Chapter 8 - INF Short Notice Inspections

Inspections with Radiation Detection Equipment

During the INF treaty negotiations, the Soviet Union indicated its intention to convert some of its SS-20 missile operating bases to SS-25 bases. The SS-25 was a fifth-generation intercontinental ballistic missile that contained a single warhead. It was road mobile, carried in a sealed canister, and mounted on a transporter-erector-launcher.¹⁶ The SS-25's range (10,500 kilometers) placed it outside the INF Treaty (500 to 5,500 km). However, the United States expressed specific concerns during treaty negotiations. When the SS-25 missile system was deployed in the field, with its missile inside the canister and mounted on the launcher, the U.S. contended that the canister might conceal an SS-20 missile. The one distinguishing characteristic between the two systems, U.S. treaty negotiators argued, was that the SS-25 had a single nuclear warhead, while the SS-20 had three warheads.¹⁷

After considerable discussion, the Soviet Union agreed to a provision in the treaty allowing the inspecting party the right to use radiation detection equipment to measure the fast neutron intensity flux emanating from the launch canister.¹⁸ A launch canister with a missile inside containing a single warhead (SS-25) emitted a different pattern of fast neutrons than did one with a missile having three warheads (SS-20). The American inspection team, using the RDE, compared their measurements against a set of benchmark radiation measurements taken during a special inspection in the summer of 1989. At that time, Commander Williams and a special INF inspection team had gone to two Soviet missile operating bases (one with SS-20s, the other with SS-25s) and had used the RDE to measure the emanations from the warheads in their canisters. The team's RDE benchmark measurement data, which were confirmed on site by their Soviet escorts, became the standard against which all subsequent RDE measurements were compared.¹⁹

In the Memorandum of Agreement of December 21, 1989, the USSR and the U.S. agreed on procedures on how RDE measurements would be taken during an on-site inspection. The inspection team had the right under the treaty to go to a former INF missile site that had been converted to a missile operating base for another system, set up its RDE, and measure only the exterior of the missile canisters to determine if the neutrons emanating indicated one or three warheads. For the entire period during which radiation measurements were being taken at the site, the party being inspected had the right to observe the process. Both parties, inspectors and escorts, recorded, processed, and made graphic representation of the RDE data.²⁰

An America inspector conducting training on the Radiation Detecting Equipment.

		After measuring each missile canister, the two parties compared the results of the RDE measurements made on site with the RDE benchmark measurements made during baseline. If the data did not differ by more than 50 percent, the on-site missile "would not be considered a missile subject to the Treaty." If the data did differ by more than 50 percent, the inspected party had to open the launch canister and allow the inspecting party to confirm by visual observation that the missile inside was not "a missile subject to the Treaty." In any event, after all of the RDE measurements of the launch canisters, the inspecting team had the right to select one of the launch canisters at random and have it opened by the inspected party for visual inspection. This provision added a measure of randomness to the inspection process and allowed a visual check of one SS-25 missile canister by the inspectors on site.²¹ Radiation detection equipment and procedures were used primarily during short-notice inspections. The same rules applied as for all other short-notice inspections: the inspection lasted no more than 24 hours; the inspection team was transported to the site within nine hours; the team had a maximum of 10 inspectors. The final inspection report was written on site by the team at the conclusion of the inspection. The report was signed by the U.S. and Soviet team chiefs. Each nation retained a copy.
		The INF Treaty: A Template for the Future
SS-20 and Pershing II INF missiles on display at the Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.		During the first three years, the INF Treaty permitted each party to conduct 20 short-notice inspections each year. From June 1988 to June 1991, both nations conducted their full quota of 60 short-notice inspections.²² By the end of the third treaty year--May 31, 1991--the United States and the USSR had eliminated all of their declared INF missiles and components and had declared as closed out all INF activity at the missile operating bases and support facilities. With the exception of a few closeout inspections in June, July, and August 1991, only two types of on-site inspections remained after the end of the third treaty year: continuous portal monitoring and short-notice inspections. These would continue as inspection rights in the treaty for 10 more years. During the first three years, however, a complex, five-part process had emerged for carrying out all aspects of the INF Treaty.

The first part consisted of U.S. and Soviet diplomats refining through their work in the Special Verification Commission the basic treaty documents: the Protocols on Eliminations and Inspections; the Memorandum of Understanding and Data Updates; and the Memoranda of Agreement. The second part was the effort by the American and Soviet on-site inspection agencies, the inspection and escort teams, and the new treaty communication centers. Cumulatively, their work established precedents, patterns, and processes for carrying out the on-site inspection provisions of the treaty. The third part of the process was the effort by the U.S. and Soviet military services, which owned and operated the INF missiles, launchers, support equipment and missile sites. They did the hard work of demobilizing, transporting, and eliminating the systems and closing out the sites. The fourth part consisted of the efforts within both governments to audit and analyze the treaty's two basic obligations of eliminating INF missile systems and sites, and of ceasing production, testing, and deployment of all ground-based, intermediate- and shorter-range INF missile systems. Judgements rendered here were critical to the fifth and final part. Leaders in both nations had to decide on a continuing basis if the other party was in compliance with the treaty. Their compliance decisions became part of a larger question about the role of arms control treaties in national security. This was the ultimate issue; and it took on added significance in the 1990s as both nations entered into new, more extensive arms control treaties and agreements.

Until these new treaties actually entered into force, the cumulative record of on-site inspections under the INF Treaty constituted an important reservoir of experience. During the first three years, both U.S. and Soviet inspectors and escorts developed a sense of professionalism in implementing the INF Treaty. This professionalism was rooted in a thorough knowledge of the treaty; leadership by the team chiefs, deputies, and linguists; and participation in hundreds of INF inspection and escort missions. This sense was captured in a quiet exchange in late December 1988, in Riga, Latvia, between a Soviet journalist and an American INF inspection team member. The Americans had just completed a closeout inspection of a former SSC-X-4 site at Jelgava, Latvia. They had flown to Riga, the capital, and were preparing to go from the airport to the city when a reporter from Sovetsksaya Latviya asked to interview them. He singled out Lt. Colonel Nicholas Troyan, the team chief, and General Roland Lajoie, who on this occasion was one of the 10 inspectors.²³

Riga, Latvia
January 1, 1989

Latvian reporter: Please tell us how the treaty is being fulfilled. Do you have any complaints against the Soviet side?

Inspector Lajoie: From my point of view and from the point of view of the OSIA representatives, the treaty is being fulfilled irreproachably. About 150 inspections have already been carried out; they have shown that the elimination of the missiles is proceeding as was agreed.

Reporter: Tell us, if you can, what you like about our republic. Have you seen anything besides military facilities?

Lajoie: We have an expression: An inspector is not a tourist. But nonetheless a very interesting program was organized for us. In 15 minutes we should be at a concert at the Dom Cathedral. By the way, I am not visiting Latvia for the first time. Six years ago, while I was working in the American embassy in Moscow I had the opportunity to visit Riga. I know for American diplomats the Baltic region, and especially Riga, is always of special interest.

Reporter: Will you be visiting us again?

Lajoie: The treaty says that on-site inspections may be made for the next 12 years. Therefore, we will probably be back, but infrequently. The missiles are all destroyed and the bases are empty.

Reporter: Then everything was done properly?

Lajoie: Yes.

"An inspector is not a tourist."

General Lajoie

General Roland Lajoie being interviewed by the media.