PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Defense Monitor in Brief

- President Reagan has proposed a $4.2 Billion, seven year civil defense program to support U.S. plans to fight, survive and win a nuclear war. Ultimate costs of the program could be over $10 Billion.
- The Reagan Administration's civil defense program is intended to demonstrate that the U.S. is prepared to fight and survive nuclear war.
- Civil defense is assumed to be a necessary complement to U.S. nuclear warfighting forces. An extensive civil defense program attempts to make nuclear war plans credible to the Soviets and acceptable to Americans.
- The program is designed to relocate two-thirds of the population, construct blast shelters for essential workers, and protect a significant portion of industrial machinery.
- A major effort is underway to protect thousands of senior government officials and provide for the continuity of normal government functions in the event of nuclear war.

Today with U.S.-Soviet relations at their worst point in twenty years, the Reagan Administration has proposed a massive, multi-Billion dollar civil defense program. This program represents a dramatic change from past civil defense efforts in scope and purpose.

In principle, civil defense is a worthy goal. Protecting life and a nation's resources are the highest responsibilities of government. But the reality of the nuclear age is that, in practice, civil defense measures can be easily overcome by the vast numbers and destructive power of nuclear weapons. Further, civil defense programs do not exist apart from each side's perceptions of the other. Preparations to survive a nuclear war in the United States and the Soviet Union will stimulate fears that increase the likelihood of nuclear war.

Since 1950 the U.S. has spent $2.6 Billion on civil defense. In general, past programs have been met with public apathy and Congressional skepticism. A system of nationwide blast shelters has been consistently rejected as too costly. A number of fallout shelter programs have been proposed but have never been sustained. Almost all previous Administration budget requests have been cut, sometimes over ninety per cent.

Reagan's Rationale

Reagan's civil defense proposal is a natural complement to the nuclear warfighting strategy of the United States. A recent defense document approved by Secretary of Defense Weinberger states that, "The United States nuclear capabilities must prevail even under the condition of a prolonged war." The Reagan Administration appears convinced that nuclear wars can be fought and "won" and is making detailed preparations in the hope that the leadership, economic infrastructure and some portion of the population can survive.

Reagan's proposed civil defense program reflects the Administration's rejection of the possibility that a nuclear war could result in the mutual destruction of both societies and that each government holds the other society hostage.

Key figures of the present Administration find the situation of mutual vulnerability intolerable and consider it immoral. Richard Pipes, a top member of the National Security Council staff, has recently said that the Administration no longer accepts the concept of mutual assured destruction. All agree that living under

Civil Defense: A Definition

"All those activities and measures designed or undertaken to: a. minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused by an enemy attack upon the United States; b. deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such attack; and c. effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed by any such attack."

Department of Defense
The Reagan Civil Defense Program

The 5 major parts of the Administration's civil defense program are:

I. CRISIS RELOCATION
In the event of rising tensions or indications of a Soviet evacuation, relocate 150 million Americans from 400 probable target areas to the countryside.

Problems:
- Evacuation requires at least a week.
- The nuclear attack must not occur too early or too late.
- Soviets must not target relocation areas.
- Adequate food and supplies must reach relocation areas.
- People must cooperate and not panic.
- Particular categories of people such as prisoners, the old and the sick pose special difficulties.

II. FALLOUT PROTECTION
Provide the entire population with protection from radioactive fallout. Construct thousands of millions of shelters before or during a nuclear attack.

Problems:
- Available construction materials may be inadequate.
- Competency in building effective shelters may be lacking.

Problems:
- Severe weather conditions will hamper shelter construction.
- Food, water and sanitation equipment must be available in the shelters for many days or weeks.

III. BLAST SHELTERS
Provide shelters for 4 million "essential" workers at their workplaces to protect against the direct effects of nuclear weapons (blast, heat, initial radiation). From the countryside, workers would commute to keep key industries operating.

Problems:
- Program cost many Billions of dollars.
- Workers may refuse to participate.
- Four million workers may not be sufficient to carry on economic production.
- Even hardened shelters are vulnerable to attack.

IV. INDUSTRIAL PROTECTION
Develop plans to protect industry from nuclear attack. During a crisis, essential workers would dismantle, disperse and bury machinery in phases. After an attack, workers would emerge from shelter, recover machinery and restart production.

Problems:
- Warning time may be insufficient to implement plans.
- Many industries, such as chemical and nuclear power plants, cannot be shut down or dismantled.
- Even if machines survive, resources needed for production, such as energy and raw materials, may be scarce or nonexistent.
- Targeted areas may not be safe to work in for months or years.

V. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT
Provide thousands of government officials with facilities and duplicate records to carry out essential functions in order to ensure the survival of the U.S. government. Protect presidential successors in the event the President is killed in an attack.

Problems:
- Plans concentrate on Executive branch bureaucrats and functions; only a few Legislative and Judicial branch officials are provided for.
- Even hardened facilities are vulnerable to direct attack and the locations are presumably known to the Soviets.

The shadow of nuclear holocaust has caused fear and anxiety. But rather than go to the source of the problem, this Administration is trying to remedy what it regards as a loss of will and resolve. Eugene Rostow, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has said, "The magnitude and momentum of the Soviet arms buildup has wearied people to the point of accommodation, isolationism and capitulation... It's this fear of nuclear war, this fear we can't restore a second strike capability, that makes men want to pursue the absolutely defeatist, suicidal policies of disengagement and isolationism."

According to this notion, it is desirable to lessen the American people's horror of nuclear war by preparing them to survive it. With a fearless population and a massive nuclear weapons buildup, we can once again intimidate the Soviets and maneuver for geopolitical advantage. Civil defense is envisioned as a major element in this effort. Each citizen will be made a nuclear soldier, rather than a nuclear hostage. They will not be frightened of nuclear war because, when the time comes, they will be told how to survive it. Sold to the American people as something prudent, responsible and humanitarian, the Reagan Administration's civil defense plans are in fact an effort to mobilize the society and make nuclear troops out of the citizenry. Civil defense is now considered a weapon and an integral part of U.S. nuclear strategy.

 presidential directive-41

The Carter Administration, responding to claims of a civil defense "gap", laid the framework for the enhanced civil defense program. President Carter authorized new civil defense policy in the form of Presidential Directive (PD)-41 in 1978 (recently declassified) and reorganized the U.S. civil defense bureaucracy through the establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979. Congress subsequently endorsed PD-41 in an amendment to the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. PD-41 stated that an improved civil defense program would not change the U.S. policy of relying on strategic nuclear forces as the major factor in maintaining deterrence. President Reagan's plans change this concept significantly.

The Reagan Plan

A civil defense policy change was formally announced in March 1982 through the release of President Reagan's National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-26. This policy change received little attention but goes far beyond PD-41 by expanding substantially the scope and importance of the U.S. civil defense program.

NSDD-26 represents a commitment to a national policy of nuclear war survival. It takes U.S. nuclear warfighting plans a significant step further by declaring that civil defense now "complements" U.S. reliance on strategic nuclear forces. Unlike PD-41, the Directive calls for the "survival of a substantial portion of the American people in the event of a nuclear attack."

The decision was made to fund a major, multi-year civil defense program in spite of reservations expressed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of Management and Budget because the program could cost over $10 Billion.
The fiscal year 1983 request for civil defense is $252 million, a 100% increase over the previous year. FEMA claims the seven year plan will cost $4.2 Billion. This figure excludes the cost of a number of major programs.

The Reagan civil defense plan consists of several elements: population protection, blast sheltering for essential workers, industrial protection and continuity of government.

Moving the Cities

The contribution by the public to U.S. nuclear warfighting plans is being prepared and coordinated by FEMA with the help of state and local governments. The most visible part of the FEMA civilian survival program is "crisis relocation." This plan calls for the evacuation of 150 million Americans from about 400 "high-risk" areas to about 2000 presumably lower risk, "host" areas, at least 50 miles away. "Host" areas are primarily small, rural towns. The two kinds of areas which comprise FEMA's "high-risk" list are: regions around 63 "counterforce" sites (important military installations) and, 330 other military/industrial installations and urban areas with populations of 50,000 or more.

FEMA's evacuation and relocation planning relies heavily on the availability and reliability of private automobiles, trained personnel for traffic control and emergency law enforcement, warning and communication systems for population "direction and control," the rechanneling of normal commerce to support the evacuated population, as well as the continued operation of designated "essential" industries.

Once urban refugees have been relocated, they must be provided protection from radioactive fallout. FEMA expects to identify about one and a half million public and private buildings in "host" areas for use as fallout shelters after an attack. Before or during the attack, civilian work crews would "upgrade" these buildings under supervision of local officials. Using bulldozers, shovels and buckets, they would pile dirt around and on top of these buildings to shield out radiation. They would then have to stock these structures with food, water, medical and sanitation supplies, special filtration devices, radiological instruments and communication equipment. Special training "shelter managers" would be assigned to assist in survival training and provide leadership in shelters.

For the tens of millions of people who will not have access to these million and a half structures, FEMA has developed elaborate instructions for the construction of "expedient" fallout shelters. These instructions come in a variety of designs: above ground, below ground or some combination of the two. Each such instructions must be reproduced in newspapers as attack threatens or distributed in host areas through other means. In general, plans usually specify that an abundance of small trees or doors will have to be readily available, 3 to 5 people each working 6 to 18 hours will be needed, and that evacuees should bring with them tools, construction materials and at least two weeks of food, water, medical, sanitary and other supplies. In addition, instructions must be provided for the construction of air pumps and emergency lamps and stoves. Evacuees are asked to bring along a radio and batteries to receive broadcasts from the authorities but few will be able to communicate with the outside world, to receive specific advice or to call for help.

Comment: FEMA assumes that a nuclear war would occur only after a period of rising tensions. At least three days would be needed to evacuate some areas, though large cities would require at least a week. For FEMA, a nuclear war must not come too soon nor too late or its plans will not work. An attack during the evacuation could result in more deaths than if the population had remained in place. If the evacuation were carried out and the attack did not come for several weeks, great strains would be put on limited resources.

The smooth coordination of an evacuation will require a high degree of volunteerism and calm behavior. In fact, problems would result at every juncture: automobiles would breakdown or run out of gas; some traffic control personnel would go with their families rather than direct traffic; and not all essential workers would stay on the job.

The availability of the supplies and equipment needed to support an evacuated population and to construct tens of millions of fallout shelters is doubtful. Two thousand shelters for 10,000 people could require 300,000 to 500,000 logs. It will be impossible for a typical family of four to get any significant portion of the materials and supplies needed into a family automobile. The competency to build effective shelters is also in doubt. Severe weather conditions would exacerbate these problems.

Surge

All of FEMA's plans require that a great deal be accomplished in a short time prior to and during a nuclear attack. The term used for this rapid mobilization of resources and people is "surge." Past experience has shown the U.S. civil defense bureaucracy that the American public will not support a permanent nuclear war mobilization program and, in fact, many of the measures FEMA plans to implement just prior to nuclear war require a variety of emergency powers not available in peacetime.

According to "surge" plans, active participation of the American public is not necessary and will not be sought during peacetime. FEMA will require only passive acceptance and several Billion dollars to develop its
citic "surge" program is a plan to multiply many times the number of "qualified" civil defense workers, state and local officials, police, military reservists and others to assist in "direction and control" and "post-attack recovery operations." FEMA's goal is "to reach approximately 7 to 8 million emergency services personnel in the event of a nuclear attack."

Comment: This will surely be needed according to an Army study which predicted there would be "an increase in conflict between sections of the country, between advocates of varying war policies, and between urban and rural populations as well." The study further noted, "the imposition of martial law or other authoritarian systems in many localities, and the widespread use of troops to maintain order" would be needed. The FEMA program to prepare for this in peacetime is called Direction and Control.

Direction and Control

The bulk of FEMA's budget for civil defense, especially in the first five years of the program, is dedicated to building and modernizing a nationwide civil defense command structure. The system FEMA envisions to direct and control the population consists primarily of a sophisticated state and local governmental communications network which will serve some 3,000 protected command posts, called "Emergency Operating Centers" (EOCs), for civil defense officials before, during and after a nuclear war.

By the end of the seven year period, all command posts will be supplied under federal matching funds with: fallout protection, emergency power generators, food, water, medical and sanitation supplies, and ventilation and radiological detection devices. These facilities and their staffs are considered the critical elements for effective crisis relocation, shelter construction, and post-attack recovery. Attempts will be made in all EOCs and over 2,500 Emergency Broadcast Stations to "harden" against the effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP). EMP is a high voltage wave produced by a nuclear detonation which can disable or disrupt communications and other electronic equipment over a wide area.

To assist EOC officials in reporting local nuclear war damage to federal authorities, FEMA will provide specially trained radiation experts called "Radiological Defense Officers." They will attempt to predict local fallout patterns and advise other EOCs and the sheltered population on local conditions. To aid post-attack recovery operations, FEMA has begun producing and refurbishing millions of radiological instruments to be distributed prior to attack to law enforcement personnel, shelter managers, EOCs and others. These instruments are designed to monitor accumulated radiation doses and radiation levels and decay rates in and outside of shelters.

Comment: The Direction and Control program alone will cost billions of dollars. FEMA argues that these improvements will have peacetime utility for responding to natural and technological disasters. Most of the improvements, however, are designed only for nuclear war.

The availability of a crude radiation monitoring system will do little to protect individuals or contribute to their treatment. Radiation can be neither felt nor seen by individuals and radiation sickness is not easily detectable in its early stages. Many victims could enter shelters, get seriously ill and receive little or no medical care. Disposing of corpses could expose others to radiation. And, due to unpredictable weather conditions, forecasting fallout patterns will be difficult. Whether or not communication equipment can be effectively shielded from EMP is still uncertain.

Blast Shelters

The second element in the Reagan civil defense program, one not included in the Carter Directive, is blast sheltering for essential workers in high-risk areas. Estimates for a funding decision on this program are to be completed in two years. The cost of this shelter program could run into Billions of dollars but is not included in any of the FEMA estimates for civil defense.

Evacuation plans call for essential workers to relocate with their families to "nearby" host areas and to commute on a two-shift basis into the risk areas to keep essential industries operating. Certain industries, such as chemical and steel plants cannot be shut down. Others are needed to support the evacuated population. Law enforcement personnel would also be needed to patrol the empty cities and protect the workers. Present plans call for identifying some four million essential workers in the next two years as a first step to prepare for construction of an industrial blast shelter system. To reduce workers' vulnerability to radiation, FEMA will increase research efforts on radioprotective drugs.

In 1983, FEMA will sponsor the design and construction of 20 prototype blast shelters: 10 reinforced concrete, each with a 100 person capacity and 10 prefabricated steel tube, each with a 20 person capacity. FEMA and industry officials are optimistic that these shelters could be mass produced at a cost of several Billion dollars.

In the event Congress does not authorize these funds, FEMA is preparing plans for "expeditious" industrial blast shelters. Construction of these shelters would require an extended crisis period, possibly up to a year.

Comment: An industrial blast shelter system could cost as much as $10 Billion. With a peacetime workforce of 100 million people, it is doubtful that 4 million workers would be sufficient to carry on vital economic functions. Many workers could refuse to participate in the program. Those that did participate could not be assured protection anyway because even the most hardened structures are vulnerable to attack.

Construction of blast shelters in an emergency would be even less effective. FEMA itself recognizes some of the serious disadvantages of this
method. According to the Agency, “For good confidence of continuing essential risk-area operations, workers must be given the assurance that they will be provided high quality blast protection should an attack occur. Otherwise, many are likely not to commute to the risk area and will remain in host areas with their families.”

Industrial Protection

The third part of the Reagan civil defense plan is to provide protection for key industries, a portion of which will be military-related. FEMA maintains that “simple items and methods could help assure survival of American industry in the event of nuclear attack.” FEMA is making considerable use of tests the Boeing Aerospace Company made in conjunction with the Defense Nuclear Agency. These tests primarily consisted of burying machines, surrounding them with crushable material and plastic and exploding TNT near them.

The FEMA research budget has been greatly expanded to investigate a variety of methods to protect industry. Studies have been initiated to look into the feasibility of protecting factories with anti-ballistic missiles and using mobile oil refineries.

The Boeing study recommends the following techniques: coating machines with corrosion-proofing oil, grease, or paint; wrapping them in burlap or plastic bags; placing them on crushable packing material and covering them with several feet of earth. Workers would dismantle, disperse and bury machinery in phases, as a crisis escalated. Boeing estimated that with no advance preparation other than planning, “much of the U.S. industry could surge to a protected situation within 4 to 6 days.” T.K. Jones, now Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces, served as program manager for the tests.

Comment: The Boeing study simulating limited blast effects on a few isolated pieces of equipment does not allow one to extrapolate protection for thousands of complex and interdependent economic facilities, regardless of warning time. The tests do not adequately measure the full range of nuclear weapons effects, such as radiation. It could be months or even years before one could effectively work in targeted areas. Twenty-five years after the last test at Bikini Island in the Pacific it remains uninhabitable and will be for another 20 years. Even granting that a few machines may survive, whole new factories and economies would have to be built to use them.

“Stratified Layers of Deception”

Recent public reaction to these civil defense plans has been critical, accenting the obvious logistical difficulties involved without questioning the larger assumptions upon which the program is based. FEMA’s plans rely on a mixture of half-truths and “best-case” scenarios. They represent a profound and dangerous disregard for the destructive nature of nuclear weapons and the frailty of modern industrial society.

FEMA asserts that if its plans are adopted, there will be 180 million survivors (80% of the population) with society recovering in “a relatively few years.” FEMA arrives at these optimistic estimates by breaking down each aspect of its program into “manageable” parts, calculating the “life-saving potential” of each. Quantifying that which can be quantified and neglecting the rest, FEMA’s cheerful computer models and simple aggregations present a distorted view of nuclear war. After examining FEMA’s plans, one local civil defense official concluded that they are little more than “stratified layers of deception.”

FEMA assumes a certain kind of nuclear war. The Soviets must attack once and all at once, rather than phase their attacks over time. They must hit any of the 70 U.S. nuclear power plants. Deaths must be caused by immediate effects only. Survivors must have near-perfect fallout protection as long as necessary after the attack. Deaths caused by disease, starvation, mass fires or firestorms must be “insignificant.” Unknown and long-term effects such as ozone depletion must not occur.

While much is known about the effects of a single explosion the consequences of dozens, hundreds or thousands of nuclear weapons detonating are totally unpredictable. The cumulative impact of the incalculable and long-term effects were studied by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment in its 1979 report, The Effects of Nuclear War. Its primary conclusion was that: “The effects of a nuclear war that cannot be calculated are at least as important as those for which calculations are attempted.”

Plans for a Few

The least known of FEMA’s nuclear war preparations is the Federal Preparedness program. It is designed primarily to protect the leadership and essential functions of the Executive Branch before, during and after a nuclear war. Its central element is Continuity of Government (COG), a highly classified program involving scores of secret, protected facilities equipped with a variety of advanced data processors, communication and other information systems to carry out detailed nuclear emergency procedures and contingency plans. This
Soviet Civil Defense

In the 1950s, the Soviet Union began efforts to defend its citizens against nuclear weapons. Twice invaded in the twentieth century, it is not surprising that the Soviet Union should be concerned with homeland defense even in the nuclear age. In the 1960s and 70s, a more energetic program, though not a crash effort, was initiated. According to a report published in 1978 by the CIA, the Soviet civil defense program has approximately 100,000 full-time personnel. While costs are unknown, the CIA estimates the Soviet civil defense expenditure per year to be $2 billion. The CIA computes these costs, as it does military expenditures, by assuming what it would cost the U.S. to do the same. With 3/4 representing manpower costs, these estimates are highly inflated. A compulsory civil defense training program exists for all citizens in the Soviet Union—a combination of lectures, films, booklets and practical instruction. According to the CIA, however, the Soviet civil defense program is plagued by “bureaucratic difficulties and apathy.”

The Soviet urban evacuation plan is similar to the American plan, moving tens of millions of people from the cities to the country. All of the logistical problems in the U.S. plan would be compounded manyfold in the Soviet Union due to more limited resources and other factors. For instance, the Soviets have a primitive highway system and only 5% of the motor vehicles in the U.S. do. Most people would have to walk thirty miles a day, carrying the necessary tools and supplies to construct fallout shelters in the country. The bitter climate could make this difficult in winter; mud would present a set of different problems during spring and autumn. It is very doubtful that Soviet food supplies, inadequate in peacetime, could begin to meet wartime needs since sufficient stockpiling is clearly out of the question.

The Administration claims that the Soviets could, in a crisis, blackmail the U.S. by implementing their evacuation plans. To prevent this, the Administration asserts that the U.S. needs to be able to order a counterevacuation.

It is unlikely the Soviets would ever risk such an adventure. Like the U.S., the Soviets have never practiced a large scale evacuation. Even if they did implement their plans, the U.S. would have ample time to alert and ready additional nuclear forces. More submarines could be sent to sea and additional bombers could be placed on alert. Also, missiles could be quickly retargeted.

Although the Administration claims that U.S. civil defense plans would be implemented only after evidence of a Soviet evacuation, in an actual crisis, the U.S. could evacuate first.

It is often claimed that Soviet industry has been planned with civil defense in mind and that an active program of protecting and dispersing machinery exists. In fact, Soviet industry is more concentrated than U.S. industry and, as the CIA notes, the tendency is for new facilities to be placed near existing installations. Little evidence exists that Soviet efforts to harden economic installations or rapidly disperse them would prevent massive damage from an attack designed to destroy the economy.

The Soviets have taken steps to protect a large number of leaders, somewhat similar to leaders. Fixed relocation sites are known to U.S. targets and are vulnerable to direct attack. The new Weinberger defense document makes explicit that essential to early success in a nuclear war is “decapitation,” the destruction of the Soviet leadership in their command posts.

It should be recognized that civil defense in the Soviet Union performs other functions besides trying to limit the effects of a nuclear war. Civil defense is another device to instill and maintain a garrison-state mentality and the belief that the leaders are protecting their people.
Soviet Civil Defense: "A Potemkin Village"

There is no need to match the Russians... They make mistakes, too... There are not only enough nuclear warheads for direct hits on every military target, every city or village, but also for every relocation area in the U.S.—or the USSR... qualified Russian observers concede that Russian civil defense is a phony, a Potemkin village."

Admiral Noel Gayler (Ret.)
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
March 16, 1982

"We do not believe that the Soviets' present civil defenses would embolden them deliberately to expose the USSR to a higher risk of nuclear attack."

Soviet Civil Defense
C.I.A. July 1978

vail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States." One of the goals of PD-58 is to expand plans for protecting all 16 presidential successors through evacuation and dispersal to many separate protected facilities throughout the United States. Preparations for continuity of government and presidential succession are central to U.S. plans to fight and win nuclear war.

With the exception of the Vice President, FEMA is responsible for protecting all presidential successors. The Presidential Succession Act and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution designates the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore of the Senate as next in line after the Vice President, followed by the heads of Executive departments in order of their creation (State, Treasury, Defense, etc.). FEMA has already designed and the White House administers a Central Locator System for keeping track of all successors. Efforts will be made to keep some successors out of Washington at all times. FEMA reportedly has its own surveillance teams to help keep track of the successors. Greater and more "random dispersal" outside of the Federal Relocation Arc is the key to the new plans, which are to be completed by the end of the 1980s. Many sites will be needed and FEMA is identifying possible relocation facilities in each of the 10 Regions. The CoG program will also include updates for evacuating and relocating a number of "key" Congressional leaders and Supreme Court Justices.

These plans have been strongly endorsed by the Reagan Administration which in one year has tripled the Federal Preparedness budget to $148 million. Future budgets throughout the 1980s will be substantial as the program expands.

Saving the Bureaucracy

Thirty-three Executive departments and agencies have been assigned emergency responsibilities before, during and after a nuclear war. Under FEMA guidance, each
agency must prepare plans and assign personnel to carry out these responsibilities. The program is designed to preserve the United States government. Currently, essential records are being duplicated and stored within the Relocation Arc and the 10 Regions.

All 33 departments or agencies have designated "teams" to carry out different categories of emergency responsibilities. Team "A" personnel have "uninterruptable" functions which must be carried out at their offices; Team "B" personnel must relocate to FEMA's "Special Facility" at Mt. Weather near Berryville, Virginia; Team "C" personnel must relocate to their agency's own, secret facility somewhere in the Relocation Arc to await further instructions.

A good deal of the specific guidance which agencies receive from FEMA to carry out their emergency functions comes from Federal Preparedness Circulars and the National Plan for Emergency Preparedness, which is undergoing revision. A more detailed and classified nuclear war plan, Federal Emergency Plan D, differs from the National Plan in that it contains a set of Presidential Emergency Action Documents. These documents would activate standby organizations, and formally allow for the exercise and delegation of broad emergency powers.

An Unwinnable Race

Effective protection and national survival in a nuclear war, with today's vast number of nuclear weapons and their destructive power, is impossible. The active pursuit of and belief in a civil defense program of significant size will increase the likelihood of nuclear war. This is especially so in time of crisis. As tension builds, the pressure to demonstrate resolve by preparing for evacuation and leadership dispersal, will grow. Either side's decision to evacuate the cities could trigger the nuclear war it was designed to prevent.

Selling this program to the American public and Congress is a formidable task. Crisis relocation plans are only now being unveiled and are meeting with stiff resistance and outright rejection. These plans are being recognized for what they are, an effort to manipulate and mobilize the American public by diverting attention from the real problem, the dangerous and dynamic nature of the arms race. To initiate a new race, of nuclear war survival, can only lead to catastrophe.

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