(U) MNF-I concurred with N.2.a. and N.2.b, noting that MNSTC-I would determine requirements for logistics mentors needed for the MNC-I and MNSTC-I staffs, and coordinate with MNF-I C1 to ensure requisite skills and experience levels are incorporated in the JMD or RFF, as appropriate.

(U) MNF-I nonconcurred with recommendation N.2.c. They stated that the MNF-I CG directed the establishment of a "Council of Colonels," renamed the Iraqi Logistics Development Committee (ILDC), an initiatives group to develop a way ahead to assist the accelerated growth of the ISF life support, maintenance, and logistics system. The ILDC is represented by all Coalition Force organizations, to include: MNF-I, MNC-I, MNSTC-I, Iraqi Assistance Group (IAG), and Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) MiTT. Between 15 February and 30 March 2008, the ILDC operational planning team (OPT) met several times to develop an ISF logistics way ahead. The Committee provided several in-progress review briefings to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource and Sustainment, MNF-I; the Commander, Iraqi Assistance Group, MNC-I; and the Commander, Coalition Army Advisory Training Team, MNSTC-I. In late March 2008, the initiatives group provided a decision brief to the Commander, MNC-I and Commander, MNSTC-I. The ILDC OPT deliverable product is an MNF-I FRAGO that will establish a common operating picture of ISF logistics capability and capacity, in order to synchronize efforts of all stakeholders responsible for assisting in the development of the ISF logistics system. The FRAGO, to be published in late April/early May 2008, will provide a Logistics Action Plan directing MNF-I and subordinate units to execute effects-based tasks to increase the ISF logistics capability and capacity. ILDC will refine and develop metrics to measure ISF logistics capability and capacity by function across all levels of support in order to establish current capability, target training efforts to close the capability gap, and gauge progress towards ISF self-reliance.

(U) Assessment Response.

(U) The management comments meet the intent of recommendations N.2.a. and N.2.b.

(U) After reviewing the management comments regarding recommendation N.2.c, we did not change the recommendation. Our recommendation was made to ensure that logistics trainers and mentors were properly trained for the mission they were assigned. We found some very dedicated trainers and mentors that were not properly prepared for the job they were given. In response to the final report, we ask that MNF-I provide us with a copy of the MNF-I FRAGO that will implement the Logistics Action Plan, as developed by the ILDC OPT. We will review this document to determine if it meets the intent of recommendation N.2.c.

(U) N.3. We recommend that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, U.S. Central Command expedite:

(U) a. Approval of the Multi-National Corp-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Document/Request for Forces and request the necessary funding to accomplish the actions cited in Recommendations N.2.a., N.2.b. and N.2.c.

(U) b. Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank, to include civilians from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to fill positions designated in the Joint Manning Document/Request for Forces for

the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq logistics mentoring functions.

(U) Management Comments to Recommendation N.3.

(U) USCENTCOM concurred, noting that they will review and validate future requirements for logistics mentors approved by Commander, MNF-I for addition to MNC-I and MNSTC-I JMD/RFF, as appropriate.

(S)

(U) The Joint Staff concurred, noting that overall MNC-I JMD manning is at 95 percent, and MNSTC-I overall manning is also at 95 percent. U.S. Joint Forces Command, as the force provider, will ensure that the appropriate Service identifies military/civilian personnel that meet the requisite skills, experience, and rank/rate necessary to meet the requirements.

(U) Assessment Response. The management comments meet the intent of Recommendation N.3.

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Appendix A. Scope and Methodology (U)

(U) The Secretary of Defense and the Congress became concerned about the accountability and control of U.S. weapons and ammunition (arms and ammunition) provided to the security forces of Iraq (the army and police). These concerns grew out of a Hotline complaint, followed by Defense Criminal Investigative Service and U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division investigations.

(U) In addition, the Government Accountability Office and Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction issued audit reports that identified problems with the oversight of weapons being provided to the Iraq Security Forces. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense and Congress requested that the DoD Inspector General review the current state of arms and ammunition accountability and control in Iraq.

(U) We made survey visits of approximately one week each to Afghanistan and Kuwait to gain a theater-wide perspective of the arms and ammunition accountability and control situation in Southwest Asia, which is the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. We identified issues in Afghanistan that we did not fully address during this effort but which merit follow-up.

(U) We examined accountability and control policies and procedures for arms and ammunition in Iraq that were currently in place at the time of our assessment. The scope of our assessment in Iraq applied to two areas:

- U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition that were under DoD control before DoD formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF). Specifically, this included arms and ammunition from the time of arrival at selected Iraq ports of entry until formal handover to ISF.

- U.S.-purchased and otherwise obtained arms and ammunition that were under ISF control after DoD formal handover to ISF. Specifically, this included arms and ammunition from the time of formal handover to ISF by DoD organizations through the subsequent issuance to selected ISF military and police units.

(U) We examined the delivery processes for U.S.-controlled arms and ammunition flowing to Iraqi military forces at the Taji National Depot and to Iraqi police forces at the Baghdad Police College for those arms and ammunition delivered through the port of entry at the Baghdad International Airport. We examined the process that ISF used to issue weapons to individual soldiers and police and the delivery process by which the ISF distributed arms and ammunition through subsequent issuance to selected ISF military and police units.

(U) We reviewed United States Code; DoD Directives, Instructions, Regulations, and Manuals; and Army Regulations applicable to the management of arms and ammunition, Foreign Military Sales, and logistics.

(U) The Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team chronology was:

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(U) June – July 2007	Briefed DoD and Department of State leadership and Congressional Committees
(U) July 2007	DoD Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team established
(U) September – October 2007	Trip to Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Iraq
(U) November 2007	Briefed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(U) December 2007	Briefed Congressional Committees
(U) December 2007– March 2008	Report writing
(U) March 2008	Draft assessment report issued
(U) April 2008	Management comments received and evaluated
(U) April–May 2008	DoD Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team Followup Trip to Iraq

Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage (U)

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) have issued four reports and testimony discussing the accountability and control over arms and ammunition and other equipment provided to the Iraq Security Forces. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov. Unrestricted SIGIR reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.sigir.mil. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at or at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports or at http://www.dodig.mil/inspections/ie/reports

GAO (U)

(U) GAO Report No. GAO-07-711, "STABILIZING IRAQ: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces," July 2007

(U) GAO Report No. GAO-07-582T, "OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: Preliminary Observations on Iraqi Security Forces' Logistical Capabilities," March 2007

(U) GAO Report No. GAO-07-308SP, "SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," January 2007

SIGIR (U)

(U) SIGIR Report No. SIGIR-06-033, "Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided By the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund," October 2006

DoD IG (U)

(U) DoD IG Report No. D-2008-026, "Management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund in Southwest Asia - Phase III," November 2007

(U) DoD IG Report No. IE-2005-002, "Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training," July 2005 (the Department of State Office of Inspector General participated in this assessment and issued Report No. ISP-IQO-05-72)

(U) **Summary of DoD IG Report No. D-2008-026.** This report showed that:

- (U) The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) was not always able to demonstrate proper accountability for and management of ISFF purchases and could not always demonstrate that the delivery of services, equipment, and construction was properly made to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF).

- (U) This occurred because MNSTC-I did not have sufficient controls and procedures in place, did not maintain adequate oversight, and did not maintain accountable property records. In addition, MNSTC-I did not have adequate

resources for efficient management of services, equipment, and construction purchased through the ISFF.

- (U) As a result, MNSTC-I was unable to provide reasonable assurance that funds appropriated for ISF achieved the intended results, that resources were used in a manner consistent with the mission, and that resources were protected from waste and mismanagement.

(U) Summary of Government Accountability Office Report No. GAO-07-711.

(U) This report showed that:

- (U) DoD and Multi-National Force (MNF-I) had not specified which DoD accountability procedures, if any, applied to the train and equip program for Iraq as of July 2007.

- (U) The MNF-I did not have orders that comprehensively specified accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraq Security Forces as of July 2007.

- (U) DoD and MNF-I could not fully account for Iraq Security Forces' receipt of U.S.-funded equipment.

- (U) A discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons existed between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and MNSTC-I property books.

(U) Summary of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Report No. SIGIR-06-033.

(U) This report showed that:

- (U) Twelve types of small arms (a total of 370,251 weapons) had been purchased for ISF, using Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) funds, through 19 contracts issued as of April 26, 2005. The report also showed that 12 types of small arms (a total of 134,842 weapons) had been procured using funding sources other than IRRF for a total of 505,093 weapons[15] issued and warehoused (pending issue) as of September 4, 2006.

- (U) Weapons accountability was questionable in two property books maintained by MNSTC-I for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The property books did not show a combined inventory quantity of sufficient numbers to account for the three types of weapons procured for ISF using IRRF funds. IRRF funds were used to purchase 178,135 of the 3 types of weapons but the two property books totals showed only 164,105 on record, a variance of 14,030 weapons or about 7.9 percent.[16]

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[15] (U) The report noted that this is the total issued and on-hand quantity (pending issue) as reflected in the two MNSTC-I maintained property books as of September 4, 2006.

[16] (U) The report noted that the combined quantity of these three items from the two MNSTC-I maintained property books could reasonably be expected to also include weapons from a variety of sources; such as weapons donated, captured, and purchased with funds other than IRRF.