U.S. Department of Energy                                    ORDER
     Washington, D.C.                                    DOE 5630.13A


1.   PURPOSE.  To establish the Department of Energy (DOE) policy,
     requirements, responsibilities, and authorities for the development and
     implementation of Master Safeguards and Security Agreements (MSSA's).

     of 2-3-88.

3.   SCOPE.  The provisions of this Order apply to Departmental Elements and
     contractors performing work for the Department as provided by law
     and/or contract and as implemented by the appropriate contracting


     a.   Facilities which have Category I quantities of special nuclear
          material (SNM) or those facilities that have Category II
          quantities within the same protected area that roll-up to a
          Category I quantity,

     b.   Facilities which have a radiological sabotage threat which would
          cause an unacceptable impact on the health and safety of the

     c.   Facilities which have an industrial sabotage threat which would
          cause an unacceptable impact to those DOE programs supporting
          national defense and security, and/or

     d.   Other facilities that Heads of Departmental Elements deem

5.   POLICY.

     a.   Levels of protection shall be provided in consideration of the
          potential risks to national security and the health and safety of
          the public.

     b.   The levels of protection identified in approved facility MSSA's
          shall be the basis for facility planning, executing, and
          evaluating the protection program.

6.   DEFINITIONS.  See Attachment 1.


     a.   The MSSA establishes a formal agreement requiring the joint
          approval of the field element manager and the cognizant Program
          Secretarial Officer(s) for the levels of protection of graded
          safeguards and security interests from theft, sabotage, and other
          malevolent acts associated with SNM or vital assets which may
          adversely affect national security or the health and safety of the
          public.  Such agreements take into account DOE policy applicable
          to specific sites and/or programs, to achieve acceptable
          protection levels that minimize inherent risks on a cost-effective

     b.   The MSSA's contain summary level information adequate to describe
          the basis supporting the agreement, assumptions, exceptions, and

     c.   The MSSA includes statements of the facility's safeguards and
          security performance levels based on the status of several
          complementary performance indicators such as the results of
          vulnerability assessments, system performance tests, surveys,
          inspections, evaluations, and training levels as well as the field
          element managers' judgment of the effectiveness of the protection

     d.   MSSA's are supported by backup documentation, adequate to validate
          the MSSA maintained at the field organization or contractor
          facility.  This may include vulnerability assessments, cost/
          benefit analyses, implementation procedures, guidelines,
          performance exercises, and other studies.

     e.   The MSSA may be used to document exceptions to safeguards and
          security policy and to provide the basis for relief from certain
          safeguards and security requirements.

     f.   Each signatory agrees to support the safeguards and security
          commitments set forth in MSSA's under their cognizance to the
          fullest extent practicable.  Planning and budget submittals shall
          be consistent with the commitments made in the MSSA.  Funding
          constraints applied as part of the budget submission and
          authorization process may necessitate changes in plans documented
          in the MSSA's.

     g.   The MSSA is reviewed and updated annually.

     h.   If tests or other indicators demonstrate that the actual level of
          protection is less than that approved in the MSSA, action must be
          taken to compensate for identified vulnerabilities.

     i.   All Departmental Elements managing facilities included in
          paragraph 3 shall prepare MSSA's.  An MSSA shall designate
          facility levels of protection which the appropriate field
          organization, Program Secretarial Officer, and Headquarters
          safeguards and security responsible official acknowledge to be


     a.   Program Secretarial Officers (PSOs) shall:

          (1)  Approve MSSA's that apply to their programs (including
               subsequent modifications requiring Headquarters approval).

          (2)  Support commitments made in the MSSA to the fullest extent
               possible through the budget process.

          (3)  Coordinate the review and approval process with all
               appropriate organizations.

     b.   Director of Security Affairs (SA-1) shall:

          (1)  Establish safeguards and security policies, design basis
               threat statements, standards, and guidance for the DOE.

          (2)  Support commitments made in the MSSA to the fullest extent
               possible through the budget process.

          (3)  Review, comment, and concur in MSSAs.

     c.   Director of Safeguards and Security (SA-10), shall:

          (1)  Formulate safeguards and security policies, threat
               statements, standards, and guidance for DOE.

          (2)  Issue guidelines for the preparation, review, revision, and
               approval of MSSA's.

          (3)  Review and verify MSSA's to ensure that they are complete,
               assumptions are supported by technical justification, and
               that the conclusions are supported by appropriate analyses
               and detailed documentation.

     d.   Director of Security Evaluations (EH-4) shall verify compliance
          with specific provisions of the MSSA's through inspections and

     e.   Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program shall, in accordance
          with the responsibilities and authorities assigned by Executive
          Order 12344 (statutorily prescribed by 42 U.S.C. 7158, note) and
          to ensure consistency throughout the joint Navy/DOE organization
          of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, implement and oversee all
          policy and practices pertaining to this DOE Order for activities
          under the Director's cognizance.

     f.   Heads of Field Elements shall:

          (1)  Prepare, review, and approve MSSA's for selected safeguards
               and security interests under their jurisdiction.

          (2)  Implement, enforce, and maintain the protection measures and
               terms of the MSSA's under their management jurisdiction.

          (3)  Prepare and maintain adequate documentation for validation of
               MSSA's in support of the requirement of paragraph 7d.

          (4)  Inspect, evaluate, and review protection systems to validate
               assumptions made in the formulation of MSSA's.

          (5)  Direct the review and consolidation of appropriate changes
               and updates to the MSSA's.

          (6)  Advise the Office of Safeguards and Security, and appropriate
               Program Secretarial Officers of significant delays in
               implementing protection features documented in the MSSA.

          (7)  Support commitments made in the MSSA to the fullest extent
               possible through the budget process.


     a.   Changes that significantly alter the agreed-on protection
          philosophy or performance standards of protection systems shall
          require the approval of the cognizant Program Secretarial
          Officer(s), the Head of the Field Element, and the concurrence of

     b.   Changes that are consistent with agreed-on protection policy may
          be made by the Heads of Field Elements with a copy of changes
          provided to the Office of Safeguards and Security and the
          cognizant program manager(s).


                                         DONALD W. PEARMAN, JR.
                                         Acting Director
                                         Administration and Human
                                           Resource Management

DEFINITIONS 1. ACCEPTED RISK. The acknowledgement that a protection system may not achieve 100 percent protection against all occurrences, but further improvement in the system is not justified. 2. CATEGORY I AND CATEGORY II QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL. See DOE 5633.3, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS. 3. CONTRACTOR. An entity or person who contracts directly or indirectly to supply goods or services to the DOE. Note: This includes subcontractors of any tier, consultants, agents, and cooperative agreement participants. 4. DESIGN BASIS THREAT POLICY. A policy statement that describes threats that are postulated for the purpose of establishing requirements for safeguards and security significant programs, systems, components, equipment, information or material. 5. EVALUATION. Determination of the effectiveness of a safeguards and security system or program element relative to approved standards. 6. FACILITY. An educational institutions, manufacturing plant, laboratory, office building, or complex of buildings located on the same site that is operated and protected as one unit by the Department or its contractor(s). 7. INSPECTION. The process of gathering information to determine the effectiveness with which protection programs are implemented. 8. LEVEL OF PROTECTION. The degree of safeguards and security provided to protect Departmental interests. 9. MASTER SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY AGREEMENT (NSSA). A formal understanding among cognizant managers regarding levels of protection and accepted risk. 10. PROGRAM SECRETARIAL OFFICERS (PSO). A senior outlay program official and includes the Assistant Secretaries for Conservation and Renewable Energy, Defense Programs, Fossil Energy, Nuclear Energy, and Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, and the Directors of Energy Research; Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, and New Production Reactors. A lead PSO is the PSO assigned line management responsibility and accountability for Headquarters and field operations and to which one or more multiprogram field offices report directly. 11. ROLL-UP. Accumulation of a Category I quantity of special nuclear material from Category II quantities located within the same protected area, or for category determinations, the summation of smaller quantities of special nuclear material to obtain a higher category quantity. 12. SABOTAGE. a. Industrial. Any deliberate act, not involving radiological releases, which could have unacceptable impact to DOE programs. b. Radiological. A deliberate act directed against a nuclear materials facility or its components, or a nuclear material or weapon shipment, which could cause an uncontrolled release of radiation or radioactive material. 13. THEFT. The removal of Government property and/or materials from a DOE or DOE contractor-operator facility without permission or authorization and contrary to law, or the unauthorized removal of special nuclear material. 14. VALIDATION. The confirmation by testing that an implemented, operational system or critical system element meets established requirements. 15. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT. A systematic evaluation process in which qualitative and/or quantitative techniques are applied to arrive at an effectiveness level for a safeguards and security system to protect specific targets from specific adversaries and their acts.