12 November 1999 Text: Albright before Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (Secretary of State discusses CTBT and ABM treaties) (4510) Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argued in favor of the United States ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and attempted to explain the Administration/Senate rift on this issue during a November 10 speech before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. She acknowledged that the failure of the Senate to take up the vote could be blamed on both sides: "to the Senate for giving the Treaty short shrift; to the Administration for not doing enough to lay the groundwork for a successful debate." She also cautioned concerned observers not to over-react. "The United States has not gone crazy. A clear majority in the Senate wanted to delay voting to allow more time to deliberate on the Treaty. President Clinton and Vice President Gore have reaffirmed America's commitment to nonproliferation," Albright said. President Clinton, the Secretary noted, "has made clear that the United States will continue to observe a moratorium on nuclear explosive tests and has urged all others to do the same. And we will continue to work with Congress to provide our share of support for preparatory work, including construction of the International Monitoring System." But U.S. ratification of the treaty is essential, the Secretary warned, because "if we do not accept the rules we insist that others follow, others will not accept them either. The result will be a steady weakening of nuclear controls. And if efforts at control fail, within a couple of decades or less, a host of nations from the Middle East through South Asia to the Korean Peninsula could possess nuclear weapons." Albright also discussed the current debate in the United States regarding the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. "On one side, there are those demanding that we scrap the ABM Treaty, despite objections from Russia, China and our allies. On the other are people who oppose any adjustments to the Treaty, and are against developing even a limited system of national missile defense," she explained. "The Administration believes that both extreme views are dangerous. The first risks reviving old threats to our security; the second fails to respond to new ones," the Secretary said. She pointed out that for more than a quarter century, the ABM Treaty has contributed to strategic nuclear stability. "It is based on the understanding that an all-out competition in ABM systems would create destabilizing uncertainties about intentions, and destroy our ability to reduce strategic offensive arms," Albright said. "Preserving this understanding is vital to us. It is also essential to Russia." But the strategic environment has changed since the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972, Abright said. "The Gulf War showed what a real threat theater-range missiles in hostile hands can be. And tests of longer-range missiles by Iran and North Korea raise concerns about vulnerability that must be addressed." To meet the demands of the new strategic environment, the Administration is developing and testing a limited National Missile Defense System, with a decision on deployment possible as early as next summer, Albright said. For deployment to occur, certain changes to the ABM Treaty would be necessary, and the Administration has begun discussing these with Congress, U.S. allies and Moscow. So far, Russian leaders oppose any ABM Treaty modifications, the Secretary said. But U.S. proposals, she argued, are limited and would not undermine Russia's deterrent. Albright said that "because Russia and we are vulnerable to the same threats, we are prepared to cooperate with Moscow on missile defense." Following is the State Department text: (begin text) Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Remarks at Chicago Council on Foreign Relations November 10, 1999, Chicago, Illinois As released by the Office of the Spokesman U.S. Department of State [As Prepared for Delivery] SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Thank you, Chairman Burnham, for that introduction. John Rielly, members of the diplomatic corps, officers and members of the Council, guests and friends, good evening. I am delighted to be here in Chicago, a city that Richard Wright once called the pivot of the Eastern, Western, Northern and Southern poles of our nation, but which now increasingly serves that purpose for our globe. Chicago is the capital of America's heartland, but also a dynamo of international travel and trade, blessed by the busiest airport, largest mercantile exchange, most dramatic skyline and best rightfielder in the world. It has also been blessed for more than three-quarters of a century by this very venerable institution--the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. In 1922, the year the Council was founded, our country was walking away from the League of Nations, our cities were coping with Prohibition, and our Secretary of State had a beard. Much has changed since then, but this Council has remained one of our nation's most influential platforms for discussing America's rightful place in the world. And the Council has also been a leader in assessing American attitudes towards international relations. I was heartened that your latest survey shows strong, albeit guarded, support for an active U.S. role. I was delighted to see that most Americans agree with me that President Clinton deserves high marks for his foreign policy leadership. But your survey also reveals that a majority of our citizens are afraid, as the new century is about to dawn, that the next hundred years will prove even bloodier than the last. Given our experience of Holocaust and global war, that is a daunting prospect. And we have no higher responsibility than to do all we can to prevent that prospect from becoming a reality. This evening, I would like to discuss with you a major part of that responsibility. Because even though the Cold War has ended, the dangers posed to us by nuclear weapons have not. We must carry out a comprehensive strategy to limit those dangers both by keeping such weapons out of the wrong hands and by deterring and defending against their possible use. These goals received a setback last month when the U.S. Senate voted not to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT. America's allies and friends responded to this vote with universal shock and disappointment. I have personally been besieged by calls from counterparts around the globe. All express concern. Some even fear that America is on the verge of deciding simply to go it alone; to abandon efforts at nuclear nonproliferation; and to rely solely on military might in what could become a new, wider and even more dangerous nuclear arms race. My reply to those who harbor such fears is not to over-react. The United States has not gone crazy. A clear majority in the Senate wanted to delay voting to allow more time to deliberate on the Treaty. President Clinton and Vice President Gore have reaffirmed America's commitment to nonproliferation. And, as Winston Churchill once reportedly declared, "Americans can always be counted upon to do the right thing in the end, after all other possibilities have been exhausted." That said, the Senate debate was a highly sobering experience. Never before have the clearly expressed views of our closest allies have been so lightly dismissed. Never before has the Senate rejected so abruptly a treaty of this importance. Never before has the tradition of a bipartisan foreign policy, once championed by such giants of this state as Everett Dirksen and Paul Douglas, seemed so distant. Much has been said about how the Administration and Senate leadership handled this issue. It is fair to assign blame to both sides: to the Senate for giving the Treaty short shrift; to the Administration for not doing enough to lay the groundwork for a successful debate. But our focus now must be not on where we have been, but on where we are headed. And that is why I have chosen to address this subject here, tonight. Those of us in public life have a duty--when circumstances warrant--to raise a flag of warning. I do so now. Because I believe it is dangerous when the world's leading nation is as sharply divided as we appear to be on how to confront the world's greatest threat. Our challenge is to overcome the scars left by past arguments, put aside partisan distractions, and come together around concrete measures that will keep Americans secure. To succeed, we must go beyond slogans to the reality of a world in which U.S. actions and attitudes have real consequences. Because if we do not accept the rules we insist that others follow, others will not accept them either. The result will be a steady weakening of nuclear controls. And if efforts at control fail, within a couple of decades or less, a host of nations from the Middle East through South Asia to the Korean Peninsula could possess nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them at long range. One can imagine then a world imperiled by bitter regional rivalries in which governments are able to threaten and destroy each other without ever having to mass troops at a border, send an aircraft aloft, or launch a ship of war. This is where the issues of nuclear testing and missile defense are linked. For those of us concerned about defending against missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction should be the first to value halting nuclear tests as an initial line of defense. More than four decades ago, President Eisenhower warned that the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons would spread, and that not even a massive arsenal would be enough to keep America safe. He strived, therefore, to achieve agreements, including a comprehensive test ban, that would reduce the risk of war. His successor, President John Kennedy, took up that same banner. In 1963, he said that "the conclusion of a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests...would check the nuclear arms race in one of its most dangerous areas...Surely, this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding to the temptation neither to give up the effort, nor...our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards." These, then, are the core principles that guided America in years past and should guide us still. First, America must lead in the effort to assure stability and peace in a nuclear world. Second, we should strive for sound agreements to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. Third, we should view such agreements not as ends, but as means; they must contribute to our overall security. Obviously, agreements do not erase the need for a powerful nuclear and conventional military deterrent. But they establish rules that increase the chance that our deterrent will succeed in preventing war. They complicate efforts by potential adversaries to develop and build nuclear weapons. And they make it more likely that others will join us in a common response against those who break the rules. By outlawing nuclear tests, the CTBT will impede the development of more advanced weapons by nuclear weapons states, and constrain the nuclear capabilities of countries that do not now have such weapons. For example, in Asia, the CTBT would make it harder for North Korea to advance its nuclear weapons program; or for China to develop the technology required to place multiple warheads atop a single small missile. In the Persian Gulf, the Treaty would create another important yardstick to measure the intentions of Iran, where an historic debate between the forces of openness and isolation is underway. In South Asia, the Treaty would be a valuable tool for constraining a potentially catastrophic arms race along a disputed border. In Russia, there is support among some for building a new generation of tactical nuclear arms, because Russia's conventional military capabilities have degraded and money is lacking to rebuild them. The CTBT would reinforce momentum towards nuclear restraint around the world. Despite these benefits, critics say the Treaty is too risky because some countries might cheat. But improvements in our own national means of verification, together with the International Monitoring System established by the Treaty, would enhance our ability to detect nuclear explosions. Also, the Treaty's provisions for on-site inspections should help deter violations and assist in finding the smoking gun should a violation occur. Moreover, the military value of very low-yield tests is limited. They are of little use in developing more advanced strategic weapons. The bottom line is that, under the CTBT, it is less likely that nations will test because the risks of detection will be higher. But if they do test in ways that might threaten our security, they will be detected. And if that were to happen, the world, not just the United States, would object with the full force of international law on its side. Of course, some among you may be asking, so what? Aren't international law and world opinion merely abstractions? Won't governments, and especially those we worry about most, pursue their own interests regardless of treaty obligations? There is a good deal of merit in these questions. But there is no merit to the conclusion that some draw--which is that if we cannot assure 100% compliance with the rules we establish, we are better off not establishing any rules at all. Consider the facts. During the first 25 years of the nuclear age, five countries tested nuclear weapons. In the 29 years since, two, India and Pakistan, have joined the list. During this period, knowledge about how to build nuclear arms has spread, but far fewer nations than we once predicted are acting on that knowledge. The question is "Why?" The answer, I think, is that global standards do matter. Over the years, more and more nations have embraced the view that it is unnecessary and dangerous to develop and test nuclear weapons. This view has given birth to an extensive, although not yet complete, framework of legally binding agreements. These include nearly universal participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. Of course, neither law nor opinion will prevent nations from acting in their own best interests. But most countries are influenced in how they define their interests by what the law is; and most find it in their interests to operate within the law, or at least be perceived as doing so. Why else, for example, did South Africa, Brazil and Argentina abandon their nuclear weapons programs? Why else did China agree to halt its own nuclear tests and sign the CTBT? Why else have India and Pakistan agreed, in principle, to do the same? And why else have the nations that contribute to the proliferation problem made such vigorous efforts at concealment? Some Treaty opponents have pointed out, accurately, that North Korea joined the NPT and then evaded its obligations under it. But why did North Korea take on those obligations in the first place? And why should we conclude that because that pact was violated, we would have been safer without it? After all, North Korea's secret activities first came to light as a result of inspections under that agreement. Further, we can only imagine what kind of world we would have today if the NPT had not entered into force three decades ago. Or what kind of world we will have three decades from now if we decide that the job of stopping proliferation is either not worth doing or already done. To me, it is an open and shut case that outlawing nuclear tests by others will result in a more favorable security climate for America than would otherwise exist. But the second question we must consider is whether accepting a legal ban on our own tests will undermine our nuclear deterrent. That deterrent includes our ability to put a nuclear weapon on a bomber or missile and deliver that weapon with a high degree of accuracy. The knowledge that we can do this will stop any rational government from attacking us, and the CTBT would not affect that. Because the Treaty does not cover delivery systems, we can continue to test and modernize them. There can be no doubt that our deterrent is effective. After all, we have already conducted more than 1000 tests--hundreds more than anyone else. Our knowledge base and technology are superb. However, many Senators opposed the CTBT because of their concern that, without testing, weapons in our arsenal might become either unsafe or unreliable. Obviously, this is a very serious concern, which we have taken seriously. Our nation's most experienced nuclear weapons scientists have examined very carefully the possibility that our weapons will degrade without testing. They have recommended steps that will enable us to retain confidence in the safety and reliability of our arsenal under CTBT, including a robust program of Stockpile Stewardship. These steps were incorporated in a package of understandings that accompanied the Treaty when it was submitted to the Senate. We simply do not need to test nuclear weapons to protect our security. On the other hand, would-be proliferators and modernizers must test if they are to develop the kind of advanced nuclear designs that are most threatening. Thus, the CTBT would go far to lock in a technological status quo that is highly favorable to us. There is, moreover, even another layer of protection for American security. If the day should come when our experts are not able to certify the safety or reliability of our nuclear arsenal--or if the Treaty is not working, and new threats are arising that require us to resume nuclear tests--we will have the right to withdraw from the Treaty. The case for ratifying the CTBT is strong. It asks nothing of us that we cannot safely do; it requires of others a standard we very much want the world to meet. Those tempted to cheat will face a higher risk of being caught, and will pay a higher price when they are. And if the worst case unfolds, and we must withdraw, we can and will. The burden on Treaty supporters is to persuade skeptics that ratifying the CTBT will reduce the dangers posed to our security by nuclear weapons, without endangering our security by preventing us from taking steps necessary to national defense. But there is also a burden on Treaty opponents. For it is not sufficient simply to say the Treaty is imperfect. Opponents must offer an alternative that is better. And they must explain why America will be safer in a world where nuclear tests are not outlawed and may again become commonplace; where there is no guarantee of an international monitoring system to detect such tests; where we have no right to request on-site inspections; and where America is held responsible by allies and friends everywhere for the absence of these protections. To those Senators who want the Administration to bury the CTBT, we say, "No, our national interests will not allow us to do that." But to those who are willing to take a further look at the Treaty, we say, "How can we help?" For despite the Senate vote, the Treaty lives. It is essential that the dialogue on CTBT continue and bear fruit. After all, the Administration and Congress have worked together on difficult national security issues before. A number of leading Senators from both parties have expressed interest in a bipartisan effort to move forward on CTBT now. In that spirit, I am announcing today that we will establish a high-level Administration task force to work closely with the Senate on addressing the issues raised during the test ban debate. As we did with NATO enlargement, this team will also carry the dialogue to Americans from all walks of life to explain and analyze the Treaty. In our discussions with the Senate, we will be open to a variety of possible approaches for bridging differences, including at an appropriate point the potential need for additional conditions and understandings, as was the case with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Meanwhile, President Clinton has made clear that the United States will continue to observe a moratorium on nuclear explosive tests and has urged all others to do the same. And we will continue to work with Congress to provide our share of support for preparatory work, including construction of the International Monitoring System. Finding the way forward on CTBT is necessary, but not sufficient, to crafting a bipartisan strategy for reducing the nuclear danger. It is equally important that we establish common ground on the question of national missile defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Here, agreement must be found between the extremes. On one side, there are those demanding that we scrap the ABM Treaty, despite objections from Russia, China and our allies. On the other are people who oppose any adjustments to the Treaty, and are against developing even a limited system of national missile defense. The Administration believes that both extreme views are dangerous. The first risks reviving old threats to our security; the second fails to respond to new ones. For more than a quarter century, the ABM Treaty has contributed to strategic nuclear stability. It is based on the understanding that an all-out competition in ABM systems would create destabilizing uncertainties about intentions, and destroy our ability to reduce strategic offensive arms. Preserving this understanding is vital to us. It is also essential to Russia. If we were simply to abandon the ABM Treaty, we would generate fears in Moscow that we are also abandoning the goal of stability. We would squander an historic opportunity for negotiating further mutual reductions in our nuclear arsenals. And we would run the unnecessary risk of transforming Russia into once again our most powerfully armed adversary. On the other hand, our partners must recognize that the strategic environment has changed greatly in the 27 years since the ABM Treaty was signed. The Gulf War showed what a real threat theater-range missiles in hostile hands can be. And tests of longer-range missiles by Iran and North Korea raise concerns about vulnerability that must be addressed. Our military serves as an effective deterrent to any rational adversary. The problem is how to deal with threats from sources that are neither rational nor interested in complying with global norms. It is against this danger that the Administration is developing and testing a limited National Missile Defense System, with a decision on deployment possible as early as next summer. For deployment to occur, certain changes to the ABM Treaty would be necessary, and we have begun discussing these with Congress, our allies and Moscow. To date, Russian leaders have expressed strong opposition to any Treaty modifications, and accused us of undermining the entire system of international arms control simply by raising the subject. A Russian defense official recently proclaimed that his nation has the ability to overwhelm the missile defense system we are planning. That is true--and part of our point. The system we are planning is not designed to defend against Russia and could not do so. And that will remain true even if we are able to negotiate further deep reductions in our arsenals. The changes we are contemplating in the ABM Treaty are limited. They would not permit us to undermine Russia's deterrent. And because Russia and we are vulnerable to the same threats, we are prepared to cooperate with Moscow on missile defense. In response, Russia must do more than just say "Nyet." It is in our mutual interest to develop an arrangement that preserves the essential aims of the ABM Treaty, while responding to the new dangers we both face. Domestically, the Administration recognizes that if we are to have support for any agreement we might reach with Russia, we must consult closely with the Legislative Branch. The Administration and Congress have the same boss--and that is the American people. We have an obligation to work shoulder to shoulder in support of policies that will keep our citizens secure. In defending against nuclear dangers, we rely on a combination of force and diplomacy. That is why our military must remain second to none, but also why we need resources to back our international diplomatic leadership. Earlier this year, Congress voted to cut the President's request for international programs by more than $2 billion. By standing firm in our negotiations, we won much of that back. Now we are engaged in a final effort to persuade Congress to pay what we owe to the United Nations. This is not just a matter of honoring our word, although that in itself should be enough. The UN serves important American interests. These include peacekeeping, safeguarding nuclear materials, prosecuting war criminals, enforcing sanctions against rogue states, protecting intellectual property rights, fighting disease, and saving children's lives. Half a century ago, our predecessors created the UN. Thirty-eight years ago, our nation was proudly represented there by Illinois' favorite son--Adlai Stevenson. Today, we are the organization's number one debtor. We are even in danger of losing our vote in the UN General Assembly. America can do better than that. I hope you agree. Congress should vote this year--at long last--to pay our UN bills. The issues I have discussed today of nuclear risks and national defense, of resources and American interests affect us all. And I hope the dialogue concerning them will broaden far beyond the narrow corridors of Washington D.C. These are matters that warrant the attention of our universities and scientists, our professionals and our vast network of nongovernmental organizations. We need a truly national debate. For we Americans are the inheritors of a tradition of leadership that has brought our country to the threshold of the new century strong and respected, prosperous and at peace. The question our children will ask is whether we were good stewards of that inheritance. Because a decade of two from now, we will be known as the bitter partisans who allowed their differences to immobilize America, or as the generation that marked the path to a safer world. We will be known as the unthinking unilateralists who allowed America's international standing to erode, or as the generation that renewed our nation's capacity to lead. There is no certain roadmap to success, either for individuals or for nations. Ultimately, it is a matter of judgment, a question of choice. In making that choice, let us remember that there is not a page of American history of which we are proud that was authored by a peddler of complacency or a prophet of despair. We are doers. We have a responsibility in our time, as others have had in theirs, not to be prisoners of history, but to shape history; a responsibility to act--with others when we can, alone when we must--to protect our citizens, defend our interests, preserve our values and bequeath to future generations a legacy as proud as the one we received from those who came before. To that mission, this evening, I pledge my own best efforts and summon both your support and the wise counsel of this esteemed Council. Thank you very much. (end text)