II. The National Security Role

A. Introduction and Background

1. The Changing Environment

The end of the Cold War has brought substantial change. Weapons modernization, arms control agreements, the fear of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the significant decline in defense spending require a restructuring of the laboratories' support for the national security mission. Today, these laboratories represent an extraordinary national resource of people, facilities, and experience. Every attempt should be made to use this resource as missions change.

2. National Security Requirements

The President stated in the National Security Strategy (July 1994) that a safe, secure and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent remains a cornerstone of U.S. national security policy. The President announced a moratorium on underground nuclear testing with a goal of establishing a comprehensive test ban. He instructed the DoD and DOE to explore means other than nuclear testing to maintain confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of the weapons stockpile. He also directed strong efforts to support the Non-Proliferation Treaty and counter weapons of mass destruction. This direction is the basis for DOE and DoD planning for the future and the Task Force's consideration of alternate futures for the weapons laboratories.

The maintenance of a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile, contributions to critical proliferation and treaty issues, and participation in other national priorities related to this mission are essential parts of the nuclear weapons laboratories' future and require adequate facilities, motivated and capable people, and the requisite budget. This future will require new types of management, different technical personnel, and a mode of operation that is closer to industry's than the laboratories have practiced in the past.

3. Specific Weapons Requirements

The Nuclear Posture Review identified the need for flexibility either to accelerate the drawdown if both sides implement START II more quickly, or the ability to return inactive weapons to service if the Russians suspend or delay START II implementation. The weapons laboratories need the capability to respond to either circumstance.

Over the past two years, the Department of Energy has established the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program, replacing a test-based stockpile stewardship, to maintain confidence in nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. The focus of the new program includes improving experimental capabilities, enhancing computational capabilities, advanced stockpile surveillance, advanced manufacturing and materials capability, maintaining system engineering and infrastructure and preserving a nuclear design and experimentation capabilities.

B. Main Findings and Recommendations

1. Mission

1. Attracting and retaining skilled scientists, engineers, and managers over the years ahead with the expertise required for the complex and demanding stewardship role;

2. Enhancing surveillance of weapons in the stockpile[4], during dismantlement, and of the nuclear materials that accumulate as a result of that dismantlement;

3. Continuing hydrodynamic testing as required to cope with problems;

4. Assessing problems, reanalyzing previous data through numerical simulations, and developing appropriate data bases; and

5. Sustaining the scientific process of inquiry through experimentation.

In today's world, proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction remains a major threat to U.S. national security. Because of this threat the DOE laboratories' work in non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, verification, and intelligence support has become a major mission as well as an extension of their stewardship of the nuclear stockpile. These activities are supported by the expertise maintained within the entire nuclear weapons infrastructure. It is important that their funding be included within the core infrastructure support. The Task Force notes that organizational compartmentalization within the Department complicates and makes difficult the appropriate inter-relationship and funding balance between stockpile support and non-proliferation, and recommends that the Department's organization reflect their importance and interdependence.

2. Attracting and Retaining Scientists, Engineers, and Managers

• Providing appropriate rewards for high performers;

• Weeding out weaker performers; and,

• Engendering in the research and engineering staff a sense of achievement, based on personal responsibility and personal accountability.

3. Configuration of the Nuclear Weapons Laboratories

The Task Force believes LLNL should retain enough nuclear weapons design competence and technology base to continue its activities in non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, intelligence support, and verification, to provide independent review for several years while alternative approaches to peer review are developed (see "Peer Review"), and to participate in weapons relevant experiments on the National Ignition Facility (NIF). LLNL would transfer, as cost-efficiency allows, over the next five years its activities in nuclear materials development and production to the other design laboratory. LLNL would transfer direct stockpile support to the other weapons laboratories as the requirements of science-based stockpile stewardship, support of the DoD nuclear posture, and the status of test bans allow. Under these conditions, the Task Force believes that the transfer can be made in five years. The Task Force notes that if the NIF is built at LLNL, this will reinforce the weapons design capability at that laboratory.

4. Peer Review

5. Contributions to Basic Science

6. Major Research Facilities

• Continued funding support for the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing (DARHT) facility;

• Continued near-term support for Los Alamos Neutron Scattering Experiment/Los Alamos Meson Physics Facility (LANSCE/LAMPF);

• Continued pursuit of advanced computing, including computing through workstation networks; and,

• Proceeding with the National Ignition Facility (NIF) as a research facility, prioritized with respect to other major research investments.

  In its favor, NIF will provide a unique means for doing very important experiments involving extremely high temperatures in condensed matter physics and it thus will make it possible to maintain expertise in one of the areas of physics fundamental to modern nuclear weapons design. Similarly, the data and theory it will produce will contribute uniquely to science generally and to astrophysics in particular. On the other hand, there is some possibility that NIF will inadequately simulate secondaries, although this is already a lower priority than understanding primaries. There is a low probability that inertial fusion will become a useful source of energy in the foreseeable future. NIF may not attract the scientists and engineers that stockpile stewardship really needs. NIF may also complicate discussions at the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference and negotiations of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In short, NIF is a risk (as are most major research projects), but on balance the Task Force supports its construction. An important consideration is that the question of whether or not NIF is built at LLNL, when combined with other recommendations for change given in this report and elsewhere that could define the future of that laboratory.

  7. Non-Nuclear Research Requirements

  The Task Force recommends that non-nuclear research activities continue at the weapons laboratories as long as a paying customer requires them, as they are rooted in nuclear weapons research, contribute to core R&D, and pay their fair share of overhead and basic research support.

  8. Nuclear Weapons Production Capacity

  There is no need for nuclear weapons production at this time nor is start-up of production envisioned for problems expected in the stockpile. Capability-based deterrence requires, however, the potential for weapons production in the event of increased threat that may arise in the future. The current world situation and the existing production capability do not mandate investment in additional production capability. The Task Force recommends that future production should be based on the residual capabilities of Pantex, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories, and believes that no further investments in production capability are needed at this time.

  9. Tritium Supply

  Accelerator-based production of tritium looks attractive, given today's understanding of the technology. The Task Force, however, does not make a recommendation relative to replacement, or to the mode of production, but rather supports continued R&D in accelerator-based production of tritium.

  10. Management of the Nuclear Weapons Laboratories by DOD

  As requirements for national security change, DoD and DOE must size their organizations and improve their coordination for maximum effectiveness. The DoD must act as an intelligent and prudent customer regarding nuclear weapons. The separation, within the U.S. government, of nuclear weapons development and operations is a long tradition and has recently been challenged in the interest of efficiency. The Task Force, however, agreeing with most previous studies of this issue, sees no compelling reason for DoD to manage the national security activities at the weapons laboratories. Indeed, the Task Force believes that there is much value at this time in maintaining an independent and technically expert organization to focus on nuclear stockpile issues and to continue to ensure that decisions regarding the safety, control, and stewardship of nuclear weapons are raised to the high policy level that they deserve. The corporatization proposal contained in Section VII in the Task Force report could eliminate the management issues for both DoD and DOE and give a customer focus to the weapons programs.

  C. Summary of Recommendations

  1. The primary mission of the weapons laboratories must be a safe, secure and reliable nuclear stockpile in the absence of explosive testing. Science-based stockpile stewardship is the approach chosen be the Department to achieve this mission. It requires the following rank-order priorities:
     • Attracting and retaining skilled scientists, engineers, and managers over the years ahead with the expertise required for the complex and changing stewardship role;

     • Enhancing surveillance of weapons in the stock pile, during dismantlement, and of the nuclear materials that accumulate as a result of the dismantlement;

     • Continuing hydrodynamic testing to cope with problems;

     • Assessing problems, reanalyzing previous data through numerical simulations, and developing appropriate data bases; and

     • Sustaining the scientific process of inquiry through experimentation.

  2. Non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, verification, and intelligence support have become a major mission along with stewardship of the nuclear stockpile. The Task Force notes that organizational compartmentalization within the Department complicates and makes difficult the appropriate inter-relationship and funding balance between support and non-proliferation, and recommends that the Department's organization reflect their importance and interdependence.

  3. The Task Force believes Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory should retain enough nuclear weapons design competence and technology base to continue its activities in non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, verification, an intelligence support, to provide independent review for several years while alternative approaches to peer review are developed, and to participate in weapons relevant experiments on the National Ignition Facility (NIF). Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory would transfer as cost-efficiency allows over the next five years its activities in nuclear materials development and production to the other design laboratory. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory would transfer direct stockpile support to the other weapons laboratories as the requirements of science-based stockpile stewardship, support of the DoD nuclear posture, and the status of the test bans allow.

  4. The Task Force recommends continued funding support for the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing (DARHT) facility; continued near-term support for the Los Alamos Neutron Scattering Experiment/Los Alamos Meson Physics Facility (LANSCE/LAMPF); continued pursuit of advanced computing, including computing through workstation networks; and proceeding with the National Ignition Facility (NIF) as a research facility, balanced with respect to other major investments.

  5. The Task Force recommends that future production needs should be based on residual capabilities of Pantex, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories, and believes that no further investments in production capability are needed at this time.

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