The logistics of scheduling, transporting, housing, feeding, equipping, and supporting this and other INF inspection teams and the aircrews was a major effort for both the U.S. and the Soviet on-site inspection agencies. Both nations needed an extensive logistical infrastructure. OSIA established field offices and support personnel in Washington and San Francisco; at Yokota Air Base in Japan; at Frankfurt, West Germany; and in Moscow and Ulan-Ude in the Soviet Union. Stretching across 19 time zones, these people and offices had responsibility for supporting the mission of on-site inspections and escorts under the INF Treaty.25

Colonel Troyan's team was not the only American inspection team in the USSR during September and October 1988. Three other U.S. teams were conducting closeout inspections of six Soviet missile bases, in widely dispersed areas of the USSR. At the same time, eight more American teams were monitoring the destruction of Soviet missiles at Kasputin Yar, Saryozek, Kansk, Chita, Stan'kovo, Sarny, Lesnaya, and Jelgava. OSIA's director said that in the fall of 1988 the United States had almost 100 INF inspectors in the Soviet Union conducting closeout, elimination, and portal monitoring on-site inspections.26

The record of the United States in conducting closeout inspections of Soviet INF sites can be understood by examining the inspection activity in each of the first three treaty years. All INF sites, Soviet and American, had to be closed out or declared as closed out within those three treaty years, from June 1, 1988, to June 1, 1991. The term "declared as closed out" took on added significance at the end of the third treaty year. In the final weeks of that year the United States and the Soviet Union declared several INF sites closed out--having no INF missiles, support systems, facilities, or activities. The declarations were made in late April and May 1991, but the actual closeout inspections occurred in June, July, and August. Consequently, a few of the final closeout inspections were actually accomplished in the fourth treaty year.

United States INF Closeout Inspections27

1st INF Treaty Year, June 1988-June 1989 50
2nd INF Treaty Year, June 1989-June 1990 36
3rd INF Treaty Year, June 1990-June 1991 47*

*Includes U.S. inspections in June, July and August 1991.

American inspectors boarding a bus, Ulan-Ude, USSR.


Missile Operating Base, RAF Molesworth, Great Britain.
  As noted earlier, closings of U.S. missile sites progressed at a distinctly different pace than closings of Soviet sites. This was because the United States had fewer sites (31 to the USSR's 130) and because U.S. basing strategy placed its INF missiles, specifically the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) on larger, more centralized missile operating bases. During the initial baseline phase, the United States declared five INF sites closed. Soviet INF inspectors conducted closeout inspections of each site. During the remainder of the first treaty year, the United States declared two other INF sites closed out: RAF Molesworth in Great Britain and Florennes Air Base in Belgium. When the INF Treaty was signed in December 1987, the U.S. Air Force had just begun the deployment of INF GLCM missiles at Molesworth. Eighteen missiles and six launchers were listed in the treaty's Memorandum of Understanding and had been inspected during baseline. Following that period, the Molesworth GLCMs were withdrawn from the force, prepared for shipping, and transported to the United States for elimination at Davis-Monthan AFB in Arizona. At the same time, the Air Force prepared the site at Molesworth to be closed out in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. Following the formal closeout declaration in December 1988, Soviet INF inspectors arrived at Molesworth on January 19, 1989, for the closeout inspection. Colonel John Fer, USAF, led the American escort team. After the 24-hour inspection, Colonel Fer and the escort team accompanied the Soviet team to the point of entry, RAF Greenham Common Air Base, where they departed for Moscow.28

In Belgium, the status of the American GLCM base at Florennes was similar to that of Molesworth at the time of the signing of the INF Treaty in December 1987. In this case, 20 cruise missiles and 12 launchers had been deployed to Florennes; deployment had stopped at that point.29 In the summer of 1988, the INF site had been inspected by a Soviet team during baseline. Then the Florennes' missiles and launchers were withdrawn from the force, prepared for shipment, and returned to the United States for elimination. The last of the Florennes-based cruise missiles left Belgium on December 13, 1988.30 Following the required base closure activities, the United States declared that the INF site at Florennes had been closed out. On March 10, 1989, Colonel Fer again served as senior American escort for the Soviet team performing the closeout inspection. This was the final closing of a U.S. site in the first treaty year. Of the 31 sites declared in the MOU, the United States eliminated seven sites in that first year.31

By contrast, during the second treaty year (June 1, 1989, to June 1, 1990) the United States placed no sites in closeout status.32 The United States operated Pershing II missile bases at three sites in West Germany: Schwaebisch-Gmuend, Neu Ulm, and Waldheide-Neckarsulm. In addition, there was a Pershing II missile storage facility at Weilerbach and a launcher repair facility at the U.S. Equipment Maintenance Center at Hausen in Frankfurt. All of these Pershing II sites remained active during the second treaty year. American GLCMs were deployed in U.S. Air Force units on six missile operating bases in five Western European nations: the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, West Germany, and the Netherlands. The missile base in the Netherlands, at Woensdrecht, was never activated; it was closed out during the baseline period. Two other American cruise missile bases, RAF Molesworth in the United Kingdom and Florennes in Belgium, were closed out in the first treaty year. The three remaining bases in Western Europe were large, centralized, modern bases. Greenham Common in the United Kingdom had 101 missiles and 29 launchers; Comiso in Italy, 108 missiles and 31 launchers; and Wuescheim in West Germany, 62 missiles and 31 launchers. In addition, the United States had its GLCM missile repair facility at the SABCA plant in Grosselies, Belgium. This facility and the three major cruise missile bases remained in active status throughout the second treaty year.33


Thus, the United States entered the third treaty year, one in which all of its remaining INF sites had to be closed out, with 24 active sites. In the first half of that year, it declared three INF sites closed: SABCA-Grosselies, Belgium; Wueschheim, West Germany; and Waldheide-Neckarsulm, West Germany. Soviet INF inspectors conducted closeout inspections at each installation. In the second half of the treaty year (December 1, 1990, to June 1, 1991), the remaining 21 American INF sites were readied for closeout in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. By May 31, 1991, the United States had declared all of its remaining INF sites eliminated. The following table gives the number of Soviet INF closeout inspections by treaty year.

Soviet INF Closeout Inspections34

1st INF Treaty Year, June 1988 - June 1989 7
2nd INF Treaty Year, June 1989 - June 1990 0
3rd INF Treaty Year, June 1990 -June 1991 24*

*Includes Soviet inspections conducted in June and July 1991.

Conversion of Closed-Out INF Missile Sites
The INF Treaty contained a provision that recognized that either party might wish to convert an eliminated INF site to another purpose. Article X, paragraph 9, stated that if a party to the treaty wanted to convert an INF missile operating base to use by another non-INF missile system, then they had to notify the other party "no less" than 30 days before the scheduled beginning date of the conversion. The notice declared the purpose of the conversion and the completion date.35 The Soviet Union exercised this treaty provision and converted some of its former INF missile operating bases to facilities for newer, longer-range SS-25 mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles. The United States did not. Converted sites, because they had once been INF missile operating bases, were still subject to short-notice on-site inspections, which is the topic of the next chapter.    


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