QUESTION: One last thing - before the Soviet Union collapsed, in those heady days when Gorbechev would announce a massive unilateral reduction of one weapon or another, compelling the Bush Administration - maybe the word compelling is editorial - to respond with cuts, there were sharp reductions. Is this Administration now simply in a position of having to wait for Yeltsin to push the START treaty through, which he can't apparently - he hasn't so far - to reduce arsenals? Is there any notion that maybe the U.S. doesn't need 10,000 nuclear weapons these days?
MR. RUBIN: Again, without crossing some tricky thresholds that have not been crossed, let me say the following. We think the best way to pursue deep reductions is through a controlled process of treaties, and a controlled process of verification; that this is the best way to assure the world and assure the United States - and for that matter, the Russians - that this is being done in a controlled, organized and stabilizing way. We are prepared to be as innovative as possible in trying to examine how to proceed, including, as I said, things like including warheads and fissile material.
With respect to the size of the cuts, the President of the United States and the President of Russia have already agreed on some general ranges on the objectives of START III. But to get down and negotiate that agreement, both the President of Russia and the President of the United States believe the necessary prerequisite is ratification of START II. We do not think the prospects for START II ratification are dead. We think that it would be better for START II to be ratified sooner rather than later; and we're certainly not encouraged by the recent events in recent weeks in which it has been delayed.
But we do believe that, as President Yeltsin continues to put the pressure on and explain to the members of the Duma that it is hurting Russia for START II not to be ratified, that logic and wisdom will prevail. It sometimes takes time for treaties to be ratified. In the meantime, we continue to have exploratory discussions, as we have had for some time, on where we go from the point that START II is ratified.
So we want to see deep cuts in nuclear arms. We want to see all the different capabilities taken into account. And we want to move forward. One of the prerequisites for moving forward in sort of a traditional negotiating context is the ratification of START II.