*Note: Titles in this table have been shortened slightly. Only the titles as they appear in the actual Treaty text are official.
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Desiring to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
Recognizing the advantages of providing each Party the opportunity, prior to the commencement of baseline data inspections, to conduct exhibitions and inspections for the purposes provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty, in accordance with the procedures provided in the Protocol Regarding Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,
Have agreed as follows:
Each Party shall conduct exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, as provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.
The exhibiting Party shall provide necessary assistance to the inspectors in the conduct of inspections during such exhibitions.
The exhibitions and inspections provided for in Article I of this Agreement shall be conducted at locations chosen by the exhibiting Party on dates agreed upon through diplomatic channels. These exhibitions and inspections shall be completed no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty. Except as provided for in Articles III and IV of this Agreement, such exhibitions and inspections shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol, including the provisions concerning inspection reports and non-disclosure of information obtained as a result of these exhibitions and inspections.
An inspection team conducting an inspection during exhibitions in accordance with this Agreement shall include no more than 15 inspectors.
2. For each exhibition, the exhibiting Party shall notify the inspecting Party, no less than 10 days prior to each exhibition, of its agreement with, or objection to, the designation of each inspector and aircrew member proposed in connection with the exhibition. The exhibiting Party may object to an individual on the list only in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol. The exhibiting Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed as may be required to ensure that each such inspector or such aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory throughout the in-country period established for the exhibition.
(b) Points of entry under this Agreement shall be: for the United States of America, Washington, D.C., and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow.
The exhibiting Party shall treat with due respect the inspectors and aircrew members of the inspecting Party in its territory in connection with the conduct of these exhibitions and inspections, and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the person, freedom, and dignity of such persons.
This Agreement shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties in any way or to impose additional obligations on the Parties under the Treaty.
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall terminate upon completion of the exhibitions and inspections provided for herein. The termination of this Agreement shall not prejudice the validity of the information obtained as a result of such exhibitions and inspections, and contained in the inspection reports, for the exercise of the rights of the Parties and the fulfillment of the obligations of the Parties under the Treaty after its entry into force.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE at Moscow, on July 31, 1991, in duplicate, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the Government of the United States of America:
James A. Baker, III
For the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics:
A. A. Bessmertnykh
The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Desiring to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, including the Protocol Regarding Inspections and
Continuous Monitoring Activities, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol,
Recognizing the advantages of providing both Parties ample time to review the lists of proposed
inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members in order to inform the other Party of agreement with,
or objection to, the names on such lists within the time period provided for in the Treaty,
Considering their common interest in providing a mechanism for an exchange of such lists prior
to entry into force of the Treaty,
Have agreed as follows:
On a date agreed upon by the Parties, which shall be no later than 30 days before entry into force
of the Treaty, each Party shall provide to the other Party the lists of its proposed inspectors,
monitors, and aircrew members as provided for in Section II of the Protocol. The date of
exchange of such lists shall be agreed upon by the Parties through diplomatic channels.
Each Party shall have the right to amend the lists of its proposed inspectors, monitors, and
aircrew members, provided that each Party may make a change to these lists no more than one
time within any 21-day period commencing from the date of exchange of such lists. With each
change, the number of inspectors whose names are entered in the list of inspectors shall not
exceed 30, the number of monitors whose names are entered in the list of monitors shall not
exceed 25, and the number of aircrew members whose names are entered in the list of aircrew
members shall not exceed 25. The lists of proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members
shall constitute the initial lists provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol, upon
entry into force of the Treaty.
Each Party shall provide to the other Party the lists required by Article I of this Agreement, and
amendments to such lists, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established by the
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.
This Agreement shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties in any way or to
impose additional obligations on the Parties under the Treaty except as stated in Articles I and II
of this Agreement.
This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature, and shall terminate upon entry into force of
the Treaty.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective
Governments, have signed this Agreement.
DONE at Moscow, in two copies, on July 31, 1991, in the English and Russian languages, both
texts being equally authentic.
For the Government of the United States of America:
For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
James A. Baker, III
A.A. Bessmertnykh
| FOR THE UNITED STATES OF | FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET |
| AMERICA: | SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: |
| George P. Shultz | Eduard A. Shevardnadze |
| July 30, 1991 |
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I am instructed to state the following:
In connection with the agreement on the phasing of the reductions of strategic offensive arms reached within the framework of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet Union provides formal assurances to the effect that, in the course of implementing the reductions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty, the number of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be reduced evenly during all phases. In order to implement this assurance in the most effective manner, it is agreed that deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the limits on the aggregate numbers for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, are reached.
Reductions of launchers of heavy ICBMs shall be implemented by means of elimination in accordance with the procedures specified in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty.
If this statement is acceptable, I propose that this letter, together with your response, be included in the official records of the negotiations in the form of statements reflecting the official positions of the Soviet Union and United States.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| [s] |
| Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| Union of Soviet Socialist |
| Republics to the Negotiations |
| on Nuclear and Space Arms |
| July 30, 1991 |
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the United States of America, I am authorized to state that the United States accepts the formal assurances set forth in your letter of this date, the substantive portion of which reads as follows:
In connection with the agreement on the phasing of the reductions of strategic offensive arms reached within the framework of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet Union provides formal assurances to the effect that, in the course of implementing the reductions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty, the number of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be reduced evenly during all phases. In order to implement this assurance in the most effective manner, it is agreed that deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the limits on the aggregate numbers for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, are reached.
Reductions of launchers of heavy ICBMs shall be implemented by means of elimination in accordance with the procedures specified in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty.
The United States agrees that this response, together with your letter, shall be included in the official records of the negotiations in the form of statements reflecting the official positions of the United States and Soviet Union.
This reply, together with your letter, shall constitute an agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
|
Sincerely, |
| [s] |
| Ambassador Linton F. Brooks |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| United States of America |
| to the Negotiations on |
| Nuclear and Space Arms |
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms
| Moscow, July 1991 |
Dear Mr. Secretary,
On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I should like to confirm that the provisions set forth in the letter signed on July 30, 1991 by our ambassador concerning the stage-by-stage reduction of deployed heavy ICBMs in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are legally binding.
| Respectfully, |
| [s]Bessmertnykh |
His Excellency
James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State of the U.S.
Moscow
| July 31, 1991 |
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D.
I have the honor to inform you of the following. From the outset, Tu-95RTs airplanes were tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations.
These airplanes have not been and are not heavy bombers, nor have they been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion. Tu-95RTs airplanes have external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the Tu-95 type: they have no bomb bays, no external carrier beams to suspend or carry aerial bombs or missiles, and no equipment necessary for control of such weapons. Other differences characteristic of these airplanes are the additional three-dimensional radomes of the surface situation surveillance equipment under the fuselage and on the sides of the airplane. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently has 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes, which are based only at naval air bases.
Under the proposed agreement, our Governments would agree as follows:
(b) The United States of America shall have the right to request the exhibition of all the other 36 Tu-95RTs airplanes. Such exhibition shall be conducted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at two airfields (in the European and Asian parts of the country) no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty and no later than 60 days after the request. The United States of America shall bear all costs for the transportation and stay of the group of visitors, which shall include no more than 10 persons. The currency of payment shall be agreed between the sides before the visit.
(c) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be based at facilities where heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based, that is, at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.
(d) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers, and shall not be accountable under the 75 aggregate limit on heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty.
(e) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has no plans to continue production of Tu-95RTs airplanes. In case of the production of such airplanes, they would be treated as former heavy bombers under the Treaty. As such, each new airplane would be subject to inspection to confirm that it is not equipped for air-to-surface weapons.
If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, except for subparagraphs (a) and (b) which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty and shall remain in force for 240 days. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, the other subparagraphs of this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| [s] |
| Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| Union of Soviet Socialist |
| Republics to the Negotiations |
| on Nuclear and Space Arms |
| July 31, 1991 |
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to accept your proposal that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D.
I have the honor to acknowledge the information set forth in your letter of this date, the substantive portion of which reads:
From the outset, Tu-95RTs airplanes were tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations.
These airplanes have not been and are not heavy bombers, nor have they been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion. Tu-95RTs airplanes have external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the TU-95 type: they have no bomb bays, no external carrier beams to suspend or carry aerial bombs or missiles, and no equipment necessary for control of such weapons. Other differences characteristic of these airplanes are the additional three-dimensional radomes of the surface situation surveillance equipment under the fuselage and on the sides of the airplane. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently has 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes, which are based only at naval air bases.
Under this Agreement, our Governments shall agree as follows:
(b) The United States of America shall have the right to request the exhibition of all the other 36 Tu-95RTs airplanes. Such exhibition shall be conducted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at two airfields (in the European and Asian parts of the country) no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty and no later than 60 days after the request. The United States of America shall bear all costs for the transportation and stay of the group of visitors, which shall include no more than 10 persons. The currency of payment shall be agreed between the sides before the visit.
(c) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be based at facilities where heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based, that is, at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.
(d) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers, and shall not be accountable under the 75 aggregate limit on heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty.
(e) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has no plans to continue production of Tu-95RTs airplanes. In case of the production of such airplanes, they would be treated as former heavy bombers under the Treaty. As such, each new airplane would be subject to inspection to confirm that it is not equipped for air-to-surface weapons.
This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the terms set forth above. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, except for subparagraphs (a) and (b) which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty and shall remain in force for 240 days. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, the other subparagraphs of this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| Sincerely, |
| [s] |
| Ambassador Linton F. Brooks |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| States of America |
| to the Negotiations on |
| Nuclear and Space Arms |
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms
| July 31, 1991 |
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on the distinguishability of heavy bombers of the type designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-1, pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.
Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:
(b) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be made distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by the covering, using a process equivalent to welding, of all but the two pylon attachment joints that serve as jacking points for the airplane.
(c) The two extra sets of B-1 heavy bomber attachment joints, for which no unique pylons exist, shall not be considered in determining the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a B-1 heavy bomber is actually equipped. These attachment joints have not been used to mount armaments, and the United States of America has no plans for them to be used to mount armaments. These attachment joints shall be covered by a process equivalent to welding, and shall remain covered in the event that a B-1 heavy bomber is later converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(d) The unique equipment required to move the weapons bay bulkhead in B-1 heavy bombers and the equipment required to load B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs onto such heavy bombers shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(e) All B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be subject to inspection during the period provided for baseline data inspections.
(f) B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-1 rotary launchers that carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, except for such items on visiting heavy bombers for which notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.
(g) Provided that no deployed B-1 heavy bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, there shall be no requirement for the United States of America to provide technical characteristics for such heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. The United States of America shall, however, provide distinguishing features for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. In the event that the United States of America converts B-1 heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, then technical characteristics for such heavy bombers would be provided. Although the United States of America has no B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America shall exhibit a B-1 test heavy bomber that is equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs during appropriate distinguishability exhibitions pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.
(h) Similar provisions shall apply, as appropriate, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, but some of which are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| Sincerely, |
| [s] |
| Ambassador Linton F. Brooks |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| United States of America |
| to the Negotiations on |
| Nuclear and Space Arms |
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms
| July 31, 1991 |
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to accept your proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on the distinguishability of heavy bombers of the type designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-1, pursuant to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.
Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:
(b) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be made distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by the covering, using a process equivalent to welding, of all but the two pylon attachment joints that serve as jacking points for the airplane.
(c) The two extra sets of B-1 heavy bomber attachment joints, for which no unique pylons exist, shall not be considered in determining the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a B-1 heavy bomber is actually equipped. These attachment joints have not been used to mount armaments, and the United States of America has no plans for them to be used to mount armaments. These attachment joints shall be covered by a process equivalent to welding, and shall remain covered in the event that a B-1 heavy bomber is later converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(d) The unique equipment required to move the weapons bay bulkhead in B-1 heavy bombers and the equipment required to load B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs onto such heavy bombers shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(e) All B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be subject to inspection during the period provided for baseline data inspections.
(f) B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-1 rotary launchers that carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, except for such items on visiting heavy bombers for which notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.
(g) Provided that no deployed B-1 heavy bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, there shall be no requirement for the United States of America to provide technical characteristics for such heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. The United States of America shall, however, provide distinguishing features for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. In the event that the United States of America converts B-1 heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, then technical characteristics for such heavy bombers would be provided. Although the United States of America has no B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America shall exhibit a B-1 test heavy bomber that is equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs during appropriate distinguishability exhibitions pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.
(h) Similar provisions shall apply, as appropriate, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, but some of which are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| [s] |
| Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| Union of Soviet Socialist |
| Republics to the Negotiations |
| on Nuclear and Space Arms |
| July 31, 1991 |
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.
Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:
In cases of elimination of a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, each Party shall:
(b) convert those launch control centers by any method of its choice, for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; or
(c) retain such launch control centers for their original purposes.
If a Party that possesses a silo used as a launch control center decides to convert it for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty by a method that involves opening the silo, that Party shall provide a notification to the other Party no less than 30 days in advance of initiation of such conversion through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or through diplomatic channels.
The Party that receives such a notification shall have the right to conduct a visit to the silo being converted in order to confirm that it is not being converted into a silo launcher of ICBMs pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty, on the timing and procedures for conducting such a visit.
If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| [s] |
| Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| Union of Soviet Socialist |
| Republics to the Negotiations |
| on Nuclear and Space Arms |
| July 31, 1991 |
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.
Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:
In cases of elimination of a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, each Party shall:
(b) convert those launch control centers by any method of its choice, for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; or
(c) retain such launch control centers for their original purposes.
If a Party that possesses a silo used as a launch control center decides to convert it for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty by a method that involves opening the silo, that Party shall provide a notification to the other Party no less than 30 days in advance of initiation of such conversion through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or through diplomatic channels.
The Party that receives such a notification shall have the right to conduct a visit to the silo being converted in order to confirm that it is not being converted into a silo launcher of ICBMs pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty, on the timing and procedures for conducting such a visit.
This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| Sincerely, |
| [s] |
| Ambassador Linton F. Brooks |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| United States of America |
| to the Negotiations on |
| Nuclear and Space Arms |
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms
| July 31, 1991 |
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.
Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:
(b) With respect to launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall proceed as follows. A launch canister remaining after the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall either remain for an indefinite period of time in the open at the launch site, that is, at a test range or an ICBM base, with the front end open, or shall be eliminated. Elimination of such a launch canister shall be carried out in the open either in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. Elimination of each such launch canister shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. If the elimination is to be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, then such a launch canister shall be transported to such a facility directly from the relevant test range or ICBM base, and a notification of the movement of the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. After the elimination of such a launch canister has been completed, the remains of such a launch canister shall remain in the open for no less than 45 days and afterwards may be removed and used for any purpose.
(c) Notifications shall not be provided in connection with the above-mentioned operations involving launch canisters, except for notifications of their movement to conversion or elimination facilities. Data on the number of empty launch canisters shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.
If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| [s] |
| Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| Union of Soviet Socialist |
| Republics to the Negotiations |
| on Nuclear and Space Arms |
| July 31, 1991 |
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.
Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:
(b) With respect to launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall proceed as follows. A launch canister remaining after the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall either remain for an indefinite period of time in the open at the launch site, that is, at a test range or an ICBM base, with the front end open, or shall be eliminated. Elimination of such a launch canister shall be carried out in the open either in situ or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. Elimination of each such launch canister shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. If the elimination is to be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, then such a launch canister shall be transported to such a facility directly from the relevant test range or ICBM base, and a notification of the movement of the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. After the elimination of a launch canister has been completed, the remains of such a launch canister shall remain in the open for no less than 45 days and afterwards may be removed and used for any purpose.
(c) Notifications shall not be provided in connection with the above-mentioned operations involving launch canisters, except for notifications of their movement to conversion or elimination facilities. Data on the number of empty launch canisters shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.
This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| Sincerely, |
| [s] |
| Ambassador Linton F. Brooks |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| United States of America |
| to the Negotiations on |
| Nuclear and Space Arms |
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms
| July 31, 1991 |
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments to ensure effective engineering site surveys conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter known as the Treaty.
Under this agreement, our Governments would agree as follows:
No later than 60 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels the following information on such facilities, including data on logistical resources and local topography:
(b) diagrams of underground utilities, including cabling, in the proposed perimeter continuous monitoring area;
(c) locations of proposed termination point(s) for water, sewage, and electrical supply lines;
(d) data on power supply fluctuations, including maximum, minimum, and average voltage; data on maximum, minimum, and average kilowatts of power; data on maximum, minimum, and average time (in milliseconds) of electrical power disruptions in the perimeter continuous monitoring area over a period of seven consecutive days;
(e) whether the electrical current to be supplied is one-phase or three-phase;
(f) a short description of the topography of the area in which the facility subject to continuous monitoring is located and of the available logistical resources for the construction and installation of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and
(g) statistical data giving the maximum, minimum, and average number of vehicles exiting the portal and the road exits on an hourly and daily basis.
Each Party shall, whenever possible, provide additional information necessary to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, when that Party receives a request for such information.
If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty, and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:
(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| [s] |
| Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| Union of Soviet Socialist |
| Republics to the Negotiations |
| on Nuclear and Space Arms |
| July 31, 1991 |
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments to ensure effective engineering site surveys conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter known as the Treaty.
Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree as follows:
No later than 60 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels the following information on such facilities, including data on logistical resources and local topography:
(b) diagrams of underground utilities, including cabling, in the proposed perimeter continuous monitoring area;
(c) locations of proposed termination point(s) for water, sewage, and electrical supply lines;
(d) data on power supply fluctuations, including maximum, minimum, and average voltage; data on maximum, minimum, and average kilowatts of power; data on maximum, minimum, and average time (in milliseconds) of electrical power disruptions in the perimeter continuous monitoring area over a period of seven consecutive days;
(e) whether the electrical current to be supplied is one-phase or three-phase;
(f) a short description of the topography of the area in which the facility subject to continuous monitoring is located and of the available logistical resources for the construction and installation of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and
(g) statistical data giving the maximum, minimum, and average number of vehicles exiting the portal and the road exits on an hourly and daily basis.
Each Party shall, whenever possible, provide additional information necessary to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, when that Party receives a request for such information.
This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty, and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:
(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| Sincerely, |
| [s] |
| Ambassador Linton F. Brooks |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| United States of America to the |
| Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms |
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms
| July 31, 1991 |
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.
Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that:
(b) In connection with paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, photographs of items listed in Annex 2 to this letter be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty.
(c) Photographs of items listed in Annex 3 to this letter be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial technical exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features. Such photographs shall be in addition to those required under paragraph 4 of Section XIV and paragraph 10 of Section XV of the Protocol on Inspections Relating to the Treaty.
(d) The criteria for producing the photographs of items on the lists shall be the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.
(e) The Parties shall have the right to raise, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions concerning the provision of photographs pursuant to this agreement.
If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on this date and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:
(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| Sincerely, |
| [s] |
| Ambassador Linton F. Brooks |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| United States of America to the |
| Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms |
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms
List of photographs to be provided prior to signature of the Treaty:
For the United States of America:
B-1 unique support equipment, pylons, and rotary launchers
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Driver Training Vehicles
Launch-Associated Support Vehicles
Launch-Associated Railcars
List of photographs to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty:
For the United States of America:
MMIII without front section and without SCDM
MMII first stage
MMIII first stage
PK first stage
PK second stage
PK third stage
PK SCDM
SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:
TRIDENT I as a unit with front section (inert missile)
TRIDENT II as a unit with front section (inert missile)
POSEIDON first stage
TRIDENT I first stage
TRIDENT II first stage
Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-129
B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B
B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
B-1B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
B-2 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs of a type that does not include the category heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs
Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-86B
Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-129
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
SS-13 first stage
SS-17 in launch canister without front section
SS-18 in launch canister without front section
SS-19 in launch canister without front section
SS-24 (for silo launcher) in launch canister without front section
SS-24 (for rail-mobile launcher) in launch canister without front section
SS-25 in launch canister without front section first stage
Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "A"
Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "B"
Rail-mobile launcher of SS-24 ICBMs
Fixed structure for road-mobile launchers
Fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers
SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:
SS-N-8 as a unit with front section
SS-N-18 as a unit with front section
SS-N-20 as a unit with front section
SS-N-23 as a unit with front section
Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
Bear H6 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear H16 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear T training heavy bomber
Bison A former heavy bomber
AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCM
AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCM
List of photographs to be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features:
For the United States of America:
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
SS-17* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-19* as a unit without front section and without SCDM (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-24** (for silo launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
SS-24** (for rail-mobile launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
SS-25** as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
__________
* To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile and first stage during elimination no later than one year after signature of the Treaty.
** To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile during initial exhibitions.
SS-N-18 first stage
SS-N-20 first stage
SS-N-23 first stage
__________
* To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the first stage during elimination.
| July 31, 1991 |
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to accept the proposal set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.
Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that:
(b) In connection with paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, photographs of items listed in Annex 2 to this letter be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty.
(c) Photographs of items listed in Annex 3 to this letter be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial technical exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features. Such photographs shall be in addition to those required under paragraph 4 of Section XIV and paragraph 10 of Section XV of the Protocol on Inspections Relating to the Treaty.
(d) The criteria for producing the photographs of items on the lists shall be the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.
(e) The Parties shall have the right to raise, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions concerning the provision of photographs pursuant to this agreement.
This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on this date and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless before the expiration of this period:
(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.
Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.
Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin |
| Head of Delegation of the |
| Union of Soviet Socialist |
| Republics to the |
| Negotiations on Nuclear and |
| Space Arms |
List of photographs to be provided prior to signature of the Treaty:
For the United States of America:
B-1 unique support equipment, pylons, and rotary launchers
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Driver Training Vehicles
Launch-Associated Support Vehicles
Launch-Associated Railcars
List of photographs to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty:
For the United States of America:
MMIII without front section and without SCDM
MMII first stage
MMIII first stage
PK first stage
PK second stage
PK third stage
PK SCDM
SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:
TRIDENT I as a unit with front section (inert missile)
TRIDENT II as a unit with front section (inert missile)
POSEIDON first stage
TRIDENT I first stage
TRIDENT II first stage
Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-129
B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B
B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
B-1B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
B-2 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs of a type that does not include the category heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs
Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-86B
Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-129
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
SS-13 first stage
SS-17 in launch canister without front section
SS-18 in launch canister without front section
SS-19 in launch canister without front section
SS-24 (for silo launcher) in launch canister without front section
SS-24 (for rail-mobile launcher) in launch canister without front section
SS-25 in launch canister without front section first stage
Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "A"
Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "B"
Rail-mobile launcher of SS-24 ICBMs
Fixed structure for road-mobile launchers
Fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers
SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:
SS-N-8 as a unit with front section
SS-N-18 as a unit with front section
SS-N-20 as a unit with front section
SS-N-23 as a unit with front section
Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
Bear H6 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear H16 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear T training heavy bomber
Bison A former heavy bomber
AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCM
AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCM
List of photographs to be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features:
For the United States of America:
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
SS-17* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-19* as a unit without front section and without SCDM (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-24** (for silo launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
SS-24** (for rail-mobile launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
SS-25** as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
__________
* To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile and first stage during elimination no later than one year after signature of the Treaty.
** To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile during initial exhibitions.
SS-N-18 first stage
SS-N-20 first stage
SS-N-23 first stage
__________
* To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the first stage during elimination.
CORRESPONDENCE RELATED TO THE TREATY
| July 31, 1991 |
Dear Mr. Minister:
Our strategic arms control negotiators in Geneva have continued the discussions which Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I began in New York last year on prohibiting the basing of strategic offensive arms in third countries. I believe a solution to this problem is possible, and would like to offer some concrete thoughts on how this issue could be resolved.
Let me remind you of the many steps that we have already taken to meet your concerns:
First, we have agreed to your proposal to ban the basing of strategic offensive arms outside national territory. That ban will take effect immediately upon entry into force of the START Treaty.
Second, while we do not regard our operations in Holy Loch, Scotland as basing, we are prepared to commit that ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty.
Third, I can reaffirm our commitment, which I gave to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze orally, that no arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines, such as that currently in Holy Loch, will be carried out in the future.
Finally, I can formally reaffirm that the United States does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory.
But, as I explained in New York, we cannot accept a Provision in the START Treaty for inspections outside national territory. At the same time, with respect to our Agreed Statement on this subject, incorporated in the Agreed Statement Annex to the Treaty, I can cite the following paragraph thereof:
The Parties agreed that . . . the Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits.
In this connection, the sides should use, as appropriate, relevant procedures provided for in the Treaty or measures worked out by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission under provisions of Article XV of the Treaty.
I believe that, with the clarifications and assurances in this letter and your response, the Agreed Statement and the relevant Treaty provisions, all questions associated with third country basing have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction.
| Sincerely, |
| [s] |
| James A. Baker, III |
His Excellency
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow
| July 31, 1991 |
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I agree that your letter of this date provides a basis for solving the problem of prohibiting the basing of strategic offensive arms in third countries. I accept the proposals which you made in that letter.
We note that the arrangement which you have in Holy Loch, Scotland will be terminated and that all your ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty. For our part, I would like to state that, as we have indicated in the past, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory, and does not carry out any arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines similar to that currently existing in Holy Loch and commits itself not to carry out such arrangements in the future.
With respect to our Agreed Statement on this subject incorporated in the appropriate Annex to the Treaty, I can cite the following provision:
In this connection, the sides should use, as appropriate, relevant procedures provided for in the Treaty or measures worked out by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission under the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty.
I agree that, with the clarifications and assurances contained in your letter and this response, the Agreed Statement and the agreed Treaty provisions, all questions associated with third country basing have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction.
Mr. Secretary, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
| [s] |
| Alexander A. Bessmertnykh |
| Minister of Foreign Affairs of the |
| Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
His Excellency
Mr. James A.Baker, III
Secretary of State of the
United States of America
| December 6, 1990 |
Dear Eduard,
Our arms control experts have been discussing the subject of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with multiple weapons. As you recall, we agreed in May to ban long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. I understand from my experts that the Soviet side believes such a ban must be extended to include long-range non-nuclear ALCMs as well.
As I have told you in the past, we cannot permit the START Treaty to limit our conventional capabilities. In our view, the recent events in the Gulf underscore the importance of preserving non-nuclear options. At the same time, I would like to address your concerns over the possible circumvention of a ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Thus, let me make the following points:
First, under the START Treaty, the United States will comply with its obligation not to produce, test, or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMS with multiple weapons.
Second, in abiding by this obligation, the United States will not produce, test or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring the capability in the future to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor would the United States convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Any such action by either side would be inconsistent with its Treaty obligations.
Third, any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons which might be deployed would, of course, be distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs in accordance with the procedures, including appropriate exhibitions and inspections, which are now being worked out in Geneva for distinguishing long-range nuclear ALCMs from long-range non-nuclear ALCMs.
Finally, in accordance with Article XII* of the START Treaty, each side will be obliged to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to any questions raised by the other side's compliance with its Treaty obligation to ban long-range nuclear ALCM with multiple weapons.
Naturally, these assurances are premised on the assumption that the Soviet side interprets its obligations toward the United States under the Treaty with regard to long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons in the same way.
I believe that these points should alleviate your concerns. You should feel free to share them with your colleagues if you think this would be helpful. Of course, I am ready to meet with you to finalize this or any other issues.
Eduard, with these responses, and with the constructive steps your side took recently in Moscow on ALCMs, we should be able to resolve all remaining ALCM issues. Let's do so now.
| Sincerely, |
| [s] |
| James A. Baker, III |
The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
New York
| Moscow, December 6, 1990 |
Dear James,
In response to your letter on long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons, please allow me to inform you that desiring to rapidly reach agreement on the START Treaty, we are ready to accept the solution, which you propose in your letter. For its part the Soviet Union will adhere to the following:
Under the START Treaty, the USSR will comply with the obligation not to produce, test or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.
Under this obligation, neither the Soviet Union, nor the United States will produce, test or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring in the future the capability to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor will the Soviet Union convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Any such action by either side would be inconsistent with its Treaty obligations.
The START Treaty must contain provisions on how to distinguish long-range nuclear and long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, including appropriate exhibitions and inspections. As I understand it, the two sides agree that those provisions be applied to long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Thus, each side would be confident that the other side is complying with the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.
Finally, I note our common understanding that in accordance with Article XII* of the START Treaty each side will be obliged to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to questions raised by the other side regarding ambiguity or concerns related to the other sides compliance with its Treaty obligations regarding the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.
In conclusion, I would like to express my satisfaction with the solution we have found to this problem. I hope that an equally constructive and mutually acceptable solution will be found for all other outstanding questions related to the preparation of the START Treaty for signature.
There is not much time left until that signing, therefore it is very important that everything necessary be done now to conclude this historic agreement.
| Respectfully, |
| [s] |
| E. Shevardnadze |
His Excellency James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
United States of America
Washington, D.C.
________________
* As written, should be "XV"
| May 19, 1990 |
| Sincerely, |
| [s] |
| James A. Baker, III |
The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow
________________
*As written, should read "Protocol"
| [No Date] |
I received information from the head of our START Delegation in Geneva that the US Delegation had been instructed by Washington to suspend work which involves introducing changes into the Treaty in accordance with the agreement on heavy ICBMs reached in New York. In this context, the US side refers to the fact that allegedly I, in my conversation with you, said that the Soviet side did not intend to construct new silo launchers for heavy missiles.
I believe there is a misunderstanding here. In this connection, I would like to once again set forth the Soviet position, on the basis of which agreement was reached in New York. The essence of the matter is that in modernizing its heavy ICBMs the Soviet Union will construct new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs simultaneously with the elimination of such silo launchers, i.e., staying within the 154 limit. Thus, the Soviet side does not have plans of constructing an additional number (in excess of 154) of heavy ICBM silo launchers.
I wish to emphasize that our position is part of the New York agreement on heavy ICBMs, which we reaffirm in its entirety.
In conclusion, I would like once again to assure you, Mr. Secretary, that our meetings and discussions have given me a feeling of profound satisfaction, and express confidence that our useful dialogue and contacts will be continued in the interests of our two countries.
| Respectfully, |
| [s] |
| D. Yazov |
| Minister of Defense of the USSR |
| Marshal of the Soviet Union |
The Honorable Richard Cheney
Secretary of Defense of the
United States
Washington, D.C.
| Moscow, December 6, 1990 |
Dear Sirs,
In view of the doubts you had with regard to the issue of constructing new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs - in the context of the broader agreement on heavy ICBMs reached in New York in October 1990 - we deem it expedient to provide the following additional clarifications.
First of all, we would like to reiterate with full clarity that under that agreement new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs would be constructed solely for replacing silo launchers of heavy ICBMs eliminated according to the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures to the START Treaty, which means that their number will remain within the Treaty limits. As we understand it, you may have a question as to what would require such construction. An answer to this question should be sought in situations which might arise in real life.
We hope you agree with us that such accidents unfortunately cannot be fully ruled out, where - in particular, due to long period of operation of silo launchers - their further operation would be impossible. Incidentally, this has been taken into account in the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures to the START Treaty, which as the two sides have already agreed upon, provides for a special procedure for notifying and removing from Treaty accountability strategic offensive arms, including ICBM silo launchers, in case of their accidental loss or disablement beyond repair. Naturally each side would have the right in such cases to compensate for the systems removed from accountability - within the appropriate Treaty limits. This of course, applies to heavy ICBMs as well. At least for this reason, the possibility to construct new silo launchers for them should not be precluded.
Also, situations must not be ruled out where it would be necessary to relocate silo launchers, including those for heavy ICBMs, which means that they would be closed in one area of the country and constructed in another, for non-military considerations, particularly in connection with the internal political developments that are taking place in our country. Relocations of silo launchers might be required either during or after the period of reductions under the Treaty. A timely consideration of non-military factors by simply changing our current plans is difficult to realize.
At present we have no plans to relocate silo launchers for heavy ICBMs. Although such relocation, if required in the future, would incur additional great expenses and would be a hard step to take, we cannot, as you may understand, exclude such a possibility.
We hope these additional explanations remove completely the misunderstanding that has arisen and make it possible, at least, to reaffirm the New York agreements on heavy ICBMs and finally close this issue.
| Respectfully, |
| [s]E. Shevardnadze |
| [s] D. Yazov |
| His Excellency | His Excellency |
| James A. Baker, III | Richard B. Cheney |
| Secretary of State | Secretary of Defense |
| United States of America | United States of America |
| Washington, D.C. | Washington, D.C. |
| July 29, 1991 |
The Parties agree that:
| July 29, 1991 |
The Parties agree that, for any facility or item not listed in the Memorandum of Understanding under paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a notification, in accordance with paragraph 1, 2, or 3 of Section I of the Notifications Protocol Relating to this Treaty, shall be provided according to the complete list of the appropriate categories of data set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding or in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty, regardless of the Party to which such categories pertain. In this connection, due consideration shall be given to those changes that may be made in the above-mentioned categories of data pursuant to the relevant procedure provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding.
| July 29, 1991 |
In connection with paragraph 3 of Section II, Section VI, and paragraph 1 of Section VIII of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties agree that if they decide to convene a session of the Commission on the territory of one of the Parties, questions that may arise concerning the settlement of costs that may be incurred in connection with such a session shall be resolved prior to the convening of that session.
| July 29, 1991 |
The Parties agree that, with respect to the ban on support equipment at eliminated facilities in Paragraph 27 of Article V of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, support equipment includes, but is not limited to, ICBM emplacement equipment, training models of missiles, transporter-loaders of mobile ICBMs, storage cranes, launch-associated support vehicles, and driver training vehicles.
| July 29, 1991 |
The Parties agree that the ban on broadcasting telemetric information from ICBMs or SLBMs using narrow directional beaming, pursuant to subparagraph 2(c) of Article X of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, is established in order to ensure near-omnidirectional radiation of broadcast signals.
| July 29, 1991 |
The Parties agree that the English words "metric ton" and the Russian word "ton" mean 1,000 kilograms.
| July 29, 1991 |
The Parties agree that in order to facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities pursuant to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, questions concerning the use of chartered flights, if necessary for the transport of inspectors, monitors, equipment for the conduct of inspections, and equipment and supplies for the conduct of continuous monitoring activities shall be considered in the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
| July 29, 1991 |
The Parties note that the issue of currency of payment for costs relating to implementation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is not yet resolved and shall be deferred, without prejudice to the position of either Party, for subsequent consideration in a broader context with respect to both the Treaty and to other U.S.- Soviet agreements in the area of arms limitations.
| July 29, 1991 |
The Parties understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are necessary to verify compliance with provisions of the Treaty.
The Parties also understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol shall not apply to parameters not specified in that subparagraph.
| July 29, 1991 |
The Parties agree that the formulation "weapon storage area" as used in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms means a location, shown on a site diagram, for the long-term and short-term storage of nuclear and non-nuclear armaments. Such locations shall be depicted on site diagrams of facilities subject to inspection pursuant to subparagraph 14(f) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol.
| July 29, 1991 |
Recognizing the importance of the exchange of site diagrams to guarantee reciprocal rights in respect to suspect site inspections pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Data Base Relating to this Treaty that are subject to suspect site inspection shall meet the criteria in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties agree that facilities or portions of facilities that are involved in the production of solid rocket motors shall not be subject to inspection. The Parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities subject to suspect site inspection shall be exchanged no later than 30 days after the date of signature of the Treaty.
| July 29, 1991 |
The sides understand that, in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol, they assume the obligation to agree within the JCIC on procedures for weighing or determining by other means the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs with the purpose of confirming the launch weight of ICBMs or SLBMs of a new type declared on the basis of a change in launch weight before the beginning of deployment of any such new type of ICBM or SLBM. The Parties further understand that they are obligated to negotiate such procedures in good faith, and without efforts to artificially hinder agreement on such procedures so as not to delay the deployment of such an ICBM or SLBM.
The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to the B-2 heavy
bomber. This statement will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms and will be politically binding.
The United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long-range nuclear
ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight-tested from a B-2 heavy bomber.
The United States of America recognizes that the first flight test of a long-range ALCM from a B-2 heavy
bomber will require that : B-2 heavy bombers be exhibited pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty;
B-2 heavy bombers be subject to inspection pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty; and all other provisions of the
Treaty that pertain to heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested
apply to B-2 heavy bombers.
The United States of America recognizes that requirements under the Treaty referred to in this statement will
also apply with equal force to heavy bombers, both of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, of any new type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested
| July 29, 1991 |
The United States of America, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The United States of America declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner.
| July 29, 1991 |
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner.
| July 29, 1991 |
The U.S. side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the U.S. side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20-23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty of December 8, 1987. The U.S. Side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty.
| July 29, 1991 |
The Soviet side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the Soviet side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20-23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty of December 8, 1987. The Soviet Side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty.
| July 29, 1991 |
The U.S. side has taken note of the Soviet sides statement and believes that such information would be helpful in discussing compliance concerns when and if such concerns are considered in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
| July 29, 1991 |
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has vehicles in its inventory that resemble launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles. In the event that a compliance concern arises because of the presence of such a vehicle at an eliminated facility, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will either provide information on the features of such vehicles that distinguish them, by national technical means of verification, from launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles, or provide clarification about what the vehicle is and the reason for its presence at the eliminated facility.
| July 29, 1991 |
The United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, except with the United Kingdom. The United States attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent in helping maintain world peace. As a result, the United States has, for many years, helped maintain and modernize that deterrent. This is what we have referred to as "the existing pattern of cooperation" between the United States and the United Kingdom. It currently includes agreement by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapons system. In this regard, the United States endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that "the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States."
| July 29, 1991 |
The Soviet side takes note of the statement, made by the United States in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between the USSR and the U.S., to the effect that the United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the START Treaty, except with the United Kingdom.
It also notes the statement made by the U.S. side to the effect that the existing pattern of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the area of strategic offensive arms currently consists of the provision by the United States of Trident-II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union also takes into account the fact that the United States of America endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that "the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States."
If the United States were to alter its existing pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom on strategic offensive arms in such a way that the terms and purposes of the START Treaty would be circumvented and the strategic balance altered, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider its supreme interests jeopardized. In that case, in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider that it has the right to withdraw from the Treaty.
| July 31, 1991 |
| July 29, 1991 |
Paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol describes the method for determining the throw-weight of ICBMs or SLBMs, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles. The U.S. side understood that this method for determining throw-weight was negotiated specifically to address design characteristics that are unique to the RSM-54 SLBM, known to the U.S. side as the SS-N-23. However, the Soviet side now asserts that the throw-weight of the SS-N-23 should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of the Throw-weight Protocol.
The Soviet side also informed the U.S. side that the accountable throw-weight of the SS-N-23, 2800 kg, was determined on the basis of the 1(b) method. While the U.S. side believes the SS-N-23 is of 1(a), not 1(b), design; for purposes of calculating throw-weight, the U.S. side accepts the SS-N-23 as a type 1(b) SLBM. However, the U.S. side stresses that this acceptance is without prejudice to our right to contest in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission the throw-weight values of any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporates a design similar to the SS-N-23, if such throw-weight values are based on the 1(b) method.
| July 29, 1991 |
In connection with the U.S. Statement on the SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54) the Soviet side confirms that the throw-weight of that missile should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, since in terms of its design the SLBM SS-N-23 does not belong to missiles, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.
In this connection, the Soviet side states that there is no ground for raising an issue related to determining the throw-weight pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol for any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporated a design similar to the SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54).
| July 29, 1991 |
With respect to the inclusion of the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs in Annex G and H to the Memorandum of Understanding, the attachment joints used on bombers belonging to the United States of America are of a design that allows the attachment of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. In the U.S. view, such armament attachment joints are inappropriate for use as specified features that make heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Further, since such armament attachment joints are installed on airplanes belonging to the United States of America other than heavy bombers, their presence is not sufficient to consider an airplane to be a heavy bomber.
| July 29, 1991 |
The Soviet side makes the following statement concerning the purposes of inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of data on the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs. Noting the importance of verification of the provisions of the Treaty relating to counting the number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers, the Soviet side states that the technical data distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs to pylon, measured on pylon and distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCM to launcher are included in Annexes G and H to the Memorandum of Understanding in order to confirm the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of a type, category, and, if applicable, variant, is equipped. The Soviet side agrees that, since the design of attachment joints used on heavy bombers of the United States of America is such that it permits the suspension of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear arms, joints for attaching weapons shall be considered as a non-mandatory distinguishing feature for categories of heavy bombers listed in Sections (ii) and (iii) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding.
| July 29, 1991 |
The U.S. side believes that construction of any additional underground structures adjacent to waters in which ballistic missile submarines operate and comparable in size and configuration to the ones located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet, the Yagelnaya Submarine Base, and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base, would raise concerns regarding compliance with the obligation provided for in Article V, paragraph 26 of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. For its part, the United States does not have such underground structures, does not plan to construct and will not construct any such underground structures while the START Treaty remains in force. The U.S. side proceeds from the premise that the Soviet side will exercise similar restraint.
| July 29, 1991 |
Since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has underground structures located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara inlet (Kola peninsula), the Yagelnaya submarine base (Kola peninsula), and the Pavlovskoye submarine base (Primorskiy kray), in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and in order to settle the issue of these underground structures once and for all, the Soviet side states that these underground structures have no adits that make them accessible to waterborne craft of any displacement from adjacent waters and that the Soviet Union has no plans to construct and will not construct such adits as long as the Treaty remains in force. Effective verification of this shall be ensured by national technical means.
The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the United States of America does not have and will not construct similar underground structures as long as the Treaty remains in force.
While the United States cannot circumscribe the Soviet right to withdraw from the START Treaty if the Soviet Union believes its supreme interests are jeopardized, the full exercise by the United States of its legal rights under the ABM Treaty, as we have discussed with the Soviet Union in the past, would not constitute a basis for such withdrawal. The United States will be signing the START Treaty and submitting it to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification with this view. In addition, the provisions for withdrawal from the START Treaty based on supreme national interests clearly envision that such withdrawal could only be justified by extraordinary events that have jeopardized a Party's supreme interest. Soviet statements that a future, hypothetical U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could create such conditions are without legal or military foundation. The ABM Treaty, as signed on May 26, 1972, has already been substantially amended and clarified by subsequent agreements between the Parties. Moreover, current and future negotiations, to which the Soviet Union committed in the June 1990 Summit Joint Statement, could lead to significant additional changes in the ABM Treaty, or its replacement. Changes in the ABM Treaty agreed to by the Parties would not be a basis for questioning the effectiveness or viability of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet side states the following:
This Treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the Treaty between the U.S.
and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as signed on May 26, 1972.
The extraordinary events referred to in Article XV1 of this Treaty also include events related to withdrawal by
one of the Parties from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, or related to its material
breach.
__________________
1 As written, understood to mean "Article XVII". Two Treaty Articles were included after the statement was made, but before
the Treaty was signed.
The U.S. side notes the statement of the Soviet side and believes that the concern it expresses about the impact
of the new Tri-service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is
totally unfounded.
The TSSAM is a non-nuclear, short range cruise missile that is not subject to START and that will have no
impact on the integrity, stability, or durability of that agreement. The U.S. side stands by the Houston Agreement,
which emphasized that the United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long
range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight tested from a B-2 heavy bomber. The TSSAM is not a
long-range nuclear ALCM, and the Treaty is clear that its potential use on a B-2 would in no way imply that a B-2 is
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or alter the status of the B-2 under START.
The U.S. believes that no START provisions will apply based on the potential equipage of the B-2 with
TSSAM.
STATEMENTS EXCHANGED AT A MEETING BETWEEN U.S. AMBASSADOR
BROOKS AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN ON JULY 27, 1991.
| July 31, 1991 |
The United States of America, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the United States of America for the duration of the Treaty. This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding.
The first such declaration and all subsequent declarations are provided on the understanding that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make comparable declarations. The first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent declarations will be provided annually thereafter.
The United States of America will specify the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years that the Treaty is in force.
The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year.
Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations.
Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.
The United States of America will provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics information on which particular types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. Such information will be confidential and will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.
The United States of America will not produce or deploy sea-launched cruise missiles armed with two or more nuclear weapons.
The United States of America will make these declarations for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and invites the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make comparable declarations. These declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed upon by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the future.
For the duration of the Treaty, the United States of America will also provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics annually confidential information on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of between 300 and 600 kilometers, deployed on surface ships and submarines. This information will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and annually thereafter.
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will continue to seek, as stated in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification.
| July 31, 1991 |
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the United States of America with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the duration of the Treaty. This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding.
The first such declaration and all subsequent declarations are provided on the understanding that the United States of America will make comparable declarations. The first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent declarations will be provided annually thereafter.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will specify the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years that the Treaty is in force.
The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year.
Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations.
Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will provide the United States of America information on which particular types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. Such information will be confidential and will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce or deploy sea-launched cruise missiles armed with two or more nuclear weapons.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make these declarations for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and invites the United States of America to make comparable declarations. These declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed upon by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the future.
For the duration of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will also provide the United States of America annually confidential information on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of between 300 and 600 kilometers, deployed on surface ships and submarines. This information will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and annually thereafter.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will continue to seek, as stated in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification.
| July 31, 1991 |
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the importance of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and acting in the interest of strengthening stability and enhancing confidence, makes the following declaration concerning its plan with respect to the Tu-22M bomber, which is known to the United States as the Backfire. This declaration will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty and will be politically binding.
The Tu-22M airplane is a medium bomber and is not a strategic offensive arm. At the same time, taking into account the need to remove all concerns standing in the way of the agreements, the Soviet side declares that it will not give the Tu-22M airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances in any manner, including by in-flight refueling.
The Soviet Union will not have more than 300 Tu-22M airplanes at any one time, not including naval Tu-22M airplanes. The number of naval Tu-22M airplanes will not exceed 200.
In view of the fact that there must be no constraints in the START Treaty on arms that are not strategic
offensive arms, Tu-22M airplanes will not be subject to that Treaty.