At Magna, the OSIA detachment commander, Lt. Commander James L. Szatkowski, USN, worked with the Hercules Corporation to initiate construction of a two-mile-long, nine-foot-high, double-chain-link fence around the perimeter of the 185-acre former Pershing II rocket motor production area. This was the area that would be subject to portal monitoring on-site inspections. Within this fenced area, the Hercules Corporation operated an active, working rocket motor production plant. An average of 400 to 500 trucks and other vehicles entered and left the fenced area each week. Under the treaty, Soviet inspectors would have the right to monitor all vehicles exiting the Hercules facility, to inspect those vehicles transporting cargo larger than a certain dimension (Pershing II first-stage rocket motor), and to conduct patrols of the perimeter fence.¹²

Before the Soviet inspectors arrived at the site, other construction projects had been initiated. The United States built a single portal road exiting from the former Pershing II plant. According to the treaty, all vehicles that could contain an intermediate range ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), or the longest stage (Pershing II, first stage) of any such missile, had to leave the plant on this portal road. On one side of the road, within sight of the plant and the perimeter fence, the Soviet Union had the right to build up to three buildings, which would serve as a data collection center, inspection team headquarters, and warehouse. In fact, during the technical talks, the Soviet INF delegation had indicated its intention to have only a single building, a modular trailer flown from the Soviet Union, at its portal. This building would serve both as their data collection center and as site headquarters.¹³

Magna, Utah, lies approximately 15 miles west of Salt Lake City.

While these meetings and site preparations were under way, Commander Szatkowski pulled together a small staff of technical managers, contract specialists, and security people. OSIA's initial Magna Detachment--Robert Erickson, Edward Dotson, Norman Olsen, and Elizabeth Olsen--worked closely with the Hercules Corporation, its plant managers, and employees. Plant security was a major concern, with training on the treaty and security precautions instituted for all employees and senior managers.

For nearly seven months, the Hercules plant and OSIA's Magna Detachment were the center of intense managerial and policy attention. If the INF Treaty itself was unprecedented, the right to conduct continuous portal monitoring inspections at a private industrial plant was extraordinary. Congress, senior administration officials, and the media wanted information on the planning, preparations, and readiness for the Soviet portal monitoring inspectors.¹⁵ One week before the Soviet inspectors were expected to arrive in Magna, General Lajoie flew to Utah for a final review. Complimenting the Hercules Corporation for its "cooperation" after a difficult start, Lajoie characterized the previous five months as "hectic." In his remarks to the local press, he stressed that the Soviet inspectors would always be accompanied by American escorts, "to make sure they do what they have to, but no more."¹⁶

Second, because of the issue of distinguishing banned SS-20 missiles from non-INF SS-25 missiles, the INF Treaty authorized U.S. inspectors to install and operate at the portal a large, nondamaging, radiographic imaging system, known commercially as CargoScan. This equipment--together with infrared profilers to monitor road and rail traffic, rail and road weighing scales, and a data collection center--was authorized in the treaty for use by both Soviet and American portal monitoring inspectors. The Soviets, reserving their treaty rights, chose not to install an imaging system at Magna, while the United States decided not to install rail or road weighing scales at Votkinsk. The United States, however, had planned all along to install and operate the treaty-authorized CargoScan monitoring equipment. This fact made the U.S. inspection operations at Votkinsk much more complex than Soviet operations at Magna. CargoScan was complex and, as events revealed, controversial in its installation and initial operations.

When OSIA was established in January 1988, one of its functions was to work with other U.S. government agencies to get this portal monitoring equipment, at that point in research, development, and acquisition, from the United States to the Soviet Union in accordance with the provisions of the INF Treaty. At OSIA, Colonel Englund and Colonel Connell and their staff--especially Lt. Commander Charles N. Myers, U.S. Navy; Major Mark L. Dues, USAF; Major Richard A. Kurasiewicz, U.S. Army; 1st Lt. Stuart K. O'Neill, USAF; and 1st Lt. W. Scott Ritter, USMC--concentrated in the spring of 1988 on tracking all of the items associated with this portal monitoring inspection equipment. Again and again, portal issues arose during the bilateral technical talks. Decisions there influenced what equipment would be shipped, when it would be sent, and, to a degree, when it would become operational.¹⁷

In June 1988, the Hughes Technical Services Company was awarded the $1.8 million dollar contract.¹⁹ This company, a subsidiary of the Hughes Aircraft Company, had extensive experience in operating, maintaining, and supporting systems for the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and other government agencies. At Votkinsk, the company would be responsible for providing all of the technical, operational, and maintenance services required to manage, operate, and maintain the portal monitoring facility. Of the 30 American inspectors permitted on site at Votkinsk, the Hughes Company would provide up to 23. The other inspectors--the site commander, deputy, and treaty specialists--would be military officers and civilian personnel assigned to OSIA. Because the contract was not awarded until June 1988, after the treaty had entered into force, there would be a period for interviewing, hiring, and training company personnel. Consequently, for the initial six to seven weeks, OSIA inspection teams conducted the portal monitoring inspections.

The United States intended to initiate its portal inspections at Votkinsk as soon as possible under the terms of the treaty. General Lajoie selected Colonel Englund and Colonel Connell, both experienced, senior Soviet specialists, as site commanders at Votkinsk. They rotated every three to four weeks, with one of them on site in Votkinsk at all times. Accompanying them, until the Hughes personnel arrived in mid-August, was an inspection team of approximately 25 members. Colonel Englund led the first team.

For all INF inspectors the months of July and August 1988 were exciting times. The United States and the USSR conducted more than 150 baseline inspections in eight weeks; in addition, they initiated three of the four other types of INF inspections--portal monitoring, closeouts, and eliminations. These initial on-site inspections set precedents that influenced all subsequent INF inspections and sent a strong signal about how the treaty would be carried out.