2007 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION
ASSESSMENT MEETING

Vienna, 6 and 7 March 2007

CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY

CHAIRPERSON’S REPORT

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SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT
MEETING
CHAIRPERSON’S REPORT
Mr. Chairperson,

Last week, on 6 and 7 March, the Seventeenth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) took place in Vienna. In accordance with the decision of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC.DEC/3/07), Belarus, which held the chair of the closing session, is reporting on the AIAM to the FSC and, subsequent to the Meeting, is providing the Chairperson’s report together with the reports of the working session rapporteurs.

The purpose of the AIAM was to discuss the present and future implementation of agreed confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), as established in Chapter XI of the Vienna Document 1999. The agenda and modalities of the Seventeenth AIAM had been agreed upon in FSC Decision No. 3/07. The Meeting consisted of three working sessions and one parallel meeting. The opening plenary meeting and the working sessions were chaired by Azerbaijan, while the closing plenary meeting was chaired by Belarus. The discussions in each working session were moderated by a co-ordinator and summarized by a rapporteur.

The Seventeenth AIAM tested a number of important innovations, which were a result of the work aimed at revitalization of the agenda and modalities of the Meeting. For the first time, the agenda of the AIAM included a meeting of the heads of verifications centres, which afforded military representatives the opportunity to have an in-depth discussion on practical aspects of implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 and the Global Exchange of Military Information. The other new element introduced in the agenda was a working session devoted to suggestions aimed at improvement of the implementation of CSBMs. In the view of many delegations, both sessions considerably enriched the discussion and the outcome of the event.

In his opening statement (FSC.AIAM/28/07), the Chairperson of the opening plenary meeting and of the working sessions of the AIAM gave a brief introduction to his perspective on the event. He argued that the AIAM would serve as a tool to mirror the FSC’s work during the year and called attention to several important achievements in 2006, namely, special FSC meetings and workshops on small arms and light weapons (SALW), on the Code of Conduct on Político-Military Aspects of Security and on the Implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). He welcomed the innovation of introducing the parallel meeting of the heads of verification centres and expressed the hope that that first event would set a precedent for future meetings. In conclusion, he encouraged the delegations to engage in open and dynamic debate on their vision regarding further improvement of the implementation of CSBMs.

The current Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation provided brief information in his report (FSC.AIAM/18/07) about the activities of the FSC and the implementation of CSBMs since the sixteenth AIAM, in March 2006. Among those, he
referred to FSC Decision No. 2/07, which had led to the preparation by the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) of the Summary Report on Recent Trends in the Implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 and Other Measures (FSC.GAL/24/07/Corr.1), as well as FSC Decision No. 3/07, aiming at revitalization of the agenda and modalities of the AIAM. He also touched upon the special meetings held by the FSC on SALW, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and mentioned the ongoing work on the proposals regarding the prior notification of large-scale military transit and the deployment of foreign military forces on the territory of OSCE participating States, as well as the information exchange on rapid reaction forces.

Particular attention was devoted to the implementation of commitments contained in the OSCE Documents on SALW and on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition. The Chairperson underscored the importance of the forthcoming Special Meeting on Combating Illicit Trafficking of SALW by Air, to be held on 21 March. He recalled a progress report to the Ministerial Council meeting in Brussels on further implementation of the OSCE Documents on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition and on SALW, which had highlighted the achievements of the OSCE in that area. He also emphasized that the FSC continued to follow closely and supported the development of projects aimed at reducing the danger emanating from surplus stockpiles of SALW and conventional ammunition.

The Director of the CPC presented the Summary Report on Recent Trends in the Implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 and Other Measures Addressed during the AIAM (FSC.GAL/24/07/Corr.1), prepared in accordance with FSC Decision No. 2/07. The Report was intended to be a working tool of the participating States to facilitate the discussion on steps taken by them to implement the Vienna Document 1999 and other agreed measures and to promote the improvement of its implementation. In accordance with the above-mentioned decision, the Summary Report would in future years be provided three weeks before the holding of the AIAM.

In working session 1, the delegations discussed the implementation of the Vienna Document 1999. The first part of the session focused on the annual exchange of information, defence planning, risk reduction and military activities. The second part dealt with contacts, evaluation, inspection, regional measures and the Communications Network.

Working session 2 was dedicated to discussing the operation and implementation of other FSC-agreed measures and documents, including the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the OSCE Documents on SALW and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, FSC decisions on export controls in the field of SALW, etc.

The meeting of the heads of verification centres was held simultaneously with working session 2 and was devoted to the clarification of questions arising from implementation and operation of agreed measures, including the use of additional equipment during the inspections and evaluation visits.

Working session 3 focused on suggestions aimed at improving the implementation of CSBMs.

The discussion in each of the working sessions proved to be open and thought-provoking. Many ideas and opinions were put forward which would require further
in-depth consideration in the FSC. More detailed and comprehensive information about the debates in each session can be found in the reports of the rapporteurs.

At the closing plenary meeting, the rapporteurs presented their reports on the proceedings and the results of the working sessions. No disagreement was expressed with the contents of the reports provided.

Under the agenda item “concluding remarks”, one delegation stated that the dialogue at the 2007 AIAM seemed to have been more open than in the past. In that connection, the delegation commended the discussion that had taken place in working session 3, arguing that the session had proved to be a useful element and should be retained in the agenda of future meetings.

There was a discussion on the dates, agenda and modalities of the eighteenth AIAM. One delegation presented a “food-for-thought” paper containing two draft decisions on those subjects (FSC.AIAM/7/07) and proposed that agreement should be reached on the dates, agenda and modalities with a view to adopting both decisions at the FSC meeting the following week (FSC.AIAM/25/07). However, several delegations, while supporting the idea of deciding on the proposed dates for the eighteenth AIAM, argued that it would be premature to agree upon the agenda and modalities in the course of the current meeting, since they believed that there could be a need to modify the agenda, in particular with regard to the organization of future meetings of the heads of verification centres.

The participating States agreed that the Eighteenth AIAM would be held on 4 and 5 March 2008, and that the relevant draft decision would be forwarded to the FSC Chairperson with a view to its adoption at the joint FSC/PC meeting the following week. The draft decision on the agenda and modalities for the next AIAM would be further discussed in the FSC and adopted as appropriate.

In his concluding remarks, the Chairperson of the closing plenary meeting noted that the AIAM was a valuable undertaking aimed at ensuring full and timely implementation of all OSCE confidence- and security-building measures, which comprised the backbone of the Forum for Security Co-operation. It afforded an opportunity to review the functioning of existing measures and documents agreed by the FSC and to identify the issues that required further consideration. The open and substantive debates, along with informal dialogue and consultations, helped to clarify the different understandings of the way in which the agreed CSBMs and other measures should be implemented in practice. The Chairperson called upon all the participating States to ensure a proper follow-up to the suggestions they put forward in the course of the AIAM. He expressed the view that a proactive approach to the follow-up would facilitate the process of improving implementation of CSBMs, thus confirming the significance of the AIAM and further strengthening the FSC.

In closing, the Chairperson expressed his appreciation to the Partners for Co-operation for participating in all the sessions of the Meeting. He also thanked Cyprus, the current holder of the FSC Chair, Azerbaijan as the Chair of the opening plenary meeting and the working sessions, the co-ordinators and rapporteurs of the working sessions, the experts from capitals and the CPC, and the interpreters and conference services for their invaluable support during the Seventeenth AIAM.
Mr. Chairperson, this is a brief summary of the Seventeenth AIAM. More detailed information can be found in the documents referred to in this report, as well as in the other documents distributed in the course of the meeting.
REPORTS OF THE WORKING SESSION RAPPOLEURS
WORKING SESSION 1
Part A
Tuesday, 6 March 2007

Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

— Vienna Document 1999:
— Annual exchange of military information;
— Defence planning;
— Risk reduction;
— Military activities:
  (i) Prior notification of certain military activities;
  (ii) Annual calendars;
  (iii) Constraining provisions;
  (iv) Observation of certain military activities.

Working Session 1, Part A, was co-ordinated by Colonel Claes Nilsson, Military Adviser at the Permanent Delegation of Sweden to the OSCE, and the rapporteur was Anne MacLeod, Second Secretary at the Delegation of the United Kingdom to the OSCE. The co-ordinator structured the Session around his food-for-thought paper (distributed in advance under reference symbol FSC.AIAM/3/07). The paper was intended to promote a useful discussion and to encourage delegations to suggest possible ways of improving the current operation of the Vienna Document. The paper suggested a number of points for consideration, but delegations were free to raise any other issues.

1. Annual Exchange of military information

The co-ordinator introduced the session, noting that the level of returns under the provisions of the Vienna Document relating to the Annual Exchange of Military Information (AEMI) remained high. In 2006, 51 participating States had submitted returns before the deadline. However there were some questions about the methods used for conducting the exchange which still relied on the ‘sit and wait and walk around the table procedure’ rather than on the electronic submission of the information.

One delegation, which already provided its AEMI returns electronically, stressed that that procedure worked well. Most interventions supported a move towards the electronic submission of the information. However, electronic submission of returns, using the communications network, was not enough by itself. There was still a need for an ‘on-site’ meeting of experts to ensure the clarity and accuracy of the information submitted and to resolve any discrepancies in the data provided. The timing of that meeting was important. It would be difficult for some delegations to send participants to an expert-level meeting at the
same time as to the AIAM. There were two other proposals: to have an expert meeting at the
time of the AEMI, although some said that that would not allow for sufficient time to analyse
the information submitted ahead of the meeting or, alternatively, the meeting should take
place before the AIAM. One delegation stressed that it was for individual participating States
to decide who should attend the expert meeting, either heads of verification centres or
representatives of ministries of defence.

Some delegations also raised concerns about the capacity of participating States to
analyse all the information submitted. One participating State suggested an assessment of the
data by region, as not all the information submitted was of interest to all other delegations.
Another participating State raised concerns about the sudden disappearance of a type of
vehicle that had previously been notified, stressing the need to ensure transparency and to
maintain high standards in the information submitted. There were also concerns about the
need to avoid using different values when reporting numbers of troops and personnel.

2. Defence planning

The co-ordinator noted a negative trend in the number of participating States
submitting information under the heading of defence planning. Three main issues were
focused on:

— The reasons why some participating States regularly failed to submit information on
defence planning;

— The concerns of some participating States whose parliamentary procedures prevented
them from providing details as to when the annual budget would be approved for
inclusion in the annual calendar;

— Ways of enhancing the analysis of the information provided.

A number of ideas were put forward for consideration, with some delegations
highlighting the failure to submit any information as the most serious problem to be
addressed. There was some support for holding a workshop which might consider why some
participating States were not submitting information on defence planning and could look at
ways of supporting those that failed to do so. But it was stressed that that would only be
useful if those that currently did not submit returns could be persuaded to participate. Some
questioned whether non-compliance was a matter a political will. Some thought that better
technical analysis of the information provided could be a potential tool to better understand
specific subject areas where States had difficulty with compliance. But others thought that
there was adequate technical information in the report of the CPC. More detailed analysis
was a matter for individual participating States.

The annual calendar was discussed as a tool for reminding States to submit
information. The co-ordinator stressed the importance of following the provisions of the
Vienna Document, which required participating States to exchange information annually on
their military budgets. There was some support for having a mechanism to remind
participating States of the deadline for submitting information, three months after agreeing
their military budget. Perhaps a voluntary announcement in the FSC by all participating
States when their budgets had been approved could trigger a reminder by the CPC. One
delegation suggested that the failure to submit information in the annual calendar could be a potential early warning that a participating State might fail to submit a return.

3. **Risk reduction**

The co-ordinator reported that no contacts or activities had been reported under Chapter III of the Vienna Document in 2006. Experience had shown that those provisions were rarely used and it was commonly understood that they related only to crisis situations. Was there potential for using Chapter III as a part of the OSCE “toolbox”?

Delegations contributed several observations: the purpose of notifications under Chapter III was to dispel concerns about unusual military activities. If no concerns were raised, then that was not a problem *per se*. Others agreed that there was a need to question how the Vienna Document could contribute to crisis situations. Concerning using Chapter III in a regional context, one participating State observed that, if the Vienna Document 1999 was to be used by field missions, the missions would need training in its application.

4. **Military activities**

(i) **Prior notification of certain military activities**

In 2006, nine participating States had sent prior notifications of certain military activities. Of those, two had been submitted in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Document 1999. The remaining seven had been communicated in accordance with the FSC Chairperson’s statement of 2005 (FSC, 461st meeting, 5 October 2005), which provided for the voluntary submission of prior notifications of major military activities conducted below the threshold of the Vienna Document 1999.

The co-ordinator suggested that increasing the number of notifications would provide for a more effective inspection regime and increased transparency. A number of delegations provided details of their recent notifications, even of exercises falling well below the notification thresholds and encouraged others to do the same. Many agreed that voluntary notifications were a useful tool for planning inspections — steering participating States to carry out inspections at times when there would be military activities to observe. However, one delegation thought that voluntary measures were not working, while politically binding measures had proven worthwhile. Others disagreed and commented that the time was not right to lower the thresholds for compulsory notifications.

In conclusion, the co-ordinator pointed out that notifications below the threshold values were voluntary. There was no consensus on going beyond a voluntary system, but participating States were encouraged to have follow-up discussions among heads of verification centres and in the FSC to encourage others to make better use of voluntary notifications.
(ii) **Annual calendars**

The co-ordinator said that the numbers of annual calendars submitted had generally remained stable, although it seemed to be the same participating States that submitted information every year. In 2006, nine participating States had submitted prior notifications of military activities for 2007, and four had done so according to the FSC Chairperson’s statement in 2005. Notably, some delegations had submitted notifications of several activities in one notification, increasing the total number of notifications to 18.

One delegation said that they were not able to put details of all their activities into annual calendars, but proposed annexing later notifications to the annual calendar when internal procedures had been completed.

(iii) **Constraining provisions**

The co-ordinator noted that all submissions in 2006 concerning constraining provisions for 2008 had been nil returns. Participating States had varied in the year for which they submitted information on constraining provisions. The Vienna Document was clear that information should be provided on activities that a State planned to carry out or host in the second subsequent calendar year. There were no interventions by delegations concerning the added value of the constraining provisions.

(iv) **Observation of certain military activities**

In 2006, no exercise had exceeded the thresholds in Chapter VI, and there had been no invitations to observe certain military activities since 2002. One delegation thought that observations of certain military activities placed a significant burden, on the host State and questioned whether delegations might consider ways of reducing that burden which in turn might increase the levels of observation. One delegation proposed combining such observations with airbase visits. That might provide the added benefit of allowing for more interesting visits.

4. **Conclusions**

This working session had provided a worthwhile opportunity for delegations to highlight their views. The discussion had provided many ideas and opinions for more detailed consideration in other AIAM sessions and during the rest of the year in other fora. Some of the recommendations had already received indications of support.
WORKING SESSION 1
Part B
Tuesday, 6 March 2007

Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

— Vienna Document 1999:
  — Contacts;
  — Evaluation;
  — Inspection;
  — Regional measures;
  — Communications Network;
— Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI).

Working Session 1, part B, was co-ordinated by Colonel Anders Gardberg, Senior Military Adviser at the Permanent Mission of Finland to the OSCE; the Rapporteur was Lieutenant Commander Frederick Pollack, Military Advisor at the United States Mission to the OSCE. The co-ordinator distributed his food-for-thought paper (FSC.AIAM /1/07) in advance. The introductory remarks reinforced the intent of the paper, both of which aimed to promote discussion by assessing the facts and identifying possible shortcomings in implementation.

1. Contacts

Numerous delegations provided information on measures put in place for contact purposes. VD 99 instructs that visits of airbases and military facilities are to demonstrate normal, everyday activities. However, some tours had been “over-prepared” and could not be considered as taking place on a “normal working day”. In some instances, the host country or other participants had been unfortunate in their gender attitude. In addition, the co-ordinator noted a trend showing a higher number of participating States with air combat units that had not arranged a visit to a peacetime airfield within the past five years, or participating States with a military facility that had not arranged a visit to a military facility within the past five-year period.

The provisions for visitations are mandatory. Some kind of effective mechanism to prompt States to comply may need to be considered. Logistics and costs were identified by some speakers as possible key factors for their inactivity. On a positive note, numerous host countries reported having lowered financial and time burdens while enhancing visitor experiences by combining the airbase visit and the military facility visit in one trip. In order to improve the economy of the visit, it might prove beneficial, if appropriate, to include in the
visitors’ itinerary additional activities such as a demonstration of new military weapon systems (Vienna Document 1999, paragraph 31, stipulates that new weapon systems must be presented within one year of their deployment), military exercises, and cultural events. Another way of promoting cost savings might be to arrange joint visits to multiple countries so as to make it easier for smaller States to host and attend such activities.

States were encouraged to send experts on the tours and to avoid allowing the visits to develop into military-related “field trips”. Countries without a pool of experts trained in technical fields as well as VD 99 might opt to send one expert on VD 99, and separate experts in airfields and/or military facilities. That option would be well suited for visits combining tours of an airfield and a military facility during the same trip.

Multiple visits to different countries within the same time frame raised difficulties for some delegations. Suggestions for resolving this issue focused on enhancing CPC involvement with scheduling of planned visits or demonstrations of new weapon systems. It was noted that the issue had been brought up at previous AIAMs.

The 24-hour rule grants delegations a period lasting no more than 24 consecutive hours within a two-day span to visit an airfield or military facility. Although this allows, e.g., for a beneficial briefing and dinner the night before the tour, strong support was expressed for the “one working day” concept over the 24-hour rule.

The co-ordinator was encouraged that numerous States provided early announcements of expected upcoming events.

2. Inspection and evaluation

The co-ordinator opened the discussion by outlining trends in inspections and evaluations. During the past five years, the number of inspections had remained relatively flat. In 2006, 81 of the 84 requested inspections had taken place. The number of evaluation visits had been slightly lower than five years earlier. Forty-one participating States had received inspections and 28 participating States had conducted inspections in 2006. Fifteen participating States had received inspections without performing any. Regarding evaluation visits, 17 participating States had received visits without conducting any. That was not an East-of-Vienna, West-of-Vienna issue. Of the inspections, 43 per cent had been conducted by multinational groups, whereas 35 per cent of the evaluations had been multinational.

The nature of visits and inspections had changed. In the case of inspections, it was difficult to see whether anything unforeseen had occurred. The surprise effect of inspections hardly played a role any longer, and the idea of considering how to split up the inspection over the course of a year was mentioned. When considering how to conduct inspections, it was important to respect the letter and the spirit of the Vienna Document.

The passive quota system had again created difficulties for host and inspector, since at least one State’s inspections/visits had been conducted within a tight time frame and during its official holiday period. In addressing the quota race, an idea referred to as “flexible implementation” was put forward. That would permit different forms of verification to be interchanged, and would allow the States to decide how much of each form they would like.
Numerous concerns were expressed regarding refusal by States of inspections or evaluations without reasonable explanations or without the proposal of a new date for the inspection or evaluation.

Another concern raised referred to areas within the zone of application where compliance and verification measures were not possible, thus placing foreign forces outside the reach of verification.

Attention was called to the need to receive timely information in support of transiting teams travelling through participating States.

3. Regional measures

Regional measures are among the central CSBMs in the Vienna Document. In this spirit, numerous States have entered into bilateral arrangements on the basis of VD 99. These relationships were seen as smoothing natural issues and promoting mutual trust. It was seen that the regional measures were addressing the quota race, as the bilateral measures were most often reciprocated and taking place throughout the year. In addition to bilateral proposals, further training by OSCE missions intended to enhance existing measures was encouraged.

4. Communications Network

With nearly all the participating States connected to the Communications Network, and more than half connected over 99 per cent of the time in 2006, the Network was a very good resource and one of the best functioning but least known features in the OSCE. The co-ordinator questioned whether the Communications Network was being used in the best possible way, and asked whether participating States could more effectively use the Network for other CSBM-related exchanges of information.

The OSCE website is undergoing a significant change, requiring users to have a “token” by 10 March to access its information. Concern was raised that a lack of tokens would prevent access to the website by many people who were currently legitimately obtaining information from it. The CPC would work with delegations requiring additional tokens.

Concern for the security and good functioning of the Network was raised, as more than one INA version was currently in use. Regarding configuration control, the CPC confirmed that most States were currently using the latest updated INA version, and that at least one State was continuing to use the older INA 1.0 version. The CPC cautioned that they only provided web software technical support to those States using the latest software. It was suggested that the issue be further discussed in the appropriate forum.
The CPC advised that the network had the technical ability to transfer different forms of information without an upgrade. Agreement would need to be reached within the OSCE to pass other forms of files in addition to those currently being distributed. There was no technical restriction preventing participating States from connecting to Vienna, as the CPC would provide technical and educational support to requesting States. However, the CPC would not seek synergies with Doc.In or similar systems, as that would substantially weaken network security.

In addition to the CPC’s offer of assistance to bring all States online, offers of assistance were made by individual States. One suggested that the FSC Chairperson should send a message to States that were not online, with explicit directions for achieving connection.

5. **Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI)**

A general discussion on the advantages/disadvantages of combining the dates for submission of the AIAM and GEMI took place. The overall level of GEMI submissions was considered to remain high.

6. **Summary by the co-ordinator**

The discussion was open and frank. It showed that the AIAM still has an important role to play in giving delegations the opportunity to raise matters of concern with regard to implementation.
WORKING SESSION 2
Wednesday, 7 March 2007

Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

— Principles governing conventional arms transfers (CAT);
— Principles governing non-proliferation;
— Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations;
— Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL);
— Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security;
— OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW);
— OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition;
— Principles for export controls of MANPADS;
— Principles on the control of brokering in SALW;
— Standard elements of end-user certificates and verification procedures for SALW exports.

Ms. Diana Marvin, of the delegation of the USA, was the co-ordinator of Working Session 2, and Mr. Anton Eischer, of the delegation of Austria, was the rapporteur. The co-ordinator had circulated a food-for-thought paper in advance under the reference FSC.AIAM/6/07, with comments and questions regarding documents and the agenda of the Working Session. That paper was intended to spark discussion about the topics concerning the operation and implementation of other FSC-agreed measures and documents.

1. Principles governing conventional arms transfers

The co-ordinator stated that these principles governing CAT remained the backbone of current export control systems, and were now used for SALW, MANPADS and WMD. To start the discussion, she asked whether the participating States were satisfied with current implementation of regulations governing CAT and whether there was a need for further work on the annual questionnaires.

In the view of one delegation the OSCE Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers contain quite a number of extremely relevant provisions which participating States must take into account. Special reference was made to the political commitment to restrain exports of weapons to countries with unresolved conflicts. A specific case was mentioned where, although no limits and restrictions had been violated, the rapid build-up of weapons...
was extremely alarming. It was also emphasized that States that exported weapons to
countries with unresolved conflicts were taking upon themselves an enormous political
responsibility.

One delegation stated that, in the phase of demilitarisation and transformation of an
army, certain weapons and training were necessary. Furthermore the modernization was
going hand in hand with economic development; it was fully transparent and no limits had
been violated. Another delegation reserved its right to reply on the topic of export of weapons
to countries with unresolved conflicts.

A delegation reminded the participating States that, since the UN had changed its
questionnaire, an improvement of the OSCE questionnaire was needed. It suggested a review
of the questionnaire as one of the next activities relating to the document on CAT. That
suggestion was supported by another delegation, which recalled that the change was technical
in nature. It also was mentioned that the proposal for an update had already been made in the
past year.

Finally, the co-ordinator confirmed that before the UN had changed its questionnaire,
it had been consistent with the OSCE questionnaire and concluded that an updating of FSC
Decision No. 13/97 would be required.

2. Principles governing non-proliferation

Introducing the principles governing non-proliferation, the co-ordinator noted that the
participating States were quite active in reviewing possible contributions to the objectives set
forth in UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and had approved an FSC decision
along those lines in 2006. She informed the participating States that her delegation would
brief them on a national plan at the meeting following week. In order to initiate the
discussion, she asked the participating States whether there were thoughts on further steps to
address proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and how the OSCE, as a regional
organization, could advance other non-proliferation objectives.

One delegation recalled that the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was
high on the country’s national agenda and it was willing to share views and thoughts with
other participating States in order to spread its ideas to other regions. The same delegation
mentioned adherence and implementation as the two most important aspects. The latter one
in particular should focus on production, marketing and transport, all of which were these are
equally important. Transit countries had a heavy burden to bear and needed close
co-operation to fight the spread of WMD. The delegation also provided information about the
second meeting on combating nuclear terrorism that had taken place in Ankara in 2006. That
meeting had been co-hosted by two other participating States, which would report on it. In
closing, it reminded the participating States that the OSCE as a regional security organization
was the right place to tackle such questions. Concerning the meeting in Ankara the
co-ordinator added that nine OSCE participating States had been among the 13 countries that
had taken part in it. One result of the meeting had been the expression of a wish for broader
participation in future similar meetings. Her delegation would inform the participating States
about the meeting during the joint PC/FSC meeting on 14 March 2007. That suggestion was
supported by one delegation, which also stated that duplications should be avoided and
further work should be based on suggestions made in the draft update FSC.DEL/286/05/Rev.1/Corr.1.

Another delegation welcomed the efforts and activities of the OSCE with regard to non-proliferation of WMD and in particular the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). However it also reminded the participating States that duplication of efforts with those of other international organisations should be avoided, and proposed that FSC decision on UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) should be reviewed. That suggestion was supported by another delegation, which expressed its concern about the co-ordinators paper on the topic. In its view, the FSC decision on UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) did not contain a provision for developing national plans on implementation, and the UN was the right body for further developing implementation measures relating to this resolution. It also welcomed early discussion on the topic in the FSC.

Finally the co-ordinator took note of the concerns raised about national implementation plans and made clear, that the effort would take place at the national level. She also recognized the need for further discussions on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) at the coming FSC meetings.

3. **Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations**

The co-ordinator recalled in her paper that the document on stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations had never been applied since its adoption. One delegation regretted that fact. In its view, the measures were important in regions where conflicts still existed and measures relating to illegal military presence and temporary deployment of forces should be added. Those topics should also be taken up by the FSC and discussed in that format.

4. **Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines**

Concerning the Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines, the co-ordinator, pointed out that, according to the document on “recent trends”, 11 participating States are in need of assistance with APL problems, and 32 participating States had indicated a willingness to provide assistance. In conclusion it therefore seemed very likely that assistance was being rendered. For further discussion, she wondered how providers/recipients could best communicate such requests and could avoid duplication of efforts.

One delegation stated very clearly that, for such activities, the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines would provide the best setting for an information exchange and clearing of requests for assistance in the destruction of such landmines.

Another delegation informed the participating States about that country’s commitment to alleviate the effects of armed conflicts and its financial provision for post-conflict clean-up. That assistance was being rendered to four other participating States without regard to the source or type of explosive contamination, including that caused by unexploded cluster munitions. The same delegation stated that cluster munitions were only one type of munition which could produce contamination from hazardous explosive remnants of war (ERW). In that country’s experience, unexploded cluster munitions were only in nine out of 52 countries a factor.
5. Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security

The co-ordinator reminded the participating States of the highly successful special FSC meeting regarding implementation of the Code of Conduct (FSC.GAL/98/06) that had been held in September 2006 and recalled that the FSC was planning to study the results of the seminar at an upcoming meeting of Working Group A (FSC.DEL/26/07). Many suggestions for enhancing the implementation of the Code had been made at this meeting. Delegations were been asked at the present AIAM whether they wished to highlight a specific area for further discussion.

At the outset, a delegation questioned the value-added of discussing the document during the present AIAM, since the FSC had held a special meeting in 2006 last year and 46 recommendations had already been made. It also pointed out that certain participating States had recommended at the special FSC meeting in 2006 last year that the AIAM would be the proper forum for discussing the Code of Conduct. The same delegation expressed its hope that those delegations would assume their responsibility and provide their contributions. It also said that the 46 recommendations of the special meeting in 2006 as well as the excellent papers of the Conflict Prevention Centre, provided a good basis for further work on improving the implementation of the Code of Conduct. Of the 46, it drew the attention of the delegations to the recommendations on model answers and definitions relating to different types of forces and asked if they would improve the implementation as well as the analysis of the answers by participating States. The same delegation also informed participating States about the seventh Workshop on the Code of Conduct that had taken place in Geneva in September 2006. According to the organizers, the 38 participants in the Workshop had included representatives from 22 participating States. One novelty had been the participation of representatives from OSCE partner countries. The aim of the Workshop had been first to familiarize the representatives of participating States with the Code of Conduct and second, to present the Code of Conduct to the Partners for Co-operation. The delegation also informed the other participating States that it was prepared to hold such a seminar in co-operation with other participating States.

Another delegation considered the focus to be on improvement of the implementation of the Code of Conduct. It again expressed its support for the last food-for-thought paper on the topic and stated that it attached importance to concrete discussions on a phase-by-phase basis. The discussions should aim at draft decisions on reviewing the questionnaire and its format, definitions and harmonization of the answers to the questionnaire in a time frame which should be determined. In addition, the answers to the questionnaire should be made publicly available.

Another delegation reminded the participating States that the special FSC meeting in 2006 had produced numerous proposals for improving the implementation of the Code of Conduct. The delegations last food-for-thought paper, which had been supported by other participating States, went one step further. The appointment of a special co-ordinator in the meantime would also be an important step. The future work of the participating States on the topic should aim at enhanced implementation of the Code of Conduct.
A delegation noted that the appointment of its representative as the co-ordinator indicated the importance that it attached to the topic. For further work, it would prefer to concentrate on the application side more than on the provisions.

A further delegation stated that it was paying close attention to the implementation of the Code of Conduct. In order to support other participating States in implementing the Code, it had sent instructors to participating States in the Southeast European and Caucasus region, who had arranged tailor-made courses in co-operation with the OSCE missions. The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the near future would arrange a high-level Code-of-Conduct seminar in Sarajevo, which would be followed by two expert level seminars for police and the intelligence sector later in the spring and by more courses for to the armed forces in BiH in the autumn of 2007. The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina had also organized a high-level security policy seminar in February as part of the Mission’s Security Policy Training Project, which aimed to assist the BiH authorities to set up a national security policy training system. Those activities could be used as examples of how implementation could be improved, also building upon capabilities of the OSCE missions in that region. The same delegation also supported the idea expressed by other participating States that the questionnaire should be improved and the answers made publicly available.

Before the closing of Working Session 2 a delegation wanted to draw the attention of the participating States to paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the Code of Conduct, which in its view could also provide for regional security concerns.

6. OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons

By way of introduction, the co-ordinator noted that the destruction of 5.3 million small arms and light weapons (SALW) from 2001 to 2005 was a good example of improving the security of many people in the OSCE area. She also expected that, in 2006, it would be possible to dispose of a large amount of SALW and so contribute to the success story. To initiate the discussion, she asked the participating States what could be done to ensure continued success in that arena, what were the remaining priority areas and what kind of lessons learned/improvements could be put forward for further action.

One delegation stated that the SALW document was one of the successful aquis of the OSCE. It reminded the participating States of the forthcoming special FSC meeting on illicit trafficking of SALW by air transport, to take place on 21 March 2007 and called upon them submit proposals and concerns to the co-ordinator of the session.

The FSC co-ordinator responsible for requests submitted pursuant to the OSCE Document on SALW briefed delegations on the status of two projects in other participating States and shared with delegations some thoughts concerning implementation of SALW projects (FSC.AIAM/27/07). In the case of one project, he noted its advanced status, expressed his hope for continued support for it and described it as a very good example for the conduct of a project within the OSCE. He also provided information about a donor visit to the project in 2006 last year and about a visit of donors as well as interested participating States planned to take place between 18 and 26 April 2007. In the case of the other project he informed the participating States that the funding received permitted the project to be started and asked participating States to consider providing support for it. Regarding co-operation
and co-ordination on implementation with other international organizations, he drew
attention to the participation in joint workshops, working groups and information exchanges,
as well as the support of OSCE projects by other international organizations. He also
mentioned the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Secretariat of
the OSCE and UNDP. As there would be an official request by one participating State to a
number of international organizations, including the OSCE an enhanced co-ordination and
co-operation between the OSCE and other international organizations was necessary in order
to ensure that the strengths and differing capacities were used in the most cost-effective way
and to avoid duplication in work.

One delegation referred to the necessity of co-ordination and co-operation among
international organizations regarding implementation of SALW projects and regretted the
lack of co-ordination thus far. It mentioned that the model the OSCE had in relation to the
second dimension involving an advisory board consisting of different international actors the
so called ENVSEC initiative was a reasonable one for improving co-operation. Something
similar should be invented in relation to the politico-military projects.

Another delegation stressed the importance of OSCE’s contribution to the discussions
going on in other international organizations, first and foremost, the United Nations. The
know-how and experience of the OSCE in the field of non-proliferation, including SALW,
would be of benefit to others in their own deliberations, e.g., the discussions that were
planned to take place within the United Nations with a view preparing an arms trade treaty.
The same delegation also noted that the impacts of SALW trafficking and proliferation on
development had been stressed. It was suggested that the negative impacts of SALW on
development would fit well into the work of the OSCE, given the Organization’s
comprehensive approach to security. The developmental aspect of proliferation of SALW
would call for the development of synergies between the FSC and the PC, the Organization’s
three committees, and certain field missions.

A delegation provided information about the status of an SALW project in its country.
It stated that the registration of the project was underway and an expert visit will take place in
the near future. More information on the project would be given in one of the next FSC
meetings.

In the view of one delegation, the SALW document had not been fully implemented.
Participating States were invited to ensure full implementation by participating in the one-off
exchanges as well as providing updates to the one-off information exchange of 2002. In order
to facilitate the assessment visit and the implementation of the UN document on marking and
tracing participating States were asked to provide sample pictures of the marking of SALW.

The representative of the CPC also drew the attention of the participating States to the
co-ordination among international organizations, and stated that the OSCE possessed the
technical capabilities for such co-operation, and the co-operation between the OSCE and
UNDP was very successful. That co-operation encompassed task- and experience-sharing and
management and financing of projects.

Another delegation provided information about the multilateral symposium on SALW
together with other participating States that had taken place in Geneva in October 2006.
During that symposium, a consensus had been reached among the participants that a further
symposium of the same should be held at the NATO training centre in Oberammergau with the aim of reaching more participants and gaining more support. Other participating States were asked to hold such symposiums too.

7. **OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition**

Concerning this document, the co-ordinator of Working Session 2 reminded delegations that a number of OSCE projects were under way or near completion and larger projects were on the horizon. She also mentioned the approved best practice guides and noted that there might be more. To launch the discussion, she asked about the lessons learned from the projects, better control mechanisms to safeguard such stockpiles, other niche areas for the FSC to work on and the process on the cooperation with other international organizations.

The FSC co-ordinator for requests submitted pursuant to the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (CA) provided information about two additional requests submitted by participating States since the last AIAM, which brought the total number of participating States which requesting support to ten (DSC.AIAM/22/07). One of the new requests referred to the disposal of ammunition and upgrading of security of SALW and CA stockpiles. The other request concerned destroying surplus ammunition and liquid rocket fuel. The co-ordinator also informed delegations about the status of projects in two other participating States. In addition, he provided information about a group of friends on rocket fuel component melange, which had been established in December 2006. In conclusion, he thanked the 15 participating States that had donated funds in response to the request for assistance related to stockpiles of CA and rocket fuel component melange.

A delegation informed the participating States about the completion of chapters for the best practice guide on CA, and said that there were still the chapters on surplus and risk reduction to be finished. It expressed its gratitude regarding the cooperation with other participating States on that best practice guide, which demonstrated the great importance of the work. The same delegation also suggested the holding of a special session of the FSC on the topic. Another delegation confirmed its willingness to continue its role as co-ordinator on the best practice guide.

One delegation informed the participating States about its contribution to the best practice guide and its efforts towards the elimination of its stockpile of CA and melange. The two projects in the country concerned were being implemented and aimed at the elimination of security threats to the local population. For safety reasons, the project on melange had the highest priority. The signing of the draft MoU was a precondition for further tender procedures and the start of the melange project. The same delegation would also greatly appreciate any additional assistance from participating States.

The representative of the CPC updated the delegations concerning the melange projects and informed them that a downsizing of those projects was envisaged in order to attract donors and implementers more easily.

One delegation informed the participating States about the country’s huge amount of outdated conventional ammunition. Although it had submitted requests for assistance some time earlier, it intended to rely in future on its own resources. It was prepared to inform the
participating States about that development. Lastly the delegation expressed its thanks to the representative of another delegation for co-ordination of the Kaliningrad Group of Friends.

In closing the Working Session 2, a partner country called attention to the danger of the transfer of CA, especially when SALW fell into the hands of terrorists. That country had therefore initiated a project for an international instrument at the Conference on Disarmament. It was willing to provide information about that initiative to participating States.

8. **Principles for export controls of MANPADS**

The co-ordinator reminded the participating States that effective export controls in respect of MANPADs remained a high priority for many participating States. Several participating States had offered to provide assistance to ensure proper controls and the destruction of excess stocks. The delegations were asked to provide information about their activities in those areas and to make comments on how the control mechanism could be improved based on practical experience.

The representative of the CPC provided information about a seminar on SALW held in a participating States in October/November 2006. The seminar had also included MANPADS, and an interesting discussion had taken place. During the meeting, the participating States concerned had stated that it would refrain from exporting MANPADS.

A delegation mentioned that the problems relating to MANPADS represented a good example of the need for export control. In that regard, it would also be helpful and important for countries that were not members of non-proliferation regimes to maintain contact with those that were and to exchange views with them.

Another delegation informed the participating States that its country had established a task force on MANPADS. The main aim of the group was to locate such weapons and destroy them. The delegation also invited others to contact them or the task force if they needed support in destroying MANPADS.

9. **Principles on the control of brokering in SALW**

The co-ordinator reminded the participating States that national control of brokering remained an essential part of the process of preventing the sale of SALW to regions of conflict. She asked whether any participating States were willing to share information on their current practices or recent improvements to better control brokering.

The representative of the CPC informed the participating States that only 32 of 52 participating States had provided information on the control of brokering in SALW, and so there was a lack of information on brokering practices. In his view, it would be possible to include the issue of brokering in the annual exchange.

Another delegation stated that the OSCE was always at the forefront of action to prevent and combat in trafficking illicit arms in all its aspects. Therefore, the focus should be on the implementation of agreed principles and documents. Participating States should look at the documents and improve implementation. If the OSCE wished to retain its status, the
participating States would have to fully implement all the documents and principles. That statement was supported by another delegation.

11. **Standard elements of end-user certificates and verification procedures for SALW exports**

The co-ordinator stated that the effective use of end-user certificates (EUC) and verification procedures went hand in hand with brokering controls. She was interested in how the participating States were implementing the standard elements of EUCs for SALW and whether there was a need for additional information or training to further implementation.

No delegation wished to speak on the item.
Suggestions aiming at the improvement of the implementation of CSBM

1. Introduction

Working session 3 was co-ordinated by Mr. Arnout Pauwels from the Belgian delegation. The rapporteur was Col. Walter K. Schweizer from the German delegation.

The co-ordinator opened the session by noting that such a session had been included in the AIAM’s agenda for the first time. He also pointed out that, after some discussion in the FSC, the session had been included in an attempt to revitalize the proceedings of the AIAM and also to provide a platform for discussing conclusions stemming from the implementation of CSBM. He pointed out that the session should also answer the question as to whether such a session should be included in future AIAMs.

2. Conduct of the session

First, a briefing was given by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Montenegro, Lt. Gen. Lakčević, on the Armed Forces of Montenegro, which also included a request for support in getting connected to the OSCE Communications Network.

The briefing was followed by a free flowing, lively discussion on the topic of the working session. Thirteen participating States contributed to the exchange of views, and some took the floor several times to react immediately to statements made by other participating States.

Finally, the co-ordinator concluded that the session had been useful and that there had been an openness for dialogue. He thanked the participating States for the concrete suggestions made, which would help to focus the discussions in the FSC. He also noted that no delegation had questioned the usefulness of CSBM and that there was a willingness to further discuss improvements in their implementation.

3. Conclusions

The following preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the session:
— The Vienna Document 1999 is still working well and reflects, by and large, the security requirements of the OSCE participating States, even though its system reflects the security situation in the late 1990s;

— There is still room for improvement in the implementation of existing provisions to cope with shortcomings, such as the number of returns relating to defence planning, the thresholds no longer adequate to today's military activities, and the application of voluntary measures;

— Better implementation could be addressed by improving the mechanisms for existing provisions, as well as by establishing new measures;

— New measures (new-generation CSBMs), in particular ones intended to address new security challenges, would need to address the security requirements of participating States and to differentiate technical aspects of implementation clearly from political ones;

— New measures would need to fulfil a number of criteria, such as taking into account the security interests of each participating State, being compatible with existing measures, being verifiable and adding value to security and stability in the OSCE area;

— Before discussing concrete measures, a dialogue should be held to identify security requirements.

Concrete proposals were made during the session, e.g.:

— To clearly name those participating States which are not in compliance with CSBM provisions;

— To identify the reasons for non-compliance with existing CSBMs by some participating States and to develop ideas for making them more interested in fulfilling their obligations under politically binding agreements. Possible factors identified were: financial reasons, lack of military interest, lack of political will;

— To make use of an escalating reminding mechanism, including the offer to provide support, as appropriate;

— To follow up proposals made at AIAMs by participating States;

— To provide information on CSBMs not having a verification regime during inspections or evaluations under the provisions of Vienna Document 1999, on a voluntary basis;

— To install automatic translation within the OSCE Communications Network for the OSCE languages;

— To focus more on the value of regional and bilateral CSBMs, without losing sight of the implications of such measures for the security of other participating States;
— To hold a special session of the FSC on the future of arms control and CSBMs to provide for inputs on new-generation CSBMs. This proposal was supported by a number of participating States, although the view was also expressed that the existing mechanism could be used instead;

— To focus on politically binding decisions in the development of new-generation CSBMs.
Meeting of the Heads of Verification Centres (HoV)

Wednesday, 7 March 2007

Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

— Clarification of questions arising from implementation;
— Operation of agreed measures including the use of additional equipment during inspections and evaluation visits.

The meeting of the heads of verification centres (HoV) was co-ordinated by Mr. Yuriy Kryvonos of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC); Ms. Elli Kytömäki of the CPC was the rapporteur. To stimulate discussion at the meeting, the co-ordinator had circulated an introductory food-for-thought paper before the meeting, under reference symbol FSC.AIAM/4/07. Based on this paper, he introduced the subject of discussion and set forth its general aim. Discussion at the meeting was divided into three areas: clarification of questions arising from the implementation of the CSBMs; functioning of agreed measures; and the way ahead. The representatives were encouraged to share their experiences and ideas related to the practical aspects of the implementation of the CSBMs and other FSC documents, as appropriate, and the meeting saw a very lively and productive exchange of ideas, with several proposals advanced for further action.

1. Clarification of questions arising from implementation

Before turning to the specific agenda items, one delegation made a general statement stressing the importance of maintaining the high standards of the agreed CSBM measures and expressing concerns related to non-compliance. The views expressed about the obligatory nature of implementation of VD 99 were also supported by one other delegation. The same delegation also noted that the CPC Summary Report on Recent Trends in Implementation of VD 99 would be of greater value if it included an analysis regarding the bottlenecks faced in implementation and specific shortcomings, and made reference to those States that failed to comply with the agreements. The delegation also noted that future meetings of the heads of verification centres should have practically targeted plans dealing with specific issues regarding the implementation of VD 99 and could also deal with issues related to the implementation of other measures.

One delegation expressed disagreement with regard to tasking the CPC with conducting a more analytical summary report on implementation of VD 99. The co-ordinator also pointed out that the scope and nature of the Summary Report were governed by the relevant FSC decision, which limited it to the provision of statistical data and stated that the CPC would not enter into comparisons between national policies. At the same time, the Summary Report should be considered together with the CPC Annual Survey, which provided information on the status of the implementation of all agreed measures by individual States.
The proposal related to the inclusion of other measures than those contained in VD 99 in possible future HoV meetings was supported by one delegation, while another delegation expressed hesitation regarding the inclusion of other regimes in the discussion. Several delegations expressed the desire to keep the HoV meeting at a practical, less political, level.

With regard to the specific question put forward by the co-ordinator regarding the reference year of annual calendars and constraining provisions, several delegations noted that VD 99 required States to submit information regarding constraining provisions by 15 November regarding the second subsequent calendar year, and that that was the only correct practice in that regard.

Under the first agenda item, delegations also discussed the question of additional equipment used in inspections and evaluation visits. One delegation informed the meeting that it would allow all participating States to use all equipment needed for inspection without any restrictions, in accordance with the principle of reciprocity. It was also mentioned that participating States should not be limited in terms of providing more openness and transparency during verification activities.

Several delegations supported the suggested reciprocity approach and stated that it was an important model for the measures.

Delegations also noted that times had changed since the adoption of VD 99, and therefore the teams now had new types of equipment at their disposal. Five representatives noted that practices with regard to the use of equipment should be modernized, and one delegation proposed that updating the list of allowed equipment should be included in the Survey of Suggestions following the current meeting. One delegation noted that there was no consensus on that proposal, while another one noted that the current procedures seemed to be working very well.

One delegation noted that its teams followed the practice introduced by the FSC Chairperson in 2002 regarding the use of digital cameras during inspections and evaluations, and proposed that the FSC Chairperson consider issuing a similar statement regarding the use of mobile phones. The approach of using a Chairperson’s statement to move forward with the issue was supported by another delegation, which also underlined the need to establish a common baseline regarding the use of additional equipment.

With regard to the question about the role of a deploying State in specific area inspections, it was noted that co-operation between the hosting, conducting and deploying States was very important in conducting specified area inspections. One delegation expressed concerns regarding such events, and noted that if objects of verification belonging to other States were within the specified area, such requests should be communicated in advance to ensure smooth proceedings. Another State provided explanations regarding their national practices in this regard. It also suggested that the list of personnel who could be involved in escorting inspection teams should be provided in advance. One delegation noted that it had never encountered problems with inspections of military formations of third parties. It also noted that any possible foreign troops in the specified area should be reported during the briefing.
2. Functioning of agreed measures

Under agenda item 2, delegations engaged in a lively discussion regarding the practicalities related to conducting visits and verification measures. With regard to organizing visits, the discussion initiated during working session 1 was continued. It was generally noted that a more even distribution of events would be to everyone’s benefit, due, among other reasons, to budgetary constraints. Several delegations raised the issue of providing notification of planned visits well in advance, not just 42 days prior to the event.

One delegation suggested that the CPC be tasked with keeping a record of the forecast visits, and States could, on a voluntary basis, provide their information to the CPC, for example, one or two years in advance. In the event of overlapping of the dates foreseen, the CPC could communicate the fact to the participating States concerned to enable them to adjust their plans. This idea was supported by another delegation that added further refinement to it, suggesting the possibility of placing a commonly agreed-upon ceiling on the visits. One delegation pointed out possible technical limitations related to informing other participating States about the visits far in advance.

One delegation suggested that the CPC surveys might include a chart with tentative information regarding the forecast of planned visits. Two delegations, having supported the idea of co-ordination of visits, nevertheless noted that they would not be in favour of imposing any ceilings on the number of visits per year. It was also noted that the rule regarding the time frame for sending replies to invitations should be observed in order to ensure proper and smooth preparations for the visits. It was also suggested that the HoV meeting could be an appropriate forum for co-ordinating visits. Two more delegations provided information about their plans for organizing visits.

In the course of the discussions, delegations also reverted to the issue of the “quota race”, which was noted by many to be the most pressing issue under this agenda item. It was commonly noted that States should make additional efforts to improve the situation in the area concerned. It was stressed that the passive quota for inspection, as specified in VD 99, was intended to respond to potential security concerns of participating States throughout the year.

One delegation proposed for discussion a co-ordination mechanism that might be similar to that of the Open Skies system, which would allow for better distribution of inspections and evaluation visits throughout the year and better participation of all the participating States in verification activities. Remarks calling for some kind of co-ordination mechanism were supported by several delegations. Future HoV meetings could be considered in order to address this issue.

3. The way ahead

The meeting also discussed the possible ways ahead with regard to future HoV meetings. There was wide support for holding the meetings on a regular basis in the future. Preference was expressed for the option of having a one-day meeting prior to the AIAM. In order for the meetings to produce added value, they should aim at concrete recommendations and outcomes. It was also noted that a precise and detailed agenda of the meeting should be circulated in advance.
At the end of the meeting, the delegation of Montenegro informed the participants about the establishment of its national verification centre, and asked for assistance from other participating States.
Vienna Document 1999:

(148) The participating States will hold each year a meeting to discuss the present and future implementation of agreed CSBMs. Discussion may extend to:

(148.1) Clarification of questions arising from such implementation;

(148.2) Operation of agreed measures, including the use of additional equipment during inspections and evaluation visits;

(148.3) Implications of all information originating from the implementation of any agreed measures for the process of confidence- and security-building in the framework of the OSCE.

(150) The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) will hold such meetings. It will consider, as required, suggestions made during the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) aiming at the improvement of the implementation of CSBMs.

I. Agenda and indicative timetable

Tuesday, 6 March 2007

10–10.45 a.m. Opening plenary meeting

— Opening of the meeting by the Chairperson;
— Remarks by the Chairperson of the FSC;
— Presentation of a summary report by the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC).
11 a.m.–6 p.m. Working session 1: Implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 and Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI): Clarification, assessment and conclusions

— Vienna Document 1999:
  — Annual exchange of military information;
  — Defence planning;
  — Risk reduction;
  — Military activities:
    (i) Prior notification of certain military activities;
    (ii) Annual calendars;
    (iii) Constraining provisions;
    (iv) Observation of certain military activities;
  — Contacts;
  — Evaluation;
  — Inspection;
  — Regional measures;
  — Communications Network;

— GEMI.

1–3 p.m. Lunch break

Wednesday, 7 March 2007

10 a.m.–1 p.m. Working session 2: Operation and implementation of other FSC-agreed measures/documents: Clarification, assessment and conclusions

— Principles governing conventional arms transfers;
— Principles governing non-proliferation;
— Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations;
— Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines;
— Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security;
— OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW);
— OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition;
— Principles for export controls of MANPADS;
— Principles on the control of brokering in SALW;
— Standard elements of end-user certificates and verification procedures for SALW exports.
II. Organizational modalities

1. The AIAM will last two days and will be organized in the form of opening and closing plenary meetings together with working sessions and a meeting of the HoV, dealing with the topics contained in the agenda (I). The indicative timetable provides more detail.

2. The organizational meeting of chairpersons, co-ordinators, rapporteurs, and the CPC will be held on 5 March 2007 at 3 p.m.

   The working hours of the AIAM will be from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 3 to 6 p.m.

3. Interpretation into the OSCE official languages will be provided at all meetings of the AIAM, including the meeting of the HoV.

4. The meeting will be chaired by participating States, in rotation, in accordance with the French alphabetical order, following on from the chairing of the closing plenary meeting of the 2006 AIAM by Austria. The chair of the opening plenary meeting and working sessions will be held by Azerbaijan. The chair of the closing plenary meeting will be held by Belarus.

5. Debates in the working sessions will be oriented to problems and solutions and there will be no formal statements. Possible national statements for the opening plenary should only be presented in written form and are to be distributed in advance. The working sessions are designed to be very informal meetings of national experts with the objectives of answering questions, exchanging information and allowing for constructive debate between participating States. Delegations are strongly encouraged to provide detailed explanations
and concrete examples of their own implementation experiences. Delegations are welcome to distribute written contributions in advance of the meeting, both on agenda points and on related matters for possible discussion. All delegations are strongly encouraged to provide national experts to participate in the AIAM.

6. The CPC will circulate the revised Annual Survey on CSBM Information Exchanged and the AIAM Survey of Suggestions 2006, no later than 15 February 2007. By the same dateline, the CPC will additionally circulate a summary report on recent trends in the implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 and other measures. These will serve as a basis for preparatory work by delegations and co-ordinators. In particular, the co-ordinators should focus on suggestions which might get the support of delegations.

7. Working session 1 will have two designated co-ordinators and two rapporteurs while working sessions 2 and 3 will have one co-ordinator and one rapporteur. The HoV meeting will be chaired by the CPC. The CPC chair of the HoV meeting will also act as a co-ordinator assisted by one rapporteur. The task of the co-ordinators will be to facilitate the discussion, while the task of the rapporteurs will be to present an oral report to the closing plenary meeting.

8. The co-ordinators will circulate a list of topics and questions for facilitating the discussion in their working sessions. They will be supported by the CPC in this regard. They will ensure that all relevant areas are addressed.

9. During the first part of the closing plenary meeting, the rapporteur from each working session and from the HoV meeting will give an oral report to the delegates on the issues that were addressed during the meetings. This report should include problem areas, improvements in implementation accomplished by OSCE participating States, suggestions for further improvement, and any other relevant information. Delegations are encouraged to comment on or add to the reports presented by the rapporteurs.

10. Delegations with volunteers for co-ordinators or/and rapporteurs for the working sessions and the meeting of HoV should provide the names of the individuals to the Chairperson of the FSC as soon as possible, but no later than 14 February 2007. The names of the co-ordinators and rapporteurs for each working session and the meeting of HoV will be made known to all delegations no later than 16 February 2007.

11. During the first FSC plenary meeting following the AIAM, the Chairperson of the closing plenary meeting will report on the AIAM to the FSC and provide the Chairperson’s report together with the reports of working sessions and HoV meeting rapporteurs. Within a month after the AIAM the CPC will circulate a written report of suggestions made during the meeting aimed at improving the implementation of CSBMs.
12. The recommended approach, to ensure the most productive discussion in the FSC as participating States consider, as required, suggestions made during the meeting aiming at the improvement of the implementation of CSBM{s}, is for delegations to bring forward suggestions or topics of interest by means of food-for-thought papers. Discussions on initial papers could lead to further work in the FSC.

13. The Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) and the Asian Partners for Co-operation (Afghanistan, Japan, Mongolia, the Republic of Korea and Thailand) are invited to attend all working sessions of the 2007 AIAM.