12 April 2000
(U.S. continues pressing for stronger regime, he says) (2560) John Holum, the State Department's senior adviser for arms control, says that the United States continues pressing to strengthen the Wassenaar Arrangement multilateral regime for controlling exports of advanced technology and conventional armaments. In April 12 testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Holum said the United States wants more disclosure by Wassenaar members about the exports they approve. Now a Wassenaar member discloses a decision undercutting another member's denial of an export license only for the most-sensitive items. Holum said the United States wants the undercutting provision applied more broadly. He said the United States also wants Wassenaar agreements on controlling portable surface-to-air missiles. The Wassenaar Arrangement succeeded the much more powerful Cold War-era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). Holum said the annual Wassenaar meeting in December demonstrated that the 33 members are converging more on ways to make the regime more responsible, transparent and accountable. "This is a noteworthy achievement after just four years," he said. "Nonetheless, significant national differences remain, both in substance and procedure, that will require patient persuasion and diplomacy to resolve." He said the best way for the United States to achieve its export-control objectives is in multilateral regimes such as Wassenaar. The United States must realize that it cannot regain the veto of other countries' proposed exports as it had under COCOM. "Our allies simply would not agree to it," he said. Following are terms and abbreviations used in the text: -- COCOM: Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. -- dual-use goods: goods with both civilian and military applications. -- WA: Wassenaar Arrangement. -- WMD: weapons of mass destruction. -- Australia Group: multilateral export-control regime for chemical and biological weapons. Following is the text of Holum's testimony as submitted for the committee's record: (begin text) Statement of John D. Holum Senior Adviser for Arms Control and International Security Department of State Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Wassenaar Arrangement and the Future of Multilateral Export Controls The Department of State appreciates this opportunity to discuss the Wassenaar Arrangement and the future of multilateral export controls. I am encouraged by congressional interest in this important subject, and look forward to working closely with the Committee on this and other multilateral export control issues. I would like to begin my testimony by describing the Wassenaar Arrangement, then discussing Wassenaar's strengths and weaknesses. It is important to note at the outset that Wassenaar is not, and cannot be, COCOM. COCOM, and other multilateral control mechanisms faced a clearly defined, mutually agreed strategic threat, and addressed that threat by embargoing exports of arms and sensitive dual use items to proscribed destinations. Along with our allies, we agreed upon procedures for controlling exports to these destinations, including allowing for any nation to veto a specific export. The end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, moves toward democracy and market-based economies in the former Warsaw Pact, deep cuts in the strategic arsenals of both sides, and the goal of assisting economic and political reform in East Europe, Russia and the other newly independent states -- rather than retarding their economic development -- all led our allies to the view that the COCOM, arrangement had outlived its strategic rationale and could not be sustained. The U.S. eventually joined this view when it became clear that our trading partners would no longer agree to follow the procedures outlined in the COCOM arrangement. In the waning days of COCOM, the U.S. sought to preserve the controls for as long as possible, and pushed to establish a new worldwide arrangement to cover conventional arms and related technologies. It was only through U.S. leadership that we were able to stem the flow of arms and sensitive technologies to places such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya, destinations largely ignored by the former COCOM. The world has changed for the better. Many of the targets of COCOM now are members of Wassenaar, as well as trading partners, friends, and in some cases treaty allies. Our former COCOM partners recognize that responsible national export controls and policies remained indispensable to promote international peace and security in the post-Cold War environment, even though they opposed, and continue to oppose, any COCOM-like control regime. Despite this broad agreement, it was only through persistent and strong U.S. leadership that COCOM members, eventually with participation by Russia, designed a new multilateral export control regime to address the new challenges posed by regional instability and states whose behavior threatened international security. That new regime is the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) -- the first global, multilateral arrangement covering both conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. It was negotiated and established in the mid-1990s at the same time that COCOM was disbanded, when it became apparent that the Cold War's East-West export controls no longer were appropriate. However, Iraq's buildup of arms before the Gulf War demonstrated the need for some form of global export regime and the Wassenaar Arrangement responded to this challenge by covering more than just dual-use items, as had been COCOM's focus. The Wassenaar Arrangement received final approval by 33 co-founding countries in July 1996, and began operations in September 1996. The WA is designed to prevent destabilizing accumulations of arms and dual-use goods and technologies. The Arrangement encourages transparency, responsibility, consultation and, where appropriate, national policies of restraint. In doing so, the WA fosters accountability in transfers of arms and dual use goods and technologies. The Arrangement also provides a venue in which governments can consider collectively the implications of various transfers on their international and regional security interests. It also seeks to enhance cooperation to prevent dangerous transfers. WA members maintain export controls on items covered by the Wassenaar Munitions and Dual Use lists. These lists regularly are reviewed by experts of the Participating States and revised as needed. However, the decision to transfer or deny any controlled item remains the responsibility of individual member states. There are not, as there were in COCOM, case-by-case prior reviews of proposed exports to proscribed destinations, or vetoes on proposed exports. To facilitate, meeting the WA'S principal objective of preventing destabilizing accumulations, members report on their decisions to transfer or deny to non-members certain classes of weapons and dual-use technologies. Again unlike COCOM, Wassenaar members are not constrained to honor each other's denials, but consultations are encouraged in such cases. In order to enhance transparency in arms transfers, Wassenaar members report semiannually on their deliveries to non-members of seven weapons categories derived from the UN Register of Conventional Arms. These categories are Battle Tanks, Armored Combat Vehicles, Large Calibre Artillery Systems, Combat Aircraft, Attack Helicopters, Warships, and Missiles and Missile Launchers. In order to promote transparency and like-mindedness, Wassenaar members also report on their transfers to non-members of dual use goods. The Wassenaar List of Dual Use Goods and Technologies consists of a Basic List of controlled items, on which members semiannually report aggregated license denials. The Basic List is subdivided into a Sensitive List of technologies on which members report individual denials of licenses within 30-60 days. In addition to these individual denials, members also report semiannually aggregated numbers of licenses issued or transfers made. Finally, the Sensitive List is further subdivided into a Very Sensitive List, consisting of technology subject to extreme vigilance in national licensing decisions. Although no country is an explicit target of the WA, members are committed to dealing firmly with states whose behavior is a cause for serious concern. There is broad agreement that these states presently are Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. Wassenaar members deal with these "countries of concern" by preventing, through shared national policies of restraint, their acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual use goods and technologies for military end-use. Wassenaar provides for the first tine a global mechanism for controlling transfers of conventional armaments, and a forum in which governments can examine and debate the implications of various transfers on their international and regional security interests. It also calls attention to potentially destabilizing accumulations of weapons, and to situations that may call for concerted actions. The United States works actively within this unique forum to advance our national interests. Wassenaar has addressed such topics as the conflict in Sudan, North Korea's weapons production programs, Iran's conventional arms procurement objectives, arms flows to areas of conflict in Africa, and the situation in Kosovo. At the December 1996 Plenary meeting, members issued a public statement confirming that they do not transfer arms or ammunition to Afghanistan. In 1997, members reiterated the need to exercise maximum restraint when considering licenses for the export of sensitive items to destinations where the risks are judged greatest. This statement was refined in 1998 to include regions in conflict. In 1999 members discussed Small Arms/Light Weapons and the possibility of developing common export guidelines for man-portable Surface-to-Air missiles (MANPADS). They agreed to a modest increase in arms transparency, and reaffirmed their policies of "maximum restraint" regarding arms exports to areas of conflict. Wassenaar is more than just a forum for discussion. The United States has helped establish and maintain Wassenaar's control lists, has benefited from sharing data on arms and technology transfers, and has gained insight into the policies and positions of other members. It has also served to promote and reinforce strong norms of responsible export behavior, which over time has encouraged restraint. As head of the U.S. delegation to the 1999 Wassenaar Plenary meeting, I am well aware that the Arrangement falls short of U.S. goals in some important areas. We would like to see more transparency in both arms and duel use transfers, more targeted information sharing, more discussion of common problems and possible solutions, as well as some form of a no-undercut provision for dual use denials. We would like to get agreement on guidelines for MANPADS transfers, controls on brokering, and possibly an arms transfer code of conduct. These are ambitious, but attainable, goals. I observed at the Plenary that national views increasingly are converging around the ideas of responsibility, transparency and accountability. This is a noteworthy achievement after just four years. Nonetheless, significant national differences remain, both in substance and procedure, that that will require patient persuasion and diplomacy to resolve. We are well aware of the strong advantages to a veto-type arrangement but it is critical to recognize that we will never be able to impose one unilaterally. Our allies simply would not agree to it. Additionally, a veto-style arrangement could actually harm U.S. exporters by increasing dramatically license processing times by requiring coordination with as many as 33 countries, ceding to those outside the regimes the ability to respond in a more timely manner. It is also important to recognize that in many fields, the U.S. is the leader technologically; we do not believe that it would be advantageous to delegate to other countries whose industries are not as advanced as the U.S. the right to determine which sales can and cannot be made. The Future of Wassenaar As you prepare for your upcoming travel to Europe. I would recommend looking to the future, rather than the past. Wassenaar is a product of the post-Cold War period, and faces a dramatically different security environment than institutions developed during that period. In the new global economy we must lead by example. I believe we have made solid steps in this direction, and that a consensus is emerging among Wassenaar partners that reflects their commitment to responsible transfers. This commitment already is implemented in the national policies of Wassenaar partners, and ultimately is what unites us. The most effective way to achieve U.S. objectives is to continue to act collectively to assess the risks, and to coordinate policies. The Wassenaar Arrangement provides a unique venue for the evaluation, coordination and cooperation that can yield a safer, more peaceful international environment. We will continue to make a concerted effort in this forum to foster greater like-mindedness as we examine sensitive transfers, assess the risks, and determine appropriate responses at the national level. The Future of Multilateral Export Controls While arms and sensitive dual-use technology transfers to State sponsors of terrorism have dropped dramatically since the beginning of the decade, we must continue our work to constrain the ability of these countries to develop weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons. Recognizing that the spread of weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated conventional arms is the most important security threat in the post-Cold War world, the role of the multilateral nonproliferation regimes has now shifted to focus on the behavior of programs of proliferation concern and the entities that supply and procure for them, rather than targeting particular recipient countries. Our export control system for the post-Cold War world responds to these new security threats. We have emphasized broadening international adherence to our non-proliferation and export control goals. Especially since 1991, significant strides have been made in strengthening the contributions of export controls to nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, memberships in both the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group together now include all of the significant nuclear supplier states and almost all relevant suppliers are members of the other regimes. Increasingly, countries that had been contributing to the proliferation problem -- such as Argentina, Brazil and South Africa -- are becoming part of the solution. With the backing of Congress, we have been able to assist former Warsaw Pact countries with weak border controls and weaker legislation to bolster their resources and to resist commercial incentives to trade in sensitive dual-use items, arms, and components of WMD. Our overall approach has been to: -- Reduce the demand for dangerous weapons and technologies through support for international non-proliferation norms and through strategies to reduce regional instability; -- Pursue a multilateral approach to achieving our nonproliferation goals through the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (AG), and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); -- Implement and further strengthen the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), and use the WA to promote responsible transfers of arms, sensitive duel-use goods, and related technology, and require transparency in such transfers; -- Work with key suppliers, transshipment centers, and intermediaries that are not members of the nonproliferation regimes to adopt export policies and practices compatible with international standards, thereby increasing the number of countries, as described in the draft EAA, "whose policies and activities are consistent with the objectives" of the regimes; and -- Retain the ability to impose unilateral controls in those limited and extreme circumstances that may require them. We also continue the effort to reduce demand for dangerous weapons through regional diplomacy -- as in the North Korea, the Middle East and South Asia -- to respond to the underlying sources of stability and insecurity. I would like to thank the Committee for the opportunity to address this timely topic. Any form of export control requires difficult and delicate compromises. Multilateral export controls multiply these difficulties, but also multiply the rewards. The fact that so many countries participate in these regimes, and try to improve them, says that the rewards outweigh the difficulties. I look forward to working further with you on this important subject. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)