Inspector General
United States
Department of Defense

Special Plans & Operations

Report on the Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Logistics Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces
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MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

December 19, 2008

SUBJECT: Report on the Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Logistics Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces (Report No. SPO-2009-002)

We are providing this report for review and comment. We performed this assessment in response to requests from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. We considered client comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.

After receiving client comments to the draft report, we have made the following changes which are reflected in this report:

- Deleted draft Recommendation 6.c. and 6.d. and consolidated aspects of 6.c. into a revised Recommendation 6.a. We also revised the wording and redirected the action for Recommendation 6.b. from DSCA to MNSTC-I.
- Deleted draft Recommendation 8.b., and renumbered draft Recommendation 8.a. to Recommendation 8 in the final report.
- Deleted draft Recommendations 20.c. and 20.d. and renumbered the draft 20.e. as 20.c. in the final report.
- Deleted draft Recommendation 23.a.(3)
- Added new Recommendations 21.d. and 22.c.

We request additional comments and information by January 30, 2009 as follows:

- Deputy Secretary of Defense: We request your comments to Recommendation 21.d.
- USCENTCOM: We request your comments to Recommendations 19.a.(1), 19.a.(2), 20.b., 21.a.(1), 21.a.(2), and 21.a.(3).
- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs: We request that ASD(GSA) provide additional information to Recommendations 7.a. and 7.b.

If possible, please send your comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to spo@dodig.mil. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We are unable to accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, they must be sent over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to Mr. Joe A. Baker at (703) 604-9170 (DSN 664-9170) or Mr. Robert M. Murrell (703) 604-9074 (DSN 664-9074). The team members are listed inside the back cover.

Thomas F. Gimble
Principal Deputy
DISTRIBUTION:

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS
COMMANDER, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ
Executive Summary:
Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Logistics Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces

Who Should Read This Report?
Personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Central Command and its subordinate commands in Iraq, and the Military Departments and Defense Agencies who are responsible for property accountability and control, the Foreign Military Sales program supporting Iraq, and the development of the logistics and medical sustainment bases within the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) should read this report.

Background
In October 2007, the DoD IG assembled a Munitions Assessment Team (MAT) to evaluate the control and accountability of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives in Iraq and Afghanistan. The results of that assessment were published in the classified report, DoD IG Report No. SPO-2008-001, “Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq,” July 3, 2008.

At the request of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the MAT team reassembled to determine the status of corrective actions that were to be implemented in response to that July 2008 report.

The fieldwork for this assessment was conducted in Iraq during April and May 2008. The team evaluated the status of issues on accountability and control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives, the responsiveness of Foreign Military Sales support to the ISF, and the development of logistics sustainment capability for the ISF, which included issues related to building the Iraqi military health care system and its sustainment base.

Results
This report is divided into five parts: (1) Follow-up Assessment on the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq; (2) additional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives issues; (3) Foreign Military Sales; (4) Logistics Sustainability; and (5) Medical Sustainability. The results are discussed in each of those parts.
Follow-up Assessment on the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq

We commend DoD management and the field commanders for taking aggressive actions to implement the recommendations. Of the 45 recommendations in the MAT I report directed to DoD management and field commanders, 29 had been completed and closed and 16 were open with corrective actions ongoing.

Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives

The mission of the arms, ammunition, and explosives logistics supply chain is to provide an effective end-to-end system that delivers materiel to the warfighter, while maintaining the security and safety of the materiel and the public. Inherent in that mission is the requirement to implement procedures and mechanisms throughout the supply chain that ensure accountability and control of arms, ammunition, and explosives while enabling mission execution.

We found that Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) had made significant progress in improving the U.S. military’s system for controlling and accounting for weapons and ammunition being supplied to ISF. However, we formulated seven new recommendations in the areas of weapons accountability and control and captured enemy weapons (see Part II of this report).

Specifically, for example, MNSTC-I should advise and assist the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior in the development and implementation of, or contracting for, an Arabic-based warehouse management system to manage their stored materiel. MNSTC-I also needs to help the Ministries of Defense and Interior implement management quality controls at their warehouses to ensure the accurate recording of weapons serial numbers, as well as a schedule of sample inventories, to verify weapons quantities on-hand and the serial numbers of those weapons.

While the ISF continued to make progress on weapons accountability, the handling of captured enemy weapons remains a concern. MNSTC-I needs to assist the Ministry of Defense in implementing its policy on captured enemy weapons, as well as completing the inspection and serial number recording of the captured enemy weapons stored at the Taji National Army Depot and the Iraqi Army Location Commands. Further, MNSTC-I needs to ensure that the serial numbers for all captured enemy weapons are recorded and forwarded to the DoD Small Arms and Light Weapons Serialization Program. Moreover, MNSTC-I needs to assist the Ministry of Interior to complete and issue its formal policy for captured enemy weapons.

Foreign Military Sales

The Foreign Military Sales program has historically functioned primarily as a peacetime security assistance initiative. However, the U.S. is now using Foreign Military Sales as the principal means to equip, expand, and modernize ISF during wartime conditions. To be successful in executing this strategic decision, the Foreign Military Sales program in
Iraq needs to be fully supportive of the wartime equipping requirements of MNSTC-I and ISF. Responsive support beyond the norm is essential for rapid ISF force generation, replacement of combat losses, and force modernization. Therefore, a wartime standard for Foreign Military Sales case processing times should be established that will accomplish the U.S. “train and equip” strategic objective in Iraq.

Substantial progress has been made in upgrading the MNSTC-I Security Assistance Office in 2008. However, this office still was not adequately staffed with personnel who possessed the requisite security assistance skills and experience required to successfully execute the mission. Further, the Security Assistance Office needed to develop standard operating procedures to provide continuity across personnel rotations.

An End-Use Monitoring Compliance Plan should be developed and implemented for all sensitive equipment items, including night vision devices, that the United States intends to supply to ISF. This is essential for providing reasonable assurance that the Government of Iraq is complying with the requirements imposed by the United States Government as a condition for the use, transfer, and security of these sensitive items.

**Logistics Sustainability**

The ability of ISF to operate independently relies on developing adequate logistical support for fielded military and police units. This support includes standardized logistics policies and processes; a logistics organization that is able to procure, receive, store, distribute, maintain, and re-supply its forces; maintenance of a sufficient logistical infrastructure; and support of professional logistics training activities. MNF-I and its subordinate commands, MNSTC-I and MNC-I, have responsibility for assisting ISF through mentoring and other actions to build these capabilities and develop logistics sustainability.

Notable progress has been made in developing Iraq logistics sustainability in the past year. Although joint Iraqi-U.S. efforts to plan and organize ISF logistics systems were in an early stage of development, they began to receive focused attention. Logistics sustainment experts from MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MNC-I are achieving unity of Coalition and Iraqi efforts through the Iraqi Logistics Development Committee. Significant facility improvements were evident at the Taji Army National Depot. Despite problems in resources and distribution, the ISF has demonstrated the capability to generate “Iraqi” solutions to meet their logistics needs, as was evident from recent security operations in Basra and Mosul, and in Iraqi Army transition to life support self-reliance.

MNSTC-I needs to advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Iraqi Army to develop and publish logistics policies, processes, and procedures for establishing self-sustaining logistics functions. Inefficient logistics distribution practices were evident among the Ministry of Interior, Iraqi Police Service, National Police, Border Police, and Facilities Protection Service. The significant lack of 3rd Line maintenance capability and a ground transportation capacity in support of MoD and MoI were among the issues that also have to be addressed. Iraqi Army Location Commands suffered from shortages in resources, personnel, and equipment and ill-defined responsibilities and authorities. Furthermore,
critically needed equipment, such as computers, monitors, laser printers, and medical supplies had been stored in the Abu Ghraib warehouse for up to 2 years without apparent requirements providing for their further disposition.

As U.S. forces are projected to draw down in the near future, it is essential that planners and policymakers retain a sufficient cadre of logistics trainers and advisors in Iraqi to ensure achievement of ISF logistics sustainment capability.

**Medical Sustainability**

Independent, effective ISF operations will depend on an ISF health care delivery system that provides acceptable field-level combat casualty care, evacuation of casualties, restorative surgery and rehabilitation, and long-term care for disabled ISF personnel. The Iraqi Police obtained their medical care from civilian sources, so the medical section of this report focuses on the Iraqi Army. A sustainable Iraqi Army health care system will also depend on an integrated Iraqi civil-military health care system in which civilian clinical services, medical education, and medical logistics adequately support Iraqi Army needs. The complexity of medical stabilization and reconstruction challenges in Iraq also requires a robust, unified U.S. interagency and international effort driven by a detailed, multi-year strategy and reconstruction plan.

Notable progress has been made. The MNF-I Surgeon has reinvigorated an interagency, civil-military coordination forum with U.S. Mission–Iraq to synchronize U.S. health sector reconstruction activities. Intensive mentoring of Iraqi Air Force aeromedical personnel by Coalition Air Force Training Team paid dividends in successful ISF casualty evacuation during the Basra operations the spring of 2008. In addition, a strong relationship among MNSTC-I, Iraqi Army Surgeon General, and the Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute has set the conditions for effective, comprehensive training of Iraqi Army medical staff.

However, there are still significant challenges ahead in assisting and mentoring the development of the Iraqi Army’s medical capability to achieve the end state of a self-reliant, self-sustaining medical care system. The Iraqi Army Health Care System is currently unable to support its combat operations but rather is dependent on the U.S. and Coalition for casualty care.

In order to achieve the goal of health care self-reliance and sustainability, the Iraqi Army needs to develop a comprehensive, multi-year strategy, with supporting doctrine and defined end-states, as well as build stronger partnerships with Coalition forces to develop Iraqi Army medical care through mentoring and other assistance.

But, the U.S. interagency medical mentoring of Iraqi Army suffered from a lack of planning and specific, prioritized medical objectives. U.S. and other Coalition Forces need to develop a comprehensive, phased, integrated multi-year medical mentoring plan to assist the Iraqi Army achieve an operationally sustainable health care delivery system. To implement such a plan, Coalition medical mentoring needs significant reinforcement.
United States Government interagency efforts to build strategic medical partnerships that support reconstruction of the Iraqi civilian and military health sectors were not synchronized. The United States needs to develop a comprehensive, integrated, multi-year plan to build strategic partnerships among U.S. Government agencies, NGOs, academic partners, and with key Iraqi ministries to develop a sustainable Iraqi Army health care system, and a civilian health care system that complements the Iraqi Army health care system.

For detailed discussions of the foregoing observations and recommendations, please refer to the respective sections in the report that follows.

**Client Comments and Our Response**

We received client comments to the draft report from the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Commander USCENTCOM; Commander, MNF-I; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; and Commander, MNSTC-I. As a result of management analysis and client comments we added, revised, and renumbered recommendations. There are several unresolved items, primarily in the area of medical sustainment. In addition, there are several recommendations for which we request additional comment or information. For those recommendations requiring client reconsideration or additional comment, please see the table on the following page.
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Please provide comments by January 30, 2009.
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Client Comments

Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Vice Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commander, United States Central Command
Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
Introduction

Background

The DoD Office of Inspector General performed an assessment of the accountability and control of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)\(^1\) provided by the U.S. to the Iraq Security Forces in September and October 2007. The results of that assessment and recommendations for corrective actions were published in DoD IG Report No. SPO\(^2\)-2008-001, “Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq,” July 3, 2008 (a classified report).

At the request of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Inspector General assembled an assessment team in February 2008 to determine the status of the corrective actions recommended for the accountability and control of AA&E in Iraq.

The scope of the initial assessment in 2007 was expanded to assess issues involving the accountability and control of AA&E in Afghanistan, the responsiveness of U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) processes supporting the Afghan National Security Forces and the Iraq Security Forces (ISF), and the development of logistics sustainment capability for the Afghan National Security Forces and ISF, to include a related issue on building the Afghan and Iraqi military health care system and their sustainment base.

Initiation of the 2007 Iraq Assessment

DoD Office of Inspector General efforts regarding the accountability and control of U.S.-purchased AA&E provided to ISF was triggered by a December 2005 DoD Hotline complaint and other information that a senior U.S. Army officer received illegal gratuities from a DoD contractor. This had evolved into extensive and ongoing DoD criminal investigations involving millions of dollars in bribes and a number of U.S. military officers, noncommissioned officers, civilian officials, and DoD contractors.

While investigating these complaints, investigators from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Division raised further concerns about the accountability, control, and loss of weapons provided to ISF by the U.S. Government. These concerns were reinforced by a Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction audit report, followed by a Government Accountability Office audit report, which indicated accountability and control problems with particular weapons provided to ISF in Iraq.

In December 2006 and January 2007, the DoD Office of Inspector General received allegations from the Turkish National Police and the Turkish Ministry of Defense that

\(^1\) We did not include an evaluation of explosives in our assessment.

\(^2\) DoD IG, Office of Special Plans and Operations.
weapons and explosives the U.S. supplied to ISF were finding their way into the hands of insurgents, terrorists, and criminals in Turkey.

After being briefed on that situation, SECDEF, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Congressional leadership requested that the DoD Inspector General send a team to Iraq. The team was to review the effectiveness of accountability and controls over AA&E provided to ISF that were currently in place at the time of our assessment. The DoD Inspector General organized and deployed an assessment team to address the issue and review AA&E accountability.

**Public Laws**

Congress also provided approximately $15.4 billion to the Iraq Security Forces Fund and approximately $11.7 billion to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund through Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-28, and 110-161. These Public Laws define the train and equip mission performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The laws specified that the Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund funds be used in support of the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan to provide:

- Funding
- Equipment, supplies, services
- Training
- Facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction

**Objectives**

On February 13, 2008, we announced the 2008 “Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq—Phase II.”

The objectives for this assessment were to:

- Follow-up on the recommendations made during our initial assessment[^3] on munitions accountability and control to determine the status of implementation.
- Determine whether security assistance processes were responsive to Iraq Security Forces equipment requirements. Specifically, we examined the organizational structure and processes used to execute security assistance programs during wartime operations and for Foreign Military Sales to Iraq.
- Assess whether the Iraq Security Forces logistics sustainment base was being effectively developed. We examined the status and effectiveness of planning to develop a sustainable Iraqi logistics base.

After the announcement of this assessment, a decision was made to examine an additional but related issue concerning mentoring and building the Iraq Security Forces health care systems and their sustainment base.

Appendix A discusses the scope and methodology related to the assessment objectives and a list of acronyms used in this report. Appendix B provides a summary of prior coverage related to the assessment objectives. Appendix C provides the definitions of terms used in this report. Appendix D provides a list of the organizations contacted and visited during the assessment. Appendix E summarizes the status of the implementation of the recommendations from the 2007 assessment. Appendix F provides a list of the organizations which support the train and equip mission. Appendix G provides a summary of United States Code and DoD policies applicable to this report. Appendix H depicts a notional division and below medical mentor laydown. Appendix I provides a notional medical operational readiness report. Appendix J provides a list of agencies and organizations to which this report has been distributed.
Part I – Follow-up Assessment on the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq

Introduction

DoD management officials and field commanders concurred with 41 of the 45 recommendations and non-concurred with four. Part I of this report summarizes the status of the 45 recommendations, as determined by our follow-up assessment. (A complete list of the recommendations and their status is shown in Appendix E.)

We commend DoD management officials and field commanders for the aggressive actions they have taken to implement the recommendations of the July 3, 2008 report.

We have determined through on-the-ground follow-up that appropriate actions have been completed on 29 of the 45 recommendations. Management completed actions on the four non-concurrences and satisfied the intent of our recommendations. We included those in the total of 29 closed recommendations.

We have determined that management actions are ongoing but not yet completed on 16 recommendations, and we request that the responsible DoD management officials continue to update the OIG on actions taken or planned with regard to the 16 open recommendations.

Presentation of Recommendations
For each recommendation, we provide a status by:

- Stating the recommendation made in DoD IG Report No. SPO-2008-001
- Describing DoD management’s position on the recommendation
- Providing an opinion on DoD management’s actions to implement the recommendation based on our follow-up assessment in Iraq in April and May 2008

Status of Recommendations

Recommendation A
We recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence issue a
letter to clarify that DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.64 governs the accountability and control and DoDI 5100.76 governs the physical security of arms, ammunition, and explosives under U.S. control from the point of entry into the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility until formal handover to Iraq Security Forces (ISF) or as appropriate to other Coalition partners within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

Management Comments to Recommendation A
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD (P)), USD (AT&L), and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred with this recommendation. They stated that the Office of the Secretary of Defense will issue a memorandum clarifying the applicability of DoDI 5000.64 and DoDI 5100.76 and will also reiterate the provisions of DoD 5200.8-R.

Status of Implementation of Recommendation A
A memorandum was published by Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concerning the applicability of DoDI 5100.76 and DoD 5200.8-R. However, USD (AT&L) has not provided us a memorandum concerning the applicability of DoDI 5000.64. We need to review the final memorandum, when issued by USD (AT&L), to determine whether it adequately implements the intent of the recommendation. The recommendation remains open.

Recommendation B.1
We recommended that the Commander, USCENTCOM issue formal procedures governing the accountability and control of arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through the USCENTCOM area of responsibility until formal handover to ISF or as appropriate to other Coalition partners within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility.

Management Comments to Recommendation B.1
USCENTCOM concurred, noting that the USCENTCOM Director of Logistics was drafting formal guidance that was proposed for publication not later than July 2008.

Status of Implementation of Recommendation B.1
On July 3, 2008, USCENTCOM issued a memorandum to its subordinate commands titled “CENTCOM Weapons and Munitions Accountability Awareness.” The memorandum cited existing guidance related to weapons and munitions control within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. It noted “Special attention must be provided to ensure that weapons and munitions remain under U.S. control from the point of entry into

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the theater, through the transportation network until formal handover to designated security officials or other coalition partners is accomplished.”

While we commend USCENTCOM in issuing this guidance, we believe that its memorandum needs to cite other DoD guidance applicable to the accountability, control, and physical security of AA&E. In addition to the references cited in the memorandum, the USCENTCOM memorandum should provide as references these DoD guidance documents:

- Title 40 U.S.C., section 524
- DoDI 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006
- Department of Defense “Strategic Plan for the Distribution of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” May 2004
- DoDI 5100.76, “Safeguarding Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) and the AA&E Physical Security Review Board,” October 8, 2005
- DoD 5200.08-R, “Physical Security Program,” April 9, 2007

The USCENTCOM memorandum should be more directive in nature and more clearly emphasize:

- Accountability for AA&E (not just control)
- Accountability, control, and physical security of U.S.-supplied AA&E moving into and within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility but not yet delivered to a port of entry in Iraq or Afghanistan
- The DoD Small Arms and Light Weapons Serialization Program
- Accountability of captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons

7 This is one of several guidance documents that implements DoD Directive 4140.1, “Supply Chain Materiel Management Policy,” April 22, 2004.
USCENTCOM guidance for its area of responsibility should also specify that it governs the delivery of AA&E:

- Purchased through the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) or,
- Obtained through formal Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs or other U.S. funding sources or,
- Obtained through capture, confiscation, abandonment, recovery, or turn-in.

Our analysis of the USCENTCOM memorandum “CENTCOM Weapons and Munitions Accountability Awareness,” July 3, 2008, is that it partially meets the intent of the recommendation. The recommendation remains open.

**Recommendations B.2.a and B.2.b**

We recommended that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) issue formal procedures:

a. Governing the accountability and control of arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport through Iraq until formal handover to ISF or as appropriate to other Coalition partners in Iraq.

b. Coordinating the efforts of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division, and any other command component to provide accountability and control of arms and ammunition under U.S. control from the point of entry into and transport throughout Iraq until formal handover to ISF or, as appropriate, to other Coalition partners in Iraq.

**Management Comments to Recommendations B.2.a and B.2.b**

MNF-I concurred, noting that the MNSTC-I Commanding General approved and released the Logistics Accountability Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on April 26, 2008. The SOP provided specific direction for accountability and control of sensitive items (including arms and ammunition) during Port of Debarkation operations, intra-theatre distribution, and warehouse operations.

**Status of Implementation of Recommendations B.2.a and B.2.b**

We reviewed the MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability SOP and found that it was thorough and adequate in process and procedure. However, the MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability SOP applied only to MNSTC-I personnel. Unless additional action was taken, the SOP would have had no impact on the actions of U.S. and Coalition personnel assigned to MNC-I and other commands involved in the control and accountability of arms and ammunition being provided to ISF.

We discussed this issue with MNF-I and MNC-I. On June 5, 2008, the MNF-I Chief of Staff issued a memo making the MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability SOP applicable to all MNC-I elements “in order to ensure consistent accountability standards across the
supply chain in Iraq.” This action met the intent of recommendations B.2.a and B.2.b. We closed these recommendations.

**Recommendations C.1 and C.2**

We recommended that the Commander, MNF-I issue formal procedures that:

1. Govern the accountability, control, and final disposition of weapons captured by U.S. forces, to include recording captured weapons’ serial numbers.

2. Coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I in processing weapons captured by U.S. forces.

**Management Comments to Recommendations C.1 and C.2**

MNF-I concurred, noting that in coordination with MNF-I and MNSTC-I, MNC-I published Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 085 on January 28, 2008. The FRAGO was designed to coordinate the transfer of captured enemy weapons in a controlled and recorded manner between Coalition forces and ISF.

![Figure 1. Captured Weapons Stored at Taji National Depot.](source: DoD IG personnel - October 2007.)

**Status of Implementation of Recommendations C.1 and C.2**

We reviewed MNC-I FRAGO 085 and found it adequate in process and procedure. We also conducted a spot check of reporting mandated by the FRAGO. This review indicated that captured enemy weapons were being properly accounted for and that serial numbers were being forwarded to MNSTC-I for entry into the serial number database. These actions met the intent of recommendations C.1 and C.2. We closed these recommendations.

**Recommendations D.1 and D.2**

We recommended that the Commander, MNF-I issue formal procedures that:
1. Describe the mission, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting the Ministry of Defense (MoD), Ministry of Interior (MoI), and subordinate ISF organizations on the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

2. Coordinate the efforts of MNC-I and MNSTC-I transition teams to support ISF in its efforts to account for and control U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

Management Comments to Recommendations D.1 and D.2
MNF-I concurred, noting that the MNSTC-I Commanding General approved and released the Logistics Accountability SOP on April 26, 2008. The SOP provided specific direction for accountability and control of sensitive items (including arms and ammunition) during Port of Debarkation operations, intra-theatre distribution, and warehouse operations.

MNSTC-I worked closely with the MNC-I Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) and stated that they would continue to ensure that these teams adhere to the accountability procedures developed by MNSTC-I. The MiTTs have been directed to continue submitting the required documentation resulting from weapons issued to the Iraqi units.

Status of Implementation of Recommendations D.1 and D.2
We determined that U.S trainers and mentors were actively involved in the accountability of weapons and ammunition under ISF control during visits to:

- Taji National Army Depot (NAD)
- Kirkush Military Training Base (KMTB) Location Command (formerly called Regional Support Units or Base Support Units)
- Baghdad Police College (BPC)
- Irbil Police College
- Sulaymaniyah Police College
- Sulaymaniyah Police Academy
- Sulaymaniyah Provincial District of Police
- 3d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st National Police Division

At all of those locations, the Iraqis were accounting for weapons by serial number. At Taji NAD, a joint Coalition/Iraqi team was just completing a serial number inventory of 63,583 weapons stored at the depot.

We counted a total of 915 weapons at 3 Iraqi warehouse storage locations. We identified 899 serial numbers accurately recorded in inventory Excel spreadsheets for an accuracy rate of 98.25 percent and 16 serial numbers inaccurately recorded for a discrepancy rate of 1.75 percent, when those counts were compared to the MoD and MoI Excel spreadsheet databases. Improvements are needed in accurately recording weapons serial numbers and those are discussed in Observation A of this report.
These actions met the intent of recommendations D.1 and D.2. We closed these recommendations.

**Recommendation E**

We recommended that the Commander, MNSTC-I advise and assist MoD and MoI in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for military and police national arms and ammunition depots and other storage facilities that address the accountability and control of U.S.-supplied or Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition.

**Management Comments to Recommendation E**

MNF-I concurred, noting that the Iraqi procedures for accountability of equipment, including arms and ammunition, were stated in the “Iraqi Supply Handbook,” Chapter 3, Property Accountability Guide. The Handbook outlined accountability through the use of the Iraqi Army Form 102 and it detailed the procedures. Rather than recommending the creation of an additional policy, MNF-I and MNSTC-I recommended that efforts be focused on assisting in enforcing policies already in place.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics at the Iraqi Army Joint Headquarters had established a committee that would develop procedures for the accountability of both U.S.-supplied and Iraqi-procured arms and ammunition. The initial report of the committee detailed current and future issues related to the tracking of arms and ammunition from their arrival at Umm Qasr or Baghdad International Airport. The procedure involved the Coalition-contracted movement of arms and ammunition from Umm Qasr or Baghdad International Airport to the National Ammunition Depot at Bayji.

Contractor personnel conducted receipt inspections of all ammunition and updated the National Ammunition Depot master inventory. When arms and ammunition were required at one of the five existing Ammunition Supply Points, the MNSTC-I logistics section coordinated movement of the ammunition to the requesting Ammunition Supply Point through Coalition-contracted movement. Inventories at existing Ammunition Supply Points were managed by Iraqi forces with MiTT oversight. Regular inventory reports were submitted to the MNSTC-I logistics section. The procedures for future ammunition accountability of arms and ammunition by MoD were being developed by a committee chaired by the Ammunition Section of Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

The MoI issued a memorandum signed by the Assistant Deputy Minister for Administration and Financial Affairs on December 18, 2007, directing that weapons and ammunition be secured with three locks, each with a key maintained by an officer with a minimum of four years of service experience. Monthly inventories were to be conducted. MoI Memorandum #47, January 12, 2008, signed by the Deputy Minister of Administration and Financial Affairs, established rigid fines for the loss of any weapon or ammunition. Fines ranged from 100,000 Iraqi dinars for a bayonet, to 5,000,000 Iraqi dinars for a pistol, to 15,000,000 Iraqi dinars for a machinegun.
**Status of Implementation of Recommendation E**

We reviewed Chapter 3 of the “Iraqi Supply Handbook” and MoI memorandums that addressed security of weapons and fines for lost weapons. The “Iraqi Supply Handbook,” although unsigned and unofficial, was adequate in process and procedure regarding accountability of arms and ammunition under Iraqi military control. While the MoI memorandums were less detailed than the MoD “Iraqi Supply Handbook,” those memorandums did set a minimum standard that, if followed, was adequate for accountability for arms and ammunition. We noted that MoI Memorandum #47 sets the fine for the loss of a pistol at roughly equivalent to a years’ pay for a policeman.

Our visits to Taji NAD; BPC; the KMTB and Taji Location Commands; two police colleges; one police academy; and the 3d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st National Police Division indicated that subordinate units in both MoD and MoI were currently accounting for weapons by serial number and providing adequate security for ammunition.

We encourage all trainers and mentors to conduct periodic inventories with their Iraqi counterparts in ISF to ensure accountability of weapons and ammunition.

These actions met the intent of recommendation E. We closed this recommendation.

**Recommendation F**

We recommended that the Commander, MNSTC-I advise and assist MoD and MoI in the preparation and promulgation of formal policies and procedures for accountability, control, processing, and final disposition of weapons ISF captured or weapons captured and turned over to ISF by Coalition forces.

**Management Comments to Recommendation F**

MNF-I concurred. They reported that MNSTC-I was aware of the issue and were advising MoD Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics on a directive that was being drafted. While MoI has not provided a written copy of its current policy, MoI officials at the provincial and ministerial levels had confirmed the following procedures were in place:

- If a police unit captured weapons, it must inventory and inspect each weapon by serial number.
- The inventory was passed to the MoI Auditing Department and compared against its weapons databases to determine the source.
- The capturing unit may request to retain the weapons to fill shortages or permission to destroy the weapons. The MoI Director of Logistics will provide disposition instructions.
- If the weapons are to be destroyed, a committee of three senior officers must witness the destruction and provide certification to the MoI Director of Logistics.
Status of Implementation of Recommendation F
MoD published a policy letter dated April 22, 2008, that mirrored the requirements stated in MNC-I FRAGO 085, which detailed procedures for accountability of captured enemy weapons. We reviewed the MoD policy and determined that it was adequate.

The MoI Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure had verbally committed to provide MNC-I MoI procedures as well, although such policy had not yet been institutionalized in written form.

MNSTC-I continues to work with MoI to issue policy that meets the intent of the recommendation. We request MNSTC-I provide a copy of any policy MoI publishes that addresses captured enemy weapons. This recommendation remains open.

We determined that improvements are needed in the implementation of the MoD captured enemy weapons policy at Iraqi Army depots and commands. This issue is discussed in Observation 2, found in Part II of this report.

Recommendations G.1.a, G.1.b, G.2.a, and G.2.b
These recommendations were classified. See the classified version of DoD IG Report No. SPO-2008-001, “Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq,” July 3, 2008.

Management Comments to Recommendations G.1.a, G.1.b, G.2.a, and G.2.b
The management comments to these recommendations were classified.

Status of Implementation of Recommendations G.1.a, G.1.b, G.2.a, and G.2.b
Our review of recently published MNSTC-I policy and procedure, as well as spot checks of serial number accountability of weapons at the U.S.-controlled Abu Ghraib warehouse, Taji NAD, and the KMTB Location Command indicated that the intent of these recommendations G.1.a, G.1.b, G.2.a, and G.2.b had been met. We closed these recommendations.

Recommendation G.2.c
We recommended that the Commander, MNSTC-I, with advice and assistance from MoD and MoI, jointly develop formal procedures for the delivery, joint inventory, and formal handover of U.S.-controlled arms and ammunition provided to ISF, requiring that a 100 percent joint inventory of weapons (by weapons count, weapons type, and serial number) be performed with authorized ISF officials at the time of delivery and formal handover to ISF.
Management Comments to Recommendation G.2.c
MNF-I concurred, noting plans for a joint Iraqi/U.S. serial number inventory of weapons at Taji NAD and the MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability SOP requirement for such an inventory prior to transfer of any weapons or ammunition to ISF.

Status of Implementation of Recommendation G.2.c
MNSTC-I had published policy that mandated a joint Iraqi/U.S serial number inventory of weapons and inventory by type and quantity of ammunition prior to transferring these items to ISF. Until these inventories were completed, these items were kept under a 24-hour U.S. guard.

We determined that the intent of recommendation G.2.c had been met. We closed this recommendation.

Recommendations G.3.a, G.3.b, and G.3.c
We recommended that the Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan review all contracts it issued to procure and deliver arms and ammunition to ensure that clauses are included requiring vendors and shippers to:

a. Deliver arms and ammunition to Iraq through U.S.-controlled ports of entry within Iraq. The contract procedures and the procurement contracts should comply with the procedures issued by the Commander, MNSTC-I, as discussed in Recommendation G.1.a.

b. Provide serial number lists electronically in advance of any weapons shipments to Iraq and post serial number lists on the outside of weapons shipping containers along with other required shipping documents and also on the inside of weapons shipping containers.

   c. Provide en route visibility to include the arrival dates and times of arms and ammunition cargo being delivered to Iraq.

Management Comments to Recommendations G.3.a, G.3.b, and G.3.c
MNF-I concurred. They reported that the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan had been including serial number instructions for weapons as of September 2007. Additionally, sensitive item shipping instructions were included in contracts as required by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division memorandum dated May 18, 2007. Those instructions provided tracking and accountability controls be maintained up to acceptance by the Government from the contractor or its shipper.

Status of Implementation of Recommendations G.3.a, G.3.b, and G.3.c
We reviewed three weapons contracts issued by the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan since September 2007 and determined that all three included the clauses specified in the recommendations under G.3. The command also indicated that these clauses were a part of their standard contract templates for arms purchases.
Ghraib warehouse, we noted that weapons serial numbers were posted on the outside of all weapons crates and containers.

Our spot check of weapons serial numbers at Abu Ghraib warehouse showed a 99 percent accuracy rate. We found two AK-47 rifles with a serial number engraved on the stock that was different that the one stamped on the receiver of the weapon. In both cases, a single number had been switched with the one beside it in the serial number sequence.

We determined the intent of recommendations G.3.a, G.3.b, and G.3.c had been met. We closed these recommendations.

**Recommendations H.1 and H.2**

1. We recommended that the Commander, MNSTC-I install data input quality controls in their centralized database of weapons serial numbers using a trained database programmer.

2. We recommended that the Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity assist and support MNSTC-I with installing data input quality controls in the MNSTC-I centralized database of weapons serial numbers to ensure system compatibility.

**Management Comments to Recommendations H.1 and H.2**

The Secretary of the Army and MNF-I concurred. MNSTC-I requested U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity assistance and a representative visited MNSTC-I in February 2008, identifying necessary corrections that have been implemented. MNSTC-I was sourcing a contracted solution for a commercial database to further enhance data integrity and provide continuity.

**Status of Implementation of Recommendations H.1 and H.2**

We found the quality and organization of the MNSTC-I weapons serial number database improved over that of our visit in September and October 2007. MNSTC-I was able to track the issue of all U.S. M-16/M-4 rifles down to the Iraqi Army brigade level. Since early 2006, MNSTC-I has been able to track the issue of other types of U.S.-procured weapons at least to the point of their transfer to ISF at Taji NAD and BPC. Although beyond the scope of this assessment, we note that MNSTC-I was also making progress on accounting for U.S.-procured weapons issued to ISF prior to 2006.

Recommendation H.1 remains open pending the resolution of the MNSTC-I effort to contract for a commercial database solution. We have closed recommendation H.2.

**Recommendations I.1.a, I.1.b, and I.1.c**

We recommended that the Commander, MNSTC-I advise and assist MoD in:

a. Performing a 100 percent joint U.S. forces and ISF inventory that will establish a baseline for Iraqi military weapons and ammunition stored at Taji NAD and will record serial numbers of U.S.-provided weapons.
b. Performing a 10 percent sample inventory of Iraqi military weapons and ammunition on a monthly basis to maintain data integrity of the inventory database.

c. Establishing effective warehouse management and organization processes at Taji NAD for the storage of weapons and ammunition and requesting help from U.S.-based logistics organizations as needed.

Management Comments to Recommendations I.1.a, I.1.b, and I.1.c
MNF-I concurred, noting that MNSTC-I was conducting a 100 percent inventory check of all procured weapons (procured using either the Iraq Security Forces Fund or FMS funding) held at Taji NAD in coordination with the Iraqi Army. However, MNSTC-I personnel had not yet completed a 100 percent inventory of ammunition.

MoD was conducting checks of ammunition at Taji NAD each week and was reporting stocks on hand to MNSTC-I. MNSTC-I does not have the manpower required to conduct monthly 10 percent checks once weapons are transferred to ISF but will recommend to ISF commanders that such an inventory be included in their regulations.

MNSTC-I’s Coalition Army Advisory Training Team was focused on the mentoring of the Taji NAD leadership in effectively managing warehouse operations, stock control procedures, and inventory management. The goal was to have the Iraqis accurately receive, store, and inventory stocks and to pick, pack, and ship stocks to the Location Commands and ISF. The Logistics Military Assistance Team was focused on overseeing the progress of the Iraqis in those warehouse functional areas needed to prepare the Iraqis to execute supply depot operations. The overall purpose of these efforts was the successful transition of warehouse operations and management to Iraqi Army control.

Status of Implementation of Recommendations I.1a, I.1.b, and I.1.c
MNSTC-I had completed the 100 percent joint Iraqi/U.S. inventory of 63,583 weapons stored at Taji NAD. They recorded the serial numbers in an Excel spreadsheet that had a “Search Function” and turned it over to the Iraqi leadership. Despite encouragement by U.S. trainers, it remains uncertain whether the Iraqis will use the automated spreadsheet or go back to their system of paper records. We have closed recommendation I.1.a.

MNSTC-I trainers were working with their Iraqi counterparts to establish a monthly 10 percent inventory of weapons and ammunition at Taji NAD and the Location Commands. Recommendation I.1.b remains open pending our receipt of a report regarding implementation of a monthly 10 percent inventory schedule.

During our visits to Taji NAD and the KMTB Location Command, we noted that the Iraqis did not appear to have a system in place to document the physical location of specific items within a warehouse. They could determine the particular warehouse where certain types of weapons were located from their property books or other paper documents. However, they would then have to search the warehouse to determine where a particular lot number or series of weapons serial numbers were physically stored within
the warehouse. MNSTC-I trainers were on-site working with their Iraqi counterparts on this issue.

Additionally, MNSTC-I was renovating a number of warehouses at Taji NAD by use of a cost sharing program with the Iraqis. Plans to install shelving, as required, in these renovated warehouses would assist the Iraqis in organizing the warehouses into some type of central management system. However, the degree of automation that would result from development of a centralized warehouse management system for the Iraqis was yet undetermined. There was some Iraqi resistance to automating such a system, as they are more familiar and comfortable with a paper system. Recommendation I.1.c remains open pending resolution of these issues.

**Recommendation I.2**

We recommended that the Commander, MNSTC-I advise and assist MoI to construct sufficient capacity for arms and ammunition storage at BPC and other sites as necessary for the anticipated volume of arms and ammunition shipments.

**Management Comments to Recommendation I.2**

MNF-I concurred. The MoI was constrained for storage space at BPC for inbound weapons and ammunition and employed a 3-pronged approach to alleviate this problem. The first step was to increase the rate of throughput to subordinate organizations. The second step was to use temporary container storage in the newly constructed container yard. The third step was to divert ammunition to the Abu Ghraib warehouse complex, where MoI had planned to establish a permanent workforce.

The Coalition was funding the construction of 12,000 square meters of storage space on BPC and this work was estimated to be completed by May 28, 2008. Once completed, all of the hardened warehouses at BPC were to be freed up for ammunition storage.

**Status of Implementation of Recommendation I.2**

MoI had stationed five personnel at Abu Ghraib warehouse to assist in the organization and temporary storage of items, to include ammunition, destined for MoI organizations. MNSTC-I had placed two of their trainers at Abu Ghraib warehouse to assist the MoI personnel. Construction had been completed on seven new warehouses at BPC, funded by MNSTC-I, and provided approximately 11,600 square meters of additional storage space. These additional warehouses should solve the near-term problems of storage at BPC. We closed this recommendation.

**Recommendations J.1, J.2, and J.3**

These recommendations were classified. See the classified version of DoD IG Report No. SPO-2008-001, “Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq,” July 3, 2008.

**Management Comments to Recommendations J.1, J.2, and J.3**

The management comments to these recommendations were classified.
Status of Implementation of Recommendations J.1, J.2, and J.3
We determined that the intent of recommendations J.1, J.2 and J.3 had been met. We closed all three recommendations.

Recommendation K.1
We recommended that the Commander, MNSTC-I assist MoD and MoI and their subordinate military and police organizations in attaining and maintaining 100 percent accountability and control of ISF weapons by serial numbers.

Management Comments to Recommendation K.1
MNF-I concurred, noting that they would continue to direct MNSTC-I to advise and assist MoD and MoI with regard to directing their subordinate organizations to achieve and maintain 100 percent accountability of all weapons by serial number.

Status of Implementation of Recommendation K.1
Our visits to Taji NAD; BPC; the Taji and KMTB Location Commands; two police colleges; one police academy; and 3d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st National Police Division indicated that subordinate units in both MoD and MoI were accounting for weapons by serial number and providing adequate security for ammunition. While serial number accountability would require continued mentoring vigilance on the part of U.S. trainers, we determined that the intent of the recommendation had been met. We have closed this recommendation.

Recommendation K.2
We recommended that the Commander, MNSTC-I instruct all Coalition MNSTC-I military transition teams to assist/mentor the appropriate Iraqi personnel in MoD and MoI in development of their own centralized database of weapons serial numbers.

Management Comments to Recommendation K.2
MNF-I non-concurred with the recommendation as it was initially written because MNF-I believed it implied that MNSTC-I should register all Iraqi weapons in the MNSTC-I weapons serial number database. MNSTC-I reported that its database only tracks weapons procured through the Iraq Security Forces Fund, procured through the U.S. FMS program, and re-issued under the captured enemy weapon program at Taji NAD. Tracking weapons procured by the Government of Iraq directly from non-U.S. sources was a Government of Iraq responsibility.

MNSTC-I noted that it did not have the manpower to track that subset of weapons, even if the Government of Iraq were to provide the serial numbers. We modified the recommendation to limit it to the categories of weapons specified by MNSTC-I.

Status of Implementation of Recommendation K.2
There was no evidence that MoD was planning to develop and maintain a centralized database of weapons. Although MNSTC-I had given the Iraqis a baseline “point of departure” by providing the serial numbers of 63,583 weapons stored at Taji NAD, as
As well as the serial numbers of weapons stored at the Location Commands, it was unclear how MoD planned to proceed. MNSTC-I mentors continued to advise their MoD counterparts on the utility of such a centralized database.

The Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure in the MoI had developed a centralized weapons serial number database. All weapons that were destined for MoI organizations were routed through BPC, where the serial numbers were entered into the MoI central serial number database. The Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure was also aggressively pursuing an effort to capture the serial numbers of MoI weapons already issued to subordinate organizations. MNSTC-I mentors continued to advise and assist their MoI counterparts with accountability of weapons and ammunition.

We counted a total of 915 weapons at 3 Iraqi warehouse storage locations. We identified 899 serial numbers accurately recorded in inventory Excel spreadsheets for an accuracy rate of 98.25 percent and 16 serial numbers inaccurately recorded for a discrepancy rate of 1.75 percent, when those counts were compared to the MoD and MoI Excel spreadsheet databases and issue documents. Improvements are needed in accurately recording weapons serial numbers and those are discussed in Observation A, found in Part II of this report.

There was no evidence that MoD was planning to develop and maintain a centralized database of weapons although the MNSTC-I effort to convince MoD to develop such a database continued. We determined that development of a centralized weapons serial number database in MoI was proceeding satisfactorily but had not been fully completed. Recommendation K.2 remains open.

**Recommendations L.1.a and L.1.b**

We recommended that the Commander, MNF-I:

a. Approve a MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document (JMD) that provides for sufficient numbers of personnel and identifies the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute its logistics mission.

b. Establish an Office of Inspector General and an Office of Internal Review in the MNSTC-I JMD that provides for sufficient numbers of personnel and identifies the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute their oversight mission.

**Management comments to Recommendations L.1.a and L.1.b**

MNF-I concurred. MNSTC-I had completed a comprehensive personnel manning review in the fall of 2007 that resulted in a request to modify the MNSTC-I JMD to source the personnel shortfalls. In February 2008, the Commander, MNF-I approved the MSNTC-I JMD change proposal.

If approved and sourced by the Joint Staff, the JMD change would increase overall manning in the MNSTC-I logistics section by almost 47 percent (an increase from 64 to
The proposed JMD also reflected a net increase of five personnel within the MNSTC-I Office of the Inspector General, to include an internal review function.

**Status of Implementation of Recommendations L.1.a and L.1.b**

The actions taken by MNF-I and MNSTC-I met the intent of recommendations L.1.a and L.1.b. We have closed these recommendations.

**Recommendations L.2.a and L.2.b**

We recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, USCENTCOM expedite:

a. Approval of the proposed MNSTC-I JMD and request the necessary funding to accomplish the actions cited in recommendations L.1.a and L.1.b.

b. Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience level, and rank to fill the positions designated in the JMD for the MNSTC-I logistics function, the Office of Inspector General, and the Office of Internal Review.

**Management Comments to Recommendations L.2.a and L.2.b**

USCENTCOM concurred, noting that they received the MNF-I out-of-cycle request to modify the MNSTC-I JMD in March 2008. USCENTCOM staff was in the process of validating the MNSTC-I JMD for submission to the Combatant Commander for approval. USCENTCOM expected to submit an approved document to the Joint Staff not later than June 1, 2008.

The Joint Staff concurred, noting that they actively pursue the staffing of all JMDs that had been validated and forwarded by the combatant commands. The Joint Staff reported that MNSTC-I was currently manned at 95 percent. As a subset of that manning, the MNSTC-I individual augmentation billets show a Service commitment to sourcing of 94 percent.

**Status of Implementation of Recommendations L.2.a and L.2.b**

USCENTCOM forwarded the out-of-cycle MNSTC-I JMD to the Joint Staff on July 14, 2008. These recommendations remain open.

**Recommendation M.1**

We recommended that the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) appoint a DoD Executive Agent for the Iraqi FMS program. Consideration should be given to designating the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent. The Executive Agent will activate a Joint Program Management Office that will focus full-time on support for ISF, seven days per week to:

a. Integrate, expedite, coordinate and drive the Iraqi FMS program in the United States, increase the responsiveness of the support effort for the U.S. commanders, and
meet the wartime requirements of ISF. This is an operational, not a policy, office or another bureaucratic layer.

b. Ensure USCENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I have the support needed, as required and on-time, to better assist MoD and MoI to build combat ready military and police forces.

**Management Comments to Recommendation M.1**

The USD (P) non-concorded, noting that an Executive Agent for FMS already existed. DoD Directive (DoDD) 5105.65, paragraph 3, provides: “the DSCA [Defense Security Cooperation Agency] shall direct, administer, and provide overall policy guidance for the execution of security cooperation and additional DoD programs in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended,…and this Directive.”

Establishment of a formal Joint Program Management Office for the Iraq FMS program would create unneeded bureaucracy and is not necessary in view of actions already taken to improve the responsiveness of Iraq FMS.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense created an Iraq FMS Task Force in August 2007 to assist the DoD leadership to monitor the implementation of Iraq’s FMS program, ensure coordination among relevant organizations, and improve the processing and delivery of Iraq FMS cases. Further, DSCA has established an internal Iraq Integrated Project Team and assigned an experienced FMS manager, whose sole job is to lead the Iraq FMS team.

Moreover, the establishment of a U.S.-based Joint Program Management Office to implement integration and coordination of a country’s FMS program would, in general, need to be requested by the government of that country and funded by it. Under the Arms Export Control Act, the President may sell defense services or contract services. Section 21(a)(1)(C) of the Arms Export Control Act states that for defense services, the purchaser must agree to pay in U.S. dollars, “the full cost to the U.S. Government of furnishing such service.”

The Secretary of the Army non-concorded with the last sentence in Observation M regarding the lack of responsiveness of the FMS program to the urgent needs of ISF, stating that the observation required additional analysis. The Secretary of the Army also non-concorded with recommendation M.1.b., noting that the Army had diverted thousands of items from inventory and accelerated delivery of numerous commodities. The Army reported that it had sufficient processes in place to achieve and maintain operational awareness with MNSTC-I, DSCA, and Army stakeholders.

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8 The USD(P) response was included with the USD (AT&L) response to the draft report. See Appendix E in the classified version of DoD IG Report No. SPO-2008-001, “Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq,” July 3, 2008.
Status of Implementation of Recommendation M.1

We did not change or modify recommendation M.1. Because we believe that the success of the FMS program for Iraq is so critical, we asked that DoD senior management reconsider their non-concurrence with the proposal to establish an Executive Agent to drive this program and address the areas that still need improvement.

On August 15, 2008, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs responded to our request to reconsider their non-concurrence, reiterating that position. He noted that DoDD 5101.1, “Department of Defense Executive Agent with change 1,” May 9, 2003, established that an Executive Agent shall be conferred when “(n)o existing means to accomplish the DoD objectives exists.”

The Assistant Secretary stated that DSCA exists to accomplish the DoD objectives regarding FMS and had the necessary financial and logistical delivery systems in place to adequately provide defense articles and services to Iraq. He believed that creating an Executive Agent would duplicate investments in time, funding, and personnel already made by DSCA. He further noted that the Deputy Secretary of Defense Iraq FMS Task Force had made substantial progress in eliminating bottlenecks in the Iraq FMS support program. Creating a Joint Program Management Office under a newly established Executive Agent would create unneeded bureaucracy.

Based on this latest input from USD (P) and recent decisions by the Government of Iraq on where and how to procure defense articles for their military and police organizations, we have closed recommendation M.1. We will continue to monitor the performance of the FMS program to determine if improvements resulting from the Deputy Secretary of Defense Iraqi FMS Task Force efforts ensue.

Recommendation M.2

We recommended that the SECDEF, with appropriate Congressional approval, establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to acquire a pool of high priority, high demand, urgently needed equipment that will be immediately available for shipment to ISF to expand forces, modernize forces, and replace combat losses.

Management Comments to Recommendation M.2

USD (P) concurred, stating that DoD included the establishment of a Defense Coalition Support Account in its package of legislative proposals, which was currently pending Congressional action.

Status of Implementation of Recommendation M.2

This recommendation remains open.

Recommendation M.3

We recommended that the Commander, MNF-I establish and approve authorized positions for the MNSTC-I security assistance office in the MNSTC-I JMD that provides...
sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute its security assistance mission.

Management Comments to Recommendation M.3
MNF-I concurred, noting that the MNSTC-I personnel department, with support from MNF-I personnel department, worked extensively with the USCENTCOM personnel directorate to add 18 positions to the MNSTC-I JMD. These positions were approved in November 2007. Total manning of the MNSTC-I security assistance office is currently at approximately 90 percent. However, assignment of Security Assistance Office officers to MNSTC-I who have had any FMS experience prior to their assignment to MNSTC-I continues to be a challenge. The Joint Staff J5 continues to be a strong advocate and provides invaluable assistance in identifying experienced personnel to fill these positions.

Status of Implementation of Recommendation M.3
The authorizations, assigned strength, and experience levels of the MNSTC-I security assistance office have improved considerably since our visit in September and October of 2007. Although experience levels of personnel remained a challenge, the Brigadier General in charge of the office noted that his current assigned strength of about 32, and projected end-strength of 68 (pending approval of the latest JMD by USCENTCOM and the Joint Staff), would be sufficient to meet mission requirements. We closed this recommendation.

Recommendations M.4.a and M.4.b
We recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, USCENTCOM expedite:

a. Approval of the MNSTC-I JMD to accomplish the actions cited in Recommendation M.3.

b. Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions designated in the JMD for the MNSTC-I security assistance function.

Management Comments to Recommendations M.4.a and M.4.b
USCENTCOM concurred, noting that the additional JMD positions for the MNSTC-I security assistance office were forwarded to the Joint Staff on August 27, 2007, and approved by the SECDEF on November 5, 2007. The military services are working to fill these new positions with personnel possessing requisite skills and experience levels.

The Joint Staff concurred, noting that the MNSTC-I FMS division has a current manning of 32 of 36 positions. The remaining four billets have Service commitments for sourcing. The SECDEF recently approved five additional billets to support the MNSTC-I division as a functional capability team. These billets will be manned by July 2008. U.S. Joint Forces Command will ensure that the appropriate Service identifies military/civilian personnel that meet the requisite skills, experience, and rank/rate necessary to meet the requirements.
Status of Implementation of Recommendations M.4.a and M.4.b
USCENTCOM and the Joint Staff supported manning of the MNSTC-I security assistance office with numbers of experienced personnel sufficient to meet mission requirements. The Services supported the fill of authorized positions. USCENTCOM forwarded the latest JMD to support additional personnel for the MNSTC-I security assistance office to the Joint Staff on July 14, 2008. Recommendations M.4.a and M.4.b remain open.

Recommendation M.5
We recommended that the Commander, MNSTC-I, advise and assist the Iraqi MoD and MoI in establishing a requirements planning process that forecasted the ISF equipment and training needs on a multi-year basis to stabilize and improve the responsiveness of the Iraqi FMS program.

Management Comments to Recommendation M.5
MNF-I concurred, noting that MNSTC-I will continue to work with both MoD and MoI to refine their processes for identifying, prioritizing, and resourcing requirements.

Status of Implementation of Recommendation M.5
MoD had improved their ability to plan for and forecast force development and sustainment needs with assistance from MNSTC-I. Plans and documents had been developed and approved forecasting the growth of the Iraqi military for the next several years. MoI had improved in this area but to a lesser extent than MoD. We were not able to obtain a written approved plan for the MoI-sponsored growth. MNSTC-I continued to assist both ministries in this critical area. This recommendation remains open.

Recommendation N.1
We recommended that SECDEF appoint a Department of Defense Executive Agent to integrate, coordinate, and expedite the support needed by USCENTCOM, MNF-I, MNC-I, and MNSTC-I as they advise and assist MoD and MoI in planning and building their logistics sustainment base for ISF. The Executive Agent would drive the support needed from the United States to support the U.S. Commanders as they assist ISF to build their ability to conduct totally independent operations and expand their battle space.

Management Comments to Recommendation N.1
USD (P) and USD (AT&L) concurred with the importance of developing ISF logistics capabilities, agreeing to explore options and mechanisms to assist the Government of Iraq in that effort. They did not explicitly support or reject the “Executive Agent” proposal.

Status of Implementation of Recommendation N.1
After considering management comments and looking at on-the-ground actions taken by MNF-I, MNSTC-I, MNC-I on this issue, we note that considerable progress has been made. The MNF-I-sponsored Iraq Logistics Development Committee (ILDC) has been instrumental in assisting the ISF in developing its logistics sustainment capability.
Although not flawless, the Iraqi military is now sustaining itself in most areas of life support. Strides have been made in maintenance and transportation capability at all levels. With some contractor support, the Iraqi Army now controls and operates the logistics functions at Taji National Depot and a majority of the Location Commands. The MoI controls and operates the logistics functions for the Iraqi Police from their logistics hub at the Baghdad Police College. Most recently an Iraqi Army 4th line General Transportation Regiment has completed training and become operational. The Iraqis have also demonstrated improved logistics capabilities during recent operations in Basra, Diyala, and Mosul. While work remains to be done, we believe that development of the Iraqi logistics capability is on track and mitigates against the need for a Logistics Executive Agent. We will continue to monitor progress in this area; however, we have closed the recommendation.

**Recommendations N.2.a, N.2.b, and N.2.c**

We recommended that the Commander, MNF-I:

a. Establish and approve the required positions for senior logistics mentors and Military and Police Transition Team logistics mentors in MNC-I and MNSTC-I through the JMD or Request for Forces (RFF) processes so as to provide sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute the logistics mentoring mission.

b. Ensure that senior logistics mentors and MiTT logistics mentors assigned to MNSTC-I via the JMD/RFF process are further assigned to advise/mentor the appropriate offices in MoD, MoI, the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, and ISF, as needed.

c. Establish a logistics training program in Iraq, comparable in comprehensiveness to that currently provided by the Counter-Insurgency Academy, to train U.S. Military and Police Transition Team logistics mentors. This could be a block of instruction taught at the Counter Insurgency Academy itself. We need to ensure that logistics mentors and advisors are prepared to perform this critical mission.

**Management Comments to Recommendations N.2.a, N.2.b, and N.2.c**

MNF-I concurred with N.2.a. and N.2.b., noting that MNSTC-I would determine requirements for logistics mentors needed for the MNC-I and MNSTC-I staffs, and would coordinate with the MNF-I personnel section to ensure requisite skills and experience levels are incorporated in the JMD or RFF, as appropriate.

MNF-I non-concurred with recommendation N.2.c. They stated that the MNF-I Commanding General directed the establishment of a “Council of Colonels” (subsequently renamed the Iraqi Logistics Development Committee (ILDC)), an initiatives group to develop a way ahead to assist the accelerated growth of the ISF life support, maintenance, and logistics system.

The ILDC is representative of all Coalition Force organizations, to include: MNF-I, MNC-I, MNSTC-I, the Iraqi Assistance Group, and Iraqi Ground Forces Command.
MiTTs. Between February 15 and March 30, 2008, the committee’s operational planning team met several times to develop an ISF logistics way ahead. The committee provided several in-progress review briefings to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Resource and Sustainment, MNF-I; the Commander, Iraqi Assistance Group, MNC-I; and the Commander, Coalition Army Advisory Training Team, MNSTC-I.

In late March 2008 the initiatives group provided a decision brief to the Commander, MNC-I, and Commander, MNSTC-I. The committee was directed to coordinate and publish a FRAGO to establish a common operating picture of ISF logistics capability and capacity, in order to synchronize efforts of all stakeholders responsible for assisting in the development of the ISF logistics system.

Accordingly, MNC-I FRAGO 434 to MNC-I Operations Order 08-01 was published on 15 June 2008 to implement the logistics action plan, as developed by the Iraqi Logistics Development Committee’s operational planning team. Task 3 of that FRAGO provided instructions and taskings regarding ISF logistics capability development.

The Iraq Assistance Group was designated as the MNC-I Executive Agent for this effort and was directed to develop a Phoenix Academy training course for the Logistics Training Advisory Teams.

The committee will continue to refine and develop metrics to measure progress in developing ISF logistics capability and capacity by function, across all levels of support, in order to establish current capability, target training efforts to close the capability gap, and gauge progress towards ISF self-reliance.

Status of Implementation of Recommendations N.2a, N.2.b, and N.2.c

We note that authorization for additional logistics mentors/trainers was working through the JMD/RFF process. The MNF-I initiative to field Logistics Training Advisory Teams for the U.S. sustainment brigades to augment the existing U.S. Logistics Maintenance Assistance Teams already at the Iraqi Location Commands was notable and making steady, ongoing progress. Recommendations N.2.a. and N.2.b. remain open.

We reviewed the MNC-I FRAGO 434, June 15 2008, to the MNC-I Operations Order 08-01 and determined that the Iraq Assistance Group was tasked to develop a Phoenix Academy training course for the Logistics Training Advisory Teams. We were subsequently provided a curriculum for the Logistics Training Advisory Team training course. After evaluating those documents, we believe that the intent of recommendation N.2.c had been met, and we have closed that recommendation.

Recommendations N.3.a and N.3.b.

We recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, USCENTCOM expedite:

   a. Approval of the MNC-I and the MNSTC-I JMD/RFF, and request the necessary funding to accomplish the actions cited in Recommendations N.2.a., N.2.b. and N.2.c.
b. Assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank, to include civilians from the Office of the SECDEF, to fill positions designated in the JMD/RFF for the MNC-I and the MNSTC-I logistics mentoring functions.

**Management Comments to Recommendations N.3.a and N.3.b**

USCENTCOM concurred, noting that they will review and validate future requirements for logistics mentors approved by Commander, MNF-I for addition to the MNC-I and the MNSTC-I JMD/RFF, as appropriate.

The Joint Staff concurred, noting that overall MNC-I JMD manning was at 95 percent, and MNSTC-I overall manning was also at 95 percent. U.S. Joint Forces Command, as the force provider, would ensure that the appropriate Service identified military/civilian personnel to meet the requisite skills, experience, and rank/rate necessary to meet the requirements.

**Status of Implementation of Recommendations N.3.a and N.3.b**

USCENTCOM and the Joint Staff remain committed to approving and sourcing requirements for logistics mentors and trainers in Iraq. Commanders in Iraq believe planning and resourcing for that mission is on-track. These recommendations remain open.

**Summary**

We commend DoD management and field commanders for taking important and critical steps in addressing issues surrounding control and accountability of arms and ammunition provided to the security forces of Iraq, FMS support, and developing ISF logistics sustainment. While significant progress is being made, work still remains to be done. We will continue to work with management to address the remaining 16 open recommendations from our Report No. SPO-2008-001, “Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq,” July 3, 2008 (a classified report).
Part II – Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives

Introduction
The “Department of Defense Strategic Plan for the Distribution of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” (AA&E Strategic Plan) May 2004, was developed to improve the oversight, management, control, safety, and security of AA&E across the entire DoD logistics chain.9

The Challenge
The AA&E Strategic Plan states:

The Department of Defense faces a significant challenge as it seeks to protect and safely test, acquire, produce, store, transport, maintain, and dispose of its arms, ammunition and explosives (AA&E) while it effectively meets the requirements of warfighters for timely supplies of AA&E worldwide. Meeting these demands must be effective and efficient in the face of an ever-changing and growing threat environment. Terrorists, or other individuals or entities pursuing their own agenda, seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of the United States and use our nation's AA&E and conveyances in ways never conceived before.

The Scope
The scope includes selected activities in the testing, acquisition, production, storage, issue, transportation, receipt, and disposal of AA&E-from origin to final destination. It focuses on the distribution process and the interaction, integration, and interoperability of these logistics chain activities. The AA&E Strategic Plan encompasses the requisite safety, security, and accountability provisions dictated by national, international, state, and local laws and regulations, host nation agreements, and DoD policies.

The Mission
The mission of the AA&E logistics chain10 is to provide an effective end-to-end system that consistently and quickly delivers AA&E materiel to the warfighter, while

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9 The DoD AA&E logistics chain comprises a partnership of commercial and internal DoD (organic) capabilities, assets and infrastructure, business processes, and technologies. While this [AA&E Strategic] plan does not specifically address actions involving tactical in-theater movement of AA&E, it is the responsibility of the theater combatant commander to implement AA&E safety and security measures commensurate with his mission and the threats and risks within his assigned geographic area of responsibility (see DoD 5100.76-M, Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” August 12, 2000).

10 In the context of the AA&E Strategic Plan, the logistics chain encompasses traditional distribution functions involving the issue, storage, packaging, transportation, and receipt of materiel. It also encompasses those functions that potentially affect the distribution process to include testing, procurement, and production of materiel and subsequent processes, such as demilitarization and disposal. It also encompasses the separate logistics and transportation sectors within the DoD portion of the Federal Government Critical Infrastructure Protection structure.
maintaining the security and safety of the materiel and the public. Inherent in that mission is the requirement to implement mechanisms to rapidly and properly act and respond to threats or incidents that could compromise the mission, safety, or security of AA&E during the distribution segment of the overall logistics chain.

**The Strategic Vision**

The strategic vision is an effective and efficient worldwide logistics chain that meets warfighters’ demands for AA&E where and when needed while protecting against security threats, limiting exposure to the public, and minimizing the potential for safety mishaps.
Observation 1. Assistance to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in Accounting for and Managing Weapons and Ammunition\(^{11}\)

We counted a total of 915 weapons at 3 Iraqi warehouse storage locations. We identified 899 serial numbers accurately recorded in Excel inventory spreadsheets for an accuracy rate of 98.25 percent, and 16 serial numbers inaccurately recorded for a discrepancy rate of 1.75 percent, when those counts were compared to the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) Excel spreadsheet databases.

There was no warehouse management system at Baghdad Police College (BPC) and Taji National Army Depot (NAD) to readily link the location of a particular lot or serial number sequence of weapons to a specific bin or location within a particular warehouse. Although the Iraqis could identify the specific warehouse in which certain items were located, finding the item in the warehouse usually involved a manual search.

The weapons serial number discrepancies occurred because the Iraqis had not yet implemented a quality control system to verify and maintain data integrity of recorded serial numbers of weapons at the time of initial entry into existing warehouse databases and thereafter.

The inability to easily determine precise locations of materiel in a particular warehouse occurred because there was no system to link the various Excel spreadsheets or handwritten paper documents (displaying items by type of supply) into a master warehouse management system that could provide warehouse, storage and bin locations, and a capability to update inventory balances.

As indicated by the discrepancy rates identified in our inventory counts of weapons serial numbers, there was the potential for weapons serial numbers to be inaccurately recorded and for weapons to become misplaced, lost, or stolen.

Further, without an operable warehouse management system, there will be a likely degradation of asset visibility resulting in supply chain inefficiencies and a weakened inventory management control process, with the potential for misplacement, loss, or theft of supply commodities.

**Applicable Criteria**

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) advisors and trainers were involved in mentoring the processes for weapons and ammunition accountability and general warehouse management at BPC, Taji NAD, and Kirkush Military Training.

Base (KMTB) Location Command on a daily basis, although those were Iraqi responsibilities. As such, certain U.S. policies and procedures, adjusted to meet Iraqi needs and capabilities, may serve as a basis for the MNSTC-I efforts in these areas.

U.S. Government and DoD policies and procedures that apply to the accountability, control, and physical security of property and AA&E are outlined below. Specific requirements cited in these guidance documents are discussed in Appendix F.


**Accountability and Control for DoD Property.** DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006, provides policy and procedures for DoD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C., section 524.


**Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives**
DoDI 5100.76, “Safeguarding Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) and the AA&E Physical Security Review Board,” October 8, 2005, outlines the authorities, responsibilities, and functions relative to worldwide uniform policy, standards, and guidance for the physical security of conventional AA&E in the possession or custody of the DoD Components.

DoD 5100.76-M, “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” August 12, 2000, prescribes minimum standards and criteria for the physical security of DoD sensitive conventional AA&E, including non-nuclear missiles and rockets.

DoD 5200.08-R, “Physical Security Program,” April 9, 2007, implements DoD policies and minimum standards for the physical protection of DoD personnel, installations, operations, and related resources; to include the security of weapons systems and platforms.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons Serialization Program.**
DoD 4000.25-M, “Defense Logistics Management System,” Volume 2, Chapter 18 (“Small Arms and Light Weapons Serial Number Registration and Reporting”), Change
5. March 25, 2008,\textsuperscript{12} addresses DoD Components’ responsibility for inventory management of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW) and other activities involved in the shipment, registration, or receipt of SA/LW. It also provides procedures for reporting SA/LW serial number data between the DoD Components and the DoD SA/LW Registry.


This memorandum provided mandatory direction to all MNSTC-I personnel for the maintenance of materiel accountability through the process of acquisition, receipt, storage, and distribution up to and including the point of issue to the Government of Iraq. It also provided a basis for MNSTC-I trainers and mentors to advise and assist their Iraqi counterparts on the accountability of arms, ammunition, and other supplies.


This memorandum directed the implementation of the MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability SOP and that it be issued to all Multi-National Corps-Iraq elements to ensure consistent accountability standards across the supply chain in Iraq. The issuance of the MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability SOP provided a basis for Multi-National Corps-Iraq trainers working with Iraq Security Forces (ISF) units to train and advise their Iraqi counterparts on the accountability of arms, ammunition, and other supplies.

**Weapons Serial Numbers Counts**

We performed a count of a judgmental sample of weapons serial numbers at BPC, the Taji NAD, and the KMTB Location Command to determine the accuracy of weapons serial numbers recorded on MoD and MoI master inventory Excel spreadsheets.

**Baghdad Police College**

The BPC had implemented procedures to account for weapons by serial numbers. The serial numbers for weapons were manually recorded in the warehouse. Subsequently, the serial numbers were provided to MoI for posting by Iraqi personnel in an inventory Excel spreadsheet.

**Inventory Counts.** We inventoried a total of 217 weapons of various types at BPC. Of the 217 weapons counted, we identified 215 serial numbers accurately recorded for an accuracy rate of 99 percent and two serial numbers inaccurately recorded for a

discrepancy rate of 1 percent when those counts were compared to the MoI central database and issue documents.

- Serial Number BD 078 was incorrectly recorded as DB 078, and
- Serial Number 8007 was incorrectly recorded as 8807.

During the inventory of 9mm Glock pistols, we found that only 128 of the 158 listed on the Excel sheet inventory were on-hand. The Iraqis stated that 30 of the pistols had been issued and provided Form 102s documenting the issue of the weapons, by serial number. The manual transfer of the issue paperwork had not yet been documented in the master inventory Excel spreadsheets.

On-site MNSTC-I personnel said they would assist the Iraqis in posting the corrections in the master inventory Excel spreadsheet.

**Warehouse Management.** There was no warehouse management system to readily identify the specific location of those weapons stored within a particular warehouse, although Iraqi officials at BPC knew the warehouses in which a particular lot or type of weapon was stored.

Iraqi MoI personnel had to rely on the knowledge and memory of the warehouseman in charge of a particular warehouse, who could usually locate the weapons in question after a short search.

**Taji National Army Depot**

The Taji NAD had implemented procedures to account for weapons by serial numbers. MNSTC-I had completed a 100 percent joint U.S./Iraqi inventory of the 63,583 weapons stored at Taji NAD. The serial numbers were manually recorded at the warehouse. Subsequently, the data was entered into an inventory Excel spreadsheet by U.S. personnel and transferred to the Iraqis.

**Inventory Counts.** We identified 8 serial number discrepancies in the Excel spreadsheet during a judgment sample inventory of 463 rifles and pistols. The errors identified were:

- 9mm pistol serial number was listed in the database twice
- 9mm pistol serial number 41011 was incorrectly recorded as 41018
- 9mm pistol serial number 41176 was incorrectly recorded as 41376
- 8.5mm pistol BA442500 was not recorded on the spreadsheet
- 8.5mm pistol BA18028 was not recorded on the spreadsheet
- AK-47 rifle 90393 was incorrectly recorded as 90398
- AK-47 rifle 89679 was incorrectly recorded as 89674
- AK-47 rifle 90502 was incorrectly recorded as 91512

Of the 463 weapons counted, we identified 455 serial numbers accurately recorded for an accuracy rate of 98.27 percent and 8 serial numbers inaccurately recorded for a discrepancy rate of 1.73 percent, when those counts were compared to the MoD database.
MNSTC-I personnel made on-the-spot corrections to the Taji NAD Excel spreadsheet serial number database.

**Warehouse Management.** There was no master warehouse management system at Taji NAD that could identify the location of a particular lot or serial number sequence of weapons to a specific bin or location within a particular warehouse. Although the Iraqis could identify the specific warehouse in which certain items were located, finding the item within the warehouse usually involved a search of the warehouse.

**Kirkush Military Training Base Location Command**
The Kirkush Military Training Base (KMTB) Location Command had implemented procedures to account for weapons by serial numbers. All weapons were accounted for by serial number and were maintained on a U.S. controlled inventory Excel spreadsheet.

We identified 6 serial number discrepancies in the Excel spreadsheet during a judgmental sample inventory of 235 rifles and pistols. The errors identified were:

- Markov pistol 1829 was incorrectly recorded as 1825
- Glock 9 mm pistol GMD 531 not on the serial number list
- Glock 9mm pistol GMD 532 not on the serial number list
- Glock 9mm pistol HCR 853 not on the serial number list
- Glock 9mm pistol HCR 856 not on the serial number list
- Glock 9mm pistol HAT 001 not on the serial number list

Of the 235 weapons counted, we identified 229 serial numbers accurately recorded for an accuracy rate of 97.44 percent and 6 serial numbers inaccurately recorded for a discrepancy rate of 2.56 percent, when those counts were compared to the MoD database.

The spot inventories of AK-47 and M-16 rifles were 100 percent accurate.

MNSTC-I personnel made on-the-spot corrections to the KMTB Excel spreadsheet serial number database.

**Results of Weapons Serial Numbers Counts**
We counted a total of 915 weapons at three Iraqi warehouse storage locations. We identified 899 serial numbers accurately recorded in inventory Excel spreadsheets for an accuracy rate of 98.25 percent, and 16 serial numbers inaccurately recorded, for a discrepancy rate of 1.75 percent, when those counts were compared to the MoD and MoI Excel spreadsheet databases and issue documents. A summary of the weapons serial numbers counts are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of Sample Weapons Serial Numbers Inventory Counts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Weapons serial Numbers Counted</th>
<th>Serials Correctly Recorded</th>
<th>Percentage Correctly recorded</th>
<th>Serials Incorrectly Recorded</th>
<th>Percentage Incorrectly Recorded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>99.07</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taji NAD</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>98.27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMTB</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>97.44</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>98.25</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There has been significant improvement in the serial number accountability of weapons provided by U.S. forces to the security forces of Iraq. However, even a seemingly small error rate can have unwanted and unacceptable consequences. The goal for recording serial numbers, therefore, must be 100 percent accuracy to prevent the misplacement, loss, or theft of weapons.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

1.a. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior and their warehousing organizations in attaining and maintaining 100 percent accountability and control of Iraq Security Forces weapons by serial numbers by requesting the:

   (1) Implementation of data quality controls such as verifying or double checking the recording of weapons serial numbers at the time of entry into warehouse databases.

**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander stated that MNSTC-I and the MoI ensured full accountability of weapons by jointly conducting serial number inventories as weapons are delivered to the warehouse. Resulting inventories were maintained in the MoI weapons database. Iraqi MoD weapons were accounted for at the depot and unit warehouses by serial number through a manual ledger process. MNSTC-I acknowledged that the Joint Headquarters’ Deputy Chief of Staff-Logistics and the National Supply Depot Commander had a double verification process for weapons received or issued at Taji National Supply Depot and that serial numbers of M16s/M4s issued to Iraqi soldiers were linked to biometric data that included fingerprinting, retinal scan, voice scan, biographical information, and a photograph of the soldier holding the weapon.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.
1.a. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior and their warehousing organizations in attaining and maintaining 100 percent accountability and control of Iraq Security Forces weapons by serial numbers by requesting the:

(2) Implementation of a monthly 10-percent or random sample of the inventory of Iraqi weapons and verification of the serial numbers recorded in warehouse databases.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. He reported that the MoI did not presently conduct either monthly or random inventories of weapons. Subsequent inventories of MoI weapons were only conducted when the weapons were distributed to using units. He stated that they continue to emphasize to the MoI the use of random inventories to periodically spot check weapons. The Commander, MNSTC-I affirmed that the MoD, on the other hand, was utilizing an automated database system at Taji National Supply Depot and was conducting monthly inventory reconciliation for 10 percent of the serial numbers. Ledger monthly reconciliation for 10 percent of serial numbers to on-hand weapons was also being instituted at the unit level of the Iraqi Army.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required. MNSTC-I should continue to encourage the MoI to develop policies and processes for conducting random physical inventories of weapons.

1.b. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior in developing and implementing or contracting for an integrated Arabic-based warehouse management system to account for, control, and manage stored commodities, to include arms, ammunition, and explosives. The system should be automated to the extent acceptable to and sustainable by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. The system should, at a minimum:

- Record quantities and descriptions of items received and issued
- Show the organizations from which items were received and to which items were issued
- Identify items to a specific location within a warehouse
- Show balances of the quantities of items on-hand

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander noted that the MoI lacked computer proficient warehouse workers and reliable power for computerized systems. He pointed out that two automated systems were already used with the MoD. One of these, the Iraqi Army Maintenance Program (IAMP), was an internet-based network covering the Joint Repair Parts Command at Taji and Divisional Location Command workshops providing simple acquisition, receipt, and inventory management functions, and email
communications between the main Iraqi Army maintenance locations. He reported that the IAMP was a popular and well-used system, and that MNSTC-I was working with the contractor (Anham) to have that system translated into Arabic and to add movement control and stock numbering functions to it.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive. The actions planned and taken by MNSTC-I to modify the IAMP system in order to provide an automated warehousing system for the MoD partially meet the intent of the recommendation; however, the description provided of the proposed IAMP system does not address its potential for warehouse control and management of arms, ammunition, and explosives. We also note the lack of appreciable progress in establishing a workable warehouse management system for the MoI. In his response to our final report, we request that Commander, MNSTC-I describe more completely how the IAMP system will be applied to the warehouse management of arms and ammunition, or, what other alternative systems would be used, if applicable. We also request that Commander, MNSTC-I address the steps being taken by his command to assist or provide a workable warehouse management system for the MoI.
Observation 2. Assistance to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in Accounting for and Managing the Inventory of Captured and Otherwise Obtained Weapons\(^\text{13}\) 14

The MoD captured weapons policy at Iraqi Army depots and Location Commands had not been fully implemented. Thousands of captured weapons were in storage at Taji NAD and the KMTB Location Command. These weapons had not had their serial numbers recorded and had not been inspected for serviceability and placement into the Iraqi military weapons inventory.

Further, there was no MoD procedure in place to destroy or demilitarize any captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons found to be unserviceable or otherwise inappropriate for military use. Likewise, the MoI did not have a policy for captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons.

This occurred because U.S. and Iraqi manpower constraints and competing priorities had delayed the inventory and inspection of captured weapons at MoD Location Commands. Further, the MoI had not yet institutionalized a policy for captured weapons.

As a result, this could result in less than 100 percent accuracy in accountability of captured enemy weapons by serial number and possible misplacement, loss, or theft of weapons. Further, the objectives of the DoD SA/LW Serialization Program could not be achieved for captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons. In addition, weapons that fall into enemy hands may not be traceable to the responsible individual(s) if recovered.

**Applicable Criteria**

Although captured weapons accountability and control at Taji NAD and KMTB Location Command are Iraqi responsibilities, MNSTC-I advisors and trainers were involved in the process. As such, certain U.S. policies and procedures, adjusted to meet Iraqi needs and desires, may serve as a basis for the MNSTC-I efforts in these areas.

U.S. Government and DoD policies and procedures that apply to the accountability, control, and physical security of property and AA&E are outlined below.

\(^{13}\) Otherwise obtained weapons include confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons in addition to captured weapons.


DoD 5100.76-M, “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” August 12, 2000, prescribes minimum standards and criteria for the physical security of DoD sensitive conventional AA&E, including non-nuclear missiles and rockets.

DoD 5200.08-R, “Physical Security Program,” April 9, 2007, implements DoD policies and minimum standards for the physical protection of DoD personnel, installations, operations, and related resources; to include the security of weapons systems and platforms.


- DoD Components responsibility for inventory management of SA/LW and other activities involved in the shipment, registration, or receipt of SA/LW and provides procedures for reporting SA/LW serial number data between the DoD Components and the DoD SA/LW Registry
- Procedures concerning accountability of captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons

Multi-National Corps-Iraq FRAGO 085 to Multi-National Corps-Iraq Operation Order 08-01, “Processing and Reutilization of Captured Enemy Weapons,” January 24, 2008. This document enacted revised policy
and procedures for receipt, processing, reporting, accounting, and distribution of captured enemy weapons by Coalition forces to elements of ISF. This document was classified.


Memorandum, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, “Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Logistics Accountability Standard Operating Procedures,” April 26, 2008. This memorandum provided mandatory direction to all MNSTC-I personnel for the maintenance of materiel accountability through the process of acquisition, receipt, storage, and distribution up to and including the point of issue to the Government of Iraq. It also provided a basis for MNSTC-I trainers and mentors to advise and assist their Iraqi counterparts on the accountability of arms, ammunition, and other supplies.

Memorandum, Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Implementation of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Logistics Accountability Standard Operating Procedures,” June 5, 2008. This memorandum directed the implementation of the MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability Standard Operating Procedures and that it be issued to all MNC-I elements to ensure consistent accountability standards across the supply chain in Iraq. The issuance of the MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability Standard Operating Procedures provided a basis for MNC-I trainers working with ISF units to train and advise their Iraqi counterparts on the accountability of arms, ammunition, and other supplies.

Visibility over Captured and Otherwise Obtained Weapons
DoD 4000.25-M, Volume 2, Chapter 18, provides five objectives for SA/LW serial number registration and reporting; the key objective being to establish continuous visibility over all SA/LW by serial number from the contractor to depot; in storage; in transit to requisitioners; in post, camp, and station custody; in the hands of users; during turn-ins; in renovation; and during disposal and demilitarization.

DoD 4000.25-M, Volume 2, Chapter 18, also addresses captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons.

- Paragraph C18.2.9. requires that captured, confiscated, or abandoned enemy SA/LW in the possession of DoD as a result of military actions shall be registered. The SA/LW may be of foreign or domestic manufacture and may include recaptured U.S. military SA/LW.
- Paragraph C18.2.7. requires that the DoD Components shall establish procedures to ensure reporting of lost, stolen, unaccounted for, and/or recovered SA/LW under the provisions of DoD 5100.76-M.
• Paragraph C18.7.3. requires that SA/LW recovered by law enforcement agencies or foreign countries and returned to the custody of a DoD Component be registered on the DoD Component Registry (DoD Component Registry information is provided to the DoD SA/LW Registry).

• Paragraph C18.5.1.2. DoD SA/LW Registry shall provide a central repository of SA/LW’ serial numbers from the DoD Component Registries, to include those on-hand, in-transit, lost, stolen, demilitarized, or shipped outside the control of DoD.

• Paragraph C18.5.2.10.2. requires that all new weapons or devices that could be construed as weapons be reported to the Joint SA/LW Coordinating Group chairperson.

Clearly defined procedures need to be established and enforced to maintain adequate visibility for the accountability, control, physical security, and final disposition of captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons held by U.S. forces or the ISF. The make, model, and serial numbers of these weapons should be recorded and reported to the DoD SA/LW Registry.

An unbroken chain of custody to account for, control, and maintain physical security of captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons held by U.S. forces or the ISF needs to be established to govern the process of handling these weapons until final disposition, whether that be destruction, storage, or reissue to ISF.

Further, a chain of custody by serial number would enable U.S. Forces and Government of Iraq law enforcement agencies to obtain serial numbers for weapons found to be misplaced, lost, or stolen to identify the last accountable entity for those weapons. This information would provide a starting point for investigative officials to trace weapons and determine the cause of the loss.

Processing Captured and Otherwise Obtained Weapons

Iraq Ministry of Defense Memorandum #8578121, “Captured Weapon Recommendations,” April 22, 2008, provided preliminary guidance to Iraqi military organizations on accountability, control and processing of captured weapons. The MoI, however, has not yet institutionalized a policy for captured weapons.

The MoD captured weapons policy at Iraqi Army depots and Location Commands has not been fully implemented. Thousands of captured weapons were in storage at Taji NAD and the KMTB Location Command. These weapons had not had their serial numbers recorded and had not been inspected for serviceability and placement into the Iraqi military weapons inventory. MNSTC-I estimated that there may have been as many as 80,000 captured weapons stored at various depot locations throughout Iraq.15 Current planning calls for captured enemy weapons turned into the Location Commands were to be inventoried and transported to Taji NAD for disposition.

MNSTC-I and Iraqi military personnel at Taji NAD were initially uncertain how they would handle those captured weapons that were eventually found to be unserviceable or of no military value. There was no procedure in place to destroy or demilitarize any captured weapons considered to be unserviceable or otherwise inappropriate for military use.

MNSTC-I noted that U.S. and Iraqi manpower constraints and competing priorities had delayed the inventory and inspection of captured weapons at Taji NAD and the KMTB Location Command.

However, with the assistance of five Department of the Army civilian inspectors from Anniston Army Depot and five soldiers with the Military Occupation Specialty 45B (Small Arms Repairer) from 1st Sustainment Brigade, MNSTC-I had recently begun the inventory and inspection of Captured Enemy Weapons (CEW) at Taji National Depot. As of the date of our visit, 19,989 CEW had been processed. MNSTC-I planned to ship CEW from the Location Commands, including KMTB, to Taji for processing.

MNSTC-I was working closely with the Defense Logistics Agency and MoD to establish a demilitarization capability to support the captured weapons work. Initial plans called for training and equipping a demilitarization capability within the Taji National Maintenance Depot Small Arms Shop. Captured weapons categorized as authorized and repairable will be passed to the Small Arms Shop and, once repaired, placed into the Class V (weapons and ammunition) system at Taji NAD.

Captured weapons not authorized or repairable or of no military value were to be destroyed. This ongoing effort was recently documented in MNSTC-I FRAGO 08-028 [Captured Enemy Weapons 4th Line Processing at Taji National Depot], SUBJECT: Inspection, Repair, and Demilitarization of Captured Enemy Weapons (CEW) at Taji National Depot (TND), 041500C Aug 08. For example, MNSTC-I has identified an existing engineering company in Baghdad with the capability of destroying unserviceable or otherwise unusable CEW.

The relatively slow progress in implementing the MoD captured weapons policy and the lack of any MoI policy could result in less than 100 percent accuracy in accountability of captured enemy weapons by serial number and possible misplacement, loss, or theft of the weapons, with an attendant risk to Coalition and ISF personnel. Further, the objectives of the DoD SA/LW Serialization Program could not be achieved for captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons. In addition, weapons that fall into enemy hands may not be traceable to the responsible individual(s), if recovered.
Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

2.a. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense to implement its captured weapons policy and complete the serial number inventory and inspection of captured enemy weapons stored at Taji National Army Depot and Iraqi Army Location Commands as soon as possible.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander stated that his command had coordinated captured enemy weapons procedures with MNC-I and that the approved CEW process had been documented in MNC-I FRAGO 08-540 and MNSTC-I FRAGO 08-028. He reported that MNSTC-I had processed over 17,000 captured weapons from the backlog at Taji.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive. The comments do not mention the completion status of the serial number inventory at Taji, nor do they address the status of any inventory of captured weapons that may be found at other Iraqi Location Commands. The MNSTC-I response does not speak to the status of implementation of the captured weapons policy within the Iraqi MoD. We request that Commander, MNSTC-I provide this information in reply to the final report.

2.b. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq with assistance from the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, advise and assist the Ministry of Defense to establish a demilitarization capability as part of the Taji National Maintenance Depot Small Arms Shop.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander stated that captured weapons determined to be potentially repairable are held for transfer to the Taji National Maintenance Depot for repair. Once repaired these weapons are returned to the Class V warehouses at the Supply depot for subsequent reissue. Weapons not authorized, not included on the ISF Inventory, or determined as beyond repair are segregated and stored in a secure location pending demilitarization. He stated that MNSTC-I J4 had worked an agreement for demilitarization of the backlog of captured enemy weapons with the Iraqi Mine and Clearance Organization.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive. We agree that formal processes have been established for the demilitarization of captured enemy weapons; however, it is unclear if the arrangement with the Iraqi Mine and Clearance Organization is a temporary one to accommodate the disposal of the existing backlog of excess
captured weapons, or if it permanently establishes a demilitarization process at Taji. We request that Commander, MNSTC-I provide this information in reply to the final report.

2.c. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq ensure that the serial numbers resulting from the inventory of captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons at Taji National Army Depot and Iraqi Army Location Commands are recorded in the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq weapons serial number database and are subsequently forwarded to the Army Material Command, Logistics Support Activity for inclusion in the DoD Small Arms and Light Weapons Serialization Program database.

**Client Comments**
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander stated that serial numbers were recorded and entered into a CEW database maintained by MNSTC-I J4 for those captured weapons inventoried at Taji National Army Depot. He stated that the serial numbers will be forwarded to the Army Material Command, Logistics Support Activity for inclusion in the DoD Small Arms and Light Weapons Serialization Program database.

**Our Response**
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

2.d. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to complete and issue formal policy for captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons.

**Client Comments**
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander, MNSTC-I stated that MNSTC-I J4 had demilitarization responsibility for captured weapons until December 31, 2008, after which demilitarization for captured weapons would become the responsibility of the GoI. He agreed that MNSTC-I would advise the Iraqis on setting up their demilitarization process should they choose to pursue that program.

**Our Response**
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive. We understand from the comments that implementation of a demilitarization process for the MoI after December 31, 2008, will be a sovereign decision of the GoI and that MNSTC-I will assist in establishing that process only if requested. No additional comments are required.
Part III – Foreign Military Sales

Introduction
A well-established Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program enables the United States to advance its strategic goals by developing and maintaining close political and military ties with other countries and, therefore, supports key U.S. national security interests abroad.

In Iraq, prior to 2007, funding for Iraq Security Forces (ISF) equipment and training was provided primarily through the United States Government-appropriated Iraq Security Forces Fund. As the Government of Iraq (GoI) began to use its national funds for self-support, the U.S. FMS program formed the centerpiece for GoI purchases of military equipment and training for ISF. However, the GoI’s intention to diversify its international sources of supply and competition from other supplier countries also will play a part in Iraq’s procurement decision process, as will Iraqi views with respect to the responsiveness and quality of U.S. FMS program support.

Under any scenario, FMS shipments to Iraq are expected to increase significantly over the next few years as Iraqi purchases already made or anticipated surge through the system. Responsive U.S. support, beyond the peacetime standard, is essential to assure the GoI of the value of reliance on the FMS program for much of their equipment for the ISF.

In January 2008 the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) pointed out that Iraq’s most significant problem remained equipping and sustaining the ISF. To address that issue, which has significant implications for achieving U.S. goals and objectives with respect to Iraq, the FMS program has made marked progress in the past year but it must continue to mature and demonstrate that it can meet ISF requirements for force generation, replacement of combat losses and force modernization.

Recent Accomplishments in Iraqi FMS Program

Iraqi Government Involvement
MoD and MoI officials are becoming more engaged in requirements development, and generally taking a more mature approach to executing their FMS roles. The MoD, for example, has identified its FMS equipment requirements for 2008 and is working on future requirements.

Security Assistance Office
A Security Assistance Office (SAO) General Officer billet at Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) has been established to provide the requisite program leadership.
SAO manning has increased approximately three-fold since our initial Munitions Assessment Team visit in Fall 2007, adding needed resources to address its rising workload.

**Security Assistance Officers and Liaison Officers**

MNSTC-I SAO liaisons have been strategically placed at most ports of entry and warehouse locations throughout the country, thereby increasing visibility and oversight of the FMS process. At the time of our visit, the Port of Umm Qasr was the only location that did not have SAO personnel assigned.
Observation 3. End-Use Monitoring Compliance Plan

Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and MNSTC-I had not developed and implemented a compliance plan in coordination with the GoI to implement the requirement for FMS End-Use Monitoring (EUM) of sensitive equipment items supplied to ISF.

This occurred because of a lack of emphasis by MNF-I and MNSTC-I and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on EUM requirements, as well as weak internal management controls on FMS equipment accountability.

As a result, the lack of an EUM compliance plan prevented the assurance that the security control and accountability of U.S.-origin sensitive items being supplied to the ISF under FMS were handled in accordance with Congressional, DoD, and Department of State policies.

Applicable Criteria

DoD 5105.38-M. DoD 5105.38-M, “Security Assistance Management Manual,” October 3, 2003, provides guidance for the administration and implementation of security assistance and related activities in compliance with the directives. Chapter 8 on EUM legal and policy requirements is important to command responsibilities.

Foreign Assistance Act. The Foreign Assistance Act, section 505(f), provides guidance on technology transfers and sensitive item procurement.

Government of Iraq Section 505 Assurance Letter, dated August 14, 2004. GoI agreement to provide the same level of security and accountability as the U.S. and to permit the U.S. Government to observe and review items sold under the security assistance program.

Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-041 – Registration and Monitoring of Defense Articles and Services Provided to Iraq.

“Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-041 – Registration and Monitoring of Defense Articles and Services Provided to Iraq,” September 25, 2008, establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and sets forth procedures to certify the establishment of a registration and monitoring system for controlling the export and transfer of defense articles to the GoI and/or other groups, organizations, citizens, or residents of Iraq. It also designates DSCA as the lead agent responsible for developing, implementing, and enforcing the registration and monitoring policy pursuant to section 1228, Public Law 110-181, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008,” January 28, 2008. The DTM was effective September 25, 2008, and was to be converted to a new DoD Instruction within 180 days of the issue date.
End-Use Monitoring Compliance Plan

The Arms Export Control Act, section 40A, states that a EUM Compliance Plan provides “reasonable assurances that the recipient is complying with the requirements imposed by the U.S. Government with respect to the use, transfer, and security of defense articles and monitoring of U.S. arms transfers, and security of defense articles and services.”

The Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs has signed a Section 505 assurance letter that Iraq will accept the legal and policy standards required by the Security Assistance Management Manual, a commitment that is also stated in FMS Letters of Offer and Acceptance. Iraq has previously received weapons technology from the U.S. and has agreed to a variety of controls stated in U.S. law and policy. Among those is the EUM compliance plan, which represents the foundation of the EUM program. These requirements were included in Chapters 5 and 8 of the Security Assistance Management Manual and in the documents authorizing transfer.

MNSTC-I End-Use Monitoring Initiatives

In August 2008, the MNSTC-I SAO reported that, with the assistance of DSCA personnel and Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) trainers, it had developed and planned to implement a EUM Compliance Plan and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and had incorporated those documents into the MNSTC-I J4 accountability SOP. The MNSTC-I SAO also reported that it was endeavoring to “assist the Iraqis to understand EUM accountability requirements including a suitable inventory system for monitoring sensitive items.”

Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

Revised Recommendations. As a result of our assessment of client comments, we revised Recommendations 3.a. and 3.b. to clarify that MNSTC-I is the organization assigned primary responsibility for accomplishing the actions associated with these recommendations.

3.a. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, in coordination with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, develop an End-Use Monitoring compliance plan in coordination with the Government of Iraq.

Client Comments

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander, MNSTC-I stated that the “Iraq Golden Sentry End-Use-Monitoring (EUM) Standard Operating Procedure” was signed September 12, 2008, and describes the responsibilities, points of contacts, required procedures, inspection requirements, documentation, and visit procedures for the EUM program. He also stated that MNSTC-I had developed and updated Memorandums of Agreement for Night Vision Devices (NVDs) with the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Bureau, MoD, and MoI detailing the requirements and procedures for the Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of NVDs purchased, delivered, or controlled by the ISF.
Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

3.b. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, in coordination with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, assist and train the Government of Iraq in understanding the importance, security issues, and legal implications of End-Use Monitoring requirements.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander reported that MNSTC-I had worked to identify and meet the ISF EUM program managers from the Iraqi bureaus and ministries receiving NVDs and train them in the management and execution of NVD accountability and safeguard procedures and requirements for their respective organizations.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.
Observation 4. Accountability of Night Vision Devices at Taji National Depot

Serial numbers copied from 690 NVDs stored at Taji National Depot by the Iraqi Army could not be reconciled to the serial numbers on related inventory lists provided. Furthermore, the inventory data provided did not specify stock or warehouse locations where the NVD’s were being stored, or show FMS case identifier numbers that would allow a particular NVD to be located.

This occurred because of a lack of compliance with DoD regulations and congressionally-mandated EUM procedures, a sustained focus on EUM within MNSTC-I and DSCA, and an executed EUM compliance and implementation plan.

As a result, there was a lack of accountability controls for NVDs.

Applicable Criteria

Title 40 U.S.C., section 524. Title 40 U.S.C., section 524, states:

- Required. Each executive agency shall –
  1. maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under its control

DoD Instruction 5000.64. DoD Instruction 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006:

- Provides policy and procedures for DoD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C., section 524.
- Requires that accountable property records shall be established for all property purchased, or otherwise obtained, that are sensitive as defined in DoD 4100.39-M, “Federal Logistics Information System,” Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007.

DoD 4100.39-M. DoD 4100.39-M, “Federal Logistics Information System,” Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007, states that sensitive items are materiel that require a high degree of protection and control due to statutory requirements or regulations. It defines sensitive items as items of high value, highly technical or of a hazardous nature, and small arms, ammunition, explosives, and demolition material.

Foreign Assistance Act, Section 505 (f). Requirements for technology transfers in sensitive situations.

GoI agreement to provide the same level of security and accountability as the U.S. and to permit the U.S. Government to observe and review items sold under the security assistance program.


Night Vision Device Inventory Sample Results
We conducted a joint spot inventory of NVDs in Warehouse 1C14 at the Taji National Depot.

We obtained a list of NVD serial numbers from MNSTC-I in handwritten and Excel spreadsheet format. No comparable Iraqi inventory data was provided. From those printouts, we were able to spot locate individual NVDs by serial number for three separate shipment orders: 18330, 18374, and 18740. The data provided did not contain a field indicating the storage location of a particular NVD by pallet, building, or other location, nor did it provide an FMS case identifier or similar data. In addition, there was no data element which tied a serial number to a specific FMS case delivery. Therefore, we could not determine with certainty whether this was an FMS shipment, an ISFF shipment, or whether the NVDs had been transferred by another U.S. supply mechanism.

We then opened boxes contained in two separate storage containers and tried to reconcile the listed items with handwritten inventory lists, with no success. Further, we copied serial numbers from a group of 690 NVDs and upon returning to our location could not match those numbers to the inventory lists we were provided.

MNSTC-I Night Vision Device Assessment Team
In response to our briefing to the Commanding General, MNF-I on July 21, 2008, MNSTC-I ordered an AR 15-6 investigation into the accountability and control of NVDs provided to the ISF.

The assessment included:

- Cataloging procedures existing at the time of NVD transfer, including those for transfer and accountability, and documentation of same.
- Determining whether proper identification and lost or unaccounted for reporting occurred and the cause for such loss and/or unaccountability of NVDs.
- Identifying lost NVDs from existing data and interviews.
- Determining how NVDs were lost or how the accountability loss occurred.
• Corrective actions implemented or required for future loss prevention and accountability.

The investigation revealed there had been a lack of documented NVD accountability, according to the MNSTC-I assessment team’s initial report. Documentation revealed that of the 40,058 NVDs that had been identified as issued to the ISF, more than 26,000 lacked supporting transfer documentation detailing transfer date, serial number, and receiving Iraqi official, among other information.

The MNSTC-I internal review was continuing at the conclusion of our fieldwork.

**Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense, Assessment D2008-D00SPO-0271.000**

On August 19, 2008, the Office of Inspector General announced an “Assessment of the Accountability of Night Vision Devices Provided to the Security Forces of Iraq.” This work began immediately. Specifically, the DoD IG assessment was to determine whether the accountability, control, and physical security over the distribution of NVDs provided to the ISF was adequate. The assessment included the areas of contracting and procurement, transportation and storage, U.S. issuance procedures to the ISF, and oversight support subsequently provided by the ISF.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

4.a. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq reconcile night vision devices discrepancies at Taji National Depot between inventory data and stocks on-hand consistent with End-Use Monitoring requirements.

**Client Comments**

MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander, MNSTC-I stated that action on this recommendation was complete.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive. While MNSTC-I concurred with the recommendation, its comments failed to describe actions taken to accomplish the recommendations and show the completion dates of those actions. We request that Commander, MNSTC-I provide this information in reply to the final report.

4.b. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq mentor Iraq Security Forces personnel to develop a suitable system for accountability of night vision devices in accordance with signed agreements and the Foreign Assistance Act section 505.
**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander, MNSTC-I responded that the MoD had nominated the Director of Property under the Director General for Central Auditing as the accounting manager for NVD End-Use Monitoring, in accordance with FAA section 505. He additionally stated that procedures were being developed for IA Divisions to report their authorized and on-hand stocks of NVDs to the Joint Headquarters’ Combined Logistics Operations Center.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive. While the comments described positive actions to address NVD End-Use Monitoring within the MoD, MNSTC-I did not discuss actions to institutionalize a suitable accountability system for MoI or any other Iraqi agency to which NVDs have been or will be issued. We request that Commander, MNSTC-I report actions accomplished in this regard in reply to the final report.

Comprehensive Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) with site-specific guidance were ordinarily unavailable for SAO personnel at the Iraqi supply points we visited that handled FMS shipments.

This occurred because MNSTC-I did not ensure that SOPs were fully developed and promulgated for SAO personnel assigned to site-specific security assistance operations.

As a result, there was inconsistent performance in the reception, storage, and forward movement of FMS equipment. Further, institutional knowledge of procedures and continuity of processes were not retained for use by SAO personnel assigned to Iraqi supply points at future dates.

Applicable Criteria


Standard Operating Procedures

A SOP is a useful tool for several reasons:

- SOPs provide institutional knowledge of procedures, continuity of processes, and instructions on the performance of routine or repetitive activity.
- SOPs can be used to facilitate the training of new personnel.
- SOPs are part of a quality assurance system facilitating consistent quality integrity for a product or desired end-result in both work performance and as evidence of compliance with prescribed policies and requirements.

Without such SOPs for specific Iraqi supply points, no guidelines were available to:

- establish quality assurance procedures for SAO personnel and ensure that there is a quality assurance audit trail specific to Iraq
- govern current operations
- provide written processes and procedures for incoming staff that reflect the continuity of operations and experiences gained
• document event-specific activities for the MNSTC-I SAO personnel associated with handling FMS materiel at various supply points located throughout Iraq

Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

Revised Recommendation. As a result of our assessment of client comments, we revised Recommendation 5 to clarify that MNSTC-I is the organization assigned primary responsibility for accomplishing the actions associated with this recommendation.

5. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq ensure that Standard Operating Procedures are developed for Security Assistance Office personnel assigned to site specific security assistance operations.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander reported that MNSTC-I had developed and resourced a Logistics, Movement and Accountability cell in July 2008 to develop SOPs by November 2008.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive. We request that MNSTC-I provide us with a copy of the SOPs when they are completed.

The MNSTC-I SAO was generally staffed with personnel who did not possess the requisite security assistance program training and experience necessary to accomplish its important strategic role of providing FMS support for training and equipping ISF. Only 13 of the 39 personnel assigned to the MNSTC-I SAO arrived in-country possessing in-residence DISAM security assistance training while only 5 arrived in-country with prior security assistance experience.

In addition, there were a significant number of personnel assigned to the MNSTC-I SAO with tours of duty of less than 12 months, which further hampered the ability of the command to ensure it had sufficiently experienced personnel for quality execution of its security assistance program.

This occurred because organizations with responsibilities to manage, support, and provide oversight to the security assistance mission in Iraq had not sufficiently addressed problems concerning adequate training, experience, and rotation policies.

As a result, the ability of MNSTC-I SAO to responsively and effectively accomplish its security assistance mission in Iraq may have been impaired.

Applicable Criteria

Members of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent possible, timely and effective individual, collective, unit, and staff training necessary to perform to standard during operations…

The DoD Components shall ensure their individuals and organizations are trained to meet the specific operational requirements of the supported Combatant Commanders, as identified in Combatant Commander-approved Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs), before deploying for operations and while deployed.


Security Assistance Training and Experience

The MNSTC-I SAO was generally staffed with personnel who did not possess the requisite security assistance program training and experience necessary to accomplish its important strategic role of providing FMS support for training and equipping ISF. Specifically, only 13 of the 39 personnel assigned to the MNSTC-I SAO arrived in-country possessing in-residence DISAM security assistance training while only 5 arrived in-country with prior security assistance experience.

DoDD 2055.3, paragraph 4.3.3.2.3 states, “SAO and DAO personnel assigned security assistance program management functions shall attend the Security Assistance Management Overseas course at DISAM. Attendance at the DISAM course is mandatory, unless the course has been completed satisfactorily within the last 5 years.” However, according to documents furnished by MNSTC-I, 26 of 39 SAO personnel had not received in-residence DISAM training before being assigned to MNSTC-I.

Of the 26 personnel that had not received in-residence DISAM training before being assigned to MNSTC-I, 14 (one individual assigned to MNSTC-I had received both in-residence DISAM and in-country security assistance training) received security assistance training in Iraq while assigned to MNSTC-I, but this reduced effective mission time. While finding experienced security assistance personnel may be difficult, pre-deployment training at the DISAM course is achievable, necessary, and required by DoD.

In addition, effective program management dictates that the security assistance mission be accomplished according to the prescribed laws, regulations, and procedures found in Congressional, Department of State, and DoD legal and policy guidelines. The lack of trained and experienced personnel necessary to perform the many legal, policy, and procedural tasks required only further hampers the accomplishment of the security assistance mission.

Rotation Policies

There were a significant number of personnel assigned to the MNSTC-I SAO with tours of duty of less than 12 months, which further hampered the ability of the command to ensure it had sufficiently experienced personnel for quality execution of its security assistance program.

Short personnel tours of duty and different rotation policies among the military services hinder MNSTC-I SAO program execution and do not provide adequate stability or continuity for the security assistance program in Iraq. The MNSTC-I SAO requires personnel with length of tours sufficient to build the institutional knowledge and experience needed to become effective FMS case managers and to develop effective relationships with ISF personnel.

At the time of the assessment team’s visit in April - May 2008, 19 of 39 personnel assigned to the SAO were on tours of duty of less than 12 months. Thus, many SAO personnel with only 6-month assignments were scheduled to rotate home just when they were becoming effective in their positions and had begun to establish effective working
relationships with ISF personnel. In our opinion, untrained personnel assigned to the SAO need at a minimum four to six months of work in Iraq to gain sufficient in-country experience to become effective FMS case managers.

The U. S. Army Security Assistance Command uses a new rotation policy for Army security assistance personnel, which it believes enhances the effectiveness of its personnel in contingency operations, such as Iraq.

U. S. Army Security Assistance Command personnel deploy for 6 months to Iraq, gain experience working there, and return to work supporting the Iraq program in the U.S.-based U.S. Army Security Assistance Command office. Following a 6-month U.S. rotation tour, those personnel return to the SAO in Iraq. This rotation policy provides continuity to U. S. Army Security Assistance Command efforts to support security assistance in Iraq and results in stronger internal controls. The use of this personnel policy helps develop a base of experienced SAO personnel that understand the Iraq program and can effectively address issues in-country.

The U. S. Army Security Assistance Command rotation policy provides one solution to the rotation problem, as would requiring all SAO personnel to serve one year tours of duty.

DoDD 2055.3, paragraph 5.1.6 has established a mechanism to coordinate tour lengths for SAO personnel by giving the Director, DSCA, the authority to “coordinate on overseas tour length policies that affect security assistance personnel.” This would ensure that personnel are assigned long enough to successfully perform their functions. This longevity would allow the SAO office to develop effective and constructive security assistance relationships with ISF personnel built on familiarity, trust and competence. The importance of the MNSTC-I SAO mission’s ability to effectively implement the FMS program in support of standing-up ISF merits resolving tour length issues.

Recent Improvements in the Iraq Security Assistance Office
Manning

A General Officer billet has been established at the MNSTC-I SAO to provide the requisite program leadership. The General Officer appointed as Director, MNSTC-I SAO, was proactively pursuing FMS issues with key officials from the Ministries of Defense and Interior, as well as conducting site visits throughout the theater of operations to determine the effectiveness of the security assistance program in Iraq.

SAO manning has increased approximately three-fold since the first DOD IG Munitions Assessment Team visit in September of 2007, adding much needed personnel to help execute the current workload. Further, at the request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics was in the process of placing eight acquisition professionals with security assistance backgrounds in 1-year tours with the SAO to enhance MNSTC-I security assistance capability.
Conclusion
The shortage of personnel with the requisite security assistance program training and experience were factors that limited MNSTC-I SAO responsiveness and effectiveness and impaired the accomplishment of the security assistance mission in Iraq. Short tours of duty, combined with the assignment of personnel who did not have prior security assistance training and experience, hindered program success.

Taken together, these personnel weaknesses did not support effective development of the necessary SAO program stability, continuity, and expertise. The strategic importance to U.S. interests of implementing the FMS program in Iraq in support of standing-up ISF as rapidly as possible merits providing the SAO office with an adequate number of personnel that have the requisite program training, experience, and length of tours. This would likely improve responsiveness and effectiveness in accomplishing the security assistance mission.

Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

Revised, Deleted, or Renumbered Recommendations. As a result of our assessment of client comments, we combined Recommendations 6.a. and 6.c. into 6.a., deleted 6.c. and 6.d., and consolidated the client’s comments to 6.a. and 6.c. under 6.a. In addition, we revised Recommendation 6.b. and redirected it to MNSTC-I.

6.a. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency; the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, ensure that personnel assigned to security assistance positions designated in the Joint Manning Document for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Security Assistance Office have received adequate security assistance training and achieved requisite experience levels before deployment. At a minimum, personnel assigned should attend the resident Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Overseas course.

Client Comments
Commander, USCENTCOM concurred. The Commander, USCENTCOM stated that since the development of the MNSTC-I JMD (includes the SAO billets), USCENTCOM has worked with the Joint Staff and Services to expedite sourcing and filling of the SAO billets. The MNSTC-I SAO billets have been coded, making DISAM training a requirement. In addition, to emphasize this point, in July 2008 USCENTCOM requested assistance from the Joint Staff to ensure that the Services identified personnel well in advance so that DISAM training can be scheduled and conducted prior to their arrival in Iraq.
Originally, personnel filling the new SAO JMD positions were on 120-day TDY rotations until the Services could begin sourcing and filling the SAO billets. USCENTCOM reported that position fills have approached steady-state so that personnel from the Services were arriving for 12-month tours and attendance at DISAM had become more consistent. It was also noted that personnel with SAO/FMS experience are a very low density skill set that is spread across many specialties in all the Services with no systematic means to track and manage. The vast majority, perhaps 90 percent or more, of the personnel in other USCENTCOM SAO shops lacked prior FMS experience.

**Our Response**
Commander, USCENTCOM, comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

6.b. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, take the necessary action to revise its Joint Manning Document to establish a minimum of 1-year tour lengths for security assistance personnel assigned to the Security Assistance Office in Iraq or establish an alternate rotation policy (discussed in this observation) similar to that developed by the United States Army Security Assistance Command for Army security assistance personnel.

**Client Comments**
The original recommendation was directed to the Director of DSCA. The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Global Security Affairs (ASD(GSA)), responding for the Director, DSCA, concurred with comment. The Assistant Secretary stated that the operational commander must have the personnel and resources necessary to perform the security assistance mission in Iraq. The Assistant Secretary reported that the Director, DSCA, would continue to work with the Joint Staff and other appropriate organizations who set tour lengths and establish training requirements for personnel assigned to MNSTC-I. The Assistant Secretary stated, however, that the Director, DSCA, did not have the authority to establish tour lengths for SAOs.

**Our Response**
The Assistant Secretary’s comments were responsive. We agree that the length of tours for SAO personnel in Iraq is a matter for the commander, in this case, MNSTC-I. As a result, we revised Recommendation 6.b., redirecting it to MNSTC-I. We request that Commander, MNSTC-I provide comments in response to the final report.
Observation 7. Foreign Military Sales – Performance

FMS standard processing time standards for FMS cases used to equip ISF were inadequate for wartime contingency operations in Iraq and were not meeting the train and equip requirements of MNSTC-I and ISF.

This occurred because the 120-day case processing time standard\textsuperscript{16} has not been adjusted for wartime operations in Iraq.

As a result, MNSTC-I was hindered in efficiently and effectively achieving its mission to train and equip ISF in support of U.S. goals and objectives in Iraq.

Applicable Criteria

\[\text{...[T]he maximum processing time between Implementing Agency receipt of the Letter of Request and release of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance should normally be no more than 120 days, with no adjustments for hold times, additional work needed to clarify requirements, or any other consideration. Although delays may occur while processing some LOAs [Letter of Offer and Acceptance], Implementing Agencies should process at least 80 percent of their total number of LOAs within 120 days.}\]

U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Iraq

The FMS program has historically functioned primarily as a peacetime security assistance program. However, the United States is using a FMS program as the principal means to equip, expand, and modernize ISF during wartime conditions. Building a responsive and proactive FMS program that is successful in this wartime environment will greatly enhance and expedite the ability of ISF to be fully combat ready in a timely manner. To be successful in executing this strategic decision, a FMS program needs to be fully supportive of the wartime equipping requirements of MNSTC-I and ISF.

Further, a well-established FMS program enables the United States to further develop and maintain close bilateral political and interoperable military ties with Iraq and, therefore, supports key U.S. national security interests and also facilitates the reduction of U.S. military forces.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{16} According to briefing charts provided by the Iraq FMS Task Force, Update of Actions dated November 7, 2007, the 120-day processing time standard is from receipt of the Letter of Request by the security assistance community to the release of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance to the recipient nation for signature.}\]
FMS shipments to Iraq will sharply increase over the next few years as the GoI expands its projected FMS purchases from the United States. Responsive support beyond the norm is essential for rapid ISF force generation, replacement of combat losses, and force modernization.

**Security Assistance Management Manual Standard Case Processing Timeframes**

The standard processing time for FMS cases used to equip ISF were inadequate for wartime contingency operations in Iraq and were not meeting the train and equip requirements of MNSTC-I and ISF.

The standard FMS case processing time was 120 days, as established in the Security Assistance Management Manual, from receipt of the Letter of Request by U.S. security assistance officials to the release of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance by DSCA. This standard was developed by DSCA and was applied to customers worldwide regardless of whether that customer was at peace or war. However, the standard 120-day case processing time was not adjusted for wartime operations in Iraq and was not meeting the train and equip requirements of MNSTC-I and ISF. As a result, MNSTC-I was hindered in efficiently and effectively achieving its mission to train and equip ISF in support of U.S. goals and objectives in Iraq.

At the time of this assessment, the FMS program had not yet demonstrated that it could responsively meet MNSTC-I and ISF wartime equipping requirements. Establishing a reduced standard case processing time for wartime operations would help MNSTC-I to achieve its train and equip mission more efficiently and effectively and improve the level of service. We believe that the strategic importance to the United States of standing-up ISF merits establishing a reduced standard FMS case processing time for the wartime conditions it faces in Iraq.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

**Revised Recommendation.** As a result of our assessment of client comments, we revised Recommendation 7.a. to clarify that security assistance policy be incorporated into DoD 5105.38-M, “Security Assistance Management Manual,” October 3, 2003, to establish a process for developing case-by-case standard FMS case processing times based on wartime and contingency operations. The process would be used to develop case processing times for a country or regional scenario as conditions dictated. We also

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17 According to the “FMS Customer Financial Management Handbook (Billing),” the term used to identify a request from an eligible FMS participant country for the purchase of U.S. defense articles and services.

18 According to the DoD Financial Management Regulation Volume 15, Definitions, April 2002, the Letter of Offer and Acceptance is the authorized document for use by the U.S. Government to offer to sell defense articles and defense services to a foreign country or international organization and notes that a signature by the purchaser represents acceptance of the offer.
revised the recommendation to specifically develop a standard FMS case processing time for Iraq based on wartime and contingency operations conditions.

7.a. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Commander, U.S. Central Command incorporate a security assistance policy into DoD 5105.38-M, “Security Assistance Management Manual,” October 3, 2003, to establish a process for developing country or regional case-by-case standard processing times dictated by wartime and contingency operations conditions. In addition, establish expedited standard processing times for Iraq dictated by the wartime and contingency operations conditions.

Client Comments

The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Global Security Affairs, concurred with comment. The Assistant Secretary agreed, in principle, that FMS case processing for wartime and contingency operations should be expedited. Unfortunately, each operation draws from different funding sources, is granted different authorities, and cannot be a “one size fits all” solution. In general, accelerated case processing beyond the standard processing time identified in DoD 5105.38-M requires funding to provide those additional services. DSCA maintains an average of 33 days processing time for FMS case development in support of operations in Iraq, which is significantly faster than the standard average processing time. DSCA has worked with MNSTC-I, GoI, USCENTCOM, and the Implementing Agencies to establish a case processing standard for Iraq.

Our Response

The Assistant Secretary’s comments were partially responsive. We commend DSCA, as noted in the client’s comments, on achieving an average of 33 days processing time for FMS case development in support of operations in Iraq. However, without an established expedited standard processing time for Iraq dictated by the wartime and contingency operations conditions, it cannot be determined whether the 33 days processing time is satisfactory or needs improvement. Nevertheless, the client comments indicated that DSCA is working to establish a case processing standard for Iraq. We request that the ASD(GSA) provide the completed case processing standard for Iraq in reply to the final report. In addition, we request that the ASD(GSA) provide comments to the revised recommendation as it concerns establishing a process for developing country or regional case-by-case standard processing times dictated by wartime and contingency operations conditions.

7.b. We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Commander, U.S. Central Command develop a comprehensive plan to provide the necessary personnel support and funding within the security assistance community to be able to process and implement Foreign Military Sales cases at the newly established wartime standard for Iraq.
Client Comments
The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Global Security Affairs, concurred with comment. The Assistant Secretary stated that DSCA, working with the Implementing Agencies, has requested information as to the necessary personnel requirements to meet accelerated case development and implementation for Iraq. The Implementing Agencies have already identified their required levels of personnel support to DSCA. DSCA has forwarded the manpower information to USCENTCOM, MNF-I, and MNSTC-I. Furthermore, DSCA has assisted in identifying funding sources legally available to fund the acceleration of case development and implementation, as well as additional defense services.

Our Response
The Assistant Secretary’s comments were partially responsive. It cannot be accurately determined whether the personnel requirements and funding sources data collected to date are useful or even needed until an expedited standard processing time is established for Iraq that is dictated by the wartime and contingency operations conditions, and that expedited standard processing time provides the goal on which required resources may be based and requested. We request that the ASD(GSA) provide the completed comprehensive plan with respect to personnel and funding requirements based on a wartime case processing standard for Iraq in reply to the final report.
Part IV – Logistics Sustainability

Introduction
The effort to help Iraq Security Forces (ISF) develop their logistics sustainment capability has faced numerous and formidable obstacles. Among these have been:

- Lack of formal codification of Iraqi logistics processes resulting in inconsistent understanding and enforcement of the processes throughout the ISF
- A non-responsive equipment and parts distribution system that limits growth of other logistics capacities
- Lack of consistent reconciliation practices leading to distribution weaknesses
- Commanders’ routine use of ad hoc procedures to expedite resupply
- Undeveloped and immature reporting processes
- Corruption concerns that force centralized control from the top
- High illiteracy rate that hinders development of logistics capabilities
- Dependence on a paper-driven supply system

While it has made some notable progress, the Coalition effort to develop the logistics capability of the ISF has progressed slowly. Previously, the focus of ISF capability development by the Coalition had been on generating the force – establishing the army and police forces – and the associated training capability needed to maintain those forces. The generation of logistics personnel and logistics capabilities had significantly lagged that of building the base of the army and police forces. In the recent past, when trained logistics personnel did report to combat units, they were often reassigned to infantry duties because manning the combat units was the priority emphasis. Given the U.S. willingness to provide key default logistics services when the ISF was incapable of doing so, dependence on the Coalition became a common approach to logistics support for the ISF.

In some areas, the ISF has gradually become more competent and self-sufficient. Requirements for Coalition logistics assistance during recent Iraqi-led operations indicated progress in mobilizing and delivering logistics support at a distance, but also highlighted ISF limitations in planning and conducting sustained expeditionary life support. Most significantly, however, there appears to have been a fundamental change in attitude toward the development of logistics sustainment capability for the ISF – both by the ISF and the Coalition.
Ministry of Defense and Iraqi Army Logistics

Growing Capacity
The Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) limited logistics and sustainment capacity has improved, but remains a key area for development. First and second line supply and maintenance at the organizational and division level existed throughout the Iraqi Army (IA) and continued to improve in capability and delivery of services. There was a shortfall, however, in third line supply and maintenance capability. The MoD still required significant Coalition assistance, especially in warehouse and depot operations. Plans were underway to transfer responsibility for ammunition and supply warehouse operations from the Coalition to Iraqi control. The transfer of responsibility for national supply and ammunition depots from the Coalition to Iraqi forces was to occur by the end of 2008 and maintenance depots by the end of 2009. By the end of 2008, the Iraqi Army capability for strategic transport was to have greatly improved with the donation of over 400 German vehicles, many intended for 4th line transportation.

Taji National Depot Complex
The development of Taji as a national supply and maintenance depot and logistics training base was moving forward. Construction of national-level maintenance and warehousing facilities at Taji were scheduled to come on line sequentially beginning in spring 2008, with the full set of depot capabilities completed by the summer of 2009. Once completed, the Taji National Maintenance and Supply Depots – coupled with base support units (Location Commands) and deployable logistics battalions – would provide the MoD with a nationwide operational supply and distribution system.

Location Commands
The MoD had decided to develop 13 fixed-site logistics base support units called Location Commands to support each Iraqi Army division. Eight such Location Commands already existed. All 13 Location Commands were targeted for full operational capability by the end of calendar year 2008. The Location Commands would be responsible for all 3rd Line maintenance and supply. The plan to locate divisional logistics battalions at support bases further emphasized the recruitment and training of specialized skills required to execute logistics operations.

Logistics Training
Logistics training has been conducted at either Regional or Divisional Training Centers (for basic specialty training), or at the Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute (IASSI) for intermediate logistics. While the IASSI facilities at Taji were adequate, they suffered from a shortage of qualified trainers and electrical power, which together have had negative impacts on training throughput. With some attention to these issues, IASSI could serve as a model national logistics training center to accommodate the growing needs of the Iraqi Army for expanded logistics capabilities.
Life Support Self Reliance

The MoD implemented a Life Support Self-Reliance (LSSR) program for military food preparation and services, effective December 1, 2007. MoD provided initial funding to Divisional Commanders to procure basic equipment and establish local food vendor support. The initiation of life support self-reliance was not without significant problems: quality and quantity of food was an issue; there were widespread reports of poor food preparation sanitation; living conditions for some soldiers was inadequate; and the system was vulnerable to corruption. MoD has formed committees to audit the funds used to pay for the food and services and to evaluate the quality of food and life support services provided to the soldiers. The standards of IA life support would not have been acceptable to western forces, but despite early problems, it has succeeded – “the Iraqi way.”

Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Logistics

Decentralized Logistics

Unlike the MoD, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) used a civilian model for logistics and therefore did not have organic logistics units. The ministry did not track logistics personnel by occupational specialty. Once hired, police received additional training to assume administrative or logistical duties as required. The Iraqi Constitution grants significant authority to the provinces, thus, the central MoI was responsible only for certain logistics functions. Provincial Directors of Police had their own budget for local purchases and local maintenance. The same was true for the Department of Border Enforcement and Ports of Entry.

The development underway of the National Police Sustainment Brigade represented a notable advance in developing a MoI logistics capability at the national level. Scheduled for completion by the end of 2008, this brigade was projected to have organic mobility and the capability of accomplishing a wide range of logistical missions including line haul transportation, deployable maintenance, supply receipt storage and issue for National Police divisions, combat health treatment, and mobile fuel storage and distribution.

Maintenance

Organic MoI maintenance capability was not capable of sustaining the level of maintenance required to keep vehicle operational readiness rates at or above 85 percent. In order to develop a pool of trained MoI mechanics, Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)-funded maintenance programs continue to include mechanic training as part of their schedule. In preparing to take on its share of the 8,500 refurbished High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) bought with ISFF, the MoI realized that it was going to be unable to train all its own mechanics to maintain an expanded vehicle fleet. The MoD and MoI were drafting a Memorandum of Agreement to facilitate MoD support of MoI HMMWV integration with both mobile maintenance teams and train-the-trainer packages. The Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute began training MoI HMMWV mechanics in April 2008. By the end of 2008, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the MoI had plans to complete the MoI Integrated Maintenance Plan, increase parts procurement and warehousing capability, and
build 3rd and 4th Line maintenance facilities in 15 Provinces and 5 Department of Border Enforcement regions.

**Coalition Plans for Developing the ISF Logistics Sustainment Base**

Operational events, as well as significant organizational changes in logistics systems and procedures between MoD, Joint Headquarters (JHQ), and MNSTC-I had altered the national logistics timeline conceived in 2006, as well as the MoD Logistics Action Plan and the Coalition-developed MoI Concept of Support. Nevertheless, Coalition leadership determined in 2007 to make ISF logistics development and self-sustainment a primary objective. They have taken significant steps to accomplish that goal.

**Functional Capability Teams**

MNSTC-I had previously provided advisors to the MoD and MoI Logistics directorates. In 2008, however, support for the advisory teams had been augmented by the addition of Functional Capability Teams in sustainment, materiel acquisition, personnel acquisition, budgeting, force management, and training.

**Iraqi Logistics Development Committee**

In late 2007 the Iraqi Logistics Development Committee (ILDC), chaired by senior Coalition logistics leaders from Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and MNSTC-I was established to find a way to accelerate development of the logistics capabilities required to achieve ISF logistics self reliance. The ILDC brought together the Ministerial Logistics Advisory teams, Coalition logistics and sustainment leaders from throughout Iraq, the Functional Capability Teams, the Coalition’s Military Transition Teams, and Iraqi logistics leadership to develop a combined approach for ISF logistics development.

The proposed 3-phased approach adopted by the ILDC emphasized the establishment of formal partnerships and “true relationships” between Coalition logistics forces and their partner ISF units. Relationships would be established through key leader contacts at all levels of the ISF command structure by Coalition leaders and logistics experts. The ultimate purpose of the partnerships would be to gain a deeper appreciation and understanding of the Iraqi culture and the ISF concept for logistics support. Teams would coordinate their efforts in partnering, training, and advisory activities with ISF units. MNC-I and MNSTC-I had taken steps to provide dedicated personnel to educate and train partner units. A combined logistics readiness conference was to be held quarterly, eventually to be led by the Iraqis.

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19 MNSTC-I would provide fourteen Logistics Military Assistance Teams, each consisting of nine logistics subject matter experts for the purpose of mentoring and advising the Location Commands and Taji National Depot. MNC-I planned to provide variable-sized Logistics Training and Advisory Teams from its organic Sustainment Brigade assets to provide dedicated partnering activities from the 1st through 3rd line of ISF logistics.
The Logistics Partnering and Advising Model for the MoD and the MoI is an aggressive attempt to make up lost time in developing ISF logistics self sufficiency. It stresses partnership to develop a logistics system that adopts some western efficiencies into an Iraqi logistics structure. In June 2008, the Coalition had issued a Fragmentary Order directing the establishment of appropriate partnerships. By August 2008, the ILDC projected moving into the second phase of the model. The end result was to be a self sustaining ISF logistics system by the end of 2009.
Observation 8. Use of Iraq Security Forces Funds for Joint Iraqi and U.S. Projects

The funds available to MNSTC-I through the ISFF for training and equipping, to include developing a sustainable logistics capacity for ISF, are diminishing.

Over the past 2-3 years, the Government of Iraq (GoI) has increased its revenues with the result that budget allocations for both the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior have increased. As a consequence of the GoI’s improved ability to fund its own security operations, U.S. lawmakers have reduced ISFF appropriations available to MNSTC-I for development of ISF.

MNSTC-I’s application of ISFF resources to execute ISF “train and equip” mission requirements has proven to be essential to rapid ISF development. In addition, using ISFF funding as Coalition leverage with the GoI has had a multiplier effect on GoI funding for this key goal, increased GoI commitments to purchasing U.S. equipment via FMS, and remains critical to influencing the pace and priority of joint U.S.-ISF efforts to build a self-sustaining Iraqi logistics capacity.

Significantly reducing U.S. ISFF resource support for our effort in Iraq would diminish U.S. influence with the GoI, in particular with respect to gaining its commitment to priority U.S. objectives in the “train and equip” mission, including that of enabling the development of the Iraqi logistics sustainment capacity. It would also reduce the return on investment gained when ISFF financing is matched with a multiple of GoI funding in making purchases of U.S. equipment and in achieving other ISF development objectives.

Applicable Criteria

Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-028, and 110-161. Provisions in these U.S. laws provide for in excess of $15.7 billion for the ISFF, which “shall be available to the Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purpose of allowing the Commander, MNSTC-I, or the Secretary’s designee, to provide assistance, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to the security forces of Iraq, including the provision of equipments, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction and funding.”

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. The Directive also states it is DoD policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be
explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.

**Iraq Security Forces Fund**

In May 2005, Congress authorized the creation of the ISFF in P.L. 109-13. Projects supported by the fund have provided the Iraq Security Forces with equipment, supplies, services, and training, as well as repair, renovation, and construction of facilities. Congress has appropriated $15.44 billion to the ISFF since 2005, the vast majority of the funding having been directed at four major activities within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior:

- Equipment and Transportation
- Training and Operations
- Infrastructure
- Sustainment

Table 2 displays the ISFF funds budgeted for the use of MNSTC-I in accomplishing the training and equipping mission for the Iraq Security Forces. Of note, ISFF funding had decreased markedly in FY-08 with a 46 percent reduction from FY-07 levels, and with the FY-09 budget submission there is a further 33 percent reduction in the request from that appropriated in FY-08.

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*(Sources: SIGIR Report to Congress, April 2008; MNSTC-I Briefing to DoDIG, 7 May 2008; DoD FY-2009 GWOT Bridge Request)*

Out-year appropriations for ISFF funding are expected to decrease further because of the increasing capability of the Government of Iraq to finance its own security and infrastructure requirements. While the FY-2009 ISFF request of $2 billion had not been funded at the time of this assessment, there were indications that Congress would significantly reduce the request even further.
The Iraqi Government has progressively increased its fiscal commitment to building its security forces and developing MoD and MoI institutional capacity. In 2006, GoI outlays for ISF exceeded that of the U.S. government for the first time. The GoI approved a $9.0 billion budget for the security ministries for CY 2008. The Iraqi security ministries’ budget projection for 2009 was expected to approach $11 billion.

**Iraq Security Forces Fund Funding Leverage**

Fiscal resources – of both the United States and GoI – have been the principal means at the disposal of MNSTC-I to influence ISF force generation and force development, to include enabling capabilities such as logistics sustainment. For this reason, the MNSTC-I center of gravity has been the availability and effective application of U.S. and increasing GoI resources in a timely manner to produce the necessary Iraqi security force and defense capability.

In addition to providing funds for manning, training, and equipping ISF forces for the counterinsurgency effort, ISFF funds have been used principally in accelerating the generation and fielding of new forces. The availability of ISFF funds and the flexibility with which they could be directed at specific projects have made ISFF particularly valuable to MNSTC-I in achieving force generation objectives.

As ISFF availability has diminished and more restrictions have been placed on their application, MNSTC-I has had to reprioritize their use, in many cases leveraging available ISFF funds as “seed money” for larger ISF projects with the expectation of Iraqi MoD or MoI buy-in. In this they have had some success. Examples of cost sharing activities have included:

- **MoD**
  - Fielding MI-17 helicopters and Huey IIs
  - Fielding HMMWVs and parts support
  - Fielding M16/M4s
  - Infrastructure repairs at Taji for National Depot Complex, Regional Training Center, the Iraqi Army Support and Service Institute

- **MoI**
  - Individual police equipment
  - Training Centers and academies
  - Vehicles
  - Baghdad Police College Expansion

Finally, the judicious application of scarce ISFF funds has the potential for an increased return on U.S. investment. This is particularly important when the funds are used to purchase counter-insurgency equipment that meet U.S. strategic interests in the region and which will require additional Iraqi capital investment and/or follow-on sustainment expenditures.

As an example, the U.S. will make a capital outlay of approximately $276 million to refurbish and field over 8500 HMMWVs for the Iraqi MoD and MoI. The GoI will spend $358 million over the next 5 years in sustainment costs for U.S. parts and
equipment, a return on investment of almost $82 million. Similar returns on investment are projected for other U.S.-supplied equipment through the FMS program including, for example, C-130J aircraft and OH-58 helicopters.

Constraining U.S. ISFF resources in FY 2009 and beyond will impact decisions regarding the short-term fielding of enablers and force quality and longer-term force generation based on valid strategic requirements. The options for MNSTC-I in the face of such constraints would be: (1) defer requirements to out-years; (2) secure even greater GoI funding; (3) cancel requirements altogether, or a combination thereof.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

8. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, conduct an extensive risk analysis of the essential train, equip, and sustainment tasks and projects planned for the Iraq Security Forces and determine the effect on these projects of continuing diminished ISFF funding; and that MNSTC-I develop strategies for mitigating or transferring those risks.

**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander stated that there were sufficient ISFF funds to execute MNSTC-I’s mission-essential tasks in 2008 and 2009. He stated that funding of individual ISFF programs was subject to stringent senior leader oversight, including risk assessment and mitigation planning. MNSTC-I suggested that their program by program approach was more flexible and appropriate than a single overarching-extensive risk analysis of all MNSTC-I projects. He said that MNSTC-I would continue to conduct regular reviews of its projects in light of identified risks, and would provide senior decision makers in the Ministries the insights and recommendations generated by these reviews.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.
Observation 9. Request for Forces for Logistics Military Assistance Teams

The specialty skills that had previously been coordinated and approved by JCS under Request for Forces (RFF) for 126 MNSTC-I sponsored Military Transition Team billets were no longer valid.

These positions had previously been designated as logistics advisors to the now renamed and restructured Regional Support Units (RSUs) and Garrison Support Units (GSUs).

Since then, U.S. forces have organized the Iraqi Logistics Development Committee, which has constructed a comprehensive new concept for providing coordinated and integrated logistics advisory services for the 13 Iraqi Location Commands and Taji National Depot. The new concept replaced the advisor skills that had been required previously by the MNSTC-I Military Transition Teams assigned to the former RSUs and GSUs with a new emphasis on logistics skill sets.

To ensure the appropriate U.S. military personnel skill sets were provided for the updated logistics advisory mission, MNSTC-I had submitted an updated Request for Forces (RFF 868). This RFF changed the previously approved 126 Military Transition Team billets to specific logistics specialties, and renamed the 14 teams as “Logistics Military Assistance Teams” (LMATs).

It is important that JCS expeditiously approve and source the 126 billets requested for the Logistics Military Assistance Teams, which are essential for enhancing the ISF logistics capability and executing the Iraqi Army Logistics Partnership Model.

Applicable Criteria

CJCS Manual 3122.01A. CJCSM 3122.01A, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures,” September 29, 2006, sets forth planning policies, processes, and procedures to govern the joint operation planning and execution activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commander(s) and other joint force commanders in development of selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. Enclosure (R) of the manual describes the responsibilities and procedures for completing an RFF or Request for Capabilities message.

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DoD policy and assigns
responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

**Logistics Military Assistance Teams (LMATs)**

The Iraqi logistics partnering and advising model being implemented in 2008 called for an integrated effort between the LMATs and logistics Ministerial Advisory teams directed by MNSTC-I, and the Logistics Training and Advisory Teams (LTATs) resourced by logistics sustainment brigade personnel that fall under the control of Multi-National Corps-Iraq.

Prior to 2008, the U.S. military personnel expertise provided to Military Transition Teams that had been assigned as logistics advisors to the RSUs and GSUs were ill defined, and in some cases these positions were manned by military officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) without any specific skills or experience in logistics or supply management. In late 2007, the Iraqi MoD discarded the previously agreed logistics concept calling for five RSUs and 28 localized GSUs, instead opting to develop and build fixed-site base support units, called Location Commands, one for each division. The 13 Location Commands would be responsible for 3rd and 4th Line maintenance and supply support for the Iraqi Army.

With a renewed emphasis by U.S. forces on developing a credible and sustainable logistics capability for the ISF, it became increasingly important that the 126 Military Training team personnel comprising the 14 LMATs mentoring the 13 Iraqi Army Location Commands and the Taji National Depot should be manned by officers and NCOs possessing the proper logistics skills.

The requested makeup of each of the LMATs is:

- 1 Senior Logistics Advisor, O5
- 1 Logistics Staff Advisor, O4
- 1 Base Management and Engineer Officer, O3
- 1 Ammunition Supply and Storage Advisor, E7
- 1 Food Service Advisor, E7
- 1 Administrative and Communications Support Advisor, E6
- 1 Bulk Fuel and Supply Advisor, E6
- 1 Equipment Maintenance Advisor, E6
- 1 Medical Advisor, E6

In early 2008, MNSTC-I submitted RFF 868 through U.S. Central Command to the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense requesting that the 126 advisory positions be coded for specific logistics specialties.

20 Ministerial Advisory teams falling under MNSTC-I dedicated to logistics mentoring include elements of the Ministry of Defense Advisory Team (MoD-AT), the Joint Headquarters Advisory Team (JHQ-AT), and the Ministry of Interior Training Team (MoI-TT).
The IG team concurs with MNSTC-I’s request to code the LMAT billets for personnel with the specific logistics specialties identified.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

**Revised Recommendation.** As a result of client comments, we revised draft Recommendation 9 to clarify that the Commander USCENTCOM should coordinate with Commander, Joint Forces Command rather than with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to expedite sourcing of the MNSTC-I Request for Forces.

| 9. We recommend that Commander, United States Central Command, coordinate with the Joint Staff and with the Commander, Joint Forces Command to expedite sourcing of the MNSTC-I Request for Forces 868 that defined the billet specialty requirements for the Logistics Military Assistance Teams. |

**Client Comments**
Commander, USCENTCOM partially concurred, suggesting that we amend the draft recommendation as noted above. The Commander stated that the MNSTC-I RFF had been approved by USCENTCOM and validated by the Joint Staff. He reported that USCENTCOM is coordinating with the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command to source the LMATs.

**Our Response**
Commander, USCENTCOM comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.
Observation 10. Use of Taji National Depot Airstrip for Iraqi Fixed Wing Aircraft

The Taji National Depot was the central hub of logistics support to the Iraqi Army, but the Taji National Depot’s airstrip was not being used for fixed wing logistics support operations.

While the airfield has routinely supported Coalition and ISF rotary wing operations, it had not been certified for fixed wing logistics operations because Coalition Forces had erected structures immediately adjacent to the airfield that presented potential physical impediments. Further, there was no implementation planning to bring the air strip up to proper specifications in order to support fixed wing cargo and logistical operations at Taji National Depot.

By not using the Taji airfield for routine fixed wing logistics operations, support for the ISF is diminished. Parts and equipment destined for the Taji National Depot must be flown into other Aerial Ports of Debarkation in Iraq and then ground convoyed to the Taji National Depot. Trucking the supplies and equipment intended for the depot adds an unnecessary step in the resupply chain, increases the security risk to the convoy, and subjects the supplies being transported to greater risk of pilferage.

Taji National Depot would be able to improve its cargo shipment/receiving capability by certifying the airfield for routine fixed wing logistics support, and organizing and implementing such operations.

Applicable Criteria

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

Taji National Depot Airfield

The single 5800 foot runway at Taji National Depot is capable of handling light and medium cargo aircraft. An Air Force Civil Engineering Support Agency survey in December 2004 noted that the airfield was capable of supporting up to medium cargo aircraft (C-130 and/or C-17 or similar). However, the fixed wing capacity of the airfield, especially in the apron areas, had been restricted by the presence of numerous removable barriers. The airfield and its apron areas were being used primarily for Coalition and Iraqi rotary wing aircraft.
**Taji Location Command**

During our visit to the Taji National Depot the assessment team inquired about the current use of the airfield and its potential for including fixed wing to increase its use. Senior leaders within the Taji Location Command and U.S. military representatives confirmed that the airfield was capable of sustaining fixed wing cargo operations, and that limited Iraqi C-130 aircraft operations had been recently conducted at the airfield. Despite the clear demonstration of the capability to stage and move logistics supplies via fixed wing operations from the airfield, neither the U.S. nor Iraqi Army representatives we interviewed were aware of any plans for the airfield to be used as a major Aerial Port of Debarkation/Aerial Port of Embarkation hub in support of future Iraqi Army logistics operations.

The assessment team also noted the existence of a rail spur at Taji that connected to an international single track railroad originating in Basra and terminating in Beirut, Lebanon. In addition to use of the airfield for fixed wing, establishing a rail logistics capability to support Taji, thus coupling air and rail capability, would greatly enhance its capacity as a strategic and operational logistics distribution hub for the Iraqi Army.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

| 10.a. | We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, in conjunction with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, study the feasibility of certifying the Taji Airfield for fixed wing logistics support operations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of logistics distribution for the Iraqi Army. |

**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, reporting that MNF-I had begun efforts to certify Taji Airfield for fixed wing cargo operations. He stated that there were a number of projects underway to improve the capability of the airfield to enable fixed wing operations by the end of 2008.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

Coalition logistics experts have been developing various models of logistics processes to be followed by the MoD and the IA since 2003. These processes have been developed (mostly modeled on U.S. and western logistics principles) to varying degrees of specificity in a series of unofficial draft documents produced in English. Nevertheless, official Iraqi guidance clearly describing the logistics policies, processes, and procedures for the MoD and IA had not been formally issued.

As a result, the logistics processes and procedures followed within the Iraqi MoD and IA are not standardized, and they are not clearly understood by the Coalition logistics mentors and trainers whose job it is to assist in the operational and tactical implementation of the Iraqi logistics system. The logistics capability development of the MoD and the IA has consequently been delayed.

Applicable Criteria

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

Draft Ministry of Defense Logistics Guidance

The assessment team obtained several draft MoD logistics organizational documents, which together detailed a systematic approach for the development of a sustainable Iraqi Army logistics system. All of the “Iraqi” logistics documents we obtained were in English and only a few had Arabic counterparts. We were unable to determine the degree to which these documents had been formally accepted and adopted as Iraqi MoD standard procedures. It did appear, however, that despite the absence of official Iraqi documents, the logistics procedures detailed in these draft directives were, in many cases, being followed within the Iraqi MoD and the IA logistics system.

- Ministry of Defense Policy Administration – Policy on Writing Policies, 1 Sep 2005 (Unsigned draft)
- Ministry of Defense Administration – Policy on Distribution within the Iraqi Armed Forces, 30 May 2006, (Unsigned draft)
Official Logistics Guidance Needed

The Coalition had provided mentors and trainers for the Iraqi MoD and Army since 2003. One of the goals of that initiative had been to transform the Iraqi logistics processes into a western model, building on the elements of a U.K. system which had been previously instituted. Often, the goal of establishing a self-sustaining logistics capability had taken a back seat to growing and fielding the army as a viable counterinsurgency force.

By 2006, MNF-I had developed a plan jointly agreed with the MoD and JHQ for developing the Iraqi Army logistics capability, but that plan never materialized in the face of a growing counterinsurgency effort and an eventual change in Iraqi focus with respect to its logistics strategy. The U.S. Mission-Iraq and MNF-I Joint Campaign Plan of November 2007 made development of the Iraqi logistics capability a top priority again.

Despite the subsequent renewed efforts by the Coalition to develop the sustainment capability of the Iraqi Army, some U.S. advisors expressed concern over the lack of official Iraqi MoD guidance that detailed the Iraqi logistics doctrine and procedures. One of the advisors interviewed stated that:

“The Iraqi (logistics) chain of command is convoluted and confused. We think in terms of one structure, but they have something entirely different. We are imposing an American system on the Iraqis, and now we are saying that we must develop their logistics capability using the ‘Iraqi way.’ The problem is – what is the Iraqi way?”

The assessment team was unable to find any official Iraqi document that broadly specified the Iraqi logistics doctrine or processes. Unlike U.S. practice, Iraqi leaders tend to establish policy and procedure by memorandum. We were able to discover several Iraqi policy memoranda that prescribed basic procedures for accomplishing certain tasks. U.S. logistics mentors, however, must cobble together many such memoranda in order to create a picture of what is the officially sanctioned Iraqi logistics system.
We were able to discover several examples showing how Coalition Force lack of understanding about the “Iraqi way” for logistics had caused uncertainty in the execution of the Iraqi logistics concept:

- The draft prepared by the Coalition for the Ministry of Defense Administration on Policy on Asset Accountability and Visibility within the Iraqi Armed Forces, dated 30 May 2006, discussed the role of the Iraqi MoD M4. This organizational construct was based on a western model, but it apparently did not meet with the emerging Iraqi concept. In 2007, the Iraqi MoD reorganized, discarding the M4 organization and establishing instead the Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

- The unsigned draft Policy on Distribution within the Iraqi Armed Forces, dated 30 May 2006, discussed RSUs (Regional Support Units) (subsequently rejected by the IA), Garrison Support Units (GSUs) (rejected by the IA), Support Command responsibilities (also rejected later by the Iraqis), the Iraqi Armed Forces Logistics Concept (never implemented), and three levels of logistics transport (since superseded by the IA desire for 4 levels).

- The unsigned draft MoD Policy on Ammunition Management Procedures, dated 15 June 2006, similarly referred to the “Support Command,” the former MoD M4 organization, and Regional Support Units, all of which have been rejected by the MoD.


The Iraqi Supply Handbook appeared to be an excellent “how to” primer for Coalition Forces. It addressed such issues as Iraqi procurement practices, equipment, property accountability, sustainment (fuel, ammunition, vehicle and equipment repair, life support), transportation, maintenance, and medical procedures. The problem with this guide, however, was that it was unsigned and undated, and it was not clear whether the procedures and processes described therein were accurate and official.

The assessment team recognizes that organizationally the Iraqi Army continues to evolve. However, it is essential that Iraqi-centric logistics practices and procedures be institutionalized, in concert with the Coalition, in order to provide clear, related objectives for establishing a self-sustaining Iraqi logistics capability. In this regard, it is also important that the Coalition Forces logistics subject matter experts, whose job it is to mentor and advise the Iraqi Army, have clear guidance on the Iraqi logistics system they are helping to create.
Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

11. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, coordinate with the Ministry of Defense, Joint Headquarters, and the Iraqi Army to expedite development and publication of detailed, officially approved logistics directives and decrees that clearly describe the doctrine, policies, processes, and procedures for establishing self-sustaining logistics functions within the Ministry of Defense, Joint Headquarters, and the Iraqi Army.

Client Comments

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, noting that the staff of the Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff – Logistics (JHQ DCOS-Log), with assistance from MNSTC-I, had printed and distributed the Iraqi Supply Handbook throughout the Iraqi Joint Forces, and that this handbook addressed policies and processes for self sustaining logistics functions from the strategic/depot level down through the tactical/operational level. Commander, MNSTC-I reported that the Iraqi Logistics Development Committee, composed of Coalition and Iraqi logistics leaders, would focus on establishing a doctrinal framework to address current gaps in the Iraqi logistics concept.

Our Response

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive. The distribution of the Iraqi Logistics handbook by the MoD is a positive step in developing a workable logistics policy. The copies of the handbook we were provided in May 2008 provided “how-to” guides for procurement, equipping, property accountability, fuel and ammunition support, vehicle and equipment repair, life support, transportation, maintenance, and medical issues in a compendium form. The draft handbook we viewed did not, however, address the policy underpinnings of the Iraqi MoD logistics system. While we recognize that the Iraqi process of issuing policy may differ from that practiced here, we believe that there must be more guidance than that found in the handbook. In response to the final report, we request that Commander, MNSTC-I provide an updated status on any other existing, officially approved MoD logistics policy documents and regulations. We additionally request that Commander, MNSTC-I provide us with copies of the approved Iraqi Logistics Handbook that was distributed by the JHQ DCOS-Log.
Observation 12. Iraqi Funding for Life Support Functions in the Iraqi Military

The transition of the Iraqi Army to self-reliance in December 2007 appeared to be under-funded. The MoD had not provided Iraqi Location Command military bases with an Operations & Maintenance budget that covered the cost of life support issues (food, water, housing, sanitation). Rather, it had relied on a system whereby life support costs were included in an additional stipend in the payroll for the soldiers, which Iraqi Army units stationed at the base would provide to the base commander. This stipend appeared to be incapable of meeting the life support needs.

Because the Iraqi life support self reliance policy was implemented without sufficient base operating funding, the Location Commands that oversee the base support functions have been unable to provide for some basic services. Units that were supposed to be supported by the Location Commands were either going without certain basic services or were making up the shortfall with their own funds or other alternative means.

Shortfalls in base operating support have negatively impacted operational units and have detracted from their ability to perform their primary mission.

Applicable Criteria

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

Iraqi Army Life Support Functions

In 2006, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense took over life support functions for the Iraqi Army from the Coalition Forces. By doing so, the Iraqi government became responsible for such life support services as providing food, water, cleaning, supplies, security, facilities and equipment maintenance, morale items, sanitation and waste removal, and mortuary services for more than 130,000 Iraqi Soldiers. To fulfill those responsibilities, the MoD had funded and executed contracts for the Iraqi Army’s life support operations.

By 2007, the Ministry of Defense, dissatisfied with the process and cost of contracting for food services, suspended contracting for life support services for the Iraqi Army. Instead, the MoD implemented a Life-Support Self-Reliance program for military food preparation and services. The MoD provided initial funding to Divisional Commanders to procure basic equipment and establish local food vendor support.

21 The MoD’s LSSR initiative removed food services from the mission of the Location Commands, but the responsibilities for other basic services remained. The Location Commands were still tasked with providing
The MoD provided an increased allocation of funding for LSSR in a phased manner. They also increased the paycheck of the individual soldier by an amount believed to be sufficient to cover the expenses of basic life support services (food and water). The unit to which the soldier was assigned would then keep a large portion of this increase in pay, and the unit would be responsible for providing the food for the soldiers.

The MoD formed committees to audit the funds used to pay for the food and services and to evaluate the quality of food and life-support services provided to the soldiers.

**Funding Base Operating Expenses**

After visiting two Location Commands it was evident that the transition to Iraqi self reliance was generally succeeding, although the quality of food provided for the Iraqi soldier was reportedly less substantial than had been provided under the contracted system. Of greater concern, however, was the lack of uniform financial resources available for the Location Commands to properly carry out their support mission for tenant units. At both Location Commands we visited, there were significant shortfalls in electrical power generation, food, water, sewage treatment, mortuary affairs, and fuel.

Under the LSSR, the MoD provided to each tenant unit a set amount of money per soldier assigned to that unit. A portion of that money was supposed to then have been given to the Location Command in order to pay for those life support functions that the tenant unit could not provide. At Taji National Depot, the Location Command collected money from all units and ran a centrally supported logistical operation for life support. At the Kirkush Military Training Base (KMTB), however, the tenant units kept most of the daily funds, providing for their own life support in a decentralized fashion.

Both the Taji Location Command and the KMTB Location Command support a large number of tenant units, including IA training centers and IA Divisions. Most of the tenant units were stove-piped to the MoD and outside the Location Command chain of command. Organizationally, the Location Command had no real influence on the tenant units when it came to collecting the Location Command’s share of the monthly stipend paid to the tenant commanders for life support and base infrastructure. There was an additional perception by the Location Command commanders that the numbers of personnel assigned to the tenant unit commands were misreported to the MoD and Location Command. With the system currently in place, the tenant commands were suspected of reporting a larger number of assigned personnel to the MoD in order to receive more funds, while at the same time reporting a smaller number of personnel to the Location Command. This would result in the tenant unit keeping extra life support funds for its personnel, a possible source of corruption, while simultaneously providing the Location Command fewer funds than that needed to provide life support services for the actual number of military members on the base.

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cleaning, supplies, security, facilities and equipment maintenance, morale items, sanitation and waste removal, mortuary services, and electric power.

22 5000 Iraqi Dinar per day, or 150,000 Iraqi Dinar per month.
The Location Commands organized committees on their garrisons that included the Location Commander and unit tenant commanders on each base, to determine what funding support from the soldier stipends should be apportioned to cover Location Command Operation and Maintenance expenses. The Location Commander at Taji indicated that this arrangement had not covered his Operation and Maintenance costs and therefore commonly shared base service support functions had not been sufficiently funded.

**MoD Outlook**

Officials in the MoD and JHQ were aware of the perceived shortfall in life support funding. Indeed, an inspection of Taji Base by the JHQ Inspector General in April 2008 revealed significant widespread problems in food services, sanitation, and living conditions resulting from inadequate life support funding at Taji. The difficulty in meeting food service and sanitation standards may be transitory and resulting from the instability that accompanied the December 2007 transition to LSSR. Most troubling, however, were the reports we received that the MoD was unresponsive to repeated requests from field units for guidance and assistance in resolving their life support issues.

MoD leaders admitted that the transition to LSSR had not been without start-up problems but that if the Location Commands lacked the funds to properly support the assigned units in their area of responsibility, they should request additional funding. Although there appeared to be a disconnect between the MoD and Location Commands on the fact or extent of actual funding shortfalls, it was apparent, in addition, that the Location Commands lacked the proper level of planning and budgeting expertise, and they were also unsure of the proper methodology for requesting additional resources from the MoD in order to receive sufficient funding and other support.

Further exacerbating the tension between the Location Commands and the ministry was the underlying perception that the MoD would not provide the required support or that funds allocated for additional support would become “lost” in the bureaucratic process. The move to Life-Support Self-Reliance has been a significant step toward maturity and logistics sustainability for the MoD and the Iraqi Army; however, its implementation may have been hasty and not sufficiently planned. It was encouraging to note that the JHQ Inspector General and auditors from MoD Central Auditing were engaged in evaluating the problems associated with implementation of Life-Support Self-Reliance.

As the Iraqi Army moves toward logistics self sustainment, it is important that Coalition sustainment professionals assist where possible to identify problems and assist the MoD, JHQ, and Iraqi Army in implementing prompt “Iraqi” solutions.
Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

12.a. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq engage with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense leadership to assist them in developing a practical Base Operations Support budget and budgeting process that is sufficient to meet the needs of the Location Commander to support his tenant units, as well as to cover costs for general base infrastructure repair and services.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander reported that his command continues to advise the Iraqi staff in defining requirements, establishing a base operating support strategy, and developing a successful budget process for base infrastructure and repair. He acknowledged, however, that senior levels within the MoD leadership had not properly delegated the funding authority required to implement the strategy.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required. We request that MNSTC-I continue to urge appropriate offices within the MoD to take the necessary action to ensure that base operating support functions are adequately funded by the ministry, and therefore sustainable.

12.b. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinate with the Ministry of Defense to assess the potential adverse impact that failure to provide basic services and maintenance of base infrastructure is having or may have on Iraqi self reliance.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander stated that MNSTC-I will soon conduct a Rehearsal of Concept with the MoD Director of Infrastructure to reveal potential impacts to mission resulting from various levels of facility support scenarios.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.
Observation 13. Availability of Electricity at Location Commands

Both the Taji National Depot and KMTB averaged only 4-5 hours of electrical service per day. The lack of power generation negatively affected many critical IA functions.

The Iraqi side of Taji Base relied on over 300 diesel powered generators located throughout the base to produce its total output of electrical power. KMTB also used diesel generators to provide the total capacity of electrical power for the base. Neither base was connected to the national electrical grid. Electrical power generation for both bases was restricted by the lack of fuel for the generators.

Because insufficient quantities of diesel fuel were allocated to operate the diesel generators, the installations were unable to produce the required electrical capacity to properly support the Iraqi Army tenant units on base. The lack of electrical capacity adversely affected 3rd and 4th line vehicle maintenance repair, equipment repair and maintenance facilities, supply warehouses, training facilities, mortuary and health services, and Iraqi Army divisional headquarters. Additionally, the loss of electrical power precluded the uninterrupted use of key information technology resources such as computer hardware/software for parts requisition and tracking.

Applicable Criteria

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop. It establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

Availability of Continuous Electrical Power

At both Taji Base and KMTB, the Location Command commanders complained about their inability to provide sufficient electrical capacity for their tenant units and for their base general support requirements. At the time of our visit, we were informed that electrical power at each base was available for only 4-5 hours per day. The lack of electricity was not limited to these sites. The assessment team heard the constant theme that electrical production was insufficient at various sites supporting the ISF. The shortfall was evident from the battalion up to the national depot level.

The Taji Location Command supported over 31 tenant units that included such elements as the Iraqi Army Support and Service Institute, the Taji National Maintenance Depot, the Taji National Supply Depot, the tracked maintenance facility, the Taji Training Center, the Engineering Schools, and two Iraqi Army divisions. The KMTB Location Command supported a similar assortment of Iraqi Army units and facilities. Both Taji
and KMTB used diesel generators exclusively for the production of electrical power for all the tenant units. Neither base was connected to the national electrical power grid.

The inability to provide ready and sustained electrical power further prevented the full use of information technology equipment which could serve to streamline and improve logistical support. Parts requisitioning and tracking, currently performed by contractor (but soon to transition to the Iraqi Army), was made more difficult and time consuming without electrical power. The deficiency in electricity caused technicians to rely on outdated and slow handwritten processes for accountability, requisition, and distribution of parts and equipment. The lack of electricity also restricted the use of power tools and night work. At Taji, we were informed that the lack of electricity also affected life support capabilities such as the refrigeration units for dining, refrigeration for mortuary affairs, and operation of sewage plants to process waste. Without sufficient electricity, the Iraqi Army could not produce ice, a critical but easily overlooked quality of life commodity during the hot summer months.

**Lack of Diesel Fuel**

While these bases could extend their hours of electrical support by being connected to the national electrical grid, lack of diesel fuel was the immediate reason that Taji or KMTB were not able to sustain electrical generation. We suspect that the same problem occurs at each of the Iraqi garrisons.

Competition for diesel within the MoD has been intense. From figures provided by MNSTC-I, and based on equipment fuel usage rates, in 2007 the MoD had a requirement for 38 million liters of diesel monthly, but the Ministry of Oil only allocated 20 million liters. That allocation had to be distributed among MoD HQ vehicles, Motor Transport Regiments vehicles, combat armored vehicles, aviation fuel, and generators. In January 2008, MoD reduced the allocation of diesel for the generators at the bases by 50 percent in order to reduce pilferage and hoarding of fuel supplies. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics at JHQ stated that Location Command commanders needing more fuel could request additional fuel, with appropriate justification, if the allocation was insufficient for current needs.

**National Power Grid**

The assessment team was informed that many of the installations were geographically located near the national power grid. Assuming limited fuel allocation for the generators and that connection to the national grid were feasible, electrical capacity could significantly increase for each Location Command should they connect to the grid. Without a plan to bring the military installations onto the national power grid as soon as feasible to support and sustain power requirements, the ability of the Iraqi logistic units to properly support the Iraqi Army will remain dependent on diesel fuel oil, a scarce commodity, and therefore be greatly hindered.
Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

13.a. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinate with the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and Commander, Gulf Region Division, to assess the electrical generation capacity at each prospective Location Command and provide a plan to mitigate, transfer, or avoid the risk to logistical sustainment that could result from the inability of each base to produce sufficient electricity to meet established requirements.

Client Comments
See comments at 13.b. below.

13.b. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and/or the Iraqi Army Joint Headquarters to make the provision of adequate electrical power supply at the Location Commands a priority.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred with Recommendations 13.a. and 13.b. The Commander stated that MNSTC-I was collaborating with the MoD Military Works engineers and the Ministry of Electricity to determine the scope of requirements for each base. This collaborative effort was expected to form the basis for a contract with Baghdad University through the Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division to assess the power requirements for the major MoD facilities and their impact on the national electric power grid and to identify actions necessary to deliver adequate power to Iraqi Army bases. The Commander reported that primary electrical power at each Location Command would be provided by generators or connection into the Iraqi national power grid, where available. Back-up power would be provided by generators. In either case, functioning generators depended on the allocation and availability of fuel and effective maintenance.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.
Observation 14. Location Commander Duties and Authorities

The responsibilities and authorities of the Location Command commanders at Taji and Kirkush Military Training Base were vague and not well defined, resulting in confused command relationships and an inability to prioritize limited resources. This may be indicative of the command relationships experienced in all other Location Commands.

The Location Command commanders were assuming the role of garrison commander but without written guidance detailing their specific authorities, duties, or responsibilities.

Because of the lack of specific guidance, a degree of confusion appeared to exist between the Location Command commanders and the supported tenant commanders over authorities, including the proper distribution of base support resources. Location Command commanders reported to the MoD through a different operational chain of command than their respective IA Division unit counterparts, and they were unsure of the extent or limit of their responsibilities and authority.

Applicable Criteria

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop. It establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

Guidance for Location Commands

At the end of 2007, the MoD and JHQ approved plans to develop and build fixed-site logistical base support units, or Location Commands, for each division. At the time of our visit, eight of the logistics bases existed. Construction of the remaining five bases and associated Location Command units was to have been completed by the end of 2008. The Location Commands, while co-located with Iraqi Army divisions, did not report operationally to the Division Commander, instead falling under the command and control of the Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.

The IG team visited two Location Commands – Taji and KMTB. From discussions conducted with the Coalition Military Transition Teams at each site and with the Location Command commanders, it became evident that there was uncertainty regarding

23 The Location Commands (and associated IA Divisions) that were operational at the time of our visit included: Al Asad (7 IA Div), Tallil (10 IA Div), Taji (6 & 9 IA Div), Kirkuk (4 IA Div), Habbaniyah (1 IA Div), Kirkush (5 IA Div), Numaniyah (8 IA Div), and Al Kasik (3 IA Div).
24 The five Location Command units to be established included: Al Shaiba, Al Ghizlani, Tikrit, Al Memona, and Rustamiyah.
command relationships, authorities, and responsibilities with respect to the Location Commands and their tenant units.

The commanders at each of these Location Commands reported that they had no clear guidance on the extent or limit of their authority or their specific responsibility with respect to units located on their base. Ostensibly, the Location Commands had been established to serve as garrison commanders, providing such services as:

- Base security
- Military police services
- Confinement
- Communications
- Legal services
- Finance
- Contracting
- Base services, to include:
  - Water, electric, and sewage
  - Infrastructure
  - Public affairs
  - Billeting
  - Food services
  - Fire department
  - Stores
  - Morale and welfare services
  - Imam, cafeterias, barber, tailoring, post office, laundry, base cleaning, farming
- Base logistics (supply and maintenance)
- Base medical services
- Mortuary services

The assessment team received briefings indicating that by May 2008, several actions detailing the scope of authority and responsibility for the Location Commands would have been completed.

- JHQ Deputy Chief of Staff-Logistics develop “draft” Location Command Internal Operating Procedures
- JHQ Deputy Chief of Staff-Logistics issue an order establishing the relationship of the Location Command to the Divisions, to include all tenant activities located on the Location Command bases
- MoD Director General for Personnel and the JHQ Deputy Chief of Staff-Personnel identify commander and leadership structure at each Location Command

Additionally, by October 1, 2008, the JHQ Deputy Chief of Staff-Logistics was to have developed the Location Command Support and Services Doctrine.
The Life-Support Self-Reliance program implemented by the MoD in December 2007 compounded the issue of responsibility for food services. At KMTB, the security unit assigned to the Location Command commander to provide base security was supporting itself and not relying on the Location Command to provide life support functions. The new Location Commands had scarce guidance from MoD on how they should implement life support for their tenant commands, or how they should collect and allocate funds for the life support services that they provided for the tenants (electricity, fuel, infrastructure repair, supply and equipment issuance, etc).

Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

14. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to establish and issue a clear, definitive list of responsibilities and authorities for each Location Command commander.

Client Comments

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, reporting that the JHQ Deputy Chief of Staff-Logistics held the first Location Command Commanders Conference in June 2008 to disseminate policy and procedures for these commands. MNSTC-I stated that the Iraqi Supply Handbook and a future Tactical Exercise Without Troops would further clarify the role and mission of the Location Commands for the Division Commanders and the Location Commands.

Our Response

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive. We applaud the efforts of the JHQ DCOS-Log to convene a conference to clarify roles and responsibilities of the Location Commands; however, we believe there must be some official Iraqi documentation other than the Iraqi Supply Handbook that provides clearer guidance and legitimacy for the Location Commands. We request that in response to the final report, MNSTC-I provide status on the proposed Location Command Support and Services Doctrine that was to have been developed by the DCOS-Log by October 1, 2008, as well as the status of other MoD policy documents, memoranda, or regulations that officially sanction or prescribe the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of the Location Command commanders.
Observation 15. Distribution of U.S.-Funded Arms and Ammunition to the Kurdish Ministry of Interior

The Kurdish Minister of Interior reported that his government had received very few weapons and no ammunition from the central government MoI, despite repeated requests. Officials at the Kurdish Police Academy, the Kurdish Police Colleges, and the Sulaymaniyah Provincial Director of Police made similar reports. The training installations said that trainees only fired 6 to 12 rounds of 9mm and no AK-47. The Provincial Director of Police reported that they were forced to buy weapons and ammunition on the Black Market to meet operational needs.

The Iraqi central government MoI appeared to be providing little or no supply support to the Kurdish Ministry of Interior regarding issuance of small arms and ammunition. Therefore, there was no equitable sharing with the Kurdish government of arms and ammunition provided to the Ministry of Interior through the U.S.-funded ISFF.

The shortage of arms and ammunition was a detriment to the operational readiness of the police forces in the semi-autonomous Kurdish areas of Iraq, encouraged official tolerance of the arms and ammunition black market, and could perpetuate past inequities in sharing central government resources.

Applicable Criteria


Provisions in these U.S. laws provide for in excess of $15.7 billion for the ISFF.

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

Discussion

The team visited the following organizations on May 13 and 14, 2008, while in the semi-autonomous Kurdish area in Iraq:

- Kurdish Ministry of Interior,
- Irbil Police College,
- Sulaymaniyah Police College,
- Sulaymaniyah Police Academy, and
- Sulaymaniyah Provincial Directorate of Police.
The Kurdish Minister of Interior (KMoI) asserted that KMoI forces did not receive their fair share of the equipment, to include arms and ammunition, which had been provided to the Government of Iraq MoI through the U.S.-funded ISFF. When questioned about this alleged lack of equitable support, officials at the central government MoI reportedly responded that the KMoI should use the 17 percent of national revenues allocated it by Iraqi law to purchase the equipment and supplies they needed, including small arms and ammunition. To overcome their chronic shortage of arms and ammunition against operational need, the Minister stated that the KMoI bought weapons and ammunition, to include Glock pistols, on the Baghdad black market. The Minister stated that they nonetheless established accountability for such weapons on their property books, by serial number.

Officials from the Irbil Police College stated that they needed a minimum of 60 rounds of 9 mm ammunition to qualify their cadets, vice the 15 rounds per cadet available at the time of our visit. (Sixty qualification rounds per cadet are still considered insufficient by U.S. standards.) They also reported that all of their weapons were accounted for by serial number, a fact verified by an inspection of their arms room and property books. The Commandant of the College stated that the support he did receive came exclusively from the KMoI. To his knowledge, there had been no support from the Iraqi central government MoI.

Officials from the Sulaymaniyah Police College stated that, out of necessity, they purchased ammunition on the black market for both Glock pistols and AK-47 rifles. Still, their cadets fired only 10 rounds each with the Glock and about 50 rounds with the AK-47 during training and qualification.

Officials from the Sulaymaniyah Police Academy stated that trainees fired 30 rounds with the pistol and 40 rounds with the AK-47. U.S. trainers thought the trainees should fire a minimum of 120 rounds with the pistol and 100 rounds with the AK-47 to qualify.

Officials from the Sulaymaniyah Provincial Directorate of Police stated they did not have enough AK-47 rifles for their policemen. They also stated that they purchased AK-47 ammunition on the black market and that this was still insufficient for meeting their operational needs.

Although we were not able to independently verify these reports of shortages of arms and ammunition and lack of support by the MoI, we did discuss the situation with MNSTC-I officials. They were aware of these reports as the MNSTC-I Director of Interior Affairs had visited the KMoI about ten days prior to our visit and the Director had promised to look into the situation.

MNSTC-I noted that the methodology used to distribute Iraqi equipment, including arms and ammunition, purchased with Iraqi funds was a decision subject to the authority of the central GoI. The “17 percent” distribution of national wealth argument was also a sovereign political decision. That observation, however, dealt with distribution of U.S.-funded equipment, not Iraqi-funded equipment.
The reality dictates that all U.S. provided, ISFF-funded support to the Iraqi police forces must flow to and through the MoI, for further distribution as the MoI sees fit. However, we believe MNSTC-I should evaluate the use of ISFF funds for arms and ammunition to determine that we are not inadvertently supporting an internal inequity in MoI’s use of these funds and therefore a perpetuation of historic inequities in central government treatment of Kurdistan.

Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

15. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, review the distribution of equipment and material provided through the Iraq Security Forces Fund to determine if the arms and ammunition requirements of the Kurdish Ministry of the Interior are being met in an equitable manner.

Client Comments

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander stated that MNSTC-I had reviewed the request for the fair distribution of equipment that they had received from the Kurdish MoI (KMoI) and discussed it with MoI. He reported that the central government MoI had distributed equipment to the KMoI as part of the three-phased equipment issuance plan approved by the MNSTC-I Commander in June 2008. The Commander stated that phases two and three of equipment issue would occur after a requirements analysis was completed and a Memorandum of Agreement between the KMoI and the central government MoI was signed.

Our Response

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.
Observation 16. Undistributed ISFF-Funded Equipment

Equipment had been stored in the Abu Ghraib warehouse for extended periods of time without apparent requirements providing for its further disposition. We noted that 5,524 computers and monitors, 3,628 laser printers, and 86 televisions had been stored in the warehouse for up to 2 years. The equipment had been purchased with Iraq Security Forces Funds.

The failure to properly distribute this equipment occurred due to a lack of validated requirements. In addition, the absence of a proper reconciliation process precluded the ability to ensure that items requested or in stock reached their intended unit.

As a result of this lack of reconciliation and validation, some items placed in storage in the warehouse were in danger of becoming obsolete due to exceeding shelf life and technological usefulness.

Applicable Criteria

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.


Excess, Unclaimed Equipment

During the visit to Abu Ghraib warehouse, the team noted undistributed electronic equipment that had been in the warehouse in excess of 2 years. These items included computers, printers, and televisions. The computers were in danger of becoming obsolete because of the extended shelf time and technological advances. The loss of warranty and software support during the excessive time in the warehouse could also have been a problem.

Warehouse personnel were unable to provide the ultimate destination for some of the equipment. The IG team determined that the Coalition Forces had purchased these items with Iraq Security Forces Funds, but we were unable to identify the intended recipient of the equipment.
Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

16. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, conduct an inventory of equipment held in the Abu Ghraib warehouse, identify those unclaimed items that have been in inventory over 12 months, determine the appropriate recipient, if possible, and take proper steps to distribute the equipment promptly. In the event equipment is determined to have no consignee and to be in excess, then we recommend that the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq process the equipment for disposition in accordance with applicable regulations of the Defense Materiel Reutilization Program.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, stating that a process was in place at Abu Ghraib warehouse to record all property in the automated database maintained at that site. He reported that MNSTC-I had begun to issue all equipment at the Abu Ghraib warehouse to the appropriate organizations in the Mol and MoD.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.
Observation 17. Iraqi Army Maintenance Program

The plan to de-scope the Coalition-funded national vehicle maintenance contract in May 2008, transferring responsibility from a commercial contractor to the IA, appeared to be precipitous and problematic. The problem was particularly acute at the 3rd Line, or intermediate level, of vehicle maintenance which was being performed at certain, if not all, Location Commands.

The Iraqi Army was not prepared to assume the responsibility for 3rd Line maintenance in May 2008 because

- There were insufficient numbers of maintenance technicians assigned to the 3rd Line facilities
- The Iraqi Army mechanics who were assigned to the 3rd Line vehicle repair shops were inadequately trained or experienced to perform the maintenance procedures required at that level of difficulty for the wide assortment of vehicles in the IA inventory
- The Iraqi Army had not established mature processes that effectively linked parts management to vehicle maintenance

Until the IA maintenance and parts management capability is developed, significant intervention of Coalition vehicle maintenance experts and/or contracted personnel would be necessary to mentor these programs. Otherwise, the operational readiness of IA vehicles could suffer as the number of vehicles awaiting repair or parts becomes unmanageable.

Applicable Criteria

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, states it is DoD policy that “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”

Vehicle Maintenance Challenge

Because of the wide mixture of the MoD’s vehicular fleet, vehicle maintenance has been a significant challenge for the IA, and this challenge has been particularly pronounced at the 3rd Line (or intermediate level) of maintenance.

The diversity in vehicles evolved because the fleet was assembled variously from vehicles left over from Saddam’s army, MoD vehicle purchases, and vehicle gifts received from donor countries. According to a 2006 vehicle inventory, the IA had 6 different types of fuel trucks, at least 4 of which came from different manufacturers; 21
different types of light utility vehicles, most from differing countries; and 15 different types of medium cargo vehicles, including U.S. military 2.5- and 5-ton cargo trucks. The numbers and variety of vehicles will further increase in 2008 with the arrival of 404 German-donated vehicles of various sizes, a portion of which the IA intends to employ to develop their 4th Line transport capability.

The sheer diversity of vehicles in use in the Iraqi Army has had a noteworthy negative impact on maintenance. Vehicle maintenance at all levels is challenged by requirements for both metric and U.S. standard tools and by shortages of the wide variety of diagnostic test equipment needed. Technical and parts manuals for the vehicles being used, as well as maintenance training for the different types of equipment, have been virtually non-existent. Even if manuals existed, many were not in Arabic. Maintenance of such a wide assortment of vehicles would require a staggering spare parts support inventory and an associated parts distribution and tracking system. According to Coalition officials, obtaining repair parts for such a varied fleet, especially for vehicles of non-U.S. manufacture, had been so difficult that mechanics had routinely cannibalized needed parts from similar vehicles awaiting repair.

**‘Intermediate Level’ Vehicle Mechanics**

As an interim solution to meet the maintenance requirements of the diverse fleet of IA vehicles, MNSTC-I initiated a national maintenance contract in 2005 with the contractor, Anham. The command’s intent was to contract maintenance services to support the sustainment of the vehicles and equipment issued to the Iraqi Armed Forces and to assist the Iraqi Armed Forces in becoming self-sufficient. To facilitate the transfer of organizational and intermediate maintenance tasks, the contractor was tasked to conduct on-the-job training for Iraqi maintenance personnel. Coalition officials stated that while this training regimen was beneficial, it had not yet produced sufficient numbers of trained Iraqi mechanics. Indeed, one of the senior contract maintenance trainers at Taji informed the team that the IA vehicle mechanics were severely understaffed and not well trained, particularly for the degree of proficiency required at the intermediate maintenance level.

In March 2005, the Coalition and the MoD established the IASSI at Taji Base to train IA logisticians, including organizational level and intermediate level vehicle mechanics. The Institute’s production of properly trained mechanics has been problematic. At the time of our visit, IASSI was critically undermanned in instructors in its Maintenance Wing, with only 33 percent (5 of 15) of its authorized officers, 14 percent (16 of 113) of its authorized NCOs, and 0 percent (0 of 12) of its authorized enlisted complement assigned. Instructor shortfalls have been a continual problem at IASSI, noted by a 2007 GAO report detailing the shortages.25

Compounding the maintenance instructor shortage at IASSI has been the fact that scheduled intermediate level mechanic training for Iraqi Army personnel simply had not

been occurring at the school. The team obtained an IASSI document identifying completed and projected courses from school establishment through April 2008. The spreadsheet indicated that 1213 soldiers had completed the Maintenance Supervisor course, 335 had completed the Maintenance Level I Organizational Maintenance Course, and 257 soldiers had completed the HMMWV Maintenance course. There had been zero graduates from the Level 2/3 Intermediate Maintenance course. Indeed, it appeared that the course, although listed as a potential offering, had never been scheduled.

3rd Line Maintenance

In our visits to both the Taji and Kirkush Military Training Base Location Commands we discovered endemic problems as well. At KMTB, the director of maintenance informed the team that his company had 50 mechanics of 138 authorized. None of the unit’s mechanics were school trained (only trained through on-the-job training), and yet he claimed that they were all “expert” 3rd Line mechanics. This commander further stated that he did not need to send his mechanics to school as they were capable of performing any maintenance needed with their current level of expertise. Coalition Military Transition Team members opined that, contrary to the commander’s view, the mechanics were barely capable of performing routine, 1st Line maintenance, and that the on-the-job training program was not that successful. At Taji, we were informed that the 3rd Line mechanics were likewise significantly understaffed and not well trained. Many of the technicians could not read or write. Vehicle maintenance at the intermediate level required the extensive use of diagnostics tools, but diagnostic equipment was lacking.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics for the Iraqi Joint Headquarters also posited that the Logistics Commands were not properly staffed in their repair shops and that he was very concerned about the lack of capability for vehicle maintenance, not only at the intermediate and depot level, but also at the organizational level.

Iraqi Army Maintenance Program

As long as the Coalition funded the national maintenance contract for repair of IA vehicles, the MoD had not shown much inclination toward assuming the responsibility for that function or the associated requirement for materiel management and distribution. Several Coalition officials opined that as long as the Coalition was doing the job, the Iraqi MoD would be reluctant to take over the responsibility (or the associated cost). Nonetheless, in 2008, the Iraqi MoD logistics leadership and MNSTC-I did reach agreement on the priorities for transitioning logistics functions from Coalition to Iraqi control. These priority functions were:

- Life Support (transitioned to Iraqi control in 2006)
- Maintenance and Repair Parts Management

26 The Maintenance Level I Organizational Maintenance course is no longer offered at IASSI, instead being provided at the Iraqi Army Regional Training Centers (Taji, Kirkuk, Kirkush, An Numaniyah, Tallil, and Habbaniyah).
• Strategic Ordnance
• Base Management and Warehousing
• Transportation and Distribution

The contract covering 3rd Line maintenance shops was to end May 31, 2008, but MNSTC-I had agreed to exercise a de-scoped option of the Iraqi Army Maintenance program contract through November 2008. The contracted maintenance services were to have been reduced with the contractor continuing to provide support with the following:

• Maintain the current presence at the Al Asad maintenance site, providing mechanical oversight and information technology support and training.
• Maintain the current presence at the Taji Track Shop maintenance site, providing mechanical oversight and information technology support and training.
• Maintain personnel at the Taji Central Warehouse to provide training and oversight in Class IX\textsuperscript{27} Materiel Management, automation, and warehouse functions.
• Maintain personnel at each 3rd Line Maintenance facility (Location Command) to provide oversight and training on automation and Class IX management.
• Provide mobile Maintenance Support Teams to support Wheel and Track maintenance

The MoD was to be responsible for the following:

• All maintenance conducted at 3rd Line maintenance shops less the Taji Track Shop and Al Asad. These two shops would continue to be manned by Iraqi civilians employed and trained by the contractor
• Procurement of all Class IX material through FMS, direct contracting, or local purchase
• Providing personnel at the Taji Central Warehouse to perform all warehousing operations, in addition to providing personnel to train on Class IX automation
• Delivery of all parts from Taji Central Warehouse to all other Location Command 3rd Line shops

At the end of November, the de-scoped contract was to have ended with the Iraqi Army assuming full responsibility for all 3rd Line vehicle maintenance and Class IX Materiel Management.

In view of the shortage of training resources at IASSI, the lack of adequate training specifically to qualify mechanics to perform 3rd Line maintenance, and the consequent

\textsuperscript{27} In the U.S. Army logistics system, the Supply Class IX encompasses all repair parts needed for major end items such as: aircraft, ground support equipment, administrative vehicles, tactical vehicles, missiles, weapons, etc. In the Iraqi Army, repair parts fall under their supply designation of “Electrical & Mechanical Engineering.”
shortage of mechanics properly trained to perform 3rd Line maintenance on Iraqi Army vehicles, we believe the move to transition this important capability from Coalition to Iraqi Army responsibility was premature and occurred before the Iraqi Army was capable of fully assuming the mission.

Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

17.a. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters to assess the Iraqi Army capability to conduct 3rd Line intermediate vehicle maintenance and associated spare parts support and identify a bridging strategy to ensure adequate support is available.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander stated that a bridging strategy had been developed to improve lack of qualified mechanics and lack of spare parts. He reported that HMMWV repair parts were being pushed to 1st and 2nd Line elements to alleviate their immediate spares shortages and that short term contract support for spares distribution had been arranged to fill the gap until the General Transportation Regiment (GTR) becomes operational in late 2008. He stated that the Iraqi Army Maintenance Program (IAMP) computerized network had been set up in all 3rd and 4th Line workshops and translated into Arabic. Additional MNSTC-I advisers had been deployed to the Combined Logistics Operations Center (CLOC) to enable improved asset tracking and cross leveling. The Commander expressed concern over the lack of planned logistic procurement, especially for Class IX parts, by the ISF either through the use of FMS or by direct contracting.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

17.b. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters to ensure that the 3rd Line intermediate maintenance organizations attached to the 13 Iraqi Location Commands are manned sufficiently to perform their mission.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander reported that the JHQ directorate responsible for manning 3rd Line locations had recently hired 3,000 new soldiers and that they had received another 3,200 rejoiners, of whom 2,700 were NCOs. In addition, the JHQ had also recruited 400 former Army Warrant Officers to increase the knowledge level of the current force. He stated that manning of the Location Commands remained a key topic for the JHQ.
Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

17.c. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinate with the Iraqi Joint Headquarters to ensure that there is an adequate number of qualified staff at the Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute to provide the appropriate level of logistical support training for the Iraqi Army, to include a sufficient number of instructors for the Iraqi Maintenance Level 2 and 3 courses.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, stating that there were 76 instructors at the Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute and that this number was a sufficient capacity.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive. Without knowing the billets authorized and the student throughput it is difficult to determine if 76 instructors is sufficient capacity. The IASSI spreadsheet we received in May 2008 indicated that there were 142 billets authorized for the Maintenance Wing, of which 15 were officers, 133 were NCOs, and 12 enlisted. If there are 76 instructors now onboard and these are maintenance instructors, then manning for the Maintenance Wing is only at 54 percent. What instructor manning percentage is considered sufficient to staff the Maintenance Level 2 and 3 courses for the expected student throughput? We request that MNSTC-I provide more detail in clarifying the manning of the maintenance instructor billets in response to the final report.

17.d. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinate with the Iraqi Joint Headquarters to ensure that there is sufficient 3rd Line vehicle maintenance training throughput at the Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute to improve the numbers of trained and qualified mechanics for assignment to 3rd Line maintenance facilities.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. He reported that due to the involvement of the Director of the Electrical, Mechanical, and Engineering Directorate of the JHQ, attendance at logistic courses had risen from 734 students in the 2nd quarter to 1,041 in the 3rd quarter. He stated that IASSI had a capacity of 1,460 student maintenance slots.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.
17.e. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq assess the need to extend or renew the national vehicle maintenance contract for the Iraqi Army’s 3rd Line vehicle maintenance and, if it is determined that an extension of the contract is necessary, to coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and/or the Iraqi Joint Headquarters to initiate prompt deliberations to renegotiate the contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense covering the costs.

**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, stating that MNSTC-I had conducted a review of the IAMP contract and the support provided to the Iraqi Army and that MNSTC-I had determined to transition the contract to the MoD after the expiration of the current contract (June 2009). The Commander recommended that the contract not be extended or renewed using Iraq Security Forces Funds. At expiration, he suggested that the MoD would renegotiate the current contract or go with a different option. In either case the contract would be resourced through the MoD.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.
Observation 18. Class IX Material Management

The IA did not appear ready to assume responsibility for or control of Class IX repair parts management at Taji National Depot or at the KMTB Location Command.

The IA did not have an organic management system to monitor inventory, usage or distribution of parts, nor did they have a system in place to ensure Class IX inventory replenishment. The IA units that would be responsible for Class IX repair parts management did not have a sufficient number of trained and qualified logisticians assigned to perform that function. Additionally the software currently used by the national maintenance contractor for spare parts tracking was not in Arabic, hindering its transition to the Iraqis for them to manage their Class IX parts.

Without a usable, standardized parts management system that is linked to requirements, the Iraqi Army would not have the necessary capability to efficiently, economically, or promptly requisition, receive, track, and store the parts needed for the wide array of equipment in their inventory. As a consequence, equipment and major end items would soon become non-operational for lack of repair parts.

Applicable Criteria

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, states it is DoD policy that “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”

Transition to Iraqi Control

Since 2005, 1st through 3rd Line maintenance for IA vehicles had been managed through the Iraqi Army national maintenance contract, administered by MNSTC-I. Class IX repair parts management was closely aligned with the vehicle maintenance program and, in fact, was managed through the same contract as the Iraqi Army Maintenance Program.

As the Iraqi Army developed capability and demonstrated an increased commitment to assume responsibility for its own sustainment, it became clear that many of the logistics tasks previously accomplished by the Coalition should be transferred to Iraqi control. The national maintenance contract was originally due to expire in March 2007, but was

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28 Supply Class IX encompasses all repair parts needed for major end items such as: aircraft, ground support equipment, administrative vehicles, tactical vehicles, missiles, weapons, etc. In the Iraqi Army, repair parts fall under their supply designation of “Electrical & Mechanical Engineering.”
extended through May 2008. At that time, MNSTC-I wanted to transition contracted maintenance and parts support to the Iraqi MoD. The Ministry of Defense, however, was reluctant to renegotiate its own national maintenance contract because of the expense and a general mistrust of contracting, especially with foreign firms.

In 2008, the Iraqi MoD logistics leadership and MNSTC-I agreed on the priorities for transitioning certain logistics functions to the Iraqi Army. One of the first logistics programs that they agreed to move to Iraqi control was the Iraqi Army Maintenance Program and repair parts management. In 2008, the Iraqi MoD logistics leadership and MNSTC-I agreed on the priorities for transitioning certain logistics functions to the Iraqi Army. One of the first logistics programs that they agreed to move to Iraqi control was the Iraqi Army Maintenance Program and repair parts management.29

The contract covering 3rd Line maintenance shops was to end May 31, 2008, and MNSTC-I had agreed to exercise a de-scoped option of the Iraqi Army Maintenance program contract through November 2008. The contracted maintenance services were to have been reduced with the contractor continuing to provide support with the following:

- Maintain the current presence at the Al Asad maintenance site, providing mechanical oversight and information technology support and training.
- Maintain the current presence at the Taji Track Shop maintenance site, providing mechanical oversight and information technology support and training.
- Maintain personnel at the Taji Central Warehouse to provide training and oversight in Class IX Materiel Management, automation, and warehouse functions.
- Maintain personnel at each 3rd Line Maintenance facility (Location Command) to provide oversight and training on automation and Class IX management.
- Provide mobile Maintenance Support Teams to support Wheel and Track maintenance.

The MoD was to be responsible for the following:

- All maintenance conducted at 3rd Line maintenance shops, less the Taji Track Shop and Al Asad. These two shops would continue to be manned by Iraqi civilians employed and trained by the contractor.
- Procurement of all Class IX material through FMS, direct contracting, or local purchase.
- Providing personnel at the Taji Central Warehouse to perform all warehousing operations, in addition to providing personnel to train on Class IX automation.

29 In 2006, the Ministry of Defense had earlier assumed the responsibility from the Coalition for funding and managing “life support” functions for the Iraqi Army. By doing so, the Iraqi government became responsible for such life support services as providing food, water, cleaning, supplies, security, facilities and equipment maintenance, morale items, sanitation and waste removal, and mortuary services for the Iraqi Army.
• Delivery of all parts from Taji Central Warehouse to all other Location Command 3rd Line shops

At the end of November 2008, the de-scoped contract was planned to end with the Iraqi Army assuming full responsibility for all 3rd Line vehicle maintenance and Class IX Materiel Management.

**Materiel Management Challenges**

The transition of materiel management to Iraqi control and management was not without potential impediments. Chief among these were:

- The sheer number of parts required to support a diverse and non-standard inventory of major equipment such as that existing in the Iraqi Army
- A deficiency of Iraqi Army logistics personnel appropriately trained in materiel management
- Immature and unconnected (non-networked) information technology systems supporting parts management

**Diverse Parts Inventory**

One of the most difficult problems with providing parts support for vehicle maintenance in the Iraqi Army was the fact that the IA has over 160 different types of vehicles in its inventory. The national maintenance contractor – Anham – maintained an Authorized Stockage List of over 6000 parts for 120 vehicle types. For some vehicles, a mandatory parts list had not been developed.

Obtaining parts for many of the vehicles that had been donated to the Iraqi Army has been a near impossibility. The variation of vehicle type and their dispersion throughout Iraq caused both a lag in the requisition and distribution of parts, as well as a problem maintaining an adequate supply of frequently used parts for required maintenance. It had been difficult to position repair parts at the correct location. As the Iraqi Army has grown, logisticians have had to determine which parts (and how many) should be available for 1st and 2nd Line maintenance at the organizational level, and which parts should be held at the Location Commands for 3rd Line (intermediate or depot level) maintenance.

In addition to the quantity and diversity of spare parts required was a coinciding problem of lack of standardized stock numbering. A senior official in the Joint Headquarters opined that there was no concept of standardization for vehicle parts. He further stated that “most of the vehicles are a liability since they cannot be supported with skilled maintenance and parts.” It is worth noting that the Coalition in Afghanistan had been working to move the Afghan National Army into a system that used NATO stock numbering.

The NATO Codification System represents a uniquely reliable system for creating the standardized descriptions that are critical in managing a large distributed inventory and an efficient supply chain. The Assessment Team believes that the Coalition should
investigate the practicality and long-term benefit of instituting the NATO system in Iraq, both through the MoD and MoI, to standardize the Iraqi materiel management efforts.

**Iraqi Army Personnel for Class IX Parts Management**

There was an insufficient number of trained and qualified soldiers available to assume the responsibility for parts management. This was evident at Taji National Depot and at KMTB. The shortages in Iraqi Army personnel were particularly acute among NCOs and Warrant Officers, as well as enlisted personnel. Taji had not hired civilians to perform the maintenance or parts support mission. Table 3 below shows the manning for Taji National Depot at the time of our visit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>NCOs</th>
<th>Junood</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authorized</strong></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>On Hand</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trained</strong></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Commander Taji National Depot Briefing to DoDIG Assessment Team, May 8, 2008)

Training for Iraqi Army personnel in maintenance and parts management has been deficient. A senior official in the Joint Headquarters indicated that the best training provided thus far only made a new recruit an apprentice mechanic. There were significant shortages in NCOs and Warrant Officers to supervise and develop apprentice mechanics.

According to a senior Iraqi Army official from the IASSI, one problem hampering the training of logisticians for the Iraqi military was illiteracy. At least 25 percent of the students who reported for each course were turned away because they were illiterate in Arabic and therefore incapable of reading the required manuals. This included students from Kurdish provinces who, though literate in Kurdish, could not read, write, or speak Arabic. Through April 2008, IASSI had trained 2460 soldiers in the Supply and Warehouse course, but there was no course on parts requisitioning and monitoring.

The new director of Electro-Motive Equipment Branch in the Joint Headquarters initiated a request, signed by the Iraqi Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, asking for a Letter of Request through FMS to provide 22-24 contracted personnel for parts distribution and management at Taji National Depot, and for the contractor to provide training to IA personnel on this issue. At the time of our visit, the Secretary General to the MoD had not yet signed the FMS letter of request.

**Information Systems**

At both Taji and KMTB Location Commands, the contractor handling the national maintenance contract had an electronic database system in place to track storage,

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30 The Electro-Motive Branch, under the JHQ Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, oversees the Location Commands, and therefore, the vehicle maintenance and repair parts processes.
distribution, and requisition of parts. Warehousing of parts was accomplished by Iraqi personnel who maintained ledger records of stock location.

The computer system used by the contractor was a proprietary system, and the database was in English, not Arabic. The contractor stated that at the time when the parts requisitioning and monitoring contract expired at the end of November, he did not believe the Iraqis had plans to use the contractor’s database because it was in English. There had been no move to convert the electronic data in the contractor’s database to an Arabic system.

A senior Coalition advisor stated that the Iraqis may be able to develop information technology solutions locally for Class IX parts support, but that there was a reluctance to establish a connection between levels. This unwillingness to develop a connected IT system apparently had more to do with a perceived surrendering of authority and power than with computer capability. (This is part of the cultural aspect underlying the difficulties of establishing an effective and efficient logistics system…local unwillingness to be transparent which could lead to loss of authority.)

**Conclusion**

In view of the diverse parts inventory required by the wide assortment of vehicles maintained in the Iraqi Army, the lack of a sufficient number and quality of Iraqi Army logisticians trained and experienced in stock control and repair parts requisition and handling, and the inefficiencies caused by lack of sufficient information technology resources, we believe the move to transition repair parts materiel management from Coalition to Iraqi Army responsibility was premature and occurred before the Iraqi Army was capable of assuming the mission.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

18.a. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq adopt a phased approach to transition Class IX to the Iraqi Army, coordinating with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to incrementally transfer Class IX repair parts control only as the Iraqi Army demonstrates the capacity to manage the system.

**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. The Commander stated that MNSTC-I was implementing a strategy of incremental, conditions-based transition of responsibility of Class IX responsibility to the IA. He stated that the contract to provide contracted mentors and teachers for 3rd line supply warehousing, distribution, and management would end in May 2009. Transition of 4th Line maintenance would occur incrementally as the various workshops at Taji reached initial operating capability. Distribution of Class IX parts forward of 3rd Line is currently under Iraq control, and distribution from the National Depot to 3rd Line would transition to Iraqi control when the IA General Transportation Regiment stood up in late 2008. All Class IX repair parts have been consolidated at Taji National Supply Depot. He stated that MNSTC-I was assisting in
developing the IAMP IT network to provide a basic inventory control and distribution management capability which was scheduled to be under Iraqi control by Nov 2008. The Commander reported that MNSTC-I was increasing its advisory support to the MoD acquisition branches in order to develop the MoD’s capacity for direct contracting.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

18.b. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior to assist the Iraq Security Forces adopt the NATO Codification System for standardization of their parts lists.

**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, stating that MNSTC-I was advising the MoD to adopt the standard NATO Codification System to simplify their inventory management and acquisition. MNSTC-I was researching procurement options for the NATO codification system and protocols to enable the NATO system to interface with the Iraqi Army Maintenance Program (IAMP). MNSTC-I reported that the MoI had agreed to the NATO Codification system and were currently establishing an applicable automated system.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

18.c. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to reduce variety in the fleet of supported vehicles in order to decrease the range and depth of parts needed in the Iraq Security Forces Assigned Stockage Lists to support that fleet.

**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred. He reported that the JHQ Transportation and Provisioning (T&P) Directorate was interested in reducing the number of supported vehicles as part of a wider lifecycle management program and had issued guidance specifying which vehicles would be sustained with a spare parts inventory (priority vehicles) and those non-priority vehicles that would be naturally attrited. The Commander stated that the MoI was particularly challenged by the multiple models of vehicles in the fleet, making even basic maintenance a challenge. The MoI was working to establish equipment support on its myriad types of vehicles. He said that MNSTC-I would encourage MoI direct purchase contracts on already supported vehicles and advise the MoI on readiness reporting processes to monitor their vehicles for better overall operations.
**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

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18.d. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to optimize Iraqi Army logistics training throughput at the Iraqi Army Support & Services Institute, to include repair parts and materiel management.
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**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred and stated that the number of soldiers attending logistics training at the Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute (IASSI) continues to rise through the combined efforts of MOD Logistics staff and MNSTC-I.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive. We are pleased to note that the logistics training capacity at IASSI has increased; however, the information provided was very non-specific with respect to numbers of students completing the repair parts and materiel management courses, nor did the comments include any report on actions taken to coordinate with the MoD to optimize training throughput. We request that MNSTC-I provide additional data describing the increase in training throughput and the measures taken to optimize training attendance in response to the final report.
Part V – Medical Sustainability

Introduction

Development of the health sector of another nation’s security forces as part of a stabilization and reconstruction operation is a new mission for DoD, and is one that assumes particular importance as traditional military medicine adapts to the new requirements of counterinsurgency warfare. While DoD personnel often participate in medical training venues in international military-to-military and military-to-civilian settings, not since the 1920-1921 efforts of the U.S. Army to modernize the Polish health care system has the U.S. military taken on a comprehensive task in this sector in the international environment.

Iraqi Health Care System

In a recent report, the World Health Organization noted that the Iraqi health care system was in disarray and rated it as the third worst in the world. What was once reputedly the best system among Middle East countries has deteriorated significantly over the past 20 years in terms of medical infrastructure, equipment, and education. Since 2003, large numbers of physicians have fled the country due to the deteriorating security conditions, leaving only 15,000 of the approximately 60,000 physicians needed. The Ministry of Health (MoH) responsible for the public care system at one point became largely dysfunctional because of sectarian and political strife.

Iraqi Army Health Care System

According to the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF–I) Surgeon’s Operational Planning Team report, “Strategic Plan for Improving the Iraqi Healthcare System,” the development of the Iraqi Army health care system has been delayed by poor security conditions in much of the country in recent years, challenged by an environment of semi-permissive threats, sectarian strife, cultural inequalities, extreme bureaucratic inefficiencies, and widespread internal corruption.

The new Iraqi Minister of Health had initiated cooperation with U.S. efforts in late 2007, but very little cooperation with the Ministry existed previously. Additionally, the Iraqi Army was entirely dependent on MoH civilian hospitals for inpatient hospitalization care. All hospitals owned and operated by the Iraqi Army were transferred to MoH in 2003, leaving the new Iraqi Army with staffing and infrastructure for outpatient clinic services only. The Iraqi police obtain their medical care primarily from civilian sources, so the medical section of this report focuses on the Iraqi Army.

The complexity of these medical stabilization and reconstruction challenges in Iraq calls for a more robust U.S.-based interagency effort to assist U.S. military and civilian

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personnel in developing a detailed multi-year strategy and implementation plan for these tasks. U.S. planning should, in turn, be integrated into a strategic planning and implementation process supported by the other countries’ governments represented in the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition and with non-governmental organizations and international agencies, as appropriate.

The recommendations in this report also reflect the belief that improved pre-deployment training, increased combatant commander involvement, and interagency reach-back support are essential for mission success.
Observation 19. Iraqi Army Heath Care Delivery System

The Iraqi Army could not provide for the in-garrison and operational health care needs of its soldiers or adequately support its combat operations. Although some progress had been made in assisting the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in the development of medical logistics, training, manning, facilities, and Surgeon General operations, plans had not been developed that would assist MoD in fully developing a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system.

This occurred because neither MNF-I nor Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) had prepared a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multi-year plan that was coordinated with MoD and identified overall strategies, doctrines, or end-states to develop a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system.

Further, MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) had not fully identified the barriers to improving Iraqi Army medical care or effectively advised and assisted MoD in overcoming those barriers. As a result, development of a long-term sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system was unable to move progressively forward.

In the near term, the Iraqi Army remained dependent on the U.S. and Coalition forces for significant medical support for battlefield combat casualty care, casualty evacuation, and some definitive treatment. Until the Iraqi Army achieves health care sustainability, U.S. forces will have to maintain their combat casualty care assistance to support the Iraqi Army.

Applicable Criteria

Although management of the Iraqi Army health care system is an Iraqi responsibility, certain U.S. policies and procedures, adjusted to meet Iraqi needs and capabilities, may serve as a basis for the MNSTC-I efforts in these areas.

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. The Directive also states it is DoD policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.
The Military Health System Strategic Plan

The DoD Military Health System (MHS) mission is “to provide optimal health services in support of our nation’s military mission - anytime, anywhere.” The MHS is a unique partnership of medical educators, medical researchers, and health care providers and their support personnel worldwide. “The Military Health System Strategic Plan – A Roadmap for Medical Transformation,” May 29, 2008, was developed to:

[R]e-examine our fundamental purpose, our vision of the future, and strategies to achieve that vision. We are refocusing our efforts on the core business in which we are engaged - creating an integrated medical team that provides optimal health services in support of our nation's military mission - anytime, anywhere. We are ready to go in harm's way to meet our nation's challenges at home or abroad - to be a national leader in health education, training, research and technology. We build bridges to peace through humanitarian support when and wherever needed, across our nation and the globe, and we provide premier care for our warriors and the military family.

Joint Publication 4-02, Health Service Support, October 31, 2006

According to Joint Publication 4-02, the purpose of health service support (HSS) is to maintain the individual and group health needed to accomplish a military mission. The intent is to effectively and efficiently use medical capabilities and individual healthful practices to prevent and/or correct any human condition that would impair or preclude the joint force from achieving its objectives. Joint Publication 4-02 states that HSS is related to three joint functions: sustainment, movement and maneuver, and protection and adds:

HSS promotes, improves, conserves, or restores health within a military system. HSS capabilities are employed across the range of military operations and include the ability to organize, train, and equip preceding deployment and enable the employment of physically fit personnel. These capabilities span the operational environment from point of injury/illness to the appropriate capability of care.

Joint Publication 4-02 continues to state that foremost is the role of HSS in sustainment: the provision of medical support required to maintain health during prolonged operations until successful accomplishment of the joint force objectives. Joint Publication 4-02 also notes that one of the HSS operational considerations is stability operations.

Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability operations objectives could include the restoration of services such as water, sanitation, public health, and essential medical care. The desired military end state in the health sector should be an indigenous capacity to provide vital health services.

Providing for the Medical Needs of the Iraqi Army

The Iraqi Army could not provide for the in-garrison and operational health care needs of its soldiers without significant Coalition medical support. MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and
MNC—I had not fully identified the barriers to improving Iraqi Army medical care, devised a plan to address those barriers, or effectively advised and assisted MoD with a strategy to overcome them.

**Combat Casualty Care**

Combat casualty care was largely unavailable within the Iraqi Army health care system. For example, anecdotal reports of 115 patients transported to Baghdad after recent operations in Basra indicated that no medical care was provided by the Iraqi Army before or during patient movement. Iraqi Army combat divisions had only 11 percent of the 588 doctors authorized and 32 percent of the 7,410 allied health personnel authorized.

MoD did not have its own functioning hospitals to care for soldiers. The Iraqi Army had basic and advanced clinics at all of its regional garrisons, though none of those clinics were fully staffed. Garrison clinics had 31 percent of the 98 doctors authorized and 77 percent of the 658 allied health personnel authorized. The U.S. was finishing construction on just one new Iraqi Army field hospital, funded through Foreign Military Sales.

All inpatient care for soldiers had to come from civilian hospitals operated by MoH, but poor security within those facilities had allowed acts of uncontrolled sectarian violence by militia units against soldiers, limiting their access to hospital care. Recently, MoD and MoH had created two short-term ad hoc partnerships in which MoD had provided security for a hospital wing in a civilian hospital where soldiers were protected from militia violence. Those partnerships show potential for meeting the inpatient needs of soldiers nationwide if security conditions continue to improve.

**Recruiting and Retaining Medical Personnel**

The Iraqi Army was unable to recruit or retain sufficient medical staff. Physician staffing was at 18 percent of requirements and was falling as physicians fled the country or resigned from the military to work in civilian hospitals. In addition to the exodus of physicians since 2003 due to the deteriorating security environment, military service was seen as undesirable because military physicians were paid approximately half as much as MoH physicians and were often required to work in clinics distant from their families, rather than in hospitals near their homes.

Dentists, nurses, combat medics, medical logistics, administrative, and allied health support personnel were also staffed at critically low levels, far below those required, and few junior officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers were in place. Nurse staffing was at 29 percent of requirements, and medics were at 46 percent.

**Iraqi Army Medical Education and Training**

Initial training, upgrade training, and continuing medical education for Iraqi Army medical care personnel was lacking. Moreover, initial medical training classes at the Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute were only about 30 percent filled because of the low value ascribed to training medical personnel by the Iraqi Army line leadership.
For example, 22 percent of the seats were filled at Basic Medic courses between October 2007 and March 2008. No classes had been scheduled in the first 3 months of 2008 for Medic Refresher, Preventive Medicine, Enlisted Medical Logistics, Flight Surgeon, Enlisted Flight Medic, or Train the Trainer. No seats were filled in the planned 40-student Medical Logistics Officer class offered between October 2007 and March 2008. Newly accessed medical personnel were often redirected to combat positions before attending basic medical training courses.

**U.S. Military Medical Education and Training**

U.S. military medical personnel providing Coalition medical care throughout Iraq had recognized an unmet need for training of Iraqi military and civilian medical personnel. U.S. 62nd Medical Brigade personnel developed over 25 courses in trauma management, preventive medicine, medical logistics, dental care, and many others, and trained 356 Iraqi military and civilian personnel in over 3,589 days of training in the first 8 months of that initiative – August 2007 through March 2008.

While that training was recognized to still fall short of what was required to build sustainable capability in the Iraqi health care system, it took advantage of niche capabilities available in U.S. medical treatment facilities, strengthened the relationships between Iraqi and U.S. medical personnel, and laid foundations for future education and training initiatives. However, to achieve a sustainable health care delivery system, the Iraqi Army must develop and operate its own training facilities to meet its medical personnel needs.

**Medical Logistics and Funding**

A poorly functioning national medical logistics system prevented effective medical facility re-supply with consumable medical supplies and pharmaceuticals. Medical logistics was marginally functional at the Iraqi Army regional depot (Location Command) level, and was unable to adequately re-supply even a local garrison clinic. For example, medical equipment purchased by the U.S. before the clinics were transitioned to Iraqi control could not be sustained because of the lack of regional availability of reagents and test kits.

Monthly re-supply orders were only received after a three-month delay and were not complete. Medical logistics warehouse personnel had not developed procedures to rotate limited shelf-life medical supplies or to store sensitive supplies and pharmaceuticals in appropriately temperature-controlled environments. In addition, all four of the forklifts at the Supply Class VIII (medical materiel) warehouse at Taji National Depot were broken. Further, the Iraqi Army Surgeon General had no operating budget for clinics or field hospitals, but was dependent on a tedious, centralized MoD funding process for all recurring operations and maintenance costs.

**Dependence on U.S. Medical Facilities**

Consequently, the Iraqi Army received much of their inpatient care from U.S medical facilities. Approximately 65 to 70 percent of the inpatient care workload of U.S. military medical treatment facilities located in Iraq was provided to Iraqi military, police, and
civilian patients. U.S. military medical treatment facilities located in Iraq supplied medical and surgical care to Iraqi soldiers, police, and civilians for emergency conditions.

That care often included inpatient hospitalization until the individual could be transferred to an Iraqi MoH civilian medical facility able to provide ongoing care. However, because of the lack of medical treatment and follow-up capacity within the MoH health care system, many of those individuals remained in U.S. military medical treatment facilities for extended periods of time.

In the near term, therefore, the Iraqi Army remains dependent on the U.S. and Coalition forces for significant medical support for battlefield combat casualty care, casualty evacuation, and some definitive treatment. Until the Iraqi Army achieves health care sustainability, U.S. forces will have to maintain its combat casualty care assistance to support the Iraqi Army.

**Lack of Integrated Planning**

No plans were in place to assist MoD in developing the Iraqi Army health care delivery system. Although some progress had been made in assisting MoD in the development of medical logistics, training, manning, facilities, and Surgeon General operations, neither MNF-I nor MNSTC-I had prepared a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multi-year plan that was coordinated with MoD and that identified overall strategies, doctrines, or end-states to develop a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system.

**Metrics for Iraqi Army Institutional Capabilities**

MNSTC-I had identified 10 institutional capabilities necessary to support Iraqi Army medical operations and had developed metrics for each area. Those areas included command and control, medical surveillance, medical personnel, recruiting forces, training, equipping, logistics, sustainment, pay and promote, and treatment.

While progress had been identified in some of those areas, solutions for most areas depended on MoD processes beyond the control of the Iraqi Army Surgeon General. For example, budget execution and contracting bottlenecks within MoD obstructed the purchase of equipment and supplies, and the recruitment of medical personnel depended on close collaboration with the MoH.

**Comprehensive Planning**

We believe that a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multi-year plan that identifies overall strategies, doctrines, and end-states to develop a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system is urgently required. That plan should be prepared by MNF-I and MNSTC-I, coordinated and synchronized with MoD, and should support on-going development of the Iraqi Army health care system to achieve a sustainable capability of care. U.S. military medical mentoring and advising teams that will support implementation of that development plan are discussed in Observation 20. Without comprehensive planning, the development of a long-term sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system will be unable to move forward and dependence on U.S. forces will linger.
Conclusion
The Iraqi Army health care delivery system was unable to support combat operations and was dependent on the U.S. and Coalition forces for battlefield combat casualty care, casualty evacuation, and some definitive treatment. On its own initiative, MoD was unable to develop an independently sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system and required extensive Coalition assistance to achieve that goal.

Independent, effective operations of the Iraqi Army will depend on access to a functioning health care delivery system that provides acceptable field-level combat casualty care, prompt evacuation to lifesaving emergency surgical services, and definitive and restorative surgery and rehabilitation. It should be able to return wounded soldiers to active duty and provide long-term care if they are unable to return to duty.

Building a health care delivery system for the Iraqi Army is a key logistics sustainment challenge that, in particular, requires increased U.S. support and involvement. Building a responsive, proactive, and successful health care delivery system in a stability operation scenario such as Iraq will expedite and sustain the ability of the Iraqi Army to be fully combat ready and more effective in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. It will also facilitate a more rapid drawdown of U.S. military medical operations.

Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response
19.a.(1) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command prepare and implement a medical education section for Iraqi Army health care personnel in its Theater Security Cooperation plan.

Client Comments
Commander, USCENTCOM partially concurred. USCENTCOM stated that the development of medical education opportunities rests within the scope of operations of MNF-I and MNSTC-I. He stated that as operations transition from the current structure to a more traditional security cooperation relationship, the development of a health engagement strategy, including medical education and training, would be appropriate and warranted. Until that time, USCENTCOM suggested that those activities were best developed and coordinated by personnel in country with an intimate knowledge of and relationship with the Iraqi health care system. The Commander reported that the role of the USCENTCOM Surgeon General’s Office (SGO) was to identify and facilitate relationships that support the training and education mission to ensure that health system development goals are attained and that there is continuity between rotating personnel.

Our Response
Although USCENTCOM partially concurred, its comments were not responsive to the intent of the recommendation. The scope of engagement necessary to develop the health care system of the Iraqi Army exceeds the current capacity of MNF-I and MNSTC-I, as revealed by the deficiencies described in our recommendation above. The causes for
those deficiencies are many, but the root cause appears to be lack of unity of effort across DoD and U.S. Government agencies. Rather than postponing action until a more traditional security cooperation relationship develops at an unknown date in the future, USCENTCOM should use all means available to achieve unity of effort now, with an emphasis on focused, comprehensive planning and interagency engagement. The Theater Security Cooperation plan is a valuable means to focus combatant command efforts, but it is not available to DoD elements in country. These issues are described in greater detail below, particularly at our response to Recommendation 20.c. on page 146.

We request that USCENTCOM reconsider its position on the recommendation and provide comments on the final report.

19.a.(2) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command coordinate regular in-country training for Iraq Security Forces personnel with DoD sources such as the Defense Medical Readiness Training Institute and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences.

Client Comments
Commander, USCENTCOM partially concurred. USCENTCOM stated that the responsibility for day-to-day engagement and training activities rested with forces currently located in Iraq (MNF-I and MNSTC-I), and that ongoing training and education activities were occurring. Furthermore, USCENTCOM stated that those training activities were best developed by personnel in country who possessed an intimate knowledge of and relationship with components of the Iraqi health care system. The Commander reported that the role of the USCENTCOM SGO was to assist in identifying and facilitating relationships that supported the training and education mission of forces assigned in Iraq and to maintain a strategic role in the training and education mission to ensure a clear vision of health system development goals and continuity between successive assigned personnel.

Our Response
Commander, USCENTCOM’s comments were not responsive to the intent of the recommendation. While we agree that training activities for the Iraq Security Forces are greatly influenced by the personnel in country who are working with the Iraqi health care system on a daily basis, we believe that the Theater Commander is in a unique position to leverage strategic partnerships with greater facility than the commander in country. See our summary response at Recommendation 20.c. on page 146 for greater detail. We request that USCENTCOM reconsider its position on the recommendation and provide comments to the final report.

19.b.(1) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq mentor Iraqi Army health care personnel at the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, division, brigade, and unit levels by Coalition partners (this is discussed in more detail in Observation 20).
**Client Comments**

Commander, MNF-I concurred, adding that the MNF-I Surgeon General had gained tentative approval from the Iraqi Minister of Health to initiate mentoring programs for Iraqi physicians, nurses, and health care administrators.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNF-I comments were partially responsive. The MNF-I response appears to focus on mentoring Iraqi civilian health care professionals rather than Iraqi Army health care personnel and does not mention using medical expertise that may be available in Coalition forces. While mentoring Iraqi civilian health care professionals is an important component of the development of the Iraqi health care delivery system, the intent of this recommendation is to address mentoring and advising needs within the Iraqi Army. MNF-I should leverage the extensive military medical expertise currently available in coalition units by developing partnering agreements with Coalition units for advising and mentoring. Such efforts must be in support of a comprehensive, synchronized, multi-year medical mentoring plan as described in our summary response at Recommendation 20.c. on page 146. Therefore, we request that MNF-I provide additional comments in response to the final report identifying specific plans or initiatives undertaken or considered for mentoring Iraqi Army health care professionals by making use of the medical expertise resident in Coalition forces.

19.b.(2) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq develop and implement partnering agreements between co-located Coalition and Iraqi Army units in which Iraqi personnel are provided routine and emergency care on a reimbursable basis (this is discussed in more detail in Observation 23).

**Client Comments**

Commander, MNF-I non-concurred with the recommendation, stating that routine care for Iraqi personnel was prohibited by Title X. Further, the Commander reported that there were no implementing instructions available, nor medical units equipped or staffed to bill for services rendered. MNF-I reported that U.S. medical resources in Iraq had been operating from a locally approved exception to policy for non-Coalition Force medical care.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNF-I comments were not responsive to the intent of the recommendation. DoD Instruction 6015.23, “Delivery of Healthcare at Military Treatment Facilities: Foreign Service Care; Third-Party Collection; Beneficiary Counseling and Assistance Coordinators,” October 30, 2002, implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures on provision of care in military treatment facilities. MNF-I should develop a local exception to policy to provide the routine and emergency care which is being provided on a reimbursable basis and submit a formal exception to policy request to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)) to allow for that care. Subsequently, MNF-I should provide input to the ASD(HA) so that DoDI 6015.23 can be updated to support MNF-I requirements in Iraq. During our visit, we identified
two medical personnel who were already trained and equipped to implement a theater wide reimbursement policy within the current scope of their duties. Our response at Recommendation 23 on page 167 provides additional detail about reimbursement for care.

We request that MNF-I reconsider its position on the recommendation and provide comments to the final report.

19.c.(1) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in developing and implementing a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multi-year Iraqi plan that identifies overall strategies, doctrines, and end-states to develop a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system. This plan should include, at a minimum, facility construction, logistical support, external medical mentoring, and civilian partnerships for staffing and management.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, noting that MNSTC-I was engaged with the MoD SGO and Directorate of Military Medical Services in both near-term and long-term planning. He reported that current ongoing planning efforts with the MoD SGO included such issues as major facility construction, logistics support, external medical monitoring, and civilian partnerships for staffing and management.

Our Response
Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive. MNSTC-I is to be commended for its proactive engagement efforts with the MoD SGO, identifying multiple sources for medical supplies, and developing civilian partnerships. Those efforts should be incorporated into a long-term plan that includes milestones and desired end states so that those early successes can be continued and built upon as MNSTC-I Health Affairs team members rotate. Additionally, resource gaps, including required manpower and expertise, should be identified and promptly elevated to MNF-I and USCENTCOM for expedited action, so that progress is maintained. We request that MNSTC-I provide additional comments in response to the final report identifying specific actions to develop and implement a comprehensive, multi-year plan for developing a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system.
We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in developing financial and educational initiatives to recruit, train, and retain physician, dentist, nurse, combat medic, medical logistics, administrative, and allied health support personnel to work in the Iraqi Army health care delivery system. Specific techniques that can be used are:

- Promoting the use of enabling technologies such as distance learning and telemedicine where feasible to recruit, train, and retain new and current health care soldiers and workers for the Iraqi Army.

- Developing procedures for providing entry-level literacy and medical vocational training to disaffected groups in Iraq (e.g., the Sons of Iraq) and to recruit from this manpower pool for positions in the health care sector to obtain counterinsurgency benefits.

Client Comments

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, noting that MoD provides incentive pay for physicians and lobbies to keep pace with MoH; expansion of that effort was also needed for nurses, dentists, and allied health personnel who work in the MoD. The Commander reported, however, that physician staffing remained the significant obstacle. The draft Iraqi Law of Ministry Service & Retirement is currently approaching its second reading in the Iraqi Parliament and is expected to pass into law by the end of Calendar Year 2008. This broad based legislation is expected to create authority for making pay and benefits equitable to MoD physicians for their service.

Our Response

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive to the intent of the recommendation, but did not address leveraging enabling technologies or providing entry-level training for disaffected groups. We request that MNSTC-I respond to this recommendation in the final report. See our response at Recommendation 19.c.(5) below for more extensive discussion of this issue.

We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in developing a practical medical operations support budget that is sufficient to meet the current and future recurring operations, maintenance, and re-supply needs of the Iraqi Army health care delivery system and the construction of adequate health care facilities.

Client Comments

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, noting that the MoD SGO has budgeted for medical operations within its purview, which are severely limited due to manpower shortages. He stated that during FY07, execution was less than 5 percent of allocated budget due to extensive bureaucratic barriers within MoD, but that the FY08 execution had improved significantly with over 60 percent execution with two months remaining in the fiscal year.
**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive to the intent of the recommendation, but did not demonstrate that MNSTC-I was advising MoD on budgeting for current and future recurring operations, maintenance, and re-supply needs, or construction of adequate health care facilities. See our response at Recommendation 19.c.(5) below for a more detailed explanation. We request that MNSTC-I respond to this recommendation in the final report.

| 19.c.(4) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in developing partnerships with the Ministry of Health for access of Iraqi Army soldiers to secure hospitals for surgical care, specialty referral care, and rehabilitative care. |

**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, noting that the MoD SGO was currently re-negotiating a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the MoH that was set to expire at the end of 2008. A working draft had been provided to MNSTC-I for comment and recommendations. MNSTC-I reported that the MOA contained provisions for the referral, surgical care, and rehabilitation of ISF personnel.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required.

| 19.c.(5) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in developing partnerships with the Ministry of Health and other Government of Iraq ministries for access to schools of medicine, nursing, public health, and allied health professions, including financial incentives where necessary, to produce sufficient medical staff to operate the Iraqi Army health care delivery system. |

**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, noting that the MoD SGO was currently re-negotiating a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the MoH that was set to expire at the end of 2008. A working draft had been provided to MNSTC-I for comment and recommendations. MNSTC-I reported that the MOA contained provisions for training, referrals, surgical care, and rehabilitation of ISF personnel.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were partially responsive to the intent of the recommendation, but did not identify the on-going process to ensure that Iraqi Army health care needs from the MoH will continue to be addressed in an interagency forum. The solutions to challenges in manpower, training, salary, budget, and civil-military partnerships to develop the Iraqi Army require coordinated efforts by MNSTC-I, MNF-I, and the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché, with support from USCENTCOM and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. MNSTC-I should elevate those crucial issues to the MNF-I and U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché’s interagency forum for tracking and take coordinated action consistent with a comprehensive, integrated, multi-year developmental plan. We request that MNSTC-I provide a description of the process by which they coordinate with MNF-I and the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché.
Observation 20. Multi-National Force-Iraq Medical Mentoring Support to the Iraqi Army

Adequate planning and specific, prioritized medical objectives had not been developed for providing mentoring support to the Iraqi Army necessary to assist the Iraqi Army in achieving operationally proficient, sustainable health care delivery capability. Further, it was not evident that mentoring priorities had been synchronized with the appropriate levels of the Iraqi Army medical leadership and Coalition partners or that actionable information had been developed on the difficulties to be overcome with respect to medical logistics, manpower, training, and readiness.

This occurred because MNF-I had not assigned sufficient priority to medical mentoring of the Iraqi Army to effectively develop sustainable combat services support capabilities in the medical area. The MNF-I Command Surgeon had not developed a comprehensive, detailed, and integrated multi-year medical mentoring plan that prioritizes and synchronizes mentoring efforts for MNC-I and MNSTC-I and links together strategic, operational, and tactical mentoring steps required in the mentoring plan.

As a result, Coalition medical personnel have not been adequately trained for mentoring Iraqi Army medical personnel, the identification of solutions to strategic, operational and tactical medical problems in developing an effective Iraqi Army health care delivery system was delayed and adequate resolutions were not implemented.

Applicable Criteria


Members of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent possible, timely and effective individual, collective, unit, and staff training necessary to perform to standard during operations. . . .
The DoD Components shall ensure their individuals and organizations are trained to meet the specific operational requirements of the supported Combatant Commanders, as identified in Combatant Commander-approved Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs), before deploying for operations and while deployed.

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

The Military Health System Strategic Plan. The DoD Military Health System (MHS) mission is to provide optimal health services in support of our nation’s military
mission—anytime, anywhere. The MHS is a unique partnership of medical educators, medical researchers, and health care providers and their support personnel worldwide.

**U.S. Mentoring Planning and Support for the Iraqi Army**

Adequate planning and specific, prioritized medical objectives had not been developed for providing mentoring support to the Iraqi Army and to assist the Iraqi Army in achieving an operationally proficient, sustainable health care delivery capability. In addition, it was not evident that mentoring priorities had been synchronized with the appropriate levels of the Iraqi Army medical leadership and Coalition partners and actionable information had been developed on the difficulties with medical logistics, manpower, training, and readiness.

**Developing and Implementing Planning**

Developing a sustainable Iraqi Army health care system requires a comprehensive, phased mentoring plan that synchronizes and coordinates ministerial level medical training and mentoring with medical training and mentoring at the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, division, brigade, and battalion levels. An early focus of this plan should be on developing junior officers and non-commissioned officers. The plan should include conditions under which responsibilities will be gradually handed over as the Iraqi staff and system demonstrate the capability to take on key sustainment tasks in military medicine.

Implementation of this plan will require medical Military Advisory Teams to advise, mentor, and assist the Iraqi Army in developing critical capability and proficiency in medical logistics, medical plans and operations, combat casualty care, casualty evacuation, in-garrison care, patient administration, resource management, and partnership agreements for life support and other base support functions.

Mentors should be assigned to Iraqi Army medical personnel at the division, brigade, and battalion levels to develop military medical combat service support capability, and at fixed clinics, recruiting and training sites, and medical logistics depots. A notional medical mentor requirement at the brigade level requires approximately 10 mentors per brigade. A notional division and below unit medical mentor laydown is described in Appendix H.

Mentoring and advising a 14-division, 50-brigade Iraqi Army would require approximately 528 U.S. or Coalition military medical personnel or contractor personnel as mentors and advisors, with an additional 25 mentors for the fixed clinics, recruiting and training sites, and medical logistics depots.

**Coalition Medical Activities**

Mentoring partnerships with Coalition forces were largely ad-hoc at the ministerial, division, brigade, and unit levels, as dedicated mentors were assigned to only the Iraqi Army Surgeon General and the Iraqi Ground Forces Command Surgeon. Several medical logistics mentors worked within one brigade but were not addressing strategic medical logistics issues.
While some Iraqi Army mentoring and training was being provided by partnered Coalition medics, it was ad hoc and unfocused, and was a low priority since Iraqi mentoring and training was a secondary duty to mentors’ primary role of Coalition medical care. Most Coalition medical activities with Iraqis were short-term projects, rather than focused on support of capability-building strategic programs, thus distracting from long-term capability development.

**Logistics Military Assistance Teams**

MNSTC-I and MNC-I were developing Logistics Military Assistance Teams and Logistics Training Advisory Teams to strengthen partnerships with the Iraqi Army to accelerate development of a sustainable force. The Logistics Military Assistance Team manning concept included one combat medic that would provide basic medical care to the team.

This medic’s secondary duties included mentoring Iraqi health personnel on aide station operations, providing emergency medical support for Iraqis, and providing oversight on medical supply management. A tertiary duty was to advise, assist, and coordinate with his Iraqi Army counterpart in support of current and future operations.

We believe that the medical mentoring and advising functions that are needed to develop a sustainable, effective Iraqi Army health care system will not be met by just one medical mentor, for whom mentoring and advising are secondary or tertiary duties.

**Mentoring the Transition of Health Clinics to Iraqi Army Control**

MNSTC-I mentoring of the efforts to transition health care clinics to Iraqi Army control had not been effective. Those efforts had brought to the surface significant procedural and process barriers within the Iraqi Army that prevented sustainable independent medical operations.

For example, Iraqi Army in-garrison clinics and medical units in support of operational maneuver units were under-staffed, and Iraqi Army personnel who were present were not being advised and mentored in their core duties. Medical equipment was improperly maintained when present and supplies and pharmaceuticals were often not present when needed.

The lack of mentors inhibited assuring that Iraqi Army medical personnel were in place and able to effectively work in the critical functional areas of medical logistics, medical plans and operations, combat casualty care, in-garrison care, patient administration, and financial management.

**Coalition Air Force Training Team**

We believe that a strong mentoring team can be very effective. For example, intensive mentoring of Iraqi Air Force aeromedical personnel over the past two years had resulted in demonstrable capability in casualty evacuation during recent operations in Basra. The Iraqi Air Force successfully transported 105 casualties from Basra to Baghdad.
A team of seven U.S. mentors training Iraqi Air Force flight surgeons and flight medical technicians had rapidly identified and corrected previously unaddressed manpower and training process problems that had prevented effective operations.

As the Iraqi Air Force expands to more locations and its aeromedical section grows from a staff of 36 to the anticipated end state of 120, the medical mentoring and transition Coalition Air Force Training Team will need to grow to maintain objective aeromedical proficiency at multiple Iraqi Air Force locations. A strong foundation had been laid that could ensure ongoing success as the Iraqi Air Force takes on more responsibility and moves towards independent operations.

**Medical Mentoring Process**

Effective mentoring depends on having qualified personnel embedded at tactical, operational, and strategic levels so advice, support, and troubleshooting can be simultaneously passed up and down both the Iraqi and U.S. command chains. This process should be clearly established for the key operational proficiency areas of command and control, clinical care, and medical logistics.

For example, a U.S. medical mentor at the tactical unit level would help his Iraqi counterpart identify a medical supply shortfall and help prepare a supply requisition according to Iraqi Army procedures. The U.S. mentor at the tactical unit level would notify the U.S. mentor at the next level up that the requisition is working its way through the system once that particular requisition is put into the Iraqi Army medical supply system.

This next-level mentor would then work with his Iraqi counterpart to find the requisition, approve it, and forward it to an Iraqi Location Command to be filled. This mentor would also notify the U.S. mentor at the Location Command that the requisition had been approved and needed to be filled. The Location Command mentor would work with the Iraqi Location Command staff to fill the requisition and ship the items appropriately, or to forward the requisition to the Taji National Depot according to Iraqi Army procedures.

This process works from the top down as well as from the bottom up, to pass down orders, new policies, and procedures; and it applies in many administrative and clinical areas as well. Lack of mentors at any level prevents the entire system from functioning effectively.

**Measuring Effectiveness of Medical Mentoring**

Effective medical mentoring and advising requires in-depth engagement with Iraqi Army medical personnel at field units, Location Command clinics, recruiting and training sites, and medical logistics depots. Tools must be developed that support timely and accurate data collection so problems are identified, elevated, and corrected by senior leaders.

Typical problem areas include inadequate numbers of properly trained medical staff, equipment and supply shortfalls, and weak management and operational readiness.
reporting. A Medical Operational Readiness Report for weekly submission via the Medical Military Advisory Team structure would provide prompt identification of the most typical staffing, training, and resupply issues, and can be easily customized according to local needs. Appendix I shows an example of this form.

**Future U.S. Mentor Training**

Under DoDD 3000.05, the responsibilities of key DoD organizations are outlined.

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall:
  
  Identify personnel and training requirements for stability operations and evaluate DoD progress in developing forces to meet those requirements, according to DoD Directive 1322.18 (reference (c)).

- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
  
  Develop curricula at joint military education and individual training venues for the conduct and support of stability operations, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

- The Commanders of the Geographic Combatant Commands, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall:
  
  Identify stability operations requirements and incorporate stability operations into military training . . .

- The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, shall:
  
  Ensure curricula in individual and unit training programs and service schools prepare personnel for stability operations, in coordination with the USD (P&R) [Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness] and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

More specifically, DoDD 3000.05 requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to “Ensure DoD medical personnel and capabilities are prepared to meet military and civilian health requirements in stability operations.”

**Training Curricula**

U.S. and Coalition medical mentoring personnel need a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of Iraqi culture and history; background and organization of MoD, MoI, MoH, and ISF; mentoring efforts used to date along with the successes and failures that have occurred; and the difficulties in facilitating long-term change in the Iraqi system. This understanding is needed so that expectations for change are reasonable and effective mentoring strategies can be developed and implemented.

Further, U.S. and Coalition medical mentors should be trained with similar curricula so mentoring efforts can be synchronized and standardized. This added preparation would reduce potential confusion among ISF medical personnel that may receive mentoring from different approaches.
Pre-deployment Training
All mentors received approximately 60 days of pre-deployment combat skills training at Fort Riley, Kansas and 1 week of additional training in Kuwait prior to their arrival in Iraq. This training focused on combat skills and convoy operations. This training has been reported by Coalition medical personnel in Iraq to be insufficient preparation for cross-cultural medical mentoring in the ISF setting.

Preparation for Medical Mentoring in Iraq
Short-term deployments, lack of health systems developmental experience, and lack of preparation for cross-cultural medical mentoring will likely limit the effectiveness of efforts by U.S. military and civilian mentors and trainers in Iraq, as it has in Afghanistan. In addition, the multiple tasking of personnel and the relegation of efforts to build a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system to secondary status relative to Coalition support precluded an adequate focus on Iraqi health sector engagement.

DoD efforts to support the reconstruction, training, and organizing of the Iraqi Army health care system were complicated by the 6 to 12 month deployment cycles of U.S. military personnel, which limited continuity, effective mentoring, and sustainable progress. However, additional pre-deployment training and preparation may partially compensate for shorter lengths of deployments.

The Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences has prepared a draft training curriculum for medical Embedded Training Teams, Police Mentor Teams, and Provincial Reconstruction Team members in Afghanistan as an initial effort to improve the focus for pre-deployment training. This curriculum may be applicable to mentoring practices in Iraq, as it includes many aspects of medical reconstruction and development that are common to both Embedded Training Team and Police Mentor Team missions.

According to the Commanding General, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, this additional pre-deployment training should be provided before service members deploy from the U.S. to minimize the training footprint in theater. Providing such training in theater is difficult due to time, travel, force protection, and operational tempo constraints.

Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

20.a.(1) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq assign sufficient priority to medical mentoring of the Iraqi Army to effectively develop sustainable combat services support capabilities in the medical area; and develop a comprehensive, phased, detailed, and integrated multi-year medical mentoring plan that prioritizes and synchronizes mentoring efforts and that links together strategic, operational, and tactical mentoring steps required in the mentoring plan.
**Client Comments**

Commander, MNF-I concurred, stating that efforts were ongoing between the MNF-I Surgeon, the U.S. Mission-Iraq (USM-I) Health Attaché, and the Iraqi Minister of Health in the Medical Fusion Cell, which coordinates activity at a strategic level. The Commander reported that the Iraqi Healthcare Optimization Panel was the operational/tactical arm of the Medical Fusion Cell. The MNF-I Surgeon’s cell had also developed and circulated an Action Plan along four Lines of Effort in support of the MoH.

**Our Response**

Although MNF-I concurred, we do not consider its comments responsive to the intent of the recommendation. Medical Fusion Cell activities and the MNF-I Action Plan were focused primarily on the Iraqi civilian health care system. While that focus is essential, the intent of the recommendation was to develop a comprehensive, phased, detailed and integrated multi-year medical mentoring plan for the Iraqi Army. This effort will require MNF-I direction, as it requires support and coordination from MNC-I, MNSTC-I, the USM-I, and the Iraqi MoH. See our summary response at Recommendation 20.b. below for a more extensive discussion of this issue.

We request that MNF-I reconsider its position on this recommendation and provide comments to the final report that speak to the development of a comprehensive, phased, detailed, and integrated multi-year medical mentoring plan addressing medical mentoring needs of the Iraqi Army.

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20.a.(2) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq establish a medical sustainment staff element, within the Multi-National Force-Iraq logistics section, with the primary mission of mentoring the Iraq Security Forces in developing a sustainable health care system.

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**Client Comments**

Commander, MNF-I non-concurred, stating that this required action more appropriately belonged at the USCENTCOM level or above. The current trend has been to decrease the MNF-I Surgeon’s billets by removing Joint Manning Document (JMD) slots. The organization had gone from a peak of 17 personnel to its current level of 6. The Commander stated that because of JMD manning constraints, the Surgeon’s office was required to augment its staff for ongoing projects and that for any significant, sustained capability, it would need to be supported from higher authority.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNF-I comments were not responsive to the intent of the recommendation. We request that MNF-I respond to the recommendation regarding the establishment of a medical sustainment staff element and provide comments on the final report. MNF-I should coordinate with USCENTCOM to elevate the issue of insufficient JMD staff to address this requirement. See our responses at Recommendations 20.b. and 20.c. on pages 145-146 for a more extensive discussion of this issue.
20.a.(3) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq organize Medical Military Advisory Teams under its medical sustainment cell and place experienced contractor personnel in key positions for continuity of mentoring effectiveness.

Client Comments
Commander, MNF-I non-concurred with this recommendation, stating that that action more appropriately resided at the USCENTCOM level or above. MNF-I stated that the current trend had been to decrease the MNF-I Surgeon’s billets by removing Joint Manning Document (JMD) slots. The organization had gone from a peak of 17 personnel to its current level of 6. The Commander stated that because of JMD manning constraints, the Surgeon’s office was required to augment its staff for ongoing projects and that for any significant, sustained capability, it would need to be supported from higher authority.

Our Response
Commander, MNF-I comments were not responsive to the intent of the recommendation. We request that MNF-I respond to the recommendation regarding the establishment of a medical sustainment staff element and provide comments on the final report. MNF-I should coordinate with USCENTCOM to elevate the issue of insufficient JMD staff to address that requirement. See our responses at Recommendations 20.b. and 20.c. on pages 145-146 for a more extensive discussion of this issue.

20.a.(4) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq submit a Request for Forces to staff the Medical Military Advisory Teams and other medical mentoring positions with 553 medical mentors to embed with Iraqi Army field units, Location Command clinics, recruiting and training sites, and medical logistics units.

Client Comments
Commander, MNF-I concurred, but stated that the current trend had been to decrease the MNF-I Surgeon’s billets by removing JMD slots. The Commander noted that the organization had gone from a peak of 17 personnel to its current level of 6. He stated that because of JMD manning constraints, the Surgeon’s office was required to augment its staff for ongoing projects and that for any significant, sustained capability, it would need to be supported from higher authority.

Although not required to comment, the Vice Director of the Joint Staff added that a holistic review of all medical capabilities would be required before any level of sourcing would be provided.

Our Response
Although, MNF-I concurred with the recommendation, we do not consider its comments responsive. We agree that the number of medical staff in the MNF-I Surgeon’s office has decreased and that coordination must be made with USCENTCOM to increase the
numbers of billets on the MNF-I JMD. However, we believe that the need for Medical Military Advisory teams and medical mentors is a key aspect of building a sustainable Iraqi Army medical capability. We also agree with the Joint Staff assessment that a holistic review of all medical capabilities is required before any level of sourcing could be provided. That review should be requested by the senior field command in theater – MNF-I. While it may be more appropriate for Medical Military Advisory Teams and other medical mentors to be assigned to other organizations, such as MNSTC-I or MNC-I, we request that MNF-I respond to the recommendation regarding the submission of a Request for Forces (RFF) and provide comments to the final report. See our responses at Recommendations 20.b. and 20.c. below for more extensive discussion of this issue.

20.a.(5) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq establish a partnership between its medical sustainment cell, and the logistics sustainment cell that is under consideration in the Taji National Army Depot Logistics pilot project, to take advantage of the proximity to the Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute and the Supply Class VIII medical logistics warehouses.

Client Comments
Commander, MNF-I non-concurred, stating that the current trend had been to decrease the MNF-I Surgeon’s billets by removing JMD slots. He reported that the organization had gone from a peak of 17 personnel to its current level of 6. He stated that because of JMD manning constraints, the Surgeon’s office was required to augment its staff for ongoing projects and that for any significant, sustained capability, it would need to be supported from higher authority.

Our Response
Commander, MNF-I comments were not responsive. We request that MNF-I respond to the recommendation regarding a partnership between its medical sustainment cell and the logistics sustainment cell at Taji National Army Depot and provide comments to the final report. See our responses at Recommendations 20.b. and 20.c. below for a more extensive discussion of this issue.

20.b. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, establish a requirement for comprehensive medical pre-deployment and in-country training for the medical mentors supporting Coalition efforts in Iraq.

Client Comments
Commander, USCENTCOM concurred.

The Vice Director, Joint Staff supported the recommendation of establishing a requirement for comprehensive medical pre-deployment and in-country training for the medical mentors supporting coalition forces. Furthermore, the Vice Director stated that the Joint Staff supported ongoing efforts and recommended using the draft training curriculum for medical Embedded Training Teams, Police Mentor Teams, and Provincial
Reconstruction Team members being developed by the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences.

**Our Response**

While the USCENTCOM concurred with the recommendation, its comments were partially responsive, omitting any description of medical pre-deployment or in-country training for medical mentors. USCENTCOM should develop a process to determine the adequacy of pre-deployment and in-country training, such as pre-deployment and post-deployment surveys of Medical Military Advisory Team members. We request that USCENTCOM provide additional detail about medical pre-deployment and in-country training for medical mentors in response to the final report.

The Vice Director, Joint Staff comments were responsive to the intent of the recommendation, and no additional comments are required from his office.

**Deleted and Renumbered Recommendations**

As a result of client comments, we eliminated Recommendations 20.c. and 20.d. as written in the draft report. Draft Recommendation 20.e. was renumbered to 20.c.

| 20.c. | We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, develop and implement an in-country mentoring orientation program for medical mentors that describes and clarifies current mentoring practices, the Iraq Security Forces medical development objectives and priorities, and that among other issues, meets the requirements of the Commander, U.S. Central Command. |

**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I non-concurred, noting that although MNSTC-I had provided an orientation program for the medical component to the MNSTC-I Logistics Military Advisory Teams (LMATs), there were significantly more mentoring teams in the Iraq Theater of Operations than the LMATs. MNSTC-I also stated that MNF-I should more appropriately be the organization to develop the orientation program.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were not responsive to the intent of the recommendation. We agree that there are more medical mentors present in Iraq than those attached to the LMATs. We believe that development of an orientation program for medical mentors nevertheless resides with MNSTC-I because MNSTC-I is responsible for the current ISF train and equip mission. We request that MNSTC-I provide further comments on development of such a medical mentoring orientation course in response to the final report.

**Addendum: Our Summary Response**

The client comments to Recommendations 20.a.(2) through 20.a.(5) and to Recommendation 20.c. highlight the fundamental challenges facing USCENTCOM and
MNF-I as U.S. forces are right-sized and repositioned for the next phase of support to the Iraqi Army. The lack of DoD expertise applied to comprehensive health sector development, the lack of strategic interagency partnerships at all levels to obtain that expertise, and constraints imposed by USCENTCOM as responsibility for combat and security operations are transitioned to the Iraqi Security Forces have prevented effective planning for developing a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system.

A holistic, integrated, synchronized, multi-year plan that identifies overall strategies, doctrines, and end-states; that identifies the external expertise needed to advise and mentor Iraqi Army medical personnel; and that provides a concept of operations and adequate staffing for Medical Military Advisory Teams requires strong coordination between the Joint Staff, USCENTCOM, and MNF-I, as well as support from other U.S. government agencies. We believe that the deliberative planning process should be applied to develop this comprehensive plan to develop an independent, sustainable ISF health care system.

Commander, MNF-I should request, and USCENTCOM should support, sufficient JMD manpower to develop and maintain the required plan necessary to effectively mentor and advise the Iraqi Army combat medical services support capabilities; to create and support a medical sustainment staff element to carry out medical mentoring and advising, and to generate a Request For Forces to staff sufficient Medical Military Advisory Teams.

Commander, MNF-I should task MNSTC-I to develop and implement an in-country orientation program for new Medical Military Advisory Teams that describes and clarifies current mentoring practices and progress towards developmental milestones, among other key issues.

Because of the nature of the medical mentoring program as it exists in Iraq, we request that Commander, USCENTCOM and Commander, MNF-I jointly and in coordination reconsider their positions on Recommendations 20.a.(2) through 20.a.(5) and on Recommendation 20.c. and provide comments to each in response to the final report.
Observation 21. Synchronization of U.S. Government Interagency Efforts

MNF-I and MNSTC-I had not developed comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multi-year plans that identified overall strategies, doctrines, or end-states to establish a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system,

In addition, the U.S. interagency health care representatives in Iraq, including DoD, the U.S. Mission–Iraq, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, lacked both a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multi-year plan and an effective U.S. Government interagency planning forum to support reconstruction of the civilian and military health sector and assist the Iraqi government in developing their own sustainable national health sector capability

This occurred because U.S. Central Command and MNF-I had not developed, in coordination with the U.S. Mission–Iraq, the Department of State, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the relevant Iraqi ministries, a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multi-year plan to fully mobilize Coalition and Iraqi efforts to support reconstruction of the civilian and military health sector and assist the Iraqis in developing an independent and sustainable national health sector capability where necessary to support the MoD and the Iraqi Army.

Further, a single organizational focal point had not been identified or established for planning and accomplishing the U.S. Government’s role in supporting the health care goals with respect to establishing an independent and sustainable system for MoD and the Iraqi Army, once those goals were identified by MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MoD (see Observation 19); nor had an interagency forum been established to plan and coordinate the implementation of U.S. Government health sector mentoring of MoH or accomplish other health care support activities on behalf of MoD and the Iraqi Army.

As a result, an integrated Iraqi health care system may not develop upon which an independent and sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system would have to depend. In addition, until the Iraqi Army achieves health care sustainability, the U.S. and Coalition partners will have to maintain their combat casualty care assistance to support the Iraqi Army.

**Applicable Criteria**

**DoD Directive 3000.05.** DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations
The Military Health System Strategic Plan

The DoD MHS mission is “to provide optimal health services in support of our nation’s military mission - anytime, anywhere.” The MHS is a unique partnership of medical educators, medical researchers, and health care providers and their support personnel worldwide. “The Military Health System Strategic Plan – A Roadmap for Medical Transformation,” May 29, 2008, was developed to:

[Re-examine our fundamental purpose, our vision of the future, and strategies to achieve that vision. We are refocusing our efforts on the core business in which we are engaged - creating an integrated medical team that provides optimal health services in support of our nation's military mission - anytime, anywhere. We are ready to go in harm's way to meet our nation's challenges at home or abroad - to be a national leader in health education, training, research and technology. We build bridges to peace through humanitarian support when and wherever needed, across our nation and the globe, and we provide premier care for our warriors and the military family.

Furthermore, the MHS Strategic Plan, under “Purpose, Vision, and Strategy” states:

We have a singular opportunity to build bridges to peace in hostile countries. In many circumstances, the MHS will serve as the tip of the spear and a formidable national strategy tool for the nation. And, we can take advantage of a one-time opportunity to design and build health facilities that promote a healing environment during the clinical encounter, empower our patients and families, relieve suffering, and promote long-term health and wellness. We will employ evidence-based design principles that link to improved clinical outcomes, patient and staff safety, and long-term operational efficiencies.

Joint Publication 4-02, Health Service Support, October 31, 2006

According to Joint Publication 4-02, the purpose of HSS is to maintain the individual and group health needed to accomplish a military mission. The intent is to effectively and efficiently use medical capabilities and individual healthful practices to prevent and/or correct any human condition that would impair or preclude the joint force from achieving its objectives.

Joint Publication 4-02 states that HSS is related to three joint functions: sustainment, movement and maneuver, and protection and adds:

HSS promotes, improves, conserves, or restores health within a military system. HSS capabilities are employed across the range of military operations and include the ability to organize, train, and equip preceding deployment and enable the employment of physically fit personnel. These capabilities span the operational environment from point of injury/illness to the appropriate capability of care.

Joint Publication 4-02 continues to state that foremost is the role of HSS in sustainment: the provision of medical support required to maintain health during prolonged operations until successful accomplishment of the joint force objectives. Joint Publication 4-02 also notes that one of the HSS operational considerations is stability operations.
Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability operations objectives could include the restoration of services such as water, sanitation, public health, and essential medical care. The desired military end state in the health sector should be an indigenous capacity to provide vital health services.

**U.S. Strategy for Developing Capacity in Iraqi Ministries**

The U.S. interagency health care representatives in Iraq, including DoD, the Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, lacked a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multi-year plan to support reconstruction of the civilian and military health sector and to assist the Iraqi government in developing its own sustainable national health sector capability.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has highlighted the need for an integrated U.S. Government strategy to help build the institutional capacity of the Iraqi national government, whereby a lead entity with a strategic approach integrates U.S. Government efforts with Iraqi government priorities. \(^{32}\) GAO found that the U.S. Government was just beginning to develop an overall strategy, with a clear purpose, scope, and methodology; delineation of U.S. roles, responsibilities, coordination, and integration; desired goals, objectives, and activities; performance measures; and a description of costs, resources needed, and risk. GAO singled out MNSTC-I as having developed some of these elements for its individual mentoring programs at the ministries, but not as a part of a unified strategy for all U.S. government support efforts.

More recently, GAO reaffirmed the importance of integrated, coordinated ministerial capacity building efforts with clear ties to Iraqi-identified priorities and information on how resources will be targeted to achieve the desired end-state. \(^{33}\) It concluded that an overarching direction from a lead U.S. Government entity that integrated efforts was lacking; and that shifting time frames and priorities in response to deteriorating security, and a shift from long-term institution-building projects to more immediate efforts to help Iraqi ministries overcome their inability to spend their capital budgets and deliver essential services to the Iraqi people, further delayed capacity building.

The MNF-I Command Surgeon had recognized the challenges of developing coordinated strategic plans with MoH, where deliberate strategic planning was a new concept. This office had developed a strategic engagement plan for MNF-I that focused on four lines of operation: 1) human resources, 2) population health, 3) infrastructure, and 4) governance.

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This approach allowed the identification of initial priorities in each area and should lead to the development of tasks and measures of effectiveness.

The MNF-I Surgeon’s staff had identified additional barriers to progress, including the lack of available personnel with experience in strategic planning; the challenges in working in collaboration between DoD and other U.S. Government agencies and non-governmental organizations; and limited U.S. experience and training in medical stability operations.

Nevertheless, we believe that a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multi-year U.S. plan still needs to be prepared. This plan should serve to fully mobilize efforts to build strategic medical partnerships that support reconstruction of the civilian and military health sector and assist the Iraqis in developing a sustainable national health sector capability. Having and implementing this plan are essential to the development of the Iraqi Army health care delivery system.

**Planning and Accomplishing U.S. Government Health Care Goals**

There was no single U.S. Government focal point, such as a planning group or an interagency forum, for planning and accomplishing U.S. Government health care goals, including the mentoring of Iraqi health care organizations. However, an interagency forum to coordinate the implementation of U.S. Government health sector reconstruction activities had just been reinstituted by MNF-I in coordination with the U.S. Mission.

**Coordination for Iraqi Army Medical Sustainability**

Given the dependence of the Iraqi Army on medical services provided by MoH, there were potential efficiencies if U.S. Government civilian and military mentoring of MoD and MoH activities to develop an independent and sustainable health care system for the Iraqi Army were fully coordinated and mutually reinforcing. Recruiting of Iraqi medical personnel, initial and continuing medical education, provision of medical supplies and equipment, and planning construction and renovation of medical infrastructure could have been accomplished more efficiently and at lower cost if the key actors – MoD and MoH – were working in close collaboration with, and supported by, an integrated mentoring effort on the part of the U.S. government.

For example, insufficient planning and coordination between the MNF-I Command Surgeon and the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché limited the U.S. Government effort to bring MoD and MoH together. In one instance, this led to redundant engagement on Iraqi planning for improvement of the Kimadia medical logistics system. Close coordination of MoD and MoH engagement activities by DoD elements and the U.S. Mission-Iraq during both planning and implementation phases is essential to building sustainable ministry capacity in which both MoD and MoH work together in support of Iraqi Army health care development.

**Coordination of Health Sector Reconstruction Activities**

There was little coordination and integration of Iraqi government health sector
reconstruction activities between the rural, provincial, and central levels. Specifically, there was minimal communication between the central MoH and provincial health Directors General on health care needs and priorities and no apparent Iraqi central-local government coordination or prioritization of projects.

Uncoordinated mentoring of MoD and MoH health officials by DoD elements and U.S. Mission-Iraq officials at the rural, provincial, and central levels led to unfocused expenditure of resources. However, coordinated mentoring efforts could provide Iraqi leadership and management development training at multiple levels, increase responsiveness of Iraqi central government leaders to local concerns, and leverage U.S. efforts and resources.

U.S. Government and Government of Iraq Coordination and Planning

Recognizing the crucial need for effective coordination between DoD and the U.S. Mission-Iraq with respect to mentoring MoD and MoH, the MNF-I Command Surgeon had re instituted an interagency civil-military forum to synchronize strategic health sector support issues and activities that included a process to evaluate and coordinate health activities at the rural, provincial, and central levels.

While this group was just getting underway after a prolonged period of inactivity, it had the potential to improve all U.S. Government health care development activities, particularly those in support of the Iraqi Army. The MNF-I Command Surgeon’s “Strategic Plan for Improving the Iraqi Healthcare System” may serve as a foundation for a coordinated U.S. Government strategy for capacity building in MoD and MoH.

We believe that this newly functioning interagency civil-military forum could be the single focal point for planning and overseeing the accomplishment of the U.S. Government’s role in supporting the health care goals for MoD and the Iraqi Army, once those goals are identified by MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and MoD (see Observation 19). This forum also needs to plan and coordinate the implementation of U.S. Government health sector mentoring of MoH with respect to accomplishing support activities on behalf of MoD and the Iraqi Army.

Conclusion

As stated previously in Observation 19, the Iraqi Army health care delivery system was unable to support combat operations and was dependent on the U.S. and Coalition forces for battlefield combat casualty care, casualty evacuation, and some definitive treatment. Moreover, on its own initiative, MoD was unable to develop an independently sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system.

As such, the limited resources and human capital in the Government of Iraq require military and civilian health care systems in support of the Iraqi Army to be developed as efficiently, economically, and cooperatively as possible. The ability to establish a partnership between the Iraqi military and civilian sectors for hospital care, family member health care needs, and for specialty care is indeed essential to creating a sustainable Iraqi health care system in support of the Iraqi Army. Achieving this
objective will also impact Iraqi capacity for sustaining success in the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts.

Moreover, near-term DoD assistance in the development of an Iraqi Army health care delivery system and subsequent longer-term U.S. Government support through U.S. interagency health care representatives in Iraq, would enable the U.S. to further develop and maintain interoperable military ties with Iraq over the longer term.

Without a comprehensive and fully coordinated U.S. and Iraqi government effort, an integrated Iraqi health care delivery system may not develop upon which a sustainable Iraqi Army health care system would have to depend. In addition, until the Iraqi Army achieves health care sustainability, the U.S. and Coalition partners will have to maintain their combat casualty care assistance to support the Iraqi Army.

The MHS Strategic Plan states, under “Purpose, Vision, and Strategy,” as noted elsewhere in this report, that “We have a singular opportunity to build bridges to peace in hostile countries. In many circumstances, the MHS will serve as the tip of the spear and a formidable national strategy tool for the nation. And, MHS specifically supports the designing and building of health facilities that promote a healing environment during the clinical encounter, empower our patients and families, relieve suffering, and promote long-term health and wellness. We will employ evidence-based design principles that link to improved clinical outcomes, patient and staff safety, and long-term operational efficiencies.”

DoDD 3000.05 states it is DoD policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. . . .

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.

Additionally, the MHS Strategic Plan, under “Purpose, Vision, and Strategy,” also states, “We must have a willingness to experiment, to create a learning support capacity, and to challenge our assumptions constantly in light of new challenges. We must take rational risks to move our system forward….risks that will place us in uncharted environments.”

We believe that it is now time to implement the goals and guidance provided by DoDD 3000.05 and the MHS Strategic Plan by initiating operations to build health care systems that support U.S. objectives in Iraq.
Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

21.a.(1) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command develop and implement, in coordination with the U.S. Mission–Iraq, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, and the relevant Iraqi ministries, a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multi-year plan to fully mobilize efforts to build strategic medical partnerships that support reconstruction of the civilian and military health sector consistent with Iraqi goals and objectives to develop a sustainable national health sector capability where necessary to support the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Army.

Client Comments
Commander, USCENTCOM partially concurred. USCENTCOM agreed with the benefit of a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated multi-year plan to build health sector capacity. The Commander suggested that the focal point for such an effort should reside with the Health Attaché assigned to the U.S. Mission-Iraq. USCENTCOM admitted that there was less certainty to be applied to the effort of building health capacity given the ongoing transition to full Iraqi control. The Commander suggested that the planning effort should be tempered by the continued role of the USG and while considering a future shift to a more traditional security cooperation relationship.

Our Response
Although USCENTCOM partially concurred, its comments were not responsive to the intent of the recommendation. USCENTCOM did not address the development of a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multi-year plan. We believe that unity of effort between DoD elements and all U.S. Government agencies is essential if effective synchronization is to occur in support of Iraqi Army health sector reconstruction. While capacity is developing within the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché’s office, the core competency for strategic planning continues to rest within DoD.

An independent, sustainable Iraqi Army health care system is essential if DoD is to properly transition support to full Iraqi control. As described in Observation 20 of this report, efforts to transition health care clinics to Iraqi Army control have not been effective. Significant procedural and process barriers within the Iraqi Army were identified that prevented sustainable independent medical operations. Our evaluation of the root causes behind these continued deficiencies in Iraqi Army development was consistent with the issues identified by the GAO in their reports, GAO-08-117 and GAO-08-568T – inadequate integration and coordination of U.S. Government efforts; insufficient planning of goals, objectives and activities of the actors; and inadequate Iraqi ministerial capacity building and consideration of Iraqi-identified priorities. We believe it would be prudent to focus USCENTCOM efforts on fully mobilizing DoD support efforts and that of the U.S. Government team to develop sustainable capacity within the Iraqi Army and MoD. See our response at Recommendation 21.b. for a more extensive discussion of this issue.
21.a.(2) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command identify, access, and leverage subject matter experts, the assets of the Military Health System, existing DoD efforts, and those of other U.S. Government (such as the Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Agency for International Development), international, and private sector organizations to assist the U.S. Mission–Iraq and the Multi-National Force-Iraq Command Surgeon efforts to coordinate and implement:

- Development of a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system
- Improved civilian and military medical education systems that adequately complement the Iraqi Army health care delivery system

**Client Comments**

Commander, USCENTCOM partially concurred. USCENTCOM agreed with using and leveraging subject matter experts and assets of the U.S. Government and others to assist development of the Iraqi Army health care system. The Commander stated that similar to previous recommendations, the USCENTCOM SGO must maintain a level of awareness of ongoing development strategy and activities and seek to facilitate support of those activities. The Commander stated that the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché, MNF-I, and MNSTC-I were best positioned and staffed to identify development strategies and methodologies and to carry those out. Finally, USCENTCOM suggested that the USCENTCOM SGO should provide strategic oversight, facilitate the matching of resources to the development strategies, and ensure continuity between deployed forces.

**Our Response**

Although USCENTCOM partially concurred, its comments were not responsive to the intent of the recommendation. USCENTCOM did not explain the planning and process it would use to identify, access, and leverage the U.S. and Iraqi government organizations to develop the Iraqi Army health care delivery systems or to improve education systems. We believe that unity of effort between DoD elements and with all U.S. Government agencies is essential if effective synchronization is to occur in support of Iraqi national health sector reconstruction. While capacity is developing within the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché’s office, the core competency for strategic planning continues to rest within DoD. Neither MNF-I nor MNSTC-I have sufficient manpower or expertise on staff to plan and implement the needed development strategies, as described in client comments to Recommendations 20.a. and 20.b. on pages 143 and 145. See our response at Recommendation 21.b. on page 157 for a more extensive discussion of this issue.

21.a.(3) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Central Command establish, in support of the U.S. Mission–Iraq and the Multi-National Force-Iraq, an interagency forum to plan and coordinate the implementation of U.S. Government health sector mentoring of the Ministry of Health and accomplish other support activities on behalf of the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Army.
Client Comments
Commander, USCENTCOM partially concurred. USCENTCOM agreed with the need for an interagency forum to plan and coordinate the U.S. Government effort, and believes that this role falls within the purview of the Health Attaché assigned to the U.S. Embassy. The Commander stated that MNF-I had absorbed a portion of the coordination role by default, and he pointed out that if the Department of State had the lead for stabilization and reconstruction, then the Department of State should take the lead for planning and coordination.

Our Response
Although USCENTCOM partially concurred, its comments were not responsive to the intent of the recommendation. MNF-I, MNSTC-I, and U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché efforts have been limited, due in part to insufficient support from the multiple U.S. Government agencies involved. USCENTCOM plays an essential coordinating and leveraging role in identifying and bringing together strategic partners in support of the planning and implementation efforts within Iraq and has access to planning tools, resources, and expertise that are unavailable to MNF-I and MNSTC-I. USCENTCOM liaison officers with the Department of State and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) should be mobilized to seek agency support for the planning effort.

In accordance with the DoD policy stated in DoDD 3000.05 and Joint Publication 4-02, the U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so, including the restoration of services such as public health and essential medical care, with a desired end state of an indigenous capacity to provide vital health services. See our response at Recommendation 21.b. below for a more extensive discussion of this issue.

21.b. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, establish a single focal point for planning and accomplishing the U.S. Government’s role in supporting the health care goals of the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Army.

Client Comments
The Commander, MNF-I non-concurred, stating that the lead agent for interfacing with the Government of Iraq was the U.S. Mission-Iraq. For health care issues, this is the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché’s office. The Commander stated that MNF-I was in a support role to the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché.

Our Response
Commander, MNF-I comments were not responsive to the intent of the recommendation. DoD has the lead role and responsibility for supporting the development and sustainment of the MoD and Iraqi Army health care system capabilities. USCENTCOM and MNF-I were not achieving sufficient unity of effort to achieve this goal within DoD elements, or with other U.S. Government agencies such as the Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and USAID. As described in our summary response
at Recommendation 20.c. on page 146, appropriate right-sizing and repositioning of U.S.
forces for the next phase of support to the Iraqi Army requires a holistic reevaluation of
the U.S. engagement strategy. USCENTCOM should facilitate and resource
comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multi-year planning, building strategic
partnerships, and collaboratively engage the MoD and MoH where needed to build a
sustainable, independent Iraqi Army.

USCENTCOM should include these interagency and inter-ministerial engagements in its
requirements analysis, strategy and theater guidance, and in tasking MNF-I, as part of the
deliberative planning process described in our summary response at Recommendation
20.c. on page 146. MNF-I should proactively engage the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health
Attaché to identify resource and authority requirements for this effort. Medical staff
elements should elevate issues through command channels to the theater commander, as
necessary, to overcome bureaucratic barriers that cannot be solved at the staff officer
level. We believe that the USCENTCOM comments highlight the challenges faced by
DoD in implementing DoDD 3000.05 and Joint Publication 4-02 in the interagency
environment to further develop the Iraqi Army health care system.

We request that USCENTCOM and MNF-I jointly and in coordination reconsider their
positions to Recommendations 21.a.(1), 21.a.(2), 21.a.(3), and 21.b. and provide
comments to each in response to the final report.

21.c.(1) We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
establish a U.S.-based health sector reach back support office within the Department of
Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Commander, United States Central Command. Use this office to identify, access, and
leverage subject matter experts, the assets of the Military Health System, existing and
future DoD efforts, and those of other U.S. Government (such as the Department of State,
the Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Agency for International
Development), international, and private sector organizations to assist the U.S. Mission–
Iraq and the Multi-National Force-Iraq Command Surgeon efforts to promote and
implement:

- Development of a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system
- Improved Iraqi civilian and military medical education systems that adequately
  complement the Iraqi Army health care delivery system

Client Comments
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs concurred, noting that the
International Health Division within ASD(HA) was developing expertise and staffing for
reach back support to the Combatant Commands and was seeking to co-locate
interagency personnel from the Departments of State and Health and Human Services,
USAID, and the World Health Organization for complementary strengths and expertise.
**Our Response**
The Assistant Secretary’s comments were responsive to the intent of the recommendation, and no additional comments are required.

21.c.(2) We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs recommend to interagency counterparts the establishment of a U.S.-based interagency health sector reach back support office that would coordinate all U.S. Government health sector reconstruction activities in Iraq.

**Client Comments**
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs concurred, noting that the International Health Division will be the focal point for developing the interagency reach-back capability, as described in 21.c.(1).

**Our Response**
The Assistant Secretary’s comments were responsive to the intent of the recommendation, and no additional comments are required.

**Added Recommendation.** Based on our assessment of DoD health care policy and interagency health care coordination in stability operations as reported in the IG DoD Report, “Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Control and Accountability; Security Assistance; and Sustainment of the Afghan National Security Forces (Report No. SPO-2009-001, dated October 24, 2008), and the continued importance of this topic as evidenced in Iraq, we add the following recommendation.

21.d. We recommend that the Deputy Secretary of Defense designate the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs as the lead to:

- Develop policy for all Defense Department stability operations with a medical component, health-related security and health sector reconstruction activities, medical capacity building, and medical components of humanitarian assistance and disaster response actions;
- Develop policy to form strategic partnerships and cooperative mechanisms with other U.S. Government agencies for stability operations with a medical component, health-related security and health sector reconstruction activities, medical capacity building, and medical components of humanitarian assistance and disaster response actions;
- Develop, in cooperation with other U.S. Government agencies and nongovernmental organizations, non-kinetic strategies for Combatant Commanders and U.S. Embassy country teams to use medical resources in stability operations with a medical component, health-related security and health sector reconstruction activities, medical capacity building, and medical components of humanitarian assistance and disaster response actions;
- Develop measures of performance and outcomes to meet end state goals;
- Identify and program for the resources required to support these tasks.
**Client Comments.**
This is a new recommendation. We request that the Deputy Secretary of Defense provide comments in response to the final report
Observation 22. Storage of U.S. Medical Equipment and Supplies at Abu Ghraib Warehouse

Medical equipment sets purchased to outfit Iraqi clinics has been stored unused in Abu Ghraib Warehouse (AGW) for more than two years. Further, heat sensitive medical supplies also stored in AGW were cooled only by window air conditioning units.

This occurred because there has been no successful attempt to determine where this medical equipment could be used in Iraq or to distribute it to satisfy those identified needs. Further, proper refrigeration equipment was not obtained to ensure that heat sensitive medical supplies were properly protected.

As a result, scarce medical equipment remains unused and the resources to obtain that equipment may have been wasted. In addition, critical medical supplies may not any longer be effective or safe to use if heat damage has occurred while those supplies remained in storage.

Applicable Criteria

DoD Instruction 6430.2. DoDI 6430.2, “DoD Medical Standardization Board (DMSB),” March 17, 1997, implements policy and updates responsibilities, organization, management, and functions of the DoD Medical Standardization Board. One of the policies prescribed is that “Standardized medical materiel shall be used in the total health care system to the greatest extent possible to achieve economies of scale, minimize wastage of outdated shelf-life items, and allow health care providers to use in peacetime what they will use during contingency operations.”

Specifically, Section 6.7.4 states that the DoD Medical Standardization Board shall “Oversee medical shelf-life management programs, in coordination with the Services and the Food and Drug Administration, affecting expiration date management of dated and deteriorative materiel and other items found in Services' assemblages.”


This manual describes environmental monitoring of storage conditions and shelf-life extensions. It states that “any pharmaceutical that is found to have been exposed to temperature or humidity conditions outside the prescribed manufacturer guidelines for more than 72 hours will be considered unserviceable stock and not available for issue.”

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FDA Shelf Life of Medical Devices
Food and Drug Administration, “Shelf Life of Medical Devices,” April 1991, describes Food and Drug Administration regulations and policies relating to shelf life of medical devices, discusses various parameters that determine the length of time a particular device will remain within acceptable specifications, and outlines activities that can be undertaken to establish the shelf life of a device.

Medical Equipment
Medical equipment sets purchased to outfit Iraqi clinics but never issued remained unused and stored in AGW for more than two years. Warehouse personnel believed that some of the clinics were not built or completed because of the termination of the contractor while disinterest or lack of aggressive action on the part of the Iraqi government may have delayed or ended any efforts to construct or complete the clinics or identify new uses for the equipment.

We believe that this equipment was purchased using funds appropriated to the Iraq Security Forces Fund and as such remains U.S. Government property. However, it did not appear that there has been any successful attempt to determine where this medical equipment could be used in Iraq or to distribute it to satisfy those identified needs. Continued storage of this equipment may result in deterioration of the equipment. In either case, unused or deteriorated equipment is a waste of resources.

We believe that MNSTC-I needs to ensure that this equipment is promptly and effectively put to use by the Iraqi government to meet validated needs. Otherwise, or if the Iraqi government has no interest in using this equipment, the equipment needs to be put to better use elsewhere. For example, the equipment could be transferred to Afghanistan and the Iraq Security Forces Fund be reimbursed by the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.

Medical Supplies
Heat sensitive medical supplies stored in AGW were cooled only by window air conditioning units. Those units may not have been adequate to maintain the required temperature in the heat of summer to protect those supplies. Medical supplies such as Morphine and other heat sensitive medical supplies require careful temperature controls or those supplies may no longer be safe to use and thus must be destroyed and are wasted.

Proper refrigeration equipment needs to be identified and obtained by AGW to ensure that heat sensitive medical supplies are properly protected and safe to use even during the heat of the Iraqi summer.
Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response

22.a. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq ensure that this equipment is promptly and effectively put to use by the Iraqi government to meet validated needs or if the Iraqi government has no interest in using this equipment, put the equipment to better use elsewhere.

Client Comments
Commander, MNSTC-I non-concurred and noted that after further investigation, it was determined that a predominant amount of equipment and material in question was owned by the MoH. The equipment and material that was owned and controlled by MNSTC-I was intended for a recently completed MoI clinic. Delivery of that equipment and material had been delayed due to construction schedule changes and was completed in May 2008.

The Commander reported that MNSTC-I personnel visited AGW on May 28, 2008. The Class VIII supplies identified by the Inspector General team belonged to the MoH, MoD, and MoI. MNSTC-I stated that MoH Class VIII fielding was the responsibility of the Department of State and that MNSTC-I subsequently coordinated action with Department of State and the AGW Commander for its distribution.

The Commander, MNSTC-I reported that the MoD Class VIII materiel was identified and information was provided to the Director of Logistics at the MoD SGO. MNSTC-I and MoD SGO then developed plans for the distribution of that material. The MoI Class VIII materiel was delivered in May 2008. There were three more deliveries to the MoI in June and July 2008. The remaining MoI equipment was delivered in September 2008 to the National Police (NP) Headquarters at its Site 1 clinic. The NP had developed, published, and executed a comprehensive distribution plan from Site 1 to all of its supported brigades. MNSTC-I reported that it would continue to engage and mentor the NP in Class VIII self sustainment, replenishment, and advancement.

Our Response
Although MNSTC-I non-concurred with the recommendation, its comments were responsive, and no additional comments are required. MNSTC-I is to be commended for unraveling the sources and destinations of these supplies and equipment. While some wastage occurred, MNSTC-I efforts apparently salvaged much of the value.

22.b. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq determine medical storage refrigeration requirements for heat sensitive medical supplies and ensure the proper equipment is obtained and installed to maintain environmental safeguards for those medical supplies stored at Abu Ghraib Warehouse.
**Client Comments**

Commander, MNSTC-I concurred, noting that environmental safeguards were sufficient for the storage of medical supplies. While shelf-life was decreased, the temperature remained within acceptable limits for flow-through storage. MNSTC-I reported that it would continue to advise on development of storage requirements and procedures.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNSTC-I comments were responsive to the intent of the recommendation, and no additional comments are required.

**Added Recommendation**

The difficulty in identifying the responsible parties for the equipment addressed in Recommendation 22.a. underscores the need for proactive interagency coordination and communication of U.S. Government agencies involved in health sector reconstruction, and the importance of establishing management controls to ensure that equipment and supplies are promptly and effectively put to use, especially for items subject to pilferage or wastage. The requirement for multiple U.S. Government agencies to support multiple Iraqi ministries, where management controls are lacking, further calls for a single U.S. Government point of coordination if U.S. taxpayer resources are to be managed in a responsible fashion. While the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché is the most appropriate location for that coordination, the late development of its management capacity calls for DoD to take on this role early in a stability operation, in accordance with DoDD 3000.05. DoD should improve planning for this role and should coordinate with the Department of State for an early handoff when the theater matures and sufficient capacity has been developed within the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché’s office. As a result of the foregoing, we have added the following recommendation:

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22.c. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq coordinate with the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché to develop a transition plan whereby the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché assumes overall responsibility for interagency coordination and communication of U.S. Government agencies involved in health sector reform, to include establishment of appropriate management controls to ensure that medical equipment and supplies are promptly and effectively put to use.
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**Client Comments**

This is a new Recommendation. We request that Commander, MNF-I provide comments in response to the final report.
Observation 23. U.S. Government-Provided Health Care Services to Iraqi Nationals

Approximately 65 to 70 percent of the inpatient care workload of U.S. military medical treatment facilities located in Iraq was provided to Iraq Security Forces and Iraqi civilian patients, at an annual cost to the U.S. of approximately of $30 million to $36 million. Further, management controls for wartime theater medical care costs for DoD deployable medical systems are not in place.

This occurred because medical expense record keeping systems were not established at U.S. military medical treatment facilities to document all direct and indirect inpatient and outpatient costs for health care treatment provided to individual Iraqi military, police, and civilians.

Further, processes were not established with the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Health to reimburse the U.S. Government for all future costs for health care treatment provided to individual Iraqi military, police, and civilians at U.S. military medical treatment facilities. In addition, management controls for wartime theater medical care in DoD deployable medical systems have not been fully developed.

As a result, the U.S. Government is unnecessarily expending tens of millions of dollars in un-reimbursed costs for health care treatment provided to individual Iraqi military, police, and civilians at U.S. military medical treatment facilities.

Applicable Criteria

DoD 6010.13-M. DoD 6010.13-M, “Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System for Fixed Military Medical and Dental Treatment Facilities Manual,” April 7, 2008, states the purpose of the Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System is to provide a uniform system of health care managerial accounting for the MHS.

The Medical Expense and Performance Reporting System provides detailed uniform performance indicators, common expense classification by work center/cost center, uniform reporting of personnel utilization data by work centers, a labor cost assignment methodology, and includes procedures for the uniform reporting of expense and labor hour data for fixed military medical and dental treatment facilities.

DoD Instruction 6015.23. DoDI 6015.23, “Delivery of Healthcare at Military Treatment Facilities: Foreign Service Care; Third-Party Collection; Beneficiary Counseling and Assistance Coordinators (BCACs),” October 30, 2002, implements policy, assigns responsibilities and prescribes procedures on provisions of care in the delivery of health care at military treatment facilities in MHS.

guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop, and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations.

**Inadequate Capacity in Iraqi Health Care System**

U.S. military medical treatment facilities located in Iraq provided emergency medical and surgical care to Iraqi military, police, and civilians for emergency conditions where life, limb, or eyesight was at risk. This care often included inpatient hospitalization until the individual could be transferred to an Iraqi civilian medical facility that could provide ongoing care. However, because of the lack of medical treatment capacity within the Iraqi health care system, many of these individuals remain in U.S. military medical treatment facilities and receive ongoing care for extended periods of time.

**Costs of Health Care Provided to Iraqi Nationals**

The initial costs of inpatient care using standard U.S. military medical treatment facility billing charges for an overnight hospitalization were approximately $30 million to $36 million annually. The initial costs for hospitalization did not include additional expenses incurred for outpatient care, surgical care, intensive care unit services, consumable medical supplies, blood products, or pharmaceuticals.

**Management Controls for Wartime Theater Medical Care in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations**

Management controls for wartime theater medical care in DoD deployable medical systems have not been fully developed. Policies and guidelines have been developed in the area of medical logistics, supplies, and equipment to enhance interoperability, increase efficiency, and maximize resources with a focus on joint operations, but guidance is limited on controls necessary in complex humanitarian assistance, stability operations, or other contingency operations where medical care is provided to non-U.S. populations.

Policies and guidelines are needed to collect sufficient managerial accounting data to achieve economies of scale; minimize wastage of personnel, supplies, and other resources; and allow leaders and managers to properly plan and budget for SSTR operations.

**Recommendations, Client Comments, and Our Response**

**Deleted Recommendation.** Based on client comments, we have deleted draft Recommendation 23.a.(3) from the final report.
23.a.(1) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq establish a medical expense record keeping system at U.S. military medical treatment facilities in Iraq to document all direct and indirect inpatient and outpatient costs for health care treatment provided to individual Iraqi military, police, and civilians.

**Client Comments**

See comments at Recommendation 23.b.

23.a.(2) We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq establish processes with the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior to reimburse the U.S. Government for all future costs obtained through the medical expense record keeping systems for health care treatment provided to individual Iraqi military and police at U.S. military medical treatment facilities.

**Client Comments**

See comments at Recommendation 23.b.

23.b. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, coordinate with the Chief, U.S. Mission-Iraq to establish processes with the Ministry of Health to reimburse the U.S. Government for all future costs for health care treatment provided to individual Iraqi civilians at U.S. military medical treatment facilities.

**Client Comments to Recommendations 23.a.(1), 23.a.(2), and 23.b.**

Commander, MNF-I non-concurred with these three recommendations and noted for each recommendation that the Defense Base Act calls for the military to provide reimbursable medical care for DoD contractors. MNF-I reported that there were no implementing instructions available and that medical units were not equipped or staffed to bill for services rendered. The Commander stated that the MNF-I Surgeon was currently working with MNF-I Admin Counsel for a way ahead. He said that the outcome of their review was unclear, but it was doubtful that reimbursable services applied to Coalition, ISF, or local national civilian care rendered. Finally, the Commander reported that MNF-I and U.S. medical care facilities in Iraq had been operating from a locally approved exception to policy for non-Coalition Force medical care.

**Our Response**

Commander, MNF-I comments were not responsive to the intent of the recommendation. The Defense Base Act applies to DoD contractors, a population not addressed in this recommendation. DoD guidance cited above (DoD 6010.13-M and DoDI 6015.23) implements DoD policy on record keeping and reimbursement procedures and provides DoD intent on reimbursement services provided to individuals not eligible for DoD-funded medical care. MNF-I has the ability to develop a locally approved exception to policy that meets the intent of this recommendation while submitting a formal exception to policy request to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)). Simultaneously, MNF-I should recommend reasonable management controls and
standardized procedures to ASD(HA) so that policy updates regarding reimbursement for
treatment provided to local nationals are reasonable and not unrealistically burdensome in
the deployed setting. The administrative burden for this billing will be minimal; during
our visit, we identified two medical personnel who were already trained and equipped to
implement a theater wide reimbursement policy within the existing scope of their duties.
MNF-I should coordinate its input with the U.S. Mission-Iraq Health Attaché and with
the appropriate Iraqi ministries so that formal DoD policy takes into account the equities
of those important partners.

We request that MNF-I reconsider its position with respect to each of these
recommendations and provide comments to each in response to the final report.

23.c. We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs update
Department of Defense policies to prescribe standardized procedures for management
controls in deployable medical systems. Controls should be appropriate for the deployed
setting and not impose unrealistic administrative burdens during combat operations, but
should allow the collection of timely, accurate, and sufficiently detailed data to permit
review and audit by management at a time when the theater matures and the operational
tempo stabilizes. Data collected should support planning and programming for
humanitarian operations and care delivered to local national patients.

Client Comments

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)) concurred, and stated
that concept of operations documents had been developed for deployed health
information systems that lay out in detail how and when health information is collected,
by whom, the paths by which it is transmitted, and its uses. The Assistant Secretary
stated that as the systems mature, the collection and evaluation processes would be more
refined.

Our Response

The Assistant Secretary’s comments were responsive to the intent of the
recommendation, and no additional comments are required.
Appendix A. Scope, Methodology and Acronyms

We conducted this assessment from February 13, 2008 to September 26, 2008 and visited sites in Iraq from April 26, 2008 to May 17, 2008. We performed this assessment in accordance with the standards established by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency published in *Quality Standards for Inspections*, (January 2005). We planned and performed the assessment to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our observations and conclusions, based on our assessment objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our recommendations, based on our assessment objectives.


The scope of our assessment in Iraq applied to five areas:

- Follow-up on the recommendations made during our initial assessment on munitions accountability and control to determine the status of implementation.
- Determine the current status of munitions accountability and control.
- Determine whether security assistance processes were responsive to ISF equipment requirements. Specifically, we examined the organizational structure and processes used to execute security assistance programs during wartime operations and for Foreign Military Sales to Iraq.
- Assess whether the ISF logistics sustainment base was being effectively developed. We examined the status and effectiveness of planning and implementation of processes to develop a sustainable Iraqi logistics base.
- Assess whether the Iraqi Army health care system and its sustainment base were being effectively developed. We examined the status and effectiveness of planning and implementation of processes to develop a sustainable Iraqi medical base.

We examined the delivery processes for U.S.-controlled arms and ammunition flowing to Iraqi military forces at the Taji National Depot and to Iraqi police forces at the Baghdad Police College for those arms and ammunition delivered through the port of entry at the Baghdad International Airport. We examined the process that ISF used to issue weapons to individual soldiers and police and the delivery process by which the ISF distributed arms and ammunition through subsequent issuance to selected ISF military and police units.
The Arms and Ammunition Assessment Team chronology was:

February – March 2008  DoD Arms and Ammunition Follow-Up Assessment Team established
April – May 2008  Field Work in Iraq
May 2008  Out-brief to Commanders MNF-I, MNC-I and MNSTC-I.
September 2008  Draft assessment report issued
October-December 2008  Management comments received and evaluated

Use of Technical Assistance
We did not use Technical Assistance to perform this assessment.

Acronyms Used in this Report
The following is a list of the acronyms used in this report.

AA&E  Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives
AGW  Abu Ghraib Warehouse
BPC  Baghdad Police College
CEW  Captured Enemy Weapon(s)
DISAM  Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
DoDD  DoD Directive
DoDI  DoD Instruction
DoD IG  Department of Defense Inspector General
DSCA  Defense Security Cooperation Agency
EUM  End-Use Monitoring
FMS  Foreign Military Sales
FRAGO  Fragmentary Order - a change to an Operations Order
GAO  Government Accountability Office
GoI  Government of Iraq
GSU  Garrison Support Unit
HSS  Health Service Support
IA  Iraqi Army
IAASSI  Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute
ILDC  Iraqi Logistics Development Committee
ISF  Iraq Security Forces
ISFF  Iraq Security Forces Fund
JHQ  Joint Headquarters
JMD  Joint Manning Document
KMol  Kurdish Minister of the Interior
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMTB</td>
<td>Kirkush Military Training Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMAT</td>
<td>Logistics Military Assistance team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSSR</td>
<td>Life Support Self-Reliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHS</td>
<td>Military Health System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiTT</td>
<td>Military Transition Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Corps-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Force-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense (Iraq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoI</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior (Iraq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAD</td>
<td>National Army Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVD</td>
<td>Night Vision Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>Request for Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSU</td>
<td>Regional Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA/LW</td>
<td>Small Arms/Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>Security Assistance Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD (AT&amp;L)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(I)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

During the last 3 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) have issued a number of reports and testimony discussing either (1) the accountability and control over munitions and other equipment provided to the Iraq Security Forces, (2) Foreign Military Sales to the Iraq Security Forces, (3) the development of the Iraq Security Forces’ logistical capability, or (4) the development of ISF medical capability.

Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov.
Unrestricted SIGIR reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.sigir.mil.
Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports or at http://www.dodig.mil/inspections/ie/reports.

Prior coverage we used in preparing this report included:

Congressionally Initiated Reports


GAO
GAO-08-568T, “Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts and Investments,” March 2008


SIGIR


DoD IG


Appendix C. Glossary

This appendix provides definitions of terms used in this report.

**Accountability** - DoD Instruction 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006, states that accountability is the obligation imposed by law, lawful order, or regulation, accepted by an organization or person for keeping accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents, or funds, with or without physical possession. The obligation, in this context, refers to the fiduciary duties, responsibilities, and obligations necessary for protecting the public interest. However, it does not necessarily impose personal liability upon an organization or person.

**Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives** – The “Department of Defense Strategic Plan for the Distribution of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” (AA&E Strategic Plan) May 2004, states:

Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) is a broad categorical concept, which can have multiple interpretations and definitions. Each of the DoD military services and agencies, plus the federal government (through the Code of Federal Regulations), have various definitions which can apply to material that may be considered AA&E, yet there is no standard definition.

For the AA&E Strategic Plan, AA&E is a term used to inclusively mean weapons, components requiring special controls, ammunition or munitions for those weapons, and other conventional items or materials with explosive, chemical, or electro-explosive properties designed for and/or capable of inflicting property damage, and death or injury to humans and animals. Items should be considered for inclusion in the AA&E category if they meet any of the following tests:

a. Possession of, or access to the item is controlled due to potential risk associated with loss of the item, or its use for unintended purposes by unauthorized persons.
b. The handling, transporting, storage, or use of the item presents a potential safety risk for the general population, and the risk must be controlled through visibility and specific procedures.
c. The handling, transporting, storage, or use of the item presents a potential or known security risk. Exceptional care must be taken to maintain accountability over the item and information about it, to preclude disclosure of classified or sensitive information, or to prevent unauthorized persons from accessing or acquiring the item intentionally or unintentionally.

**DoD Military Health System** - The DoD Military Health System (MHS) mission is to provide optimal health services in support of our nation’s military mission—anytime, anywhere. The MHS is a partnership of medical educators, medical researchers, health care providers, and their support personnel worldwide. The MHS consists of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; the medical departments of the
Military Services, and Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Combatant Command surgeons; and TRICARE providers (including private sector health care providers, hospitals and pharmacies).

**DoD Small Arms/Light Weapons Registry** - DoD 4000.25-M, “Defense Logistics Management System,” Volume 2, Chapter 18 (“Small Arms and Light Weapons Serial Number Registration and Reporting”), Change 5, March 25, 2008, states that the DoD Small Arms/Light Weapons Registry is the DoD central repository for small arms and light weapons serial numbers. The registry serves as the single point of access for inquiries relating to the last known record of small arms and light weapons serial numbers. Serial numbers are provided by the Component Registries on a scheduled and as required basis.

**Force Multiplier** – Joint Publication 1-02, “DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” as amended through October 17, 2007, states that a force multiplier is a capability that, when added to and employed by a combat force, significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment.

**Foreign Military Sales Cases** - The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program is that part of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and conducted using formal agreements between the U.S. Government and an authorized foreign purchaser or international organization.

These agreements, called Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA), are signed by both the U.S. Government and the purchasing government or international organization. The LOA provides for the sale of defense articles and/or defense services (to include training) usually from DoD stocks or through procurements under DoD-managed contracts. As with all security assistance, the FMS program supports U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.


**Foreign Military Sales Pseudo Cases** – According to personnel at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the pseudo LOA or case is used by the U.S. Government to track the sale of defense articles and/or services (to include training and design and construction services) and are generally funded by a U.S. Government entity (for example, the U.S. Government DoD funding provided to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund is used to fund pseudo FMS cases for Afghanistan).

The pseudo LOA itemizes the defense articles and services included in the Letter of Request. However, the pseudo LOA is not signed by the foreign purchaser or international organization receiving the articles and/or services. The pseudo LOA is authorized by public law and the Arms Export Control Act.
Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund – According to the “FMS Customer Financial Management Handbook (Billing),” Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management and Defense Finance and Accounting Service Center, Tenth Edition, March 2006, a fund established for each FMS customer country for recording all financial transactions for use in carrying out our specific purposes and programs in accordance with an agreement. The Trust Fund does not include monies on deposit in an approved Federal Reserve Bank New York account or in a commercial interest bearing account until withdrawn by Defense Finance and Accounting Service.

Implementing Agency - According to the “FMS Customer Financial Management Handbook (Billing),” the U.S. Military Department or Defense Agency responsible for the execution of military assistance programs. With respect to FMS, the Military Department or Defense Agency assigned responsibility by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to prepare an LOA and to implement an FMS case. The implementing agency is responsible for the overall management of the actions which will result in delivery of the materials or services set forth in the LOA which was accepted by a foreign country or international organization.

Joint Manning Document – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1301.01C, “Individual Augmentation Procedures,” January 1, 2004 (current as May 1, 2006) states that a manning document of unfunded temporary duty positions constructed for or by a supported combatant commander that identifies the specific individual augmentation positions to support an organization during contingency operations.

Joint manning documents (JMDs) for permanent activities with a joint table of distribution or joint table of mobilization distribution should only identify individual augmentation positions for temporary military or DoD personnel.

JMDs for activities without a joint table of distribution (JTD) or joint table of mobilization distribution (JTMD) (e.g., some joint task forces) should identify all positions required for that activity to support the mission. Positions should be identified as unit fill, coalition fill, civilian/contractor fill, or individual augmentation fills on the JMD.

Letter of Offer and Acceptance - DoD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 15, Definitions, April 2002, defines a LOA as the authorized document for use by the U.S. Government to offer to sell defense articles and defense services to a foreign country or international organization and notes that a signature by the purchaser represents acceptance of the offer.

Letter of Request - According to the “FMS Customer Financial Management Handbook (Billing),” the term used to identify a request from an eligible FMS participant country for the purchase of U.S. defense articles and services.
Logistics - Joint Publication 1-02 states that logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with:

- design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel
- movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel
- acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities
- acquisition or furnishing of services.

Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction -

Munitions - Joint Publication 1-02 states that munitions, in common usage, can be military weapons, ammunition, and equipment.

Security - Joint Publication 1-02 defines security as a condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from unintentional or directly hostile acts or influences. For the purpose of the AA&E Strategic Plan, security entails visibility over and physically keeping AA&E in the custody of only those with specific authorization, and the ability to quickly identify and respond to situations or incidents of actual or potential compromise of AA&E while in the logistics chain.


Small Arms - Joint Publication 1-02 defines small arms as man portable, individual, and crew-served weapon systems used mainly against personnel and lightly armored or unarmored equipment.

Small Arms and Light Weapons - DoD 4000.25-M states that for the purpose of DoD small arms and light weapons reporting, small arms and light weapons are defined as man-portable weapons made or modified to military specifications for use as lethal instruments of war that expel a shot, bullet or projectile by action of an explosive.
Small Arms are broadly categorized as those weapons intended for use by individual members of armed or security forces. They include handguns; rifles and carbines; sub-machine guns; and light machine guns.

Light weapons are broadly categorized as those weapons designed for use by two or three members of armed or security forces serving as a crew, although some may be used by a single person. They include:

- Hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers
- Heavy machine guns
- Man-portable launchers of missile and rocket systems
- Mortars
- Portable anti-aircraft guns
- Portable anti-tank guns
- Recoilless rifles

**Small Arms and Light Weapons Serial Number** - DoD 4000.25-M states that the serial number is the total series of characters appearing on the firing component part of a small arm or light weapon.

**Stability Operations** - DoD Directive 3000.05 defines stability operations as military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions.
Appendix D. Organizations Contacted and Visited

We visited, contacted, or conducted interviews with officials (or former officials) from the following U.S. and Iraqi organizations:

**United States**

**Department of State**
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Embassy Iraq
- Officials assigned to the Office of International Health

**Department of Health and Human Services**
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Public Health Service

**Government Accountability Office**
- International Affairs and Trade Team

**Department of Defense**
- The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director, Joint Staff
- Officials assigned to The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
- The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
- Officials assigned to The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Officials from United States Transportation Command
- Officials assigned to The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness

**Department of the Army**
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army Materiel Command
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army Joint Munitions Command
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity
- Officials assigned to the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
• Officials assigned to the U.S. Army TACOM and Life Cycle Management Command
• Officials assigned to the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command – 595th Transportation Group

**Department of the Navy**
• Officials assigned to the Navy International Programs Office

**Department of the Air Force**
• Officials assigned to the Deputy Under Secretary for International Affairs
• Officials assigned to the Air Force Security Assistance Center

**U.S. Central Command**
• Acting Commander, U.S. Central Command, the Acting Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command, and key senior staff members
• Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq and key staff members
• Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and key staff members
• Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and key staff members
• Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan and key staff members
• Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (to include the Logistics Movement Coordination Center)

**Defense Agencies**
• Officials assigned to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency
• Officials assigned to the Defense Logistics Agency
• Officials assigned to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service Indianapolis – Security Assistance Accounting

**Government of Iraq**

**Ministry of Defense**
• Vice Chairman, Iraqi Joint Staff
• Deputy Chief of Staff-Logistics
• Inspector General
• MoD General Secretary
• Director General for Armament and Supply
• Surgeon General
• Commander, Location Command
  o Taji
  o Kirkush Military Training Base
• Commander, Taji National Army Depot
• Commander, Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute

**Ministry of Interior**
• Minister of Interior
• Inspector General
• Deputy Minister for Administration and Finance
• Assistant Deputy Minister for Infrastructure
• Director of Contracts
• Iraqi Police Units
  o Karadah National Police Battalion

**Kurdish Ministry of Interior**
• Kurdish Minister of Interior
• Provincial Director of Police – Sulaymaniyah Province
• Kurdish Police Units
  o Irbil Police College
  o Sulaymaniyah Police Academy
  o Sulaymaniyah Police College
Appendix E. Status of Recommendations: Assessment of the Accountability of Arms and Ammunition provided to the Security Forces of Iraq, July 3, 2008, (classified report)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation Number</th>
<th>Recommendation Action Required</th>
<th>ACTION TAKEN YES/NO</th>
<th>FOLLOW-UP Required</th>
<th>FOLLOW-UP Completed</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, &amp; Logistics) (USD(AT&amp;L)) and USD (Intelligence) (USD(I)) issue a letter to clarify that Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.84 governs the accountability and control and DoDI 5100.78 governs the physical security of arms, ammunition, &amp; explosives under U.S. control from the point of entry into the CENTCOM area of responsibility until formal handover to the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) or as appropriate to other Coalition partners within the CENTCOM area of responsibility.</td>
<td>USD(AT&amp;L) letter 8/27/08. Need USD(AT&amp;L) letter.</td>
<td>Yes-review final USD(AT&amp;L) letter</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-1</td>
<td>CENTCOM issue procedures governing the accountability and control of conventional U.S. arms and ammo until formal handover.</td>
<td>CENTCOM concurred: Formal document by 6/1/08</td>
<td>Get copy of CENTCOM policy after 6/1/08</td>
<td>Yes-CENTCOM memo 7/3/08</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-2-a</td>
<td>MNF-I/CENTCOM concurred; Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Policy 03-08.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-2-b</td>
<td>MNF-I issue formal procedures governing the accountability and control of conventional U.S. arms and ammo from entry into and transport through Iraq until formal handover to the ISF.</td>
<td>MNF-I concurred. MNSTC-I Log SOP OK w/MNF-I 6/5/08 memo.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-1</td>
<td>MNF-I issue formal procedures coordinating the efforts of MNF-I and MNSTC-I in processing weapons captured by U.S. forces.</td>
<td>MNF-I concurred. MNF-I issued FRAGO 085 on 1/24/08, this subject.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-2</td>
<td>MNF-I issue formal procedures coordinating the efforts of MNF-I and MNSTC-I in processing weapons captured by U.S. forces.</td>
<td>MNF-I concurred. MNF-I issued FRAGO 085 on 1/24/08, this subject.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-1</td>
<td>MNF-I issue formal procedures describing the missions, roles, and responsibilities applicable to U.S. transition teams and senior advisors involved in advising and assisting the Ministry of Defense MOD, the Ministry of Interior (MOI), and subordinate ISF organizations on the accountability and control of U.S.- supplied or Iraqi procured arms, ammunition, and explosives.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concurred. MNSTC-I 4/26/08 Log Accountability SOP.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Log SOP OK w/MNF-I 6/5/08 memo.</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation Number</td>
<td>Recommendation Action Required</td>
<td>ACTION TAKEN YES/NO</td>
<td>FOLLOW-UP Required</td>
<td>FOLLOW-UP Completed</td>
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<tr>
<td>D-2</td>
<td>MNF-I issue formal procedures coordinating the efforts of the MNC-I and the MNSTC-I transition teams to support the ISF in its efforts to account for and control U.S. supplied or Iraqi procured arms, ammunition, and explosives.</td>
<td>MNF-I concurred. MNSTC-I 4/26/08 Log Accountability SOP.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I Log SOP OK w/MNF-I 9/9/08 memo.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>MNSTC-I advise and assist the MOD and the MOI in the preparation and promulgation of policies and procedures for military and police national munitions depots and other storage facilities that address the accountability and control of U.S.- supplied or Iraqi procured arms, ammunition, and explosives.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concurred. MOD Iraqi Supply Handbook, Chap 3: Property Accountability. Joint Headquarters Log review current procedures. MOI Memo 18 Dec 07-3 locks, key w/ officer 4 yrs experience. MOI Memo 47- fines for loss.</td>
<td>Yes, Visit Taji/Kirkush Military Training Base (KMTB). Sample inventories.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>MNSTC-I advise and assist the MOD and the MOI in the preparation and promulgation of policies and procedures for the ISF accountability, control processing, and final disposition of weapons the ISF or US forces capture and turn over to ISF.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concurred. MOD has draft. MOI has no written procedure in place. MOD Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics and MOI Deputy Minister Infrastructure verbal agreement with MNC-I FRAGO 085 and are drafting complimentary policies.</td>
<td>Yes—MOD draft adequate. MOI needs to put it in writing.</td>
<td>No-need MOD/MOI final documents.</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-1-a</td>
<td>Classified Recommendation.</td>
<td>MNF-I concurred.</td>
<td>MNF-I J4, Dublak Policy 03-08.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-1-b</td>
<td>Classified Recommendation.</td>
<td>MNF-I concurred.</td>
<td>MNF-I J4, Dublak Policy 03-08.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-2-a</td>
<td>Classified recommendation.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concurred.</td>
<td>Have copy of Dublak Policy Statement #03-08.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-2-b</td>
<td>Classified recommendation.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concurred.</td>
<td>Have copy of Dublak Policy Statement #03-08.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-2-c</td>
<td>MNSTC-I, with advice and assistance from the MOD/MOI, jointly develop formal procedures for the delivery, joint inventory, and formal handover of U.S.-controlled arms and ammunition provided to the ISF, requiring that a 100 percent joint inventory of weapons (by weapons count, weapons type, and serial number) be performed with authorized ISF officials at the time of delivery and formal handover to the ISF.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concurred/Do joint inventory, or U.S. guards are left in place until it is done. (Policy 03-08.)</td>
<td>Yes—confirmed joint inventory.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation Number</td>
<td>Recommendation Action Required</td>
<td>ACTION TAKEN</td>
<td>FOLLOW-UP Required</td>
<td>FOLLOW-UP Completed</td>
<td>STATUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-3-a</td>
<td>Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCCI/A) issue contracts used to deliver munitions that include clauses which require vendors to deliver U.S. provided munitions to Iraq through U.S. controlled ports of entry within Iraq. The contracts should comply with procedures issued by the MNF-I as discussed in Recommendation G-1-a.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No longer use port at North Point.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3-b</td>
<td>JCCI/A issue contract used to deliver munitions that include clauses which require vendors to provide serial numbers lists electronically in advance of any weapons shipments to Iraq, post serial number lists on the outside of weapons shipping containers, along with other required shipping documents, and on the inside of weapons shipping containers.</td>
<td>JCCI/A concur.</td>
<td>Recent contracts require serial # in advance</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3-c</td>
<td>JCCI/A issue contract used to deliver munitions that include clauses which require vendors to provide en route visibility to include the arrival dates and times of munitions cargo being delivered to Iraq.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Arrival dates provided.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-1</td>
<td>MNSTC-I install data input quality controls in its centralized database of weapons serial numbers using a trained database programmer.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concur.</td>
<td>Army Material Command (AMC) visit 2/08 identified deficiencies/implemented corrections. Sourcing a contracted solution for commercial database.</td>
<td>No–awaiting result of contracting effort.</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-2</td>
<td>AMC Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) assist the MNSTC-I with installing data input quality controls in its centralized database of weapons serial numbers to ensure system compatibility.</td>
<td>LOGSA visited MNSTC-I 2/08.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I J4 Material Management Section/LOGSA.</td>
<td>Complete.</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-1-a</td>
<td>MNSTC-I advise and assist the MOD in establishing an inventory baseline for Iraqi military weapons and ammunition stored at Taji National Depot (TND) by conducting a 100% joint U.S. forces and ISF inventory that records serial numbers of U.S.; provided weapons.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concur.</td>
<td>Yes–sample inventory at TND showed a 98.4% accuracy.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-1-b</td>
<td>MNSTC-I advise and assist the MOD in establishing a joint 10% sample inventory of Iraqi military weapons and ammunition on a monthly basis to maintain data integrity of the inventory database.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concur.</td>
<td>Yes–visited TND/KMTB, MNSTC-I working 10% inventory with MOD/MI.</td>
<td>Yes–sample inventories TND 98.4% accuracy.</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation Number</td>
<td>Recommendation Action Required</td>
<td>ACTION TAKEN YES/NO</td>
<td>FOLLOW-UP Required</td>
<td>FOLLOW-UP Completed</td>
<td>STATUS</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-1-c</td>
<td>MNSTC-I advise and assist the MOD in establishing an effective warehouse management and organization processes at TND for the storage of weapons and ammunition and requesting help from U.S.-based logistics organizations as needed.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concur. New warehouse by 9/08. Mentor Taji Iraqi ldrshp to manage warehouse ops, stock control procedures, and inventory management. New ammo storage complete. Warehouse refurbishment contract by 30 Apr 08.</td>
<td>Yes—still work to be done with Iraqis.</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-2</td>
<td>MNSTC-I advise and assist the MOI to construct sufficient capacity for munitions storage at Baghdad Police College (BPC) and other sites as necessary for the anticipated volume of munitions shipments.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concur.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-1-a</td>
<td>Classified recommendation.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concur.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes-complete.</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-1-b</td>
<td>Classified recommendation.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concur.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes-complete.</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-1-c</td>
<td>Classified recommendation.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I concur.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes-complete.</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-1</td>
<td>MNSTC-I instruct all Coalition MNSTC-I military transition teams to assist/mentor the appropriate Iraqi personnel in the MOD and MOI in development of their own centralized database of weapons serial numbers.</td>
<td>Delegating to MNC-I and MNSTC-I.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I Log SOP OK w/MNF-I 8/5/08 memo. Also sample inventory results.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-1-a</td>
<td>MNF-I approve a MNSTC-I Joint Manning Document (JMD) that provides for sufficient numbers of personnel and identifies the requisite skills and experience to successfully execute its logistics missions.</td>
<td>MNF-I concurred.</td>
<td>CENTCOM forwarded JMD request to Joint Chiefs 7/14/08.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-1-b</td>
<td>MNF-I establish and staff an Office of Inspector General and an Office of Internal Review in the MNSTC-I JMD that provides for sufficient numbers of personnel and identifies the requisite skills and experience to successfully execute its oversight mission.</td>
<td>MNF-I concurred.</td>
<td>CENTCOM forwarded JMD request to Joint Chiefs 7/14/08.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation Number</td>
<td>Recommendation Action Required</td>
<td>ACTION TAKEN</td>
<td>FOLLOW-UP Required</td>
<td>FOLLOW-UP Completed</td>
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<tr>
<td>L-2-a</td>
<td>CENTCOM/JS expedite the approval of the proposed MNSTC-I JMD and request the necessary funding to accomplish the actions cited in Recommendations L-1-a and L-1-b.</td>
<td>CENTCOM concurred. Formal document by 6/1/08</td>
<td>Get copy of CENTCOM policy after 6/1/08</td>
<td>No-MNSTC-I JMD to JS 7/14/08</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-2-b</td>
<td>CENTCOM/JS expedite the assignment of personnel, with the requisite skills, experience and rank, to fill the positions designated in the JMD for the MNSTC-I logistics function, the Office of the Inspector General, and the Office of Internal Review.</td>
<td>CENTCOM concurred. To JS by 6/1/08.</td>
<td>Check w/CENTCOM 6/1/08</td>
<td>No-MNSTC-I JMD to JS 7/14/08</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) appoint a Department of Defense (DoD) Executive Agent for the Iraqi FMS Program. The Executive Agent will activate a joint program management office.</td>
<td>No-USD (Policy) (USD[P]) and USD(AT&amp;L) non-concur</td>
<td>Yes-asked them to reconsider.</td>
<td>Yes-latest response and conditions on ground have changed.</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-2</td>
<td>SECDEF, with appropriate Congressional approval, establish a Defense Coalition Support Account to acquire a pool of critically needed equipment that will be immediately available for shipment to the ISF to expand forces, modernize forces, and replace combat losses.</td>
<td>USD(P) concurred—before Congress awaiting action.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>No-need Congressional decision.</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-3</td>
<td>MNF-I establish and approve authorized positions for its security assistance office in the MNSTC-I JMD office that provides sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute its security assistance mission.</td>
<td>MNF-I concurred.</td>
<td>MNSTC-I cites progress. We verified increased strength.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-4-a</td>
<td>CENTCOM/JS expedite approval of the MNSTC-I JMD and request the necessary funding to accomplish the actions cited in Recommendation M-3.</td>
<td>CENTCOM concurred. SECDEF approve 30+ 11/5/07. 38 more at CENTCOM. If approved, total 68.</td>
<td>Check w/CENTCOM 6/1/08</td>
<td>No-on-track</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-4-b</td>
<td>CENTCOM/JS expedite the assignment of personnel, with the requisite skills, experience and rank, to fill the positions designed in the JMD for the MNSTC-I security assistance function.</td>
<td>CENTCOM concurred. Initial 30 for SAO almost all in place.</td>
<td>Track assignment of any additional plus up to JMD.</td>
<td>No-on-track</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendation Report Number</td>
<td>Recommendation Action Required</td>
<td>ACTION TAKEN</td>
<td>FOLLOW-UP</td>
<td>FOLLOW-UP STATUS</td>
<td>STATUS</td>
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<td>M-5</td>
<td>Advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior in establishing a requirements planning process that forecasts the Iraq Security Forces equipment and training needs on a multi-year basis to stabilize and improve the responsiveness of the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales program.</td>
<td>Not addressed in draft MNSTC-I response - SAO Office. Force Mgt Functional Capability Tm (FCT) working with Iraq. Clear picture of MoI force generation requirements. Less so for MoD.</td>
<td>Obtain copy of force generation planning for MoI, when it is developed.</td>
<td>No--awaiting approved MoI plan.</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-1</td>
<td>SECDEF appoint a DoD Executive Agent to expedite support to the U.S. Central Command, the Multi National Forces-Iraq, and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq to advise and assist the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, in planning and building their logistics sustainment base for the Iraq Security Forces.</td>
<td>No--USD(P) and USD(AT&amp;L) took no position. Want to explore additional options.</td>
<td>Yes--requested they reconsider or provide additional options.</td>
<td>No input--situation changed on ground</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-2-a</td>
<td>MNF-I establish and approve authorized positions for senior logistics mentors, and military and police transition team logistics mentors in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Documents that provide for sufficient personnel with the requisite skills and experience levels to successfully execute the logistics mentoring mission.</td>
<td>MNF-I concur. Mentors and trainers are done through Request for Forces</td>
<td>Process working on track.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-2-b</td>
<td>MNF-I ensure that senior logistics mentors and military transition team logistics mentors in the Joint Manning Documents are assigned to the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, and ISF as needed.</td>
<td>MNF-I concur. Mentors and trainers are done through Request for Forces</td>
<td>Process working on track.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-2-c</td>
<td>MNF-I establish a logistics training program in Iraq, comparable to that currently provided by the Counter-Insurgency Academy, to train U.S. military and police transition team logistics mentors.</td>
<td>MNF-I nonconcur. Propose ILDC Log Action Plan and LMATTLTAT.</td>
<td>No--request copy of FRAGO implementing Log Action Plan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-3-a</td>
<td>JCS/CENTCOM expedite approval of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Security Transition Command-Iraq Joint Manning Documents and request the necessary funding to accomplish the actions cited in recommendations N.2.b. and N.2.c.</td>
<td>CENTCOM concur.</td>
<td>Will support any additional MNSTC-I request</td>
<td>No-CENTCOMMN STC-I say on track</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-3-b</td>
<td>JCS/CENTCOM expedite the assignment of personnel; with the requisite skills, experience, rank, and to include civilians from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to fill the positions designated in the Joint Manning Document for the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq logistics mentoring functions.</td>
<td>CENTCOM concur.</td>
<td>Will support any additional MNSTC-I request</td>
<td>No-CENTCOMMN STC-I say on track</td>
<td>Open</td>
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</table>
Appendix F. Organizations Supporting the Train and Equip Mission

Government of Iraq Organizations

**Iraqi Ministry of Defense**

Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces are composed of the Joint Headquarters-Command and Control (responsible for the operational command and control of all Iraqi military forces except special operations forces), the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (Army), the Iraqi Navy, the Iraqi Air Force, and the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command.

**Iraqi Ministry of Interior**

Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces are composed of the Iraqi Police Service (local police), the National Police (a nationally deployable force), the Directorate of Border Enforcement, the Directorate of Ports of Entry, the National Information and Investigation Agency, and other smaller forces. MoI also continues to consolidate the Facilities Protection Services that were assigned to the various ministries within the Government of Iraq.

**Iraq Security Forces**

Iraq Security Forces (ISF) are composed of three components: the forces assigned to MoD, which the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) estimated to have assigned more than 326,000 Service members; the forces assigned to MoI, which the MNF-I estimated to have assigned more than 161,000 civilian security personnel; and the forces assigned to the Counter-Terrorism Bureau (special operations forces), which MNF-I estimated to have assigned more than 3,000 Service members.

DoD Organizations in Southwest Asia

**U.S. Central Command**

The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) is one of the combatant commands and is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida. Its area of responsibility includes 20 nations that stretch from the Egypt, throughout the Arabian Gulf Region, into Central Asia. USCENTCOM established MNF-I and the Multi-National Corps-

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35 (U) The definition of assigned is derived from monthly payroll data for both MoD and MoI forces and includes all personnel, trained and untrained (ministry staffs are not included), who received pay the previous month but do not reflect present for duty totals.
Iraq (MNC-I) on May 15, 2004, to replace Combined Joint Task Force 7 and assume responsibility for conducting military operations in Iraq.

**Multi-National Force-Iraq**

MNF-I is headquartered at Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq, with the mission to create a secure environment in Iraq. MNF-I concurrently conducts stability operations to support the Government of Iraq, which will help restore essential services and develop the economy.

**Multi-National Corps-Iraq**

MNC-I is a subordinate command of MNF-I and is headquartered at Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq. MNC-I is the tactical unit responsible for command and control of combat operations by Coalition forces throughout Iraq and its primary mission is to conduct counterinsurgency, stability, and support operations.

**Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq**

The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) is headquartered in the International Zone, Baghdad, Iraq, and is a subordinate command of MNF-I. MNSTC-I manages the use of Iraq Security Forces Fund funds in Iraq.

The primary mission of MNSTC-I is to assist the Government of Iraq in developing, organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining ISF. This mission was previously performed by three components of MNSTC-I. The Coalition Military Assistance Training Team organized, trained, equipped, and mentored the Iraq Armed Forces. The Civilian Police Assistance Training Team organized, trained, equipped, and mentored the Iraq Civilian Police Forces and other components of MoI. The Joint Headquarters Advisory Support Team assisted the Joint Headquarters of the Iraq Armed Forces in developing a command and control system.

As of January 6, 2008, MNSTC-I reorganized itself into the following components. The MNSTC-I headquarters includes the Primary and Special Staff and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission. MNSTC-I provides assistance and mentoring using training and transition teams.

- Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
- Coalition Air Force Transition Team
- Coalition Army Advisory Training Team
- Functional Capability Teams
- Intelligence Transition Team
- Iraqi National Counter-Terrorism Task Force Transition Team
- Joint Headquarters Transition Team
- Maritime Strategic Transition Team
- Ministry of Defense Transition Team
- Ministry of Interior Transition Team
Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan

The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan is headquartered in the International Zone, Baghdad, Iraq, and is a subordinate command of MNF-I. The Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan provides guidance policies and procedures governing contracting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Secretary of the Army delegated the Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan to be the Executive Agent and Head of Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Appendix G. United States Code and DoD Policies

United States Code (U.S.C.) requires accountability and control over U.S. Government property. DoD policies that apply to the accountability and control and the physical security of property to include arms and ammunition that implement the U.S.C. are outlined in this appendix. In addition, DoD policy governing the management of security assistance is also discussed.

Part II – Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives

Title 40 United States Code, section 524. Title 40 U.S.C., section 524, requires accountability and control over U.S. Government property. It states:

(a) Required. Each executive agency shall –

(1) maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under its control

DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.64. DoDI 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006:

- Provides policy and procedures for DoD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C., section 524.
- Requires that accountable property records shall be established for all property purchased, or otherwise obtained, that are sensitive as defined in DoD 4100.39-M, “Federal Logistics Information System,” Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007.

DoD 4100.39-M. DoD 4100.39-M, “Federal Logistics Information System,” Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007, states that sensitive items are materiel that require a high degree of protection and control due to statutory requirements or regulations. It defines sensitive items as items of high value, highly technical or of a hazardous nature, and small arms, ammunition, explosives, and demolition material.

DoD Instruction 5100.76. DoDI 5100.76, “Safeguarding Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) and the AA&E Physical Security Review Board,” October 8, 2005, and related guidance cited in those Instructions apply to the accountability and control of AA&E and other designated sensitive items provided to ISF. DoDI 5100.76 outlines the authorities, responsibilities, and functions relative to worldwide uniform policy, standards, and guidance for the physical security of conventional AA&E in the possession or custody of the DoD Components.
**DoD 5100.76-M.** DoD 5100.76-M, “Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,” August 12, 2000, defines sensitive conventional AA&E, and prescribes minimum standards and criteria for the physical security of DoD sensitive conventional AA&E, including non-nuclear missiles and rockets.

**DoD 5200.08-R.** DoD 5200.08-R, “Physical Security Program,” April 9, 2007, implements DoD policies and minimum standards for the physical protection of DoD personnel, installations, operations, and related resources; to include the security of weapons systems and platforms.

**DoD 4000.25-M.** DoD 4000.25-M, “Defense Logistics Management System,” Volume 2, Chapter 18 (“Small Arms and Light Weapons Serial Number Registration and Reporting”), Change 5, March 25, 2008, addresses:

- DoD Components responsibility for inventory management of SA/LW and other activities involved in the shipment, registration, or receipt of SA/LW and provides procedures for reporting SA/LW serial number data between the DoD Components and the DoD SA/LW Registry
- Procedures concerning accountability of captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons

DoD 4000.25-M, Volume 2, Chapter 18, provides five objectives for SA/LW serial number registration and reporting; the key objective being to establish continuous visibility over all SA/LW by serial number from the contractor to depot; in storage; in-transit to requisitioners; in post, camp, and station custody; in the hands of users; during turn-ins; in renovation; and during disposal and demilitarization.

DoD 4000.25-M, Volume 2, Chapter 18, also addresses captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons.

- Paragraph C18.2.9. requires that captured, confiscated, or abandoned enemy SA/LW in the possession of DoD as a result of military actions shall be registered. The SA/LW may be of foreign or domestic manufacture and may include recaptured U.S. military SA/LW.
- Paragraph C18.2.7. requires that the DoD Components shall establish procedures to ensure reporting of lost, stolen, unaccounted for, and/or recovered SA/LW under the provisions of DoD 5100.76-M.
- Paragraph C18.7.3. requires that SA/LW recovered by law enforcement agencies or foreign countries and returned to the custody of a DoD Component be registered on the DoD Component Registry (DoD Component Registry information is provided to the DoD Small Arms/Light Weapons Registry).
- Paragraph C18.5.1.2. DoD SA/LW Registry shall provide a central repository of SA/LW’ serial numbers from the DoD Component Registries, to include those on-hand, in-transit, lost, stolen, demilitarized, or shipped outside the control of DoD.
• Paragraph C18.5.2.10.2. requires that all new weapons or devices that could be construed as weapons be reported to the Joint SA/LW Coordinating Group chairperson.

Memorandum, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, “Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Logistics Accountability Standard Operating Procedures,” April 26, 2008. This memorandum provided mandatory direction to all MNSTC-I personnel for the maintenance of materiel accountability through the process of acquisition, receipt, storage, and distribution up to and including the point of issue to the Government of Iraq. It also provided a basis for MNSTC-I trainers and mentors to advise and assist their Iraqi counterparts on the accountability of arms, ammunition, and other supplies.

Memorandum, Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Implementation of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) Logistics Accountability Standard Operating Procedures (SOP),” June 5, 2008. This memorandum directed the implementation of the MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability SOP and that it be issued to all MNC-I elements to ensure consistent accountability standards across the supply chain in Iraq. The issuance of the MNSTC-I Logistics Accountability SOP provided a basis for MNC-I trainers working with ISF units to train and advise their Iraqi counterparts on the accountability of arms, ammunition, and other supplies.

Multi-National Corps-Iraq FRAGO 085 to Multi-National Corps-Iraq Operation Order 08-01, “Processing and Reutilization of Captured Enemy Weapons,” January 24, 2008. This document enacted revised policy and procedures for receipt, processing, reporting, accounting, and issuing captured enemy weapons by Coalition forces to elements of ISF. This document was classified.


Part III – Foreign Military Sales


\(^{36}\) Security Assistance is defined in Appendix C.
DoD 5105.38-M states that:

…[T]itle to FMS materiel normally transfers from the USG [U.S. Government] to the purchaser immediately upon its release from a DoD supply activity (point of origin). However, USG security responsibility does not cease until the recipient Government’s or international organization’s Designated Government Representative (DRG) assumes final control of the consignment.

…the maximum processing time between Implementing Agency receipt of the Letter of Request and release of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance should normally be no more than 120 days, with no adjustments for hold times, additional work needed to clarify requirements, or any other consideration. Although delays may occur while processing some LOAs [Letter of Offer and Acceptance], Implementing Agencies should process at least 80 percent of their total number of LOAs within 120 days.

DoD 5105.38-M also states that DoD 5100.76-M defines sensitive AA&E and outlines mandatory procedures for handling, storing, protecting, securing, and transporting it. The AA&E procedures in DoD 5100.76-M also apply to FMS transfers. Sensitive AA&E are items such as small arms38 weapons, various types of ammunition, explosives, and special items, such as night vision sights and goggles that pose a special danger to the public if they fall into the wrong hands.

Foreign Assistance Act, section 505(f). The Foreign Assistance Act provides guidance on technology transfers and sensitive item procurement.

Government of Iraq Section 505 Assurance Letter, August 14, 2004. Government of Iraq agreement to provide the same level of security and accountability as the U.S. and to permit the U.S. Government to observe and review items sold under the security assistance program.


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37 DoD 5105.38-M states a supply activity can be either a DoD storage depot or a commercial vendor that furnishes materiel under a DoD-administered contract.
38 Small arms are defined in Appendix C.
Title 40 U.S.C., section 524. Title 40 U.S.C., section 524, requires accountability and control over U.S. Government property. It states:

(a) Required. Each executive agency shall –

(1) maintain adequate inventory controls and accountability systems for property under its control

DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.64. DoDI 5000.64, “Accountability and Management of DoD-Owned Equipment and Other Accountable Property,” November 2, 2006:

• Provides policy and procedures for DoD-owned equipment and other accountable property and establishes policy and procedures to comply with 40 U.S.C., section 524.
• Requires that accountable property records shall be established for all property purchased, or otherwise obtained, that are sensitive as defined in DoD 4100.39-M, “Federal Logistics Information System,” Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007.

DoD 4100.39-M. DoD 4100.39-M, “Federal Logistics Information System,” Volume 10, Table 61, November 2007, states that sensitive items are materiel that require a high degree of protection and control due to statutory requirements or regulations. It defines sensitive items as items of high value, highly technical or of a hazardous nature, and small arms, ammunition, explosives, and demolition material.


Members of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent possible, timely and effective individual, collective, unit, and staff training necessary to perform to standard during operations...

The DoD Components shall ensure their individuals and organizations are trained to meet the specific operational requirements of the supported Combatant Commanders, as identified in Combatant Commander-approved Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs), before deploying for operations and while deployed.


OSD Foreign Military Sales Task Force Reports. Common Operating Picture reports on difficulties with timeliness of FMS processing and shipments to Iraq.
USD (AT&L) Value Stream Analysis, April 3, 2008, and various USD (AT&L) memos. Memoranda to USTRANSCOM on process improvements to Iraq; to Service Acquisition Executives emphasizing FMS shipments to Iraq; to DSCA on importance of transportation issues to FMS; to USD (P) on visibility of FMS case processing.

Part IV – Logistics Sustainability

Public Laws 109-13, 109-234, 109-289, 110-028, and 110-161. Provisions in these U.S. laws provide for in excess of $15.7 billion for the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), which “shall be available to the Secretary of Defense, notwithstanding any other provision of law, for the purpose of allowing the Commander, MNSTC-I, or the Secretary’s designee, to provide assistance, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to the security forces of Iraq, including the provision of equipments, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction and funding.”

DoD Directive 3000.05. DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. The Directive also states it is DoD policy that:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.

States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commander(s) and other joint force commanders in development of selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. Enclosure (R) of the manual describes the responsibilities and procedures for completing a Request for Forces (RFF) or Request for Capabilities (RFC) message.


**Part V – Medical Sustainability**

**DoD Directive 3000.05.** DoDD 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005, provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop and establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations. The Directive also states it is DoD policy that:

> Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

> Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces.

**The Military Health System Strategic Plan.** The DoD Military Health System (MHS) mission is “to provide optimal health services in support of our nation’s military mission - anytime, anywhere.” The MHS is a unique partnership of medical educators, medical researchers, and health care providers and their support personnel worldwide. “The Military Health System Strategic Plan – A Roadmap for Medical Transformation,” May 29, 2008, was developed to:

> [R]e-examine our fundamental purpose, our vision of the future, and strategies to achieve that vision. We are refocusing our efforts on the core business in which we are engaged - creating an integrated medical team that provides optimal health services in support of our nation's military mission - anytime, anywhere. We are ready to go in harm's way to meet our nation's challenges at home or abroad - to be a national
leader in health education, training, research and technology. We build bridges to peace through humanitarian support when and wherever needed, across our nation and the globe, and we provide premier care for our warriors and the military family.

Furthermore, the MHS Strategic Plan, under “Purpose, Vision, and Strategy” states:

We have a singular opportunity to build bridges to peace in hostile countries. In many circumstances, the MHS will serve as the tip of the spear and a formidable national strategy tool for the nation. And, we can take advantage of a one-time opportunity to design and build health facilities that promote a healing environment during the clinical encounter, empower our patients and families, relieve suffering, and promote long-term health and wellness. We will employ evidence-based design principles that link to improved clinical outcomes, patient and staff safety, and long-term operational efficiencies.

Joint Publication 4-02, Health Service Support, October 31, 2006.

According to Joint Publication 4-02, the purpose of health service support (HSS) is to maintain the individual and group health needed to accomplish a military mission. The intent is to effectively and efficiently use medical capabilities and individual healthful practices to prevent and/or correct any human condition that would impair or preclude the joint force from achieving its objectives. Joint Publication 4-02 states that HSS is related to three joint functions: sustainment, movement and maneuver, and protection and adds:

HSS promotes, improves, conserves, or restores health within a military system. HSS capabilities are employed across the range of military operations and include the ability to organize, train, and equip preceding deployment and enable the employment of physically fit personnel. These capabilities span the operational environment from point of injury/illness to the appropriate capability of care.

Joint Publication 4-02 continues to state that foremost is the role of HSS in sustainment: the provision of medical support required to maintain health during prolonged operations until successful accomplishment of the joint force objectives. Joint Publication 4-02 also notes that one of the HHS operational considerations is stability operations.

Stability operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability operations objectives could include the restoration of services such as water, sanitation, public health, and essential medical care. The desired military end state in the health sector should be an indigenous capacity to provide vital health services.
**DoD Directive 1322.18.** DoDD 1322.18, “Military Training,” September 3, 2004, states that:

Members of the Department of Defense shall receive, to the maximum extent possible, timely and effective individual, collective, unit, and staff training necessary to perform to standard during operations. . . . The DoD Components shall ensure their individuals and organizations are trained to meet the specific operational requirements of the supported Combatant Commanders, as identified in Combatant Commander-approved Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETLs), before deploying for operations and while deployed.

**DoD Instruction 6430.02.** DoDI 6430.2, “DoD Medical Standardization Board (DMSB),” March 17, 1997, implements policy and updates responsibilities, organization, management, and functions of the DoD Medical Standardization Board. One of the policies prescribed is that “Standardized medical materiel shall be used in the total health care system to the greatest extent possible to achieve economies of scale, minimize wastage of outdated shelf-life items, and allow health care providers to use in peacetime what they will use during contingency operations.”

Specifically, Section 6.7.4 states that the DoD Medical Standardization Board shall “Oversee medical shelf-life management programs, in coordination with the Services and the Food and Drug Administration, affecting expiration date management of dated and deteriorative materiel and other items found in Services' assemblages.”


This manual describes environmental monitoring of storage conditions and shelf-life extensions. It states that “any pharmaceutical that is found to have been exposed to temperature or humidity conditions outside the prescribed manufacturer guidelines for more than 72 hours will be considered unserviceable stock and not available for issue.”

**DoD Instruction 6015.23.** DoDI 6015.23, “Delivery of Healthcare at Military Treatment Facilities: Foreign Service Care; Third-Party Collection; Beneficiary Counseling and Assistance Coordinators (BCACs),” October 30, 2002, implements policy, assigns responsibilities and prescribes procedures on provisions of care in the delivery of health care at military treatment facilities in MHS.
Appendix H. Notional Division and Below Medical Mentor Laydown

- **Troop Medical Clinic Clinical Mentor (1)**
- **XX**
- **Division Surgeon Mentor (1)**
- **10 mentors per Brigade Units**
- **Brigade Surgeon Mentor (1)**
- **CSS**
- **CS**
- **1 Physician’s Assistant and 1 Medic Mentor per Battalion Aid Station (6)**
- **1 Medic and 1 Medical Service Corps Mentor per Combat Service Support Company (2)**
- **1 Senior Medic Mentor per Platoon (1) within this Combat Support Company**
Appendix I. Notional Medical Operational Readiness Report

MEDICAL MILITARY ADVISORY TEAM
Division/Brigade/Battalion Medical Operational Readiness Report

DATE/TIME:

1. Division/Brigade/Battalion and location:

2. Medical MATs assigned:

3. Numbers of Iraqi Army medical personnel *assigned* by location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>CSS Med Co</th>
<th>CS Med Plt</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
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<th>Battalion</th>
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<td>Combat medics</td>
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<td>Physicians</td>
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4. Numbers of Iraqi Army medical personnel *available* by location

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<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>CSS Med Co</th>
<th>CS Med Plt</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
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<th>Battalion</th>
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<td>Physicians</td>
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5. Shortages of Iraqi Army medical personnel by location

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<th>CS Med Plt</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
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<tr>
<td>Combat medics</td>
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<td>Physicians</td>
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<td>Other/PA</td>
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<th>Location</th>
<th>Clinic</th>
<th>CSS Med Co</th>
<th>CS Med Plt</th>
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<th>Battalion BAS</th>
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<tr>
<td>MES Sick Call</td>
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<tr>
<td>MES Trauma</td>
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<tr>
<td>MES Pt Hold</td>
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<td>MES Dental</td>
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<td>MES Prev Med</td>
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<td>MES Ambulance</td>
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7. Critical Equipment or Supply Shortages:

8. Training conducted in last week:

9. Training planned in coming two weeks:

10. High priority training needed:

11. Number of patients seen (attach DNBI report):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>CSS Med Co</th>
<th>CS Med Plt</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Battalion</th>
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<td>Patients evacuated</td>
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12. Issues needing assistance from MNSTC-I or MNC-I:

13. MMAT Contact information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms Used in this Appendix.</th>
<th>The following is a list of the acronyms used in this appendix.</th>
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<tr>
<td>BAS</td>
<td>Battalion Aid Station</td>
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<td>CO</td>
<td>Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Combat Service Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNBI</td>
<td>Disease Non Battle Injury</td>
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<tr>
<td>M5 Bag</td>
<td>Emergency Medical Equipment Bag</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAT</td>
<td>Military Advisory Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>MES</td>
<td>Medical Equipment Set</td>
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<tr>
<td>MED</td>
<td>Medical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMAT</td>
<td>Medical Military Advisory Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Physician’s Assistant</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLT</td>
<td>Platoon</td>
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<td>Prev Med</td>
<td>Preventive Medicine</td>
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</table>
Appendix J. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
  Deputy Chief Financial Officer
  Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
Director, Joint Staff
  Director, Operations (J-3)
  Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5)

Department of the Army
Secretary of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command
  Executive Director for Conventional Ammunition
  Commander, U.S. Army Joint Arms and Ammunition Command
  Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity
  Commander, U.S. Army Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
  Commander, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
  Commander, U.S. Army TACOM and Life Cycle Management Command
Commander/Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
  Commander, Gulf Region Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Auditor General, Department of the Army
Inspector General of the Army

Department of the Navy
Naval Inspector General
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (International Programs)

Department of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Commander, Air Force Security Assistance Center
Inspector General of the Air Force
Combatant Commands
Commander, U.S. Central Command
   Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq
   Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq
   Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
   Commander, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command
   U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command

Other Defense Organizations
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

Other Non-Defense Federal Organizations
Secretary of State
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs
Inspector General, Department of State
Comptroller of the United States
Office of Management and Budget
Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member
Senate Committee on Appropriations
   Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
   House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
House Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement
   House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
House Committee on International Relations
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Report on the Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces (Project No. D2008-D0001G-0141.002)

We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on this draft DoD-IG report. For recommendation 8.b., we concur with clarifying comment as provided. We have also provided technical revisions in the attached.

Douglas A. Brook
Acting

Attachment:
As stated
Recommendation #8b (p.70): We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), working with the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Joint Staff, Commander, U.S. Central Command, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, and Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, work to ensure that funding for this important program is not reduced prematurely.

DoD Position: Concur with comment. Recommend the following edit to the recommendation to clarify the role of the OUSD(C) in the budget process:

“We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), working with the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Joint Staff, Commander, U.S. Central Command, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, and Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, work to ensure that budget requests to Congress reflect the Administration’s priorities for ISFF funding.”

DoD Technical Comments

On page 67, in the third paragraph, second sentence, delete reference to the purchase of U.S. equipment through FMS as a “key goal” of the ISFF train and equip mission.

Rationale: We suggest that purchase of U.S. equipment through FMS is an ancillary benefit from the train and equip mission for the Iraq Security Forces to establish a sufficiently capable force that will allow the U.S. military to drawdown in Iraq.

On page 68, in the last paragraph, first sentence, delete “Congressional perceptions” from statement below.

“Out-year appropriations for ISFF are expected to decrease further because of Congressional perceptions of the increasing capability of the Government of Iraq to finance its own security and infrastructure requirements.”

Rationale: Accuracy. ISFF budget requests and appropriations are expected to decrease due to the capacity of the Government of Iraq to execute its budget.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Subject: Report on the Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Logistics Sustainment

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject report. The Joint Staff concurs subject to the inclusion of the enclosed recommendations.

2. The Joint Staff point of contact is Lieutenant Colonel Brad Tannehill, USAF; J-4/SD; 703-571-9805.

Enclosure

Reference:
1 DOD(IG) memorandum, 26 September 2008, “Report on the Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces (Project No. D2008-D000IG-0141.002)”
<table>
<thead>
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<th>PARA</th>
<th>LINE</th>
<th>COMMENT</th>
<th>RATIONALE</th>
<th>DECISION</th>
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<td>S</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Add paragraph to list of applicable criteria: &quot;Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-041: Registering and Monitoring of Defense Articles and Services Provided to Iraq, 25 SEP 08.&quot;</td>
<td>This DTM, interi policy until conversion to a DODI, directs subordinate commands, including MNSTC-I, to certify the establishment of a registration and monitoring system for controlling the export and transfer of defense articles to the GOL and makes DSNA the lead agent responsible for developing, implementing, and enforcing the registration and monitoring.</td>
<td>(A/R/M)</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td><strong>Recommendation:</strong> Change as follows: &quot;With some attention in this area, the IJASGI would serve as a model national logistics training center to accommodate the growing needs of the Iraqi Army for expanded logistics capabilities.&quot;</td>
<td>As written, the entire Iraqi Army would serve as a model national logistics training center, but the paragraph addresses the IJASGI at Taj.</td>
<td>(A/R/M)</td>
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<td>127</td>
<td>20.a.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>Comment:</strong> While there is nothing legally wrong with the recommendation, a holistic review of all medical capabilities would be required before any level of scrutiny would be provided.</td>
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<td>134</td>
<td>20.b.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>Comment:</strong> The Joint Staff supports the recommendation of establishing a requirement for comprehensive medical pre-deployment and in-country training for the medical mentors supporting coalition forces. Furthermore, the Joint Staff supports the ongoing efforts and recommends the utilization of the draft training curriculum for medical Embedded Training Teams, Police Mentor Teams, and Provincial Reconstruction Team members being developed by the Center for Disease and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS).</td>
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**ENCLOSURE**
TO: DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL


1. Attached are the responses from CENTCOM, MNF-I and MNSTC-I to the DODIG Draft Report “Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces” (Project No. D2008-D0001G-0141.002).

2. POC is LTC Steve Davis, Phone: (813) 827-6660; DSN 651-6328, e-mail: davissa@centcom.mil.

JAY W. HOOD,
MG, USA
Chief of Staff

28 October 2008
Recommendation revised in final report

Draft Recommendation deleted and consolidated into Recommendation 6.a.

Project No. D2008-D0001G-0141.002

Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces

CENTCOM COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 6.a.: DODIG recommends that the Commander, U. S. Central Command coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to expedite assignment of personnel with the requisite skills, experience levels, and rank to fill positions designated in the Joint Manning Document for the Multinational Security Transition Command – Iraq Security Assistance Office. (Page 56/DODIG Draft Report)

CENTCOM RESPONSE: CENTCOM concurs. Since the development of the MNSTC-I JMD (includes the SAO billets), CENTCOM has worked with the Joint Staff and Services to expedite sourcing and filling of the SAO’s billets. The billets have been coded, making DISAM training a requirement. In addition, to emphasize this point, in July 2008 CENTCOM requested assistance from the Joint Staff to ensure that the Services identify personnel well in advance so that DISAM training can be scheduled and conducted prior to their arrival in Iraq. Personnel with SAO/FMS experience are a very low density skill set that is spread across many specialties in all the Services with no means to track and manage. The vast majority, perhaps 90 percent or more, of the personnel in other CENTCOM SAO shops lack prior FMS experience.

RECOMMENDATION 6.e.: DODIG recommends that the Commander, U. S. Central Command coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to ensure that personnel assigned to security assistance positions in Iraq receive adequate security assistance training before deployment, but at a minimum they attend the resident Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Overseas course. (Page 56/DODIG Draft Report)

CENTCOM RESPONSE: CENTCOM concurs. The MNSTC-I SAO billets have been coded, making DISAM training a requirement. In addition, to emphasize this point, in July 2008 CENTCOM requested assistance from the Joint Staff to ensure that the Services identify personnel well in advance so that DISAM training can be scheduled and conducted prior to their arrival in Iraq. Originally, personnel filling the new SAO JMD were on 120-day TDY rotations until the Services could begin sourcing and filling the SAO billets. Position fills have started to come to a steady-state so that personnel from the Services are arriving for 12-month tours, attendance at DISAM has become more consistent.
RECOMMENDATION 6.d.: DODIG recommends that the US Central Command in its role as Combatant Command conduct an evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the DOD SAO program in Iraq. Further we recommend that the US Central Command subsequently inform the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military departments of any security assistance office personnel matters that could impact the security assistance program in Iraq. (Page 56/DODIG Draft Report)

CENTCOM RESPONSE: CENTCOM partially concurs. CENTCOM recommends that a team with the required expertise be put together by DOD to take advantage of this evaluation. The nature and scope of such an evaluation cannot be conducted solely by internal U.S. Central Command assets. Expertise from organizations that conduct or oversee security assistance and security cooperation functions should make up the bulk of this assessment team.

RECOMMENDATION 9: DODIG recommends that Commander, United States Central Command, coordinate with the Joint Staff and with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to expedite approval of the MNSTC-I Request for Forces 868 that defined the billet specialty requirements for the Logistics Military Assistance Teams. (Page 73/DODIG Draft Report)

CENTCOM RESPONSE: CENTCOM partially concurs. The CDR, USCENTCOM approved requirements for Request for Forces 868 and submitted them to the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff already validated those requirements. USCENTCOM is coordinating with the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command to source the Logistics Military Assistance Team requirements. CENTCOM recommends replacing “the Office of the Secretary of Defense to expedite approval of” with “the Joint Forces Command to source.”


CENTCOM RESPONSE: CENTCOM partially concurs. The development of medical education opportunities currently rests within the scope of operations of both MNF-I and MNSTC-I. As operations transition from the current structure, which includes command surgeon staffs for both MNF-I and MNSTC-I, to a more traditional security cooperation relationship, the development of a health engagement strategy which includes medical education and training is appropriate and warranted. Until that time, these activities are best developed and coordinated by personnel in country and with an intimate knowledge of and relationship with the Iraqi health care system. The CENTCOM SG office should assist to identify and facilitate relationships that support the training and education mission of forces assigned in Iraq and should maintain a strategic role in the training and education mission to ensure a clear vision of health system development goals and continuity between successive assigned personnel.

RECOMMENDATION 19.a.(2): DODIG recommends that the US Central Command coordinate regular in-country training for Iraq Security Forces personnel with DoD sources such as the Defense Medical Readiness Training Institute and the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. (Recommendation 19, a (2). - Page 118/DODIG Draft Report)
CENTCOM RESPONSE: CENTCOM partially concurs. Responsibility for day to day engagement and training activities rests with forces currently located in Iraq (MNF-I and MNSTC-I). Ongoing training and education activities are occurring. These training activities are best developed by personnel in country who possess an intimate knowledge of and relationship with components of the Iraq health care system. The CENTCOM SG office should assist to identify and facilitate relationships that support the training and education mission of forces assigned in Iraq and should maintain a strategic role in the training and education mission to ensure a clear vision of health system development goals and continuity between successive assigned personnel.

RECOMMENDATION 20.b: DODIG recommends that the Commander, U.S. Central Command and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, establish a requirement for comprehensive medical predeployment and in-country training for the medical mentors supporting Coalition efforts in Iraq. (Page 127/DODIG Draft Report)

CENTCOM RESPONSE: CENTCOM concurs.

RECOMMENDATION 21.a.(1): DODIG recommends that the US Central Command develop and implement, in coordination with the U.S. Mission – Iraq, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, and the relevant Iraqi ministries, a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multiyear plan to fully mobilize efforts to build strategic medical partnerships that support reconstruction of the civilian and military health sector consistent with Iraqi goals and objectives to develop a sustainable national health sector capability. (Page 134/DODIG Draft Report)

CENTCOM RESPONSE: CENTCOM partially concurs. CENTCOM agrees with the benefit of a comprehensive, synchronized, integrated, multiyear plan to build health capacity. The focal point of this effort must be the Health Attaché assigned to the US Mission-Iraq. Of less certainty is the effort to be applied to building health capacity with ongoing transition to full Iraqi control. Suggest planning effort be tempered by the continued role of the USG and consideration for the shift to a more traditional security cooperation relationship.

RECOMMENDATION 21.a.(2): DODIG recommends that the US Central Command identify, access, and leverage subject matter experts, the assets of the Military Health System, existing DoD efforts, and those of other U.S. Government (such as the Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Agency for International Development), international, and private sector organizations to assist the U.S. Mission – Iraq and the Multi-National Force-Iraq Command Surgeon efforts to coordinate and implement:
- Development of a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system
- Improved civilian and military medical education systems that adequately complement the Iraqi Army health care delivery system

(Pages 134/DODIG Draft Report)

CENTCOM RESPONSE: CENTCOM partially concurs. CENTCOM agrees with the utilization/leveraging subject matter experts, assets of the USG and others to assist development
of the Iraqi Army health care system. Similar to previous recommendations, The CENTCOM SG office must maintain a level of awareness of ongoing development strategy and activities, and seek to facilitate support of these activities. The US Mission Health Attaché, MNF-I, and MNSTC-I are best positioned and staffed to identify development strategies and methodologies and to carry these out. The CENTCOM SG office should provide strategic oversight and seek to facilitate the matching of resource to the development strategies and to ensure continuity between deployed forces.

**RECOMMENDATION 21.a.(3):** DODIG recommends that the US Central Command establish, in support of the U.S. Mission – Iraq and the Multi-National Force-Iraq, an interagency forum to plan and coordinate the implementation of U.S. Government health sector mentoring of the Ministry of Health and accomplish other support activities on behalf of the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Army. (Page 134/DODIG Draft Report)

**CENTCOM RESPONSE:** CENTCOM partially concurs. CENTCOM agrees with the need for an interagency forum to plan and coordinate the USG effort. Believe this role falls within the purview of the Health Attaché assigned to the US Embassy. By default, MNF-I has absorbed a portion of this role. If State has the lead for stabilization and reconstruction, the state department should take the lead for planning and coordination.
MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, USCENTCOM, 7115 South Boundary Boulevard, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621-5101

FOR Department of Defense Inspector General

SUBJECT: Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces Project No. D2008-D0001G-0141.96/2

1. This memorandum provides the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) response to subject assessment.

2. Thank you for your efforts with respect to this assessment. See enclosure for comments.

3. If you have any questions, please contact CDR Shannon Coulter at DSN: 318-485-3096 or email shannon.coulter@iraq.centcom.mil.

Encl

TIMOTHY P. McHALE
MG, USA
MNF-I CJ1/4/8
DODIG Draft Report D Dated 26 September 2008
Project No. D2008-D0001G-0141.002

Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces

MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE IRAQ (MNF-I) COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS
(page numbers refer to the DoDIG Draft Report page)

Observation 3. Absence of an End Use Monitoring Compliance Plan.

Recommendation 3: We recommend that MNF-I and Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) in coordination with the Defense Security Coordination Agency:

a. Develop an End of Use Monitoring compliance plan in coordination with the Government of Iraq.

Concur. See MNSTC-I comments.
(Pg 46)

b. Assist and train the GoI in understanding the importance, security issues and legal implications of End Use Monitoring requirements.

Concur. See MNSTC-I comments.
(Pg 46)


Recommendation 5: We recommend that MNF-I and MNSTC-I ensure that Standard Operating Procedures are developed for Security Assistance Office personnel assigned to site specific security assistance.

Concur. See MNSTC-I comments.
(Pg 52)

Observation 19. Iraqi Army Health Care Delivery System

Recommendation 19.b: We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I):

(I). Mentor Iraqi Army (IA) health care personnel at the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, division, brigade, and unit levels by Coalition partners (this is discussed in more detail in Observation T).
Surgeon Concur with Comment: The MNF-I Surgeon gained tentative approval from the Minister of Health (MoH) to initiate mentoring programs for Iraqi physicians, nurses and healthcare administrators.

(2) Develop and implement partnering agreements between co-located Coalition and IA units in which Iraqi personnel are provided routine and emergency care on a reimbursable basis (discussed in more detail in Observation V).

Surgeon Non-Concur with Comment: Routine care for Iraqi personnel is prohibited by Title X. Further, there are no implementing instructions available, and medical units are not equipped or staffed to bill for services rendered. We have been operating off of local approval of an exception to policy for non-Coalition Force medical care. (Pg. 118)

Observation 20. MNF-I Medical Mentoring Support to the Iraqi Army

Recommendation 20.a: We recommend that MNF-I assign sufficient priority to medical mentoring of the IA to effectively develop sustainable combat services support capabilities in the medical area and:

(1) Develop a comprehensive, phased, detailed, and integrated multi-year medical mentoring plan that prioritizes and synchronizes mentoring efforts and links together strategic, operational, and tactical mentoring steps required in the mentoring plan.

Surgeon Concur, on-going: The MNF-I Surgeon works with the USM-I Health Attaché and the Iraqi Minister of Health on the Medical Fusion Cell, which coordinates activity at a strategic level. The Iraqi Healthcare Optimization Panel is the operational/tactical arm of the Medical Fusion Cell. The MNF-I Surgeon’s cell has also developed and circulated an Action Plan along four Lines of Effort in support of the Ministry of Health.

(2) Establish a medical sustainment staff element, within the Multi-National Force-Iraq logistics section, with the primary mission of mentoring the Iraq Security Forces in developing a sustainable health care system.

Surgeon Non-Concur: Requires action at CENTCOM level or above. The current trend has been to decrease the MNF-I Surgeon’s cell numbers by removing JMD slots. The organization has gone from a peak of 17 personnel to its current level of 6. Within the confines of the JMD, we are working to have personnel augment our staff for ongoing projects. For any significant, sustained capability, there will need to be support from higher. (see Recommendation 20.b.)

(3) Organize Medical Military Advisory Teams under its medical sustainment cell and place experienced contractor personnel in key positions for continuity of mentoring effectiveness.

Surgeon Non-Concur: Requires action at CENTCOM level or above. The current trend has been to decrease the MNF-I Surgeon’s cell numbers by removing JMD slots. The organization has gone from a peak of 17 personnel to its current level of 6. Within the confines of the JMD, we
are working to have personnel augment our staff for ongoing projects. For any significant, sustained capability, there will need to be support from higher. (see Recommendation 20.b.)

(4). Submit a Request For Forces to staff the Medical Military Advisory Teams and other medical mentoring positions with 553 medical mentors to embed with Iraqi Army field units, location command clinics, recruiting and training sites, and medical logistics units.

Surgeon Concur: The current trend has been to decrease the MNF-I Surgeon’s cell numbers by removing JMD slots. The organization has gone from a peak of 17 personnel to its current level of 6. Within the confines of the JMD, we are working to have personnel augment our staff for ongoing projects. For any significant, sustained capability, there will need to be support from higher. (see Recommendation 20.b.)

(5). Establish a partnership between its medical sustainment cell, and the logistics sustainment cell that is under consideration in the Taji National Army Depot Logistics pilot project, to take advantage of the proximity to the IA Support and Services Institute and the Class VIII medical logistics warehouses.

Surgeon Non-Concur: The current trend has been to decrease the MNF-I Surgeon’s cell numbers by removing JMD slots. The organization has gone from a peak of 17 personnel to its current level of 6. Within the confines of the JMD, we are working to have personnel augment our staff for ongoing projects. For any significant, sustained capability, there will need to be support from higher. (see Recommendation 20.b.)
(Pg. 126/127)

Observation 21. Synchronization of U.S. Government Interagency Efforts

Recommendation 21.b: We recommend that MNF-I establish a single focal point for planning and accomplishing the USG’s role in supporting the healthcare goals of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the IA.

Surgeon non-concur: The lead agent for interfacing with GoI is the USM-I. For healthcare issues, this is the USM-I Health Attaché’s office. MNF-I is ISO USM-I Health Attaché. (Pg. 134)


Recommendation 23.a: We recommend that MNF-I:

(1). Establish a medical expense record keeping system at U.S. military medical treatment facilities in Iraq to document all direct and indirect inpatient and outpatient costs for health care treatment provided to individual Iraqi military, police, and civilians.

Surgeon Non-Concur: The Defense Base Act (DBA) calls for military to provide reimbursable medical care for DoD contractors. There are no implementing instructions available, and medical units are not equipped or staffed to bill for services rendered. MNF-I Surgeon is
currently working with MNF-I Admin Counsel for a way ahead. The outcome is unclear, but it is doubtful that reimbursable services apply to Coalition, ISF, or LN civilian care rendered. We have been operating off of local approval of an exception to policy for non-Coalition Force medical care.

**(2)**. Establish processes with the MoD and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) to reimburse the U.S. Government for all future costs obtained through the medical expense record keeping systems for health care treatment provided to individual Iraqi military and police at U.S. military medical treatment facilities.

Surgeon Non-Concur: The Defense Base Act (DBA) calls for military to provide reimbursable medical care for DoD contractors. There are no implementing instructions available, and medical units are not equipped or staffed to bill for services rendered. MNF-I Surgeon is currently working with MNF-I Admin Counsel for a way ahead. The outcome is unclear, but it is doubtful that reimbursable services apply to Coalition, ISF, or LN civilian care rendered. We have been operating off of local approval of an exception to policy for non-Coalition Force medical care.

**(3)**. Establish processes with the MoD and MoI to reimburse the U.S. Government for all previously provided costs for health care treatment provided to individual Iraqi military and police at U.S. military medical treatment facilities.

Surgeon Non-Concur: The DBA calls for military to provide reimbursable medical care for DoD contractors. There are no implementing instructions available, and medical units are not equipped or staffed to bill for services rendered. MNF-I Surgeon is currently working with MNF-I Admin Counsel for a way ahead. The outcome is unclear, but it is doubtful that reimbursable services apply to Coalition, ISF, or LN civilian care rendered. We have been operating off of local approval of an exception to policy for non-Coalition Force medical care.

**(Page 142/143)**

**Recommendation 23.b**: We recommend that MNF-I coordinate with the Chief, U.S. Mission-Iraq to establish processes with the Ministry of Health to reimburse the USG for all future and previously provided costs for health care treatment provided to individual Iraqi civilians at U.S. military medical treatment facilities.

Surgeon Non-Concur: The Defense Base Act (DBA) calls for military to provide reimbursable medical care for DoD contractors. There are no implementing instructions available, and medical units are not equipped or staffed to bill for services rendered. MNF-I Surgeon is currently working with MNF-I Admin Counsel for a way ahead. The outcome is unclear, but it is doubtful that reimbursable services apply to Coalition, ISF, or LN civilian care rendered. We have been operating off of local approval of an exception to policy for non-Coalition Force medical care.

**(Page 143)**
MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Report on the Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Iraqi National Security Forces


As requested, I am responding to your September 26, 2008, request to review the draft subject report.

I have conducted a thorough review of the report, particularly Observations 6 and 7 which pertain to Security Assistance Office—Personnel and Foreign Military Sales—Performance. Detailed comments on the recommendations 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b are provided at Tab 1.

I thank you for your detailed assessment and hope that this information provides further clarification on the current state of Security Assistance to Iraq.

Joseph A. Benkert

Attachments:
As stated
UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Response to Draft DODIG Assessment Report – Munitions Assessment Team II – Iraq for Observations 6 and 7

BACKGROUND: Observations 6 and 7 which pertain to Security Assistance Office—Personnel and Foreign Military Sales—Performance

- RECOMMENDATION 6.b: We recommend that the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, coordinate with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, to establish appropriate tour length policies for personnel assigned to the Security Assistance Office in Iraq that provide the operational commander the personnel and resources necessary to perform the security assistance mission.

  - USD Response: Concur with Comment. The operational commander must have the personnel and resources necessary to perform the security assistance mission in Iraq. The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, (DSCA) will continue to work with the Joint Staff (JS) and other appropriate organizations who set tour lengths and establish training requirements for personnel assigned to Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).

  - The United States Government (USG) does not have a Title 22 Security Assistance Organization (SAO) in Iraq. As directed by National Security Presidential Directive–36 (NSPD-36), the conduct of security assistance in Iraq has been delegated to the Department of Defense (DoD) until such time as the Secretaries of Defense and State determine it is appropriate to transition to a traditional Title 22 SAO. The responsibility for the limited ongoing security assistance activities in support of the Government of Iraq (GoI) has been delegated to the Commander, MNSTC-I, which is not a Title 22 activity, and as such, is not subject to DoD Directives 2055.3 or 5105.38-M. Until the USG transitions from NSPD-36 to a traditional security assistance relationship with the GoI, DSCA will continue to support the provision of trained and experienced personnel to meet the MNSTC-I SAO manpower requirements as identified by the Commander MNSTC-I, through the Commander Multi National Force-Iraq, Commander US Central Command, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Under Secretary of Defense Policy. In support of the security assistance activities directed by the Commander MNSTC-I, Director DSCA will continue to deploy Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM) Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to Baghdad in order to train both SAO and GoI security assistance personnel.

UNCLASSIFIED
- Additionally, the Director, DSCA, does not have the authority to establish tour lengths for SAOs. Current policy for SAO tour length approval requires that the respective COCOM submit the recommended tour lengths to JS J1 which staffs it to DSCA, the Services, and other affected DOD agencies, such as DIA, for concurrence. The MNSTC-I, or its respective higher headquarters, would need to initiate any tour length changes to the JS.


- USDSP Response: Concur with Comment. I agree, in principal, that Foreign Military Sales case processing for war-time and contingency operations should be expedited. Unfortunately, each operation draws from different funding sources and is granted different authorities. It cannot be a “one size fits all” solution. In general, accelerated case processing beyond the standard processing time identified in the DoD 5105.38-M (i.e., the maximum processing time between Implementing Agency receipt of the Letter of Request and release of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance should normally be no more than 120 days...) requires funding to provide these additional defense services. DSCA maintains an average of 35 days processing time for FMS case development in support of operations in Iraq, which is significantly faster than the standard average processing time for FMS case development of 80% of cases within 120 days. DSCA has worked with MNSTC-I, Government of Iraq, CENTCOM, and the Implementing Agencies to establish a case processing standard for Iraq.

- RECOMMENDATION 7.b: We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency and Commander, U.S. Central Command: b. Develop a comprehensive plan to provide the necessary personnel support and funding within the security assistance community to be able to process and implement Foreign Military Sales cases as the newly established wartime standard for Iraq.

- USDSP Response: Concur with comment. DSCA, working with the Implementing Agencies (IAs) has requested information as to the necessary personnel requirements to meet accelerated case development and implementation for Iraq. The IAs have already identified their required levels of personnel support to DSCA. DSCA has forwarded the manpower information to CENTCOM, MNF-I.
and MNSTC-I. Furthermore, DSCA has assisted in identifying funding sources legally available to fund the acceleration of case development and implementation, as well as additional defense services.
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Draft Report, “Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Iraq Security Forces” (Project No. D2008-D0001G-0141.002)

Thank you for the opportunity to review and provide comments on the subject draft report, dated September 26, 2008. We concur with the draft report’s conclusions and recommendations. Specific comments for those recommendations concerning medical sustainability are attached.

My points of contact for this issue are Dr. Warner Anderson (Functional); who may be reached at (703) 681-3279, ext. 123; and Mr. Gunther Zimmerman (Audit Liaison); who may be reached at (703) 681-4360.

S. Ward Casscells, MD

Attachment:
As stated
(Project No. D2008-D0001G-0141.002)

Comments of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs

Recommendation 20.c: We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and using the assets of the Military Health System (MHS) and the Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM) at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, develop and implement comprehensive medical pre-deployment training for the medical mentors deploying to Iraq that meets the requirements of the Commander, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) (as recommended in Recommendation U.2.).

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (OASD (HA)) Response: Partially concurs. Training may be developed by a Joint medical establishment, such as the Defense Medical Readiness Training Institute. CDHAM is one of many other resources that may be used as appropriate.

Recommendation 21.c.(1): We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs: Establish a U.S.-based health sector reach back support office within the Department of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander, USCENTCOM. Use this office to identify, access, and leverage subject matter experts, the assets of MHS, existing and future Department of Defense (DoD) efforts, and those of other U.S. Government (USG) (such as the Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the U.S. Agency for International Development), international, and private sector organizations to assist the U.S. Mission–Iraq and the Multi-National Force-Iraq Command Surgeon efforts to promote and implement:

- Development of a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system
- Improved Iraqi civilian and military medical education systems that adequately complement the Iraqi Army health care delivery system

OASD (HA) Response: We concur with the recommendation as written. The International Health Division (IHD) within OASD (HA) is developing expertise and staffing for reach back support to the Combatant Commands and the Interagency. The IHD calls upon other USG Agencies (Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Agency for International Development, etc), non-governmental organizations and International Organizations (United Nations, World Health Organization), for complementary strengths and expertise. This includes ongoing efforts to co-locate interagency personnel within the IHD.

Recommendation 21.c(2): We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs: Recommend to interagency counterparts the establishment of a U.S.-based interagency health sector reach back support office that would coordinate all USG health sector reconstruction activities in Iraq.
OASD (HA) Response: We concur with the recommendation as written. As stated in response to recommendation 21.c.(1), the IIID with the OASD (HA) will be the focal point for developing this reach back capability with our interagency partners.

Recommendation 23.c: We recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs update DoD policies to prescribe standardized procedures for management controls in deployable medical systems. Controls should be appropriate for the deployed setting and not impose unrealistic administrative burdens during combat operations, but should allow the collection of timely, accurate, and sufficiently detailed data to permit review and audit by management at a time when the theater matures and the operational tempo stabilizes. Data collected should support planning and programming for humanitarian operations and care delivered to local national patients.

OASD (HA) Response: We concur with the recommendation as written. Concept of operations documents have been developed for each of our deployed health information systems. They layout in detail the how and when health information is collected, by whom, the paths which it is transmitted and the uses to which it is put. As the systems mature, the collection and evaluation processes will be more refined.
MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Inspector General

SUBJECT: Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and Sustainment for the Iraqi Security Forces Project No. D2008-D0001G-0141.002

1. This memorandum provides the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) response to the subject assessment.

2. MNSTC-I generally concurs with the conclusions contained in the report. See the enclosure for our comments.

3. We appreciate your assessment of the subject project. Thank you for the opportunity to provide written comments for incorporation in the final report.

4. If you have any question please contact LTC Patrick Dailey at DSN 318-852-1359 or email patrick.dailey@iraq.centcom.mil.

Encl

RANDY A. BUHIDAR
COL, USA
Chief of Staff
MNSTC-I Response to the DODIG Assessment of Arms, Ammunition, and 
Explosives Accountability and Control; Security Assistance; and 
Sustainment for the Iraqi Security Forces
Project No. D2009-D001G-014.002

20 Oct 2008

Observation 1. Assistance to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in Accounting for and Managing Weapons and Ammunition

Recommendation 1.a. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior and their warehousing organizations in attaining and maintaining 100 percent accountability and control of Iraq Security Forces weapons by serial numbers:

CONCUR. MNSTC-I continues to work with the Ministry of Interior in refining their current processes for serial accountability of weapons. During the inspection the DoDIG was satisfied with the current MoI method of accounting for weapons by serial numbers.

The Iraqi Security Forces have a strong culture of weapons accountability. At the Iraqi depot and unit level all weapons are accounted for on manual ledgers. The MoD feels that manual ledgers, with original signatures of responsible officers, ensures accuracy personal responsibility. The ledgers are kept at the depot and individual units.

An automated system is used to record M-16s issued to troops in the field. Biometrics data is collected on each soldier and is linked to a serialized weapon. The data is then burned onto a CD and sent to Baghdad where it is loaded into the MoD Human Resources Information Management System.

All weapons issues and receipts in the Iraqi Army are managed by a well-established process based on Iraqi Army Form 101 (request document) and 102 (issue document).

Recommendation 1. a (1). Implementation of data quality controls such as verifying or double checking the recording of weapons serial numbers at the time of entry into warehouse databases.

CONCUR. MNSTC-I and the MoI ensure full accountability of weapons entering the warehouse through jointly conducted serial number inventories. These inventories are maintained in the MoI weapons database.
Iraqi Ministry of Defense weapons are accounted for at the depot and unit warehouses through a manual ledger process, which records serial numbers. The Joint Headquarters’ Deputy Chief of Staff-Logistics and the National Supply Depot Commander have a robust double verification process for weapons received or issued at Taji National Supply Depot. Serial numbers of M16s/M4s issued to Iraqi soldiers are linked to biometric data which includes fingerprinting, retinal scan, voice scan, biographical information and a photograph of the soldier holding the weapon. The biometric program is an Iraqi run program. This biometric data is then loaded into the MOD Human Resources Information Management System.

Recommendation 1.a. (2). Implementation of a monthly 10-percent or random sample of the inventory of Iraqi weapons and verification of the serial numbers recorded in warehouse databases.

CONCUR. Presently, the MoD does not conduct monthly inventories or random inventories of weapons. Following the initial jointly conducted inventories of weapons entering the warehouse, there is no follow-on inventory until the weapons are distributed to units. MNSTC-I continues to advise the MoD on the use of random inventories to periodically spot check accountability of weapons. MNSTC-I also advises the MoD warehouse leadership on improved automation to facilitate these random inventories.

MoD is utilizing an automated database system at Taji National Supply Depot and is conducting monthly inventory reconciliation for 10% of the serial numbers. At the Iraqi Army unit level, ledger monthly reconciliation for 10% of serial numbers to on-hand weapons is being instituted.

Recommendation 1.b. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, advise and assist the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior in developing and implementing or contracting for an integrated Arabic-based warehouse management system to account for, control, and manage stored commodities, to include arms, ammunition, and explosives. The system should be automated to the extent acceptable to and sustainable by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. The system should, at a minimum:

- Record quantities and descriptions of items received and issued
- Show the organizations from which items were received and to which items were issued
- Identify items to a specific location within a warehouse
- Show balances of the quantities of items on-hand
CONCUR. The MoI lacks computer proficient warehouse workers, and reliable power for computers remains a challenge. MNSTC-I will continue to encourage the implement of an automated system for the MoI. We will also review lessons learned from the automated systems implemented by the MoD.

Two such systems are already in use with the MoD. The first, at the Taji National Supply Depot, is a contracted inventory management system called MySAP, covering all Classes of supply in the depot. It is a complicated system, and operates in English, so is not popular with its Iraqi users.

The second system, called Iraq Army Maintenance Program (IAMP), is an internet-based network covering the Joint Repair Parts Command at Taji (formerly known as the Taji Central Warehouse) and Divisional Location Command workshops. It provides simple acquisition, receipt and inventory management functions, and email communications between the main Iraqi Army maintenance locations. This is a popular and well-used system, and MNSTC-I J4 has worked with the contractor (Anham) to have this system translated into Arabic to be completed in November 2008. A program to further extend the IAMP network, and add new functionality, such movement control and stock numbering modules, are being developed.

Observation 2. Assistance to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior in Accounting for and Managing the Inventory of Captured and Otherwise Obtained Weapons

Recommendation 2.a. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, advise and assist the Ministry of Defense to implement its captured weapons policy and complete the serial number inventory and inspection of captured enemy weapons stored at Taji National Army Depot and Iraqi Army Location Commands as soon as possible.

CONCUR. MNSTC-I has coordinated captured enemy weapons procedures with MNC-I and the process to be followed are documented in MNC-I FRAGO 08-540 and MNSTC-I FRAGO 08-028. MNSTC-I, augmented by Army Materiel Command personnel provided through 402nd AFSB have processed over 17,000 weapons from the backlog at Taji. During the process serial numbers are recorded and are entered into a CEW database run by MNSTC-I J4. These will be forwarded to the Army Material Command, Logistics Support Activity for inclusion in the DoD Small Arms and Light Weapons Serialization Program database.

Weapons are subjected to an initial triage process. Weapons determined as potentially repairable are held for transfer to the Taji National Maintenance Depot for repair. Once repaired these weapons are returned to the Class V warehouses at the Supply depot for subsequent reissue. Weapons not
authorized, not supportive of the Iraqi Security Forces inventory, or determine as beyond repair are segregated and stored in a secure location pending demil. MNSTC-I J4 has worked an agreement for demil of the backlog of captured enemy weapons with the Iraqi Mine and Clearance Organization.

**Recommendation 2.b.** We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, with assistance from the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, advise and assist the Ministry of Defense to establish a demilitarization capability as part of the Taji National Maintenance Depot Small Arms Shop.

**CONCUR.** See 2.a.

**Recommendation 2.c.** We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, ensure that the serial numbers resulting from the inventory of captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons at Taji National Army Depot and Iraqi Army location commands are recorded in the Multi-National Security Command-Iraq weapons serial number database and are subsequently forwarded to the Army Material Command, Logistics Support Activity for inclusion in DoD Small Arms and Light Weapons Serialization Program database.

**CONCUR.** See 2.a.

**Recommendation 2.d.** We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, advise and assist the Ministry of Interior to complete and issue formal policy for captured, confiscated, abandoned, recovered, and turned-in weapons.

**CONCUR.** The MNSTC-I J4 has demil responsibility until 31 December 2008. After 31 December 2008, demil for captured weapons becomes the responsibility of the GoI. MNSTC-I will advise the Iraqis with the setting up of their demil process if they choose to pursue this program.

**Observation 3. Absence of an End Use Monitoring Compliance Plan**

**Recommendation 3.** We recommend that the Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq and Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq, in coordination with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency:

**Recommendation 3.a.** Develop an End Use Monitoring compliance plan in coordination with the Government of Iraq.
CONCUR. The "Iraq Golden Sentry End-Use-Monitoring (EUM) Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) was signed 12 September 2008. The SOP delineates responsibilities, points of contacts, required procedures, inspection requirements, documentation and visit procedures for the EUM program. MNSTC-I has also developed and updated Memorandum of Agreements for NVDs with the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Bureau, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Interior. These agreements detail requirements and procedures for the Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM) of NVDs purchased, delivered or controlled by ISF. These requirements and procedures include the accountability, safeguarding, storage and reporting for NVDs.

Recommendation 3.b. Assist and train the Government of Iraq in understanding the importance, security issues and legal implications of End Use Monitoring requirements.

CONCUR. MNSTC-I has worked to identify, meet and train ISF EUM Program managers from the bureau and ministries. These program managers will be responsible for the management and execution of NVD accountability and safeguarding procedures and requirements for their respective organizations. MNSTC-I has also accomplished seven site visits in 2008. During these visits, we inspected site security; reviewed location property books; conducted 100% serial number inventories; and reviewed unit inventory and control procedures.

Observation 4. Accountability Issues with Night Vision Devices at Taji National Depot

Recommendation 4. We recommend that Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command – Iraq:

Recommendation 4.a. Reconcile night vision devices discrepancies at Taji National Depot between inventory data and stocks on-hand consistent with End Use Monitoring requirements.

CONCUR. Action complete.

Recommendation 4.b. Mentor Iraq Security Force personnel to develop a suitable system for accountability of night vision devices in accordance with signed agreements and the FAA section 505.

CONCUR. The Director of Property under the Director General for Central Auditing has been nominated as Iraqi Ministry of Defense accounting manager for night vision devices (NVD) End User Monitoring, in accordance with FAA section 505. Divisions report authorized and on-hand stocks of NVD to the Joint Headquarters’ Combined Logistics Operations Center. Reporting by serial number is being instituted.
Observation 5. Security Assistance Office – Standard Operating Procedures

Recommendation 5. We recommend that the Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq and the Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq ensure that Standard Operating Procedures are developed for Security Assistance Office personnel assigned to site specific security assistance operations.

CONCUR. MNSTC-I developed and resourced a Logistics, Movement and Accountability cell in July 2008. The Logistics, Movements, and Accountability cell has developed a draft SOP, and it will be completed by 15 November 2008. The draft SOP contains overarching transportation, movement, receipt procedures, and other logistics guidance.

Observation 8. Use of Iraq Security Forces Funds for Joint Iraqi and U.S. Projects

Recommendation 8.a. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, conduct an extensive risk analysis of the essential train, equip, and sustainment tasks and projects planned for the Iraq Security Forces and determine the effect on these projects of continuing diminished ISFF funding; and that MNSTC-I develop strategies for mitigating or transferring those risks.

CONCUR. All ISFF expenditure is made in accordance with strict criteria established by CG MNSTC-I to reduce ISFF spending and encourage Iraqi Defense expenditure. The emphasis is on leveraging shared Iraqi expenditure and ensuring the Iraqi MoD and MoI continue to increase spending on training, equipping, and sustaining the Iraqi Security Forces. Using this criteria, there are sufficient ISFF funds to execute MNSTC-I’s mission-essential tasks in 2008 and 2009. Funding of individual ISFF programs is subject to stringent senior leader oversight, including risk assessment and mitigation planning. This case-by-case approach is more flexible and appropriate than a single overarching “extensive risk analysis” of all MNSTC-I projects.

MNSTC-I will continue to conduct regular reviews of its projects in light of identified risks, and will provide senior decision makers in the Ministries the insights and recommendations generated by these reviews. MNSTC-I staff will continue to advise their Iraqi counterparts of the risk factors inherent in MoD and MoI programs.
Observation 10. Use of Taji National Depot Airstrip for Iraqi Fixed Wing Aircraft

Recommendation 10. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, in conjunction with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters, study the feasibility of certifying the Taji Airfield for fixed wing logistics support operations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of logistics distribution for the Iraqi Army.

CONCUR. MNF-I has the lead for this effort to meet a mission requirement. Their plan is currently being implemented to certify the Taji Airfield for fixed wing cargo operations. Multiple projects are currently underway to improve the condition of Taji Airfield, to include navigation aids and airfield lighting. It is estimated that the airfield will be able to support cargo operations by the end of 2008. MNSTC-I will continue to support this effort.


Recommendation 11. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, coordinate with the Ministry of Defense, Joint Headquarters, and the Iraqi Army to expedite development and publication of detailed, officially approved logistics directives and decrees that clearly describe the doctrine, policies, processes, and procedures for establishing self-sustaining logistics functions within the Ministry of Defense, Joint Headquarters, and the Iraqi Army.

CONCUR. The Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff – Logistics staff, with assistance from MNSTC-I, printed and distributed the Iraqi Supply Handbook throughout the Iraqi Joint Forces. It addresses policies and processes for self sustaining logistics functions from the strategic/depot level down through the tactical/operational level, including written procedures and flow charts. A newly established Iraqi Logistics Development Committee, combining Coalition and Iraqi logistics leaders, will focus on establishing a doctrinal framework to address current gaps in the Iraqi logistics concept. The Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff – Logistics is conducting a Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT) set for 26-27 October 2008. This will identify the friction points and identify procedural and structural gaps, for the Iraqis and Coalition to develop “ways ahead.” Additionally, the Joint Headquarters Electrical, Mechanical, and Engineering Directorate holds quarterly conferences, including Division and Location Command commanders, to discuss and work through new policies and procedures.
Observation 12. Iraqi Funding for Life Support Functions in the Iraqi Military

Recommendation 12. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq:

Recommendation 12.a. Engage with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense leadership to assist them in developing a practical Base Operations Support budget and budgeting process that is sufficient to meet the needs of the Location Commander to support his tenant units, as well as to cover costs for general base infrastructure repair and services.

CONCUR. MNSTC-I has been advising Iraqi staff in defining requirements, establishing a base operating support investment strategy, and building a successful budget process for base infrastructure and repair. However, despite the efforts by Iraqi Ministry of Defense Logistic and Infrastructure officers, senior leadership in the MoD has been reluctant to make the necessary delegations of funding authority needed to implement this policy.

Recommendation 12.b. Coordinate with the Ministry of Defense to assess the potential adverse impact that failure to provide basic services and maintenance of base infrastructure may have on Iraqi self reliance.

CONCUR. MNSTC-I intends to conduct a Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) with the Director General of Infrastructure within the next 6 months. The ROC will incorporate scenarios of facilities issues to illustrate potential impact to mission. The rehearsal will uncover gaps in roles, responsibilities, procedures, which will then be reviewed with DG Infrastructure in an after-action report for opportunities to make adjustments to processes and policy.

Observation 13. Availability of Electricity at Location Commands

Recommendation 13. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq:

Recommendation 13.a. Coordinate with the Commander, Multi-National Command-Iraq and Commander, Gulf Region Division, to assess the electrical generation capacity at each prospective Location Command and provide a plan to mitigate, transfer, or avoid the risk to logistical sustainment that could result from the inability of each base to produce sufficient electricity to meet established requirements.
CONCUR. Primary electrical power at each Location Command will be provided by generators or connection into the Iraqi national power grid, where available. Back-up power will be provided by generators, which are dependent on fuel allocation/availability and effective maintenance. MNSTC-I is collaborating with the Ministry of Defense Military Works engineers and the Ministry of Electricity to determine base requirements and to gather the scope of requirements for each base. This will form the basis for a contract with Baghdad University through the Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division, to assess the power requirements of the major Ministry of Defense facilities and the impact of this on the national electric power grid; identify actions necessary in order to deliver power to Iraqi Army bases; and prepare a statement of work for future contracting. Execution of the project(s) will depend on scope, cost, and funding source.

Recommendation 13.b. Coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and/or the Iraqi Army Joint Headquarters to make the provision of adequate electrical power supply at the Location Commands a priority.

SEE 13.a.

Observation 14. Location Commander Duties and Authorities

Recommendation 14. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to establish and issue a clear, definitive list of responsibilities and authorities for each Location Command commander.

CONCUR. Through the Joint Headquarters Deputy Chief of Staff-Logistics, the Location Commands held their first Commanders Conference in June 2008 to disseminate policy and procedures for Location Commands. The Iraqi Supply Handbook and the future Tactical Exercise Without Troops will further enhance/clarify this understanding for Division Commanders and Location Commands.

Observation 15. Distribution of U.S.-Funded Arms and Ammunition to the Kurdish Ministry of Interior

Recommendation 15. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, review the distribution of equipment and material provided through the Iraq Security Forces Fund to determine if the arms and ammunition requirements of the Kurdish Ministry of the Interior are being met in an equitable manner.
CONCUR. MNSTC-I has reviewed the request from the Kurdish Mol (KMol) and discussed these with Mol. The Mol has distributed equipment items to the KMol as part of the three phase plan approved by the MNSTC-I Commander in June 2008. Phase 1 included equipment (patrol vehicles and body armor) on hand in the Abu Ghraib Warehouse (AGW); phase two includes equipment due to arrive the AGW. Phase three includes equipment to be ordered following a requirements analysis. Phases two or three will be executed upon the signing of a KMol and Mol Memorandum of Agreement.

Observation 16. Undistributed ISFF-Funded Equipment

Recommendation 16. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, conduct an inventory of equipment held in the Abu Ghraib warehouse, identify those unclaimed items that have been in inventory over 12 months, determine the appropriate recipient, if possible, and take proper steps to distribute the equipment promptly. In the event equipment is determined to have no consignee and to be in excess, then we recommend that the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq process the equipment for disposition in accordance with applicable regulations of the Defense Materiel Reutilization Program.

CONCUR. Process is in place. All property is recorded in the automated data store maintained at that site. MNSTC-I has begun the issue of all equipment at Abu Grab Warehouse to the appropriate organizations in the Mol and MoD.

Observation 17. Iraqi Army Maintenance Program

Recommendation 17. We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq:

Recommendation 17.a. Coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters to assess the Iraqi Army capability to conduct 3rd Line intermediate vehicle maintenance and associated spare parts support and identify a bridging strategy to ensure adequate support is available.

CONCUR. The Iraqi Army now has full control of 3rd Line maintenance operations; the limited remaining contractor support will be withdrawn from most sites in May 2009. Output of the 3rd Line workshops remains well below capacity, mainly because of the shortage of qualified mechanics in the workshops and shortage of supplies of spares.

A bridging strategy has been developed to improve these problems until the Iraqi logistics capacity grows. "Push packages" of HMMWV repair parts are being delivered to 1st and 2nd line to alleviate the immediate spares shortages. Short-term contract support for spares distribution has been arranged to fill the gap until the General Transportation Regiment (GTR) becomes operational in late
2008. The Iraqi Army Maintenance Program (IAMP) network, which provides basic inventory control and requisition management at 4th and 3rd Line, including visibility of vehicle availability and Class IX stocks in the depots and warehouses, has been set up in all 4th and 3rd Line workshops and translated into Arabic. Additional MNSTC-I advisers have been deployed to the Combined Logistics Operations Center (CLOC), which is starting to provide an effective materiel management capability for the Iraqi Army, enabling asset tracking and cross leveling.

The Electrical, Mechanical and Engineering (EME) Directorate holds bi-monthly Director’s Conferences to assess logistic capability. EME is also preparing scenarios for the Logistic Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT) at the end of October 2008. The scenarios will include processes for repair parts request, issue, distribution and Code Out procedures.

Substantial stocks of Class IX are still available in the National Supply Depot, and EME has requested $2M in Ford F-350 parts via FMS to support “Push Packages” for F-350. However, the lack of planned logistic procurement, especially Class IX procurement, either through the use of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or by direct contracting, remains an area of concern.

**Recommendation 17.b.** Coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi Joint Headquarters to ensure that the 3rd Line intermediate maintenance organizations attached to the 13 Iraqi Location Commands are manned sufficiently to perform their mission.

**CONCUR.** The Joint Headquarters Electrical, Mechanical and Engineering (EME) Directorate is responsible for manning 3rd Line locations. EME recruiting continues to be strong, with 3,000 new soldiers hired in the last three months. In addition, they have received approximately 3,200 rejoiners, of which 2,700 were Non-Commissioned Officers. They have also recruited 400 former Army Warrant Officers which will greatly help increase the knowledge level of the current force. Manning at Location Commands was one of the topics covered as part of the EME Director’s Conference 13-15 October.

**Recommendation 17.c.** Coordinate with the Iraqi Joint Headquarters to ensure that there is an adequate number of qualified staff at the Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute to provide the appropriate level of logistical support training for the Iraqi Army, to include a sufficient number of instructors for the Iraqi Maintenance Level 2 and 3 courses.

**CONCUR.** Capacity of instructors is not a problem; there are currently 76 instructors at the Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute (IASSI).
**Recommendation 17.d.** Coordinate with the Iraqi Joint Headquarters to ensure that there is sufficient 3rd Line vehicle maintenance training throughput at the Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute to improve the numbers of trained and qualified mechanics for assignment to 3rd Line maintenance facilities.

**CONCUR.** This is an ongoing effort within the Joint Headquarters Electrical, Mechanical and Engineering (EME). Currently IASSI has a capacity of 1,460 maintenance slots. The EME supports training at IASSI. He visits IASSI regularly, and as a result, attendance at logistic courses has risen from 734 students in the 2nd quarter to 1,041 in the 3rd quarter.

**Recommendation 17.e.** Assess the need to extend or renew the national vehicle maintenance contract for the Iraqi Army’s 3rd Line vehicle maintenance and, if it is determined that an extension of the contract is necessary, to coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and/or the Iraqi Joint Headquarters to initiate prompt deliberations to renegotiate the contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense covering the costs.

**CONCUR.** MNSTC-I has conducted a review of this contract (IAMP) and the support provided to the Iraqi Army. MNSTC-I has determined that this contract should be transitioned to the MoD after the expiration of the current contract (June 2009). It should not be extended or renewed using ISFF. The MoD will choose to either contract the services offered by the current contractor or go with a different option.

**Observation 18. Class IX Material Management**

**Recommendation 18.** We recommend that Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq:

**Recommendation 18.a.** Adopt a phased approach to transition Class IX to the Iraqi Army, coordinating with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to incrementally transfer Class IX repair parts control only as the Iraqi Army demonstrates the capacity to manage the system.

**CONCUR.** MNSTC-I is implementing a strategy of incremental, conditions-based transition of responsibility of Class IX to the Iraqi Army. Iraq has had responsibility for 1st and 2nd Line maintenance since 2007. In May 2008, the Iraqi Army took responsibility for the maintenance functions in the 3rd Line workshops, although small teams of contractors remain in most workshops to coach, teach and mentor Iraqi Army personnel in supply warehousing, distribution and management. This contract will end in May 2009. Transition of 4th Line maintenance will occur incrementally, as the various workshops at Taji reach initial operating capability. The Small Arms Repair Shop is already under Iraqi control, with generator, wheeled and tracked maintenance shops to follow in 2009.
Distribution of Class IX forward of 3rd Line is under Iraq control. Distribution from the National Depot to 3rd Line is still managed mainly by MNSTC-I, using contracted transportation. This will transition to Iraqi control when the Iraqi Army General Transportation Regiment stands up in late 2008.

The EME Directorate has submitted a draft policy and procedures for Class IX to MNSTC-I for review and comment. All Class IX repair parts have been consolidated at Taji National Supply Depot. MNSTC-I is assisting in developing the Iraqi Army Maintenance Program (IAMP) IT network to provide a basic inventory control and distribution management capability basis. By November this will be under Iraqi control.

Most Class IX acquisition is currently provided through the FMS process. MNSTC-I is increasing its advisory support to the MOD acquisition branches to develop the MOD’s capacity for direct contracting.

Recommendation 18.b. Coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior to assist the Iraq Security Forces adopt the NATO Codification System for standardization of their parts lists.

CONCUR. The Iraqi Army currently uses the Iraqi Army Maintenance Program (IAMP) system to track parts movement and inventories at 3rd Line and back. IAMP uses a non-standard parts numbering system. MNSTC-I is advising the MoD to adopt the standard North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Codification System, which will greatly simplify their inventory management an acquisition. MNSTC-I is researching procurement options for the NATO codification system and interface protocols with IAMP. A Defense Logistics Agency team will provide a formal brief on NATO codification to the various levels of the Iraqi leadership.

The MoI has agreed to the NATO Codification system and the establishment of an automated system is currently in progress. The Director of Logistics continues to take a positive approach to advancing the logistics operations.

Recommendation 18.c. Coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior to reduce variety in the fleet of supported vehicles in order to decrease the range and depth of parts needed in the Iraq Security Forces Assigned Stockage Lists to support that fleet.

CONCUR. IA currently has over 100 different types of vehicles in its fleet, making fleet management a very difficult challenge. The Joint Headquarters Transportation and Provisioning (T&P) Directorate recognize this as a problem, and is keen to reduce this number as part of a wider lifecycle management program. They have issued guidance on which vehicles will sustained in the inventory and provided repair parts (priority vehicles), and which will be used until
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they are no longer financially viable (non-priority vehicles). This will allow the Joint Headquarters Electrical, Mechanical and Engineering Directorate to focus on sustaining the priority vehicles and allow for the natural attrition of non-priority vehicles which will result in cost savings and a more efficient vehicle fleet.

The Mol is challenged with multiple models of vehicles in the fleet, making even basic maintenance a challenge within the same organization. The Mol is diligently working to establishing equipment support on the myriad of vehicles provided by ISFF and FMS process, to include spare parts purchases through FMS. MNSTC-I will advise the Mol, where possible, to ensure direct purchase contracts are written on already supported vehicles in Iraq. Advise the Mol on readiness reporting processes to monitor the vehicles within Iraq for better overall operations.

Recommendation 18.d. Coordinate with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to optimize Iraqi Army logistics training throughput at the Iraqi Army Support & Services Institute, to include repair parts and materiel management.

CONCUR. Numbers of soldiers attending logistic training at the Iraqi Army Support and Services Institute (IASSI) continue to rise, through the combined efforts of MOD Logistic staff and MNSTC-I.

Observation 19. Iraqi Army Health Care Delivery System

Recommendation 19.c. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq:

Recommendation 19.c.(1). Advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in developing and implementing a comprehensive, synchronized, Integrated, multi-year Iraqi plan that identifies overall strategies, doctrines, and end-states to develop a sustainable Iraqi Army health care delivery system. This plan should include at a minimum facility construction, logistical support, external medical mentoring, and civilian partnerships for staffing and management.

CONCUR. MNSTC-I is engaged with the MoD Surgeon General’s Office (SGO) and Directorate of Military Medical Services in both near-term and long range planning. Current planning efforts with MOD SGO include:

- **Facility Construction:** There are currently six medical facility construction efforts scheduled to be completed. All are approved and funded, to include equipment sets. Projects underway are New Al Muthana Air Base (NAMAB) and Al Asad Location Command clinic. Four other Location Command clinics will start construction at Al Shaiba, Al Memona, Tikrit and Ghizlani. Mentoring will occur with MoD SGO as plans for an Iraqi Military Medical School formulate. Approved by the MinDef in May 2008, this school is like the Iraq Army centralized medical school prior to 2003.
- Logistics Support:
  - Developing Strategic, Operational and Tactical level medical supplies.
  - MoD utilizes five sources for supplies. (Kimadia, Samara Drug Institute, Arab Company Antibiotics Industry, Foreign Military Sales, ISFF 3)
  - Strategic level Class VIII support at the Taji National supply depot, MTOE is currently being developed for the Minister's Approval.
  - Operational level Class VIII Support via the seven "Branch Sub-Medical Warehouses." This concept was agreed upon by the Joint Planning Oversight/Operational Committee on 14 October 2008. MTOE will be developed for the Minister's approval. Infrastructure is pending for 2009.
  - Sustaining the required 24/7 power support at the warehouse locations is the key challenge at all locations.

- External Medical Monitoring:
  - Conducted through frequent interaction with the SGO to advise and mentor in four primary directorate areas of Operations & Planning, Logistics, Medical Training and Administration.
  - Iraq Army site visits are conducted to perform clinic facility inspections and communicate with clinic staff to identify problem areas then advise as appropriate on solutions.
  - MNSTC-I staff and medical training teams in the field conduct inspections and share the results with the MoD SGO.

- Civilian Partnerships for Staffing and Management:
  - MNSTC-I has created and administered contracts for management support of the very successful MOD Prosthetics clinic. This facility has received international mainstream media attention for its application of 3D virtual casting.
  - MNSTC-I Health Affairs facilitated development of a Memorandum of Agreement between the MOD and the MOH which outlines collaboration efforts between the two ministries. Current efforts are underway to conduct hospital training for the staff of the Old Al Muthana Military Hospital that opens in November 2008.

**Recommendation 19.c.(2).** Advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in developing financial and educational initiatives to recruit, train, and retain physician, dentist, nurse, combat medic, medical logistics, administrative, and allied health support personnel to work in the Iraqi Army health care delivery system. Specific techniques that can be used are:

- Promoting the use of enabling technologies such as distance learning and telemmedicine where feasible to recruit, train, and retain new and current health care soldiers and workers for the Iraqi Army.

- Developing procedures for providing entry-level literacy and medical vocational
training to disaffected groups in Iraq (e.g., the Sons of Iraq) and to recruit from this manpower pool for positions in the health care sector to obtain counterinsurgency benefits.

CONCUR. MoD provides incentive pay for physicians and lobbies to keep pace with MoH: expansion of this effort is also needed for nurses, dentists, and allied health personnel who work in the MOD. However, physician staffing remains the significant obstacle. The Iraqi Law of Military Service & Retirement is currently approaching its second reading in the Iraqi Parliament and is expected to pass by end of CY 2008. This broad-based legislation is expected to create authority for making pay and benefits equitable to MoD physicians for their service.

Recommendation 19.c.(3). Advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in developing a practical medical operations support budget that is sufficient to meet the current and future recurring operations, maintenance, and re-supply needs of the Iraqi Army health care delivery system and the construction of adequate health care facilities.

CONCUR. The MoD SGO has budgeted for medical operations within its purview severely limited due to manpower shortages. During FY07, execution was less than 5% of allocated budget due to extensive bureaucratic barriers within MoD. FY08 execution has improved significantly with over 60% execution with two months remaining in the FY.

Recommendation 19.c.(4). Advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in developing partnerships with the Ministry of Health for access of Iraqi Army soldiers to secure hospitals for surgical care, specialty referral care, and rehabilitative care.

CONCUR. The MoD SGO is currently re-negotiating a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with MoH which is set to expire at the end of 2008. A working draft has been provided to MNSTC-I for comment and recommendation. The MOA has provisions for training, referrals, surgical care, and rehabilitation of ISF personnel.

Recommendation 19.c.(5). Advise and assist the Ministry of Defense in developing partnerships with the Ministry of Health and other Government of Iraq ministries for access to schools of medicine, nursing, public health, and allied health professions, including financial incentives where necessary, to produce sufficient medical staff to operate the Iraqi Army health care delivery system.

SEE 19.c.(4)
Observation 20. Multi-National Force-Iraq Medical Mentoring Support to the Iraqi Army

Recommendation 20.e. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, develop and implement an in-country mentoring orientation for medical mentors that describes and clarifies current mentoring practices, the Iraq Security Forces medical development objectives and priorities, and meets the requirements of the Commander, U.S. Central Command.

NON-CONCUR. While MNSTC-I currently provides an orientation program for the medical component to the MNSTC-I Logistics Military Advisory Team (LMAT), there are significantly more mentoring teams in the Iraq Theater of Operations than the LMATs. However, MNF-I should be the organization to develop the orientation program.

Observation 22. Storage of U.S. Medical Equipment and Supplies at Abu Ghraib Warehouse

Recommendation 22. We recommend that the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq:

Recommendation 22.a. Ensure that this equipment is promptly and effectively put to use by the Iraqi government to meet validated needs or if the Iraqi government has no interest in using this equipment, put the equipment to better use elsewhere.

NON-CONCUR. After further investigation a predominant amount of equipment and material in question is owned by the MoH. The equipment and material owned/controlled by MNSTC-I was meant for the recently completed MoH Dublin Clinic. Delivery of this equipment and material was delayed due to construction/schedule changes and was completed in May. There was a small amount of material that had expired that was purchased over two years ago. Items that had expired were turned over to the MoH for destruction at their discretion. Investigation revealed that this material was most likely components of sick call sets not collectively packaged for early distribution to clinic sites in 2007-2008.

MNSTC-I visited AGW on 28 May 2008. The Class VIII identified by the IG belonged to three different organizations: MoH, MoD, and MoI. The following bullets outline specific actions for this material:

- MoH Class VIII fielding resides with the Department of State (DoS). MNSTC-I coordinated action with DoS and AGW Commander. MNSTC-I is not lead organization for MoH Class VIII.
MoD Class VIII was identified and information was provided to Director of Logistics at MoD SGO. MNSTC-I and MoD SGO have developed plans for the distribution of this material. This material has been located in the warehouse for over 2 years as a result of the construction of facilities lagging behind delivery of equipment.

MoI Class VIII was delivered the first week of May 2008. There were 3 more deliveries on 15 June, 3 July, and 15 July 2008. The remaining equipment which constitutes the final “fit out” was delivered 20 September 2008 (LSR#4829A), to the National Police (NP) Headquarters at Site 1 clinic. This final push marks the beginning of the MoI/NP self sustainment. The NP has developed, published and executed a comprehensive distribution plan from Site 1 HQ to all of their supportive brigades. MNSTC-I will continue to engage and mentor the NP in Class VIII self sustainment, replenishment and advancement.

Recommendation 22.b. Determine medical storage refrigeration requirements for heat sensitive medical supplies and ensure the proper equipment is obtained and installed to maintain environmental safeguards for those medical supplies stored at Abu Ghraib Warehouse.

CONCUR. Environmental safeguards are sufficient for the storage of medical supplies. While shelf-life is decreased the temperature remains within acceptable limits for flow through storage. MNSTC-I will continue to advise on development of storage requirements and procedures.
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