DOCI: DODD 5210.63
TITL: DODD 5210.63 Security of Nuclear Reactors and Special Nuclear Materials,
April 6, 1990, USD(P)
References: (a) DoD Directive 5210.63, subject as above, April 24, 1978
(b) DoD Directive 5210.41, "Security Policy for Protecting
Nuclear Weapons, September 23, 1988
(c) Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73
(d) Department of Energy (DoE) Order 5632.2A "Physical
Protection of Special Nuclear Material and Vital
Equipment," February 9, 1988
(e) through (q), see enclosure 1
A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
This Directive reissues reference (a) to update policy,
responsibilities, procedures, and minimum standards for safeguarding DoD
nuclear reactors and special nuclear materials (SNM).
B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
1. Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); the
Military Departments; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff;
the Unified and Specified Commands; the Defense Agencies having
responsibility for the protection of nuclear reactors and SNM; and the DoD
Field Activities (hereafter referred to collectively as "DoD
2. Applies to all land-based nuclear reactors at fixed sites or in
transit, research and test reactors under the direct control of DoD
Components, and space-borne nuclear reactors located on DoD installations.
3. Applies to all SNM, regardless of form or whether incorporated in
reactor cores or in other items under the direct control of DoD
a. Self-protecting SNM; that is, SNM that are not readily separable
from other radioactive material and that have a total external radiation
dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any
accessible surface without intervening shielding. SNM in a single unit
that weighs in excess of 5,000 pounds may have reduced security measures
upon approval of the cognizant agency.
b. SNM in a quantity not exceeding 350 grams of uranium-235,
plutonium, or combination possessed in any analytical, research, quality
control, metallurgical, or electronic laboratory.
4. Does not apply to nuclear weapons. Because of the unique
requirements associated with nuclear weapons, separate guidance regarding
their security is provided in DoD Directive 5210.41 (reference (b)).
5. Does not apply to nuclear reactors or SNM on board U.S. Navy ships.
(See paragraph E.4.c., below.)
6. Does not apply to those nonactive or decommissioned DoD nuclear
reactor facilities or nuclear propulsion systems on Navy ships when no
fissile material is present.
7. Does not abrogate or abridge the:
a. Authority or responsibility of a commander to provide equivalent
or better standards than those applied to licensed facilities or materials
or to apply more stringent security standards required by other DoD
Directives during emergencies, or at any time the threat to DoD nuclear
reactors or SNM indicates additional protection measures are necessary.
b. Responsibility of DoD Components operating nuclear reactors under
Nuclear Regulatory Commission license or processing SNM to comply with
the requirements of 10 CFR 73 (reference (c)), and DoE Orders 5632.2A and
5632.1A (references (d) and (e)).
Terms used in this Directive are defined in enclosure 2.
It is DoD policy to ensure that nuclear reactors and SNH receive
special protection because of their operational importance and the serious
consequences of unauthorized possession or use of nuclear materials. The
conservation of SNM; the safety of the public, operating personnel, and
property; and the protection of SNM from sabotage, theft, loss, or
diversion are of paramount importance during all phases of operations.
1. The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD(P)), in coordination
with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy
(ATSD(AE)), has the authority and responsibility for DoD security policy
for DoD nuclear reactors and SNM.
2. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)
(ATSD(AE)) has the authority and responsibility for standards and guidance
on defense nuclear energy matters.
3. The DoD Physical Security Review Board, as established by DoD
Directive 5100.76 (reference (f)), shall advise and assist the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Security Policy) (DUSD(SP)) and ATSD(AE) on
matters involving the security of nuclear reactors and SNM.
4. The Heads of DoD Components shall:
a. Effect necessary programming, budgeting, and accounting actions to
ensure fulfillment of nuclear reactor and SNM security requirements.
b. Develop site-specific security instructions, procedures, and
plans, applicable to nuclear reactors and SNM facilities in accordance
with this Directive.
c. Provide a security operational concept for each new type of plant
or new class of ship possessing a nuclear propulsion system for
coordination with the DUSD(SP) and ATSD(AE).
a. Each DoD Component shall develop procedures to ensure adequate
protection is afforded nuclear reactors and SNM and to comply with
statutory accountability requirements. Procedures shall provide
protection against theft, sabotage, diversion, and other hostile acts that
could impact adversely on national security and on the health and safety
of operating and security personnel and the public.
b. The level and strategy of protection shall be consistent with the
category of SNM involved, the standards described in enclosures 3 and 4,
radiation levels, the applicable threat, operational requirements, and
potential risks. Physical security procedures must constitute a balanced,
in-depth system that is responsive to all credible potential
c. Nuclear reactors and components without SNM shall be protected
consistent with the highest level of classified information they contain.
d. Security-related equipment shall be protected from unauthorized
access consistent with its importance to the protection of nuclear
reactors and SNM.
e. Unclassified information pertaining to security plans, procedures,
and equipment for the physical protection of nuclear reactors and SNM
shall be safeguarded as described in the DUSD(SP) Memorandum (reference
f. General access to nuclear reactors and SNM shall be restricted to
authorized personnel with established need. Access shall be kept to a
minimum and appropriate entry control and identification procedures shall
be established to ensure need for access.
g. Any operator or security individual in a position that would allow
the individual, acting alone, the opportunity to divert or cancel the
diversion of Category I or Category II quantities of SNM shall be subject
to extensive screening and continuing evaluation by supervisors and
co-workers in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.42 (reference (h)).
2. Physical Security and Vulnerability Assessment
a. A physical security and vulnerability assessment shall be prepared
for existing facilities where Category I or II SNM is used or stored, and
during the planning, design, and full-scale development phases of such
b. The Military Services, through their intelligence and law
enforcement services, shall develop and coordinate with appropriate
commanders a postulated threat as the basis of the assessment. A design
basis for the postulated threat is contained in Section 73.1 of 10 CFR 73
c. The assessment shall ensure that all credible potential
vulnerabilities are addressed and that appropriate consideration has been
given to changing requirements and new technologies.
d. Additional guidance may be found in MIL-STD-1785 (reference (i))
and MIL-HDBK-1013/1 (reference (j)), or other sources with similar depth
e. The assessment shall be reviewed at least annually and updated as
f. Factors to be considered in assessing security requirements for
nuclear reactors include:
(1) Location of the reactor.
(2) Configuration in which the reactor is maintained.
(3) Category of SNM contained in the reactor.
(4) Nature and capabilities of potential threats.
(5) Availability and protection of other equally attractive targets
at other facilities.
(6) Reliability and qualification of security and operating
g. Factors to be considered in assessing security requirements for
(1) Degree of enrichment, activity level, and category of the SNM.
(2) Quantity and configuration of the SNM.
(3) Availability and protection of equally attractive material at
(4) Difficulties associated with removal of the SNM from the site.
3. Physical Security Plan
a. Upon completion of the physical security and vulnerability
assessment, a site security plan shall be developed and implemented that
prescribes the minimum standards and procedures and that complies with 10
CFR 73 (reference (c)) and this Directive. The plan shall consider:
(1) Minimum physical security criteria and standards for protecting
nuclear reactors and SNM prescribed in enclosures 3 and 4.
(2) Emergency and contingency procedures as well as protection
strategies and measures to prevent radiological sabotage and the theft or
diversion of SNM.
(3) Requirements for security equipment unique to security or for
monitoring nuclear reactors and SNM described in DoD Directive 3224.3
b. Security plans shall be reviewed at least annually in conjunction
with review of the vulnerability assessment, current intelligence, and
other relevant factors, and shall be updated as required or when
facilities are modified. In addition, security programs shall be reviewed
as necessary to ensure adequate protection at all times.
4. Use of Force
a. In accordance with DoD Directive 5210.56 (reference (1)),
Categories I and II quantities of SNM are designated as vital to the
national security whose loss, damage, or compromise would seriously
prejudice national security or jeopardize the fulfillment of an essential
national defense mission. Security force personnel shall be armed and all
possible actions shall be taken, including the use of deadly force within
the limitations of reference (l), to prevent the theft, sabotage, or
unauthorized control of SNM from a site or shipment where Category I and
II quantities of SNM are known or reasonably believed to be present.
b. All security force personnel shall be trained on the use of deadly
force. Training shall include specific scenarios, tailored to individual
locations, that require security force members to detail their responses
to representative situations involving the use of deadly force as outlined
in reference (1).
5. Reporting Incidents
All incidents and threats related to radiological sabotage, theft or
diversion of SNM, or to damage to nuclear reactors shall be reported in
accordance with DoD Instruction 0-7730.12 (reference (m)). A copy of the
report shall be provided to the DUSD(SP) and the ATSD(AE).
6. Inventory Discrepancies
When an assessment of SNM status reveals an inventory discrepancy
statutory reporting requirements must be followed and the DUSD(SP) and
ATSD(AE) shall be informed of such discrepancies.
7. Variances and Waivers
When it is neither practical nor cost-effective to meet a specific
physical security standard, variances or waivers may be reviewed and
approved as described in enclosure 5.
8. Public Release of Information
Public release of information regarding incidents and threats related
to radiological sabotage and the theft or diversion of SNM shall be
governed by DoD Directive 5230.16 (reference (n)) and DoD Instruction
5210.67 (reference (o)).
G. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION
This Directive is effective immediately. Forward two copies of the
implementing documents to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Security
Policy) within 120 days; forward one copy of changes to implementing
documents within 60 days of publication.
Donald J. Atwood
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Enclosures - 5
3. Special Nuclear Material (SNM) Protection Standards
4. Physical Security Standards for DoD Nuclear Reactors and Category
I and II Quantities of Special Nuclear Material
5. Variances, Waivers, and Exceptions
(e) Department of Energy (DoE) Order 5632.1A, "Protection Program
Operations," February 9, 1988
(f) DoD Directive 5100.76, "Physical Security Review Board," February 10,
(g) Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Security Policy) Memorandum,
"Interim Guidance for Identifying and Controlling Unclassified
Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI)," September 13, 1989
(h) DoD Directive 5210.42, "Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability
Program," December 6, 1985
(i) MIL-STD-1785, "System Security Engineering Program Management
Requirements," January 31, 1988
(j) MIL-HDBK-1013/1, "Design Guidelines for Physical Security of Fixed
Land-Based Facilities," March 1983
(k) DoD Directive 3224.3, "Physical Security Equipment (PSE) Assignment
of Responsibility for Research, Development, Testing, Evaluation,
Production, Procurement, Deployment, and Support," February 17, 1989
(l) DoD Directive 5210.56, "Use of Force by Personnel Engaged in Law
Enforcement and Security Duties," May 10, 1969
(m) DoD Instruction 0-7730.12, "Notification Procedures for Accidents and
Significant Incidents Involving Nuclear Weapons, Reactors, and
Radioactive Materials," August 1, 1976
(n) DoD Directive 5230.16, "Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs
Guidance," February 7, 1983
(o) DoD Instruction 5210.67, "Special Nuclear Material Information,
Security Classification Guidance," December 3, 1982
(p) DoD C-5210.41-M, "Nuclear Weapon Security Manual (U)," September
1987, authorized by DoD Directive 5210.41, September 23, 1988
(q) JCS Pub. 1-02, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,"
June 1, 1987
1. Access. Close physical proximity to nuclear reactors and/or SNM in
such a manner as to allow the opportunity to tamper with, steal, or damage
such items. Normally, a person is considered not to have access if an
escort or guard is provided when the person is in close proximity to the
reactor or SNM (DoD C-5210.41-M (reference (p))).
2. Clear Zone. (Also referred to as an isolation zone.) An area
adjacent to a physical barrier, clear of all objects that could conceal or
shield an individual (10 CFR 73 (reference (c))).
3. Delay. The effect achieved by physical features, technical devices,
or security measures and forces that impedes an adversary from gaining
access to a nuclear weapon. Normally expressed as a function of time, it
is a major consideration in the design and development of nuclear weapon
security systems (DoD Directive 5210.41 (reference (b))).
4. Duress System. A system that can covertly communicate a situation of
duress to a security control center or to other personnel who can notify a
security control center (DoE Order 5632.1A (reference (e))).
5. Exclusion Area. A designated area immediately surrounding the nuclear
reactor and/or the SNM. Normally, the boundaries of an Exclusion Area are
the walls, floor, and ceiling of a structure or are delineated by a
permanent or temporary barrier. In the absence of positive preventive
measures, unescorted entry to the Exclusion Area constitutes access to the
nuclear reactor and/or the SNM vault or storage container (DoD Directive
6. Limited Area. A designated area immediately surrounding one or more
Exclusion Areas. Normally, the area is between the boundaries of the
Exclusion Area and the outer or inner barrier or boundary of the perimeter
security system (reference (b)).
7. Material Access Area. An area containing Category I quantities of SNM
specifically defined by physical barriers, located within a protected
area, and subject to specific access controls (reference (e)).
8. Material Surveillance Procedures. Procedures to ensure the
observation of an area containing SNM by at least two cleared and
knowledgeable authorized persons who may be doing other work but who can
give an alarm in time to prevent unauthorized removal or diversion of the
SNM or an act of sabotage, involving SNM (reference (e)).
9. Nuclear Reactor. A facility in which fissile material is used in a
self-supporting chain reaction (nuclear fission) to produce heat and/or
radiation for both practical application and research development (JCS
Pub. 1-02 (reference (q))).
10. Postulated Threat. An estimate of potential adversary types, acts,
capabilities, and combinations thereof that could constitute a risk to a
facility or asset. A postulated threat is necessary when a specific
threat cannot be determined or when an existing threat may change or grow
during the projected life cycle of an asset or system faster than security
improvements can be developed and implemented. The postulated threat
allows for the consideration of future growth in adversary capabilities
and is used as the basis for the design of security systems, equipment,
and facilities (DoD Directive 5210.41 (reference (b))).
11. Protected Area. An area encompassed by physical barriers and to
which access is controlled (10 CFR 73, reference (c)).
12. Radiological Sabotage. Any deliberate act directed against a nuclear
reactor, SNM facility, or transport that could directly or indirectly
endanger public health and safety by exposure to radiation (reference
13. Safe. A burglar-resistant cabinet or chest having a body of steel at
least 1/2-inch thick and a built-in, three position, changeable
combination lock in a steel door at least 1-inch thick, exclusive of bolt
work and locking devices (DoE Order 5632.1A (reference (e))).
14. Security Container. A security cabinet that bears a test
certification label on the inside of the locking drawer or door and is
marked "General Services Administration-Approved Security Container" on
the outside of the top drawer or door (reference (e)).
15. Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). Plutonium, uranium-233, uranium
enriched in the isotope-233 or in the isotope-235, and any other material
that is determined to be special nuclear material, except source material,
or any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing (reference
16. Special Nuclear Material Vault. A penetration-resistant, windowless
enclosure that has: (a) walls, floor, and ceiling substantially
constructed of materials that afford forced penetration resistance at
least equivalent to that of 8-inch thick reinforced concrete, (b) any
openings greater than 96 square inches in area and over 6 inches in the
smallest dimension protected by imbedded steel bars at least 5/8 inches in
diameter on 6-inch centers both horizontally and vertically; (c) a built-
in combination lock in a steel door that in existing structures is at
least 1-inch thick exclusive of bolt work and locking devices and that for
new structures meets the Class 5 standards set forth in Federal
Specification AA-D-6008 of the Federal Specifications and Standards cited
in Title 41 CFR Part 101. (See reference (e).)
17. Vault. A burglar-resistant, windowless enclosure that meets the
definition of an SNM vault. Additionally, vaults shall include an
intrusion alarm activated by an opening of the door (reference (e)).
18. Vault-Type Room. A room having a combination-lock on its door or
doors protected by an intrusion detection system activated by penetration
of walls, floors, ceilings, openings, or motion within the room (reference
19. Vital Area. A security area located within a Protected Area for the
protection of vital equipment (reference (e)).
20. Vital Equipment. Equipment, systems, or components whose failure or
destruction would cause unacceptable interruption to a national security
program or an unacceptable impact to the health and safety of the public
(DoE Order 5632.1A (reference (e))).
21. Waste. SNM that are no longer useful, economical, or feasible to
recover, including that which has become radioactive to the extent that
material itself exhibits radioactivity of such a level that it must be
handled and disposed of by special methods to protect the general public
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL (SNM) PROTECTION STANDARDS
1. The level of protection afforded nuclear reactors and SNM shall be
consistent with the category of SNM involved, including radiation levels,
regardless of form or whether incorporated in other items, reactor cores
or facilities under the direct control of DoD Components. Figure 3-1
identifies the categories of SNM.
2. Additional protective measures may be required than those
indicated in this enclosure in those cases where SNM quantities from
lesser protected multiple locations within a facility or Protected Area
have the potential for being rolled up by an adversary into a higher
category of SNM.
B. MINIMUM PROTECTION STANDARDS AT FIXED SITES
1. Category I quantities of SNN
a. Category I quantities of SNM shall be used, processed, or stored
only within a Material Access Area enclosed within a Protected Area.
b. Category I quantities of SNM shall be stored in vaults or vault-
type rooms equipped with intrusion detection systems (IDS).
c. Category I quantities of SNM in use or process shall be under
material surveillance procedures or in process under alarm protection.
d. Category I quantities of SNM shall be protected by a security
force capable of responding to a security alarm and neutralizing
adversaries in less time than adversaries require to complete their
objective. Response times shall be specified in the site security plan.
e. Category I quantities of SNM shall be controlled at all times to
prevent theft or diversion by a single authorized individual. Control may
be achieved by material surveillance procedures.
f. Access controls, intrusion detection systems, communications
equipment, and testing and maintenance programs shall meet the applicable
requirements of enclosure 4.
2. Category II quantities of SNM
a. Category II quantities of SNM shall be used, processed, or stored
within a Protected Area.
b. Category II quantities of SNM shall be stored in vaults,
vault-type rooms, or security containers protected by IDS.
c. Category II quantities of SNM in use or process shall be under
material surveillance procedures or in process under alarm protection.
d. Category II quantities of SNM shall be protected by a security
force capable of responding to an alarm. Response times shall be
specified in the site security plan.
e. Access controls, intrusion detection systems, communications
equipment, and testing and maintenance programs shall meet the applicable
requirements of enclosure 4.
3. Category III quantities of SNM
a. Category III quantities of SNM shall be used, processed, and
stored in a Protected Area or other security area that meets the following
(1) Clearly defined perimeter barriers.
(2) Personnel and vehicle access control at the entrance,
administered by a security guard, receptionist, or other person assigned
for that purpose.
(3) A personnel identification system.
(4) Establishment and maintenance of a visitor's log.
(5) Signs prohibiting trespassing posted around the perimeter at all
entrances to the use or storage area, prohibiting the introduction of
prohibited articles, and authorizing inspections and/or searches of
vehicles, packages, or persons entering or exiting posted at all entrances
to the use or storage areas.
b. Search procedures shall be established and documented in the site
c. When unattended, Category III quantities of SNM shall be stored in
either a locked security container protected by IDS or within a locked
room protected by IDS (or in a locked room without IDS patrolled by
security forces at intervals not to exceed 2 hours). As an alternative,
the security container containing Category III SNM may be stored in a
vault or vault-type room containing Category I or II SNM.
d. Access to the material shall be limited to properly cleared
personnel in positions that have been specifically designated as requiring
access to Category III quantities of SNM in the course of assigned duties
and to-authorized visitors who are under continuous escort of personnel in
such designated positions.
e. A security response force shall respond to verified intrusion
alarms as specified in the site security plan.
4. Category IV quantities of SNM
Category IV quantities of SNM shall be used, processed, or stored in
accordance with DoD Component guidance.
C. TRANSPORTATION OF SNM
1. Domestic shipments of SNM shall be in accordance with DoE and DoD
agreement and consistent with Federal regulations and DoE Order 5632.2A
(reference (d)). SNM transport, security, control, and accountability
procedures shall be specified in the site security plan.
2. Nuclear reactor cores shall be transported and secured in
accordance with DoE and DoD agreements and shall be specified in the site
3. Movement of SNM within a Protected Area shall be protected as
described in the site security plan.
4. Movement of SNM between Protected or Staging areas at the same
a. Category I quantities of SNM
(1) Movement shall be under direct escort and surveillance of at
least two armed security force personnel.
(2) Security force personnel shall inspect the route before
transport to identify and eliminate any condition or situation that could
result in delay or risk to the movement.
(3) Prior to movement, security force personnel shall conduct a
detailed inspection and search of the transport vehicle to ensure the
safety and security of the movement.
(4) Security procedures for the movement of SNM within staging areas
shall be specified in the site security plan.
b. Category II quantities of SNM movement shall be under material
surveillance procedures and protected as specified in the site security
c. Category III and IV quantities of SNM
(1) Movement shall be accomplished as described in the site security
plan and shall include protective measures consistent with the category of
D. PROTECTION OF VITAL EQUIPMENT
1. All vital equipment shall be contained in designated Vital Areas
located within the Exclusion Area. Security procedures for the protection
of Vital Areas shall be specified in the site security plan.
2. Access control, intrusion detection systems, communication
equipment, and testing and maintenance programs shall meet the applicable
requirements of enclosure 4.
E. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF SNM
Security classification policy guidance for DoD nuclear reactors and
SNM are contained in DoD Instruction 5210.67 (reference (o)). In
addition, information concerning DoD nuclear reactors and SNM may be
controlled as unclassified controlled nuclear information as described in
the DUSD(SP) Memorandum (reference (g)).
1. Figure 3-1, Special Nuclear Material Protection Categories
2. Figure 3-2, Reportable Quantities of Special Nuclear Material
PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS FOR DoD NUCLEAR REACTORS AND
CATEGORY I AND II QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
The standards outlined in this enclosure are provided to assist DoD
Components in the development, design, and implementation of protective
measures for nuclear reactors and SNM. The protective measures used for
each location must be based on site-specific considerations and should
address all of the areas in this enclosure.
B. SECURITY SYSTEM CONCEPT
1. The goal of a security system for nuclear reactors and SNM is to
apply efforts and resources in such a manner as to preclude radiological
sabotage and the theft or diversion of SNM. To achieve this goal, a
security system shall provide the capability to deter, detect, assess,
delay, respond to, and neutralize the intended actions of the adversary.
2. The components of a security system each have a function and a
related security objective. Together, the visible components should
attempt to deter a potential adversary. Detection, accomplished through
human or electronic measures, identifies possible threats and penetration
attempts against the security system in sufficient time to allow the
remaining portions of the security system to defeat the adversary.
Assessment, through the use of closed-circuit television (CCTV)
subsystems, patrols, and fixed personnel, assists in determining the size
and intention of an intrusion. Delay, consisting of active and/or
passive security measures using various barriers, provides sufficient time
for the appropriate response to be made by the security force.
3. Response, consisting of security and law enforcement personnel, is
provided to the target in such a manner as to prevent the adversary from
accomplishing its goal. Response is accomplished by the use of
specifically designated, trained, and properly equipped security forces.
Neutralization, consisting of apprehending, forcing retreat, or
eliminating the adversary, is the final objective.
C. THREAT CONSIDERATIONS
1. The development of a security system is guided by a response to
actual validated threats or to postulated threats that may arise. The
threat is based on data derived from intelligence and investigative
sources and may include overt activities or groups, either internal or
external, using sophisticated equipment, arms, and methods. The intent of
the threat may range from a person or group of persons demonstrating to
make a political statement to persons desiring to obtain some SNM to
fabricate a nuclear weapon or threaten the public with the potential of
radiological contamination. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
provides intelligence products that cover the range of threats mentioned
above. In addition, the DIA is available to review plans for development
of security systems for DoD nuclear reactors and SNM.
2. The minimum standards contained in this enclosure define what
shall be required in designing a security system to protect nuclear
reactors and SNM based on postulated threats. It is the responsibility of
commanders at nuclear reactor and SNM facilities to define the local
threat and to respond with commensurate measures.
D. PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS
Physical security measures for the protection of DoD nuclear reactors
and SNM shall be accomplished in accordance with the following standards:
1. Physical Barriers
a. Physical barriers consisting of fences, walls, and doors shall be
designed to impede and aid in the detection of attempted entry and to
provide sufficient delay to intrusion, thereby providing security response
forces adequate time to apprehend and neutralize intruders.
b. Physical barriers shall be designed to ensure a means of limiting
ingress and egress of personnel and vehicles to a central point, thereby
facilitating identification and control procedures.
c. Physical barriers shall be used to define the perimeter of the
Protected Area and Material Access or Exclusion Areas within the Protected
Area. Both Exclusion Areas and Material Access Areas shall be located
within the Protected Area so that access to vital equipment and SNM stored
within these areas requires passage through at least two physical
d. An illuminated clear zone shall be maintained adjacent to the
physical barrier at the perimeter of the Protected Area and shall be large
enough to permit unobstructed observation on either side of the barrier to
detect activities and any penetration.
e. A warning system, consisting of warning signs and a loudspeaker
capability to warn intruders of the consequences of unauthorized entry,
shall be established as an integral part of the physical barrier system.
f. Guidance on construction techniques and materials for an effective
physical barrier system is contained in MIL-HDBK-1013/1 (reference (j)).
2. Access Controls
a. Material Access and Exclusion Areas shall be designed to
positively identify and control all authorized individuals granted
unescorted or escorted access to the nuclear reactor and SNM. All
personnel without access authorization and their vehicles, packages, and
material to be taken in or out of the Protected Area shall be identified,
controlled, and searched. All personnel authorized access and their hand-
carried packages shall be searched on at least a random basis. The access
control system shall be designed to ensure prompt ingress and egress
during emergency conditions and ensure access to vital equipment. Access
control procedures shall be specified in the site security plan.
b. Verification of identity shall be conducted by security personnel
at area entrances using a numbered picture badge identification system for
all personnel authorized access to the Protected Area without escort.
Personnel not authorized entry to the Protected Area without escort shall
be escorted and shall be badged to indicate that an escort is required.
Additional levels of identification using other human, mechanical, or
electronic means shall be used when dictated by an increased threat.
c. The access control system shall be designed to prevent
unauthorized entry of prohibited items, such as firearms, explosives, or
incendiary devices, into areas containing SNM or a nuclear reactor. The
system should also prevent the exit of SNM from areas containing Category
II or greater quantities of SNM.
d. Vehicle access to protected areas shall be restricted and
controlled. All vehicles, except under emergency conditions, shall be
searched for prohibited items before entry to the Protected Area.
Emergency vehicles shall be kept under positive control by security forces
while in the Protected Area and shall be searched before departing the
area upon termination of the emergency.
e. All keys, locks, combinations, and related equipment used to
provide access to Protected, Material Access, Vital, and other restricted
access areas shall be controlled to reduce probability of compromise.
f. The Material Access, Exclusion, and Vital Areas shall be contained
within the Protected Areas and their access controls shall be specified in
the site security plan.
3. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)
a. An intrusion detection system (IDS) shall be provided to detect
and assess unauthorized personnel, activities, or conditions and to
communicate with a central alarm monitoring activity so that an
appropriate response can be initiated. The IDS shall provide the
capability of early detection and near real-time assessment of any
penetration into a nuclear reactor or SNM facility.
(1) Rooms, buildings, or portions of a building within a Material
Access Area or controlled and alarmed process containing unattended
Category I quantities of in-process SNM shall be equipped with an IDS.
(2) Doors to vaults and vault-type rooms used to store Category I or
II quantities of SNM shall be protected with an IDS.
(3) Vault-type rooms used to store Category I or II quantities of SNM
shall be equipped with an interior IDS sufficient to detect unauthorized
(4) All unmanned exits from the Protected Area, Material Access Area,
Exclusion Area, or Vital Area shall be equipped with an IDS.
b. All IDS alarms shall annunciate in a continuously manned central
alarm monitoring facility located within the Protected Area and in at
least one other independent continuously manned on-site station (not
necessarily within the Protected Area) so that a single act could not
interfere with the capability of calling for assistance or responding to
the alarm. The central alarm monitoring facility shall be located within
a building so that its interior is not visible from the perimeter of the
Protected Area. Entry to the monitoring facility shall be controlled.
c. All IDS alarm devices and alarm communication equipment shall be
tamper-indicating and self-checking. All IDSs shall have an auxiliary
power supply in the event of a loss of primary power. Changeover to
auxiliary power shall be automatic and not result in an alarm condition or
cause false alarms.
d. All IDS equipment and components shall have a regularly applied
test, maintenance, and quality assurance program to ensure an effective
operable system. This program shall be specified in the site security
4. Communications Equipment
a. Nuclear reactor and SNM facilities shall have communications
equipment that provides dedicated, rapid, and reliable information
exchange among security personnel at the site, the central alarm
monitoring facility, security response forces, and with local law
b. There shall be at least two systems of communications between
fixed security force locations, such as entry control facilities, and the
central alarm monitoring facility. One of these systems shall be radio,
and each system shall have an auxiliary power source.
c. Security personnel, both mobile and fixed, shall have access to a
duress alarm or duress code system, as appropriate.
d. Communications equipment shall be tested daily and maintained on a
regular schedule. Test schedule and procedures shall be specified in the
site security plan.
Adequate lighting shall be provided in clear zones and around other
controlled access areas to discourage unauthorized entry, facilitate the
detection of intruders, and assist in the identification of authorized-
personnel at entry control points during hours of darkness of reduced
visibility. All security lighting shall have an auxiliary power source.
6. Security Force
a. A security force shall be established to perform the physical
security requirements outlined in this enclosure and enclosure 3, in the
site security plan, and in applicable regulations.
b. Members of the security force shall be trained, equipped, and
qualified to perform each assigned security duty and to meet emergency
situations. Sufficient security force members shall be readily
available to react and respond to security alarms and incidents. (See DoD
C-5210 41-M.(reference (p)) regarding force on force training exercises
associated with security of Category I SNM.)
c. Each facility shall have continuously on-site at least one full-
time member of the security force with the authority and capability to
direct physical protection activities and security response forces under
d. Security force management shall provide for the development,
implementation, and enforcement of security procedures. These procedures
shall be continuously assessed and revisions made when required by changed
VARIANCES, WAIVERS, AND EXCEPTIONS
Deviations from established security requirements shall be categorized
as either a variance, waiver, or exception, and may be applicable to
physical security facilities, plans, procedures, equipment, and monitoring
standards established in this Directive or in any supplemental issuance.
1. A variance is the approved continuation of a nonstandard condition
that technically varies from established requirements but essentially
affords the same level of security.
2. A waiver is the approved temporary continuation of a nonstandard
condition that deviates from an established security standard plus creates
a security vulnerability to the security system and, therefore, requires
compensatory measures. A waiver shall normally be approved for a period
not to exceed 12 months and shall be extended only by the authority who
granted the waiver and only after a review of the circumstances
necessitating the extension.
3. An exception is the approved continuation of a nonstandard
condition that varies from an established security standard plus creates a
security vulnerability to the security system and, therefore, requires
compensatory measures. Exceptions shall be granted only when correction of
the nonstandard condition is adjudged to be not feasible or cost-
effective. Exceptions shall be granted only after a careful and critical
evaluation. All exceptions shall be reviewed by the granting authority at
least every 2 years or when a major change in site configuration or
mission offers the opportunity for corrective action to terminate the
nonstandard condition. Exceptions shall be canceled unless it is found,
by the approving authority, that the exception continues to be required
and is justified.
B. REVIEW OF REQUESTS
Waivers and exceptions shall be evaluated and approved by the
Commander of the Unified of Specified Command concerned (the respective
heads of DoD Components for those sites not otherwise assigned to a
Unified or Specified Command). This approving authority may be delegated
in writing to a military officer of at least 0-7 grade on the staff. When
considering a deviation request for a particular facility or site, the
approving authority shall review all other waivers and exceptions
currently in effect for that facility or site. This review is to ensure
that, collectively, the deviations will not establish an overall
vulnerability greater than the designated compensatory measures. Each
waiver or exception shall be evaluated and approved on a case-by-case
basis. Blanket waivers or exceptions are not authorized. A 10 percent
deviation from all measurable standards, such as clear zone distances,
fence height, etc., is permitted; therefore, such deviation does not
require the submission and/or approval of a waiver or exception request.
C. COMPENSATORY MEASURES
1. A compensatory measure shall be instituted for each waiver or
exception in effect. If appropriate, one compensatory measure may suffice
for more than one waiver or exception. A compensatory measure shall also
be instituted whenever two or more variances, taken together, are
determined to constitute a vulnerability in the security system. For
example, a fence that is a few inches below the required height does not
by itself constitute a vulnerability; therefore, no compensatory measures
are necessary. However, if there are additional variances at the facility
or site; e.g., clear zones and perimeter lighting, which taken together
are determined to create a vulnerability, then compensatory measures are
2. The approving authority shall review each waiver or exception to
ensure that adequate compensatory measures have been established.
Adequate compensatory measures may include additional security forces,
procedures, and/or physical security devices such as additional locks,
alarm, lighting, anti-intrusion devices, barricades, etc., which provide a
level of security comparable to the required security standard. The
criteria for accepting compensatory measures shall involve an assessment
of the threat or vulnerability that has resulted from the condition that
necessitates a waiver or exception. The compensatory measure shall be
designed to specifically enhance the security posture in light of the
deficient situation. Compensatory measures that consist primarily of
instructions to the security force to increase their alertness do not
provide a comparable level of security.