CHAPTER 13
SECURITY

13-1 GENERAL

The presence of nuclear weapons or components at an accident site requires implementation of an effective security program as soon as possible. When an accident occurs at a military installation, security assistance may need to be obtained from civil authorities/officials until sufficient military forces arrive. Additionally, off-installation accidents could require the establishment of a National Defense Area (NDA) to permit control of civilian land by military forces. Even after establishment of the NDA, close coordination with civil law enforcement agencies is essential to an effective security program. The equivalent DoE area for an incident/accident involving DoE equipment/materials is a NSA. Overseas, there is no equivalent to the NDA. The On-Scene Commander will establish a disaster cordon or Security Area, to restrict entry and to provide for public safety.

13-2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This chapter provides guidance for planning and conducting security operations at the scene of a nuclear weapon accident and discusses security requirements, many unique to a nuclear weapon accident. Also, the chapter outlines a concept of operations to satisfy these requirements.

13-3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

The security program at the accident scene should meet the following requirements:

a. Provide effective control of the accident area.

b. Protect nuclear weapons and components.

c. Protect other classified materials and information.

d. Protect government property.

e. Provide effective coordination with civil law enforcement agencies/host nation law agencies.

f. Provide necessary operational security (OPSEC).

g. Counter potential terrorist and/or radical group activities or intelligence collection efforts.

13-4 RESOURCES

a. Initial Response Force (IRF). The IRF will have a security element for perimeter security, entry and exit control, and protection of classified information and property. “Since sufficient personnel will not likely be included in the IRF security elements responding to a nuclear weapon accident, augmentation may be required. Security forces can expect to encounter large numbers of people attracted to the accident scene, and care should be exercised to ensure that only experienced security personnel are in supervisory positions. Installations with a nuclear weapon capability should maintain equipment to control an accident site. This requirement should include rope and stanchions for barricading the accident site, NDA and entry control point signs, and portable lights. The IRF should provide security personnel with anti-contamination clothing and protective masks in the event that security requires their presence within the radiological control area. Riot control gear should be available if crowd control is required. Normally, security personnel possess equipment such as weapons and ammunition, cold weather gear, protective masks, handheld radios, canteens, and helmets.

b. Service Response Force (SRF). The SRF security officer should assess manpower requirements and ensure that sufficient additional security personnel are included in the SRF. IRF security personnel may become part of the SRF security element. The security officer should be prepared to meet all security requirements on a 24 hour basis without degrading the alertness and capability of his or her personnel to respond.

c. Civilian Response. Civilian law enforcement response depends on the location of the accident site. If the accident occurs off a military installation near a populated area, local police, fire, and rescue units will be notified and may be on-scene when the IRF arrives.
Civilian law enforcement personnel may augment military security personnel if requested.

d. Department of Energy. The DoE Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) communications pod is equipped with a slow scan TV system. This system may be very useful in surveillance operations; however, care must be taken to ensure that classified components or activities are not transmitted in the clear.

13-5 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

a. Accident Assessment. Upon arrival at the accident site, the security officer must assess the situation. This assessment includes an evaluation of ongoing emergency response operations and actions of local law enforcement agencies, and provides the foundation for the security program. While the assessment is made, security should be established at the accident site in cooperation with civil authorities. When overseas, the civilian authorities/officials will be requested to establish a Security Area (Disaster Cordon) to ensure public safety and appropriate security. This must be done in close coordination with the DoS Chief of Mission. Fragmentation hazard distances and the possibility of contamination should be considered when posting initial security personnel around the scene. This initial security is not to be confused with the National Defense Area (NDA) which may not yet be established and may be different in size.

The security officer should consider the following elements in his assessment:

1. Threat (real and potential danger to the secure area).
2. Location (on or off military installation).
3. Demographics and accident environment (remote, rural, suburban, urban).
4. Terrain characteristics (critical or dominating features).
5. Contamination (radiation intensity and extent and other hazardous materials).
6. Accident hazards (high explosives, rocket motors, or toxic chemicals).
7. Local meteorological conditions (include prevailing winds).
8. Transportation network in accident area (access routes, types and quantities of vehicles).
9. Structures in accident area (type and quantity).
10. Safety of security personnel (fragmentation distances, contamination, cold/hot weather).


(1) An NDA may be required any time an accident involving nuclear weapons or components occurs on non-Federal property. The NDA may, or may not, encompass the entire radiological control area. Security of any portion of the radiological control area existing outside the NDA is a matter of public safety and should be provided by civilian authorities/officials; however, military assistance may be requested.

(2) DoD Directive 5200.8, and Section 21 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, references (e) and (ah), provides the basis for establishing an NDA only in the United States. This area is established specifically to enhance safeguarding government property located on non-Federal land. Only IRF and SRF OSCS are authorized to designate an NDA, and then only to safeguard government resources, irrespective of other factors. The OSC should seek legal advice on any decisions regarding establishment, disestablishment, or modification of the NDA.

(3) The OSC designating the NDA must clearly define and mark its boundary. Area boundaries are established to minimize interference with other lawful activities on and uses of the property. Initially, the dimensions of the NDA may be quite large, which is necessary until more specific information is available regarding the location of the government material. The boundary is defined by some form of temporary barrier, for example, rope and wire. Warning signs as described in DoD 5210.41-M should be posted at the entry control station and along the boundary and be visible from any direction of approach. In areas where languages other than English are spoken, bilingual signs should be considered.

(4) The OSC who establishes the NDA should advise civil authorities/officials of the authority and the need for the NDA and the security controls in effect. If possible, the OSC should secure the landowners’ consent and cooperation. However, obtaining such consent is not a prerequisite for establishing the NDA.

(5) In maintaining security of the NDA, military personnel should use the minimum degree of control and force necessary. Sentries should be briefed thoroughly and given specific instructions for dealing with civilians. All personnel should be aware of the sensitive nature of issues surrounding an accident. Moreover, controls should be implemented to ensure that public affairs policy is strictly adhered to, and that requests for interviews and queries concerning the accident are referred to public affairs personnel. Civilians should be treated courteously, and in a helpful, but watchful manner. No one should be allowed to remove anything, nor touch any suspicious objects.
(6) Local civil authorities/officials should be asked to assist military personnel in preventing unauthorized entry and in removing unauthorized personnel who enter the NDA. Apprehension or arrest of civilian personnel who violate any security requirements at the NDA should normally be done by civilian authorities. If local civil authorities are unavailable, or refuse to give assistance, on-scene military personnel should apprehend and detain violators or trespassers. Disposition should be completed quickly following coordination with the legal officer. The Senior FEMA Official (SFO) should be notified of each apprehension and the actions taken. The security officer must ensure that actions of on-scene military personnel do not constitute a violation of the Posse Comitatus Act which prohibits use of DoD personnel to execute local, State, or Federal laws, unless authorized by the Constitution or an Act of Congress.

(7) When all government resources have been located, the OSC should consider reducing the size of the NDA. When all classified government resources have been removed, the NDA could be disestablished. Early coordination with State and local officials permits an orderly transfer of responsibility to State and local agencies when reducing or disestablishing the NDA.

c. Accidents Overseas. In the event of a nuclear incident/accident in a country outside the United States, the U.S. Government respects the sovereignty of the government of that country. Civil authorities there will be asked to establish a Security Area (Disaster Cordon) to restrict access and to provide for public safety. On and off-site authority at a nuclear weapon accident/incident rests with such Government officials/representatives except that the United States shall maintain custody of the weapon(s) and/or classified components.


(1) Sentry posts around the NDA should be in locations that enable guards to maintain good visual contact. This action prevents unauthorized persons from entering the NDA undetected between posts and ensures that none of the guards violate the two-man rule. Lighting should be provided, or guard spacing adjusted, to ensure that visual contact can be maintained at night. Each guard should have a means of summoning assistance, preferably a radio, or be in contact with someone who does. Consideration should be given in obtaining portable intrusion detection system sensors. This type of equipment will reduce security personnel requirements and the possibility of radiation exposure to them.

(2) During the initial emergency response, entry and exit of emergency units and other personnel may be largely uncontrolled. The security officer should recognize that during initial response, necessary life saving, fire suppression, and other emergency activities may temporarily take priority over security procedures. However, as response operations progress, standard security measures specified in DoD Directive 5210.41, reference (ad), must be enforced. As soon as possible, an entry control point should be established. When personnel from various Federal and/or civilian authorities/agencies arrive at the control point, leaders of the groups should be escorted to the operations center. An identification and badging system should be implemented, entry control logs established, and a record of all personnel entering the accident area made.

(3) A security operations center or control point should be established as the focal point for security operations and be located close to the entry control point. Its location should be fixed so that personnel become familiar with the location. Representatives of all participating law enforcement agencies should be located at the security operations center and able to communicate with their personnel.

(4) A security alert force should be considered, although early in the accident response, sufficient personnel may be unavailable to form such a force.

e. Security Considerations.

(1) Some components in nuclear weapons may reveal classified information by their shape, form, or outline. Specified classified components must be protected from sight and overhead photographic surveillance.

(2) Individuals with varying degrees of knowledge and appreciation for security requirements will assist in response operations. A comprehensive and effective information security program is available as outlined in DoD Directive 5200.1-R, reference (se), and should be promulgated in coordination with the DoE Team Leader. The content of the information security program should be briefed to everyone in the weapon recovery effort.

(3) Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information (CNWDI) access verification may have to be waived temporarily during the initial phases of accident response. When the urgency of the initial response is over and order has been established, compliance with DoD Directive 5210.2, AR 380-150, OPNAVINST 5510.1F, and AFR 205-1, references (af), (ag), and (ah), should prevail.

(4) The two-person policy is addressed in DoD and Service directives, and defined in the GLOSSARY. The
security officer must ensure that procedures provide for two-man rule compliance for all nuclear weapons and applicable components at the accident site.

(5) In the initial emergency response, Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) requirements may have to be waived due to a lack of PRP certified personnel. When certified personnel are available, they should be used in security positions which require them. Security personnel assigned to directly guard nuclear weapons and components must be PRP certified. PRP personnel should be used on the perimeter if available.

(6) An area should be available within the security perimeter where EOD and DoE personnel can discuss CNWDI related to weapon(s) recovery operations. Also, areas will be established for storage of classified documents, recovered weapons, and weapon components. The security officer must ensure that adequate security is provided for these areas.

(7) If a base camp is established to support the response operation, traffic control signs should be posted, law enforcement procedures developed, and a base camp entry control point established. Verification of vehicle trip authorization, restriction of curiosity seekers, access to the camp, and maintaining order and discipline within the camp may be parts of base camp security functions.

f. Military Intelligence. Intelligence personnel should be used to the fullest extent and incorporated actively in the overall security posture, including, but not limited to:

(1) Advice and assistance in counterintelligence to the OSC and security staff.

(2) Liaison and coordination with Federal, State, and local agencies and civilian authorities\{ officials, on threats to response operations (for example, hostile intelligence collection efforts and terrorist activities).

(3) Coordination and advice to the OSC and security staff regarding operations security.

(4) Investigating and reporting incidents of immediate security interest to the OSC and the security staff (in cooperation with the local Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

(5) Advice and assistance to the OSC and the security staff on matters of personnel and information security necessary to maintain high standards of security.

(6) Requests for large scale photographic coverage of the accident site.

13-6 ACCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX

The security annex should describe the responsibilities and procedures of the security forces. IRF and SRF forces may prepare an annex in advance which could be modified to fit the circumstances. The security annex should include:

a. Security operating procedures to include perimeter access/ entry procedures, establishing and maintaining a National Defense Area or Security Area, information security, rules of engagement, and use of deadly force.

b. Descriptions of the interface with Federal, State, and civilian law enforcement officials. Specific points of contact and phone numbers may be contained in a separate appendix to be expanded in the event of an accident.

c. Procedures for locating and operating the security operation center.

d. Guidance for handling unprotected personnel encountered in contaminated areas.

e. Procedures for coordinating with radiological control personnel to ensure that sentry posts outside the radiological control area are not affected by the resuspension of contaminants during wind shifts.

f. A description of the subversive/unfriendly threat, including an impact assessment on response operations; this and related information may be included in a separate intelligence annex.

g. Administrative and logistic requirements: for example, maintenance of entry logs and badges, expected amounts of rope, stanchions, and signs to establish and maintain the NDA, Security Area, such as special communications and clothing requirements.