News

EA - Mar 3, 1995

THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT

CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20

BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/95



ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR THE PROPOSED INTERIM STORAGE AT THE Y-12

PLANT OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM ACQUIRED FROM

KAZAKHSTAN BY THE UNITED STATES



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY



TABLE OF CONTENTS



1.0          INTRODUCTION



1.1          DOE Decision Process on Related Actions



2.0          PURPOSE AND NEED FOR AGENCY ACTION



3.0          DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION

3.1          HEU to be Acquired

3.2          Packaging

3.3          Air Transport by U.S. Air Force

3.3.1        Aerial Port of Entry Requirements

3.3.2        Flight from Kazakhstan to Dover AFB

3.3.3        C-5 Aircraft

3.3.4        Air Refueling

3.3.5        Cargo Restraint Transporter

3.4          Transfer at Dover Air Force Base

3.5          SST Transport from Dover Air Force Base to Y-12

3.6          Interim Storage at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

3.7          Inventory Accountability

3.8          Safeguards and Security

3.9          Environmental, Safety, and Health Protection

3.10         On-Site Transportation at the Y-12 Plant



4.0          ALTERNATE TO THE PROPOSED ACTION

4.1          No Action Alternative

4.2          Alternate Ports of Entry

4.2.1        Fort Campbell, Kentucky as Aerial Port

4.2.2        Air National Guard Base at McGhee Tyson Airport as Aerial Port

4.3          Alternatives Dismissed from Further Consideration

4.3.1        Other Ports of Entry

4.3.2        Other DOE Facilities

4.4          Commercial Facility



5.0          DESCRIPTION OF THE AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

5.1          Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

5.2          Dover Air Force Base, Delaware

5.3          Fort Campbell, Kentucky

5.4          Air National Guard Base, McGhee Tyson Airport, Knoxville,

              Tennessee

5.5          Global Commons



6.0          POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

6.1          Y-12 Plant

6.1.1        Environmental Effects

6.1.1.1      Land Use and Archaeological and Cultural Resources

6.1.1.2      Air Quality

6.1.1.3      Hydrology and Water Quality

6.1.1.4      Ecological Resources

6.1.2        Incident-Free Radiological Exposure

6.13         Exposure under Accident Conditions

6.14         Environmental Justice

6.1.5        Cumulative Effects

6.1.6        No Action Alternative Effects on the Y-12 Plant

6.1.7        Fort Campbell Alternative Effects on Y-12 Plant

6.1.8        McGhee Tyson Alternative Effects on Y-12 Plant

6.2          Transportation

6.2.1        Air Transport by U.S. Air Force

6.2.1.1      Incident-free Air Transport From Air Transport of HEU

6.2.1.2      Postulated Air Transport Accident Conditions

6.2.1.2.1    Air Transport Accident Probabilities

6.2.1.2.2    Air Transport Accident Consequences

6.2.2        Transfer of HEU from Aircraft to SST

6.2.2.1      Incident-Free Radiological Exposure from HEU Transfer

              Activities

6.2.2.2      Postulated HEU Transfer Accidents

6.2.3        SST Transport of HEU to Y-12 Plant

6.2.3.1      Incident-free SST Transport

6.2.3.1.1    Proposed Action: SST Transport of from Dover AFB to Y-12

6.2.3.1.2    No Action

6.2.3.1.3    SST Transport of HEU from Fort Campbell to Y-12

6.2.3.1.4    SST Transport of HEU from McGhee Tyson Airport to Y-12

6.2.3.2      Postulated SST Transport Accident Conditions

6.2.3.2.1    Proposed Action: Postulated SST Transport Accident

6.2.3.2.2    No Action

6.2.3.2.3    Postulated Accident During SST Transport from Fort Campbell

6.2.3.2.4    Postulated Accident During SST Transport from McGhee Tyson

6.2.4        On-Site Transportation Impacts

6.2.5        Non-Radiological Impact

6.2.5.1      Proposed Action

6.2.5.2      Shipment from Fort Campbell

6.2.5.3      Shipment from McGhee Tyson

6.2.6        Cumulative Transportation Impacts

6.2.6.1      Cumulative Radiological Impacts

6.2.6.2      Cumulative Non-Radiological Impacts



7.0         AGENCIES AND PERSONS CONSULTED

8.0         REFERENCES



LIST OF APPENDICES



Appendix A.   Affected Environment of Dover Air Force Base, Proposed

Aerial Port of Entry/HEU Transfer Site



Appendix B.   Affected Environment of Fort Campbell, Kentucky;

Alternate Aerial Port of Entry/HEU Transfer Site



Appendix D.   Affected Environment of McGhee Tyson and the Tennessee Air

National Guard Air Force Base Alternate Aerial Port of Entry/HEU Transfer

Site



   LIST OF FIGURES



   Figure 3.0-1         Flight Paths for the Proposed Action

   Figure 3.2-1         Physical Packing with Metal Cans

   Figure 3.3-1         United States Air Force C-5 Aircraft

   Figure 3.3.3-1       Cargo Restraint Transporter Loaded

   Figure 3.3.5-2       Cargo Restraint Transport Unit Loaded and Secured

   Figure 3.6-1         Location of the Oak Ridge Reservation

   Figure 3.6-2         Location of the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

   Figure 3.6-3         Location of the Building 9720-5 Warehouse

   Figure 3.6-4         HEU Storage Birdcage

   Figure 3.6-5         Y-12 Building 9720-5 Warehouse Tube Vault

   Figure 3.6-6         Y-12 HEU Modular Storage Vault Configuration

   Figure 5.0.1-1       Location of Proposed Action and Alternatives

   Figure 5.2-1         Location of Dover Air Force Base

   Figure 5.2-2         Location of Dover Air Force Base Airstrip

   Figure 5.3-1         Location of Fort Campbell, Kentucky

   Figure 5.4-1         Location of McGhee Tyson Airport, Tennessee

   Figure 5.42          Layout of McGhee Tyson Airstrip

   Figure 6.1.2.1-1     Average External Dose to Workers in the Building

                         9720-5 Warehouse



ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS



AFB       Air Force Base

ALAR      As Low As Reasonably Achievable

ANSI      American National Standards Institute

Be        Beryllium

CEDE      Committed Effective Dose Equivalent

CEQ       Council on Environmental Quality

CERCLA    Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability

           Act

CFC       Chlorofluorocarbons

CFR       Code of Federal Regulations

CSA       Criticality Safety Analysis

DCG       Derived Concentration Guide

DOD       United States Department of Defense

DOE       United States Department of Energy

DOT       United States Department of Transportation

DU        Depleted Uranium

EA        Environmental Assessment

EDE       Effective Dose Equivalent

EIS       Environmental Impact Statement

Energy Systems   Martin Marietta Energy Systems

EPA       United States Environmental Protection Agency

ERAD      Explosive Release Atmospheric Dispersal

FAA       Federal Aviation Administration

FBI       Federal Bureau of Investigation

FFCA      Federal Facilities  Compliance Agreement

FHA       Federal Highway Administration

FONSI     Finding of No Significant Impact

FRA       Federal Railroad Administration

HEPA      High Efficiency Particulate Air

HEU       Highly Enriched Uranium

HF        Hydrogen Fluoride

HMTA      Hazardous Materials Transportation Act

IAEA      International  Atomic Energy Agency

ICC       Interstate Commerce Commission

ICRP      International Commission on Radiological Protection

IDLH      Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health

IHD       Industrial Hygiene Department

INEL      Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

LCF       Latent Cancer Fatality

LEU       Low Enriched Uranium

LTT       Lymphocyte Transformation Test

MACCS     MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System

MTU       Metric Tons Uranium

NAAQS     National Ambient Air Quality Standards

NEPA      National Environmental Policy Act of 1-969

NESHA     National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants

NIOSH     National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

NMCs      Nuclear Material Couriers

NOI       Notice of Intent

NOV       Notice of Violation

NPDES     National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

NPL       National Priorities List

NRC       Nuclear Regulatory Commission

ORR       Oak Ridge Reservation

OSHA      Occupational Safety and Health Administration

PEL       Permissible Exposure Limit

PCB       Polychlorinated Biphenyl

PEIS      Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

RCRA      Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

SAR       Safety Analysis Report

SARA      Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act

SARUP     Safety Analysis Report Upgrade Program

SNM       Special Nuclear Material

SST       Safe Secure Transport

STEL      Short-Term Exposure Limit

SWEIS     Sitewide Environmental Impact Statement

TDEC      Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation

TEDE      Total Effective Dose Equivalent

TEMA      Tennessee Emergency Management Agency

THP       Tennessee Highway Patrol

TI        Transport Index

TIC       Time-Integrated Concentration

TID       Tamper-Indicating Device

AFTCOM    United States Air Force Transportation Command

TSD       Transportation Safeguards Division

TSR       Technical Safety Requirements

UN        United Nations

USEC      United States Enrichment Corporation

USQD      Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

Y-12      Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant



On September 27, 1993, President Clinton outlined a major principle of

U.S. nonproliferation policy: "Our national security requires us to accord

higher priority to nonproliferation, and to make it an integral element of

our relations with other countries.  The President has established the

objective of implementing United States nonproliferation policy by

selectively acquiring fissionable material from foreign sources in order

to reduce the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation. In furtherance

of this policy, the United States and Kazakhstan are pursuing an agreement

to relocate highly enriched uranium (HEU) acquired from  Kazakhstan in

exchange for monetary aid.  The prime objective of this bilateral effort

is to promote the nuclear nonproliferation policies supported by both

governments while providing monetary and humanitarian aid to the

government of Kazakhstan.  The HEU in question constitutes sufficient

material for persons with low technical skills to make 20 or more nuclear

weapons.



1.1 DOE DECISION PROCESS ON RELATED ACTIONS



As part of the decision-making process for the storage and disposition of

fissile material, the Department is preparing the Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement for Long-Term Storage and Disposition of

Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials (Disposition PEIS).  Recent nuclear arms

reduction agreements and pledges, along with Presidential decisions

concerning what stocks of plutonium, HEU, and other nuclear materials

are to be reserved for national defense, will largely determine how much

and when material will be declared surplus  and become available for

disposition.  As stated in the June 21, 1994 Notice of Intent (NOI) to

prepare the Disposition PEIS (59 FR 31935), the disposition PEIS will

evaluate alternatives for long-term storage of all weapons-usable fissile

materials and for disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials declared

surplus to national defense needs by the President The Disposition PEIS

would be followed by project specific NEPA documents to the extent

necessary to implement any decisions.



Although the decision-making process for the long-term storage and

disposition of all weapons usable fissile materials has been initiated,

final decisions and implementation may require several years. Until these

decisions are made and implemented interim storage is needed for fissile

nuclear-materials, including HEU.



Prior to final approval, the Department released the Environmental

Assessment (EA) for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium

Above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge,

Tennessee (DOE/EA 0929) to the public and the State of Tennessee in

September 1994. The EA is a revised version of a predecisional EA released

for review and comment to the State and public. in March 1994.  Additional

predecisional opportunities for State and public involvement regarding the

predecisional EA are planned for the near future.



2.0 PURPOSE AND NEED FOR AGENCY ACTION



The United States Government has determined that action is needed

immediately to minimize the nuclear proliferation risk associated with

highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Kazakhstan. This HEU constitutes

sufficient material for persons with low technical skills to make 20 or

more nuclear weapons.  The present risk of diversion must be addressed

expeditiously. In addition, weather conditions complicate the ability to

transport the HEU material over the next several months.  Action is

necessary before the winter season in order to assure that departure of

the aircraft transporting the HEU from Kazakhstan is not affected by snow

or ice storms.  De-icing and snow removal capabilities at the Kazakhstan

airport, which is located in the city of Ust Kamenogorst, are extremely

limited. The next opportunity to transfer this material would not occur

until the spring of 1995.



The potential need to acquire and store HEU from foreign sources was

addressed in the preapproval Environmental Assessment for the Proposed

Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Storage

level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE/EA-0929). That EA

includes analysis of interim storage of approximately five metric tons of

HEU from foreign sources, which would be no more than one percent of the

HEU proposed to be received for interim storage at Y-12 over the next ten

years.  Approximately 566 kg (0.566 metric tons) of HEU would be acquired

from Kazakhstan, which represents approximately 11 percent (0.566) of the

five metric tons from foreign sources addressed in the Y-12 Interim

Storage EA. Interim storage of the HEU from Kazakhstan would be needed

until decisions on its disposition can be made and implemented.



The Governments of the United States and Kazakhstan have agreed that the

HEU would be stored under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

The United States Department of Energy (DOE) is taking the necessary steps

to implement this agreement.



3.0  DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION



The proposed action is transport of HEU to be acquired by the United States

from Kazakhstan to the Y-12 Plant Oak Ridge, Tennessee for interim storage.

The HEU would be transported by the U.S. Air Force on two C-5 aircraft from

Kazakhstan to Dover Air Force Base (AFB), Kent County, Delaware. At Dover AFB,

the HEU would loaded on DOE Safe Secure Transport (SST) Trailers for highway

transport to the Y-12 Plant.



In accordance with Executive Order 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of

Major Federal Actions, the activities in Kazakhstan are not addressed in this

EA because they will be implemented with the full cooperation and involvement

of the government of Kazakhstan. These activities, which will be conducted by

U.S. personnel include repackaging the HEU into IAEA authorized containers and

loading the containers into the two C-5 aircraft.  All U.S. repackaging team

members would be fully trained in the handling of fissile radioactive

materials.  This team would consist of 31 persons:  

  

* 25 repackaging team members including three nuclear criticality safety

engineers, three health physicists, two nondestructive assay experts, one

nuclear material control and accountability experts, and one industrial

hygienist;



* one DOE safety officer; 

* one DOD doctor/medic;

* three DOD interpreters; and

* one satellite communicator.



The aircrews would consist of 24-30 personnel for three U.S. Air Force C-5

aircraft: two C-5 aircraft would transport HEU and the third would carry only

personnel and equipment.



The proposed action includes the following activities: air transport by U.S.

Air Force C-5 aircraft to the proposed U.S. aerial port of entry, Dover Air

Force Base; transfer of HEU from the C-5 aircraft via ten U.S. Department of

Energy Safe Secure Transport (SST) vehicles: SST transport of the HEU via

highways to the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and interim storage

(without processing) at the Y-12 Plant. The proposed flight plan is an

approved international route; hence no specific agreements are required.



3.1 HEU TO BE ACQUIRED



The HEU to be acquired and relocated to the United States includes

approximately 566 kg (0.566 MT) of HEU (nominally 90 percent U-235, 9 percent

U-238, and 1 percent U-234).  The HEU is contained in about 2,200 kg (2.2 MT)

of alloy, metal, and oxide. The HEU includes four material types: uranium

oxide; uranium metal; uranium beryllium machined stock as broken alloy rods,

turnings, and powders; and uranium beryllium alloy rods which were intended to

be used as fuel for a naval reactor project, but never were actually used. 

All of these materials are unirradiated (i.e., not used in a reactor). The

material forms and quantities are shown in Table 3.1-1. (The preapproval EA

for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929) contains information on uranium in

Appendix D, Uranium: Occurrence, Uses and Health Effects.) 



Laboratory analysis of samples indicates that some of the HEU contains trace

but measurable concentrations of U-232, U-236, plutonium, and other

transuranics. Less than one half kilogram of thorium uranium compound is

included in the material.



The bulk of the HEU is alloyed with beryllium (Be), of which about half is

machine turnings and oxide. It is estimated that approximately 1500 kg (1.5

MT) of beryllium in the 2,200 kg (2.2 MT) of material to be acquired. 

Beryllium in weapons components as been staged or stored in Building 9720-5

previously. The 1500 kg (l.5 MT) of beryllium to be stored in Building 9720-5

under the proposed action is about equal to the quantity of beryllium in

weapon components previously staged or stored in Building 9720-5. Beryllium is

a metal used in industrial applications because of its light weight. While

beryllium is a toxic metal, the alloy form reduces the toxicity of the

material. 



3.2  PACKAGING



The HEU would be packaged in containers meeting DOT regulatory requirements

and IAEA standards. The DOT Type B packaging with the specification 6M

(49 CFR 178.354) would be used. This packaging consists of an exterior

container, a standard 55-gallon drum, in which an inner container (DOT

specification 2R) is suspended by plywood and fiberboard insulation disks.  A

total of 456 6M-2R containers would be transported to Kazakhstan to repackage

the HEU.



** Table 3.1-1 HEU Material Forms and Quantities



Material Form    Total Weight       U-235 Content    Description   

                     (kg)               (kg)



Uranium Oxide       >26               26/0.26        Powder Form. About 7 

                                                     containers



Uranium Metal       >187/0              187          About 0.4-0.6 in diameter

                                                     x 0.8 - 1.0 in long slugs.

                                                     27 containers.



Uranium Beryllium   About 1,000         167          Finished U/Be rods, about

alloy               (9-28% by                        0.5 in diameter x 4.7 in 

                    weight is U)                     long. About 500 containers.



Uranium Beryllium   About 1,000         186          Machined turnings, broken

machined turnings   (10-60% by                       rods, and powder. About

and powder          weight is U)                     500 containers.



Totals              >2220               >566         1,025 storage containers 

                                                     and about 6,000 sample 

                                                     bottles containing no 

                                                     more than 3 grams each of 

                                                     oxides representative of 

                                                     materials listed above. **



Type B packaging meets containment and shielding requirements for normal

transport, and in addition, is designed and tested to withstand the effects of

severe accidents.  Evaluation for hypothetical accident conditions is based on

the application of free drop, puncture, thermal, and immersion tests. The

hypothetical accident condition tests are severe in nature (for example, the

thermal test exposes the package to 8000C [1.472 F] heat for no less than 30

minutes and are conducted sequentially to determine the cumulative effect on

the package. Except for a limited number of specification Type B packaging

described in the regulations (49 CFR 173A16), all Type B  packaging designs

require prior approval of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or DOE.

Packaging design requirements are found in 49 CFR 173 and 10 CFR 71. 

Packaging would meet all requirements of the NRC regulations for fissile

material packages in Part 71 of 10 CFR (Packaging and Transportation of

Radioactive Materials). These requirements establish mandatory design and

construction criteria and contents limits to assure that subcriticality is

maintained by each package.



Type B packaging is designed to retain the integrity of containment and

shielding required by DOT regulations under normal conditions of transport. In

addition, Type B packaging must be designed under both normal and hypothetical

accident conditions (10 CFR 71.55), including forklift accidents involving the

puncture of a container.



Specific standards for each Fissile Class are also prescribed in the NRC

regulations (10 CFR 7l.57 through 10 CFR 71.61). These standards identify the

shipper requirements for determining the allowable number of packages of a

given design and fissile material loading which can be safely transported

together in a vehicle.  As was the case for individual package design,

conveyance loading limits are established for both incident-free and

hypothetical accident conditions. In other words, the regulations assure that:

(1) individual package design and contents limits preclude nuclear criticality

in any single package, and: (2) when packages are stacked together for

shipment, their numbers are limited to ensure subcriticality.  Packaging must

also undergo rigid tests to demonstrate containment capabilities during normal

conditions of transport and hypothetical accident conditions. While the

possibility of a nuclear criticality accident can never be considered zero

when sufficient quantities of fissile material are present, it is remote with

regard to transportation.



The packaging to be used would be the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)

approved 6M-2R container (DOT, 1994). The intended use of the DOT

Specification 6M packaging is for shipments of enriched uranium. The 2R inner

container provides the primary containment boundary to prevent release of the

contents to the environment and enhances the shielding capability of the

packaging. The inner container also prevents moisture from reaching the

contents.  The inner container (Figure 3.2-1) holds three or four steel cans

(4.75 inch diameter) for uranium compounds such as uranium oxide and broken

uranium or uranium alloy metal. The 6M-2R container meets the requirements of

Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and is in accordance with the

International Atomic Energy Agency Regulations (IAEA 1985, as amended 1990).



3.3 AIR TRANSPORT BY U.S. AIR FORCE



The HEU would be transported by the U.S. Air Force in two C-5 aircraft from

Kazakhtstan to Dover Air Force Base (AFB).



** Figure 3.2-1 is a technical drawing of the physical packing with metal cans.**



3.3.1 Aerial Port of Entry Requirements



To select the proposed aerial port of entry, the following set of requirements

were used:



*  The aerial port should be on a military base with an airstrip where C-5

aircraft can land with minimal risk.



*  The aerial port runway should have sufficient capacity to accommodate two

U.S. Air Force C-5 aircraft and the ten DOE Safe Secure Transport Trailers

which would be used for highway transport of the HEU.



*  The aerial port should have a secure area for the transfer of HEU from the

C-5 aircraft to the SSTs.



*  There should be a relatively low to moderate population in the vicinity of

the aerial port of entry, i.e., a suburban or rural area with a population

density of less than 500 person/ km2.



In addition to these requirements, other factors considered in selecting an

aerial port of entry are as follows:



*  The air flight distance over U.S. territory should be minimized.



*  Air refueling over U.S. territory should be avoided.



*  The highway transport distance from the aerial port to the Y-12 Plant

should be minimized.

 

Dover AFB meets the aerial port requirements and considerations. Dover AFB

routinely handles the C-5 aircraft Dover AFB has more than enough capacity to

handle the C-5 aircraft and the SSTs. The equipment and personnel needed to

support C-5 flights of this nature are permanently established at Dover AFB. 



Dover AFB is in an area with a moderate population; Dover AFB is located in a

suburban area within Kent County, which has a population of 110,000.  The

population density within approximately 10 km of Dover AFB is 475.4

persons/km2. Based on the characteristics of the airstrip and support

facilities, and the moderate population density surrounding Dover relative to

other bases near urban areas, Dover AFB meets the aerial port requirements.



When considering the other factors, Dover AFB is distinguished among other

possible aerial ports.  The air night distance over U.S. territory is very low

because Dover AFB is close to the Atlantic coast, and therefore, air refueling

over U.S. territory would be avoided. The highway transport distance from

Dover AFB to Y-12 Plant is greater than the two alternative aerial ports

analyzed in this EA, but is still relatively low, and considerably lower than

most other possible aerial ports in the U.S. which are not analyzed in the EA.    



3.3.2  Flight from Kazakhstan to Dover AFB



The United States Air Force Transportation Command would utilize three C-5

aircraft to transport the HEU personnel, and equipment from Kazakhstan to the

United States.  Two of the three planes would be used to transport HEU. The

total nonstop flight time is approximately 21 hours over a distance of

approximately 8,000 miles. The two aircraft with HEU cargo would proceed

directly to Dover Air Force Base without any intermediate stop in a foreign

country. The third aircraft with the majority of the repackaging team and its

support equipment (and no HEU cargo) would make refueling stops in Europe and

proceed to McGhee Tyson, Tennessee Air National Guard Base, co-located at the

Municipal Airport of Knoxville, Tennessee. McGhee-Tyson is the site from which

the team and its equipment would depart from the U.S. to Kazakhstan.



3.3.3 C-5 Aircraft



The C-5 is a long-range, high-speed sept-wing aircraft which is designed for

use as a heavy logistics transport (USTRANSCOM. 1994). The aircraft is powered

by four General Electric engines mounted in individual pods beneath the wing.

The C-5 is capable of airlifting in excess of 250,000 pounds of cargo and 75

troops at a speed of 360 knots or 0.875 Mach. With its in-night refueling

capability, the range is unlimited. The normal crew consists of six, with

seating provisions for seven relief crew members.  The C-5 aircraft landing

gear is of the fully retractable, modified tricycle type, with four wheels on

the steerable nose landing gear and six bogie-mounted wheels on each of the

four main landing gear assemblies. The weight of the aircraft is thus

distributed among 28 wheels, which allows the aircraft to land or takeoff on

unimproved runways.



The maximum gross weight of the aircraft is 769,000 pounds with a fuel load of

51,000 gallons weighing approximately 332,500 pounds.       



The C-5 aircraft has many unique features including:



*  a forward and aft cargo door system, enabling straight-through loading and

unloading;



*  a landing gear kneeling system which enables the cargo deck to be tilted

nose-down or tail-down; or lowered in the level position;  



*  two auxiliary power units, one located in each main landing gear pod to

provide electrical, pneumatic, and hydraulic power for engine starting and for

ground operations and maintenance requirements. 



3.3.4 Air Refueling         



Each C-5 air refueling event would be accomplished with two KC-135 tanker

aircraft for each C-5.  There would be a total of four tanker aircraft

utilized to refuel both C-5s at the same time.  The tankers would take off

from their respective bases to rendezvous with the C-5s along the flight

route. As the rendezvous approaches, the tankers and the C-5 would be in

visual contact separated by 1000 feet in altitude with the C-5 one mile behind

the tankers. The C-5 would then maneuver to a position directly behind and

below the tanker. The tanker boom operator would directly monitor the C-5

closure on the tanker. Once the C-5 is in position, the boom operator would

position the flying boom into the refueling receptacle at the top of the C-5.

The fuel would then pass through the boom into the C-5. The transaction would

take approximately 20 minutes. After refueling from the first tanker, the C-5

would then maneuver to the second tanker to refuel again.  After the second

refueling is complete, the tankers would climb and turn away from the C-5 to

return to their launch bases.  The C-5 would descend 1,000 feet until the

tankers have left, then return to the appropriate altitude.  The Air force

routinely trains personnel on C-5 aircraft refueling and refueling with this

tanker is a routine operation.



** Figure 3.3.3-1 is a photograph of an Air Force C-5 Aircraft. **



3.5.5  Cargo Restraint Transporter 



Cargo Restraint Transporters are used to load material onto the aircraft and

hold the containers in place during transport in a manner that maximizes cargo

space and safety (Sandia, 1988).  A Cargo Restraint Transporter unit loaded

with drums is shown in Figures 3.3-1 and 3.3.5-2.  



The unit is loaded as follows:



*  Four drums are placed on the base section;

*  The center section is placed on top of the four drums;

*  Four additional drums are loaded on top of the center section;

*  The top section is placed on top of the four additional drums;

*  The array is secured with tiedowns through the tiedown rings 

   to the base section.



The containers would be placed in cargo restraint transporters as illustrated

in Figure 3.3.5-2. It is estimated that approximately 57 CRTs would be loaded

with containers. The CRTs would be tied down on pallets or directly onto the

cargo bay floor inside the C-5 aircraft.

  

** Figure 3.3.5-1 is an illustration of a loaded cargo restraint transporter. **



** Figure 3.3.5-2 is an illustration of a loaded and secured cargo restraint

transporter. **



3.4  TRANSFER AT DOVER AIR FORCE BASE



SSTs would be parked in a secure area at Dover AFB to await the arrival of the

two C-5 aircraft.  The unloading of the containers from the C-5 aircraft would

be done by Dover AFB personnel, and loading of the containers into the SSTs

would be done by DOE personnel.  The loading process could utilize a forklift

and/or a K-loader, which is a adjustable-height platform that would be moved

up to aircraft and then moved to the SST.  The Cargo Restraint Transporter

would be loaded onto the SST guided by floor and ceiling tracks. Once in the

appropriate position, the Cargo Restraint Transporters are secure to the SST

via lug nuts, locking pins, chains, straps, and nets. A Cargo Restraint Net is

placed over the array to further secure the material. The net is a multi-strap

adjustable net that is designed to secure a varying size of arrays of

containers within the SSTs.  Detailed instructions and procedures are

described in the Document Y/OA-3493, "Cargo Restraint Nets Handling

Instructions" (Energy System 1986) and the technical manual, "Cargo Restraint

Transporter Handling Instructions (Sandia, 1988).



3.5  SST TRANSPORT FROM DOVER AIR FORCE BASE TO Y-12



The HEU would be transported by Safe Secure Transport (SST) from Dover Air

Force Base to the Y-12 plant.  Transportation would be conducted by the DOE

Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD) in accordance with the requirements

of DOE Orders and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations (title

49 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations [CFR ]).  Since its establishment

in 1975,  TSD has accumulated more than 119 million km (74 million miles) of

over-the-road experience in transporting DOE-owned cargo, without any

accidents resulting in a release of radioactive material.



The SST vehicles which would be used to transport the HEU are specially

designed semi-trailers pulled by armored tractors, which use penetration

resistance and delay mechanisms to prevent unauthorized cargo removal. This

design has the added benefit of protecting the cargo from damage or release in

the event of a severe accident.  A robust tiedown and restraining system to

secure the cargo within the SST trailer provides additional protection. 

Secure Safe Transport vehicles are accompanied by escort vehicles equipped

with armored couriers, communications and electronics systems, radiological

monitoring equipment and other equipment to enhance safety and security.

Redundant communications systems assure that intra-convoy communications and

communications between each vehicle and the Security Communications System in

Albuquerque, New Mexico, are maintained. The SST vehicles observe special

operating procedures designed to promote safety and security.  



DOE Order 5632.2A, Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Materials with Vital

Equipment, establishes baseline protection requirements for special nuclear

materials in transit, providing for an appropriately graded level of

protection for each shipment.  DOE Order 5610, Transportation-Safeguards

System Program Operations, ensures that Transportation Safeguards System

operations are accomplished in a manner commensurate with established

practices and procedures for cargo safeguards, program continuity, and the

protection of national security, personnel, the public, and the environment.

Nuclear Material Couriers  (NMCs), the Federal Officers of the DOE who drive

and escort all shipments of HEU made within the Transportation Safeguards

System, are trained to provide an immediate response to any incident.

Depending on the incident, the NMCs will assess the integrity of the SST and

define an initial response.  An emergency notification system for reporting

and processing operations information is maintained to ensure that effective

and appropriate action is taken during emergency situations.  The response may

include notifying local authorities and establishing a joint command post,

initiating traffic control measures, providing first aid, performing basic

radiological surveys, and taking other actions deemed necessary to protect the

public and or the public domain. 



Anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons are included in the types of armament

against which DOE facilities must provide strategies and/or systems of

protection.  The Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

has the responsibility for quantifying threats within the continental United

States. According to the FBI, the terrorist threat to DOE nuclear facilities

is low.  For hardened targets (facilities with design features which would

mitigate or eliminate the effects of an attack), such as the Transportation

Safeguard System and Y-12 Plant, the threat is even lower.



DOE Albuquerque assesses threat to near and long-term operations in

coordination with the DOE HQ Office of Nonproliferation and National Security

and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application and Stockpile

Support.  There is a DOE counterintelligence program designed to provide

timely foreign intelligence information to assist in protecting weapons

shipments in transit. There has never been an overt attempt to take material

from an SST, nor has there ever been a loss of HEU during shipment by the

Transportation Safeguards Division program. 



The Transportation Safeguards Divisions liaison program assures that the

States which will be traversed are generally aware of TSD operations and

coordinates communication channels between the DOE Albuquerque Office and the

State authorities. The States are involved in briefing and training efforts,

which include sharing information on the frequency and general routing for TSD

shipments and identifying the types of assistance TSD would require in an

emergency.



The DOE Accident Response Group would respond to any incident involving the

SST transport.  The mission of the Accident Response Group is to efficiently

manage the resolution of accidents involving nuclear materials in DOE custody

at the time of the incident. The Accident Response Group handles a broad range

of incidents, including an burning of a nuclear component and radioactive

contamination, in accordance with the DOE Accident Response Group Procedures

Material which is the analog to the Department of Defense Nuclear Accident

Procedures.



3.6 INTERIM STORAGE AT THE OAK RIDGE Y-12 PLAN 



The HEU would be received for interim storage at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge

Tennessee, and stored up to ten years. The Y-12 facility is currently in

operational standdown to address safety concerns raised by the Defense Nuclear

Facilities Safety Board. The Department of Energy anticipates that the safety

concerns raised by the Board will be addressed sufficiently to allow receipt

and storage of the HEU at the Y-12 Plant in November 1994. The HEU material

would be stored in the Building 9720-5 Warehouse, which is in the southwestern

portion of the Y-12 Plant.  Building 9720-5 is a single-story warehouse that

includes approximately 3,716 m2 (40,000 ft2) of storage space.  The Oak Ridge

Reservation and the Y-12 Plant are shown in Figures 3.6-1 and 3.6-2.  The

location of Building 9720-5 within the Y-12 Plant is shown Figure 3.6-3.



** Figure 3.6-1 is a map of the location of the Oak Ridge Reservation. **



** Figure 3.6-2 is a map of the location of the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. **



The SSTs would off-load the HEU material at the Building 9720-5 warehouse. 

The material would undergo a transfer check consisting of a weight and a

tamper-indicating device verification and possibly a non-destructive assay

check. Some of the material may be loaded in Y-12 Plant transport vehicles

(known as the Blue Goose) for in-plant transport to the Y-12 Plant Laboratory

(Building 9995) for confirmatory non-destructive assay measurements as

required for nuclear material control and accountability purposes.  The

material confirmatory measurements may be also be conducted in Buildings 9720

5 or 9212.  Following these accountability checks, the HEU material would be

transported back to the Building 9720-5 warehouse. 



The HEU would be placed directly into a vault-type room in building 9720-5 for

interim storage, without any processing to convert its existing form.  The

Kazakhstan HEU material would be in the same forms and type as the special

nuclear material already stored in building 9720-5 (e.g. broken metal oxide,

solid metal, Beryllium alloys).  The materials would be packaged the same as

the existing materials and would be subject to the same physical and

administrative controls.  The bulk of the material is alloyed with beryllium

and the Y-12 plant safety documentation does not currently cover the

processing of such material.  This would be a new type of processing for the

Y-12 Plant to which further environmental, safety, and health documentation

would be requested.  Therefore, the HEU would be placed in storage in its

existing form without any pre-storage processing. 



The authorization basis for interim storage in building 9720-5 is documented

in the Unreviewed Safety Question Determination, Interim Storage of Material

NMSSS Warehouse, Building 972O-5 (U), September 15, 1994.  The determination

that there are no unreviewed safety questions is based on the following

documents:



(l) Final Safety Analysis Reports for the Assembly, Disassembly and Warehouse

Project (U), Y/TS-816, September 1984 (Energy Systems. 1984): (2)Phase I

Hazard Screening Analysis or the Nuclear Material Safeguarded Shipping and

Storage (NMSSS) Facility Building 9720-5 (U). FINAL HS/7/f/2, December 20,1990

(Energy Systems, 1990): (3) Letter from E.D. Brewer to A.K. Zava, Change in

Preliminary Hazard Rating 9720-5, December 3, 1991 (Energy Systems,1991); and

(4)Operations Safety Requirements for the Enriched Uranium Assembly;

Disassembly and Warehouse Operation (U), Y/TS-53, Rev. l, March 7, 1991

(Energy Systems, 1991).         

 

Note: The terminology Unreviewed Safety Question Determination refers to the

process of determining whether or not there are any safety questions which

have not been addressed in other safety documentation.  A determination that

an action does not constitute an unreviewed safety question means that no new

administrative or physical controls will be required to ensure safety.



The HEU would be stored within a Material Access Areas in Building 9720-5,

which is in the Y-12 Plant Perimeter intrusion Detection and Alarm System

protected area. A Material Access Area is a controlled security area that

segregates enriched uranium use or storage from other operations areas by

physical barriers and specific access controls.  All storage configurations

would meet criticality safety, environmental, and security requirements.  



Storage arrays located in vault-type rooms would rest on the floor of existing

process locations within Material Access Areas.  A vault-type room is a

structure having a combination locked door and protected by an intrusion alarm

system that is activated by any penetration of walls, floors, ceilings, or

openings, or by motion within the room.  Fabricated structures commonly

referred to as birdcages (Figure 3.64) could be used, to ensure criticality

safety while material is stage or laboratory analysis.



Upon approval of additional safety documentation, the material may be unloaded

from 6M2R containers and stored in tube vaults, modular storage vaults, or

transferred to in-plant containers in a vault or vault-type room.  A vault is

a windowless enclosure with a built-in combination locked steel door and with

walls, floor, and ceiling substantially constructed of materials that afford

penetration resistance at least equal to that of 3-inch thick reinforced

concrete.  Any openings in the vault, greater than 96 square inches in area

and over 6 inches in the smallest dimension are protected by imbedded steel

bars at least 5/8 inches in diameter on 6-inch centers.  Metals would be

stored in locked steel boxes in fixed, safe trays within reinforced concrete

vaults, commonly referred to as tube vaults.



Tube vaults (Figure 3.6-5) have concrete floors, ceilings, and walls. Matrices

of steel tubes are constructed in two opposing walls in these vaults, and the

spaces between the steel tubes are filled with concrete. Trays with fixed

spacers are used in the tubes, to hold canned materials in fixed positions on

the tray.  The trays are pulled out horizontally from the tube vault and

loaded with containers, in accordance with Y-12 Plant procedures (Energy

Systems, 1994f).  A typical tube vault can safely accommodate as much as 40

MTU of HEU, and its design life is estimated to be nearly 100 years (U.S.

Congress 1993).   



The HEU could also be stored in modular storage vaults, (see Figure 3.6) which

are structurally equivalent to the tube vaults.  A modular storage vault is

loaded at the ground level in accordance with Y-12 procedures (Energy Systems,

1994g).  Each container would be hand loaded into the storage cavity within

the vault, as described in the EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929).

The safety analysis documentation for the modular storage vaults allows for

the stacking of eight modular storage vaults. 

 

** Figure 3.6-3 is a map of the location of the Y-12 plant building 9720-5

warehouse.  **



The interim storage of the uranium material would not generate any radioactive

or hazardous waste.  The EA for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched

Uranium at the Y-12 Plant (DOE/EA-0929) describes processing operations that

generate waste and that are not involved in this proposed action.



3.7 INVENTORY ACCOUNTABILITY



Upon receipt of the enriched uranium at the Y-12 Plant, a transfer check would

be made as the shipping containers were unloaded from transport vehicles. The

transfer check would confirm container item count and identity, verify the

integrity tamper-indicating devices (including identification numbers), and

compare this information with shipping documentation to ensure that the

shipment was received intact. Confirmatory measurements in the receipt

facility would include a non-destructive analysis to verify the presence of

HEU in the container and a gross weight determination on the containers.

Following the confirmatory measurements, the HEU would enter the nuclear

materials accounting system at the Y-12 Plant. 



The Y-12 Plant maintains a database for tracking enriched uranium, documenting

nuclear material transactions, and issuing periodic reports.  The accounting

system supporting the data base, follows generally accepted accounting

principles, as promulgated by the American Institute for Certified Public

Accountants, and meets the requirements of DOE Order 5633.3A, Control and

Accountability of Nuclear Materials, which requires a physical inventory of

materials to determine the quantities of nuclear materials on hand.

Statistical random sampling of enriched uranium inventories is required to

verify and confirm the contents. Materials sealed with tamper-indication

devices (TIDS) would be visually inspected one at a time to assure that the

seals are undisturbed and the integrity of the container has not been

jeopardized.



** Figures 3.6-4 - 3.6-6 are illustrations of HEU storage facilities.  **



3.8 SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY



In terms of safeguards and security, special nuclear materials (SNM) are

categorized according to their attractiveness to theft or diversion and

according to their quantity (DOE Order 5633.3A, Control and Accountability of

Nuclear Materials).  The Y-12 Plant uses a graded safeguards system designed

to provide varying degrees of physical protection, accountability, and

material control to different types, quantities, physical forms, and chemical

or isotropic compositions of nuclear materials, consistent with the risks

associated with threat scenarios.



Safeguarding and securing HEU at the Y-12 Plant is accomplished through a

combination of four approaches: access control, material surveillance,

material containment, and detection and assessment of unauthorized removal.

Each approach may vary in extent depending on the quantity and form of HEU.

Access control refers to physically restricting access to enriched uranium to

properly authorized personnel.  Most of the Y-12 plant is a high-security

facility with restrictions, fencing, and other physical barriers that exclude

trespassers.  This physical barrier to unauthorized entry, combined with Y

12's highly trained security force and drills and exercises in various

security breach scenarios, limits the possibility of accidental or intentional

incidents resulting from uncontrolled access.



Material surveillance refers to the monitoring of HEU to detect unauthorized

activities.  Protective force personnel and process operators are present in

most areas of the plant around the clock.  These personnel are further

supported by full-time security and emergency staffs who can provide immediate

aid in the event of any security breach or environmental incident.



Material containment involves assuring that HEU is kept only in Material

Access Areas.  Materials transferred in or out of these areas are rigorously

accounted for.  A physical inventory of all HEU in interim storage is taken on

a DOE-approved, fixed schedule.  All areas that contain HEU establish separate

material control codes for accounting purposes.  Transfer between storage and

processing areas is documented, and individual items are identified with a

batch card system.  The inventory schedule is adhered to by all storage and

processing areas.



Detection and assessment of unauthorized removal of HEU is accomplished

through such means as tamper-indicating devices (TIDs) and physical or

electronic searches of vehicles, personnel, packages, and other containers at

enriched uranium storage and process areas.



3.9  ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY, AND HEALTH PROTECTION



As described in the EA for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium at

the Y-12 Plant (DOE/EA-0929), the Y-12 Plant has extensive programs and

procedures for environmental, safety, and health protection.  It is the policy

of the Y-12 Plant site management to conduct operations in a safe and

environmentally sound manner, and in compliance with all applicable federal,

state, and local laws and regulations and with all applicable DOE Orders.  The

air, groundwater, and surface water in and around the Y-12 Plant are monitored

routinely to identify and minimize the impacts to the environment from its

operations.  Worker safety is addressed throughout the receipt, prestorage

processing, intra-plant transport, and storage operations by the Y-12 Plant's

implementation of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

requirements through applicable DOE Orders.  A detailed report on monitoring

results, estimates of the current environmental impacts, and regulatory

compliance at Y-12 appears annually in the Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site

Environmental Report, which has been published since 1971 and is available to

the public.



3.10 ON-SITE TRANSPORTATION AT THE Y-12 PLANT



Transportation between Y-12 Plant buildings would be accomplished by means of

vehicles specifically designed for on-site use.  These vehicles are commonly

referred to as Blue Goose vehicles because of the color of the cargo body and

cab.  Each vehicle can transport cargo weighing up to 1.814 kg (4000 lb.).

Numerous security and safety systems have been installed on the Blue Goose and

there is no access to the cargo body from the cab.  On-Site Transportation

Safety (Energy Systems 1991) establishes safety requirements and guidelines

for handling and moving materials at the Y-12 Plant which ensure protection

equivalent to that provided by the DOT regulations (49 CFR).  These guidelines

include packaging, marketing, labeling, placarding, and emergency response

requirements.



Blue Goose vehicles operate in the Protected Area of the Y-12 Plant to

transport material to and from the Material Access Areas, which are the

controlled security areas containing special nuclear materials.



4.0 ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED ACTION



The alternatives to the proposed action considered in this EA include

the no action alternative and two alternate aerial ports of entry for

the C-5 aircraft landing in the United States: Fort Campbell, a U.S. Army

base which is located in southwestern Kentucky and the Air National Guard

base (hereafter called McGhee Tyson) which is collocated with McGhee

Tyson Airport, the commercial airport in Knoxville, Tennessee.  Fort

Campbell and McGhee Tyson Airport were selected as representative aerial

ports of entry which meet the criteria established in Section 3.3.1,

Aerial Port of Entry Requirements.  The impacts of using either Fort

Campbell or McGhee Tyson as the aerial port of entry are analyzed in

Section 6.



4.1 NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE



Under the no action alternative, the United States would not acquire the

HEU from Kazakhstan.  This would not meet the U.S. objectives for

nonproliferation and would not reduce the global nuclear danger.  As

discussed in Section 2, the HEU in Kazakhstan constitutes sufficient

material for persons with low technical skills to make 20 or more nuclear

weapons.



4.2 ALTERNATE PORTS OF ENTRY



4.2.1 FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY, AS AERIAL PORT



Under this alternative, Fort Campbell, located in southwestern Kentucky,

would be the aerial port of entry for the C-5 flight into the United

States.  Fort Campbell meets the port of entry requirements.  Fort

Campbell is a U.S. Army base with an airstrip that can accommodate the

C-5 aircraft and the SSTs.  The equipment and personnel needed for C-5

operations would be transported to Fort Campbell.  However, Fort Campbell

would not have the added measure of safety offered by Dover AFB which has

more experience with C-5 aircraft.  Fort Campbell has sufficient capacity

in a secure area to accommodate the two C-5 aircraft and 10 SSTs.  Fort

Campbell is within a three-hour drive to the Y-12 Plant, which is

considerably closer to the Y-12 Plant than Dover AFB.  Fort Campbell is

located in a rural area within four counties which have a population of

approximately 189,000.  The population density within 10 km of Fort

Campbell is 3.7 person/km2.  Based on these characteristics of the

airstrip and support facilities, and the low population in the surrounding

area, Fort Campbell meets the aerial port requirements.



In considering the "other factors," as described in Section 3.3.1, Fort

Campbell would not be as desirable as an aerial port as Dover AFB in most

respects.  The air flight distance from the East Coast of the U.S. to

Fort Campbell is approximately 600 miles while Dover is essentially on the

East Coast.  No additional refueling would be required for the Fort

Campbell alternative.  The factors which are more favorable under this

alternative than Dover are the facts that Fort Campbell has a lower

population density, and this alternative would require less highway

transport distance to Y-12 than the Dover alternative.



4.2.2  AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE AT MCGHEE TYSON AIRPORT AS AERIAL PORT



Under this alternative, the Air National Guard Base at the McGhee Tyson

Airport in Knoxville, Tennessee would be the aerial port of entry for the

C-5 flight into the U.S.  McGhee Tyson meets the port of entry

requirements.  The Air National Guard Base is a military aerial port

collocated with a commercial airport.  McGhee Tyson has sufficient

capacity in a secure area to accommodate the C-5 aircraft and the SSTs.

The equipment and personnel need for C-5 operations would be transported

to McGhee Tyson.  However, McGhee Tyson would not have the added measure

of safety offered by Dover AFB because of Dover's greater experience with

C-5 aircraft.  Also, McGhee Tyson does not have as much ramp space as

Dover AFB does for parking the C-5 aircraft and SSTs.  McGhee Tyson is

much closer to the Y-12 Plant than either Dover AFB or Fort Campbell.

McGhee Tyson is located in Blount County, which has a population of

approximately 86,000.  The center of the City of Knoxville, which is a

relatively large urban area is 10 miles from the McGhee Tyson airport.



The population density within 10 km of McGhee Tyson is 17.8 person/km2,

which is lower than Dover AFB population density of 475.4 persons/km2.

Based on these characteristics of the airstrip and support facilities and

the low population in the area within 10 km of the airport, McGhee Tyson

meets the aerial port requirements.



In considering the other factors described in Section 3.3.1, McGhee Tyson

would not be as desirable an aerial port as Dover AFB in most respects.

The air flight distance from the East Coast to McGhee Tyson is

approximately 400 miles, while Dover is essentially on the East Coast.  No

additional refueling would be required for the McGhee Tyson alternative.

The factors which are more favorable under this alternative than Dove AFB

or Fort Campbell alternatives are the facts that the McGhee Tyson

alternative has a lower population density and would require much less

highway transport distance to Y-12 than the Dover alternative.



4.3 ALTERNATIVES DISMISSED FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION



4.3.1 Other Ports of Entry



The three ports of entry analyzed in this EA provide a range of reasonable

alternatives which meet the port requirements established in Section

3.3.1.  Additional ports of entry farther west than Fort Campbell,

Kentucky, were determined not to be reasonable because they would require

additional air refueling, but would not provide any substantial benefit

when compared to the three ports of entry analyzed.



4.3.2 Other DOE Facilities



The Department is proposing to consolidate storage of HEU from the DOE

weapons complex at the Y-12 Plant in order to minimize the cost of storage

and maximize the security of the material, as discussed in the preapproval

EA for Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum

Historical Storage Level (DOE/EA-0929).  It would not be reasonable to

create a separate DOE secure storage facility solely for the limited

amount of material of foreign origin which may be stored for

nonproliferation purposes.



4.4 COMMERCIAL FACILITY



Because the eventual United States policy goal is to dispose of surplus

HEU (see Section 1.1), it could be beneficial to transport the Kazakhstan

HEU directly to a commercial nuclear processing facility for storage

rather than to the Y-12 facility, if an acceptable arrangement can be

concluded in the time available.  The Babcock and Wilcox Company has

expressed tentative interest in obtaining the HEU in order to process and

blend it to a low enriched from at their Lynchburg, Virginia facility for

use as fuel in power reactors.  The Department of Energy has been advised

by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), that the Lynchburg facility

could store the material pending a decision on its disposition.  This

approach could eventually provide a method to dispose of the material

more expeditiously and also avoid the need to re-transfer the material

from Y-12 at some later date.  Minimizing the period of storage could

also reduce the attendant costs.



Initially, any agreement with Babcox and Wilcox would be for storage only

until the legal, regulatory, environmental, and policy issues associated

with commercial disposition of the material could be resolved.  An

analysis of transporting the material to the Lynchburg facility is in

preparation and the results will be available before a final decision is

made regarding the destination of the Kazakhstan HEU.



5.0 DESCRIPTION OF AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT



The locations of the Y-12 Plant and Dover Air Force Base are shown in

Figure 5.0-1, as well as the alternative aerial ports.



5.1 Y-12 PLANT, OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE



The Y-12 Plant is located on the DOE-owned Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR)

which is within the corporate boundaries of the city of Oak Ridge,

Tennessee.  The Y-12 Plant, which is situated at the eastern boundary of

the Oak Ridge Reservation, has surrounding buffer zone of about 1,133

hectares (2,800 acres) and is about 4.8 km (3 miles) from the population

center of the city of Oak Ridge.



The estimated residential population within an 80-km (50 mile) radius of

the Oak Ridge Reservation is approximately 880,000.  A major urban center,

Knoxville (the approximate population of which is 165,000), is located

about 32 km (20 miles) to the east.  The City of Oak Ridge has a

population of about 27,000.  Except for Knoxville and the city of Oak

Ridge, the land within 80 km (50 miles) of the Oak Ridge Reservation is

predominantly rural and is used primarily for residential, commercial,

recreational, and agricultural purposes.  The preapproval EA for Proposed

Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge

Tennessee, released to the State of Tennessee and the public in September

1994, provides the full description of the Oak Ridge Reservation affected

environment (DOE/EA 0929).



5.2 DOVER AIR FORCE BASE, DELAWARE



Dover AFB is located in Kent County, Delaware, approximately 50 miles

southeast of Wilmington, Delaware and 80 miles southeast of Philadelphia.

The region where Dover AFB is shown in Figure 5.2-1 and the airstrip is

shown in Figure 5.2-2.



Dover AFB is the home of the 436th Airlift Wing and since 1973, has been

the only all C-5 base in the Air Mobility Command.  Dover AFB houses the

largest aerial port facility on the East Coast, and is the focal point

for cargo and passenger movement to Europe and the Middle East aboard

both the 436th Airlift Wing C-5s.  The mission of the 436 Airlift Wing is

to provide strategic global military airlift capability for worldwide

support of contingency and emergency war plans.  Additional information

on Dover AFB is provided in Appendix A.



** Figure 5.0-1 is a U.S. map with the locations of proposed actions and

alternatives. **



**Figure 5.2-1 is a map of a portion of Delaware with the Dover Air Force

Base highlighted. **



** Figure 5.2-2 is a layout of the Dover Air Force Base Airstrip. **



5.3 FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY



Fort Campbell is located in southwestern Kentucky and north-central

Tennessee in portions of four counties: Montgomery and Stewart counties

in Tennessee, and Christian and Trigg Counties in Kentucky.  The

installation is approximately eight miles north of Clarksville, Tennessee,

and seventeen miles south of Hopkinsville, Kentucky (see Figure 5.3-1).

Of the 105,303 total acres of land occupied by the Forces Command

installation, approximately two-thirds are in Tennessee and the remainder

in Kentucky.  The primary mission of Fort Campbell is to support, train,

and prepare the 101st Airborne Division for combat readiness.  Additional

information on Fort Campbell is in Appendix B.



5.4 AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE, MCGHEE TYSON AIRPORT, KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE



McGhee Tyson Airport is one of five major air carrier airports in the

state of Tennessee.  McGhee Tyson Airport is located approximately 30

miles from Oak Ridge, Tennessee.  The airport is located adjacent to the

corporate limits of Alcoa, Tennessee, approximately 10 miles southwest of

the Knoxville Central Business district.  The region where McGhee Tyson

airport presently shares its airfield facilities with the 134th Air

Refueling Group of the Tennessee Air National Guard and the Army Aircraft

Support Facility.  The Tennessee Air National Guard occupies 323 acres on

the west side of the airport.  The 134th's primary mission is to provide

refueling support for military aircraft and it has assigned eleven KC-135E

tankers.  McGhee Tyson Airport is categorized in the National Plan of

Integrated Airport systems as a medium-haul commercial service airport.



This category does not restrict or prevent its use by general aviation or

military aircraft. The runways are adequate for landings and takeoffs by

the largest Air Force cargo aircraft, including the C-5A.  Fuel storage

and fueling services for general aviation, air cargo, and the airlines is

handled on-site by the fixed base operators.  Additional information on

McGhee Tyson is provided in Appendix C.  The high natural radionuclide

levels make the ocean ecosystems the highest background-radiation domains

in the biosphere (IAEA, 1976).



Radionuclides have been discharges into the oceans since 1944.  However,

in 1981, it was estimated that the total input of radionuclides,

essentially from waste disposal and nuclear weapons testing, approached

0.7 percent of the natural radioactivity present in the oceans (Needler,

1981).  The total inventory of natural radioactivity in the oceans is

approximately 5.0 x 10E11  Ci(IAEA, 1976).



The relationship between environmental concentrations of radionuclides

and the concentration found in organisms is important in the study of food

web (as occurs with organic pesticides in terrestrial environments) is

observed in marine food webs.  In the marine environment, uranium has not

been found to bioaccumulate in fish and only slightly bioaccumulates in

crustaceans and mollusks (IAEA, 1976).  The readiness with which other

constitutes of spent nuclear fuel may enter the food web is variable, but

generally low (DOE, 1980).



The deep sea bottom dwellers, or benthos, are highly diverse, with many

taxonomic groups being represented there by more species than most

shallow-water communities (Hessler, 1976).  However, the number of

individual organisms in a given volume does decrease in the deep seas

and this dramatic reduction in standing stock or biomass on the deep

ocean floor.  In round figures, the total weight of bottom-living

organisms in and on each square meter seabed decreases from 10-100 grams

on the continental shelf, to 1-10 grams on the continental slope, and to

only 0.1-1.0 gram on the abyssal plain. (Rice, 1978).



The continental shelf, averaging 65 km (40.3 miles) wide and less than

200 m (0.124 miles) deep, has the greatest biomass concentration in the

ocean and is where most fisheries are located.  The deep ocean is an

average of 4 km (2.48 miles) deeper than the continental shelf (Pickard,

1979).



Specific flow estimates for the North Atlantic are up to 5.0 x 10E6 m3/s

for the total volume of water crossing the Iceland-Scotland ridge (Steel,

1962).  From the Greenland Sea, the flow through the Denmark Strait has

been estimated to be 5.0 x 10E6 m3/s (Swallow, 1960).  Water from the

Arctic that enters the Atlantic leaves mainly to the south toward

midlatitudes (NEA, 1988).



** Figure 5.3-1 is a map of the location of Fort Campbell, Kentucky. **



** Figure 5.4-1 is map of the location of McGhee Tyson Airport,

Tennessee. **



5.5 Global Commons



Because the proposed action would involve air transport over the oceans,

the potential impacts on the global commons are analyzed in this EA, in

accordance with Executive Order 12114, Environmental Effects Abroad of

Major Federal Actions.



Seawater is a complex solution containing the majority of the known

elements.  The average salinity of ocean water is about 35 parts per

thousand.  A significant feature of sea water is that while the total

concentration of dissolved salt varies from place to place, the ratios of

the more abundant components remain almost constant.  This may be taken

as evidence that over geologic time, the oceans have become well mixed.

(Pickard, 1979).



** Table 5.1 Oceanic Concentrations of naturally occurring Uranium Isotopes



     U-234      1.04 - 1.30 pCi/l

     U-235      0.04 - 0.07 pCi/l

     U-238      0.9  - 1.30 pCi/l



     Note: one picocurie (pCi) = 1.0 x 10E12 Ci **



Naturally occurring radionuclides such as uranium-234, uranium-235, and

uranium 238 are present in seawater and in marine organisms at

concentrations generally greater than their concentrations in terrestrial

ecosystems.  The ocean water concentrations of uranium isotopes are shown

in Table 5.1.



6.0 POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS



This section examines the potential impacts of the proposed action and

alternatives under incident-free and accident conditions on: the global

commons; the aerial ports of entry and their surrounding areas; the Y-12

Plant and the surrounding area, and the areas along the highway routes on

which the HEU would be transported.



6.1 Y-12 PLANT



The preapproval EA for Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium at

the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, released to the State of Tennessee

and the public on September 23, 1994, provides and analysis of the impacts

of prestorage processing and interim storage of up to 500 metric tons of

HEU, including 5 metric tons of HEU which could be acquired from foreign

sources, and 7,105.9 metric tons of LEU for up to 10 years (DOE/EA 0929).

This EA references applicable sections of the Y-12 Interim Storage EA

(DOE/EA 0929).



6.1.1 Environmental Effects



6.1.1.1 Land Use and Archaeological and Cultural Resources



Because there will be no new buildings constructed or demolished for the

proposed action, there will be no effects on land use or archaeological

and cultural resources. (DOE/EA 0929).



6.1.1.2 Air Quality



The proposed action is to provide interim storage of the HEU without any

prestorage processing, which is the greater source of air emissions,

relative to storage activities.  There would be no additional releases of

airborne contaminants beyond the effects analyzed in the Y-12 Interim

Storage EA (DOE/EA-0929) because no processing would be required.



Atmospheric discharges from Y-12 Plant production operations are minimized

through the extensive use of air pollution control equipment.

High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are used to essentially

eliminate particulate emissions (including uranium) from numerous

production facilities.  HEPA filters remove more than 99% of the

particulates from the exhaust gases.



Radioactive and nonradioactive airborne discharges would continue to be

emitted from the Y-12 Plant under the proposed action, with prestorage

processing being the primary source of emissions.  An estimated 0.055

curies of uranium was released into the atmosphere in 1993 as a result

of Y-12 Plant operations, primarily from processing operations.  There

has been a general downward trend in the total curie discharges of

uranium from the Y-12 Plant, with 0.15 curies released in 1989, 0.08

curies released in 1990, 0.06 curies in 1991 and 1992, and 0.055 curies

in 1993.  The decreased uranium emissions reflect: the reduction since

1989 in other types of process activities that are still operating; and

improvements in contamination control throughout the Y-12 Plant.



6.1.1.3 Hydrology and Water Quality



The proposed action would involve only interim storage operations, and

therefore, does not involve the types of wastewater discharges resulting

from prestorage processing.  The effects on hydrology and water quality

analyzed in the Y-12 Interim Storage EA (DOE/EA-0929) would continue

primarily as a result of other Y-12 Plant operations.



6.1.1.4 Ecological Resources



As there is little natural vegetation or fauna within the Y-12 Plant, and

there would be no new construction or demolition of buildings under the

proposed action, no effects on ecological resources would occur.  The

effects on ecological resources analyzed in the Y-12 Interim Storage EA

(DOE/EA-0929) would continue primarily as a result of other Y-12 Plant

operations.



**Figure 6.1.2.1-1  Average External Dose to Workers in building 9720-5

Warehouse



   1987    0.16 rem

   1988    0.125 rem

   1989    0.07 rem

   1990    0.025 rem

   1991    0.03 rem

   1992    0.02 rem

   1993    0.025 rem **



6.1.2 Incident-Free Radiological Exposure



This section discusses the potential radiological effects to workers and

the public from the proposed action under incident-free conditions.

Under incident-free conditions, radiological exposures to workers could

occur through direct exposure to the uranium material.  Facility workers

who would be in close proximity to the HEU material are the only

population group at risk from direct exposure to this source because

HEU emits low penetrating radiation.  These direct exposures may result

in an external dose to the workers.



The twelve workers involved in handling the HEU acquired from Kazakhstan

to place the containers in interim storage would receive a collective

dose of 0.1 person-rem.  The individual dose would be 0.008 rem.  Using

the worker dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities

per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose of 0.1 person-rem would

be estimated to result in 4 x 10E-5 excess latent cancer fatalities among

those 12 workers.  (0.1 person-rem x 0.0004 [risk factor] = .00004).  This

means that there would be a probability of 4 x 10E-5 or approximately 4

chances in 100,000 that even one excess cancer fatality would occur

among the 12 workers as a result of the proposed action.



The worker exposure from ongoing operations in Building 9720-5, which

would continue regardless of whether the proposed action is undertaken,

is shown in Table 6.1.  The estimated exposures are based on actual 1993

dosimetry data derived from dosimeters worn by Y-12 workers.  The average

annual dose and the dose to the maximally exposed worker for each building

are shown.  These annual doses are well below the Y-12 Plant annual limit

of 1 rem.  The doses resulting from routine storage operations have

substantially decreased since 1987 due to new shielding and operational

procedures.  The proposed action would be doses received over a short

duration and would not increase the annual doses received by workers in

Building 9720-5.



Under incident-free operations, there would be essentially no uranium

releases to the atmosphere and therefore, there would be no dose to the

public caused by the proposed action.  The annual dose to the maximally

exposed individual from ongoing Y-12 Plant operations would continue to

be approximately 0.0013 rem (1.3 mrem), which is the 1993 dose,

regardless of whether the proposed action is implemented.  EPA standards

for releases, such as the NESHAP regulations, limit the dose to an

individual member of the public from radionuclide releases to the

atmosphere to 10 mrem per year.  The annual collective dose from ongoing

Y-12 operations to the public within 50 miles of Oak Ridge Reservation

would continue to be 12 person-rem, which is the 1993 collective dose,

regardless of whether the proposed action is implemented.



In the postulated fire in Building 9720-5, the uranium and beryllium could

potentially ignite and become airborne.  The radiological effects of

credible bounding uranium fires are analyzed in the EA for Interim Storage

at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929).  A postulated fire that causes beryllium to become

airborne is one of toxic chemical release accident scenarios identified

in that EA (see Table 6.3).  However, the consequences of that fire are

not analyzed because it is not the bounding chemical release accident at

Y-12 Plant: the anhydrous hydrogen fluoride leak is the bounding chemical

accident, and it is analyzed in depth in the EA.



The bounding uranium fire accident analyzed in the EA for Interim Storage

at Y-12 is postulated in Building 9212, rather than Building 9720-5; it

should be noted that Building 9212 contains processing operations,

whereas Building 9720-5 is only a warehouse and does not contain

processing operations.  The consequences of the Building 9212 fire are a

dose of 0.03 rem to the involved worker, and a collective dose to the

worker population of 7,100 person-rem, which is the mean dose.  The 95th

percentile collective dose is estimated to be 40,000 person rem.  For the

public, the dose to the maximally exposed individual from this accident

would be 7.2 rem (30 rem - 95th percentile dose), and the collective dose

to the population within 50 miles would be 100 person rem (380 person-rem

- 95th percentile dose).



The health effects of the worker and public doses are presented in the EA

for Interim Storage at Y-12.  As an example, the collective dose of 100

person-rem would result in 0.02 excess latent cancer fatalities, based on

the public dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 (NRC, 1991) (100

person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 0.05).  This means that there would

be a probability of 0.05 or one chance in 20 that even one excess cancer

fatality would occur among the entire population within 50 miles of the

Oak Ridge Reservation; therefore, it is expected that not a single member

of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to radiation

from the bounding criticality accident.



The acute effects of airborne beryllium are respiratory distress such as:

pulmonary edema (fluid on the lungs) and chemical pneumonitis (chemical

toxicity of the pulmonary system).  Beryllium-induced acute respiratory

effects range from a mild inflammation of the nasal mucous membranes, to

a severe chemical pneumonitis.  Acute pneumonitis is encountered only

rarely due to improved control methods and prompt medical treatment of

beryllium exposures.  Recovery can take up to six months for acute

pneumonitis.  Severe cases may become fatal.  In addition, beryllium is

potentially a strong skin sensitizer and can cause contact dermatitis,

which is characterized by itching and reddened, elevated, or fluid-

accumulated lesions.  Following cessation of exposure and with simple

local treatment, the skin eruptions usually disappear within one to two

weeks.



Table 6.1  Radiation Doses for Y-12 Workers in Building 9720-5



Population   Population   Annual Dose       10-Year Dose    Latent Cancer

                Size      to Worker (rem)                    Fatalities



Collective      37          0.024            8.9 person      3.6 x 10E-3

                                               rem



Maximally        1          0.092            0.92 rem        3.7 x 10E-4

Exposed

Individual



6.1.3 Exposure under Accident Conditions



Building 9720-5 is a warehouse with no processing operations.  Therefore,

the postulated bounding accident is a fire or a criticality, either of

which could be initiated by natural phenomena (earthquake, tornado,

lightning), an aircraft crash, or inadvertent ignition of combustible

materials.  The probability of an aircraft crash is on the order of 1 x

10E-7 per year or less (approximately 1 chance in 10,000,000).  The

probability of an earthquake of the magnitude to collapse the building

(peak ground acceleration of .18g) is 5 x 10E-4 or approximately 1 chance

in 2,000.  The probability of a tornado of sufficient magnitude to

collapse the building is 2 x 10E-5, approximately 1 chance in 50,000.

(Kennedy, et al 1990)



Fire Accident Scenario The probability of ignition of combustible

materials in Building 9720-5 has not been calculated; as described in the

EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929), the Safety Analysis Reports

for Y-12 are in the process of being updated.  The Final Safety Analysis

Report for the Assembly, Disassembly and Warehouse Project (Energy

Systems 1986) determined that the probability of a fire occurring is not

"credible," which is a safety analysis term for an accident with a

probability greater than 1 x 10E-6.  Beryllium toxicity can be manifested

in adverse effects on the human immune system; epidemiological studies

have not determined the mechanism for these effects.



Some persons suffering acute beryllium exposure experience these

symptoms, whereas others may not.  There are uncertainties concerning the

dose-response relationship.  However, historic epidemiological data

indicate that approximately 4 percent of workers exposed to beryllium

have a positive response to the Lymphocyte Transformation Test (LTT),

which is a potential indicator of berylliosis or acute beryllium disease.



There is currently no standard for Immediately Dangerous to Life and

Health (IDLH) for beryllium issued by the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA).  The National Institute for Occupational Safety

and Health (NIOSH) gives an IDLH value of 10mg/m3 for 30 minute exposure.

(NIOSH, 1990) The OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) for an 8 hour

time weighted average is 2ug/m3, and the Short-Term Exposure Limit (STEL)

is 5 ug/m3 over a 30 minute time period.  In a beryllium fire, the

workers could be exposed to concentrations greater than the NIOSH IDLH

standard or the OSHA PEL or the STEL.  At high concentrations of

airborne beryllium, workers fatalities could potentially occur.  It is

extremely unlikely that members of the public would experience acute

effects.



Criticality Accidents: Postulated criticality accidents are analyzed in

detail in EA for Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929).  The bounding

criticality accident analyzed in the EA for Interim Storage is a ground-

level release in Building 9212, which results in fatalities among the

involved workers and an average dose of 0.1 rem to the uninvolved worker

(0.8 rem - 95th percentile dose).  For the total worker population, the

mean dose from the criticality accident is estimated to be 870 person-rem

(4,800 person-rem - 95th percentile dose).  For the public, the dose to

the maximally exposed individual from this accident would be 1.3 rem

(3.2 rem - 95th percentile dose), and the collective dose to the

population within 50 miles would be 9 person-rem (40 person-rem - 95th

percentile dose).



The health effects of worker and public doses are presented in the EA for

Interim Storage at Y-12 (DOE/EA-0929).  For example, the collective dose

of 40 person-rem would result in 0.02 excess latent cancer fatalities,

based on the public dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 (NRC

1991), (40 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 0.02).  This means that

there would be a probability of 0.02, or one chance in 50, that even one

excess cancer fatality would occur among the entire population within 50

miles of the Oak Ridge Reservation; therefore it is expected that not a

single member of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure

to radiation from the bounding criticality accident.



Beyond-Design-Basis Building Collapse: The EA for Interim Storage at Y-12

(DOE/EA-0929) analyzes the bounding scenario of the beyond-design-basis

collapse for Building 9212 could result from an extreme natural hazard

(tornado or earthquake) or an airplane crash.  This postulated accident

bounds the consequences of the collapse of Building 9720-5.  Fatalities

to the involved workers would be expected as a result of the building

collapse and the criticality that is postulated in this scenario.  In

addition, a fire and simultaneous release of HEU is postulated.  The

estimated exposure to uninvolved workers is an average dose of 2 rem.  The

average collective dose to all the workers on-site at Y-12 would be 14,000

person-rem.  The average collective dose of 14,000 person-rem from the

collapse of Building 9212 is estimated to result in five excess cancer

fatalities (14,000 person-rem x 0.0004 [risk factor] = 5).  For the

public, there would be a collective dose of 190 person-rem from the

beyond-design-basis accident, which is estimated to result in 0.1 excess

latent cancer fatalities (190 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 0.1).

This means that there would be a probability of 0.1, or one chance in

ten, that even one excess cancer fatality would occur among the entire

population within 50 miles of the Oak Ridge Reservation; therefore it is

expected that not a single member of the public would die from cancer as

a result of exposure to radiation from the beyond-design-basis accident.



6.1.4 Environmental Justice



On February 11, 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898.

Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations

and Low-Income Populations (59 FR 7829).  The order requires each Federal

agency to make environmental justice "part of its mission by identifying

and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human

health or environmental effects of its programs, policies and activities

on minority populations and low-income populations..."  By December 11,

1994, each agency must develop a proposed agency-wide environmental

justice strategy and the strategy must be finalized by February 11, 1995.



While the DOE strategy is not yet final, President Clinton directed all

agencies to take necessary steps to implement several specific directives

immediately.  Each Federal agency must analyze the environmental effects,

including human health, economic and social effects, of Federal actions,

including effects on minority communities and low-income communities,

when such analysis is required by the National Environmental Policy Act

of 1969 (NEPA).  Mitigation measures outlined or analyzed in an

environmental assessment, environmental impact statement, or record of

decision, whenever feasible, should address significant and adverse

environmental effects of proposed Federal actions on minority communities

and low-income communities.  In addition, each Federal agency is required

to provide opportunities for community input in the NEPA process,

including identifying potential effects and mitigation measures in

consultation with affected communities and improving the accessibility

of meetings, crucial documents, and notices.



The EA for Y-12 Interim Storage (DOE/EA-0929) analyzes the effects of

interim storage of enriched uranium on two potential low income

populations and minority populations, which are located in census tracts

201 and 205.  The EA does not identify disproportionate effects on these

two communities.



6.1.5 Cumulative Effects



The EA for Y-12 Interim Storage (DOE/EA-0929) analyzes the cumulative

effects of interim storage of enriched uranium.  The Oak Ridge Reservation

includes the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), K-25 Site, and Y-12

Plant.  All three sites contribute to radioactive air emissions, as

reported in the Oak Ridge Reservation Environmental Report (Energy

Systems 1994h).  During 1993, approximately 2,232 curies of radionuclides

were released to the atmosphere from the DOE ORR facilities.  Almost all

of the radioactivity released was from ORNL and primarily consisted of

tritium, radioiodine, and the inert radioactive gases argon, xenon and

krypton.  At the K-25 site, the Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA)

incinerator is the only major radionuclide source and is the primary

K-25 contributor to offsite dose.  The total discharge of radionuclides

from the K-25 site to the atmosphere in 1993 was approximately 0.42

curies.  Of the total discharges of radionuclides from the K-25 site,

less than 0.02 curies were uranium.  The total discharge of radionuclides

to the atmosphere from the Y-12 Plant in 1993 was approximately 0.055

curies from Y-12 uranium processing (Energy Systems 1994h).



In addition to the ORR facilities, five non-DOE offsite sources of minor

radioactive air emissions are located in the vicinity.  A NESHAP-permitted

waste processing facility located on Bear Creek Road adjacent to and west

of the ORR reported a maximum individual dose of 0.06 mrem due to

airborne emissions in 1993 (Energy Systems 1994h).  A depleted uranium

processing facility and a decontamination facility on Illinois Avenue

and Flint Road, respectively, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, also reported 1993

emissions (Energy Systems 1994h).  The other two sources are the Kingston

and Bull Run coal-fired steam plants.  Based on a study conducted to

determine the radiological impact of airborne effluents of coal-fired and

nuclear power plants, a hypothetical plant similar to the Kingston and

Bull Run plants was estimated to release approximately 0.02 curies of

uranium per year (McBride, et al. 1977).



Table 6.1-2 summarized 1993 airborne radionuclide emissions from both DOE

and non-DOE sources in the vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation.  A

network of ambient air and effluent samplers provide data from individual

plant emissions, cumulative emissions from ORR sources, and offsite

locations.  This network consists of three distinct categories: site

monitors, perimeter monitors, and remote monitors.  Analysis of the

perimeter air sampling data shows that the operations at Oak Ridge

Reservation slightly increase the local airborne concentrations of

radionuclides.  No major changes in the concentration of these

radionuclides were detected between 1992 and 1993 at the remote monitoring

samplers.  A hypothetical maximally exposed individual could receive 1.4

mrem/yr from radionuclides release into the atmosphere from ORR (Energy

Systems 1994h).  The collective EDE to the 879,546 persons residing

within 80 km (50 miles) of the ORR.  Thus, based on the perimeter air

sampling data, the ongoing operations have a slight effect on local air

quality.  The local impact is well within EPA's National Emissions

Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) regulatory limit of 10

mrem/year to the maximally exposed individual of the public (40 CFR 61,

Subpart H).



Table 6.1-2 1993 Airborne Radionuclide Emissions in the Vicinity of the

Oak Ridge Reservation



Site      Location     Radionuclides  Maximally Exposed    Off-site

                       Released       Off-site Individual  collective

                       (curies)       TEDE (mrem)          EDE (person-rem)



DOE/ORR  ORNL              2,231          0.1                    6

         K-25 Plant        0.42           0.1                    8

         Y-12 Plant        0.055          1.3                    12



Non-DOE  Water process-    Not avail.     0.06                Not avail.

         ing facility

         on Bear Creek

         Road



         Depleted uran-    0.05 kg        Not avail.          Not avail.

         ium processing    (approx.       (approx. less

         facility on       2 x 10E-5      than 0.0006

         Illinois Ave.     curies)        mrem)



          Decontamination   Not avail.     0.0001             Not Avail.

         facility located

         on Flint Road.



         Kingston coal-    0.02 curies    <0.0001 Not Avail. fired steam of uranium plant (estimate) Bull Run coal 0.02 curies Not avail. Not avail. fired steam of uranium plant (estimate) In addition to the extensive monitoring programs described in the annual Oak Ridge Reservation Environmental Report, a new soil monitoring program was implemented in 1992. The soil provides an integrating medium that can "record" contaminants released to the atmosphere, and soil sampling can be used to evaluate the long-term accumulation and estimated environmental radionuclide inventories. Soil plots were established at nine of the perimeter ambient air sampling stations. Initial soil plot samples collected in 1993 will form a baseline for comparison and trend analysis in future years for use in determining cumulative impacts. In recent years there has been a general decline in the level of air emissions and worker and public exposures, as a result of mission changes at Y-12 and improved administrative controls. The dose to the maximally exposed individual from all ORR sources is estimated to be approximately 14 mrem. Since implementation of the proposed action would not result in radioactive air emissions which are greater than those recently reported, the cumulative impacts from implementation of the proposed action are expected to remain at current levels. These doses are well below the 100 mrem annual regulatory limit for individuals off-site from all exposure pathways. 6.1.6 No Action Alternative Effects on Y-12 Plant Under the no action alternative, the Y-12 Plant would continue to provide interim storage for enriched uranium which is stored on site. Pending the outcome of the EA for Y-12 Interim Storage (DOE/EA-0929), the effects would either be the effects of the No Action Alternative analyzed in that EA or the effects of the proposed action of storage of enriched uranium above the maximum historical storage level. 6.1.7 For Campbell Alternative Effects on Y-12 Plant Under the alternative in which Fort Campbell would be the aerial port of entry, the HEU would be stored at Y-12 just as under the proposed action. Therefore, the effects at Y-12 Plant would be the same as the proposed action, as analyzed in Section 6.1.1 6.1.5. THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20 BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/95 
6.2  Transportation



Direct radiological exposure resulting in an external dose may occur from

radiation emitted by packages aboard vehicles in transport and during

stops.  In addition, accidents during air and highway transport could

result in external and internal radiological exposure from the release of

material.  Nonradiological impacts of the generation of pollutants and

mechanical injuries during normal transport and physical trauma during

accidents are other potential impacts.



Impacts on the transportation crew and the public from the HEU shipping

campaign were calculated by means of a RADTRAN risk analysis (Sandia

1992).  RADTRAN is a computer code that yields conservative estimates

(i.e. overstates the risk) of radiological exposure to the transportation

crew and potentially exposed public.



6.2.1   Air Transport by U.S. Air Force



Under the three alternatives, the HEU would be transported by the U.S. Air

Force.



6.2.1.1.   Incident-free Air Transport From Air Transport of HEU



The transport of under incident-free conditions would result in

radiological exposure only to the personnel on the aircraft.  There would

be no radiological exposure to the public caused by incident-free air

transport.



The radiological exposure received by persons on the C-5 aircraft would be

approximately the same whether the aerial port of entry is Dover AFB,

Fort Campbell, or McGhee Tyson.  This is because of the minimal difference

in flying time to the three destinations, in terms of percentage of total

flying time.   The maximum individual dose resulting from proximity to the

HEU is estimated to be 0.01 rem.   This would be added to the background

individual dose of 0.015 rem resulting from the cosmic radiation on a

flight (round trip).



The maximum collective dose to the 34 (maximum) persons on board is

estimated to be 0.34 person-rem.  Using the worker dose-to-risk conversion

factor of 4 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the

collective dose of 0.34 person-rem would be estimated to result in 1.4 x

10E-4 latent cancer fatalities (0.34 person-rem x 0.0004 [risk factor] =

0.00014).  This means that there would be a probability of 0.00014, or

about 1 chance in 7000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur

among the crew.



Under incident-free conditions, there would be negligible effect on the

global commons from the C-5 aircraft flight from Dover, Fort Campbell,

and McGhee Tyson.  Air emissions of criteria pollutants from C-5 and

tanker aircraft flights would consist of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides,

hydrocarbons, and particulate matter.  Emissions at the altitudes the

aircraft will fly over the global commons would constitute a very

temporary and minor addition to those already emitted by other aircraft

and ships.  Similarly, the additional C-5 operations would constitute a

very temporary 2.24 percent increase in daily operations and, therefore,

would result in very minor increases of airborne emissions.  The

additional emissions from these aircraft operations and associated ground

vehicles would fall below EPA specified threshold levels, and, therefore,

an air conformity determination is not required.



Under the no action alternative, there would be no flight and therefore,

there would be no effects.



6.2.1.2 Postulated Air Transport Accident Conditions



6.2.1.2.1 Air Transport Accident Probabilities



The C-5 aircraft has an excellent performance history.  The historical

data indicate that the probability of accidents is extremely low (No class

A accidents or 0 per 100,000 flying hour average for the last three

years).  For the of this EA, the accident probabilities are conservatively

assumed to be comparable to very large cargo planes.  Six categories of

accident severity derived from simple air-mode fault trees were used in

the RADTRAN risk analysis.  These are:



* Category 1: no forces on packages exceed Type A standards

* Category 2: no forces on packages exceed Type B standards

* Category 3: impact forces exceed Type B standards; no fire; 15 percent

  of packages fail

* Category 4: impact forces do not exceed Type B standards; engulfing fire

  for more than 30 min.; 30 percent of all packages fail

* Category 5: impact forces exceed Type B standards; engulfing fire for

  more than 30 min.; 50 percent of all packages fail

* Category 6: impact forces exceed Type B standards; engulfing fire for

  more than 30 min.; 70 percent of all packages fail.



Two separate fault trees (based on smaller aircraft than the C-5) were

used for two sets of accident scenarios: one for landing/low altitude

stalls; and one for in-flight accidents.  In the event of an accident,

the probability that one of the six accident categories would occur are

as follows:



                 Landing

                 /Stalls            In-flight

Category 1:       0.208             0.230

Category 2:       0.540             0.130

Category 3:       0.050             0.3850

Category 4:       0.060             0.014

Category 5:       0.128             0.217

Category 6:       0.014             0.024

                  _____             _____

                  1.00              1.00



For Dover AFB, the accident scenario of most concern is the landing/stall

accident.  For landing/stall accidents, there is a 75 percent probability

that an accident would not breach a container.  For the alternate ports

of entry, (Fort Campbell and McGhee Tyson) , the probability of occurrence

of a landing/stall accident is the same as for Dover AFB, but the

probabilities of an in-flight accident are greater because the routes

traverse greater distances over U.S. territory.  (The air flight distance

to Dover = 600 nautical miles; the distance to Fort Campbell = 1190

nautical miles; and the distance to McGhee Tyson = 105 nautical miles).

In-flight accidents have higher probabilities causing the breach of some

of the containers.  For example, the probability that an accident would

not breach a container drops to 36 percent.



If there were an accident during overflight of U.S. territory, the

probability that it would occur in a rural population zone was estimated

to be 80 percent.  The probability that any accident that might occur

would be in a suburban area, estimated to be 19 percent; and in an urban

area, 1 percent.  These percentages represent the national average

occurrence of rural, suburban, and urban population densities.



In the global commons, only in-flight accident probabilities are

applicable because no landings would occur in the global commons.

Although air refueling would occur in the global commons, there are no

landings involved.



6.2.1.2.2 Air Transport Accident Consequences



Air Transport Accident Consequences Over U.S. Territory



The consequences of a bounding accident(Category 6) over U.S. territory

are given for in-flight and landing/stall accidents in Tables 6.2-1 and

6.2-2 respectively.  For in-flight accidents, the consequences were

calculated for a generic high-population urban area; a conservative

generic population estimate is used because it is not possible to predict

the exact location of such an accident.  The probability of occurrence of

such an accident varies with total distance of flight over U.S. territory

as shown in Table 6.2-1.  For each port of entry, the collective dose

would be 15.6 person-rem distributed among the generic population of

5,210,000.  This would result in 7.8 x E-4 latent cancer fatalities in

the exposed population.  There is about a 1 in 1,300 chance of a single

latent cancer fatality occurring as a result of this dose among the

exposed population.



A maximum-consequence (Category 6) landing/stall accident has an equal

chance of occurring (2.0 x 10E-8) at any of the proposed ports of entry,

but the collective dose varies according to differences in the size of

the surrounding populations.  Thus, the collective dose to persons

potentially under the plume (5,000) (see footnote "a" under Table 6.2-1)

for Fort Campbell, would be lowest at 0.03 person-rem.  The collective

dose at McGhee Tyson to persons potentially under the plume (24,000)

would be 0.12 person-rem.  The collective dose at Dover to persons

potentially under the plume (26,500) would be 0.13 person-rem.  The

collective dose at Dover AFB would result in 6.5 x 10E-5 latent cancer

fatalities.  This would be a probability of 0.000065, or about 7 chances

in 100,000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur in the

surrounding population.



** Table 6.2-1  Air Transport In-Flight Accident Consequences For Bounding

                Accident in Urban Area



                  No. of Persons   Accident      Collective    Latent Cancer

                  Exposed          Probability   Dose          Fatalities

                                                 (person-rem)



Proposed Action:  5,210,000        6.7 x 10E-10    15.6         7.8 x 10E-4

Flight to Dover

AFB



No Action            0                 0             0               0

Alternative



Fort Campbell     5,210,000        2.0 x 10E-9     15.6         7.8 x 10E-4

Alternative



McGhee Tyson      5,210,000        1.3 x 10E-9     15.6         7.8 x 10E-4

Airport

Alternative  **



** Table 6.2-2  Air Transport Landing/Stall Accident Consequences For

                Bounding Accident in Urban Area



                  No. of Persons   Accident      Collective    Latent Cancer

                  Exposed          Probability   Dose          Fatalities

                                                 (person-rem)



Proposed Action:  26,500           2.0 x 10E-5     0.13         6.5 x 10E-5

Flight to Dover

AFB



No Action            0                 0             0               0

Alternative



Fort Campbell     5,000            2.0 x 10E-5     0.03         1.5 x 10E-5

Alternative



McGhee Tyson      24,000           2.0 x 10E-5     0.12         6.0 x 10E-5

Airport

Alternative



Note: The number of persons exposed gives the number persons under the

plume based on the production density surrounding the airport; persons

located closest to the airport(within 1 to 2 kilometers) would receive

the majority of the dose.  This result is generally unaffected by the

presence of a city or other population center a few miles away. **



Air Transport Accident Consequences in the Global Commons



Because the proposed action would involve air transport over the oceans,

this EA analyzes the potential environmental impacts of the proposed

action on the global commons in accordance with Executive Order 12114.



Under accident conditions, any containers which withstood the accident

and did not sink to an unrecoverable depth (200m) could possibly be

retrieved.  Containers that sank deeper than 200 meters could possibly be

retrieved, but for the purposes of this analysis, it is conservatively

assumed that the containers of HEU in depths greater than 200 m would be

breached, and the HEU would be instantaneously released into the ocean.

It is more likely that the container would be eventually breached and

that there would be a slow release over time which would have less effect

on the marine environment.



The existing oceanic environment contains substantial quantities of

uranium and its daughter products from naturally occurring processes (see

Section 5).  As a result, marine organisms are exposed to relatively high

levels of background radiation.  Since uranium has not been found to

bioaccumulate in fish and only slightly bioaccumulates in other marine

organisms, an accidental release would result in only slight increases

in the exposure of marine organisms which tend to be more radiation

resistant than terrestrial mammals and which are already exposed to

similar concentrations of uranium.  The beryllium in the material could

have a toxic effect on marine organisms, but as discussed in Section 6.1,

the effects are somewhat uncertain.  Depending on the concentrations in

the sea water, either the uranium and beryllium could potentially result

in fatalities to marine organisms.  As a result of the large volumes of

water, the mixing mechanisms within it, the background concentrations of

uranium, and the radiation resistance of aquatic organisms, the

radiological and toxic impact of this very low probability accident

releasing uranium and beryllium into the ocean would likely be localized

and of short duration.



6.2.2. Transfer of HEU From Aircraft to SST



The HEU would be immediately transferred from the C-5 aircraft to the

waiting SST vehicles at Dover AFB under the proposed action, or at Fort

Campbell, or McGhee Tyson Airport under the alternatives.



6.2.2.1 Incident-Free Radiological Exposure From HEU Transfer Activities



Incident-free radiological exposures to workers and the public from HEU

transfer activities are shown in Table 6.2.3.  Package handling modeled

with RADTRAN identifies two exposed groups of workers: the handlers

themselves, who are in this case operators of the K-loader; and 30 other

workers/guards within a 50-m radius.  The other workers/guards are not

subdivided into civilian and military personnel.  Because unloading would

occur in a secured area at a distance from the public, the dose under

incident-free conditions would be negligible.  Even at McGhee Tyson,

where the military installations are separated from the civilian airport

facilities by two parallel runways, one of which is used only by military,

the public is sufficiently distant to avoid being exposed.



** Table 6.2-3 Incident-free Radiological Exposure for HEU Transfer from

               Aircraft to SST Under the Proposed Action and Alternatives



              Population                   Transfer of HEU to SST



                                 Population     Dose           LCF's

                                    Size     (person-rem)



K-loader      Collective             2         0.088           3.6 x 10E-5

Operations    Population



              Maximum                1         0.044           1.8 x 10E-5

              Individual Dose



--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Other         Collective            30       1.5 x 10E-2       6.0 x 10E-6

Loading       Population

Workers

              Average                1        0.50 mrem        2.0 x 10E-7

              Individual Dose



--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Public        Collective           none        none              none

within        Population

500 m

              Average              none        none              none

              Individual Dose

**



Handling is modeled as occurring in the same way at all three aerial ports

of entry.  It was estimated to take 30 minutes per Cargo Restraint

Transporter (CRT), or 14.50 hours for complete transfer of all of the

CRTs on one C-5 aircraft to the SSTs if both planes are unloaded at the

same time.  No interim storage was assumed to occur during this process.

The incident-free radiological exposure resulting from HEU transfer

activities would be the same at Dover AFB, Fort Campbell, and McGhee

Tyson.  The maximum collective dose to two workers who unload all CRTs

is estimated to be 8.8 x 10E-2 person-rem.  The maximum individual dose

is estimated to be 4.4 x 10E-2 rem.  Using the worker dose-to-risk

conversion factor of 4 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC,

1991), the collective dose of 8.8 x 10E-2 person-rem would be estimated

to result in 3.6 x 10E-5 latent cancer fatalities (0.088 person-rem x

0.004 [risk factor] = 0.000036).  This means that there would be a

probability of 3.6 x 10E-5, or about 1 chance in 28,000 that any excess

cancer fatalities would occur among the workers as a result of exposure

incurred during HEU transfer activities.



The dose to other persons at the handling location is estimated to be

1.5 x 10E-2 person-rem for an average individual dose of less than 0.5

mrem.



Under the no action alternative, no flight would occur, and therefore

there would be no transfer of HEU.



6.2.2.2 Postulated HEU Transfer Accidents



The postulated HEU transfer accident is that the K-loader pierces a

package.  It is conservatively assumed that the accident damages the

package so severely that the inner and outer containers fail and some

fraction of the contents of that package are dispersed as particulate

material.  Persons nearby and downwind would receive a dose via

inhalation of particulates.  The contents of the damaged packaged are

conservatively assumed to be oxide in powder form.  The package is assumed

to release 50 percent of its contents as aerosols, five percent of which

are respirable.



The effects of an accident during HEU transfer would be the same at Dover

AFB, Fort Campbell, and McGhee Tyson.  The maximum individual dose

received by a K-loader operator primarily by inhalation, is estimated to

be 0.088 rem.  For other workers, the collective dose to the 2 operators

is estimated to be 0.176 person-rem.  Workers are modeled as being able

to move from the immediate location to at least 100 m away.  These

workers would receive an average dose of 0.021 rem.  Using the worker

dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4x10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem

(NRC, 1991), the collective dose of 0.176 person-rem would be estimated to

result in 7 x 10E-5 latent cancer fatalities (0.176 person-rem x 0.0004

[risk factor] = 0.00007).  This means that there would be a probability

of 0.00007, or about 1 chance in 14,000 that any excess cancer fatalities

would occur among workers during HEU transfer activities.



** Table 6.2-4 Radiological Exposure for Postulated HEU Transfer Accidents



             Population                   Transfer of HEU to SST



                                  Population     Dose         LCF's

                                     Size     (person-rem)



Other        Collective              30       0.6300          3.6 x 10E-5

Workers      Population



             Maximum                  1       0.0210          1.8 x 10E-5

             Individual Dose

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Loading      Collective               2       0.1760          7.0 x 10E-5

Workers      Population

             Average                  1       0.0880          3.5 x 10E-6

             Individual Dose



--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Public       Collective             8,100     0.0400          2.0 x 10E-5

(Beyond      Population

 500 m)

             Average                  1       0.0019          1.0 x 10E-6

             Individual Dose

**



The 50-year collective dose to the public from an accident during transfer

activities is estimated to be 4 x 10E-2 person-rem per year.  This

collective dose is conservatively assumed to be distributed among an

estimated 8,100 persons.  The population of 8,100 persons represents a

conservative estimate of the maximum number of persons within the plume

which would rise from the accident site and descend at approximately 500

meters away.  This does not represent the entire population within the

500 meter radius of the accident location, because only those people in

the area where the plume descends would be affected.  Any differences

among aerial ports, in terms of population or meteorological conditions,

are bounded by the conservatism in the assumption of 8,100 persons as the

affected population.  The maximally exposed member of the public, who is

assumed to be at a distance of 500 m downwind from the accident would

receive a dose of about 2 mrem.  Using the general population dose-to-risk

conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC,

1991), the collective dose to the public of 4 x 10E-2 person-rem would be

estimated to result in 2.0 x 10E-5 latent cancer fatalities (0.04 person-

rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = 0.00002).  This means that there would be a

probability of 0.00002 or about 1 chance in 50,000 that any excess cancer

fatalities would occur among the affected population of approximately

8,100.



Based on these doses and the estimated latent cancer fatalities, it is

expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die from

cancer as a result of an accident during transfer of HEU.  Under the no

action alternative, no flight would occur, and therefore, there would be

no transfer of HEU.



THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT

CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20

BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/95
6.2.3  SST Transport of HEU to Y-12 Plant



Transportation impacts were analyzed for SST highway transport from Dover

Air Force Base to the Y-12 Plant.  Representative SST routes maximizing

the use of interstate highways were developed with the HIGHWAY routing

code.  No credit was taken for shielding provided by the SST walls, which

would, in fact, decrease actual exposures.  Routes typical of those used

for SST transport were selected and are documented in the transportation

analysis (Sandia, 1994).  Route data for rural, urban, and suburban

population densities were used to define the properties and

characteristics of the transportation routes for the RADTRAN analysis of

HEU shipments by SST.



Table 6.2-5 summarizes the annual radiological exposure from incident-free

transport to three populations under the proposed action and alternatives:

(1) the transportation crew; (2) the workers (e.g., escorts, security

personnel) who may be exposed when a SST makes a rest stop; and (3) the

public, including persons sharing the transportation route at the time of

shipment, persons near the transportation route, and persons at stops.

SST stops would occur only under the proposed action and the Fort Campbell

alternative; McGhee Tyson Airport is close enough to the Y-12 Plant that

stops would not be necessary.  Under the proposed action the SSTs would

make stops only in low-population-density areas and park only in areas

which are located well away from other trucks at the stop.



6.2.3.1 Incident-free SST Transport



6.2.3.1.1 Proposed Action: SST Transport of HEU from Dover AFB to Y-12



The collective dose to the public for incident-free SST transport would

be 2.9 x 10E-4 person-rem per year.  This collective dose would be shared

by the estimated 320,000 persons within 800 meters (0.5 miles) of the

center line of the highway routes that lie between Dover AFB and the Y-12

Plant and by the persons at SST stops.  The maximum in-transit dose to an

individual member of the public would be 3.6 x 10E-5 mrem.  Using the

general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 cancer

fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose to the public

of 2.9 x 10E-4 person-rem would be estimated to result in 1.4 x 10E-7

latent cancer fatalities (.00029 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] =

.00000014).  This means that there would be a probability of .00000014,

or 1 chance in 7 million, that any excess cancer fatalities would occur

among the affected population of approximately 320,000 people.



Based on these doses and the estimated latent cancer fatalities, it is

expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die from

cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the proposed

transportation of HEU by SST from Dover AFB to Y-12.



6.2.3.1.2  No Action



Under the no action alternative, no flight would occur, and therefore,

there would be no SST transport of HEU.



6.2.3.1.3 SST Transport of HEU from Fort Campbell to Y-12



Under this alternative, the average individual dose to a SST

transportation crew member from transport of HEU from Fort Campbell to

the Y-12 Plant is estimated to be 4.6 x 10-4 rem.  The collective dose to

the public for incident-free SST transport from Fort Campbell to Y-12

would be 7.2 x 10E-5 person-rem per year.   This collective dose would be

shared by the estimated 74,000 persons within 800 meters (0.5 miles) of

the highway routes that lie between Fort Campbell and the Y-12 Plant.

The maximum in-transit dose to an individual member of the public would

be 3.6 x 10E-8 rem.  Using the general population dose-to-risk conversion

factor 5 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the

collective dose to the public of 7.2 x 10E-5 person-rem would be

estimated to result in 3.6 x 10E-8 latent cancer fatalities (.000072

person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] = .000000036).  This means that there

would be a probability of .000000036, or 1 chance in 28 million, that any

excess cancer fatalities would occur among the affected population of

approximately 74,000.



Based on these doses and the estimated latent fatalities, it is expected

that not a single worker or member of the public would die from cancer as

a result of exposure to radiation from the proposed transportation of HEU

by SST from Fort Campbell to Y-12.



6.2.3.1.4 SST Transport of HEU from McGhee-Tyson Airport to Y-12



Under this alternative, the maximum individual dose to a SST

transportation crew member from transport of HEU from McGhee Tyson Airport

to the Y-12 Plant is estimated to be 9.25 x 10E-5 rem.



The collective dose would be shared by the estimated 24,000 persons within

800 meters (0.5 miles) of the center line of the highway routes that lie

between McGhee Tyson and the Y-12 Plant.  The maximum in-transit dose to

an individual member of the public would be 3.6 x 10E-8 rem.  Using the

general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-5 cancer

fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the collective dose to the public

of 4.4 x 10E-5 person-rem would be estimated to result in 222 x 10E-8

latent cancer fatalities (.000044 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor] =

22 x 10E-8).  This means that there would be a probability of 22 x 10E-8,

or 1 chance in 500 million, that any excess cancer fatalities would occur

among the affected population of approximately 24,000.



Based on these doses and the estimated latent cancer fatalities, it is

expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die from

cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the proposed

transportation of HEU by SST from Fort Campbell to Y-12.



** Table 6.2-5 Incident-free Radiological Exposure for Transport Under

the Proposed Action and Alternatives



Information has been deleted from table because it contains classified

information  **



6.2.3.2  Postulated SST Transport Accident Conditions



Under postulated SST accident conditions, radiological consequences would

result primarily from release of respirable radioactive particulates and

subsequent inhalation by persons downwind of the accident, either directly

or after resuspention.  Other exposure methods would include direct

radiation from the cloud of airborne material and from contamination on

the ground.



SST Threat Assessment



The safeguards and security systems for SST transportation are designed

to protect against sabotage and other adversarial actions.  The approved

DOE design basis threat addresses acts of terrorism.  Since the RADTRAN

model does not address terrorist attack scenarios, the Explosive Release

Atmospheric Dispersal (ERAD) computer model has been used by the

Transportation Safeguards Division to analyze consequences due to

attack.



The most immediate and severe threat to workers and members of the public

from a terrorist attack by military-equipped forces is death or injury

from weapons-fire.  It is quite likely that one or more of the DOE

transportation workers (couriers), who are trained and responsible for

protecting the shipments would suffer fatalities during the attack.

Depending on the proximity of the members of the public to the shipment

at the time the attack occurs, civilian casualties may also be expected

from the weapons fire.



While the radiological hazard associated with weapons fire is

substantially less than the physical hazard, it is possible for an

accurately aimed, energetic projectile fired at an SST to cause a

dispersal of HEU into the atmosphere.  The effects of such a dispersal

can be bounded.  Based on tests done for the Nuclear Emergency Search

Team program, the fraction of material aerosolized would be less than 5

percent for this type of event.  The bounding conditions for the

postulated accident were as follows: the accident occurs in an urban

area; there is maximum loading of the SST (equivalent to 1000 kilograms

[454.5 pounds] of 93 percent enriched uranium); and quiet, night-time

meteorological conditions prevail, resulting in low dispersion of

contaminants.  Under these conditions, the contaminated area would be 3

square kilometers (1.16 square miles), and the maximum individual dose

would not exceed 30 mrem.  The upper bound for the collective dose would

be approximately 4,000 person-rem resulting in 2 excess latent cancer

fatalities.  The anticipated impacts due to weapons fire would be lower

than the bounding case, resulting in the containment area of 1.5 square

kilometers(0.58 square miles), a maximum individual does of 5 mrem, and

either 0 or 1 excess latent cancer fatalities in the collective

population.  The anticipated impacts are based on yearly average

meteorological data.  The threat analysis for SST shipments is discussed

in more detail in the "EA for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched

Uranium Above The Maximum Historical Storage level at the Y-12 Plant"

(DOE/EA-0929).



RADTRAN Accident Analysis



RADTRAN is a computer model which calculates the collective dose from a

postulated accident to a single exposed population (workers and the public

are not differentiated).  The transportation accident model in RADTRAN

assigns accident probabilities to a set of accident categories.  For the

truck analysis, the eight accident severity categories defined in NUREG-

0170 (The Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Nodes

[NRC 1977]) were used.  The least severe accident category (Category 1)

represents low magnitudes of crush force, accident impact velocities, fire

duration, or puncture impact speed.  The most sever category (Category 8)

represents a large crush force, high impact velocities, long fire

durations, and high puncture-impact speed (an 88-km/h [55mph] collision

into the side of the vehicle and 982C [1800F] fire lasting 1.5 hours to

produce a release of the HEU).  The bounding accident is the highest

category accident used in the analysis and is associated with a

probability of occurrence for each populations density area.



The Department of Energy had conducted more that 119 million km (74

million miles) of SST operations without accidents that resulted in any

release of radioactive materials.  However, to provide a conservative

estimate of the probability of postulated accidents, accident rates from

Department of Transportation data for the entire commercial shipping

industry (i.e., accidents on interstate highways involving at least one

commercial tractor-trailer regardless of contents) were used, and are

documented in the transportation risk assessment report (Sandia 1994).

The probability of an SST accident resulting in a release of radioactive

material would actually be lower that the probability of a commercial

accident.



In order to determine the risk of truck transportation accident, the

response of a package to accident conditions must be predicted.

NUREG-0170 (NRC) was also used to determine the amount of material which

would be released from Type B packaging for the eight accident severity

categories.  Using NUREG-0170 release fractions, the bounding accident for

SST shipment would be a Category 8 accident, since the consequences are

maximized at these severity levels.



Table 6.2-6 summarizes the potential action and alternatives.  The

population size shown in Table 6.2-6 represents the maximum populations

which could be affected in the urban area along the route for this

alternative.  The maximum potentially affected urban population along the

route from Dover would be 3,000,000 persons, while for the Fort Campbell

and McGhee Tyson alternatives, the maximum urban population would be

2,850,000 and 2,380,000 respectively.



6.2.3.2.1 Proposed Action: Postulated SST Transport Accident



Under the proposed action, the dose due to the bounding SST accident (that

is, the accident with the greatest potential consequences, even though it

might have a small probability of occurrence) is estimated to be 1.1

person-rem in an urban area.  The probability of the bounding SST accident

occurring in an urban area is estimated to be 4.9 x 10E-12.  Given the

conservatism in these estimates and the fact that an SST accident has

never occurred which resulted in the release of radiological material, the

actual probability may be much lower.  The consequences would be

diminished if the accident occurred in suburban areas or rural areas.



The transportation crew and the public are considered as one population

for the purposes of the accident consequences, and the general population

dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities (1.1

person-rem x .0005 [risk factor] = .00055).  This means that there would

be a probability of .00055, or approximately 1 chance in 2,000 that any

excess cancer fatalities would occur.



** Table 6.2-6  Radiological Exposure for shipments due to Bounding

                Accidents in Urban Areas



                  Population      Probability    Collective   Latent Cancer

                  Size            of Occurrence   Dose         Fatalities

                                                  (person-rem)



Proposed Action:  3,000,000       4.9 x 10E-12      1.10      5.5 x 10E-4

SST Shipment

from Dover AFB



SST Shipment      2,850,000       4.5 x 10E-12      1.10      5.5 x 10E-4

from Fort

Campbell



SST Shipment      2,380,000       1.0 x 10E-12      0.92      4.6 x 10E-4

from McGhee

Tyson Airport  **



6.2.3.2.2 No Action



Under the no action alternative, no SST transport would occur, and

therefore, there would be no potential for an SST accident.



6.2.3.2.3 Postulated Accident During SST Transport from Fort Campbell



Under this alternative, the dose due to the bounding accident during SST

transport from Fort Campbell to Y-12 is estimated to be 1.1 person-rem in

an urban area.  The probability of the bounding SST accident occurring in

an urban area if estimated to be 4.5 x 10E-12.  Given the conservatism in

these estimates and the fact that an SST accident has never occurred which

resulted in the release of radiological material, the actual probability

may be much lower.  The consequences would be diminished if the accident

occurred in suburban areas or rural areas.



The transportation crew and the public considered as one population for

the purposes of the accident consequences, and the general population

dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-

rem (NRC, 1991) is used.  The collective dose of 1.1 person-rem in the

SST accident would be estimated to result in 5.5 x 10E-4 latent cancer

fatalities (1.1 person-rem x .0005 [risk factor] = .00055).  This means

that there would be a probability of 0.00055, or approximately 1 chances

in 2,000, that any excess cancer fatalities would occur among the affected

populations.



6.2.3.2.4 Postulated Accident During SST Transport from McGhee Tyson Airport



Under this alternative, the dose due to that bounding accident during SST

transport form McGhee Tyson Airport to Y-12 is estimated to be 0.92

person-rem in an urban area.  The probability of the bounding SST accident

occurring in an urban area is estimated to be 1 x 10E-12 for the proposed

action.  Given the conservatism in these estimates and the fact that an

SST accident has never occurred which resulted on the release of

radiological material, the actual probability may be much lower.  The

consequences would be diminished if the accident occurred in suburban

areas or rural areas.



The transportation crew and the public are considered as one population

for the purposes of the accident consequences, and the general population

doe-to-risk factor of 5 x 10E-4 cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC,

1991) is used.  The collective dose of 0.92 person-rem in the SST accident

would be estimated to result in 4.6 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities (0.92

person-rem x .0005 [risk factor] = .00046) in this extremely unlikely

accident.  This means that there would be a probability of .00046, or

approximately 1 chances in 2,000 that any excess cancer fatalities would

occur.



6.2.4 On- Site Transportation Impacts



Intra-plant transportation between facilities is accomplished by means of

Blue Goose transportation vehicles.  Criticality safety requirements

include limitation of enriched uranium, appropriate spacing, and other

criticality safety parameters documented in a Criticality Safety Approval.



Blue Goose operators are trained and certified through a Blue Goose

training program and are qualified in the same manner as the state of

Tennessee and the Department of Transportation requires for off-site

transportation.  Each Blue Goose vehicle has received commercial driver's

license training by the Y-12 Plant Transportation Safety Department.

Drivers must be medically certified to be physically qualified and are

subject to testing for controlled substances.  The Transportation Safety

Department performs periodic announced and unannounced audits on Blue

Goose vehicle operations to ensure that they are performed in the

formally prescribed manner.



Incident-Free On-Site Transportation



Two transportation workers are involved in Blue Goose operation for any

given shipment.  Exposure data for Blue Goose transportation workers for

1993 show that the collective dose was 0.048 person-rem.  Under the

proposed action, it is  estimated that the dose would be no greater that

0.048 person-rem.  Using a factor of 4 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities

per person-rem, the collective dose of 0.048 person-rem would be estimated

to result in 0.00002 latent cancer fatalities among the Blue Goose

workers.  This means that there would be a probability of 0.00002, or a 1

chance in 50,000 that any excess cancer fatalities would occur among these

workers.  There were three Blue Goose transportation workers in 1993 who

collectively received this dose, and it is estimated that there would be

no more than three workers under the proposed action.  It is estimated

that the maximally-exposed Blue Goose Operator would receive a dose of

0.046 rem, which was the maximum for 1993.  The 0.046 rem dose would

result in an estimated 0.00002 latent cancer fatalities.  It is expected

that not a single Blue Goose Operator would die form cancer as a result of

exposure to radiation from the proposed on-site transportation of enriched

uranium.  There would be no exposure to the public during incident-free

on-site transportation.



Accident Conditions During On-site Transportation



There has never been a Blue Goose accident that has resulted in the

release of radioactive material.  The Final Safety Analysis Report on the

Transportation and Certification of Enriched Uranium Weapons Parts (Energy

Systems 1983) includes information on a postulated bounding criticality

accident.  The postulated accident scenario is that Blue Goose carrying a

full load of forty 52 centimeter (20-inch) birdcages is struck on the

right side by another vehicle, instantaneously rupturing the gas tank and

causing a fire in the cargo area.  The fire is then assumed to reduce

spacing between the birdcages due to bowing, wrapping, or melting,

resulting in a Category B type criticality (i.e., slow assembly of

unmoderated U-235 metal).  This criticality could result in yields of

1 x 10E19 fissions (spike and total).  Radiation exposure would vary from

greater than 600 rem at the site of the accident to 50 rem at 36.6 meters

(120 feet).  This would produce acute radiation sickness within a radius

of up to 36.6 meters (120 feet) with a probable mortality rate of less

than 5 percent.  At distances less than 50 feet, the mortality rate would

be 100 percent.



6.2.5 Non-Radiological Impact



One hazard of transporting radioactive material (or any material) arises

from the generation of non-radiological pollutants during travel (e.g.

vehicle exhaust, particulate from tire wear caused by tires being abraded

on a paved surface and dust generated in the wake of a vehicle).  The

generation of these pollutants may cause health effects (such as latent

cancer fatalities) which can be estimated.  The assumptions and models

used for calculating these health effects are conservative, and the

results may be considered bounding(RAO et al. 1982).



A second hazard arises from accidents that occur during transport even if

no radioactive material is dispersed.  These accidents may cause serious

injuries and even death as a result of physical trauma.  Accident

statistics regarding the number of deaths per kilometer traveled were

used to predict accident fatalities.  All non-radiological impacts include

return of the conveyance to the origin site (i.e., round trip).  Table

6.2.7 summarizes the non-radiological impacts for SST transport under the

proposed action and alternatives, except for the no action alternative

which would not involve transportation.



6.2.5.1 Proposed Action: Non-radiological Impacts



Under the proposed action, the SST transport from Dover AFB to Y-12 would

have a probability of 6.9 X 10E-5 ( or one chance in 14,500) inducing any

excess latent cancer fatalities as a result of the non-radiological

pollution generation by the conveyance.  It is estimated that "INFORMATION

DELETED" worker and 8.2 x 10E-4 public fatalities could potentially occur

as a result of traffic accidents during the SST shipment.  It is expected

that not a single transportation worker or member of the public would die

from cancer as a result of exposure to pollution during normal operations

or from physical trauma as a result of a traffic accident during the

proposed SST transport.



**  6.7-7 Total Non-Radiological Transportation Impacts



                      Proposed Health   SST Shipment from    Shipment from

                      Effects (LCFs)    Fort Campbell        McGhee Tyson

                                        to Y-12              to Y-12



Pollution Health       6.9 x 10E-5       1.4 x 10E-5          3.2 x 10E-6

Effects



Accidental             8.2 x 10E-4       3.4 x 10E-4          2.4 x 10E-5

Fatalities

(Public) **



6.2.5.2 Shipment from Fort Campbell: Non-Radiological Impacts



Under this alternative, the SST transport from Fort Campbell to Y-12 would

have a probability of 1.4 x 10E-5 (or approximately 1 chance in 100,000)

of inducing any excess latent cancer fatalities as a result of the non-

radiological pollution generated by the conveyance.  It is estimated

that "INFORMATION DELETED" worker and 3.4 x 10E-4 public fatalities could

potentially occur as a result of traffic accidents during the SST

shipment. It is expected that not a single transportation worker or member

of the public would die from cancer as a result of exposure to pollution

during normal operations or from physical trauma as a result of a traffic

accident during the proposed SST transport.



6.2.5.3   Shipment from McGhee Tyson: Non-Radiological Impacts



Under this alternative, the SST transport from McGhee Tyson Airport to

Y-12 would have a probability of 3.2 x 10E-6 (or approximately 1 chance in

300,000) of inducing any latent cancer fatalities would occur as a result

of the non-radiological pollution generated by the conveyance.  It is

estimated that "INFORMATION DELETED" worker and public fatalities could

occur in the worker and public populations respectively as a result of

traffic accidents during the SST shipment.  Therefore, it is expected that

not a single transportation worker or member of the public would die from

cancer as a result of exposure to pollution during normal operations or

from physical trauma as a result of a traffic accident during the

proposed SST transport.



6.2.6 Cumulative Transportation Impacts



The effects of incident-free SST transport under the proposed action are

considered below in the context of the potential future SST shipments to

the Y-12 Plant.  The predecisional EA for the Proposed Interim Storage of

Enriched Uranium Above The Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12

Plant (DOE/EA-0929) analyzes the proposed shipment of bounding quantities

of HEU and low enriched uranium (LEU) to Y-12 from sites within the United

States over the next ten years.



6.2.6.1 Cumulative Radiological Impacts



Table 6.2-8 presents the cumulative impacts of these two proposed

shipping campaigns: (1) SST transport of HEU from Dover AFB to Y-12, and:

(2) other proposed SST shipments of HEU and LEU to Y-12 from sites other

than Dover AFB.



The ten-year collective dose to the public from SST transport from sites

other than Dover AFB is estimated to be 486 person-rem, with 33 person-rem

resulting from HEU transport and 453 person-rem from LEU transport.  The

collective dose from the proposed action, which would occur in 1994 only,

would add .0003 person-rem.  The cumulative collective dose to the public

would therefore be approximately 486 person-rem.



Using the general population dose-to-risk conversion factor of 5 x 10E-4

cancer fatalities per person-rem (NRC, 1991), the cumulative collective

dose to the public of 486 person-rem would be estimated to result in 0.2

latent cancer fatalities (486 person-rem x 0.0005 [risk factor]=0.243).

This means that there would be a probability of 0.2, or 1 chance in 5

that even one excess cancer fatality would occur among the entire affected

population along the highway routes which would be greater than 9 million

persons.  Based on these doses and the estimated latent cancer fatalities,

it is expected that not a single worker or member of the public would die

from cancer as a result of exposure to radiation from the cumulative

effects.



**  Table 6.2-8 Cumulative Radiological Impacts of SST Transport



This table applies to the proposed bounding of HEU and LEU shipments to

Y-12 over the next 10 years.



                    Population        Collective Dose      Latent Cancer

                                        (person-rem)       Fatalities



HEU shipments      Transport crew           20               0.008

by SST from

sites other        Workers at SST            2               0.0008

than Pantex        stops



                   Public                   10               0.005

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

HEU shipments      Transport crew           36               0.01

by SST from

Pantex             Workers at SST           45               0.002

                   stops



                   Public                   23               0.001

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commercial HEU     Transport crew          0.0005            2 x 10E-7

shipments

                   Public                  0.0002            8 x 10E-4

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Commercial LEU     Transport crew           183              0.07

shipments

                   Public                   453              0.2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Total              Transport crew           239              0.1



                   Workers at stop           65             0.003



                   Public                  486               0.2



Note:  Latent cancer facilities are calculated by multiplying the dose by

the dose-to-risk conversion factor (5 x 10E-4 latent cancer fatalities per

person-rem is used for the general population and 4 x 10E-4 for workers

[NRC 1991])**



6.2.6.2 Cumulative Non-Radiological Impacts



Table 6.2-9 presents the cumulative non-radiological impacts of these two

proposed shipping campaigns: (1) SST transport of HEU from Dover AFB to

Y-12, and: (2) other proposed SST shipments of HEU and LEU to Y-12 from

sites other than Dover AFB.



**  Table 6.2-9 Cumulative non-radiological transportation impacts has

had information deleted and is not displayable. **



THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT

CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20

BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/95



7.0 AGENCIES AND PERSONS CONSULTED



United States Department of State



United State Air Force Transportation Command (USTRANCOM)



United States Department of Defense (DOD, U.S. Air Force (USAF), Scott

Air Force Base



United States Department of Defense (DOD, U.S. Air Force (USAF), Fort

Campbell Air Force Base, Fort Campbell, Kentucky



Tennessee Air National Guard at McGhee Tyson



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Rice, A.L., "Radioactive Waste Disposal and Deep Sea Biology," Oceanol,

Acta, 1, 483-491, 1978.



Rothschild, E.R., et al. 1984.  Resource Management Plan for the U.S.

Department of Energy Oak Ridge Reservation, Vol. 10 ORNL 6026/v10.  Oak

Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee.



Rusk, D. 1994.  Minutes for the public meeting on the Environmental

Assessment for the Proposed Interim Storage of Highly Enriched Uranium

above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge,

Tennessee, held on March 24, 1994, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.



Sandia (Sandia National Laboratories) 1993b.  Review of Annual Whole

Body Dose Values for TSD Memorandum from Dann Ward to George Easley.

September 29.



Sandia National Laboratories, "Cargo Restraint Transporter Handling

Instructions," Sandia National Laboratories, April 7, 1988



Sandia (Sandia National Laboratories) 1994.  Draft Final Report:

Transportation Environmental Analysis of  the Movement of Highly

Enriched Uranium (HEU) from DOE Sites to the Y-12 Plant SAND 94-0449.

Risk Analysis and Transportation Department 6641.



Sandia (Sandia National Laboratories) 1993.  Letter from W. Hartman,

Transportation and Analysis Department, Sandia National Laboratories,

and J. McClure, Risk Assessment and Transportation Department, Sandia

National Laboratories, to R. Sabre, Transportation Safeguards Division,

Albuquerque Operations Office, DOE December 15.



Southworth, G.R. et at. 1992. Ecological Effects of Contaminants and

Remedial Actions in Bear Creek.  ORNL/TM-11977.  Publication No. 3810.

Environmental Sciences Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory.



Stone, J, 1994.  Personal Communication from J. Stone, Y-12 Plant Waste

Management deputy Manger, Energy Systems, to C. Wilkinson, Y-12 Plant

NEPA Compliance Coordinator, Energy Systems (February 25).



Taylor, R. 1993 (August 6) Personal Communication from R. Taylor,

Enriched Uranium Operations, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., to C.

Wenzel, Staff Scientist, Science Applications International Corporation.



U.S. Federal Register, "Designated Critical Habitat: Norther Right

Whale," Proposed Rule, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

58 FR29186, Washington, D.C., May 19, 1993.



U.S. Federal Register, "Final Guide for Implementation of  Executive

Order 12114," 46 FR 1007, Washington, D.C. January 5, 1981



United States Congress. 1993.  Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the

Nuclear Materials, OTA-O-572.  Office of  Technology Assessment.  U.S.

Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.



Unreviewed Safety Question Determination, Interim Storage of Material in

NMSS Warehouse, Building 9720-5 (U) September 15, 1994.



USEC (U.S. Enrichment Corporation) "Environmental Assessment for the

Purchase of Russian Low Enriched Uranium Derived from the Dismantlement

of Nuclear Weapons in the Countries of the Former Soviet Union,"

USEC/EA-94001, USEC, Bethesda, Maryland, 1994.



White House.  1993 (September 27).  Nonproliferation and Export Control

Policy.  Fact Sheet Office of the Press Secretary.



APPENDIX A



AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT OF DOVER AIR FORCE BASE,

PROPOSED AERIAL PORT OF ENTRY/HEU TRANSFER SITE



Location



Dover AFB is located in Kent County, Delaware, approximately 3.5 miles

southeast of the city of Dover and one mile west of Delaware Bay.  Dover AFB

is located in the town of Dover, in Kent County, Delaware, approximately 50

miles southeast of Wilmington, Delaware and 80 miles southeast of

Philadelphia.



Current mission of Dover AFB



Dover AFB is the home of the 436th Airlift Wing and, Since 1973, has been the

only all C-5s and airplanes from the variety of other flying organizations

around the country.



The mission of the 436 Airlift Wing is to provide strategic global military

airlift capability for worldwide support of contingency and emergency war

plans.  In peacetime the 436 Airlift Wing services the world by providing a

range of airlift support on a daily basis around the globe.  One fourth of 

the nation's strategic airlift capability is represented by the people and

aircraft at Dover AFB.



Aircraft Operations



The primary aircraft authorized for the 438th Airlift Wing and its reserve

counterpart the 512th Airlift Wing are 38 C-5 Galaxy's.  The 436th Airlift

Wing is comprised of three airlift squadrons (ALS): 3rd ALS, 9th ALS, and the

31st ALS.  These units are augmented by the 326 ALS and the 709 ALS from the

512 Airlift Wing.  Operating the same C-5 Galaxy aircraft, the 436 Airlift

Wing and the 512 Airlift Wing provide daily support around the globe as well

as strategic airlift support of contingency and emergency war plan.



On an average day, 134 aircraft operations occur at Dover AFB primarily on

Runway 01/19.  An operation is defined as either one departure, one approach,

or half a closed pattern.  A closed pattern consists of both a departure

portion and an approach portion, i.e., two operations.  The principal aircraft

operating from Dover AFB and average number of daily operations per aircraft

type are shown in Table A-1.



**  Table A-1  Dover AFB Aircraft operations



       Type of Aircraft             Daily Operations

           C-5 A/B                       108

            C-141                          6

            C-130                         18

             747                           2

**



Air Quality



The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) were established by the

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and specify safe concentration

levels for six criteria pollutants.  Table A-2 lists the federal air quality

standards for the criteria pollutants.



**  Table A-2  National Ambient Air Quality Standards



Pollutant     Unit            Averaging      National Standards

                                Time          

  O          micro g/cu. m        1 hr        Primary    Secondary



 CO          micro g/cu. m        1 hr          235       same

                                  8 hr                    same

                      

 NO2        micro g/cu. m         AAM           100       same

 

 SO2        micro g/cu. m         3 hr          none      1,300

                                 24 hr          365       same

                                  AAM            80       same

 

 PM10       micro g/cu. m        24 hr          150       same

                                  AAM            50       same


 Pb         micro g/cu. m        1/4 year       1.5       same



**



The State of Delaware adopted the NAAQS, but maintained a total suspended

particulates (TSP) standard in conjunction with the new standard for

particulate matter less than 10 microns in size (PM10).  The Delaware primary

TSP standards are 260 micrograms per cubic meter (ug/m3) as a 24-hour average

and 75 ug/m3 as a 12-month geometric means.  Air quality is determined by

comparing ambient air concentrations with the appropriate primary or secondary

NAAQS for each criteria pollutant.  Areas not meeting NAAQS are designated as

nonattainment areas for the specific pollutant causing the violation.



The closet air quality monitoring station to Dover AFB is located at the Dover

City Place Station approximately 3.5 miles to the northwest of the base.

Sulfur dioxide, total suspended particulates and ozone have been monitored at

this site since 1984.  All pollutant levels observed at this monitoring

station were below the national ambient air quality standards in 1992

(Delaware, 1992).



The entire State of Delaware is classified of ozone nonattainment.  The state

is not classified as nonattainment for any other air pollutant.  The ozone

standard is attained when the expected number of days per calendar year with

maximum hourly concentrations above the standard is less than or equal to one.

No exceedances of ozone levels were observed during 1990, 1991, or 1992 at the

Dover City Police Station.  However, the classification of nonattainment

resulted from previous years of exceedances that averaged greater than 1.0.



An air emissions inventory summarizing expected annual emissions at Dover AFB

was prepared in January, 1992 (USAF, 1992c).  This inventory of emission

sources and associated estimates of pollutant quantities generated serves as a

baseline to track and plan future changes in base pollutant emission

quantities.  The estimated yearly emissions of criteria pollutant, in tons of

pollutants per year were: PM-511, carbon monoxide (CO)-2,177, nitrogen oxides

(N0x)-356, sulfur oxides (SOx)-107, and hydrocarbons (HC)-1,086. 

Additionally, according to this 1992 report, Dover AFB is categorized as a

major source of hazardous air pollutants and volatile organic compounds.  A

source is considered a major source if it emits more than 100 tons of a single

pollutant per year.



Climate and Meteorology



Dover AFB is located in Kent County, Delaware, approximately 3.5 miles

southeast of the city of Dover and one mile west of Delaware Bay.  Dover AFB

has a continental type of climate with considerable modifying influences on

the climate.



The annual precipitation at Dover AFB averages approximately 42 inches, which

includes 17.1 inches of snow (USAFETAC, 1992).  The month distribution is

fairly uniform during the year the wettest month is August with a monthly

average of 4.67 inches and February is the driest with 3.10 inches of

precipitation.  The mean annual temperature for Dover AFB is 55.5 degrees F

with the warmest month being July with a monthly average temperature of 77

degrees F.  The coldest month is January with mean temperature of 33 degrees

F.  The extreme temperatures range from 103 degrees F to 5 degrees F. 

Westerly winds from the Atlantic Ocean and Delaware Bay tend to raise the

normal winter temperatures and lower the normal summer temperature.



The prevailing wind directions for Dover AFB are from the northwest (September

to April) and from the southwest (May to August).  The average annual wind

speed is 6.2 miles per hour (MPH).



Geology



The base is located in the Atlantic Coastal Plain Province.  This area slopes

slightly (gradient changes within Kent County are usually on the order of a

few feet per mile) from Delaware Bay to the Chesapeake watershed.  The area

consists of unconsolidated sediments overlying crystalline rock that dips

toward the southeast.  Depth to bedrock in the Dover area exceeds 1,400 feet.

The geology consist of the Columbia Formation and the Chesapeake Group/Calvert

Formation and other Ternary and Cretaceous Formations.  The typical lithology

of these formations consists of sands and gravels separated by smaller amounts

of slits and clays (U.S. Air Force, 1992s).  There are no unique geological

features at Dover AFB.



The potential for geologic hazards in this area is quite low.  The area is

rated as Zone 1 with only minor damage expected from seismic activity.



Soils



Soils in Kent County developed from parent materials consisting of sediments

carried by water, wind and glacial ice.  These materials were deposited in a

shallow sea which emerged to form the Delmarva Peninsula (SCS, 1971).  The

size range of the parent material is evident in the texture of the soils.

Layers of course-sediments and sands are generally interbedded with confining

layers of fine silts and clays.



Kent County Soil Survey Reports identify the soil associations that occur

within the base boundary.  The three soil associations identified on Dover AFB

are the Sassafras-Fallington, Othello-Matapeake-Mattapex, and the Tidal Marsh

soils.  The locations and general characteristics of each association are

provided below.



The Sassafras-Fallington is found in the central part of the base.  The soils

are sandy loams with moderate to moderately rapid permeability.  The depth to

the water table ranges from about one foot to greater than five feet.  This

soil has a low potential for shrink-swell and is generally suited for

construction with the exception of a high water table in some areas.



The Othello Mattapex is located in the northern part of the base.  These soil

are silts loams and sandy loams with moderately slow permeabilities.  These

soils have a low to moderate shrink-swell potential and have moderate to

severe limitations for construction because of slow drainage and a high water

table in some areas.



The Tidal Marsh Association is found along the southern edge of the base.  The

soil properties of the Tidal Marsh have not been estimated because of a high

water table.  An extensive drainage system is in place to accommodate drainage

problems in this soil.



Soil susceptibility to wind and water erosion is generally minor to moderate

for all three soil associations.



The soil in the area of the flight line were very disturbed during the

construction of the flight line.  Grading equipment was used and fill

introduced to help make the area level.



The base IRP program has identified eight sites with soil contamination that

would be affected during the construction of the proposed action.



Groundwater



The aquifers on and around the base, in stratigraphic order, are the Columbia,

Fredrica, Cheswold, and Piney Point aquifers.  All aquifers, with the

exception of the Columbia Aquifer, are confined.  The Columbia infiltration of

precipitation.  The saturated thickness of this aquifer ranges from

approximately 15 to 20 feet in the western portion of the base to over 70 feet

in the eastern portion of the base.  The Columbia Aquifer consists of medium

to course sand.  Although the Columbia Aquifer is not used as a water supply

source for Dover AFB, it is an important groundwater resource used primarily

for irrigation and as domestic water supply throughout the state.  The City of

Dover is looking into the feasibility of using the Columbia Aquifer as a

potential potable water supply source because the deeper aquifers are being

used at their capacity.



The Fredrica Aquifer underlies the Columbia Aquifer.  The Fredrica Aquifer is

separated from the overlying Columbia Aquifer by a silty clay confining layer.

The Fredrica Aquifer is primarily sand and gravel and is also approximately 22

feet thick near Dover AFB.  The Fredrica Aquifer is not used as a drinking

water source in the immediate area of Dover AFB but is used by a few towns

south of the base.



The water supply for Dover AFB is derived entirely from groundwater supplies.

The Cheswold and Piney Point Aquifers serve as the primary water supply for

Dover AFB, the City of Dover, and major industries within the greater Dover

area.  The Piney Point Aquifer is used extensively by Dover AFB and the City

of Dover as a source of water and is at a point of almost complete

utilization.



Both the Cheswold and the Piney Point Aquifers have been extensively utilized.

Base groundwater wells, which are at 697 feet and 560 feet, however, are not

in jeopardy.



Surface Water



Dover AFB is well drained and has not experienced disruption of services due

to flooding.  Dover AFB is located within the St. Jones River and Little River

drainage basins.  The position of the northwest/southeast runway marks the

approximate location of the surface water runoff north of the divide

discharges into the Morgan Branch and Pipe Elm Branches of the Little River.

Surface water on the southern portion of the base flows southwest to the St.

Jones River through the tributary that bisects the golf course.  Both rivers

discharge into the Delaware Bay two to three miles to the east.  Most local

streams receive up to 75 percent of their base flow from the Columbia Aquifer

through groundwater discharge.



Stormwater runoff at Dover AFB is controlled by a series of open drainage and

buried drain pipes which discharge stormwater into surface water drainage

channels at the edges of the base.  The base has an NPDES permit of the

stormwater drainage system.  The stormwater is not treated before discharges

into the surface streams.  The stormwater drainage has altered the natural

drainage for some areas of the base, mainly the industrial area and changed

the areas of the drainage basins.  The airfield and the industrial area east

of Atlantic Street discharge into the Pipe Elm Branch of the Little River. 

The industrial area west of Atlantic Street discharges into the Golf Course

tributary of the St. Jones River.  Dover AFB has approximately 43 acres of

tidal and nontidal unimproved wetlands located in three areas; adjacent to the

Pipe Elm Branch on the east side of the north/south runway, in the area around

the explosive ordinance storage, and adjacent to the golf course in tidal

marsh of the St. Jones River (Ecological Assessment, Dover AFB, undated).



Dover AFB also contains an estimated 33 acres of unimproved 100-year

floodplain located adjacent to the St. Jones River and the golf course

tributary, and adjacent to the Pipe Elm Branch in the northern part of the

base.



Water Quality



All aquifers discussed provide potable water and have good water quality

within the EPA and state mandated standards.  Because of drawdown, the

Columbia Aquifer is most susceptible to degradation/contamination.



The HAZWRAP current situation report (U.S. Air Force, 1992a) identifies 12

areas with groundwater contamination on Dover AFB which encompass at a minimum

approximately 220 acres, about 6 percent of the base area.  These areas of

known contamination are part of the installation restoration (IRP) at Dover

AFB.  The contaminants in the groundwater include organics (e.g., benzene

toluene, xylene) metals (e.g., lead, chromium, and barium), and petroleum

aromatic hydrocarbons.



The sewage effluent from Dover AFB is piped off base and treated at the Kent

County sewage treatment plant. 



The Little River and St. Jones River are both used for agricultural and

industrial purposes.  The St. Jones and Little Rivers have been designated for

the following uses: industrial water supply, primary and secondary contact

recreation, fish, aquatic life and wilderness, and agricultural supply.  Water

quality is generally good in the streams on Dover AFB.  Data collected on the

base from 1980 to 1988 showed dissolved oxygen average pH, and mean phenol all

within state standards.



Cultural Resources



The main areas of Dover AFB with the potential for archaeological sites are

along the St. Jones River, located adjacent to the eastern boundary of the

base.  Archaeological surveys have revealed sites which show prehistoric

utilization of the area along the banks of the river.  The St. Jones River

continued to be the focus of early settlements, with the earliest English

settlements located along the river and surrounding areas (U.S. Air Force,

1985).



Biological Resources



Vegetation



Dover AFB contains approximately 2,543 acres of improved and semi-improved

ground.  The 2,413 acres of improved ground is comprised of Kentucky

Bluegrass, Chewing Fescue, Colonial Beatgrass, and Red Top.  The 130 acres of

unimproved grounds consist of Sorup Pine, Black Gum, Cedar, and March Grass. 

Approximately 77 acres of land on Dover AFB consists of shrubs, small trees,

and wood vines such as Red Cedar, Tree of heaven, Black Locust, Sumac, Rose

Multiflora, Blackberry, Honeysuckle, Trumpet Vine, Poison Ivy, Sassafras, and

Black Cherry.



Wildlife



Large animals in the area that are occasional inhabitants of the base include

whitetail deer (Odonolieus virginianus).  Other mammals observed at Dover AFB

are woodchuck (Marmota monax), muskrat (Ondatra zibethica), Striped Skunk

(Mephltis), Easter cottontail (Sylvilagus floridanus), Opossum (Dedelphis

marsupialis), Red fox (Vulpes fuvia), and the raccoon (Procyon lotor). 

Smaller wildlife present on Dover AFB consists of squirrels, wild turkeys,

snakes, rodents, and groundhogs.



Threatened and Endangered Species



There are no known threatened or endangered plant or animal species on Dover

AFB.  A Natural Resources inventory completed by the State Natural Heritage

Program found the following rare plants present on base: tiny headed golden

rod; green frog fruit, and Hussop-leaf Hedge-Nettle.  The upland sandpiper, a

species of state concern, has been seen on base and is considered a migrant on

the base.



Wetlands



Wetland areas on base cover a total of 43 acres, with sub-units ranging in

size from 0.3 to 17 acres.  The wetlands on Dover AFB are categorized as

Emergent Tidal Wetlands and can be divided into three communities based on

salinity and the frequency of inundation.  Tidal communities are generally

recognized as highly productive, providing spawning, and nursery areas for

aquatic fauna.  These communities also provide food forage and nesting habitat

for a variety of species.  One community, frequently flooded fresh marsh, is

found along the Pipe Elm Cheek on the east side of the north/south runway and

in an area around the explosive ordinance storage.  The semi-permanently

inundated fresh march community occurs intermittently with the flooded

tributary to Pipe Elm in the northeast corner of the base and along the St.

Jones River south of the golf course.



Noise



Noise is defined as any unwanted sound that interferes with normal activity or

in some way reduces the quality of the environment.  Noise may be intermittent

or continuous, steady, or impulsive.  It may involve a broad range of sound

sources and frequencies and by generally nondescript, or it can have a

specific, readily identifiable sound source.  There is a wide diversity among

human responses to noise, which vary not only according to the type and

characteristics of the noise source, but also according to the sensitivity and

expectations of the receptor, the time of day, and the distance between the

noise source and the receptor.  In general, noise levels around Air Force

installations result primarily from aircraft operations at the base, vehicle

traffic in the vicinity, or other background noise sources.  Dover has

conducted the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Study which identifies

noise contours for the base.



Environmental Programs



The environmental office at Dover manages the installation's environmental

program.  These programs include hazardous material and hazardous waste

management and minimization, solid waste and waste disposal, and asbestos

management.  All programs are managed in accordance with all applicable

Federal state, local, DOD and Air Force regulations, standards, and laws that

apply to the installation.        



Hazardous materials that are used at Dover AFB are purchased and distributed

through Base Supply.  Hazardous materials are used in refueling, corrosion

control, routine operations, and maintenance of aircraft, and vehicle and

grounds maintenance. 



The fuel systems at Dover AFB have a storage capacity of four million gallons

and annual throughput of 70 million gallons of JP-4.  Each organization is

responsible for the control and proper use of hazardous materials.



The use of hazardous materials generates hazardous waste.  The management of

the hazardous wastes consists of the collection, storage, transportation, and

disposal of hazardous wastes as required by the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Delaware Hazardous Waste Management Regulations.

Hazardous wastes generated at Dover AFB include solvents, fuels, lubricants,

stripping chemicals, oils, point-related materials, an other wastes from C-5

maintenance, base transportation, and civil engineering activities.



The responsibility for managing hazardous wastes lies with the generating

organization and the Dover environmental office who has designated 14

locations as 90-day hazardous waste satellite accumulation points.  Each

organization appoints accumulation point managers and alternates to provide

for the proper identification, handling, storage, and record keeping of

hazardous waste.  The generating organizations are also responsible for

transporting the waste to the conforming storage facility on base.  Conforming

storage facilities are RCRA-permitted facilities that are used to store

hazardous wastes until they are transported off-base for recycling or

disposal.  One facility is in Building 1306, and a second is a 5,000 gallon

aboveground industrial waste tank located near Building 610.  The tank is used

to collect waste from tank cleaning activities and miscellaneous operations.

The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office contracts of recycling or

disposal of these hazardous wastes.  The environmental office is responsible

for manifest tracking, submitting reports, operating, and maintaining the

storage facility.  Training is performed by the CEV personnel and includes the

subjects of labeling, inspections, and contingency procedures.  Personnel from

the CEV office also perform random inspections of the accumulation points to

ensure regulatory compliance.



The total amount of hazardous waste manifested by Dover AFB to off-site

facilities in 1992 was approximately 90,000 pounds.  An additional 130,000

pounds of non-RCRA wastes were also generated by the base in 1992 (Helmetag,

1993).



Solid Waste/Wastewater



The Resource, Recovery, and Recycling Program and the management of solid

waste on Dover AFB includes the collection and disposal of solid waste by

contract.  There are no active landfills on the base.  Dover AFB, including

the housing area, currently generates about one million pounds of solid waste

per month (Helmetag, 1993).



Receptacles are placed throughout the base for solid waste disposal.  The

Delaware Solid Waste Authority, under contract managed by the 436 CES/CEC,

hauls the waste off-base to the state operated Sandtown Landfill.  Asphalt,

concrete, and similar waste are hauled off by a separate contractor.  Scrap

metal is recycled through the CRMO.



Wastewater at Dover AFB is collected by a central wastewater collection system

and transferred to the Kent County Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) for

treatment.  Preliminary treatment is performed by a central 

oil-water separator prior to wastewater entering the main base distribution

system.  Storm water runoff from industrial areas exits the base at nine major

locations.  The base obtained an AMC group Storm water runoff permit which

included these nine locations.



Restoration Program



Past waste management activities at Dover AFB have contributed to soil and

groundwater contamination at the base.  Under the mandate of federal statutes

and regulations implementing CERCLA and SARA, the Air Force is actively

pursuing a program to address, and as necessary, remediate environmental

concerns created by these past practices.  The Installation Restoration

Program is the basis for response action on Air Force installations under the

provisions of CERCLA and SARA.  In some cases, an existing hazardous waste

site may be regulated under RCRA rather than CERCLA.  Both laws are intended

to achieve the same end result-site closure.



Dover AFB was placed on the National Priority List (NPL) by the EPA in 1989.

Because of their inclusion on the NPL, the EPA and state regulatory agencies

plan an active oversight role in their program.  Dover AFB is operating under

a Federal Facility Agreement with the EPA and the State of Delaware.  A

technical Review Committee has been established and is involved with the

ongoing remediation work.  A total of 56 IRP sites have been identified at

Dover AFB and are currently in the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study

(RI/FS) stage of investigation.  These sites include refueling areas, cargo

loading areas, fuel tanks, fire training areas, landfills, pesticide wash

areas, and others.



Fuel



The Fuels Management Flight is responsible for the management and control of

fuels at Dover AFB.  About 70 million gallons of JP-4 are issued annually for

the petroleum, oils, and lubricants facilities.  Dover AFB will soon be

purchasing JP-8 instead of JP-4.  The replacement fuel generates less sulfur

when burned and has a lower vapor pressure, which reduces levels of volatile

organic compounds (VOCs), than JP-4.



Fuel is piped onto the base and stored in bulk storage tanks (Facilities 730

734).  It is then transferred by underground pipelines to three hydrant

systems, or pumped into tank trucks for aircraft refueling.  The bulk storage

area includes four floating-roof and one fixed-roof, aboveground storage tanks

with a combined capacity of approximately four million gallons.  The

containment dikes surrounding all of the aboveground tanks at the bulk storage

are sloped earth covered with concrete.



At the three hydrant pumphouses, fuel is stored in 26 underground storage

tanks that distribute it to the hydrant pumphouses, fuel is stored in 26

underground storage tanks that distribute it to the hydrant system on the

flight line.  A truck fill stand is located at the south pumphouse and two are

located in the north storage area.  The combined capacity of the underground

storage tanks at these pumphouses is approximately one million gallons.



Gasoline and diesel fuel for military vehicles are stored and dispensed from

three underground storage tanks at the motor pool (Building 637).  Gasoline

and diesel fuel is also dispensed by three mobile refuellers to vehicles

unable to use the motor pool and to organize tanks throughout the base.



The Liquid Fuels Maintenance Shop performs mandatory inspection of these

facilities in with accordance Air Force Manual 86-16.  The Liquid Fuels

Maintenance personnel perform tank inspections every three to either years

depending upon tank construction and protection.  The pipelines are pressure

checked annually and are hydrostatically tested every five years.  Permanent

records of these inspections are maintained.  Fuels Management and Civil

Engineering personnel are trained on the operation and maintenance of

equipment to prevent fuel discharges as required by technical orders and civil

engineering regulations and manuals.



Transportation



Kent County is traversed north-south by U.S. Route 13.  Dover AFB is located

between U.S. Route 113, which runs along the southwestern boundary of the

base, and State Route 9, which is to the east of the base.  Both U.S. Routes

are four-lane divided highways.



The state highway department is involved in a major road construction project

involving a by-pass of the City of Dover.  The by-pass project will intersect

Route 113 in the area of Dover AFB.  Route 113 is currently undergoing

modifications to create a limited access highway in the areas of the base

gates.



Socioeconomics: Employment and Economic Characteristics



Total 1989 employment in Kent County was approximately 56,500.  Employment in

the county grew by 22 percent between 1980 and 1989, slightly more than in the

United States as a whole.  Employment growth for the State as a whole was much

stronger, increasing by more than 33 percent over the decade.



Dover is the State capitol of Delaware as well as the home of the Dover AFB.

As such, it has a high proportion of employment in the government section,

accounting for one-third of all employment.  Almost sixty percent of these

government employees work for the State or for local government, nearly 30

percent are military personnel, and the remainder are federal civilian

employees.



Services and trade are the next largest sectors, each accounting for almost 20

percent of employment.  Manufacturing provides 12 percent of all jobs in the

county, while the remaining sectors are quite small.



Unemployment for the Dover area (Kent County) averaged 8.3 percent for the

first nine months of 1991, while the state average for that period was 6.8

percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990a; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,

1991).



Income and the Construction Economy



Total personal income (as of 1989) in Kent County was $1.5 billion.  Annual

per capita income is approximately $14,000 roughly 80 percent of the United

States average per capita income and 75 percent of the Delaware average (U.S.

Bureau of Analysis, 1991).



The Dover area appears to have a fairly healthy construction economy.  The

dollar value of all 1992 building permit in the combined area of Kent County

and the City of Dover was approximately $118.5 million.



Population Characteristics



Kent County had a 1990 population of nearly 111,000 representing more than

one-sixth of the Delaware population.  Population growth in the county over

the decade was nearly 13 percent, slightly more than for the state as a whole

(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990a).



Housing Characteristics



According to the 1990 Census, there are more than 42,000 housing units in Kent

County.  Approximately 70 percent of the units are owner-occupied.  Vacancy

rates (and of the 1990 Census) were very low - 1.4 percent for owner-occupied

homes, while the percentage of vacant rental units was 5.0 percent (U.S.

Bureau of the Census, 1990b; USAF, 1992d).



**  Employment: Kent County, Delaware, 1989



Government     33.1%

Service        19.7%

Trade          18.4%

Manufacturing  12.3%

Construction    5.2%

Fire            4.9%

Transportation  3.7%

Other           3.7%



**

APPENDIX B



AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT OF FORT CAMPBELL, KENTUCKY

ALTERNATE AERIAL PORT OF ENTRY/HEU TRANSFER SITE



Location



Fort Campbell is located in southwestern Kentucky and north-central

Tennessee in portions of four counties: Montgomery and Stewart counties

in Tennessee, and Christian and Trig Counties in Kentucky.  The

installation is approximately eight miles north of Clarksville,

Tennessee, and seventeen miles south of Hopkinsville, Kentucky.  Of the

105,303 total acres of land occupied by the Forces Command installation,

approximately two thirds are in Tennessee and the remainder in Kentucky



Mission



Fort Campbell is organized as a combined headquarters of division,

staff, and post elements, and sanctions a number of operational,

training, and support missions.  The primary peacetime mission of Fort

Campbell is to support, train, and prepare the 101st Airborne Division

for combat readiness.  This mission includes supporting the U.S. Army

Reserves and the National Guard.  Fort Campbell has been the home of the

101st Airborne since 1956.


Climate



Fort Campbell is located in the southeastern section of the United

States on the Kentucky/Tennessee border.  This geographic setting

typically produces a warm and temperate climate.  Summers are hot and

humid with temperatures ranging between 68 and 89 degrees.  Average

relative summer humidity is 55 percent.  The winter months are damp but

mild with a mean high of 45 degrees and average low of 28 degrees.

Annual precipitation averages 47 inches.  The winter months are the

wettest with January, February, and March each averaging about 5 inches.

The driest month is October, which averages about 40 percent of the

rainfall of the wettest months.  Wintertime precipitation generally

comes from systems of low pressure and associated cold fronts which

produce widespread and uniform areas of precipitation, while summer

rainfall is deposited mainly in the form of scattered convective

showers.  Prevailing winds are southerly throughout the year, with the

exceptions of February and October, when the direction turns to

northerly.  The average wind speed ranges from 9.33 miles per hour in

February and March, to 4.25 mph in July and August.  Extremely strong

winds are not common; a record peak gust being just over 62.19 mph.  Two

types of air masses influence the regional climate:  the first from the

Gulf of Mexico, brings warm moist air over the area; the second brings

cool, dry continental air from the northwest.



Air Quality



Air pollutant emissions are generated at Fort Campbell mainly through

heating plants and motorized vehicles.  Less significant contributors

are emissions from paint spray booths and woodworking shops, vapor

emissions associated with liquid fuel transfer to and from storage

tanks, and dust emissions from the gravel roads in the western portion

of the reservation.  Estimates of total emissions are high but the total

land area over which these emissions are distributed is sufficiently

large that pollution levels do not violate federal or state standard

under normal operating conditions.



Water



The primary source or potable water for Fort Campbell is ground water

pumped from Boiling Springs which is an artesian spring with excellent

water quality.  Red River is an alternate or emergency source with a

pumping station located southeast of the installation.  Although the

total capacity of Boiling Springs is not known, the sources has an

apparent capacity great enough to support the current needs of Fort

Campbell.



Fort Campbell has an existing water treatment plant which was

constructed between 1942 and 1944 and enlarged in 1954-1955.  This

facility is in adequate condition and is expected to be capable of

meeting the current maximum demand as long as Boiling Springs continues

to be the primary source of raw water.  Fort Campbell is currently

studying various problems related to groundwater contamination.  A

technical review committee has been formed and mitigation plans are

being developed.



Surface Hydrology



Fort Campbell is located in the Cumberland River watershed,

approximately 9.3 miles north of the Cumberland River.  The installation

is drained by three subwaterways: Little West Fork, Saline, and Casey

Creeks.  All of the surface water at Fort Campbell drains from these

subwatersheds into the Cumberland River, then via the Ohio and the

Mississippi Rivers to the Gulf of Mexico.  Streamflow is naturally

increased during rainfall events but flooding is not considered to be a

problem.  Ponding does occur after a particularly heavy rainfall event

where sinkholds serve as a natural detention pond for surface runoff. 

No existing buildings are currently threatened by flooding.



Two man-made lakes are within the area.  Lake Taal, a 28 acre lake with

an earthen dam and concrete spillway, is located south of Clarksville

Base.  Joe Swing Pool is an 8 acre lake surrounded by limestone cliffs,

in an abandoned quarry located near the golf course.



Wetlands



The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services has completed the National Wetlands

Inventory mapping for all of Fort Campbell.  These have not be field

examined.  There has not been a comprehensive wetlands survey prepared

for Fort Campbell.  The Department of Environment and Health has

however, contracted with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Nashville

District for a detailed wetlands survey to be performed.  Review of the

country soils report Montgomery and Christian counties indicate the

presence of karst areas dotted with depressions, and may contain hydric

soils and wetlands.  Montgomery County in the southeast portion of Fort

Campbell contains broad areas of hydric soils.



Geology



Fort Campbell is located within the Pennyrile physiographic section,

which is one of two plateaus compromising the Mississippi Plateau.  This

region is typically a karst plain, consisting of rolling topography and

underlain rocks of middle Mississippian age, which form a series of

alternating sandstone, limestone, and shale layers.  Numerous sinkholes

and subterranean drainage systems have developed in this area.  The

limestone bedrock is covered by a thick overburden, consisting of

residual soil developed in place through weathering of the cherty

limestone parent material.  This residuum consists of highly plastic red

clay and contain smaller amounts of silt, fine chert (a tough rock

composed mainly of silica), and limestone fragments.  Cross sections

constructed from test borings indicate that this clay residuum is

between 26 and 49 feet thick.



Soils:



There are a wide variety of soils found on the reservation all of which

were formed in loess (wind deposited material).  These soils range from

a fertile dark brown silty clay loam in the eastern portion to a light

brown silt loam on gentle slopes.  Fragipan or impervious soils occur on

the rolling slopes to the west.  Soil permeability is generally poor

(0.6 - 2.0 inches per hour) and available water capacity is medium to

high.  Slopes are predominantly less than 10 percent but range from 2 to

35 percent.  Soil compressibility is low to medium and soil strength is

low.



Noise



Several factors contribute to the general noise condition at Fort

Campbell.  Major sources of noise pollution are from aircraft activities

(fixed-wing and rotary-wing), training exercises, motor vehicle traffic,

railroad operations, and military construction activities.  Areas such

as the hospital facilities, schools, library, guest homes, parks, and

the majority of family housing are not currently adversely impacted by

aircraft noise.



Vegetation



Total site vegetation includes forest, scrub, grasslands, and

agricultural crops.  Prior to 1941, when the federal government secured

the land and that was to become Fort Campbell, the are had mostly been

cleared for agriculture use.  Since that time, half of the installation

has developed tree cover due to natural regrowth and extensive planing

by Fort Campbell forestry personnel.



Wildlife



Development and human activity have forced the native populations to

less disturbed areas of the installation.  In those areas, a relatively

large animal community exists.  The installation provides a home for the

white tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus), cottontail rabbits

(sylvilagus floridanus), grey squirrel (Sciurus macroura), bob white

quail (Colinus virginianus), mourning doves (Zenaidura macroura), wild

turkey, duck species, over 40 species of reptiles, 30 species of

amphibians, and at least 50 species of birds.  The streams contain

whitesucker (Catostomus virginianus), silver redhorse (Moxostoma

anisurum), shiners (Notropis spp.), and Tennessee snubnose darter

(Etheostoma simoterun).



Threatened and Endangered Species



There are five lists of threatened and endangered species of plants and

animals in Kentucky and Tennessee.  Each state wildlife agency and U.S.

Fish and Wildlife Service maintains the lists.  In Christian and

Montgomery Counties, the following are found:



Christian County:



Grey bat - Myotis grisescens (E)

Southeastern bat - Myotis austroriparis (SR)

Eastern woodrat - Neotoma floridana magister (SR)

Hellbender - Crytobranchus allenganiensis (SR)

Armored rocksnail - Lithasia armigera (SR)

Hall's bullrush - Scripus hallii (SR)

Harper's umbrella plant - Eriogonum longifolium var. harperi (SR)



Montgomery County:



Grey bat - Myotis grisescens (E)

Indiana bat - Myotis sodalis (E)

Pink mucket pearly mussle - Lampsillis orbiculata (E)

Tan riffle shell - Epioblasma walkeri (E)

Rough pigtoe pearly mussel - Pleurobema plenum (E)

Dromedary pearly mussle - Dromus Dromas (E)

Orange-footed pearly mussel - Plethobasus cooperianus (E)

Prince's potato bean - Apios priceanan

Eastern woodrat - Neotoma floridana magister (SR)

Small-footed bat - Myotis leibii (SR)

Bachman's sparrow - Aimophila aestivalis (SR)

Appalachian Bewick's wren - Thryomanes bewickii altus (SR)

Hellbender - Crytobranchus allenganiensis (SR)

Copperbelly water snake - Nerodia erythrogaster neglecta (SR)

Muddy rocksnake - Lighasia salebrosa (SR)

Onyx rocksnake - Leptoxis praerosa (SR)

Appalachian bugbane - Cimicifunga rubifolia (SR)

Short's bladderpod - Lesquella globosa (SR)

False foxglove - Aureolaria patula (SR)

Gattinger's lobelia - Lobelia appendiculata var. gattingeri (SR)

Eastern bluestar - Amsonia tabernaemontana var. gattingeri (SR)



Land Use 



Land use at Fort Campbell is managed by the Fort Campbell Master Plan

Report into three general categories as shown in Table B-1.



**  Table B-1: Fort Campbell Land Use Categories



Training and Maneuver areas     70,000 acres



Range and Impact areas          20,700 acres



Built-Up areas                  14,000 acres 



**



Historical and Archaeological Resource



Historical and archaeological resources are protected under the National

Historic Preservation Act, as amended, the Archaeological Resources

Protection Act, and the Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act.

Currently, no historic districts, sites, buildings, or structures at

Fort Campbell are listed in the National Register of historic Places.

However, Fort Campbell recently celebrated its fiftieth anniversary and

many structures may now be eligible for inclusion on the Register.  Fort

Campbell is therefore considering negotiation of a Programmatic

Agreement with the Fort Campbell Base Commander, the Kentucky Heritage

Council, the Tennessee Historical Commission, and the Advisory Council

on Historic Preservation to identify archaeological and historic

resources, outline a maintenance plan for preservation, and produce a

resource management plan to guide future federal activities.



An archaeological survey was conducted in the early 1980's by the

University of Kentucky.  Evidence of human occupation from Paleo-Indian

through historic times was obtained from over 400 sites.

Prehistorically, the area appears to have been used primarily for

hunting grounds with few intensively occupied sites until the late

prehistoric (early Mississippian) period.  The bulk of settlement in the

Fort Campbell area took place between 1800 and 1820 primarily as

agrarian population.  Numerous small communities sprang up in and around

the Fort Campbell area.  Communities to note included Lafayette,

Garretsburg, Jorden Springs, Ashbury, Weaver's Store, New Providence,

Pardertown, Oak Grove, and Legate.  The Department of the Army purchased

these lands in the early 1940's.  A total of 68,592.28 acres from

Tennessee, and 33,163.16 acres from Kentucky.  Most of the existing

buildings were razed and graves were relocated.  



Socioeconomics



Fort Campbell is a community of over 190,000 people including military

personnel, Department of the Army and other civilian employees and

military dependents residing on the post in family housing.  Fort

Campbell also provides support to military dependents residing off-post

and retired military personnel and their families who have access to

post facilities.  As a community, Fort Campbell functions much like any

other.  It requires shopping, community and social services, security

services, health care, churches and schools in order to meet community

needs.  



Population



The installation population breakdown as of fiscal year 1993 shown in

Table B-2.



**  Table B-2: Fort Campbell Population



Military Personnel     24,216



Reserve Components     21,680



Department of the       4,702

Army Civilian

Personnel



On-Post Dependents     10,383



Off-Post Dependents    23,850



Retired Military      105,226

and Dependents



**

Economic Base



Fort Campbell has a substantial impact on the economy of surrounding

communities.  As of fiscal year 1990, Fort Campbell payroll, for both

military and civilian personnel totaled roughly $718 million.

Miscellaneous disbursements for appropriated funds, non-appropriated

funds, commissary purchases for resale from local vendors and supplies,

and services for installation operation totaled 197 million per year.

General maintenance and repair plus military construction activities

generated expenditures of $566 million.  Federal impact funds paid on

behalf of dependents of Fort Campbell military personnel attending off

post schools contributed $622,000 to the local economy.  Operations at

Fort Campbell generate substantial revenues to the local economies. 

Fort Campbell is the largest employee in the four-county region and it

is estimated that the installation contributes approximately $1.75

million daily to the area's economy.



APPENDIX C 



AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT OF MCGHEE TYSON AND THE TENNESSEE AIR NATIONAL

GUARD AIR FORCE BASE, ALTERNATE AERIAL PORT OF ENTRY/HEU TRANSFER SITE



Location



McGhee Tyson Airport (TYS) is one of five major air carrier airports in

the state of Tennessee.  Its proximity to the Oak Ridge area makes it an

ideal candidate for an alternate port of entry.  McGhee Tyson Airport is

located approximately 30 miles from Oak Ridge, Tennessee.  The Great

Smoky Mountains National Park is located approximately 20 miles to the

southeast of McGhee Tyson Airport.  



McGhee Tyson Airport is situated on a 2,250 acre tract in northern

Blount County, Tennessee at an elevation of 981 feet above mean sea

level.  The airport is located adjacent to the corporate limits of

Alcoa, Tennessee, approximately 10 miles southwest of the Knoxville

Central Business district.  The cities of Alcoa and Maryville lie

southeast of the airport.  Much of the land to the southwest of the

airport is currently undeveloped, vacant or in agricultural use.  Areas

of residential development bound the airport to the northwest, south,

and southeast.



Military Presence



McGhee Tyson has historically enjoyed a strong military presence by both

the U.S. Air Force and the Tennessee Air National Guard.  McGhee Tyson

Airport presently shares its airfield facilities with the 134th Air

Refueling Group of the Tennessee Air National Guard and the Army

Aircraft Support Facility.  The Tennessee Air National Guard occupies

323 acres on the west side of the airport.  The main gate of the Air

National Guard Base is immediately south of the air traffic control

tower site.  Once inside the main gate, there are about 40 structures

which support the operations of the Air National Guard.



The 134th's primary mission is to provide refueling support for military

aircraft, and it has been assigned eleven KC-135E tankers.  Most of the

tankers are parked on the northern ramp within the Air National Guard

complex, whereas one tanker is positioned on the south ramp.  Also

assigned to the Base is the 110th/119th Tactical Air Command Control and

the 228th Combat Communications Squadron.



Air Traffic Activities



With 1.2 million passengers per year, McGhee Tyson was identified in

1990 by the National Transportation Research Board as one of the 28

underutilized airports in the United States.  Delays from air traffic

congestion are therefore unusual at this facility.



The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 established the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) as the responsible agency for the control and use

of navigable airspace within the United States. Administratively,

control of air traffic at McGhee Tyson Airport is assigned to the FAA

Southern Region located in Atlanta, Georgia with coordinating efforts

from the Memphis Airports District Office.  Together, it is the

responsibility of Air Traffic Control, the FAA and each pilot to ensure

that procedures are followed which maintain proper separation between

aircraft.



The Federal Aviation Administration Air Traffic Control Tower is

operated continuously 24 hours per day to control the movements of all

aircraft within a five mile radius of the airport up to an altitude of

2,500 feet.  Other control systems are in place for distances further

out.  Annual aircraft operations (takeoffs and landings) remained within

a range of about 120,000 to 167,000 operations per year.  Air carrier

operations have remained between 17,000 and 26,000.  Military traffic

has leveled off to slightly more than 20,000 annual operations.  Table 1

shows an overview of operations summary by category for the last 5

years.



Commercial airlines that service the airport are: Delta, Northwest,

United and USAir.  Commuter Airlines include American Eagle, Atlantic

Coast (United Express), CC Airlines (US Air Express), Comair Airlines

(Delta Connection), Mesaba Airlines (Northwest Airlink), and Trans World

Express.  The top five markets from McGhee Tyson are Atlanta, New York,

Washington D.C., Chicago, and Memphis.



In addition to passenger service, McGhee Tyson Airport is serviced by

three all-cargo airlines: Federal Express, United Parcel Service, and

Airborne Express.  In 1993, nearly 18,999 tons of air freight and air

mail was loaded onto aircraft at McGhee Tyson Airport.



** Table C-1 Historical Operations Summary by Category at McGhee Tyson

Airport



Year     Air Carrier      Air Taxi     General      Military      Total

                                       Aviation



1990      22,407          30,186       90,811       23,501       166,905

1991      21,035          25,379       80,122       19,893       146,429

1992      20,640          22,108       64,091       21,038       127,877

1993      20,231          24,660       65,830       20,320       131,041

**



Air Cargo Facilities



The air cargo facilities at McGhee Tyson Airport are in two locations.

The primary area for all-cargo airlines is located at the northwest end

of the airfield.  Specifically designed for Federal Express, United

Parcel Service and Airborne Express, the area provides more than 55,000

square feet of automobile/truck parking and circulation.  In addition,

the U.S. Customs Service operates a port of entry for international

freight shipments.



Air Support Facilities



McGhee Tyson Airport is an air carrier facility under certification by

the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).  The Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR) 14, Part 139, governs the operations of land airports

serving DOT certificated air carriers using aircraft with greater that

30 seats.  Within these regulations, specific requirements for the

operation of aircraft rescue and fire fighting equipment and service

have been established.  In addition, the airport is required to maintain

and update an FAA approved Airport Certification Manual which outlines

operational procedures and personnel responsibilities for the safe

operation of the airport.



The fixed base operators (KnoxAir and Cherokee Aviation) provide fueling

services to the airlines and general aviation aircraft.  There are

separate fuel storage sites on the airport between Alcoa Highway and

Runway 5R-23L for KnoxAir and Cherokee Aviation.  Total fuel storage in

underground tanks consists of 225,000-gallons of Jet-A-fueling trucks

which directly fuel airline and general aviation aircraft.  In addition

to these fuel supplies, the airport and KnoxAir maintain a supply of gas

and diesel fuel for maintenance and snow removal vehicles.

Highway Transportation Corridors



Access to McGhee Tyson is available via Interstates 75, 40, and 140.

Interstate 75 is a primary north-south ground transportation route

accessing the Southeastern United States and Upper Midwest.  Interstate

40 is one of the most widely used trucking routes connecting the east

and west coasts of the United States.  Interstate 140 connects to

Pellissippi Parkway and provides ready access to Oak Ridge bypassing

downtown Knoxville.  Easy access to I-40, I-140, and I-75 is provided by

U.S. Highway 129 (Alcoa Highway).



Airport Facilities



McGhee Tyson Airport is categorized in the National Plan of Integrated

Airport systems as a medium-haul commercial service airport.  This

category does not restrict or prevent its use by general aviation or

military aircraft.  Rather, the categorization of airports according to

the typical "haul" or "stage" length of its commercial airline fleet is

intended to provide a general overview of the airport's role in the

national airport system.  McGhee Tyson airport is also categorized as a

"small hub" air passenger market.  This means that McGhee Tyson Airport

annually enplanes between 0.05 and 0.25 percent of all certified airline

emplanements in the United States.  



Runways



This existing airfield includes two parallel runways oriented in a

northeast/southwest direction.  Runway 5L-23R is 9,008 feet long and 150

feet wide.  In addition, there are 1,000-foot concrete/asphalt overruns

beyond each end of Runway 5L-23R which provide safety margins for

aircraft operations.  The runway is concrete (with a wire-combed

surface) and is strength rated at 90,000 pounds for single wheel gear

load aircraft, 200,000 pounds for dual-wheel gear aircraft, 350,000

pounds for dual-tandem gear aircraft, and 540,000 pounds for double dual

tandem gear aircraft.



Runway 5R-23L is 9,000 feet long and 150 feet wide.  This runway is made

of asphalt with a grooved surface treatment.  The pavement of this

runway is strength rated at 250,000 pounds for dual-tandem gear.  The

strength ratings for each runway are not necessarily operational

threshold limitations.  Each of these runways are capable of handling

many aircraft in the civilian and military fleet.  Most of the existing

airfield components currently meet or exceed Airport Reference Code D-IV

design standards.  The length of both runways will also accommodate the

majority of large airplanes weighing up to 60,000 pounds.  The runways

are adequate for landings and takeoffs by the largest Air Force cargo

aircraft including the C-5A.



Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting



Requirements for Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting services at an

airport are established under the Federal Aviation Regulation Part 139.

The airport's Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting facility is located

directly south of the passenger terminal apron.  The Air National Guard

maintains a rescue and fire fighting facility on the west side of the

airport as well.  There is an agreement between the Airport Authority

and Air National Guard which provides equipment if the need arises.



Fuel Storage



Fuel storage and fueling services for general aviation, air cargo, and

the airlines is handled by the fixed base operators.  Available storage

includes 225,000-gallons of Jet A and 39,000-gallons of 100 low lead

(Avgas) located within a 1.5 acre site at the north end of the general

aviation area.  In addition, several fueling trucks with various

capacities are used for actual disbursement of fuel for aircraft.



Climate



The predominant wind direction is from the southwest and over 90 percent

of the recorded wind speed at the airport is less than 10 knots.  Normal

daily mean temperatures range form 38.8 degrees Fahrenheit in January to

77.1 degrees Fahrenheit in July, with an annual average daily mean

temperature of 58.4 degrees Fahrenheit.  Temperatures occasionally rise

above 100 degrees Fahrenheit and fall as low as 5 degrees Fahrenheit.

The average annual precipitation in the area is 48 inches.  The

precipitation is mostly in the form of rain and is fairly evenly

distributed throughout the year with the summer months being slightly

wetter.  The area receives approximately 12 inches of snow per year.



Air Quality



An air quality analysis is required for projects at airports with

passengers in excess of 1.3 million at commercial service airports.

While McGhee Tyson Airport is not forecast to reach this level of

emplanements until 2015, coordination would be required with the

Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation on air quality

issues prior to any new construction.  In a letter dated April 25, 1994,

the Department of Environment and Conservation stated that Blount County

is currently in attainment for all Air Quality Standards.  There are

currently ten airport sources of air pollution which have permits from

the Division of Air Pollution Control.  The proposed action would not

result in new construction/demolition activities that would impact these

resources.



Water Quality



The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has established a requirement

for permits on all storm water runoff from industrial activities,

including airports.  The Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Authority has

joined a group permit application process.  This group permit

application has been completed through the American Association of

Airport Executives.



Historic, Architectural, Archaeological, and Cultural Resources



There are no properties eligible for or listed on the National Register

of Historic Places at McGhee Tyson Airport.



Endangered or Threatened Species of Flora and Fauna



Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency is not aware of any rare or

endangered plants or animals that would be adversely impacted.



Wetlands



The Department of the Army, in a letter dated May 5, 1994, indicated the

presence of several streams on airport property.  Also, previous

meetings with airport personnel reviewed that there are wetlands on

airport property as well.  A delineation of the potential wetlands areas

is not available.



Noise

 

The Transportation Systems Center of the U.S. Department of

Transportation at Cambridge, Massachusetts has developed a noise model

for determining the noise levels that occur in and around an airport.

This model for determining the level of noise impacts at an airport has

been accepted as a standard by the Federal Aviation Administration, the

Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Housing and Urban

Development.  This model provides an objective standard to determine

noise impacts and defines areas where noise impacts are sufficient to

require action to be taken.  The Metropolitan Knoxville Airport

Authority will be conducting a Federal Aviation Regulation Part 150

Noise Compatibility Study for the airport.



Socioeconomic Data



Socioeconomic data for the Greater Knoxville area has been collected and

reprinted by several sources, including the U.S. Census Bureau, Greater

Knoxville Area Chamber of Commerce and the Knoxville Urban Area

Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC).  An airport service area is

generally described as the area from which the primary demand for

airline passengers may be found.  For McGhee Tyson Airport, the primary

service area is considered to be the sixteen counties which comprise the

eastern Tennessee district.  Therefore, socioeconomic data for these

sixteen counties was obtained.



Sevier and Blount counties had the most significant rates of population

increase between 1980 and 1990, at 23.24 percent and 10.54 percent,

respectively.  The entire sixteen county area experienced a growth rate

in population of 5.32 percent between 1980 and 1990, from 845,121 to

890,049.



**  Table C-2  Historic Population Estimates East Tennessee District (16

Counties)



                             1970       1980       1990       Change 1980-1990  



East Tennessee District     705,445    845,121    890,049       5.32%

**



** Table C-3  Top Ten Employers in the Greater Knoxville Area



Name                             # of Employees        Type of Business



Martin Marietta Energy             16,059

Systems Inc.



Knox County Pulic                   6,125

Schools



University of Tennessee             4,990



University of Tennessee             4,072

Medical Center



Fort Sanders Alliance               3,788



Levi Strauss and Co.                3,519



Aluminum Company of                 1,600

America



State of Tennessee                  2,596



Knox County                         2,500



City of Knoxville                   2,482

**



THIS IS A DELETED/SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT

CONFIRMED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY: DOE/SA-20

BY D.P. CANNON, DATE: 3/6/95