INDEX



U.S. Department of Energy                              ORDER
     Washington, D.C.                            DOE O 452.2A


                                             Issue Date:  1-17-97
                                            Review Date:  1-17-99

SUBJECT:  SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS


1.   OBJECTIVES.

     a.   To establish the applicability, requirements, and responsibilities for ensuring the
          safety of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) nuclear explosive operations and
          associated activities and facilities, and for protecting the environment and the
          health and safety of workers and the public.

     b.   In the context of this Order, to address safety in two broad areas:  nuclear
          explosive safety (NES) and environment, safety, and health (ES&H).

     c.   To integrate portions of a number of Orders or their corresponding Rules, in order
          to integrate NES and ES&H and to require the same level of safety assurance for
          DOE defense nuclear facilities and DOE facilities in which nuclear explosive
          operations and associated activities are conducted.  The Orders or their
          corresponding Rules shall be used to the extent specified in this Order for nuclear
          explosive operations and associated activities and facilities.  Responses to
          unplanned events (e.g., Accident Response Group activities) are addressed in the
          5530-series Orders and DOE O 151.1, COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY
          MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, dated 9-25-95.

2.   CANCELLATION.  DOE O 452.2, SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE
     OPERATIONS, dated 4-29-96, is canceled.  Cancellation of the above Order does not,
     by itself, modify or otherwise affect any contractual obligation to comply with the Order.
     Canceled Orders that are incorporated by reference in a contract shall remain in effect
     until the contract is modified to delete the reference to the requirements in the canceled
     Orders.

3.   APPLICABILITY.

     a.   DOE Elements.  This Order applies to DOE Headquarters and field elements
          that manage, oversee, or conduct nuclear explosive operations and associated
          activities.

     b.   Contractors.  This Order applies to contractors and subcontractors that manage,
          oversee, or conduct DOE NEWS program as provided by law and/or contract, as
          implemented by the appropriate contracting officer.  Responsibilities are
          delineated for contractors and Federal employees within the Orders, referenced
          Rule, Technical Standards, and Implementation Guide.  Responsibilities are in
          sufficient detail such that an additional document, such as a Contractor
          Requirement Document, would not be beneficial, and may hamper
          implementation.

     c.   Exclusions.  None.

4.   REQUIREMENTS.

     a.   General.

          (1)  Nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and facilities shall
               be comprehensively reviewed and evaluated to identify hazards and
               potential accidents and to establish design, construction, and operational
               means to protect the public and worker health and safety and the
               environment.  Facility safety analysis shall be prepared using hazard
               category 2 nuclear facility guidance unless (i) a different hazard category
               is determined by DOE using applicable hazard classification guidance, or
               (ii) a different hazard category is justified for a facility within the context
               of an approved integrated safety management program.  Additional
               guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A, IMPLEMENTATION
               GUIDE FOR USE WITH DOE O 452.2A, SAFETY OF NUCLEAR
               EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS, dated 1-17-97.

          (2)  Operations Offices shall have a comprehensive safety program for nuclear
               explosive operations and associated activities under their purview and
               assure contractor implementation.

          (3)  The safety program shall integrate NES requirements from the 452- and
               applicable 5610-series Orders and ES&H requirements from other Orders
               if applicable under their own terms or invoked in this Order.  Many of the
               ES&H Orders are directly applicable, and others exclude nuclear
               explosive operations.  This Order adopts specified requirements from the
               excluded Orders to provide a complete safety program for nuclear
               explosive operations and associated activities and facilities.  Requirements
               within or invoked by this Order are implemented by the contractor
               through means proposed by the contractor and become binding through
               approval and authorization by DOE line management.

          (4)  Implementation of a requirement to prevent or mitigate one hazard shall
               be assessed to ensure that the likelihood of a significant safety incident
               involving another hazard is not increased.  If any such instance is
               identified, alternative methods shall be investigated to attempt to
               implement the requirement without increasing the risk associated with
               other hazards.  Guidelines, best management practices, or other
               nonmandatory implementation guidance shall be similarly assessed for
               potential impact on another hazard before being implemented.

          (5)  The requirements in this Order may be implemented using a DOE-
               approved integrated safety management approach as described in DOE P
               450.4, SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM POLICY, dated 10-15-96.
               A "graded approach" to the requirements in this Order is not permitted
               unless in the context of an approved integrated safety management
               program.

     b.   Operational Safety Program.  The safety program shall include the following
          elements, tailored for the operations.

          (1)  Experience Feedback.  DOE and DOE contractors and laboratories shall
               evaluate the safety lessons to be learned from critical evaluations of
               operating experience and other sources of evidence, such as research
               results and analyses, that bear upon the validity of the safety analyses and
               safety bases under which nuclear explosive operations are authorized.  In
               the event that evidence is found that may affect the validity of the safety
               basis of one or more ongoing nuclear explosive operation, then it should
               be treated as a potential unreviewed safety question (USQ) under the
               terms of DOE 5480.21, UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS, dated
               12-24-91, as modified by paragraph 4c(3) of this Order.

          (2)  Conduct of Operations.  DOE 5480.19, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
               REQUIREMENTS FOR DOE FACILITIES, dated 7-9-90, provides DOE
               policy and requirements for conducting operations at DOE facilities.  The
               guidelines in Attachment I to DOE 5480.19 shall be applied in a graded
               approach commensurate with their potential ES&H impact and their
               potential NES impact.

          (3)  Administrative Controls.  Nuclear explosive operations and associated
               activities shall be conducted in accordance with the applicable Technical
               Safety Requirements (TSRs), Nuclear Explosive Safety Rules (NESRs),
               and operational safety controls (OSCs).  Nuclear explosive operations and
               associated activities shall have safety limits, operating limits, surveillance
               requirements, limiting conditions of operation, and administrative
               controls, as necessary, that shall be specified in OSCs and NESRs.

          (4)  Training and Qualification of Personnel.  Each organization responsible
               for and/or involved in nuclear explosive operations and associated
               activities shall implement a training and qualification program for their
               respective personnel that manage, oversee, perform, or directly support
               these operations and activities.  These personnel include DOE and
               contractor management and technical support personnel, Personnel
               Assurance Program (PAP) supervisors, PAP medical personnel, and
               operations and maintenance personnel.

               (a)  Requirements for selecting, training, and qualifying personnel
                    involved with nuclear explosive operations and associated
                    activities and for assuring their continuing fitness for duty shall be
                    applied as contained in this Order and Interim Personnel
                    Assurance Program Procedures and Standards.

               (b)  Training for DOE personnel involved in nuclear explosive
                    operations and associated activities shall comply with applicable
                    portions of DOE O 360.1, TRAINING, dated 5-31-95.

               (c)  DOE contractor and laboratory training and qualification programs
                    shall comply with DOE 5480.20A, PERSONNEL SELECTION,
                    QUALIFICATION, AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR
                    DOE NUCLEAR FACILITIES, dated 11-15-94, except Chapters
                    II and III (Reactor Operations), and develop requirements
                    equivalent to those in Chapter IV.  Training and qualification
                    requirements shall be commensurate with the particular
                    responsibilities assigned.

          (5)  Maintenance of Facilities, Tooling, and Equipment.  A maintenance
               program shall be developed and implemented for facilities, tooling, and
               equipment used for nuclear explosive operations and associated activities
               in accordance with the nuclear facility requirements in DOE 4330.4B,
               MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, dated 2-10-94.

          (6)  Configuration Management (CM).

               (a)  The appropriate design laboratories and/or operating contractors
                    shall develop and implement a configuration management program
                    for nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and
                    facilities.

               (b)  The program shall be documented in appropriate plans that shall
                    be approved by the cognizant Operations Office.  Guidance is
                    provided in DOE-STD-1073-93, Guide for Operational
                    Configuration Management Programs, of 11/93.

               (c)  These plans shall address the measures for managing the
                    configuration of nuclear explosive assemblies; the configuration of
                    tooling, equipment, and procedures used in nuclear explosive
                    operations and associated activities; and the interface with the
                    facilities in which these operations and activities are conducted.
                    Additional guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

          (7)  Quality Assurance (QA).

               (a)  DOE contractors and laboratories shall develop and implement a
                    quality assurance program for nuclear explosive operations and
                    associated activities and facilities that satisfies the criteria in
                    paragraphs (b)(1) and (c) of 10 CFR Part 830.120, "Quality
                    Assurance Requirements."

               (b)  The QA program shall be approved by the cognizant Operations
                    Office.  Guidance is provided in G-830.120, Implementation
                    Guide for use with 10 CFR Part 830.120, Quality Assurance.

          (8)  Issues Management.  DOE and DOE contractors and laboratories shall
               develop and implement corrective action and commitment tracking
               systems to assist in identifying, tracking, and monitoring required actions
               related to the safety of nuclear explosive operations and associated
               activities and facilities.  Additional guidance is provided in
               DOE G 452.2A-1A.

          (9)  Occurrence Reporting.  Operational occurrences shall be reported and
               processed in accordance with DOE 0 232.1, OCCURRENCE
               REPORTING AND PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION,
               dated 9-25-95, and DOE M 232.1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND
               PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-95.
               Additional guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

          (10) Performance Indicators.
               (a)  A performance indicator program for nuclear explosive operations
                    shall be implemented in accordance with the requirements of
                    DOE O 210.1, PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND
                    ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, 9-27-95, and
                    the guidance of DOE-STD-1048-92, Performance Indicators
                    Guidance Document of 12/92.

               (b)  The program shall include NES performance indicators, as
                    appropriate, in addition to ES&H performance indicators.
                    Contractors shall identify NES performance indicators and submit
                    them to the cognizant Operations Office for approval before
                    incorporating them into the performance indicator program.
                    Additional guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

     c.   Safety Analyses.

          (1)  Process and Documentation.

               (a)  This section clarifies terms and issues employed in the nuclear
                    safety community concerning the interface between nuclear
                    explosive operations and conventional nuclear safety.

               (b)  Safety analyses shall be performed for all DOE nuclear explosive
                    operations and associated activities and facilities.  The results of
                    facility safety analyses shall be documented in a Safety Analysis
                    Report (SAR).  The results of operation- and associated activity-
                    specific safety analyses shall be documented in an operation
                    Hazards Analysis Report (HAR).  The HAR shall include a
                    Nuclear Explosive Hazards Assessment (NEHA), as described in
                    DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-96, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department
                    of Energy Hazard Analysis Reports for Nuclear Explosive
                    Operations.

               (c)  This Order, the guidance in DOE G 452.2A-1A, and the guidance
                    and requirements in DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-96 establish a process
                    for safety analysis of nuclear explosive operations and associated
                    activities and facilities.  Processes that illustrate the interactions
                    between the NES Study process, the weapon specific operation
                    hazard analysis, and the facility safety basis are shown in Figure 1
                                        and discussed in the following sections.
Figure 1.  Safety Analysis and Evaluation of Nuclear Explosive Operations and Associated
                                        Activities and Facilities.
               (d)  A safety analysis for nuclear explosive operations and associated
                    activities is an iterative process, performed in parallel with
                    development of the operation being analyzed, so that the operation
                    design benefits from the safety analysis results.  Each Operations
                    Office shall comply with the following safety analysis
                    requirements.

                    1    A safety analysis of facilities used for nuclear explosive
                         operations and associated activities shall be performed and
                         shall be documented in a SAR.  The facility safety analyses
                         shall address nuclear explosive operations and associated
                         activities in general and shall address a spectrum of
                         potential accidents based on bounding hazard conditions.
                         The SAR shall be prepared and processed in accordance
                         with the requirements of DOE 5480.23, NUCLEAR
                         SAFETY ANALYSIS  REPORTS, dated
                         4-10-92, and the guidance of its Attachment I, and DOE-
                         STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of
                         Energy  Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis
                         Reports of 7/94.  Additional guidance for preparing SARs
                         is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

                    2    TSRs for facilities in which nuclear explosive operations
                         and associated activities are conducted shall be developed
                         and implemented in accordance with the requirements of
                         DOE 5480.22, TECHNICAL SAFETY
                         REQUIREMENTS, dated 2-25-92.  Facility related
                         requirements shall be derived from the SAR.

                    3    A hazard analysis shall be performed and formally
                         documented in a HAR for each nuclear explosive operation
                         and its associated activities in accordance with DOE-DP-
                         STD-XXXX-96.  The HAR shall include a determination
                         of whether or not the operation is within the facility safety
                         basis.  HARs for ongoing operations shall be reviewed
                         annually and updated as necessary to ensure that the
                         information in each HAR is current.  These reviews shall
                         be comparable to and coordinated with the annual SAR
                         reviews that are required by DOE 5480.23.

                    4    Those aspects of the operation-specific hazards analysis
                         that involve nuclear detonation, high-explosive detonation
                         and deflagration, and fire shall be assessed using a
                         systematic accident sequence analysis and documented in
                         an HAR and NEHA in accordance with DOE-DP-STD-
                         XXXX-96.  The NEHA document shall be submitted to the
                         Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Group (NESSG) for
                         review and evaluation and included in the NES Study
                         report.

                    5    The Nuclear Explosive Safety Standards focus on
                         precluding those actions which could lead to high
                         consequence events.  The primary purpose of the NEHA is
                         to identify those operations or activities which should be
                         carefully controlled to reduce the possibility or eliminate a
                         specific accident scenario which could result in a NES
                         incident.  These actions are focused on the following.

                         a    Precluding high-explosive detonation to preclude
                              nuclear detonation.

                         b    Precluding high-explosive detonation, deflagration
                              or fire situation to preclude fissile material
                              dispersal.

                    6    OSCs and NESRs shall be iteratively derived from the
                         hazard analysis in the HAR.  OSCs shall be reviewed and
                         recommended in DOE HAR reviews; and NESRs shall be
                         reviewed and recommended in the NES Studies.  OSCs are
                         approved with the HAR and NESRs are approved with the
                         NES Study report.  The criteria for OSCs and NESRs are
                         described in DOE G 452.2A-1A and DOE-DP-STD-
                         XXXX-96.

                    7    Nothing can be clearly stated prior to conduct of the HAR
                         analysis, but it should be recognized that administrative
                         controls for nuclear explosive operations (NESRs and
                         OSCs) are not normally linked to facility TSRs.  If an OSC
                         is linked to a TSR, the TSR should be stated.

          (2)  Criticality Safety.  Nuclear explosive operations and associated activities
               and facilities shall comply with the criticality safety requirements of
               DOE 5480.24, NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY, dated 8-12-92, or
               DOE O 420.1, FACILITY SAFETY, dated
               10-13-95.

               (a)  Criticality safety analyses of the facility and general nuclear
                    explosive operations and associated activities shall be documented
                    in the SAR in accordance with the criticality safety requirements
                    of DOE 5480.23 and DOE 5480.24 or DOE O 420.1.

               (b)  Criticality safety analyses of specific nuclear explosive operations
                    and associated activities shall be documented in accordance with
                    DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-95.

               (c)  Criticality safety of a specific nuclear explosive and its
                    components is evaluated in the design process and need not be
                    discussed in the SAR.

          (3)  Change Control.  Operations Offices shall establish a change control
               process for nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and
               facilities.  The USQ process shall be used, augmented by the additional
               NES evaluations listed below.  NES evaluations shall be completed prior
               to implementation of the change.  All proposed changes to nuclear
               explosive operations and associated facilities shall be evaluated against
               applicable nuclear explosive safety documents by operating contractor
               personnel assigned nuclear explosive safety responsibilities.  The
               responsible laboratory performs this function at the Nevada Test Site.

               (a)  Proposed changes of a trivial or strictly administrative nature with
                    no likelihood of significance to nuclear explosive safety may be
                    approved by the operating contractor and shall require no further
                    NES evaluation.

               (b)  For those changes determined by the operating contractor to
                    require a DOE NES evaluation, change documentation shall be
                    evaluated and concurred with by the responsible design
                    laboratories personnel and DOE nuclear explosive safety
                    personnel.  Operations Offices shall specify the process for
                    performing such a NES evaluation.  This evaluation may result in
                    a determination of the need for a NES Study.

               (c)  The change control process shall include provisions for
                    incorporating approved changes into the appropriate safety
                    documents.

     d.   Nuclear Explosive Safety Program.  Nuclear explosive operations require
          additional special safety consideration because of the potential high consequences
          of an accident or unauthorized act.  Operations Offices shall implement a formal,
          comprehensive Nuclear Explosive Safety Program that includes the following.

          (1)  DOE Nuclear Explosive Safety Standards.  All DOE nuclear explosive
               operations shall meet the following qualitative Safety Standards to prevent
               unintended nuclear detonation or fissile material dispersal from the pit.
               There shall be positive measures to:

               (a)  minimize the possibility of accidents, inadvertent acts, or
                    authorized activities that could lead to fire, high-explosive
                    deflagration, or unintended high-explosive detonation;

               (b)  minimize the possibility of fire, high-explosive deflagration, or
                    high-explosive detonation given accidents or inadvertent acts; and

               (c)  minimize the possibility of deliberate unauthorized acts that could
                    lead to high-explosive deflagration or high-explosive detonation.

          (2)  General NESRs.  The general NESRs set forth in this paragraph are
               mandatory for all DOE nuclear explosive operations.  Exemptions from
               these rules shall be approved in advance by the Assistant Secretary for
               Defense Programs (DP-1).

               (a)  Nuclear explosive operations shall not be performed until a NES
                    Study or Survey is approved, and prestart recommendations have
                    been closed.

               (b)  Operations on nuclear explosives or collocated main charge high-
                    explosive and pit shall be performed in accordance with approved
                    written procedures.

               (c)  Operations involving a nuclear explosive not known to be one-
                    point safe shall be conducted only at the Nevada Test Site.

               (d)  Production plant operations shall not be started on a nuclear
                    explosive until it is certified by the design laboratory to be one-
                    point safe.

               (e)  If it is determined that a nuclear explosive no longer meets the
                    one-point safety criteria, all production plant operations and offsite
                    transportation with that nuclear explosive shall be discontinued.
                    Before operations can be resumed with that nuclear explosive, a
                    NES Study shall be conducted and approved.

          (3)  Supplemental NESRs.  Additional safety rules shall be developed as
               needed to supplement the general NESRs for specific operations or to
               address specific characteristics of an individual design of a nuclear
               explosive, a specific test, or an operation.

          (4)  NES Studies, Surveys, and Revalidations.  The manager of the Operations
               Office responsible for a proposed nuclear explosive operation shall
               determine the type of independent nuclear explosive safety evaluation and
               shall convene the NESSG to evaluate the proposed operation.  These
               evaluations shall meet the requirements in DOE-STD-3015-97, Nuclear
               Explosive Safety Study Process, dated 1-97.

               (a)  A NES Study shall evaluate proposed operations to ensure that
                    there are adequate positive measures to minimize the possibility of
                    unintended nuclear detonation, high-explosive detonation or
                    deflagration, or fire.  NES Studies are valid for 5 years.

               (b)  A NES Survey may be conducted as necessary for a proposed
                    nuclear explosive operation that is essentially the same as a
                    previously studied and approved operation.  NES Surveys are valid
                    for 5 years.

               (c)  A NES Study Revalidation may be conducted to determine
                    whether a nuclear explosive operation has significantly changed
                    since the NES Study was approved.  A NES Study may be
                    revalidated for a maximum of 5 years, not to exceed 10 years from
                    the date of the original approval.

          (5)  Personnel Assurance Program (PAP).  Personnel assigned nuclear
               explosive duties shall meet the PAP requirements contained in Interim
               PAP Procedures and Standards.

          (6)  Two-Person Concept.  The Two-Person Concept requires that a minimum
               of two authorized people shall be present during all nuclear explosive
               operations and during other operations designated by the Operations
               Office.  Managers of the Operations Offices responsible for nuclear
               explosive operations shall establish implementing instructions for the
               Two-Person Concept.  The two people must be in a position to detect
               incorrect or unauthorized acts and:

               (a)  be certified in the DOE PAP;

               (b)  have technical knowledge of the task being performed; and

               (c)  be knowledgeable of pertinent safety and security requirements.

          (7)  Reader Worker Procedure and Check-off.  Reader worker procedures and
               check-off shall be used for those nuclear explosive operations specified by
               the cognizant Operations Office manager.

          (8)  Control of Electrical Testers/Equipment.  Managers of Operations Offices
               responsible for nuclear explosive operations shall establish safety
               requirements for electrical testers/electrical equipment used in nuclear
               explosive areas (NEAs).

               (a)  Testers that introduce electrical energy into a nuclear explosive or
                    high-explosive subassemblies in an NEA shall meet the following
                    requirements as a minimum.

                    1    Each tester shall have independent safety characteristics
                         that do not rely on the nuclear explosive's safety features.

                    2    A single-point failure within a tester shall not result in the
                         application of unintended stimuli.

                    3    Testers shall use the lowest practical values of internal and
                         output currents and voltages that will adequately perform
                         their intended functions.

                    4    A comprehensive safety analysis shall be performed and
                         documented for each electrical tester and its interface with
                         a nuclear explosive or HE.

                    5    Procedures shall be established to control, store, maintain,
                         calibrate, and operate testers.

                    6    Each model of electrical tester and its interface with a
                         nuclear explosive or high explosive shall be evaluated by
                         an NESSG.

                    7    Operations Offices shall establish and maintain a record of
                         approved electrical testers.

                         Computer-controlled testers shall have positive measures
                         that preclude inadvertent or unauthorized actuation of
                         nuclear explosive safety critical components (e.g., strong-
                         link switches).

               (b)  The process used to evaluate and approve any electrical energy
                    source or electrical equipment intended for use within an NEA
                    shall be evaluated in a NES Study.

          (9)  Offsite Transportation of Nuclear Explosives.  The Manager, Albuquerque
               Operations Office, is responsible for all DOE offsite transportation of
               nuclear explosives in accordance with DOE 5610.14,
               TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM PROGRAM
               OPERATIONS, dated 5-12-93.  Offsite transportation operations begin
               when the loaded conveyance is closed and ends with the opening of the
               conveyance at its destination.  The following requirements shall be met.

               (a)  Nuclear explosives shall not be transported offsite in the same
                    conveyance with any other cargo.

               (b)  Nuclear explosives shall be transported offsite in safe-secure-
                    trailers (SSTs) or other conveyances specifically reviewed and
                    approved through the nuclear explosive safety study process.
                    Nuclear explosive conveyances shall be validated as acceptable for
                    conveying hazardous material in conformance with applicable
                    Department of Transportation regulations.

               (c)  Nuclear explosives shall be transported and restrained in
                    compliance with the general instructions of Technical Publication
                    (TP) 35-51, General Instructions Applicable to Nuclear Weapons;
                    the specific procedures, equipment descriptions, and restraint
                    requirements specified in TP 45-51, Transportation of Nuclear
                    Weapons Material, General Shipping and Limited Life
                    Components, TP 45-51A, Transportation of Nuclear Weapons
                    Material (Supplement), Shipping and Identification Data for
                    Stockpile Major Assemblies, and TP 45-51D, Transportation of
                    Nuclear Weapons Material (Supplement), Shipment by Safe-
                    Secure-Trailer (SST); and TP 20-7, Nuclear Safety Criteria.

          (10) Onsite Transportation of Nuclear Explosives.  Managers of Operations
               Offices responsible for nuclear explosive operations shall establish
               requirements and procedures to ensure safe onsite transportation of
               nuclear explosives at their respective sites.  Onsite transportation
               operations shall be reviewed and approved through the nuclear explosive
               safety study process.

          (11) Nuclear Explosive-Like Assembly (NELA) Requirements.

               (a)  Technical criteria for NELA requirements shall be established and
                    issued by the Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office, in
                    coordination with Headquarters and the Nevada (NV) and Oakland
                    (OAK) Operations Offices.  These requirements shall support the
                    following qualitative NELA Standards.

                    1    There shall be positive measures to minimize the
                         possibility of accidental, inadvertent, or deliberate
                         unauthorized assembly of a nuclear explosive in place of a
                         NELA configuration.

                    2    There shall be positive measures to minimize the
                         possibility of accidental, inadvertent, or deliberate
                         unauthorized transfer of a nuclear explosive in place of a
                         NELA configuration.

               (b)  Managers of Operations Offices responsible for NELA operations
                    shall implement the NELA requirements.

          (12) Marking Instructions.  Marking nuclear explosives and NELAs is intended
               to provide a rapid and accurate method to distinguish between
               configurations capable of a nuclear detonation and those that are not.

               (a)  NELAs that are routinely assembled and disassembled for training,
                    development, testing, evaluation, or demonstration purposes need
                    not be permanently marked provided the NELA is not shipped
                    offsite; however, temporary markings shall be applied.

               (b)  Permanent and temporary marking instructions shall be established
                    and issued by the Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office.
                    Managers of Operations Offices shall implement these marking
                    instructions.

          (13) Reporting Nuclear Explosive Occurrences.  DOE O 232.1 and
               DOE M 232.1 provide requirements for categorizing and reporting nuclear
               explosive occurrences under Group 9, Nuclear Explosive Safety.  The
               detailed classification for emergencies and the emergency responses to be
               taken are provided in DOE O 151.1.  Additional guidance is provided in
               DOE G 452.2A-1A.

     e.   Process Design (Defense-in-Depth).

          (1)  Multiple layers of protection shall be used to prevent accidents and/or to
               mitigate the consequences of an accident.  Configuration management
               shall be implemented to ensure that no changes are made that could
               adversely affect the safety of operations.  A positive verification process
               shall be implemented to ensure use of correct equipment, qualified
               personnel, operationally ready facilities, and current procedures.
               Additional guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

          (2)  Equipment used in nuclear explosive operations (including tooling,
               mechanical equipment, and electrical equipment) shall be designed,
               fabricated, tested, and maintained to standards commensurate with the
               safety importance of the function to be performed.  Existing Technical
               Standards may be adopted or new Standards developed, as appropriate,
               considering the unique application to nuclear explosive operations.
               Design criteria shall be maintained for tooling and equipment.  Human
               factors requirements shall be included in the design criteria
               documentation.

          (3)  Requirements for selecting, training, and qualifying personnel involved
               with nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and for
               assuring their continuing fitness for duty shall be applied as contained in
               this Order and the Interim PAP Procedures and Standards.

          (4)  Facilities in which nuclear explosive operations and associated activities
               are performed shall be operationally ready.  Interfaces between those
               facilities and nuclear explosive operations shall be controlled.
               Appropriate preventive maintenance programs shall be established to
               ensure reliability of facility equipment.

          (5)  Procedures governing nuclear explosive operations and associated
               activities shall be developed, controlled, reviewed, and approved.  Human
               factors shall be considered in the development of procedures.  Procedures
               shall be written and formatted to facilitate the safe accomplishment of the
               task (e.g., cautions, hold points, illustrations).

          (6)  The configuration and condition of a nuclear explosive and its
               components shall be known or determined during any planned operation.
               In case of unknown conditions, appropriate contingency plans shall be
               available.

          (7)  Requirements and guidance appropriate for nuclear explosive operations
               contained in DOE M 440.1-1, DOE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY MANUAL,
               dated 9-30-95, shall be followed.

     f.   Internal Safety Reviews.  DOE contractors and laboratories shall perform
          internal, objective, and independent safety reviews of nuclear explosive
          operations and associated activities.  The safety review system shall include items
          of potential safety significance from the perspectives of both NES and ES&H.
          Additional guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.




     g.   Readiness Reviews.

          (1)  Facility Readiness Reviews.

               (a)  Readiness reviews for facilities shall be performed in accordance
                    with DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1, STARTUP AND RESTART
                    OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, dated 9-29-95, and Operations
                    Office implementing directives and procedures.

               (b)  Requirements for hazard category 2 nuclear facilities stated in
                    DOE 5480.31 and DOE O 425.1 shall be used for this purpose.

               (c)  A facility readiness review is generally not required when a new
                    nuclear explosive operation is introduced and there are no changes
                    to the facility or its safety basis.

          (2)  Nuclear Explosive Operation Readiness Reviews.

               (a)  A readiness review shall be performed for startup of a nuclear
                    explosive operation, restarting an operation following a shutdown
                    greater than one year, after a significant change to the operation, or
                    after an unplanned shutdown due to significant safety concerns.

               (b)  Operations Offices shall develop and implement an operations
                    readiness review process that addresses nuclear explosive
                    operations.  The process shall incorporate the attributes of facility
                    readiness reviews from DOE 5480.31 or DOE O 425.1 by
                    adopting appropriate requirements from the Orders.  Requirements
                    unique to nuclear explosive operations shall be specified.
                    Additional guidance is provided in DOE G 452.2A-1A.

     h.   Occupational Safety and Health Program.

          (1)  Nuclear explosive operations and associated activities and facilities shall
               comply with DOE 5483.1A, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
               HEALTH PROGRAM FOR DOE CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES AT
               GOVERNMENT-OWNED CONTRACTOR-OPERATED FACILITIES,
               dated 6-22-83; or DOE O 231.1, ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND
               HEALTH REPORTING, dated 9-30-95; DOE O 440.1, WORKER
               PROTECTION MANAGEMENT FOR DOE FEDERAL AND
               CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES, dated 9-30-95; DOE 5480.11,
               RADIATION PROTECTION FOR OCCUPATIONAL WORKERS,
               dated 6-17-92; 10 CFR Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection; DOE
               N 441.1, RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION FOR DOE ACTIVITIES,
               dated 9-30-95; and DOE M 440.1-1.

          (2)  Several references are being revised at this time.  Until such time as all
               contractual documentation is adjusted to reflect changes in the DOE
               directives system, implementation plans should include the most current
               applicable directive(s) and an assessment of the possible impacts of
               anticipated changes from the specific reference used.  When the word "or"
               is used, several references may apply; when the word "and" is used, the
               intent is that all references apply.

     i.   Exemptions.

          (1)  Exemptions shall be requested when release is sought from a requirement
               in this Order or in a referenced mandatory Manual or Standard.  DOE M
               251.1, DIRECTIVES SYSTEM MANUAL, dated 10-16-95, shall be used
               to prepare, process, and approve exemption requests.  The approval
               authority is as follows.

               (a)  The cognizant Operations Office manager responsible for the
                    activity when an equivalent level of safety has been demonstrated.

               (b)  The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and
                    Stockpile Management (DP-20) when the exemption would ensure
                    adequate protection, but would not result in an equivalent level of
                    safety.  The Operations Office manager shall concur with these
                    exemption requests and forward them to DP-20 for approval.

               (c)  DP-1 approves requests for exemption from general NESRs.

          (2)  Release from a requirement that has been adopted by reference into this
               Order shall be processed as relief from this Order and not from the
               referenced Order.

     j.   Implementation.  Within 12 months after this Order is issued, Operations Offices
          shall develop an implementation plan to describe how the requirements of this
          Order will be implemented.  The implementation plan shall be submitted to DP-
          20 for approval and shall do the following:

          (1)  identify the programs, plans, practices, procedures, and other actions to be
               used in complying with the requirements;

          (2)  establish a schedule for actions necessary to achieve compliance;

          (3)  identify needed resources; and

          (4)  identify those compensatory measures deemed necessary to provide for
               adequate protection during the period of noncompliance.

5.   RESPONSIBILITIES.

     a.   Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP-1).

          (1)  Ensures that safety programs are implemented.

          (2)  Adjudicates any appeals of the Operations Office manager's decisions to
               deny or revoke PAP certifications.

          (3)  Approves requests for exemptions from general NESRs.

          (4)  Authorizes sites for the assembly, disassembly, and storage of nuclear
               explosives.

     b.   Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health (EH-1) assists DP-1 in
          ES&H disciplines concerning the safety of nuclear explosive operations and
          associated activities and facilities.

     c.   Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile Management
          (DP-20).

          (1)  Approves NES Study Reports and resolves minority opinions.

          (2)  Approves revalidations of NES Study Reports.

          (3)  Approves administrative extensions to NES Studies.

          (4)  Approves exemptions to the requirements of this Order in accordance with
               the provisions of 4i, above.

          (5)  Evaluates reported nuclear explosive occurrences and corrective actions
               for safety implications.

          (6)  Interfaces with EH in the future development of ES&H Orders to ensure
               that the requirements are integrated with the requirements of DOE O
               452.1A, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY
               PROGRAM, dated 1-17-97, and that divergence does not occur.



     d.   Managers of Operations Offices.

          (1)  Ensure that responsibilities and authorities are clearly defined and
               delegated at appropriate management and supervisory levels.

          (2)  Authorize nuclear explosive operations in accordance with the
               requirements of this Order.

          (3)  Approve HARs.

          (4)  Integrate ES&H requirements into nuclear explosive operations and
               associated activities while maintaining appropriate focus on nuclear
               explosive safety.

          (5)  Approve NES Survey Reports.

          (6)  Designate PAP certifying officials.

          (7)  Approve exemptions to the requirements of this Order in accordance with
               the provisions of 4i, above.

6.   REFERENCES.

     a.   DOE O 151.1, COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM,
          dated 9-25-95.

     b.   DOE O 210.1, PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AND ANALYSIS OF
          OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-27-95.

     c.   DOE O 231.1, ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND HEALTH REPORTING,
          dated 9-30-95.

     d.   DOE O 232.1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND PROCESSING OF
          OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-95.

     e.   DOE O 360.1, TRAINING, dated 5-31-95.

     f.   DOE O 420.1, FACILITY SAFETY, dated 10-13-95.

     g.   DOE O 425.1, STARTUP AND RESTART OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES,
          dated 9-29-95.

     h.   DOE O 440.1, WORKER PROTECTION MANAGEMENT FOR DOE
          FEDERAL AND CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES, dated 9-30-95.

     i.   DOE O 452.1A, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY
          PROGRAM, dated 1-17-97.

     j.   DOE G 452A-1A, IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR USE WITH DOE O
          452.2A, SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS, dated
          1-17-97.

     k.   DOE O 470.1, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM, dated 9-28-95.

     l.   DOE 4330.4B, MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, dated 2-10-94.

     m.   DOE 5480.11, RADIATION PROTECTION FOR OCCUPATIONAL
          WORKERS, dated 6-17-92.

     n.   DOE 5480.19, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS REQUIREMENTS FOR DOE
          FACILITIES, dated 7-9-90.

     o.   DOE 5480.20A, PERSONNEL SELECTION, QUALIFICATION, AND
          TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR DOE NUCLEAR FACILITIES, dated 11-
          15-94.

     p.   DOE 5480.21, UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS, dated 12-24-91.

     q.   DOE 5480.22, TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS, dated 2-25-92.

     r.   DOE 5480.23, NUCLEAR SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORTS, dated 4-10-92.

     s.   DOE 5480.24, NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY, dated 8-12-92.

     t.   DOE 5480.31, STARTUP AND RESTART OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES,
          dated 9-15-93.

     u.   DOE 5483.1A, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PROGRAM FOR
          DOE CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES AT GOVERNMENT-OWNED
          CONTRACTOR-OPERATED FACILITIES, dated 6-22-83.

     v.   DOE 5610.14, TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM PROGRAM
          OPERATIONS, dated 5-12-93.

     w.   DOE P 450.4, SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM POLICY, dated 10-15-96.

     x.   DOE M 232.1-1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND PROCESSING OF
          OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 9-25-95.

     y.   DOE M 251.1-1, DIRECTIVES SYSTEM MANUAL, dated 10-16-95.

     z.   DOE M 440.1-1, DOE EXPLOSIVES SAFETY MANUAL, dated 9-30-95.

     aa.  DOE N 441.1, RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION FOR DOE ACTIVITIES,
          dated 9-30-95.

     bb.  DOE-STD-1048-92, Performance Indicators Guidance Document, dated 12-92.

     cc.  DOE-STD-1073-93, Guide for Operational Configuration Management
          Programs, dated 11-93.

     dd.  DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy
          Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, dated 7-94.

     ee.  DOE-STD-3015-97, Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Process, dated 1-97.

     ff.  DOE-DP-STD-XXXX-96, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy
          Hazard Analysis Reports for Nuclear Explosive Operations, TBD.

     gg.  Interim Personnel Assurance Program Procedures and Standards, published on
          10-02-96.

     hh.  10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management, Section 120, "Quality Assurance
          Requirements."

     ii.  10 CFR Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection.

     jj.  G-830.120, Implementation Guide for use with 10 CFR Part 830.120, Quality
          Assurance, dated 4-15-94.

     kk.  Joint Department of Energy/Department of Defense (DOE/DoD) Technical
          Publication 20-7, Nuclear Safety Criteria, dated 9-1-86.

     ll.  Joint DOE/DoD Technical Publication 35-51, General Instructions Applicable to
          Nuclear Weapons, dated 11-27-89.

     mm.  Joint DOE/DoD Technical Publication 45-51, Transportation of Nuclear Weapons
          Material, General Shipping and Limited Life Components (LLC), dated 3-16-84.

     oo.  Joint DOE/DoD Technical Publication 45-51A, Transportation of Nuclear
          Weapons Material (Supplement), Shipping and Identification Data for Stockpile
          Major Assemblies, dated 2-1-80.

     pp.  Joint DOE/DoD Technical Publication 45-51D, Transportation of Nuclear
          Weapons Material (Supplement), Shipment by Safe-Secure-Trailer (SST), dated
          7-14-89.

7.   CONTACT.  DP-20, Office of Weapons Surety (DP-21), 301-903-3463.                          DEFINITIONS

This attachment provides the definitions pertinent to DOE O 452.2A.

1.   Access.  The proximity to a nuclear explosive that affords a person the opportunity to
     tamper with it or to cause a detonation.

2.   Certified Personnel (for nuclear explosive duties).  Operations personnel who are current
     with respect to Personnel Assurance Program (PAP) certification and the training and
     qualification program for the specific nuclear explosive operation to which they are
     assigned.

3.   Custody.  Responsibility for control of and access to nuclear explosives.

4.   Defense-In-Depth.  Multiple layers of protection (e.g., equipment design, procedures,
     and training) to prevent accidents and/or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

5.   Electrical Equipment.  Custom designed and fabricated devices or commercial devices
     (both modified and unmodified) used in performing operations on a nuclear explosive
     that do not connect to the electrical circuitry of the nuclear explosive.

6.   Electrical Testers.  Custom designed and fabricated devices or commercial devices (both
     modified and unmodified) used in performing operations on the electrical circuitry of a
     nuclear explosive.

7.   Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H).  The application of risk reduction measures to
     control or mitigate the possibility of exposing the public, workers, and environment to
     hazardous materials or hazardous energy.  This includes, for example, environmental
     protection, nuclear safety, criticality safety, occupational safety, fire protection, industrial
     hygiene, health physics, occupational medicine, industrial safety, and radioactive and
     hazardous waste management.

8.   Facility.  Any equipment, structure, system, process, or activity that fulfills a specific
     purpose.

9.   Fissile Material Contamination.  Release of fissile material in excess of that controlled
     and monitored by DOE radiological protection programs.

10.  Fissile Material Dispersal.  The aerosolization and transport of fissile material by a
     driving force, such as fire, high-explosive deflagration, or high-explosive detonation.

11.  Graded Approach.  A process by which the level of analysis, documentation, and actions
     necessary to comply with a requirement in this Order are commensurate with the relative
     importance to safety and the magnitude of any hazard involved.

12.  Hazard Analysis.  The determination of material, system, process, and plant
     characteristics that can produce undesirable consequences, followed by the assessment of
     hazardous situations associated with a process or activity.

13.  Hazard Analysis Report (HAR).  A report that documents the systematic evaluation of
     hazards to workers, the public, and the environment for a specific nuclear explosive
     operation and its associated activities.

14.  High-Explosive Deflagration.  A rapid chemical reaction in which the output of heat is
     sufficient for the reaction to proceed and be accelerated without input of heat from
     another source.  Deflagration is a surface phenomenon, with the reaction products
     flowing away from the unreacted material along the surface at subsonic velocity.

15.  High-Explosive Detonation.  A violent chemical reaction within a chemical compound or
     mechanical mixture evolving heat and pressure.  A detonation is a reaction that proceeds
     through the reacted material toward the unreacted material at a supersonic velocity.

16.  Main Charge.  The high explosive whose explosive energy implodes the pit.

17.  Nuclear Detonation.  An energy release through a nuclear process, during a period of
     time on the order of one microsecond, in an amount equivalent to the energy released by
     detonating four or more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

18.  Nuclear Explosive.  An assembly containing fissionable and/or fusionable materials and
     main charge high-explosive parts or propellants capable of producing a nuclear
     detonation (e.g., a nuclear weapon or test device).

19.  Nuclear Explosive Area (NEA).  Any area that contains a nuclear explosive or collocated
     pit and main charge high-explosive parts.

20.  Nuclear Explosive Duty.  Work assignments that allow custody of a nuclear explosive or
     access to a nuclear explosive area.

21.  Nuclear Explosive Hazards Assessment (NEHA).  A systematic evaluation of hazards
     that could lead to a nuclear detonation, high-explosive detonation or deflagration, or fire
     in nuclear explosive areas.

22.  Nuclear Explosive-Like Assembly (NELA).  An assembly that is not a nuclear explosive
     but that represents a nuclear explosive in its basic configuration (main charge high
     explosive and pit) and any subsequent level of assembly up to its final configuration, or
     which represents a weaponized nuclear explosive such as a warhead, bomb, reentry
     vehicle, or artillery shell.  A NELA does not contain an arrangement of high-explosive
     and fissile material capable of producing a nuclear detonation.

23.  Nuclear Explosive Operation.  Any activity involving a nuclear explosive, including
     activities in which main charge high-explosive parts and pit are collocated.

24.  Nuclear Explosive Operation-Associated Activities.  Activities directly associated with a
     specific nuclear explosive operation, such as work on a bomb nose or tail subassembly,
     even when physically separated from the bomb s nuclear explosive subassembly.

25.  Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES).  The application of positive measures to control or
     mitigate the possibility of unintended or unauthorized nuclear detonation, high-explosive
     detonation or deflagration, or fire in a nuclear explosive area.

26.  Nuclear Explosive Safety Rules (NESRs).  Safety limits, operating limits, surveillance
     requirements, safety boundaries, and management and administrative controls that
     significantly contribute to minimizing the possibility of nuclear detonation,
     high-explosive detonation or deflagration, or fire in nuclear explosive operations.

27.  Nuclear Explosive Safety Study.  A formal evaluation of the adequacy of positive
     measures to meet the DOE Nuclear Explosive Safety Standards.

28.  Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Revalidation.  A formal evaluation to determine whether
     a nuclear explosive operation has significantly changed since its Nuclear Explosive
     Safety Study was approved.

29.  Nuclear Explosive Safety Survey.  A formal nuclear explosive safety evaluation based on
     a comparative analysis of the operation with the nuclear explosive operation evaluated in
     a current and approved Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Report.

30.  Nuclear Weapon.  A nuclear explosive configured for DoD use.

31.  One-Point Safe Nuclear Explosive.  A nuclear explosive that, in the event a detonation is
     initiated at any one point in the high-explosive system, presents no greater probability
     than one in a million of producing a nuclear detonation.

32.  Operational Safety Controls (OSCs).  Safety limits, operating limits, surveillance
     requirements, safety boundaries, and management and administrative controls that
     significantly contribute to protecting workers, the public, and the environment from
     hazards other than nuclear detonation, high-explosive detonation and deflagration, and
     fire (which are addressed by Nuclear Explosive Safety Rules) for specific nuclear
     explosive operations and associated activities.

33.  Permanent Marking.  A durable method, normally by metal deformation, of indicating on
     an external area of an assembly whether it is a nuclear explosive or a nuclear explosive-
     like assembly.

34.  Personnel Assurance Program (PAP).  A program that establishes the requirements and
     responsibilities for screening, selecting, and continuously evaluating employees assigned
     to or being considered for assignment to nuclear explosive duties.

35.  Pit (Live).  A fissile component, or set of fissile components, designed to fit in the
     central cavity of an implosion system and which if placed therein will create a nuclear
     explosive.

36.  Positive Measures.  Design features, safety rules, procedures, or other controls used
     individually or collectively to provide nuclear explosive surety.  Positive measures are
     intended to ensure a safe response in applicable operations and to be controllable.  Some
     examples of positive measures are strong-link switches; other safety devices;
     administrative procedures and controls; general and specific nuclear explosive safety
     rules; design control of electrical equipment and mechanical tooling; and physical,
     electrical, and mechanical restraints incorporated in facilities and transport equipment.

37.  Reader Worker Procedure and Check-Off.  A procedure used during specified nuclear
     explosive operations in which one person reads the description of the operation to be
     performed, the operation is performed, and the reader checks off on a list that the
     operation has been performed.

38.  Readiness Review.  A disciplined, systematic, documented, performance-based
     examination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and management control
     systems to ensure that a facility will be operated within its approved safety envelope as
     defined by the facility safety basis.

39.  Risk.  The qualitative or quantitative expression of possible loss that considers both the
     likelihood that an event will occur and the consequence of that event.

40.  Safety Analysis.  A documented process to:  (1) provide systematic identification of
     hazards within facilities in which nuclear explosive operations and associated activities
     are conducted and within specific nuclear explosive operations and associated activities;
     (2) describe and analyze the adequacy of measures taken to eliminate, control, or
     mitigate identified hazards; and (3) analyze and evaluate potential accidents and their
     associated risks.

41.  Safety Analysis Report (SAR).  A report that documents the results of safety analysis to
     ensure that a facility can be constructed, operated, maintained, shut down, and
     decommissioned safely and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

42.  Safety Basis.  The collection of information related to controlling the hazards of an
     operation used to determine that operations can be conducted safely within the facility.

43.  Safety-Class Structures, Systems, and Components (safety-class SSCs).  Structures,
     systems, or components including primary environmental monitors and portions of
     process systems, whose failure could adversely affect the environment or safety and
     health of the public as identified by safety analyses.

44.  Safety Critical Equipment.  Any equipment that upon failure may cause a significant
     safety vulnerability.

45.  Safety Significant Structures, Systems and Components (safety- significant SSCs).
     Structures, systems, and components not designated as safety-class SSCs but whose
     preventive or mitigative function is a major contributor to defense-in-depth (i.e.,
     prevention of uncontrolled material releases) and/or worker safety as determined from
     hazard analysis.

46.  Significant Safety Incident.  An incident that results in serious injury or abnormal
     radiation exposure to personnel, initiation of any explosive or pyrotechnic, rupture of a
     high-pressure vessel, or abnormal release of radiological contamination.  This list is not
     meant to be all inclusive; reasonable judgment is expected.

47.  Technical Safety Requirements (TSR).  Those requirements that define the conditions,
     the safe boundaries, and the management or administrative controls necessary to ensure
     the safe operation of a nuclear facility and to reduce the potential risk to the public and
     facility workers from uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials or from radiation
     exposures due to inadvertent criticality.  TSRs consist of safety limits, operating limits
     (limiting condition for operation and limiting control setting), surveillance requirements,
     administrative controls, use and application instructions, and the basis thereof.  TSRs
     were formerly known as "operational safety requirements" for nonreactor nuclear
     facilities and "technical specifications" for reactor facilities.

48.  Temporary Marking.  A nondurable marking method on an external area, attached to an
     assembly, or otherwise marked, indicating the configuration of a nuclear explosive-like
     assembly.

49.  Use Control.  The application of systems, devices, or procedures that allow timely
     authorized use of a nuclear explosive while precluding or delaying unauthorized use
     (nuclear detonation).