Chapter 8 - INF Short Notice Inspections

Inspection Team Composition and Equipment

According to American inspectors, short-notice inspections were among the most interesting of the five types of INF on-site inspections. They contained an element of surprise, because the party being inspected had no advance notice of the site to be inspected. They had an element of pressure, because the inspection could not exceed 24 hours on site. The only exception to this 24-hour rule was a treaty provision for the inspecting team chief and senior escorting officer to agree to an extension of no more than eight hours. In fact, during the first three treaty years, no inspection was ever extended. Short-notice inspections also had an element of interest. Short-notice inspections of closed-out or converted INF missile operating bases and support facilities, after they had been formally eliminated, constituted an opportunity for on-site inspectors to examine these sites. If a missile site had been converted from an operating base for INF missiles--for instance, Soviet SS-20s--to a base for missiles with longer ranges--such as the SS-25s (not an INF missile)--short-notice inspectors might find inspecting that site to be of special interest.

For all on-site inspections the INF Treaty spelled out team size, composition, leadership, and, to a degree, how the inspection team could organize itself. On-site inspection teams conducting short-notice, as well as baseline and closeout, inspections were limited to 10 members. Each inspection team operated under the direction of a team leader and a deputy. At least two inspectors on each team spoke the language of the party being inspected. Short-notice inspections, like those conducted during baseline and closeouts, were limited to 24 hours.¹⁰ American teams conducting short-notice inspections always brought with them the measuring, weighing, and photographic equipment authorized in the treaty's Memorandum of Agreement. This equipment, which was negotiated, had to be hand-carried to the site by the inspection team members. The equipment consisted of the following items:

Authorized INF Team Equipment¹¹

	United States	USSR
Linear measuring devices (each inspector)	2 measuring tapes (30m, 3m) 1 plum bob set (bob, cord, target) 1 pi tape	3 measuring tapes (20m, 10m, 5m)
Portable weighing devices (each team)	4 Heavy-duty portable scales	4 Heavy-duty portable scales
Camera equipment (each team)	2 Polaroid camera sets (8-eight pack film)	2 Polaroid camera sets (8-eight pack film)
Other portable equipment (each inspector)	1 Flashlight, 1 Compass 1 Roll of seals (tamper indicating)	1 Flashlight, 1 Compass 1 Sealing device (tamper indicating)
Radiation detection device (each team)	1 Radiation detection device set	1 Radiation detection device set

This equipment allowed the inspectors to measure and, if appropriate, weigh the missiles and support equipment and facilities declared to be present at the site. The objective was for the inspectors to ascertain that the INF missiles and facilities were in fact those covered under the treaty. Storage buildings, garages, trucks--all were subject to measurement to discover if a treaty item, a missile stage, for instance, had been stored in them. All on-site inspections of active INF missile operating bases or facilities involved visually inspecting, measuring, and possibly weighing the INF missile systems that were on site at the time of the inspection.

The standard characteristics of these missiles and their supporting equipment had been declared in the treaty's Memorandum of Understanding.¹² In that memorandum, both parties had published technical data for each INF system-length of the missile; length of first and second stages; maximum diameter; weight of first and second stages; maximum length, width, and height of launchers; and characteristics of the missile transporters, support equipment, and missile shelters. During baseline, these standard measurements were confirmed and, where necessary, corrected by one inspection team from the U.S. and one from the USSR. Commander John C. Williams, U.S. Navy, led the U.S. team and they conducted baseline technical data measurements on the six Soviet INF missile systems. The measurements made by this team became the standard used by all other U.S. teams as they conducted on-site inspections.¹³

Inspection teams had to hand-carry all inspection equipment from the point of entry to the inspection sites. Shown here are the emergency first aid kit, Polaroid camera with film, flashlights, compass, seals, measuring tapes, measuring rod, and weighing scales.

SGT Stephen C. Prato, escort, assists and confirms measurement by Soviet inspector G.M. Komogortsev.

When the inspection team leader decided to document a treaty ambiguity, Polaroid photographs were taken. The escorting team took the photos. Here SGT Spenser A. Smith, holding the camera, takes the picture, while Colonel Aleksandr V. Kuznetsov (l), Soviet team chief, observes.

Two Polaroid cameras, a primary camera and a backup, were carried to the site by the inspecting team. The treaty's Protocol on Inspections defined their use.¹⁴During an inspection, an inspector had the right to request a clarification from the escorting party regarding an ambiguity. The term "ambiguity" was never formally defined in the treaty, but it was clear that the on-site inspector could ask for a clarification if he or she had a question about an aspect of the treaty. To give an example, an on-site inspector might ask for a clarification about an object or building at the site that did not appear to conform to the description provided in the treaty documents. Or an inspector might question a procedure used during an elimination for destroying an item on a missile launcher, rendering it inoperable.

To resolve the ambiguity, the treaty stipulated that the inspector had the right to request a clarification from the in-country senior escort. If the inspector's questions could not be resolved satisfactorily, the inspecting party could make a note of the question or issue on the inspection report and they could request that a photograph be taken. The inspecting team's camera would be used, but the escort team, according to the treaty, would take the photograph. Two photographs were snapped, one for each party. Both parties had agreed during the INF Technical Talks to use Polaroid cameras. Once the photos were taken, they were included in the final inspection report, along with any explanation of the ambiguity.¹⁵ From this point, resolution of the ambiguity lay in the hands of decision makers in the respective national capitals. If they felt the inspector's questions merited further consideration, they could place the issue before the Special Verification Commission in Geneva. The commission was authorized by the treaty and its charter to resolve questions relating to compliance with treaty obligations. If the issue did not merit further consideration, it remained as noted in the inspection report.

In general, the equipment authorized by the INF Treaty for use in short-notice (as well as baseline, closeout, and elimination) inspections constituted a "low" technology approach. The treaty limited on-site inspections to a prescribed area (a site), to direct observation (10 inspectors on site), and to making a few simple measurements (length, diameter, weight) to confirm gross system data. There were two major exceptions to this generalization. The first involved the X-ray imaging equipment used by U.S. continuous portal monitoring inspections at Votkinsk. The second occurred during short-notice inspections when the inspecting party used specially authorized radiation detection equipment (RDE).