26 Feb 96
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (ORD)
JOINT BIOLOGICAL POINT DETECTION SYSTEM (JBPDS)
(NO. NBC 1.09A)
1. General Description of Operational Capability.
a. Overall Mission Area. During Operation Desert Storm (ODS), a major deficiency identified was the inability of U.S. forces to effectively defend against Biological Warfare (BOO) agents. Current national military strategy specifies a worldwide force projection capability that requires detection, identification, and vaccination in order to protect U.S. forces against potential BW threats. JBPDS will meet the Joint Chief's urgent need to enhance the survivability of U.S. forces. The JBPDS will provide commanders with an effective system to detect and presumptively identify BW agents. Its primary purpose is to limit the effects of biological agent attacks which have the potential for catastrophic effects to U.S. forces at the operational level of war. It may also assist medical personnel in determining effective preventive measures, prophylaxis, and the appropriate treatment if exposure occurs. Detection and identification of biological agents within the theater
of operations will increase the effectiveness of U.S. forces by limiting adverse impacts on operations and logistical systems.
b. Type of System Proposed. The JBPDS will provide near-real-time biological agent detection and warning, identification, and sample isolation capability. To meet the operational requirements, the JBPDS may include complementary biological detection and identification technologies into platform specific configurations. Technologies will be selected based on their reliability and technological maturity. Each system configuration will consist of three functional areas: detection and warning, sample collection,
and identification. The detection and warning feature will continuously monitor the environmental background for changes consistent with a high probability of BW attack. The sample collection function will collect, concentrate, and preserve a sample for analysis. The identification feature applies specific identification technology to provide a highly reliable indication of which high priority BW agent is present.
The U.S. Army's JBPDS platform will be the Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) shelter mounted on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle - Heavy Variant or field based. The U.S. Marine Corps JBPDS platform will be used in a field portable mode, installed on the Marine Corps' NBC Reconnaissance System (NBCRS), Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle (TUGV), or employed by foot mobile reconnaissance units. The U.S. Navy JBPDS platform will be installed on deployable surface ships and at priority overseas shore installations. The U.S. Air Force JBPDS platforms are outlined in Air Combat Command's Operational Requirements Document CAF(USAF) 004-85-I-P, for a Biological Warfare Pathogen/Toxin Detector of 11 August 1994. The USAF ORD is included as Annex A to the JPBDS ORD.
c. Operational Concept. JBPDS will be used in multiple configurations for planned installation or rapid deployment on service designated platforms. Once deployed, JBPDS will provide operators with rapid warning and sensing data to the presence or absence of likely BW hazards delivered under alternative scenarios. Operational Commanders shall position JBPDS at forward upwind locations to maximize warning time to downwind personnel. JBPDS will also capture, contain, and provide suspect samples for complementary and confirmatory analysis. The data and sample products will be transferred along designated routes to augment local and theater-wide command decisions regarding appropriate immediate actions and protective posture to limit personnel casualty producing effects of BW challenges. As a point detector system, JBPDS will be used as part of an evolving joint biological detection and warning network comprised of stand-off, remote, point and monitoring elements. Field commanders will integrate JBPDS inputs with operational inputs from intelligence, meteorological, radar, intelligence, local area operations, and other available assets to make a determination on increasing personal protection levels and maximizing combat effectiveness.
d. Support Concept. Support for the JBPDS will be accomplished by maximizing the use of existing logistic systems with standard testing and diagnostic equipment. The system is expected to have one depot level support facility for all services. Intermediate and organizational level support shall be based on individual service support management concept.
e. Mission Needs Statement Summary. DoD Biological Defense Mission Need Statement (MNS), validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) of 31 August 1992, U.S. Marine Corps' MNS for Biological Detection and Warning System (NBC 109.A) of 19 May 1992, and the U.S. Navy's MNS for Biological Warfare Defense of 3 June 1992.
a. Threat to be Countered. Despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the downfall of communism in the former USSR, and extensive efforts to negotiate treaties which would eliminate biological weapons from military arsenals, the number of countries pursuing an offensive biological warfare program continues to increase. As many as thirteen countries are developing, or are suspected of developing, biological weapons. Threat biological agents include microorganisms and toxins. These biological agents can be delivered to target areas virtually anywhere in the theater of operations by surface-to-surface missiles, aircraft bombs, multiple rocket launchers, artillery, and/or special forces operating in rear areas. Spray devices and aerosol generators are available for disseminating some biological agents. While primarily an inhalation hazard, there is evidence that a number of countries may be developing biological agents which are percutaneous hazards. Relevant threat documents include: Defense Intelligence Agency's "World-Wide Biological Warfare Threat 1993-2005~, of 1 March 1993, Office of Naval Intelligence's ''Naval Chemical and Biological Warfare ONI-TA-004-94" and Marine Corps Intelligence Activity's ''Mid-Rage Threat 1992-2002 Part I and Part II."
b. Threat to the System. The threat to the JBPDS will be from indirect (air, ground, and naval) weapons systems due to its potential location in the Theater of Operations. There is no direct threat to the JBPDS.
c. Future Threat. It is anticipated that some threat forces will field a variety of new BW agents within the lifetime of the system.
3. Shortcomings of Existing Systems. Current BW agent detection methods rely on accurate intelligence, suspicious munitions or events, time consuming laboratory analysis, or the onset of illness among U.S. forces before a biological attack can be detected. In most cases, relying on these methods will not provide operational commands the means to effectively mitigate the possible effects of a biological agent attack. However, the Army and Navy are fielding an initial manual capability, using off-the-shelf technologies, to detect and identify a limited number of biological agents.
4. Capabilities Required. The JBPDS shall automatically detect and identify the presence of BW agents in order to allow operational commanders to take appropriate defensive measures. It will be the primary device for early warning to minimize casualties and sustain combat effectiveness under conditions ranging from large area coverage BW line source release to covert point source generation. The JBPDS will provide an audible and visual indication of the presence of biological agents and also a visual readout of their identification. The system shall discriminate threat agents from the environmental background with high reliability and have a minimum number of false alarms. The JBPDS shall have the capability of producing a sample for transport to and further analysis by in-theater, CONUS or other designated laboratories. The U.S. Air Force JBPDS capabilities required are identified in Annex A, Air Combat Command's Operational Requirements Document CAF(USAF) 004-85-I-P, for a Biological Warfare Pathogen/Toxin Detector of 11 August 1994. Objective values equal threshold values where no objective value is specified.
a. System Performance. (For Navy only: * indicates key performance parameter).
(1) Biological Agent Detection. The JBPDS shall provide a BW detection capability greater or equal to existing fielded interim systems (IBADS and/or BIDS)*. It is an objective requirement that the JBPDS be capable of detecting BW agents below ED50 levels as defined by the medical community. (ED50 = effective dose that will affect 50\ of the population exposed.)
(2) Biological Agent Identification. Given that detection has occurred, the JBPDS shall have probability greater than or equal to 0.98* of identifying a biological agent in less than 15 minutes* (objective of 10 minutes). The JBPDS shall as a minimum identify (organisms as to genus and species, and specific toxin not including serotype) the BW agents listed in Category A of ITF-6 Report of 9 February 1990 at the field operational unit. It is an objective of the system to identify all agents listed in ITF-6 Report of 9 February 1990. The JBPDS shall have a false positive response for identification of less than or equal to two percent* of analyses conducted. The JBPDS shall be capable of being modified to identify future threat agents. It is an objective of the system to be modified in the field.
(3) Sample Preparation. After detector alarm, the JBPDS shall produce a sample of at least 25 milliliters (ml) (objective of 50 ml) for transport to and analysis by in-theater, CONUS, or other designated laboratories. The system shall provide means to protect and preserve this sample for later analysis. Transportation of the sample to designated laboratory shall be in accordance with procedures currently being established, including chain of custody.
(4) Set-up Time. The JBPDS shall be mission capable within 30 minutes (objective of 1 minute) of arrival on site/initial warmup.
(5) Platform Operation. The system shall be designed to be operated by units occupying static positions and onboard moving ships. It is an objective for the system to operate while it is in motion when mounted on designated ground vehicles. For remote applications, the JBPDS shall be capable of relaying warning information to a remote location which would have the capability of starting, stopping, resetting, and conducting diagnostic analysis for up to 5 kilometers via a hardwire. A pre-planned product improvement (P3I) is scheduled to provide system operation via radio link.
(6) Power. JBPDS shall be compatible with commonly used power sources of its intended platforms. It is an objective for JBPDS to have a 12 hour continuous backup power capability and should automatically switch to it if primary power is lost with the exception of the USMC variant. The USMC variant shall be able to operate on standard batteries for 12 hours (objective of 24 hours) of continuous use.
b. Logistics and Readiness. (For Navy only: * indicates key performance parameter). The JBPDS shall meet the following Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) requirements: a reliability of 20.92*(objective of 20.98), an availability of 20.90* (objective of 20.98), Mean Time Between Operational Mission Failure of 2144 hours* (objective of 2594 hours), and a Mean Corrective Maintenance Time for Operational Mission Failure Repair (MCMTOMFER) (also referred to as Mean Repair Time) of <5 hours* (objective of <1 hours).
c. Critical System Characteristics
(1) Electronic Warfare (EW) Requirements. It is an objective
that the JBPDS shall not be adversely affected by enemy use of EW, Electronic Countermeasures (ECM), and shall be electromagnetic compatible with other systems in its intended operating environment.
(2) Wartime Reserve Modes (WARM) Requirements. None
(3) Conventional, Initial Nuclear Weapons Effects, and NBC Contamination Survivability (NBCCS).
(a) Conventional Effects. The system must be capable of operating under normal operating environmental conditions and hazards, such as, but not limited to shock, corrosion, vibration, EMI, dust, smoke, fungus, Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POLs).
(b) Nuclear Effects. For the U.S. Army only, the JBPDS is a mission essential item, therefore, it is envisioned that some nuclear hardening will be required. At a minimum, the system will be hardened against High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP). The system must be designed to survive nuclear effects as designated by the U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency (USANCA).
(c) NBCC Survivability. The JBPDS will be NBC contamination survivable (NBCCS) IAW DOD 5000.2, Part 6F. The system must be capable of operating in a nuclear/chemical contaminated environment. The system shall be fully operable and maintainable by service personnel while wearing the necessary protective clothing and equipment. The system must be decontaminable using standard non-corrosive decontamination solutions.
(4) Natural Environment Factors.
(a) The JBPDS shall be capable of performing Mission Essential Tasks effectively in varied geographical locations and under a variety of operating conditions (e.g., smoke dust, rain, salt spray, high humidity and sand) environments:
(b) The JBPDS shall operate in the following operational
1. Operating Temperature. The system shall be able to operate in the following temperature range -28°C to 50°C.
2. Storage Temperature. The system shall be able to operate after being stored in the following temperature range: -40°C to 71°C.
3. Relative Humidity. The system shall function properly when operating in 5% to 95% relative humidity. It is an objective of the system to operate in 100% humidity.
4. Ultraviolet Radiation Protection. The system's exposed material shall be able to withstand exposure to solar ultraviolet radiation for at least one year without performance degradation.
(5) Size and Weight Constraints. The JBPDS must meet the size and weight constraint of its intended platforms. The range of intended application includes a man portable capability (for a 10 meter carry) to permanent installation (e.g., BIDS shelter). Long range objective requirement is for a hand held system.
5. Integrated Logistics Support (ILS). ILS planning and implementation will be conducted in accordance with DoD 5000 series guidance, and will encompass the following:
a. Maintenance Planning. The system is expected to have one depot level support facility for all services. Intermediate and organizational level support will be based on individual service support management concept. Maintenance tasks and schedules are to be determined during the LSA process.
(1) Depot Level. Depot maintenance will repair components that are determined by the Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) process to warrant repair.
(2) Intermediate and Operational Level
(a) U.S. Army
1. Unit. Operator maintenance includes Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (PMCS), inspection, and go/no-go system tests using Built-In Test/Built-In-Test-Equipment (BIT/BITE). To the extent possible, unit level maintenance will use the BIT/BITE to isolate malfunctions to a faulty component or module and repair the system by replacing the faulty components or modules.
2. Direct Support (DS). DS will repair any faulty components or modules that may be determined by the Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) process to warrant repair by replacing subassemblies. DS will stock and issue authorized Repairable Exchange (RX) items. If replacement of components or modules is beyond unit maintenance capability, DS will perform those tasks also.
3. General Support (GS). GS maintenance will repair components that are determined by the Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) process to warrant repair. Components plus modules will be repaired by replacing subassemblies plus parts.
(b) U.S. Marine Corps
1. Organizational Level. Organizational level maintenance will consist of pre-operational test, operational system check, and fault isolation to obtain a go/no-go indication. Minimum preventive maintenance is required.
2. Intermediate Level. Intermediate level maintenance will fault isolate to the component/piece part level and will replace failed components as authorized.
(c) U.S. Navy
1. Organizational Level. Organizational-level maintenance will include both preventive maintenance (as described in pertinent Planned Maintenance System (PMS) documentation) and corrective maintenance appropriate to the existing technical skills and test equipment of the platform on which JBPDS is installed. Corrective maintenance will be restricted to the removal and replacement of defective repairable modules and easily accessible consumable items such as light bulbs, filters, and connectors. An automatic internal system check will be incorporated to verify system operational status. Internal diagnostic effectiveness thresholds and objectives will be determined through the LSA process when the technology to be used in JPBDS is selected.
2. Intermediate Level. It is anticipated that intermediate-level repair functions (as indicated by a level-of-repair analysis (LORA)) will be performed primarily by SIMA and tender facilities.
(3) Calibration. It is an objective that the JBPDS not require calibration of system components. If required, calibration shall not be required on the JBPDS at the intermediate level or higher for at least a 12-month period.
b. Support Equipment. The JBPDS will maximize the use of existing test and diagnostic equipment. Tools for operator maintenance shall be tools available in the DOD inventory. If special support equipment is necessary, the requirements will be identified and defined during the Engineering and Manufacturing Phase and the special equipment will be procured in the Production Phase. For the Navy, any automated test requirements at the intermediate or depot levels of maintenance will be accommodated by the Consolidated Automated Support System (CASS).
c. Human Systems Integration.
(l) Operational and Maintenance Training Concept.
(a) New Equipment Training (NET). Initial training will be provided by the production contractor to the selected support activity. The support activity will be responsible for introductory training to units designated to receive the JBPDS.
(b) Institutional Training. Formal school house training for operation and maintenance of the JBPDS is expected. A hardware/manpower integration analysis will be conducted to define manpower, personnel, and training (MPT) requirements. During each phase of development MPT requirements will be refined and integrated with the hardware development process. Final system MPT requirements will be incorporated into training plans delineating responsibility and guidance for course development and implementation.
(c) Unit Training. Unit training will be accomplished through established guidelines.
(2) Manpower (force structure and end strength) Constraints. It is envisioned that operation and support of the JBPDS will not require manpower growth.
(3) Personnel Constraints. No new personnel occupational specialty codes (i.e., MOS, NEC) will be required to operate or maintain the JBPDS.
(a) U.S. Army. The following personnel codes will operate and maintain the JBPDS: 54B Chemical Specialist, 31U Signal Repairman, and 39E Electronic Repairman.
(b) U.S. Marine Corps. The following personnel codes will operate and maintain the JBPDS: MOS 5702, MOS 5711, MOS 0321, or designated personnel.
(c) U.S. Navy. The following personnel codes will operate and maintain the JBPDS: Hospital Corpsman, Damage Controlman, Electronics Technician, Interior Communication Specialist, and Data Support Specialist, or designated personnel.
(4) Training Constraints. System training devices will be required if the actual system cannot be used for training through the use of embedded training.
(5) Safety Constraints. The JBPDS shall not present safety hazards to personnel throughout its life cycle. JBPDS shall be designed to prevent operator exposure to the sample.
(6) Human Factors Engineering. The system shall automatically detect and identify BW agents with minimum human interaction. The system shall be simple enough to setup, operate, test, and tear down during both night operations and blackout conditions while wearing protective clothing.
d. Computer Resources. Computer resource development will be managed as an integral part of the overall JBPDS system development.
e. Other Logistics Considerations.
(1) System Provisioning Concept. Provisioning actions for JBPDS will be accomplished by existing Service's logistics support activities. One single item manager shall be designated for all Services.
(2) Unique Facility and Shelter Requirements. None
(3) Special Packaging, Handling and Transport Requirements. Packaging design will be concurrent with system development. There will be no special transport restrictions for the JBPDS. The JBPDS will be capable of unrestricted transport by highway, rail, maritime, and air transport modes. Refrigeration may be required for sample storage and transport to designated facilities.
(4) Environmental risk management planning will be conducted throughout the entire program to ensure all legislative and environmental regulations are met, and to minimize any potential impact to the environment.
(5) Technical data will be acquired and managed within the guidelines established by the Computer-Aided Acquisition and Logistics Support (CALS) system.
6. Infrastructure Support and Interoperability.
a. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence. JBPDS shall be designed with a standard IEA port. A P3I is planned to interface with the following Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) systems: U.S. Army's BIDS centralized data processing unit,
U.S. Marine Corps' Hazard, Warning, Information System (HAZWARN) system, U.S. Air Force Wing Command Control System (WCCS), U.S. Navy Damage Control System (DCS), and other systems designated by the operational commanders.
b. Transportation and Basing.
(1) Storage Requirement. The JBPDS hardware shall have a shelf life of at least 15 years and not require routine maintenance during covered storage. If necessary, an activation kit containing easily installed short shelf life items may be included in the system to give the required shelf life.
(2) Movement Requirement. The JBPDS must be air, land, and sea transportable; compatible with the 463L aircraft pallet loading system; and capable of movement by theater distribution systems.
c. Standardization, Interoperability and Commonality. System shall have the capability of being modified to support a variety of military applications. Signal processing and communications interfaces are adaptable for joint service interoperability. Joint Potential Designation: Joint with participation from U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Navy.
d. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC&G) Support. Accurate geodetic products are required to support accurate placement of JBPDS systems, to accurately interpret and report JBPDS output, and to integrate data with other kinds of intelligence information.
e. Environmental Support. Operational information on meteorological conditions that affect the probability of a biological agent attack and JBPDS operation will be routinely available to the operator in accordance with existing operational meteorological support doctrine.
7. Force Structure.
a. U.S. Army. JBPDS shall be internally mounted in the BIDS shelter. The BIDS proposed Basis of Issue (BOI) is one company of 35 systems per corps. Normally, each of the three divisions within the corps will develop a habitual association with one platoon consisting of seven systems with the remaining 14
systems used throughout the remaining corps area. The current acquisition estimate is 114 systems.
b. U.S. Marine Corps. JBPDS shall be employed by Division, Wing, and FSSG level NBC units in support of MAGTF commanders operational scheme of maneuver. The objective system (hand held) will be deployed down to the small unit level (fire team). The acquisition objective for the threshold requirement is for 112 systems. The acquisition objective for the hand held objective system is for 1160 systems. The USMC may deploy developmental prototypes for early operational assessments and contingency operations.
c. U.S. Navy. JBPDS shall be installed during new construction or through the FMP on surface ships (e.g., CVN, CG, DD, DDG, LHA, LSD, LHD, etc.) and designated shore installations. Theater installation requirements will be based on location/threat. The current acquisition estimate is 220 systems.
Training facilities will be provided with unit(s) based on validated training requirements.
8. Schedule Considerations
a. Initial Operational Capability. FY 1999. Initial Operational Capability is defined as the initial installation of a given system in either a fleet, air, or field unit for operational (as opposed to developmental) purposes.
b. Full Operational Capability. FY 2005. Full Operational Capability is defined as the system having permanent logistic support and training in place for all Services.
- FINAL CAF(USAF 004-85)-I-P OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT FOR A
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PATHOGEN/TOXIN DETECTOR DATED 11 AUGUST 1994.