5: geopolitical power calculations
a unique aspect of china's strategic assessments of the future security environment is the "scientific" method used to predict power relations among the major nations. Chinese ancient statecraft from the Warring States era focused on how a wise leader made strategy according to the power of his state. Sun Zi warned that the outcome of war depends on the correct assessment of power through calculations and estimates of enemy strengths and weaknesses. Consequently, more so than most Western futurists, Chinese authors want to forecast the future international status hierarchy. The means by which they make such strategic assessments is through the measurement and comparison of Comprehensive National Power (CNP).
CNP (zonghe guoli) refers to the combined overall conditions and strengths of a country in numerous areas. During the Cold War and the U.S.-Soviet confrontation, a nation's power was largely determined by military force, but in the current transition period, as the world moves toward multipolarity, military might is no longer the main defining factor of strength. Instead, elements such as economics and science and technology have become increasingly important in the competition for power and influence in the world. An evaluation of current and future strength requires the inclusion of a variety of factors, such as territory, natural resources, military force, economic power, social conditions, domestic government, foreign policy, and international influence. CNP is the aggregate of all these factors, as Deng Xiaoping stated: "In measuring a country's national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides." (493)
Chinese assessments of CNP are done both qualitatively, in general discussions of country strengths and weaknesses, as well as quantitatively, through the use of formulas to calculate numerical values of CNP. China's forecasts of CNP reject using gross national product (GNP) indexes or the measurement methods of national power used in the United States. Instead, Chinese analysts have developed their own extensive index systems and equations for assessing CNP. It will be seen that their analytical methods are not traditional Marxist-Leninist dogma or Western social science but something unique to China.
Several assessments of the current and future CNP of a number of nations are provided in this chapter, including estimations of the rank order in the future security environment of 2010 and 2020. The conflicting findings reflect the differences seen in chapters 1 and 2 about both the rate at which the world is moving toward multipolarity and the rate of decline of U.S. national power. For example, of the 20 authors introduced in this section, some authors write, "It is certain that the five major powers will be the focus of the world, but the relative strengths of the various poles will be unbalanced," (494) while others emphasize, "The strength and political gaps among the five powers are gradually getting closer." (495) This "debate" about CNP is also important to analysts of the RMA, because knowing a nation's CNP can determine which side will win a war and which side will better implement an RMA. (496) To sum up, the future CNP scores for major powers can help identify:
Although numerous authors make predictions about future CNP, few provide detailed accounts about the measurement and evaluation process. This chapter focuses on two studies that contain elaborate descriptions of how their assessments were conducted, and which represent the orthodox and reform views. After the following overview of the two abovementioned studies, the chapter is divided into four main sections:
To illustrate how China assesses CNP, the findings of two books published by the Academy of Military Science (AMS) are contrasted with those of a book by the civilian Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The publications of both institutes use premises established by Deng Xiaoping 15 years ago, and some of the authors were apparently directly involved with Deng's estimates. From AMS, this chapter draws on interviews with and the published work of Senior Colonel Huang Shuofeng. His orthodox findings differ from those presented in the reform assessment published by a team of CASS researchers. The reformers had as senior advisor noted author Gao Heng. According to interviews, Gao helped to invent the key Chinese concept of structural multipolarity, which he published in 1986, at the same time Deng Xiaoping's national security adviser announced the concept. (497)
The AMS books and the CASS book are similar in that they see America declining and an evolution toward a multipolar world, as the quantitative power gap between the United States and other major powers closes rapidly between 2000 and 2020. Additionally, they avoid describing the rise of China to superpower status. A decade ago, senior Chinese analysts pondered in public the implications of China's surpassing the United States; however, this is not mentioned by AMS or CASS authors. The publications of both institutes agree that China will, at most, become merely one pole among five equals, in spite of its much faster growth rate and much larger population and territory. Where the AMS and CASS books differ is mainly in how to assess the rate of China's rise and America's decline. They also differ in how they assess military power. By examining this "debate" about the future security environment, foreign observers can better understand how issues about the future are "argued" among both civilian and military analysts.
According to interviews in Beijing, the assessments of future power ratios by CASS and AMS are not projected beyond 2010 because to do so might aid the China Threat Theory. However, for this study, the AMS and CASS estimated growth rates and their baseline power scores for 2010 are used to project 2020 findings. It is apparent that CASS and AMS use very different rates--AMS growth estimates have China's CNP increasing seven times faster than the CASS pace; the CASS rate for Japan is also much slower. The CASS assessment has U.S. CNP decreasing 1 percent a year, to be overtaken by Japan, which is growing by 1 percent a year.
The estimates of the orthodox authors support the assertions of Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng that the multipolar world is approaching. By 2020, based on projected AMS scores, the United States and China will have roughly equal national power. However, the reform view published by the team from CASS predicts different results. Its CNP scores for the present suggest American unipolar superpower, not multipolarity. Projected CASS scores show that by 2020 Japan will be number one, followed closely by the United States, whereas China will still be only number eight in the world, not even one of the top major powers. China and Russia will be "half poles" because they will each have only about half the national power of Japan and America. These differences in CNP affect the debates discussed in other chapters of this study about which nations will be first to exploit the potential of an RMA.
Ancient Chinese Strategists as Antecedents
Although the phrase "Comprehensive National Power" did not itself come into existence until the 1980s, the concept has ancient cultural roots and "evolved from the concepts of 'power,' 'actual strength', and 'national power.' " (498) Although a number of authors cite Marxist-Leninist theory as a foundation for CNP studies, even earlier discussions of the need to compare the *overall power of different countries can be found in several Chinese ancient military classics. The studies of Herbert Goldhamer provide numerous examples of ancient Chinese strategists who emphasized the need to conduct calculations about the future. (499)
In his book Grand Strategy, Wu Chunqiu, a distinguished author at AMS, gives examples from Sun Zi's The Art of War, Wu Zi's The Art of War, and Guan Zhong's Guan Zi, to show how, "to a certain extent, the discussion of warfare in Chinese ancient literature embodies primitive, simple, and unsophisticated national power thought." (500) He explains, "In general, national power theories frequently (or above all) are closely related to issues of war." Therefore, measurements must include not only military strength but also other forces that have to do with carrying out a war. "China's wise ancient strategists," Wu writes, "never advocated relying only on military power to conquer the enemy, but emphasized combining military power with the nonmilitary power related to war in order to get the upper hand." Sun Zi advanced that there were "five things" and "seven stratagems" that governed the outcome of war. Weighing these components, which include politics, military affairs, economics, geography, and "subjective guidance," could forecast the results of a war in advance. Wu Zi writes about six conditions under which, if the other side's strength was greater, war should be avoided. Wu Chunqiu writes, "These six points include the factors of national territory, population, domestic embodiment power, the legal system, servants, the quantity and quality of troops, as well as international aid. Even in an assessment based on modern views, these factors are relatively complete and are the epitome of Comprehensive National Power." Finally, the "eight views" discussed in Guan Zi are areas that, when assessed, show the size, strength, and development of a country's national power.
One of the largest and most famous geopolitical coalitions in ancient Chinese history was based on power calculations similar to assessments of CNP. The director of the military research division of the General Staff Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Colonel Chai Yuqiu, recounts that in 334 B.C., during the Warring States era, the strategist Su Qin proposed that the six states of the vertical pillar of the strategic rectangle that made up the Warring States geopolitical game board unite against the hegemonic state of Qin. Su Qin explained that together, the land of the six nations was five times greater than the territory of Qin, and their combined military power was ten times greater than that of Qin. If the six nations united together to attack Qin, it would be destroyed. Su Qin successfully persuaded all six to "unite vertically" (he zong) to prevent their destruction, one by one, by Qin's hegemony. It was not until the next century that Qin's leading strategist was able to break up this coalition, which had been based on quantitative calculations of comparative power. (501)
According to Wu Chunqiu, the ancient Chinese stratagem of "victory without war" also has great relevance to the concept of CNP. The origin of the stratagem is a famous quotation from Sun Zi's The Art of War: "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill"--means, according to Wu, "Under certain military pressures, one can coordinate a political and diplomatic offensive, to psychologically disintegrate the enemy forces and subdue them." (502) Later, in Xun Zi and the works of other strategists, the concept is discussed further and condensed into "victory without war." Wu believes this strategy to achieve foreign policy goals without going to battle is even more applicable to the future security environment. He writes: "Victory without war does not mean that there is no war at all. The wars one must fight are political wars, economic wars, science and technology wars, diplomatic wars, etc. To sum up in a word, it is a war of Comprehensive National Power. Although military power is an important factor, in peacetime it usually acts as a backup force, and plays the role of invisible might."
Compared to China, American studies of the future neglect geopolitical hierarchy and the rank order of the great powers. One reason may be the noble hope that war and geopolitics have become obsolete. Western studies have warned that errors in assessing power may explain why wars occur and that it is extremely difficult to assess geopolitical power accurately. (503) An almost poetic account is from the remark by the great English statesman, Lord Bolingbroke:
A precise point at which the scales of power turn . . . is imperceptible to common observation . . . they who are in the rising scale do not immediately feel their strength, nor assume that confidence in it which successful experience gives them afterwards. They who are the most concerned to watch the variations of this balance, misjudge often in the same manner and from the same prejudices. They continue to dread a power no longer able to hurt them, or they continue to have no apprehensions of a power that grows daily more formidable. (504)
The Chinese focus on geopolitical calculation makes it crucial to them to have good estimates of the future. The idea of measuring and comparing CNP developed during the early 1980s, as Deng Xiaoping modified Chairman Mao's party line that "world war was unavoidable," by instead predicting that "world war probably can be avoided." (505) The Marxist-Leninist "foundation" of Deng's new assessment of the security environment was that "the growth of the world's forces of peace exceed the growth of the forces of war." Not only were the United States and the Soviet Union at a stalemate in their military struggle, but the strength of countries that were opposed to war was increasing. The international environment was changing, and the importance of economic issues and conflicts was growing. Military force was no longer the main index for judging a country's strength. Numerous other factors contributed to a country's power and were playing a greater role in warfare, such as economics, science and technology, and popular will. There needed to be a means for measuring the sum of the "forces restricting war," which included China. Deng wrote:
If at the end of the new century China attains a "comparatively well off level," then there will be a major increase in the power restricting war. If China again goes through thirty to fifty years of construction, and comes close to the level of developed countries, then at that time it will be even harder for a war to be fought. (506)
In order to make more accurate assessments about the future balance of power, country strength had to be evaluated in a variety of areas.
Zhu Liangyin and Meng Renzhong of AMS write, "Deng Xiaoping used keen foresight and . . . established the theoretical basis for the emergence and formation of his Comprehensive National Power theory." (507) While Zhu and Meng never once quote Deng using the specific phrase "Comprehensive National Power," they set forth his "thought" on the subject, through analysis of his statements on the priorities of China's national construction and the significance of this development to the growth of China's strategic power. Deng's views that economic strength can be a force for peace and can counter military strength are used to show that "economic power is the most important and most essential factor in Comprehensive National Power." They go on to state that "Deng Xiaoping believes that military power is the basic means for ensuring that economic power will rise, protecting the nation's general interests, and carrying out global strategic goals. Therefore, while we on the one hand emphasize economic power as being the base of Comprehensive National Power, we must on the other hand devote ourselves to the development of military power, the element with the most direct role in Comprehensive National Power."
Zhu and Meng write that science and technology are considered to be "the guiding force in raising Comprehensive National Power." (508) This is established through Deng's emphasis on the need for scientific and technological research and advancement in the military and economic arenas. They claim Deng further developed the sacred classics of Marxist-Leninism by adding his unique idea of the "primary" productive role of science and technology. "Marx talked about science and technology being a productive force and this is very accurate, but perhaps today saying it that way is not sufficient, I think that they are the primary productive force."
Deng Xiaoping's new assessment of the security environment required a means to compare China to other countries. According to a book by Senior Colonel Huang Shuofeng of AMS, the specific phrase "Comprehensive National Power" was put forward by Colonel Huang himself as he worked with Deng. In On Comprehensive National Power, Huang describes how, in 1984, as part of a study on China's national defense strategy in the year 2000, Chinese scholars looked at the "national power equations" of Ray Cline and the West German professor William Fuchs as possible ways in which to analyze the international balance of power. After rejecting them based on their use of the concept of "power politics," the absence in their equations of a way to evaluate the role of science and technology, and other issues, Chinese scholars began to create their own models and formulas for weighing and contrasting different countries' overall power. Colonel Huang writes that in 1984 he "put forward the concept of 'Comprehensive National Power,' and established a 'Comprehensive National Power dynamic equation' model aimed at comprehensively assessing the comprehensive power of different countries in the world, and conducted comparative analysis of the major countries Comprehensive National Power." (509)
In observing the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party, a clue about how important something is can come from the strained efforts to justify its creation with appeals to precedents from the sacred Marxist classics. It appears that Comprehensive National Power is sufficiently important to merit such claims. Colonel Huang Shuofeng cites Marx, Engels, and Mao as precedents for "guiding thoughts on studying Comprehensive National Power" and its relationship to warfare, (510) emphasizing Engels' discussion in Anti-Duhring on the important role of economics and other factors in military force. Huang also mentions Lenin's statement, "War is a test of every nation's complete economic and organizational power," and writes that Lenin's theory, "using the language of today," would be that war "is a test of every country's Comprehensive National Power." (511)
According to Colonel Huang, Chairman Mao Zedong also contributed to the development of the concept of CNP through his "strategy of grasping the situation as a whole," which applied Marxist-Leninist theory to China's military strategy. In his writings, Mao not only emphasized the role of concrete material components, such as military and economic power, in affecting the balance of power, but also the function of spiritual components, in particular the influence of leaders and popular will. In "Strategic Issues in China's Revolutionary War," he wrote, "Victory or defeat in war is mainly determined by both side's various military, political, economic and natural conditions; this is not an issue. However, it is not simply just that, it is also determined by the subjective leadership capabilities of both sides in combat." (512) Both Huang and Wu Chunqiu laud Mao's On Protracted Warfare for its comprehensive comparison of China's and Japan's strengths during World War II and praised Mao's 1956 speech, "On the Ten Relationships," which was "a complete guide to strengthening Comprehensive National Power." (513)
The close connection between warfare and national power, which formed the basis of earlier Chinese strategic theory on the subject, of course remains a prominent issue today. However, because the foundation and means for exerting one's power and influence have diversified, because conflicts between countries are more focused on nonmilitary issues, and because they can be resolved through diplomatic and economic channels, Chinese scholars in a number of disciplines, both military and nonmilitary, today use the concept of CNP to make assessments in their particular areas. CNP scores can aid "warfare" today in general terms in an "all directional economic war," (514) and more specifically in future warfare to predict "who is capable of winning a victory in a new RMA war." (515)
The basis of a discussion on employing the framework of CNP to analyze the outcome of future wars in The New Revolution in Military Affairs and High-technology Warfare, by Li Qingshan, a People's Liberation Army (PLA) colonel, is highly similar to the arguments put forward by China's ancient strategists. Sun Zi and Wu Zi both discussed how victory or defeat in war can be known in advance if a comparison is done of certain factors that contribute to a country's strengths. Li Qingshan agrees: "Through the analysis of belligerent countries' Comprehensive National Power, even before a war has begun, people can frequently know the results in advance." (516) However, Li adds that power changes during a war, because "Comprehensive National Power is a relatively dynamic concept." As a war develops, fluctuations and transformations will inevitably occur in the strengths and functions of the various component factors. Li states, "The outcome of war to a very large extent is determined by the contrast of the actual strength and potential of the two sides before the war begins, but what plays a direct role in the outcome of the war are the changes that take place in this comparison of forces during the process of military operations, as well as the results of diplomatic struggles, ideological struggles, and economic struggles."
Li's book asserts that the RMA will not override previously existing premises for making strategic assessments. Li claims that high-technology weaponry "can change the appearance of warfare, but it cannot change the laws of victory in warfare. Victory or defeat in war is, of course, related to the technological means used by the belligerents, but it is not the sole relationship. Historically, in numerous wars the victors have been both those who have technically inferior weaponry and those who have technically superior weaponry. Technology is not the only factor determining victory or defeat in war." (517) Li links the RMA to CNP. Lenin wrote, "War is a test of every nation's complete economic and organizational power," which Li asserts means that new RMA warfare "is still a comprehensive test of the level of countries' strength."
During development of the RMA, Li believes that CNP will continue to be composed of a country's strength in five major areas--politics, economics, military affairs, science and technology, and foreign affairs--each of which he discusses with regard to its influence and role in war. Beginning with political affairs, he states, "Warfare is the continuation of politics and reflects a country's strategic intentions, the desires of the people, organizational ability, and decision making ability." (518) According to Li, if a country's decisionmaking, organizational capability, or strategy is weak, unfocused, or defective, these factors will outweigh "actual" strength in determining the outcome of a war. Popular will expressed in opposition to a war can also reduce "actual" power. Pure military power "is warfare's most direct material force, it includes people, weaponry, strategy and tactics, organization and command, as well as various safeguards, etc. It is the most basic factor determining victory or defeat in war, and strength or weakness in any area will have a major role in war." Of course, in future RMA warfare, where "the entire process of war is permeated by the contest and match of technology," the extent of a country's scientific and technological development will be of major importance in attaining victory. (519)
While Li Qingshan views the component factors of CNP from the perspective of their relevance to warfare, authors Tong Fuquan and Liu Yichang analyze them with more economic issues in mind. Tong and Liu's interest in evaluating and comparing countries' CNP stems from the role it plays in world conflicts and rivalries over "science and technology, industrialization, foreign trade, finance, and natural resources." (520) They divide CNP into four major parts--economics, politics, science and technology, and military affairs--placing economics in the most crucial position. "Actual economic strength," they write, "is, of course, the major component part of Comprehensive National Power, and to a certain extent, a country's actual economic strength represents its Comprehensive National Power." The other three areas are not discussed as independent factors but with regard to their relationship to economics.
Concerning politics, Tong and Liu write, "In general, political power and actual economic strength are linked together." (521) They believe a country with strong economic power will have powerful political influence, and a nation with unsubstantial economic strength will not have major political influence. However, they do grant an exception for Japan, whose great economic strength does not translate into a strong role in international political affairs. A similar relationship exists between the extent of a country's economic strength and the level of its scientific and technological development. While the authors recognize the importance of military power, they assess it based on its connection to the other factors:
Actual military strength also is an area that can not be lacking in Comprehensive National Power; if a country's military power is not strong, it is out of the question that this country could have powerful Comprehensive National Power. In general, the size of military expenditures is both a reflection of whether a country's actual military strength is strong or weak, and an important sign of whether its economy is powerful, additionally, the development of military technology is related to actual scientific and technological strength. Therefore, in a certain sense, the enhancement of actual military strength is a strong symbol of a country's powerful Comprehensive National Power. (522)
Strategy and Structure
Sun Zi's emphasis on the importance of knowing and then attacking an opponent's strategy has also found its way into the study of CNP. "Prospects for the New World Structure," by Xi Runchang of AMS, is an effort to predict the future world structure based on each area that contributes to Comprehensive National Power--strategy, population and national territory, military affairs, economics, and international influence. However, in his discussion on evaluating and comparing CNP, Xi does emphasize an area of definite significance to his discipline--the less concrete component factors, especially strategy. Xi explains that his particular stress on the importance of strategy does not ignore the position of the other components, but is "done in order to give prominence to this important area that people often overlook." (523) According to Xi, national strategies need to be evaluated in three aspects:
Today, the United States, Europe, and Japan, because of their "overwhelmingly ambitious" goals and because they have moved quickly to implement their strategies, are ahead of other countries. "By comparison, Russia and China, particularly Russia, are especially slow in the area of action. In a certain sense, this is an important reason why, in today's international competition, Russia and China are in defensive positions, or are said to have been late to enter the ranks of the major competing nations." (527)Grand Strategy
In Grand Strategy, Wu Chunqiu, of AMS, views the relationship between a country's strategy and CNP somewhat differently than Xi. He argues that CNP and grand strategy have an "unbreakable internal connection" of a "dual nature." (528) On the one hand, CNP is wielded to attain the goals of grand strategy, but on the other, because this requires strong CNP, its development becomes one of the aims of grand strategy. Wu therefore does not consider strategy to be a component of CNP. Rather, he breaks the main factors and their functions down in the following manner: "In the current age when peace and development have become the main trends in the world, numerous countries, to different degrees, recognize that economics are the foundation; science and technology, especially high technology, are the guide; education is the guide of the guide; national defense is the backup force; and national policies are the key factor playing a unifying and coordinating role."
Not only can studies of CNP aid a country in making strategic assessments of the international situation, but they also are an important tool for analyzing a country's own strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, Wu explains that countries can learn from mistakes made by other countries by analyzing the development of both their national strategy and Comprehensive National Power. Like many Chinese authors, Wu cites the collapse of the Soviet Union as an example of a policy failure in the CNP competition.
What exactly are the specific components of CNP? Some Chinese authors discuss CNP only in a qualitative sense, dividing it into a few broad areas. Others, however, engage in quantitative analysis with detailed definitions of the contents of CNP. Authors share certain factors, but there are also discrepancies. Wu Chunqiu writes, "Because different countries' national conditions are not the same and researcher's personal goals are different, interpretations of the concept of national power vary. In the broadest sense, a country's power includes natural factors and social (manmade) factors; it includes material factors (hard national power) and spirit factors (soft national power); it includes actual strength, as well as potential and the mechanism for turning potential into actual strength. It is all encompassing." (529) Two books propose quantitative approaches: Comparative Studies of the Comprehensive National Power of the World's Major Nations, by a team of analysts coordinated by Wang Songfen, of CASS, and On Comprehensive National Power, by Senior Colonel Huang Shuofeng, of AMS.
The CASS Index Framework
The current Foreign Minister of Russia once headed the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IMEMO), an influential Russian research institution. Since the 1950s, China has had its own IMEMO, the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), within CASS. Comparative Studies of the Comprehensive National Power of the World's Major Nations is the product of a group of researchers in the Office of Statistics and Analysis at IWEP. Published in December 1996, the book puts forward a detailed dissection of the characteristics and roles of the CNP component factors; describes measurement methods to evaluate them; and provides extensive data tables from the results of examining the CNP of 18 countries. The authors define their subject matter carefully:
We believe that Comprehensive National Power is the organic sum of the different powers of a sovereign state during a certain period of time, it is the base which all countries rely on for existence and development, and it is the foundation on which world powers establish their international position and give full play to their influence and roles. Specifically, it is the condensed sum of the entire calculations of societies' various existence and development factors at a certain time, space, and under certain conditions." (530)
The book divides CNP into eight major areas: natural resources, domestic and foreign economics, science and technology, military affairs, government and foreign affairs capability, and social development. Three of the basic principles on which the authors relied to determine the above eight general factors include the following:
In order to objectively assess the CNP of different countries, CASS needed measurable, unified standards. To this end, they sought (for each of the eight component factors) a set of specific indexes. The creation of an index system capable of evaluating countries at different development levels and with varying social, political, and economic systems meant that the indexes selected had to be general enough to be applicable to the diverse nations of the world; be representative of all the factors that constitute Comprehensive National Power; and have data sources that were systematic and feasible. The authors wanted to include "both indexes for total amount, and indexes for amount per person; both quantity indexes and quality indexes; both efficiency indexes and consumption indexes." (532) Additionally, structural indexes were necessary in order to demonstrate the interrelations and inter-reliance of the different factors. Consequently, the authors divided the eight major areas into 64 indexes (table 3).
Man Power Resources: total population; life expectancy; the proportion of the economically active population in the total population; the number of university students per 10,000 people
Land Resources: the area of national territory; the area of cultivatable territory; the area in forest
Mineral Resources (reserves): iron; copper; bauxite
Energy Resources (reserves): coal; crude oil; natural gases; water energy
Economic Activities Capability
Actual Economic Strength (total): gross domestic product (GDP); industry production capability (electric energy production, steel output, cement output, logs output); food supply capability (total grain output, degree of self-sufficiency in grain); energy supply capability ( volume of energy production, volume of energy consumption, crude oil processing capability); total cotton output
Actual Economic Strength (per person): GDP per person; industry production capability (electric energy production, steel output, cement output, logs output); food supply capability (total grain output, average calories per person); energy supply capability (volume of energy consumption)
Production Efficiency: social labor production rate; industry labor production rate, agriculture labor production rate
Material Consumption Level: volume of energy consumption based on GDP calculations
Structure: the proportion of the tertiary industry in the GDP
Foreign Economic Activities Capability
Total import and export trade; total import trade, total export trade
Total international reserves; international reserves (not including gold); gold reserves
Science and Technology Capability
Proportion of research and development in the GDP; number of scientists and engineers; the number of scientists and engineers per 1,000 people; proportion of machinery and transportation equipment exports in total exports; proportion of high-technology intensive exports in total exports
Social Development Level
Education Level: education expenditures per person; proportion of people studying in higher education; proportion of people studying in secondary school education
Cultural Level: adult literacy rate; number of people per one thousand who get a daily newspaper
Health Care Level: health care expenditures per person; number of people doctors are responsible for; number of people nurses are responsible for
Communications: number of people who have a telephone per 100 people
Urbanization: Proportion of the urban population in the total population
Number of military personnel; military expenditures; weapons exports; nuclear weapons (the number of nuclear launchers; the number of nuclear warheads)
Government Regulation and Control Capability
Proportion of final government consumption expenditures in the GDP; proportion of central government expenditures in the GDP; investigation through interviews asking nine questions
Foreign Affairs Capability
Uses ten factors in a "nerve network model" to carry out a broad assessment.
The AMS Index System
On Comprehensive National Power, by Colonel Huang Shuofeng, provides a detailed analysis of the major component factors of CNP and their numerous indexes. Huang writes, "Comprehensive National Power research is done in order to accurately analyze the international strategic situation and evaluate the comprehensive power of enemy states, allies, and one's own country for the purpose of scientifically planning one's own national strategic decision making." (533) Only relying on theoretical research is therefore inadequate for making this sort of assessment, and instead systems theory and mathematical methods must be utilized to develop qualitative and quantitative analysis. Consequently, Huang's objective in creating an index system is to "completely and systematically" describe the characteristics and development conditions of a country's CNP "in order to carry out scientific quantitative analysis."
Huang describes CNP as a large, complex system composed of many levels or subsystems, within which there are numerous interlinked component factors. He divides the CNP index system into four major index subsystems--the material power (hard) index subsystem, the spirit power (soft) index subsystem, the coordinated power index subsystem, and the environmental index subsystem:
The material power and spirit power indexes mainly reflect a country's needed strength for existence and development; the coordinated power index mainly reflects the leadership mechanism's organization, command, management, and decisionmaking levels; and the environmental index mainly reflects the restricting conditions of Comprehensive National Power." (534)
Material power is made up of the hard factors, natural resources, economics, science and technology, and national defense. However, Huang explains, even the hard factors contain some aspects that are soft in nature, but for the purpose of analysis they are designated to a subsystem based on their dominant characteristic. For example, when viewed overall, national defense is a hard factor, but a few of its components, such as national defense ideology and military theory, are not. The "spiritual (including psychological) and intellect power soft factors" that "determine the effectiveness of the material form (hard) national power" include politics, foreign affairs, and culture and education. (535)
The coordinated power index subsystem is important because, in order for CNP to develop effectively, the factors that constitute material and spirit power "require macro adjustment and control, and coordinated develop-ment." (536) These functions are important both at the national level as well as at the lower levels of the specific areas. Although some of the soft power factors are contained both in their own system as well as in the coordinated power index, they operate differently in the capacity of the latter. As "spiritual" factors they influence the material form factors, but within the coordinated power index they regulate the relationship between the hard and soft factors. Finally, the environment index subsystem comprises three parts, the international environment (the world structure and the different balances of power), the natural environment (a country's natural resources, as well as its geographic and ecological conditions), and social environment (the political, economic and social systems and their stability). These three areas greatly influence, both negatively and positively, the development of all the other factors.
Each of the components of the major subindexes is itself a sub-subindex, and together they all form what Huang refers to as a CNP appraisal index system. For each of these sub-subindexes, he provides detailed lists of their contents, but only four of Huang's lists are seen here for comparison, two from the soft factor side, and two from the hard factor side:
After listing the above specific indexes, Huang writes, "The Comprehensive National Power index system is the concrete embodiment of the concept of Comprehensive National Power; it also is the qualitative basis for appraising Comprehensive National Power," and therefore is the foundation for his "Comprehensive National Power dynamic equation," which will be discussed later. (538) Before setting forth this equation, Huang first arranges his index system into a network structure so that it can be more easily quantified. However, in this diagram, "The Structural Network of the Comprehensive National Power System," Huang outlines national defense power differently. He breaks it down into direct military power and indirect military power. Direct military power includes measures of nuclear forces and conventional forces. The components of the latter are: total armed manpower; soldier quality; weapons effectiveness; military installations and logistics support; organizational quality; strategic reserve capability; and the extent of weapons acquisitions.
Chinese authors explicitly criticize foreign quantitative analysis methods. Three foreign formulas for assessing CNP frequently mentioned, both negatively and positively, are those created by Ray Cline, William Fuchs, and the Japan Economic Planning Department, Comprehensive Planning Office, in a study entitled Japan's Comprehensive National Power.
As noted earlier, according to Huang Shuofeng, Deng Xiaoping asked Chinese scholars in 1984 to analyze the future security environment, as part of a study on China's national defense strategy for the year 2000. They first examined existing Western formulas, but Huang rejected Cline's "national power equation" because it does not include a way to evaluate science and technology power; it is a static equation and therefore does not assess the variations in and development of a country's CNP over time; and Cline's means for judging the soft, intangible factors are not objective or unified. Huang finds fault with William Fuchs' formula because it measures only the hard material factors and completely ignores the soft ones. The Japanese study, done in 1987, is criticized by the authors of The World's All Directional Economic War, Tong Fuquan and Liu Yichang, because its index system and calculation methods are narrow and unscientific. They write that the research of the Japanese group was "done in order to serve the Japanese Government's established guiding principles and policy." (539)
As is common in China's assessment techniques, part of the foreigners' concepts may be borrowed. For example, in "Prospects for the New World Structure," in order to make "an objective and unassuming assessment" of Comprehensive National Power, Xi Runchang used Ray Cline's national power equation, P = (C+E+M) × (S+W). In the formula,
P stands for national power
C refers to population and territory
E is economic power
M stands for military power
S refers to national strategy
W is national will. (540)
In great contrast to General Huang's comments, Xi believe's Cline's standards to be "relatively objective," including the standards for the soft factors, such as strategy, which is one of Xi's main areas of focus. CASS, for one of their measurement techniques (which will be explained in greater detail later), not only adapts aspects of Cline's method but combines it with features of the Japanese study.
One foreign study on the analysis and measurement of national power that is not criticized by Chinese analysts is the International Competitive Power Report, a yearly study conducted by the World Economic Forum and the Swiss Lausanne Management Institute. (A few Chinese institutes and university departments even contribute to it.) The Chinese periodical Strategy and Management praises the report, saying that it is "an important foundation which different countries' government circles and business circles refer to when making policy decisions, and has extensive authoritativeness." (541) Beginning in 1996, the magazine stated that each year it would publish the portion of the report showing the rank order of China's international competitive standing according to the various power indexes. (542)
The CASS Weighted Index Plan
The researchers in the CASS Office of Statistics and Analysis at IWEP divide their measurement of CNP into two stages, the basic plan and the weighted plan.
The Basic Plan. The 64 indexes the researchers set forth as standards for evaluating CNP vary in size and character, so the basic plan is composed of several calculation methods, in order to cover and suit all of them. First, the data from the hard indexes are standardized through index calculation methods, which "combine R. S. Cline's comprehensive calculation method of assigning values and the comprehensive index calculation method used in Japan's Comprehensive National Power." (543) Afterwards, it is separated into calculated unit values. The hard indexes are divided into two groups, direct indexes (those directly related to GDP growth per person) and indirect indexes (those inversely related to GDP growth per person). The former set take the biggest value as 100, the latter set takes the lowest value as 100 to "successively calculate the deserved value of the different countries for those indexes." An investigation method of posing questions to specialists is utilized in the case of some of the intangible soft factors not easily measured. For example, in order to assess government regulation and control, the researchers asked some of the participants at the 1994 China World Economic Institute annual meeting questions about 9 aspects of government regulation and control in 18 countries.
The answers from 59 specialists, scholars, and professors then underwent a computerized analysis. For foreign affairs, another soft factor, the group "designed a nerve network model with ten factors related to capability in foreign affairs activities--population, territory, natural resources, military affairs, economics, science and technology, politics, ideology, system of organization, and image--to make assessments and obtained vague data of the different countries' foreign affairs capabilities; afterwards the data were standardized." For all the standardized data, "a standardized, differentiated levels collection method was adopted to obtain the basic plan data model." Based on these different methods, the researchers calculated the numerical value of the 64 indexes, the eight major areas, and the CNP for 18 countries in the years 1970, 1980, and 1990. Looked at statically, the results can be used to compare the CNP of different countries; viewed dynamically, the results show the changes in a country's CNP over time.
The Weighted Plan. Certain problems and distortions arise, however, when calculations are made under the basic plan; this necessitates "appropriate revision [of the calculation techniques] through weighted methods." (544) First, those countries with extensive natural resources and comparatively small populations, such as Canada and Australia, receive high values of CNP that do not correspond to their actual economic strength and role in world affairs. Such results arise because in those countries per-person rates of a variety of economic and social factors are fairly high. Second, when assessing CNP, the authors assert it must be recognized that the importance and role of the various factors change over time. For example, during war, even during the Cold War, military strength and the various factors that contribute to it are the most crucial components of CNP. However, during peacetime, economic development, foreign trade, and social development rise in prominence. "Therefore, based on different time periods and different missions, revisions need to be made and weights need to be assigned to ensure the research conclusions are scientific and objective." Last, not only is the number of indexes in each of the eight major areas not equal--natural resources has fourteen, while foreign economic capability has only two--but each index, regardless of its value or importance, is allotted the same weight. Consequently, in the second stage of CNP measurement, the quantitative results of the basic plan are revised through qualitative analysis, by assigning weights to both the eight major component factors and their specific indexes.
In general, the researchers determined the weighted coefficients (table 4) for the different indexes based on the following principles:
|National Power Factor||Weighted Coefficient|
Economic activities capability
Foreign economic activities capability
Scientific and technological capability
Social development level
Government regulation and control capability
Foreign affairs capability
Source: Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu (Comparative studies of the comprehensive national power of the world's major nations)(Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996), 169.
Additionally, the different indexes within each of the major factors are also assigned weights. As examples, within the science and technology factor, the index for proportion of research and development in the GDP and the index for technology personnel both have weighted coefficients of 0.30; the index for the proportion of machinery and transportation equipment exports in total exports and the index for the proportion of high-technology intensive exports in total exports are both 0.20. All four indexes constituting the military factor--the number of military personnel, military expenditures, weapons exports, and nuclear weapons--are assigned equal weights of 0.25.
National Power Factors
Foreign Economic Activities
Science & Technology
National Power Factors
Government Regulation and Control
Source: Source: Source: Wang , ed., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu (Comparative studies of the comprehensive national power of the world's major nations)(Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996), 171-179.
Based on these weighted revisions and using the data generated for the 64 indexes under the basic plan, the numerical value of the eight major areas and then total CNP is recalculated for the 18 nations for the years 1970, 1980, and 1990. The results are shown in table 5. Under the basic plan, the authors write that the guiding principle was to "seek truth from facts," and the data reflected "the natural appearance of overall Comprehensive National Power and its objectives." (546) However, the combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis in the second stage of measurement causes "the results of the calculations to be closer to the specific national conditions of the different countries, making them more reliable and believable." (547)
Forecasted Weighted Plan. The researchers at CASS evaluated CNP for 1970, 1980, and 1990 and also made forecasts of what the CNP of the 18 nations will be in the years 2000 and 2010. Based on the principles of the weighted plan, they predicted the potential future role and influence of the different component factors and adjusted their weighted coefficients accordingly. Because of the growing significance of science and technology, education, and communications, the weighted coefficients for science and technology and social development level were raised from 0.15 to 0.17 and from 0.10 to 0.12, respectively. The natural resources category had the greatest reduction, from 0.08 to 0.06. Both government control and regulation capability, as well as foreign affairs capability, were reduced by 0.01 to weighted coefficients of 0.07, and the weights allotted to the two economic factors and military affairs capability remain the same. Once again, the data from the basic plan are taken as the base; using the new weighted coefficients, as well as data from projections of the 18 countries' GDP in 2000 and 2010, forecasts of future CNP are calculated. The projected CASS CNP scores and the CASS qualitative assessments of the future role and development of individual countries are discussed at the end of this chapter.
The AMS Dynamic Equation
Compared to the researchers at CASS, Huang Shuofeng of AMS provides a much more detailed analysis of his measurement and calculation methods for CNP, including outlines of a number of his specific equations. As can be seen from the discussion in the previous section on Huang's CNP index system, he views CNP to be a large multilayered system composed of a number of interlinked subsystems and sub-subsystems. This complex system forms the framework for his calculation methods.
However, in establishing his equation, Huang also emphasizes another characteristic of CNP--that it continually evolves. He writes, "Comprehensive national power not only changes with the passage of time and transformations in the world structure, but also through the interchange of energy flows, material flows and information flows of science and technology, economics, and foreign affairs, within the international environment." (548) Therefore, in order to best assess the developments and variations in CNP, a type of "motion equation" is needed. Based on the principles of systems theory, coordinated studies, and dynamics studies, Huang summed up: "The interconnections, inter-restrictions and interactions between the numerous subsystems must be analyzed to find the quantitative relations, and in order to arrange the entire system's evolution dynamic equation;" calculations are made using various methods; the results are used to compare the CNP of the different countries; and predictions are made about future trends in the "international Comprehensive National Power contest." Not surprisingly, Colonel Huang generates final calculations quite different from his civilian colleagues at CASS.
The CNP Function. Colonel Huang defines the growth and development process of CNP as "the process of taking a group of factors and turning them into output, under fixed domestic and foreign environments, and natural conditions." This process can be depicted numerically through a "Comprehensive National Power function":
Yt = F (x1, x2, ..., xn; t)
In the equation:
the CNP n component factors are x1, x2, ..., xn
the amount of their inputs is combined, and the output volume--the
CNP--is represented by Yt
t is the variable for time
x1, x2, ..., xn are functions of t.
According to Huang, because this equation shows the relationship between the input amount of the individual component factors and the total volume of output, it is "in keeping with the universal relations principle in the Marxist materialist dialectics theory system." In materialist dialectics theory, every material thing is an independent object, but through its connections and interaction with other objects it becomes a part of a "unified whole." Including too many component factors with their extensive data and numerous interconnections would make the national power function very complicated. Huang thus simplifies the function by using "macro variables . . . with the biggest roles in the allocation, control, and guidance of comprehensive national output Yt." He selects three of the four major index subsystems from his CNP index system to be the variables: hard variables, represented by Ht ; soft variables, indicated by St; and coordinated variables, depicted by Kt. The new national power function is then written:
Yt = F (Ht, St, Kt)
So that calculations can be made using this new form of the national power function, it is rewritten using Newton's third law, where × F = kma:
Yt = Kt × (Ht)a × (St)b
In the above function:
Ht stands for the "mass" of CNP
St represents the "acceleration" of CNP
Kt is the coordinated coefficient
a is the "hard elasticity index"
b is the "soft elasticity index."
The two elasticity indexes establish country conditions in two basic areas: whether a country is a developed or developing nation (), and whether a country is at war or has unrest, or whether it is at peace and is stable (). Because and can really be only imprecisely calculated, "vague mathematics" are used to determine them. The above final form of the national power function shows how a country generates CNP by combining the input amounts of the component factors. Huang writes, "This establishes the basis for measuring and assessing Comprehensive National Power. However, the measurement of the Comprehensive National Power dynamic evolution process, requires studying the Comprehensive National Power dynamic equation." (549)
The Main CNP Dynamic Equation. Before setting forth his main equation, Huang explains that CNP is a complex system with many subsystems, with nonlinear interaction. "Therefore, when using dissipation structure theory to analyze the evolution and development process of the Comprehensive National Power system, you must use a nonlinear differential equation." Such an equation is:
Yt stands for the national power function at time t
refers to the national power yearly growth rate
M is "the greatest value for a system variable that the environment (international, domestic and natural) will permit."
Just as the CNP system has numerous subsystems and sub-subsystems, so too, does the CNP dynamic equation have several layers of equations. Although Huang does not explain them all, he provides examples of subequations for population growth, gross national product, national income growth, scientific and technological power, and national defense power. Following is a discussion of the national defense power equation. (550)
National Defense Power Subequation. Huang believes that national defense power refers to both actual and potential defense power and includes not only military power but also various related factors from political, economic, and scientific and technological power. Consequently, national defense power has a number of different subequations. The formula he provides as an example is for military power, which he divides into strategic and conventional force. The former is "assessed on the basis of the composite index of the structure of attack forces, means of delivery and nuclear warheads' quantity and quality (precision, reliability, existence rate, tufang rate), and nuclear defense capability." The latter is "determined by troop combat ability, strategic maneuverability, and the extent of armament efforts." The equation is:
Mt indicates conventional military force in period t
mt indicates the total number of troops in period t
a1 indicates soldier quality
a2 indicates weapons effectiveness
a3 indicates logistics supplies and facilities quality
a4 indicates organization and command quality
bt indicates strategic reserve capabilities in period t
ct indicates the extent of armament efforts in period t.
A country's military power also can be measured by using the two indexes of military expenditures and military capital.
Total military capital (including weapons and facilities) is calculated by adding the past military investment depreciation surplus total to that year's new investment total. Its equation is:
Kt = (1-d) Kt - 1 + It
In the formula:
Kt indicates total military capital during time t
d indicates the depreciation rate
It indicates total military investment during time t.
Then total military investment It can be calculated through its proportion in that year's gross national product. Its equation is:
It = S × GNPt
In the formula, S indicates, in year t, the new military investment total's proportion of that year's GNPt."(551)
Four Assessment and Measurement Methods. After detailing his "Comprehensive National Power dynamic equation" and several of its subequations, Huang outlines four different assessment and measurement methods for evaluating CNP: the index number method, used to compute the hard factors of the dynamic equation; a specialist evaluation method, for the soft factors; weighted coefficients, assigned to the coordinated factors; and a vague judgment method, to assess some of the undetermined factors. Under the index number method, after the data have been generated through the different subequations of the CNP dynamic equation, index numbers are established for it. These index numbers are set based upon a unified ratio, in which the value of the U.S. data from each equation is given the index number of 100. The indexes of the other countries are then set accordingly. Afterward, using the new indexes, the CNP of the different countries is calculated using the national power function. The results of Huang's calculations are shown in table 6.
Huang also projects the future Comprehensive National Power of countries; however, the only explanation he provides of his methods is: "In order to forecast the future world strategic structure, we used the Comprehensive National Power developments equation model, using the 'leading trend analysis method' to make calculations." (552)
Calculating the Rise and Decline of Nations
In his second book, On the Rise and Fall of Nations, Colonel Huang Shuofeng further develops his qualitative and quantitative analysis of CNP in order to show its role in the prosperity and decline of nations. He writes, "The strengths and weaknesses of CNP are the measures for the rise and fall of nations," and uses the above discussed "Comprehensive National Power dynamic equation" as the starting point for conducting his new assessments. (553) Huang's explanation of his original equation is almost identical to that laid out in On Comprehensive National Power, except that he gives further details regarding the science and technology power subequation. Before elaborating on how the "Comprehensive National Power equation" can be expanded upon to measure the rise and fall of nations, Huang calculates the 1996 scores of overall CNP and its various factors for six countries. Unfortunately, he did not make any predictions about the future CNP for the different countries, as he did in his previous book. The results of his new quantitative analysis of the United States, Japan, Germany, Russia, China, and India differ from those he derived 7 years before. A clear trend is that (as a percentage of the U.S. score) the CNP of all countries analyzed is growing faster than was predicted in 1989. A comparison of Huang's statistics from his two books is shown in table 7.
The original "Comprehensive National Power dynamic equation" measures only a country's strength at a given time; it does not indicate how the level of this power and its component factors influence a country's development and well being. Its numerical results allow for the comparison of CNP for different countries, but they do not illustrate the outcome of the interaction and competition between these countries. In setting forth his new "rise and fall of national power equation," Huang explains that the CNP system is "just like the organic world, it is a competitive and developing evolutionary process, where both vigorous and declining phenomenon exist." (554) The goal of the new equation is to quantitatively analyze this "competitive and developing evolutionary process," in order to determine the laws of the rise and decline of nations. Huang divides his discussion of the "rise and fall of national power equation" into two parts, its use in evaluating an individual country by itself, and its use in assessing two nations that are in competition with each other.
|Score||Rank||As % of U.S. Score|
Source: The scores for 1989 and 2000 are from Huang, Zonghe guoli lun, 220-221. The scores for 1996 are from Huang, Guojia shengshuai lun, 405. Their scores as a percentage of the U.S. score were generated by the author for comparison purposes.
In the first situation, which Huang refers to as "an environment where the initiative is in one's own hands," the equation can be used to analyze how a country's power is influenced by domestic conditions and the international environment. Explaining that "the rise and fall of a country's CNP obeys the organic world's law of the survival of the fittest," Huang makes an analogy between the disappearance of the dinosaurs and the collapse of the Soviet Union. (555) "With regard to a species, when there are natural changes and an inhospitable environment," if some form of mutation does not occur in that species that would allow it to evolve, then "this old species must decline, and no matter how prosperous this species was in the past, it will be unable to escape its destructive fate, such as occurred with the dinosaurs."
In the case of nations, Huang writes, if a country has poor strategic decisionmaking, which "deviates from the development trends of the international and domestic strategic environment" (such as through pursuing hegemony and arms expansion and focusing too much of its economy in the military arena, which hurts civilian development and leads to social and political instability), then the country will fall. (556) Once again he states, "Regardless of how prosperous it was in the past, this country will be unable to escape its fate of complete collapse. The disintegration of the Soviet Union is a typical example." However, Huang explains, if the species can adapt to its changed environment, and if countries uphold policies that are in keeping with the needs of the domestic and international environments, then "a spark can start a prairie fire," and they both can gradually develop and strengthen.
The second part of Huang's discussion on the uses for the "rise and fall of national power equation" deals with how national strength is affected by the interaction between two forces in a "struggle for existence environment." Huang writes, "The modern international struggle for existence in the final analysis is the competition of Comprehensive National Power. The focus of the competition is the struggle for strategic resources, including scientific and technological resources, economic resources, natural resources, personnel resources, information resources, etc., the key elements of Comprehensive National Power." (557) One purpose for the equation, therefore, is to analyze the influence of a struggle for the same resource, on the rise and decline of two countries. It can also be adapted to examine an internal struggle for power between a country's old state system and a new one with a new national strategy. Finally, the equation can be used to assess a situation where two countries are not vying for the same thing but are seeking different resources and one of the countries has developed a new type of resource. In this case, their competition is conducted in the global marketplace.
Huang writes that the application of the equation to the latter scenario allows him to illustrate, "the laws of a competition, in an international environment, between two arbitrary countries on the 'battlefield' of the Comprehensive National Power competition." (558) The potential results of such a competition he describes as falling into four general categories:
Prior to presenting its projected CNP scores for the years 2000 and 2010, the CASS study sets forth some main findings about the future prospects of each of the world's major powers and considers the roles they are likely to assume in the future international competition.
China. By 2010 China will draw closer to Britain's rank in CNP. Along with Korea, China is one of the two swiftest risers in the CASS study, but China's task is much harder than Korea's. Korea has been surpassing only developing nations, while China is closing in on the industrialized leaders of the world. China's CNP rank is not commensurate either with China's military strength or the gross size of its economy measured in terms of purchase power parity (PPP). At least a decade will be needed for PLA modernization to take effect. China's three strongest components of CNP are its natural resources, rapid growth rate, and military manpower and weapons. However, these are offset by two important weakness--its low level of science and technology and its low "social" development. China must focus on economic policy and raising both its science and technology and its national educational level. Using PPP and the forecasts from the models of "Global Economic Forecasts" and "Project Link," in 1990 China already had a GDP of over $2 trillion, which would be the second largest in the world. PPP, however, is misleading. Using official exchange or conversion rates, China would have only the 10th largest economy in the world, with about $369 billion, and an even lower average per capita rank order (17th). Additionally, China's per capita GDP is at best $1,950, ranking 16th in the world.
Germany. Germany will remain the third-ranking power in the world after Japan and the United States for several decades, but it will not play a political or military role equivalent to its economic status. Germany's gap in CNP with the United States will decrease. However, this will occur only because of the relative decline of the United States. Germany will likely fall further behind a faster growing Japan. Germany may perhaps be overtaken by faster growing France, now in fourth place in CNP. Only if Germany can overcome the misgivings of its neighbors and the United States, and only after 2010, can it develop its actual power and benefit from the superior science and technology in Europe, thereby closing the gap with Japan. There will then be a new competition to see who will be the world's second-ranked power. It is necessary to watch closely this competition for second place between Japan and Germany after 2010 because it will significantly affect the 21st century. Germany's prospects to increase its competitive standing depend in part on a sound economy (foreign reserves, exports, and foreign investments), but it faces two important restraints. First, it must continue to integrate eastern Germany into its economy and social welfare system. Second, Germany must try to overcome the misgivings and treaty limitations placed on its military power by neighbor states and the United States, which oppose Germany playing a military role.
Russia. Moscow has yielded its second-place ranking in the world to Germany and Japan. Russia will fall further behind both France and England. One source of Russian decline is that Russia is the target of efforts by NATO and the United States to further weaken its status. Only after 40 to 50 years will Russia be able to become once more the number-one European power, ahead of Germany, France, and Britain. However, before this can occur in the middle decades of the 21st century, Russia will continue to fall behind Japan and Germany in CNP even after 2010.
France. Since the 1970s, France has consistently placed sixth in the fierce global competition. France has the potential to improve its relative position in CNP in the decades ahead, if it reorients its trade from Africa to Asia and exploits its impressive base in science and technology. However, France must overcome a large national debt, weak industries, and high unemployment. If this is done, France can move ahead even to fourth place in the world by 2010.
Great Britain. Despite its ranking as eighth in the world in CNP, England scores very high in economic indexes. During the decade from 2000 to 2010, London will rank eighth. Even though Britain is challenged by its small territorial size, it makes superb use of its limited space and can improve its productivity. In military terms, even though Britain is a nuclear power, its role will decline, while the nonnuclear military forces of Japan and Germany will increasingly improve and close this military gap. Because of a variety of factors, Britain will probably be surpassed by Italy by 2010. Italy's CNP will give Rome a greater role as its surpasses Britain and rises to the world's seventh-ranking power.
India. Reforms in India began 13 years after those in China. The Indian reform process is still influenced by political instability. Politics will influence the extent of further reform. At the same time, India's defense spending will increase. Its state-owned enterprises are only slowly being privatized.
The Rank Order in 2000-2020. By 2010, China will have improved its rank order by only one level, rising from the world's ninth power in 1990 to number eight. Scoring higher in CNP than China in 2010 will be the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and England (table 8). Like China, Japan, Germany, France, and Italy will each move up one rank from 1990 to 2010. Korea, not China, will show the fastest rate of improvement, because since 1975 Korea has passed India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa in CNP. By 2010 Korea will also pass Australia and Canada, to the number nine position. The important "loser" is Russia, whose world rank in CNP will decline by 2010. India will remain in 13th place.
Although CASS predicts only what the CNP of the world's major nations will look like in 2010, by using their statistics from 1990, 2000, and 2010, it is possible to project forward the scores another 10 years to 2020. Based on the projections, in 2020 Japan will pass the United States to place number one in the world; China will move into seventh place, ahead of England; South Korea will pass China, jumping into the number six spot; and Russia will slip even further, to number nine. The rank of all other countries will remain the same.
The Future of Japan and the United States. Japan's CNP score by 2010 will be almost as high as that of the United States. Assuming Japan sustains its faster CNP growth rate, Japanese CNP in 2020 will surpass the United States by about 19 percent--an extraordinary finding of the CASS civilian team. It obviously fulfills the prediction by Deng Xiaoping's advisers in the mid-1980s that the United States will lose its hegemony as the multipolar structure arrives. Yet it seems to open the potential for a new hegemony by Japan.
|United States||279 (1)||241 (1)||213 (1)||192 (2)|
|Japan||162 (3)||184 (2)||206 (2)||228 (1)|
|Germany||161 (4)||162 (3)||163 (3)||164 (3)|
|France||129 (5)||141 (4)||150 (4)||157 (4)|
|Italy||115 (7)||125 (6)||137 (5)||151 (5)|
|England||116 (6)||116 (7)||115 (7)||115 (8)|
|Canada||100 (8)||92 (9)||86 (10)||81 (10)|
|Australia||78 (10)||71 (11)||66 (12)||62 (12)|
|South Africa||36 (15)||34 (16)||32 (16)||30 (16)|
|Russia||(139) (4)*||131 (5)||121 (6)||108 (9)|
|China||94 (9)||102 (8)||110 (8)||118 (7)|
|India||51 (13)||53 (13)||55 (13)||57 13)|
|Indonesia||34 (16)||37 (15)||39 (15)||40 (15)|
|South Korea||70 (11)||87 (10)||105 (9)||124 (6)|
|Brazil||62 (12)||69 (12)||75 (11)||80 (11)|
|Mexico||46 (14)||49 (14)||51 (14)||52 (14)|
|Egypt||30 (17)||26 (17)||23 (17)||21 (17)|
*In original chart to denote what retro Russia projections might have been..
Source: The scores for 1990, 2000 and 2010 are from Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu (Comparative studies of the comprehensive national power of the world's major nations)(Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996), 438. The scores for 2020 were generated by the author.
The CNP scores of Japan and the United States are both twice as high as the scores for Russia and China--a situation that does not fulfill the predictions of five "poles" in a multipolar structure. Rather, it opens the possibility that a security alliance of the United States and Japan (combining their CNP scores) would score four times higher than China alone. Even if China and Russia could combine their CNP scores in an alliance, they would still have but half the score of the combination of the United States and Japan. A comparison of tables 8 and 9 shows that CASS findings contrast sharply with those of the AMS; this contrast becomes even greater when the scores are projected forward another 10 years. In order to compare the CNP estimates of CASS and AMS, it was necessary to calculate the CNP scores for each country as a percentage of the U.S. CNP score (table 10). Two of the biggest differences between the orthodox and reform calculation results that emerge from the comparison are:
Using an extensive system of equations, discussed earlier in the chapter, Colonel Huang of AMS also calculates the CNP of the major nations of the world, with results that are greatly different from those generated by CASS. Huang forecasts CNP scores only for the year 2000, but by using the future CNP growth rates he provides, it was possible to project forward his scores to 2010 and 2020. These estimates show China passing Japan in the year 2009, passing Germany in 2011, becoming equal with the U.S. in 2021, and then taking the number-one position in the CNP rank order in 2022 (table 9).
In his second book, Huang provides 1996 CNP scores that differ from those of On Comprehensive National Power, in that they show CNP for Japan as more powerful than for Germany. However, the revised 1996 scores do not alter the big differences in CNP forecasts between CASS and AMS concerning the rise of China and the decline of the United States.
CNP Versus GDP Forecasts
For comparison purposes it is useful to contrast predictions of future CNP with future Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Some analysts consider the GDP index to be an excellent indicator of a nation's power, but for others it simply is one factor contributing to overall CNP, and a country's GDP and CNP rankings are not always the same. While Huang did not provide any statistics on future GDP, part of the CASS process of forecasting CNP is to first estimate GDP (table 11). "As a comprehensive index that reflects a country's actual economic strength, GDP and Comprehensive National Power are closely interrelated, and GDP is an important component part of Comprehensive National Power . . . countries whose GDP growth is fast, also have comparatively clear strengthening of their CNP, and visa versa. Accordingly, before forecasting CNP, it is essential to first observe and study future GDP trends." (560)
For the majority of the 18 nations analyzed by CASS, their predicted GDP and CNP rankings in 2010 are very similar (table 12), and they are forecasted to have the same rankings in both categories or off by one position. Four nations, though, have divergent estimated rankings. China, India, and Brazil are expected to place higher in GDP than in CNP, while Russia is forecasted to have the reverse outcome. According to the CASS estimates, China will rank number 4 in GDP in 2010, while it will be number 8 that year in CNP. The country with the biggest predicted difference in GDP and CNP rankings, however, is Russia. CASS calculations place Russia fifteenth in the 2010 GDP rankings, but sixth in those for CNP.
Table 9. Score and Rank Projections to 2020 of AMS CNP
|Yearly Growth Rate|
|United States||593.33 (1)||816.85 (1)||1066.21 (1)||1391.71 (1)||2.7%|
|USSR||386.72 (2)||648.34 (2)||-||-||-|
|Germany||378.10 (3)||558.23 (3)||772.36 (2)||1068.63 (3)||3.3%|
|Japan||368.04 (4)||537.39 (4)||736.35 (4)||1009 (4)||3.2%|
|China||222.33 (6)||437.35 (5)||768.57 (3)||1350.63 (2)||5.8%|
|France||276.35 (5)||384.93 (6)||507.36 (5)||668.73 (6)||2.8%|
|England||214.08 (7)||281.24 (7)||353.05 (8)||443.19 (8)||2.3%|
|Brazil||156.05 (8)||267.70 (9)||419.72 (7)||658.09 (7)||4.6%|
|India||144.16 (9)||274.08 (8)||468.15 (6)||799.67 (5)||5.5%|
|Canada||136.64 (10)||177.41 (10)||220.56 (9)||274.18 (9)||2.2%|
|Australia||112.59 (11)||147.91 (11)||185.67 (10)||233.07 (10)||2.3%|
Source: The scores for 1989 and 2000, and the yearly growth rates are from Huang Shuofeng, Zonghe guoli lun (On comprehensive national power)(Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1992), 220-221. Scores for 2010 and 2020 were generated by the author.
table 10 insert, broadside
While CASS argues that GDP is only one component factor in CNP and that forecasted GDP estimates do not necessarily correctly indicate a country's overall national strength, other authors rely on GDP as the foundation for their assertions of future power, particularly with regard to China. For example, after giving statistics from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) regarding China's future GDP and other economic indicators, as well as quoting an OECD report that says China's economy could be the world's largest by 2020, Li Zhongcheng of CICIR states, "Whether the above cited estimates have errors or not, few people would disagree that China's overall national strength will still be far behind the United States, but may catch up with Japan and will be sure to exceed Russia." (561) Other Chinese authors also refer to the predictions and findings of Western organizations to backup their assertions of China's future power. Chen Zhongjing, former president of CICIR, agrees with a U.S. Department of Defense report that by 2010 China will be number 2 or 3 in GNP. (562)
The team at CASS and Colonel Huang at AMS are not the only Chinese analysts to calculate and predict future CNP; in fact, virtually every article and book about international relations and the future security environment mentions the concept. The CASS and AMS studies are unique in that they provide extensive details and explanations about their assessment and calculation processes, as well as numerous data tables of their results. Most other Chinese authors only mention CNP in general terms or, if they make predictions, do not elaborate on how they derived their conclusions. However, despite their lack of details, it is important to set forth other calculations and forecasts as a contrast to those of CASS and AMS.
|GDP (billion $U.S., 1990 price)||GDP Yearly Growth Rate (%)|
Source: Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu (Comparative studies of the comprehensive national power of the world's major nations)(Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996), 434.
|GDP Rankings||CNP Rankings|
Source: Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu (Comparative studies of the comprehensive national power of the world's major nations)(Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996).
Hubei Science Commission Calculations. In the discussion of research on CNP by other Chinese analysts, the CASS study describes some earlier research conducted by Yu Hongyi and Wang Youdi of the Hubei Science Commission. Their formula for calculating CNP was given as "function (F), dimension (D), structure (S), level (L), and four- dimensional vector comprehensive national strength (CNS) measurement formula, in which CNS = F (FDSL). (563) The FDSL measurement formula based on the calculation results of the 12 countries is shown in table 13. In addition to Yu and Wang, the CASS study also briefly describes the work of Huang Shuofeng, but does not compare either his or Yu and Wang's analysis methods or results with its own.
CICIR Calculations. Yan Xuetong of CICIR also calculates CNP (table 14), which he breaks down into six factors: manpower, natural resources, economics, politics, military affairs, and history and culture. The only explanation he gives for his measurement process is that he uses "a simple index average value method . . . to conduct quantitative analysis." (564)
Although Yan does not calculate the past CNP scores of the five countries, or forecast their future CNP, he describes the "post-Cold War unbalanced power development trend" as a situation where "the CNP of China, Japan, and Germany is relatively tending toward strengthening, and the United States, Russia, England and France are moving toward decline." Yan's assessment of China's CNP is quite positive: "China's national power growth is particularly outstanding, accelerating the speed of the changes in the balance of strength." However, he does note that when viewed on a global scale, "China already is one of the world's great nations, but if a national power comparison is carried out among the five major post-Cold War powers, then China still is only a regional power," for "there is a very large gap between the indexes of China, Russia, Japan, and Germany, and that of the United States." (565) Yan is optimistic about the future development of China's CNP:
Looking back at the success of the reforms and opening since the December 1978 Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, we can find that the potential for China to raise its CNP is very great. It is possible that at the end of this century China will become a rising industrializing country, situated between developed and developing countries. By the twenties of the next century, China will probably become a great nation in the world, second only to the United States. (566)
|United States||0.5049||0.9262||0.6838 (1)|
|Soviet Union||0.2048||0.8252||0.4111 (2)|
Source: Yu Hongyi and Wang Youdi, "Zonghe guoli cedu pingjie (Measuring the value of comprehensive national power)," Keji jinbu yu duice (Scientific and Technological Progress and Ways of Dealing with it) 1989: 5, in Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu, Wang Songfen, ed., 50-51.
*In general it is believed that 200 million is most ideal for the population of a great nation. China's population is well over that, so it has a negative effect on national power growth, added to which, China's overall education level is lower than the four other countries, therefore its index is smaller than that of the United States, Japan, and Russia.
**The economic index is based on 1993 GNP; China's and Russia's indexes were attained by the average values of exchange and PPP calculations.
Source: Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo guojia liyi fenxi (Analysis of China's national interests)(Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1996), 95.
1994 Confidential Calculations. According to the Hong Kong newspaper Cheng Ming, a confidential report, "War to be Won," about the period 2000 to 2010, was released in 1994 by the Policy Research Office of the Chinese State Council, the Policy Research Office of the Central Military Commission, and the Policy Research Office of the Communist Party Central Committee. Classified as confidential, it was a document to be studied by departments in Beijing and the provinces. The main points are that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will be unified and the comprehensive national strength of China will be in the top three in the world. China's GNP, excluding Taiwan, is estimated to become six times the 1993 figure or, in 2010, approximately 18 trillion yuan, about U.S. $2.5 trillion. (567)
Swiss Calculations. Another useful source for comparison is to look at Western forecasts of national power. The World Competitive Yearbook , jointly published by the World Economic Forum and the International Institute for Management Development in Lausanne, Switzerland, is an annual evaluation report of international competitiveness. Of course it assesses many more countries than any of the Chinese studies discussed in this chapter. The 1998 rankings for those countries they had in common, as well as a few additions, are the United States (1), Singapore (2), Hong Kong (3), Canada (10), Britain (12), Germany (14), Australia (15), Taiwan (16), Japan (18), France (21), China (24), Italy (30), Mexico (34), Korea (35), Brazil (37), Indonesia (40), India (41), South Africa (42), and Russia (46). For some of the above nations, major changes took place in comparison to their rankings from the previous year: Japan fell from 9 to 18, Korea from 30 to 35, and Brazil from 33 to 37. On the other hand, Taiwan rose from 23 to 16, and China from 27 to 24. (568)
In the mid-1980s, Deng Xiaoping asserted that it was important to calculate future trends in CNP, a concept that helps guide China's reforms and includes economics, science, defense, and other factors. Although it was invented in 1984, Chinese authors justify the concept as stemming from ancient Chinese strategists as well as Chairman Mao. CNP scores are important for major powers because they can help identify:
Two contending scientific teams in Beijing have calculated estimates of the CNP scores of the major powers in 2010. Both teams claim to use very sophisticated quantitative methods they say had to be developed because of the deficiencies in the methodological techniques used by the West and Japan to measure future growth rates in national power.
The military team's quantitative results are consistent with the orthodox Chinese view that a multipolar world structure is emerging and that U.S. hegemony is ending. In particular, according to the military estimate, the U.S. quantitative power score by 2010 shows a decreasing gap between the United States and the other major powers. By 2020, the U.S. score will equal that of China, assuming China's power growth rate continues to be 5.8 percent, double the U.S. rate of 2.7 percent. Germany and Japan will also have higher CNP growth rates than the United States, ranking third and fourth in world power after the United States and China in 2020. If these growth rates are extended another decade or so, China, Japan, and Germany will all three equal or surpass the United States in CNP, but the United States will remain ahead of Russia (which is not scored because of uncertainty) and India, the sixth in rank order of CNP.
The civilian team's results contradict the orthodox view about an emerging multipolar structure. The most striking contrast is the assessment of China's growth rate relative to the United States (table 15). The civilian team does not rank China equal to the United States by 2020 but merely ranks it number eight in the world, with a projected power score of only about half the U.S. CNP by 2010 and 2020. A second contrast is that the civilian team's quantitative results place Japan not number four in the world by 2010 but equal to the United States. Japan pulls ahead of the United States by 19 percent in 2020. China in 2020 will still rank only seventh in the world, trailing not only the United States and Japan, but Germany, France, Italy, and even South Korea in CNP.
These differences between the civilian "reform" and military "orthodox" estimates of the future geopolitical power hierarchy take on significance in light of the claims made by Deng Xiaoping and many Chinese authors about the importance of CNP. For example, Chinese writing on the RMA emphasizes how CNP will be a crucial ingredient in determining which nation will do the best in designing and implementing an RMA. The civilian team would seem to suggest that Japan and the United States will be the nations to watch with respect to developing RMA capabilities. China will be only a distant contender, not even one of the top five powers.
Table 15. A Comparison of CASS and AMS Growth Rates
Chinese military authors assert that national power scores probably determine the outcome of wars. If so, the Chinese military team's quantitative results suggest China has little to fear from Japanese national power by 2010 and still less by 2020 when Japan will slip to fourth place. Better still, in terms of military threats to China, the military team's results suggest China will have three-fourths of the power score of the United States by 2010 and become co-equal to the United States by 2020.
493. Deng Xiaoping, quoted in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), February 26, 1990, quoted in Huang Shuofeng, Zonghe guoli lun (On comprehensive national power)(Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1992), 7.
494. Chen Xiaogong, "The World Strategic Pattern in the 1990s," International Strategic Studies 19, no. 1 (March 1991): 7.
495. Yan Xuetong and Li Zhongcheng, "Zhanwang xia shiji chu guoji zhengzhi" (A perspective on international politics in the early next century), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) 92, no. 6 (June 1997).
496. According to Li Qingshan, "Through the analysis of belligerent countries' Comprehensive National Power, even before a war has begun, people frequently can know the results in
advance." Li Qingshan, Xin junshi geming yu gao jishu zhanzheng (The new revolution in military affairs and high-technology warfare)(Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1995), 191-192.
497. See Gao Heng, "Shijie zhanlue geju zhengxiang duojihua fazhan" (The strategic world structure is developing toward multipolarity), Guofang daxue xuebao (National Defense University Journal), no. 2 (1986): 32-33.
498. Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu (Comparative studies of the comprehensive national power of the world's major nations)(Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996), 23.
499. See Herbert Goldhamer, The Adviser (New York: Elsevier, 1978); and Herbert Goldhamer, Reality and Belief in Military Affairs: A First Draft (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1979).
500. Wu Chunqiu, Guangyi da zhanlue (Grand strategy)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1995), 98. The subsequent quotes in this paragraph are from the same page.
501. Chai Yuqiu, Moulue Jia (Strategists)(Beijing: Lan tian chubanshe, 1996), 511.
502. Wu Chunqiu, Guangyi da zhanlue, 17. All other quotations in this paragraph are from pages 17-18.
503. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 114.
504. Quoted in Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 14-15.
505. Zhu Liangyin and Meng Renzhong, "Deng Xiaoping zonghe guoli sixiang yanjiu" (A study on Deng Xiaoping's Comprehensive National Power thought), in Xin shiqi junshi jingji lilun yanjiu (Studies of new period military economic theory), eds. Li Lin and Zhao Qinxuan (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1995), 42. The subsequent quotes in this paragraph are from pages 43-44.
506. Ibid., 44.
507. Ibid., 43. All other quotes in this paragraph are from pages 44-46.
508. Ibid., 49.
509. Huang Shuofeng, Zonghe guoli lun, 94.
510. Ibid., 98.
511. Ibid., 96-97.
512. Ibid., 97.
513. Wu Chunqiu, Guangyi dazhanlue, 99.
514. Tong Fuquan and Liu Yichang, Shijie quanfangwei jingji zhan (The world's all directional economic war)(Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1991).
515. Li Qingshan, Xin junshi geming yu gao jishu zhanzheng, 191.
516. Ibid., 192. All other quotes in this paragraph are from pages 191-193.
517. Ibid., 191. All other quotes in this paragraph are from pages 191-193.
518. Ibid., 192. The subsequent quotes in this paragraph are from 192-193.
519. As discussed in chapter 2, Wang Zhengxi, a Senior Adviser at the China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIISS), when writing about why other countries may exploit the RMA ahead of the United States, also links development of the RMA to CNP. "Counting on its technical superiority, the United States claims itself to be the forerunner in the military revolution and that it even has such a great lead of 30 to 50 years over other nations that no country can catch up and advance shoulder to shoulder with it before 2020. We say that military technology is an agent behind the military revolution, but not the only one. It depends on the combined action of social, political, economic, and scientific and technological factors for a military revolution to take place and proceed smoothly. . . . If the social, political, economic, scientific and technological, and military thought factors are taken into account, then it is not absolutely limited to the United States as the only country that can wage a military revolution." See Wang Zhenxi, "The New Wave of the World Revolution in Military Affairs," International Strategic Studies 44, no. 2 (April 1997): 8-9.
520. Tong Fuquan and Liu Yichang, Shijie quanfangwei jingji zhan, 232. The subsequent quote in this paragraph is from page 232.
521. Ibid., 232.
522. Ibid., 233.
523. Xi Runchang, "Shijie xin geju zhanwang" (Prospects for the new world structure"), in Shijie zhengzhi xin geju yu guoji anquan (The new world political structure and international security), eds. Xi Runchang and Gao Heng (Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1996), 46.
524. Ibid., 44.
525. Ibid., 45.
526. Ibid., 45.
527. Ibid., 46.
528. Wu Chunqiu, Guangyi dazhanlue, 94. The subsequent quotes in this paragraph are from pages 102 and 103.
529. Ibid., 95.
530. Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu, 25.
531. Ibid., 36.
532. Ibid., 64.
533. Huang Shuofeng, Zonghe guoli lun, 159. All other quotes in this paragraph are from pages 155-157.
534. Ibid., 162.
535. Ibid., 164.
536. Ibid., 165.
537. Ibid., 169, 170, 172.
538. Ibid., 173. The subsequent quotes in this paragraph are from the same page.
539. Tong Fuquan and Liu Yichang, Shijie quanfangwei jingji zhan, 234.
540. Xi Runchang, "Shijie zhengzhi xin geju," 44. The quote in the next sentence is from the same page.
541. "Zhongguo guoji jinzhengli baogao" (China's international competitive power report), Zhanlue yu guanli (Strategy and Management), no. 2 (1996): 1.
542. The report is often cited by Chinese authors, who refer to China's continued rise in the rankings. For example see Wu Zhaohong and Shui Jiayue, "Strive to Improve International Competitiveness," Qiushi, no. 6 (March 16, 1998): 32-34, in FBIS-CHI-98-126, May 6, 1998.
543. Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu, 71. All other quotes in this paragraph are from pages 71-72.
544. Ibid., 168.
545. Ibid., 169. The weighted coefficients for the factors and indexes are from pages 169-170.
546. Ibid., 167.
547. Ibid., 2.
548. Huang Shuofeng, Zonghe guoli lun, 175. The other quotes in this paragraph are from pages 185 and 188.
549. Ibid., 188-189. All quotes and equations in this section are from 189-191.
550. Ibid.; all quotes and equations in this section are from 191.
551. Ibid., 202. All quotes and equations in this section are from 202-203.
552. Ibid., 220.
553. Huang Shuofeng, Guojia shengshuai lun (On the rise and fall of nations)(Changsha: Hunan chubanshe, 1996), 337.
554. Ibid., 379.
555. Huang, Guojia shengshuai lun, 382. All subsequent quotes in this paragraph are from the same page.
556. Ibid., 382. All other quotes in this paragraph are from the same page.
557. Ibid., 383-384.
558. Ibid., 385.
559. Ibid., 386-387.
560. Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu, 432-433; the statistics are from 434.
561. Li Zhongcheng, "The Role of an Emerging China in World Politics," Contemporary International Relations 8, no. 2 (February 1998): 10.
562. Chen Zhongjing, Guoji zhanlue wenti (Problems of international strategy)(Beijing: Shishi chubanshe, 1988).
563. Yu Hongyi and Wang Youdi, "Zonghe guoli cedu pingjie (Measuring the value of comprehensive national power)," Keji jinbu yu duice (Scientific and technological progress and ways of dealing with it) 1989, 5, in Wang Songfen, ed., Shijie zhuyao guojia zonghe guoli bijiao yanjiu, 50-51.
564. Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo guojia liyi fenxi (Analysis of China's national interests)(Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1996), 88.
565. Ibid., 57, 94-95.
566. Ibid., 89.
567. According to Professor Allen S. Whiting, "Although Cheng Ming is a Hong Kong journal, it has a good track record of acquiring authentic PRC classified documents." Allen S. Whiting, "East Asian Military Securities Dynamics," Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, February 1995, 49, footnote 9. The article also stated that China will have two to four aircraft carriers and a PLA reduced to only 1.5 million from today's 3 million. By 2010, manned Chinese spacecraft will be launched and a space station will have been established.
568. "World's Competitive Countries List," The Associated Press, April 21, 1998.