Chinese Views of Future Warfare

The articles in Parts One and Two are necessarily a bit more general and abstract because of their subject matter. Those in Parts Three and Four tend to be more specific and concrete.

Part One: Articles on Deng Xiaoping's Strategic Thought
The six authors in this part quote Deng's speeches extensively on future warfare, the future security environment and Deng's "Local War" concept. Western readers who do not subscribe to Marxist-Leninism may find these doctrinal articles peculiar. After all, what is important to Western observers is that Deng radically replaced the strategic thought of Chairman Mao. Yet what China's military authors must dutifully show is that Deng "modified" Mao's thought, and therefore Mao's strategic thought remains valid and relevant for future warfare. This formulation continues in the articles in Parts Two and Three, but is largely dropped from the articles in Part Four on the Revolution in Military Affairs.

Senior Colonel Peng Guangqian, author of "Deng Xiaoping's Strategic Thought," praises several features of Deng's thought:

• "Deng Xiaoping's strategic thought constitutes a scientific system with a rich content."
• "Deng Xiaoping's strategic thoughts are innately consistent with Mao Zedong's strategic thoughts"

• Many comrades were concerned about the danger of war, but each year Deng would say that "war would not break out in 5 to 10 years."
• Deng believes that People's War is still a magic weapon to defeating enemies, and Mao Zedong's thoughts on People's War can put us Ain an invincible position.

• "Though the United States has become the only superpower, it lacks the economic power to dominate the world."
• "The world's multipolar process has created a situation whereby various forces are increasingly balancing each other."
• Deng Xiaoping believes, "World war can be postponed, but accidental incidents and local circumstances are not entirely predictable."
• "It was the viewpoint of Marx and Engels that private ownership and the existence of classes were the root cause of war. Lenin raised the point that 'modern wars grow out of imperialism.'"

• World war may be postponed or avoided, but local wars and regional conflicts are far from over.
• Deng Xiaoping has established "active defense" and People's War under modern conditions as the fundamental guiding policy for our national defense force development. "We should still adhere to the strategic policy of active defense, and this is because the policy reflects the objective law of war and is the most vital essence of Marxist military theory and Mao Zedong's military thought."

• Technology "has in no way reduced the role and functions of people's warfare in future anti-aggression wars."
• "Future people's warfare must also adapt to the characteristics of modern wars."
• People's War under modern conditions "relies on the masses of people."
• "Future anti-aggression wars will mainly be fought on Chinese territory."

Military Improvements by Major Powers
In "The International Military Situation in the 1990s," Major General Yu Qifen, now the Director of the Strategy Department of the Academy of Military Science, points out more than 30 features of the future security environment. A significant trend General Yu sees is the improvement of weapons and soldiers by the major powers:

• "The Americans believe that the key to a deterrent force lies in technological advantage during peacetime. . . .The U.S. Defense Department put forward in 1990 the program on key technology exploration, to include the following seven fields: global reconnaissance and telecommunication, accurate strike, air superiority and defense, marine control and submarine superiority, advanced combat vehicles on the ground, computers and electronic equipment, and software engineering."
• "Countries such as India, the ASEAN nations and some Middle Eastern countries have spent several hundred billion dollars on the purchase of modern weapons and equipment."
• "Western European countries widely believe that the 'true military academy' relies on military maneuvers. It is an all-round test of training for soldiers in military, politics, educational, psychological and physical ability."
• "The U.S. army has reopened the annual 'Louisiana Exercises' and has set up six combat labs to develop low-cost experimental sample training systems of high efficiency so as to improve troop quality and competence. In Britain, there are 3 big military training centers for special battle training. In France, there are as many as thirteen big training centers."

Gao writes, "After the Cold War, China faced a less severe military threat from the major powers. But, in the future, the gap between China and other major powers will be wider" because:

• China's "military expenditure per capita is extremely low."
• This gap will not close "within a short period of time."
• China's advanced military equipment is "still in the embryonic stage."
• "Chinese soldiers' educational level can not meet the needs of modern war."
• The weapons of India, ASEAN countries, Taiwan, Japan, Russia and United States are superior to China's nuclear and conventional weapons.
• This "quality gap" is expanding rapidly.

• "Japan possesses nuclear fuels and technology to produce 1000 to 2000 atom bombs."
• "Japan can make intercontinental missiles (It successfully launched the H2 rocket)."
• Japan's navy "is on the top of the list for its capability in East Asia."
• Japan Ahas in fact given up its 'three nonnuclear principles.'"
• "Japan has trampled on its Peace Constitution and passed a law authorizing a Japanese military role in peacekeeping operations."
• Japan is the world's second largest in military expenditures after the United States.
• Japan advocates "a new nationalism" in order to become a military superpower.

Managing Local War Crises
In his article, "Managing China's Future Security Crises," Zheng Jian, a research analyst in the Strategy Department of the Academy of Military Science provides a checklist of principles by which China should manage future "National Defense Security Crises" (NDSC). Crises could be caused by:

• Multiple opponents stronger or weaker than China
• External offensives seizing opportunities of our internal disturbances
• "Chain reactions from many directions"
• Opponents' using comprehensive threats
• Intervention by "indirectly concerned countries or international organizations"
• Local crisis not endangering our country's overall security
• Enduring conflicts repeated over a long period of time.

• Forecasting the crisis situations scientifically
• Combining fighting with negotiation
• Fighting "even if the opponent is more powerful than us"
• Controlling the rhythm of the action properly
• Preventing the opponent from escalating through prevention.

Part Three: Articles on Modernizing for Local War
These papers reflect China's current focus on near-term modernization. The focus is a term translated as "Local War." I selected Local War authors who have held some of the most important leadership positions in China's defense complex, including articles by the Chief of the General Staff, the Chairman of the coordinating commission for all of China's defense industries, the sole military member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and four generals who were responsible (at the time they wrote) for armor, artillery, logistics, and the strategic rocket forces or Second Artillery. Two of these authors have served as the presidents of the Academy of Military Science, whose focus on future warfare is in the near term decade ahead, not the first three decades of the 21st century. They call for modernization of armor, artillery, logistics, and nuclear forces and more reliance on science and technology.

What is remarkable about the Local War school's writing is that the ideas contained in the articles on the Military Revolution are never explicitly criticized or even mentioned. For example, despite their high positions as Chief of the General Staff and Politburo Standing Committee member, neither General Fu Quanyou nor General Liu Huaqing has apparently never mentioned the "military revolution" or the kinds of future operations and future weapons that dominate the writing of the Military Revolution school of thought found in the articles in Part Four.

Deng's concept of Local War loses a great deal in translation. The Chinese ideograph for "local" (ju bu) can mean regional, partial, sectional or local, all at the same time. For clarity, I have translated it differently in this collection depending on the context. The definition of Local War refers mainly to the scale of a war rather than its location.

The Politburo's General Liu Huaqing on Local War and the Navy
General Liu Huaqing, who is over 80 years old, is China's highest ranking military officer as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. His article commemorates the 100th anniversary of Sino-Japanese War by listing the military challenges China faces. General Liu does not want China to repeat this historical humiliation, so he advocates, "It is quite necessary to concentrate our efforts on the issue of how to enhance the building up of our country's coastal defense. History tells us that whether one has maritime sense and can pay attention to the building of coastal defense is supremely important to the rise or decline and the honor or disgrace of a nation." He adds, apparently to China's ground force officers, "Comrades in our army must have an even deeper understanding of the importance of enhancing our coastal defense."

The PLA Chief of Staff on Logistics and Local War
"Future Logistics Modernization," General Fu Quanyou's article, extensively quotes Deng Xiaoping about the great importance of logistics modernization for Local War. General Fu sees merit in using China's civilian economy. Fu writes, "We should use specially designated civilian enterprises to supply the set amount of military materials at agreed upon times, and let society shoulder more responsibility. We should have various and useful ties with the large and medium-size commercial enterprises and establish stable channels of supply."

Nuclear Weapons
In his article on the development of Chinese strategic nuclear weapons, Major General Yang Huan traces the history of China's strategic rocket forces or "second artillery" since 1958. He proposes that future work should focus on the following three areas:

• First, China must improve the survival ability of its strategic nuclear weapons. He writes, "We should strengthen research on small, solid fuel and highly automated mobile missiles" as well as on stealth technology in order to strengthen the survival ability of missiles before launch and in the course of their flight.
• Second, he believes that China should improve the striking power of its strategic nuclear weapons, "to increase the credibility of limited nuclear deterrence, we should work to improve accuracy," and our new generation should have higher striking capability.
• Third, General Yang advocates that China should improve the penetration ability of its strategic weapons. He explains, "In an era when space technology is developing rapidly and a defense system with many methods and many layers is appearing, we should pay special attention to the study of technology."

Armor
In his article "Research and Development of Armor," Major General Chen Benchan states that the development of future Chinese armor takes place when "there is a new technological revolution going on." He warns, "We should go our own way and not follow the footsteps of others." He lays out five principles for the future development of tanks and armored vehicles:

• Increase the survivability and fire power
• Upgrade current weapons in a planned way
• Take better account of terrain and weather conditions
• Establish a complete set of armored vehicles with higher standardization
• Strive for advanced, reliable, economical and easier to operate armor weapons.

COSTIND Director on Requirements for Local War
General Ding Henggao is China's highest ranking officer in charge of defense industry, as the Chairman of COSTIND, the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry. General Ding's article, "Reforming Defense Science, Technology, and Industry," is therefore authoritative. Like other members of the Local War school, however, he focuses narrowly on the near term future. General Ding writes, "in high-tech local war, we have to

• Speed up the research and development of new weapons
• "Develop our national defense science and technology to reach an advanced world level."

General Ding sees a need to use both foreign technology and China's growing civilian economy. He writes, "Defense and commercial products are becoming more and more compatible. While we emphasize the conversion of defense technology into commercial use, we must study defense-commercial dual-purpose technology and possible transfers from commercial technology to defense use."

Artillery

"China's Artillery Development," by Major General Zi Wuzheng, emphasizes that "compared with the advanced level of foreign artillery, we face serious challenges." For future warfare, General Zi suggests, "I believe that in the development of artillery weapons it is preferable to have fewer but better products." He stresses that:

• Prototypes should be used to strengthen advanced research
• Technology should leap forward
• We should "Eliminate Soviet models features but not blindly copy Western models."

In his article, "Logistics Support for Regional Warfare," Major General Yang Chengyu focuses on "how to improve the logistic support ability of our army." Like General Fu Quanyou, General Yang stresses that advanced technology and "the extraordinary fierceness of the rear defense struggle" will "create the requirements for logistic support of our armed forces" in the following ways:

• Improve rapid mobile operations: "Speed is precious in war."
• Rapid-reaction troops will depend on logistics.
• Improve sustainment capability for continuous attack operations.
• Local war's consumption rate decides the course and the outcome of war.
• U.S. troops used four times more daily per man in the Gulf War than in Vietnam.

• "First of all. . . .Only when our national economy has been developed can the national defense development rest on a solid material base. Then logistics support can be provided continuously from the rear of the country."
• "It is necessary to give priority to . . . the preparation of battlefields in the directions and areas where the operations will occur, and the development of new equipment for war. "
• "Storing and acquiring materials for war must be nationally coherent with structural improvements concentrated at the main positions.
• "We must firmly foster the idea of overall rear service for a People's War . . . the system of powerful support by both soldiers and civilians as a whole. . . . Thus, we can transfer latent support capability into actual support strength immediately when war breaks out.
• "It is a very important aspect of operations to destroy the enemy's support system."

Shun suggests that civilian economic progress will be crucial because "A national industrial census indicates that advanced equipment makes up only 3 percent of all equipment in the military sector, whereas it is 12.9 percent in the commercial sector. About 40 percent of equipment used in some old military factories is over 20 years old, and some of it dates to World War II." Shun describes in detail how the State Planning Commission recommends that military and civilian industries be integrated in the future for their mutual benefit.

A Former Academy of Military Science President on "Military Science"
In a chapter from his book on Chinese military science, Lieutenant General Zheng Wenhan, a former President of the Academy of Military Science, defines Chinese military science to be "a system of knowledge about war, laws for guiding wars, and principles of war preparations and combat operations. Military science plays an important role in guiding force development, and provides theoretical methods of fighting and winning a war. The objects of the study of military science are wars and other activities of military practice," which include:

• "The causes of wars, the nature of wars, the relationships between war and politics, economics, science, and geography, and exploring the law of emergence of wars and development, so as to lay the foundations for directing wars correctly."
• New subjects, such as military operational analysis, war mobilization science, future warfare science, the science of military law and so on.

Defeating a Superior Enemy by Surprise Air Attack
In "Dialectics of Defeating the Superior with the Inferior," Professor Shen Kuiguan of the Air Force Command Institute in Beijing provides a history of this concept and applies it to future warfare in a fashion which suggests the value of large, surprise air attack on a distracted or unsuspecting enemy, such as the Israeli attacks that destroyed the Egyptian air force in 1967. Shen begins by noting, AThe concept of defeating a powerful opponent with a weak force, or defeating the enemy even when outnumbered was continually been put forward by people from the Yin, Zhou, Ming, and Qing Dynasties. . . . "ltering the overall balance of combat factors between two belligerents is the practical foundation of defeating the superior with the inferior." The principle even applies to the outcome of the Gulf War, according to Professor Shen: "A comprehensive understanding and analysis of the Gulf War is needed in order to avoid the erroneous conclusion that it is impossible for a weak force to defeat the powerful opponent in a high-tech war."

One way "to defeat a powerful opponent with a weak force in a high-tech war is to bring the overall function of its operational system into full play [and] to persevere in defeating the superior with the inferior in crucial battles."

Shen outlines several ways to defeat a superior enemy. In one example, he writes, a "superior strategy is significant to defeating the powerful opponent with a weak force. In the Third Middle East War, Israel was obviously in a disadvantageous position in the prewar period, but its successful use of superior strategies led to Egypt's erroneous judgement in operational orientation. With Egypt's focus turned to the Gulf, Israel launched a surprise attack on Egypt and destroyed most of its air force."

General Li Jijun: Cherish Mao, But Use Statistics
Lieutenant General Li Jijun is well known in China for his experimental field work on the doctrine of Local Warfare in the 1980s while he served as Commander of the 38th Group Army. He then served as Director of the General Office of the powerful Central Military Commission, and since 1994 has been the Vice-President of the Academy of Military Science. In his article, "Notes on Military Theory and Military Strategy," he advises how to analyze future warfare.

• First, he suggests the study of Mao Zedong because "he was a great strategist of rare gifts and bold vision. Take the war to resist the United States and assist Korea for example. At that time, New China was just founded, there was big flood in southern China, hungry people were anxiously waiting to be fed, and industries were still in shambles. It took unusual strategic daring and resolution to dare to fight against the number one power in the world." In Korea in 1950 he writes, "If you counted the enemy's aircraft carriers and actual forces, the enemy strength was several times our own. . . .To fight against a superior force and win victory is the highest honor for our army."
• Second, he emphasizes Mao's defeat of the United States. "Mao Zedong's brilliance in military strategic thought is even acknowledged by our enemy. From the end of the Second World War to the Gulf War, the United States fought two local wars, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, and in both suffered defeat. In both, its opponent was China. In the Korean War, it was the direct opponent, and in the Vietnam War, it was the indirect opponent."

• Statistical analysis is needed. Dupuy of the United States has suggested that the "coefficient of dispersion of soldiers has increased 4,000 times" in the last 400 years. "The Soviet Army stipulated that an artillery battalion's salvo could suppress the center of resistance by a platoon, and that infantry density of fire should be eight bullets per minute per meter. These statistics from the Second World War raised the level of theoretical understanding."
• Systems analysis can show "the intrinsic links and changes of the various factors of war. For instance, the development of technology and its application in the war could cause changes in military equipment, and could in turn cause changes in strategies, battles and tactics."

Part Four: Articles on the Revolution in Military Affairs
The "Military Revolution" authors advocate taking seriously a potential Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). These authors seem so focused on the implications for China of a revolution in military affairs that they often neglect to even mention the subject of modernization for Local War and People's War. One author approvingly quotes the views of Andrew W. Marshall on an RMA, and another states that Secretary William Perry established a senior steering group on the RMA in the Pentagon. Others mention Russian views of the RMA. Many of these "RMA authors" serve at the Academy of Military Science, an institution of more than 500 officers (with few students) modeled largely on the General Staff Academy in Moscow, which also has written about the future implications of a potential RMA.

China's interest in how the revolution in military affairs will develop seems destined to continue. For example, late in 1996, two young officers at the Academy of Military Science, Zhu Xiaoli and Zhao Xiaozhu, authored a book, America, Russia and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Academy Press). In their preface, Zhu and Zhao thank their mentors at the Academy, who include many authors featured in this volume such as Generals Li Jijun and Wang Pufeng. Zhu and Zhao trace the history of American and Russian military writing about the revolution in military affairs. They conclude with an interesting warning: "Those who believe that the current revolution in military affairs will be under the control of the United States or can develop only according to the speed and directions set by the United States are extremely wrong and quite dangerous." Zhu and Zhao assert four reasons why the United States will fall behind after a decade and yield leadership to others:

• Exploiting a future RMA will not depend on having the largest defense budget and "sometimes it is exactly the opposite."
• Other nations may develop new operational concepts before the United States because the U.S. military is too confident to innovate radically.
• Information technology, which is decisive for the RMA, is developing in the commerical sector available to all nations.
• Several developing nations have started to participate in the "RMA competition" and are using new "measures of effectiveness" to determine the weapons they intend to acquire.

COSTIND'S Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering
In "Weapons of the 21st Century," Mr. Chang Mengxiong suggests that "we are in the midst of a new revolution in military technology" and that in the 21st century both weapons and military units will be "information-intensified." Chang describes these future weapons, then proposes that China's leaders use a new set of "measures of effectiveness" to support decisions to determine what future weapons to acquire.

Chang's former institute has no equivalent in the United States because Chinese defense industries are government owned and controlled through COSTIND on the model of the Defense Industries (VPK) in the former USSR. To find an equivalent to Chang, an American would have to imagine that the U.S. Defense Under Secretary for Acquisition actually owned and controlled the budgets and planning of all major defense corporations like Northrop-Grumman, Lockheed-Martin, and General Dynamics, as well as government defense plants, and further imagine that at the top of this structure a group of analysts like Chang Mengxiong provided long-term assessments about what weapons systems merit increased investment or cancellation.

How does Chang see the 21st century? He asserts that

• Weapons and soldiers will both be "information-intensified" by the years 2010-2020.
• Soldiers will carry GPS direction finding, night vision, IFF, and other systems.
• Soldiers will request launching of information-intensified weapons by remote control.
• Soldier's clothing will have "adjustable temperature, color" and for some permit flying.
• Individual soldiers will be able to receive orders directly from division commanders.

• "Information-intensified combat platforms"
• "Robot sentries, robot engineers, robot infantrymen, and . . . unmanned smart tanks"
• Robot troops arrayed in large numbers.

Chang discusses some specific new concepts for weapons:

• High performance microwave weapons to "destroy the opponent's electronic equipment"
• Information superiority is more important than air and sea superiority
• We will "have to gain air and sea superiority, but even more important, we will have to win information superiority first of all"
• Information deterrence will be a new operational concept
• Virtual reality for training, planning, and analysis.

• Measures are obsolete that focus on firepower lethality, mobility, and logistics.
• Future weapons must be based on the information-intensity gap.
• Information-intensity gaps "translate into a gap in combat capabilities."

• Long-range precision strikes by warships, carrier-based aircraft, and missiles
• Submarines will make missile attacks on air targets
• "The submarine will rise in status to become a major naval warfare force"

• Anti-submarine warfare will restrict submarines in shallow water zones
• "Underwater aircraft carriers and undersea mine-laying robots."

• "The sea bed [will be] an ideal place to build military bases."
• Tactical laser weapons will be used first in antiship missile defense systems.
• Naval ships and cruise missiles will become stealth capable.
• Long range combat, missile combat, and air force cover will be crucial.
• "Tactics will change sharply."
• "Remote grappling" and over-the-horizon strikes will be key to future battles.
• "Speed against speed will become the crux of future naval victory."
• Naval battles will be mostly of medium and small scale.
• Lasers, particle beams and microwave beams will have precision and lethality.
• "Lightning attacks and powerful first strikes will be more widely used."
• There will be no "grand scenes of decisive fleet engagements."
• "The future naval warfare force organization will grow ever smaller and more multifunctional."

Dominant Role of Submarines
In their second article, "The Military Revolution in Naval Warfare," Captain Shen Zhongchang and his co-authors list new technologies in nuclear propulsion, space, shipbuilding, microelectronics, satellites, air cushion effects, surface effects, and materials as the "materials base for the new military revolution" which will also influence naval combat doctrine and operational concepts. They conclude that "There is no doubt that during the revolution, combat theory and concepts will be largely modified." They describe several points:

• Concentrations of ships will be replaced by small formations and single vessels.
• Vessels will be distributed "evenly" in the sea.
• Underwater strikes will be another important combat mode for the navy.
• "The role of submarines in future information warfare will be very important."
• There will be digitization of sea warfare to connect platforms and all arms of the services.
• The opponent's information network will be an important target.

However, the opponent's system may not be so safe from attack. Captain Shen writes, "There are many ways to destroy information systems," such as:

• "Attacking radar and radio stations with smart weapons"
• "Jamming an enemy's communication facilities with electronic warfare"
• "Attacking communication centers, facilities and command ships"
• "Destroying an enemy's electronic system with electromagnetic pulse weapons"
• "Destroying computer software with a computer virus"
• Developing directed energy weapons and electromagnetic pulse weapons.

In conclusion, Captain Shen suggests that information warfare will be a naval requirement. Ships will have to be designed with this in mind. He explains, "During the development of modern vessels, soft systems, especially communication facilities, target determining installations, and electronic warfare systems" will have to "become compatible with the C3I system of the air and land forces."

Control of Outer Space
In his article "21st-Century Air Warfare," Colonel Ming Zengfu of the Air Force Command Institute argues that "the air battlefield will become decisively significant" in future warfare. He too stresses the growing significance of smart munition, intelligent operational platforms, and integrated automatic C3I systems. Colonel Ming predicts "more and more stealth planes will be rushing into the air battlefields of the 21st century, and stealth penetration bombing will be more commonly applied." He adds that an air force must be able to "take down" the enemy's operational system by "striking the seams and ripping the fabric."

Air Power: Trigger of the Revolution in Military Affairs
In "The Military Revolution in Air Power," Major General Zheng Shenxia and Senior Colonel Zhang Changzhi make a case that the Revolution in Military Affairs will strengthen aerospace forces more than any others. They emphasize the growing importance of precision strike, stealth, night vision, longer range attacks, lethality of smart munitions, increased C3I capability, and electronic warfare. They were deeply impressed by the U.S. capability in the Gulf War to capture "all the high frequency and ultrahigh frequency radio signals of the Iraqi army," store the information "gathered by the 34 reconnaissance satellites, 260 electronic reconnaissance planes and 40 warning aircraft" and then "destroy the Iraqi communication system." They conclude that "information is the key to victory."

According to General Zheng, however, after the Gulf War the United States "gradually increased research centered on information combat." U.S. Defense Secretary Perry "put forward the proposal of 'military revolution' in early 1994, which officially confirmed the existence of the revolution." General Zheng suggests that "The application of air power in Desert Storm" was "the 'trigger' of the new military revolution."

General Zheng believes that air power can "start and stop operations easily" which is "definitely what military decision makers want to apply in today's conflicts, in which no one wants to escalate the conflicts but everyone is eager to restrain the other." In future warfare, "the ultimate goal of the parties involved is not to occupy the other's territory but to check the enemy country and take initiative at the negotiation table. Because an air force can achieve such a goal without escalating the conflict, it has more opportunities to be employed."

Zheng concludes with a message to China's ground force officers: "a former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff said before the Gulf War, the only way to avoid excessive blood-shedding by the army was to use the air force."

Finally, General Zheng states that the air force must be "linked" to space forces. He suggests that not only is it correct that "he who controls outer space controls the Earth," but also " to maintain air superiority one must control outer space."

21st-Century Army Operations
In their article, "21st Century Land Operations," Colonel Xiao Jingmin and Major Bao Bin, both of the Strategy Department, Academy of Military Science, forecast there will be "profound changes in the operational concept" in 21st-century land operations because of the military revolution. Xiao and Bao believe that:

• Battle space will be extended to hundreds or several thousand kilometers.
• "The front and rear of the battlefield will be attacked simultaneously."
• "The strategic rear area might be the first target of attack."
• "Time and speed will have new meanings."
• Enemy C3I systems and high threat weapons will be the main targets.
• Information attacks and firepower will be combined.
• The destruction of numerous enemy forces will no longer be the primary task.

Xiao and Bao stress that a "network" among various units of the armed forces will be able to:

• "Carry out long-range and accurate strikes"
• "Every soldier will have the information and firepower support of the whole digital information network"
• "Every unit will be in contact with the enemy force on the battlefield, and there will be no front lines."

He emphasizes three points.

• First, "establish a strategic reconnaissance warning and air defense system."
• Second, develop information weapons systems such as "air defense weapons systems, offensive tactical guided missile attack systems, . . .electronic warfare equipment systems, and underwater mine laying systems. These will give China over the horizon, high precision, concealed, sudden defensive attack capability and a stronger survival capacity and make the enemy terrified and worried, providing an effective threat."
• Third, build information networks to bring all branches into a single combat network.

• False intelligence and false targets to "muddle the opponents perceptions, and inspire false assessments," and "to blind or even destroy the opponent's reconnaissance."
• Resist jamming of communication by using many channels.
• Resist viruses by protection.
• Use information counterattacks.

• "Carry out raids on enemy operation platforms and bases"
• "Damage and foil the enemy's offensive"
• Organize "sabotage operations"
• "Make continuous raids to exhaust and wear down the enemy"
• Organize special warfare troops with information technology weapons.

"Informationized" Armies in 2040
In their article on information warfare, Wang Baocun and Li Fei state in the Liberation Army Daily in June 1995 that the essence of information warfare has not been defined authoritatively and the redefinitions are "imperfect and even somewhat biased." They themselves use a broad definition to include computer virus warfare, precision strike warfare and stealth warfare. Quoting U.S. Army experts they agree that while tanks were the major weapons of the 20th century, the computer will be the key weapon of the 21st century. Therefore, computer viruses to alter or destroy a computer's normal operating programs with "rapid contagion, long standing latency, and active and continuous encroachment" will be able to severely disrupt not only the C3I system and smart weapons but the entire combat potential of a nation.

America's military digitization will take several decades. In the first stage, the U.S. Army will digitize some units by installing "digitized communications equipment, second-generation, forward-looking infrared, radar, identification friend-or-foe equipment, and the global positioning system." In the second stage, after 2010 the army will be linked digitally to the navy and air force and write information war doctrine. This will require about three decades and be completed by 2040. One reason for the delays is that the weapons development cycle takes 15 years and the conversion of the military structure from one to another will take roughly two decades. Wang and Li conclude, "So it is obvious that by midcentury, the United States probably will have built the world's first completely smart military."

Wang and Li believe that some effects of information warfare can be forecast:

• First, attacks will be on "brain centers" which will "submit very quickly."
• Second, jointness. Smart anti-tank missiles "fired from friendly naval submarines."
• Third, "force concentrations will occur faster, more precisely, and more often."
• Fourth, units will be "smaller, more integrated and more multifunctional."

Innovation Through Doctrine Pushing or Technology Pushing?
In his article "Future Trends of Modern Operations," Major General Wu Guoqing, Director of the Department of Operations and Tactics, Academy of Military Science, describes the "profound reforms of concepts, modes, and tactics in modern operational doctrine." He lists:

• Operational Concepts C Warfare will have more "jointness," be of smaller scale than World War II, be shorter in duration, involve deep attacks on rear areas and the C3I systems, change the definition of "battlefield dominance" to mobile or maneuver warfare by leapfrogging.
• Operational Methods-"Large quantities of high-tech weapons" will "accelerate a series of revolutionary changes in concepts." For example, "opposing sides may not necessarily face each other in battles. Instead, they will launch attacks hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away by fully employing air assaults and missile weapons."
• "Precision all weather targeting, stealth weapons, precision guidance, night fighting" means that Aoperations will most likely become 'combination boxing,' the combination of various operational modes and patterns."
• "Air strikes are no longer only attacks by the air force. Naval and army air forces can also play very important roles. Missile attacks can be either from aircraft, cruise missiles, or by land; information war, electronic wars and psychological war are usually combined actions of all services together."
• Advances in simulation technology will improve "deception warfare. . . . Improvement of command decision-making will enable artificial intelligence simulation systems to mimic the commanding officers' mental activities and be extensively used in command activities in the near future."
• Fixed positions will become obsolete. They may be moved to sea, such as the U.S. Marine Corps has proposed for amphibious maneuver operations with defensive facilities at sea for mobile protection.

Stealth Weapons with Chinese Characteristics
Cao Benyi writes in "Future Trends in Stealth Weapons" that "the great importance of stealth weaponry in modern warfare has gradually been realized by China's scientific and military experts." Therefore, "It is necessary for China to make every effort to develop stealth technology." Cao states that great progress has already been achieved since the 1980s and that tests have by now "been completed in the case of a number of entire aircraft and a large number of components. . . . For example, the Research Institute of the Beijing Iron and Steel Complex has developed a coating material of superfine metallic particles with radar wave absorptions properties." Cao advocates six steps:

• "Expand the stealth wave band"
• Design external contours to eliminate angular reflections and mirror reflections
• Use the most modern radar wave absorption materials
• Limit heat radiation from propulsion systems
• Use electronic counter measures, increase the outer impedance load, send false targets
• Use radar testing to develop radar under wide-band conditions.

Mi Zhenyu on Weapons Development for the 21st Century
Many observers believe that Chinese concern with future warfare dates only from the Gulf War in 1991. However, one of China's most important studies of future warfare was published as early as 1988 by a team under the leadership of General Mi Zhenyu, a Vice President of the Academy of Military Science-China's National Defense Development Concepts, which suggests:

• China is in long-term competition with other major powers.
• The "gap between the weapons and equipment we now possess compared to those of advanced countries is 20 to 25 years."
• "If our objective for the year 2000 is merely to shrink this discrepancy to ten to fifteen years, then from the point of view of effectiveness, it would seem to be high, but from the point of view of competitive effectiveness, it would only be an impractical increase in quality, perhaps even a decrease."
• "When we compare the discrepancy of one or a half generation of weaponry in the year 2000 with the two to three generation discrepancies today, the difference in competitive effectiveness could prove even greater."
• "If we do not start today to plan to be better, to be ahead of everyone, how can we possibly make use of the opportunities, and become latecomers who surpass the old-timers?"

• Electronic technology is making possible "automatic searches, identification and attack, and ten- fold the precision of these weapon systems to the point of near-perfect accuracy."
• Stealth technology has raised the survivability of weapons for surprise attacks.
• High-energy laser weapons for antiaircraft defense, tactical laser weapons, high-power microwave, and plasma technology are providing the foundation for the creation of directed energy weapons.
• Technology increases the importance of preemptive strikes or first strikes.
• Not only will "space forces" be created and expanded but even a "robot force" will have to be deployed using multipurpose robots in future warfare.

Tactical Experiments
In "Tactical Studies," Yang Wei observes that "the PLA enjoys a good reputation in the world after overcoming very strong enemies on several occasions," but he warns against "being intoxicated by the glories of the past." He offers an approach such as "in 1929 when the German military did not have any tanks [but] a young officer, Heinz Guderian, broke though the bondage of traditional thinking" and invented the blitzkrieg.

Six New Combat Concepts
The COSTIND journal Contemporary Military Affairs published an article in February 1996 by Ch'en Huan on "The Third Military Revolution" which Ch'en calls "the rapid development of information technology, stealth technology, and long-range precision strike technology." Ch'en predicts new operational concepts will appear in future wars.

• Long-range Combat: "There will be three main forms of long- range strikes in the future: the first form is the one in which the air arm independently carries out long-range strikes; the second form is one in which the long-range strike combines with the long-range rapid movement of troops transported by land and sea with the vertical airdrops of airborne forces; and the third form is five-dimensional-air, land, sea, space, and electro-magnetic- long-range combat."
• Outer Space Combat: "The following new-concept weapons will come forth in a continuous stream-all of these weapons will make outer space the fifth dimension operational space following land, sea, air, and electromagnetism: Laser weapons, ultra-high frequency weapons, ultrasonic wave weapons, stealth weapons, mirror-beam weapons, electromagnetic guns, plasma weapons, ecological weapons, smart weapons, logic weapons, and sonic weapons.

• Paralysis Combat: By striking at the "vital point" of the enemy's information and support systems one can at one blow paralyze the enemy and collapse his morale.
• Computer Combat: "Relevant data show that, before the outbreak of the Gulf War, American intelligence organizations put a virus into Iraq's air defense system which led to the destruction of 86 percent of the Iraqi forces' strategic targets in the first one or two days of the war." Ch'en proposes that Awith the aid of electromagnetic waves, a virus can be injected from a long distance into the enemy's command and communication systems and into the computers on his aircraft, tanks, and other weapons, causing 'nonlethal destruction.'"
• Radiation Combat: "In the wars of the past, the power to inflict casualties mainly depended on the effects of kinetic energy and thermal energy, but the weapon systems produced by the third military revolution mainly use sound, electromagnetism, radiation, and other destructive mechanisms. . . .The main radiation weapons are laser weapons, microwave weapons, particle beam weapons, and subsonic wave weapons; they possess enormous military potential."
• Robot Combat: "The main type of military robot on active service or about to be put on active service in the armed forces of various countries of the world are vehicle emergency robots, mine-laying robots, minesweeping robots, reconnaissance robots, transportation robots, electronic robots, and driver robots. Later there will appear engineer robots, chemical defense robots, patrol robots, and even unmanned intelligent tanks, unmanned intelligent aircraft, and other 'robot soldiers'."

Today, Zheng writes, "We also need to count invisible strengths, including calculation capability, volume of telecommunications, reliability of information, and real-time reconnaissance ability."

In a rare remark that apparently criticizes Local War theorists, Zheng asks "Where shall we place the nucleus of high-tech development? Where shall we put the main emphasis of local high-tech wars?" Zheng reveals that "a consensus on these issues has yet to be reached throughout the army. People still tend to place greater emphasis on hardware instead of software, and on the present instead of the future. Such a transitional 'optical parallax' is hindering us from gaining a correct grasp of major contradictions."

Zheng concludes by recommending "a conscientious study of" the military revolution, new ideas on military development, and "'magic weapons' that can really serve our purpose."

A People's Information War?
In AInformation War: " New Form of People's War," Wei Jincheng suggests "the concept of people's war of the old days is bound to continue to be enriched" and proposes that it would be carried out "by hundreds of millions of people using open-type modern information systems." Wei sees the possiblity that "the enemy country can receive a paralyzing blow through the Internet."

Nanotechnology Weapons
Major General Sun Bailin's paper, "Nanotechnology Weapons on Future Battlefields," describes American and Japanese efforts in this field and concludes that "a variety of indications show that nanotechnological weapons could well bring about fundamental changes in many aspects of future military affairs. Nanotechnology will certainly become a crucial military technology in the 21st century!"