Chapter 2 - Critical Months, Intense Preparations

President Reagan (right) in the Oval Office with Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, and Lt. General Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

With this decision in mid-December, the Reagan Administration had resolved many of the organizational issues of how it would carry out its INF Treaty obligations. First, as stipulated in the INF Treaty, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, located in the State Department, would channel all official treaty-related communications between the two nations. Next, a new On-Site Inspection organization, affixed in the Defense Department, would manage and conduct all American inspections and escort Soviet inspectors for the duration of the Treaty. Third, U.S. representation to the Special Verification Commission, mandated by the INF Treaty to resolve compliance questions, would be provided by a senior official assigned administratively to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Finally, other U.S. Government agencies would have the mission of providing and analyzing information on INF Treaty compliance. Policy questions concerning Soviet compliance and verification on the treaty would be defined and discussed in the National Security Council committees by representatives of those departments and agencies--OSD, JCS, ACDA, State, and other agencies--which oversaw all arms control treaties. The President and his senior NSC advisors would make the final decision.

Still unresolved, however, were a host of practical issues: composition of inspection/escort teams, managerial concepts and policies for portal monitoring operations, use of commercial or military airlift, extent of financial resources, location of headquarters and field operating offices, organizational status within the Department of Defense, and even the new organization's name--On-Site Inspection Organization or On-Site Inspection Agency. For the next four weeks, mid-December to mid-January, General Daniel's small task force attacked these issues on a number of fronts. Rather quickly, they recommended that it be named an "agency" over "organization."

The issue of Department of Defense separate agency status or subordination within an existing DOD agency was much tougher. It involved two major issues acutely present in the Reagan Administration in the 1980s. First, General Daniel and the senior officers in the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceived that the new "agency" had to be sufficiently independent to compete for resources--people, money, equipment--with other established organizations and agencies within the Department of Defense. If the new agency were subordinate to another Defense Department entity, like the Defense Nuclear Agency, then there was the possibility of confusion in the interagency and interservice arenas. Independence implied decisiveness; and decisiveness translated into a quickly-established, professional organization capable of representing the U.S. government with the Soviet government.⁴

If the case for a separate DOD agency was clear, it became considerably muddled when Daniel's task force studied the second major issue--manpower. With figures of 200 inspectors, 200 escorts, and 200 aircrew members, and an undetermined number of managers, planners, trainers, and logisticians, the manpower requirements argued for placing the new agency into an existing Defense Department agency. Identifying and reassigning so many people so quickly would be very difficult. Establishing a logistical base for conducting worldwide operations would take time, money, and energy. Setting up the requisite managerial systems required by Congress and DOD regulations would require time and professional expertise. Without question, there were substantial arguments for subordination within an existing Defense Department agency. Proponents of the Defense Nuclear Agency made a strong case, but in January 1988, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Frank C. Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, decided to establish a new, separate Department of Defense agency: the On-Site Inspection Agency.⁵

Out of this defining, redefining, and decision making, certain basic assumptions emerged. The new organization--The On-Site Inspection Agency--would be an agency of the Department of Defense. Its Director, a general officer or DOD senior civilian, would report to the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and receive oversight and direction from an Executive Committee composed of that Undersecretary, the Undersecretary for Policy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Executive Committee would transmit guidance from the interagency policy committee to the new agency. The Director would be appointed by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the approval of the President. The Principal Deputy Director would be from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Two other Deputy Directors would come from the State Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The bulk of the new agency's people would be drawn from the armed services, along with a few civilian technical experts and support people. Agency headquarters would be at Washington Dulles International Airport. Logistical support for the new agency would be provided by the Defense Nuclear Agency, with contractual support from the Navy, Air Force, and the Defense Contracting Advisory Service. Training courses were to be organized and conducted by the Defense Intelligence College. On January 15, 1988, the President directed the Secretary of Defense to establish the On-Site Inspection Agency.

General Lajoie, OSIA's first Director, in his small, make-shift office at Buzzard Point, Washington, D.C.

In February, 1989, Headquarters OSIA moved to Dulles International Airport outside of Washington D.C. Holding the OSIA emblem are General Lajoie, Shirley McClain, Commander Edward J. Higgins, and David L. Pabst, Deputy Director for International Negotiations.