USIS Washington File

07 October 1999

Transcript: Secretary of State Remarks on CTBT at Hoover Institution

(She says Nuclear Test Ban Treaty allows the U.S. flexibility) (6770)

Palo Alto, California -- The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
allows the United States a good deal of flexibility, Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright says, and she urged the U.S. Senate to vote
to approve it.

During remarks delivered at the Hoover Institution at Stanford
University October 6, Albright said that when President Clinton
submitted the CTBT to the Senate for approval, he included a package
of six safeguards that define conditions under which the United States
would enter the treaty. These include: a strengthening of American
commitments in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and verification,
stockpile stewardship, maintenance of U.S. nuclear laboratories and
test readiness.

"The CTBT will improve our ability to deter and detect clandestine
nuclear weapons activity by giving us a new means to do so," she said.
"It will provide a global network of more than 300 sensors of four
different kinds and the right to request on-site inspections."

So far, 153 countries have signed the treaty, including 15 of 18 NATO
allies. The treaty cannot enter into force until the United States and
43 other nations with nuclear power or research reactors have ratified

The Secretary also condemned the Congressional decision to slash the
international affairs budget. The $2 billion cut in Clinton's Fiscal
Year 2000 budget, she said, would create "a clear and present danger
to American interests." President Clinton, according to Albright, has
said he will veto the bill when it reaches his desk.

In the past five years, the Secretary said, international affairs
funding has declined by about 20 percent, but demands on U.S.
interests have not. "What has been a bad situation is now in danger of
growing very much worse," she said.

Following is the State Department transcript, as delivered:

(begin transcript)

Office of the Spokesman

October 6, 1999




Palo Alto, California

ALBRIGHT:  Thank you.  Thank you very much.

You noticed that I gave Secretary Christopher two kisses. One was from
me and one was from the Governor of California with whom I was
yesterday. As I look out on this audience -- a nice, hefty size
audience -- but you are not what happened to me yesterday when I
addressed 8,500 women in Long Beach, thanks to the Governor of
California. So I am very glad to be able to be here with everybody
today and very grateful to Secretary Christopher for introducing me.
And it is especially great to see him here and to know how proud you
all are of him, as we are in Washington.

When I was named by the President, I said that I hoped that my heels
would fill his shoes. And it has been a struggle, Chris. I have worked
very hard. There is space left. And you really led this country in an
amazing way in a very difficult period of foreign policy and I am
grateful for everything you have done and did and continue to do
because you set us on the right path at the end of the century.

I thank you very much for your comments about my father. He loved it
here. A dirty little secret is he planned to retire here and so you
could just ask his daughter.

ALBRIGHT: I think he also did research on another book that he didn't
finish that I would like to work on at some point, which is the
history of the Czechoslovak legionnaires as they passed through Russia
on their way during the Revolution. So he always enjoyed very much
coming to Stanford and being at Hoover and being a participant in the
amazing activities that this institution has been involved in, and I
am very grateful for having been asked to speak here.

Now, Chris, in case you are concerned that your office hasn't changed
a bit since you left, it really hasn't at all; everything is the same.
Unless, of course, you count the cosmetics and hair spray and curling
iron in the bathroom.

I want to just say that -- I want to thank everybody here for allowing
me to go forward with a speech that I think bears a great deal on the
issues at hand and that allow me to have this kind of a forum. I think
Stanford, of course, is among the world's great universities, right up
there with Harvard and almost in league with Georgetown where, in case
you don't know, I taught. And I think that the lunch was so delicious
so I hope very much that you won't ask me questions that are too
difficult and those I can't answer can be answered by my other former
colleague, former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, who was an
outstanding public servant while in office and has now, I think,
performed another huge service for our country by leading the process
in which we reviewed our policy towards North Korea.

And finally, I know that George Shultz and I had a very good
conversation a couple of days ago and he was sorry not to be here and
we stay in contact. One of the great fun things to do is to keep track
of the former secretaries of state; it allows me to have great
conversations. And we are a small club. I have kind of changed the
dress code. But other than that, we are very close.

I think that, as we look at the time from Secretary Shultz to
Secretary Christopher, we have one Secretary who helped to end the
Cold War, the other to manage our transition to a new era. But both
were doers and both saw the linkage between the interests we have and
the values we uphold, and both understood that America belongs not at
stage right or stage left but, rather, on the center stage of world

We owe a debt of gratitude to wise leaders such as these and to the
Presidents whom they served. Their vision, combined with the genius
and generosity of the American people, have brought our country to the
threshold of the new century strong and respected, prosperous and at
peace, within a world that is more free than it has ever been. And at
the same time, we are conscious of new dangers and aware that progress
must be sustained as it was built through American leadership.

Today, I would like to discuss two issues, one specific and one more
general, that relate directly to our capacity to lead. The first is
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT. As you know, the Senate
has been planning to vote on this treaty within a matter of days and
if that were to happen, I believe a yes vote would be the right vote
for American security. And let me explain why.

Three years ago, President Clinton became the first world leader to
sign the CTBT. Since then, 153 others have followed suit; 51 nations,
including 15 of our 18 NATO allies, have ratified the treaty. As we
meet here today, people from around the world are asking with
considerable anxiety: Will America join this treaty or kill it? Will
the Senate vote to strengthen the world's nonproliferation regime or
undermine it?

One thing is certain. This treaty is in the national security interest
of the United States. The reasons are straightforward and compelling.
Under the treaty, America would retain a safe and reliable nuclear
deterrent, but by preventing testing the treaty will inhibit the
development of more advanced weapons by other nuclear weapon states
and make it harder for countries that do not now have such weapons to
develop them.

Our nation has the world's most advanced nuclear capabilities. In the
past, we conducted more than 1,000 nuclear explosive tests. The heads
of our nation's testing labs agree that we don't need to continue
these tests in order to maintain an effective deterrent, and that's
why we began a moratorium on tests in 1992. Aside from South Asia,
that moratorium is now worldwide but it depends almost entirely on

So this treaty is not about preventing America from conducting nuclear
explosive tests. It is about preventing others from doing so. It is
about establishing the principle worldwide that it is not smart, not
safe, not right and not legal to conduct explosive tests in order to
modernize or develop nuclear weapons. That is why General Hugh Shelton
and four previous Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff support
ratification of the Test Ban Treaty and why Defense Secretary Cohen
and former Secretaries Perry and Christopher hold the same view.

There are those who say the treaty is too risky because some countries
might cheat. But what exactly would we be risking? With no treaty,
other countries can test without cheating and without limit. The CTBT
will improve our ability to deter and detect clandestine nuclear
weapons activity by giving us a new means to do so. It will provide a
global network of more than 300 sensors of four different kinds and
the right to request on-site inspection. The treaty commits every
signatory to accept intrusive monitoring. It will give us broader and
more extensive access in more countries of interest than we would ever
have on our own. The more countries that support and participate in
the treaty, the harder it will be for others to cheat and the higher
the price they will pay if they do.

When President Clinton submitted the CTBT to the Senate for approval,
he included a package of six safeguards that define the conditions
under which we would enter the treaty. These safeguards will
strengthen our commitments in the areas of intelligence, monitoring
and verification, stockpile stewardship, maintenance of our nuclear
laboratories and test readiness.

They also specify the circumstances under which the President would be
prepared, in consultation with Congress, to exercise our right of
supreme national interest under the treaty to conduct necessary
testing if the safety or reliability of our nuclear deterrent could no
longer be certified, so we are covered either way.

As you may know, the CTBT cannot enter into force until it has been
ratified by the United States and 43 other nations with nuclear power
or research reactors. The treaty specifies that if it has not entered
into force three years after it was opened for signature, the
countries that have ratified may hold a conference and take measures
to accelerate its entry into force.

Today, that conference convenes in Vienna and the United States is
there but only as an observer -- and that is simply not right.
Proliferation is the single greatest security challenge that we and
our allies face and when vital nonproliferation issues are discussed,
we should be driving the agenda and not sitting on the sidelines.

I hope that those who oppose the CTBT will think a bit about what it
will mean if the Senate votes down the treaty. We will have preserved
the right to do something we have no need and no intention of doing
while giving a green light to those who may want to conduct nuclear
explosive tests and could one day do us great harm.

We will have cut the legs out from under our own diplomatic efforts to
persuade Pakistan and India to sign and ratify the CTBT, thereby
making a very dangerous nuclear arms race in South Asia more likely.
We will have thrown away a valuable tool in slowing the modernization
of China's nuclear arsenal. We will have disregarded the counsel of
allies and friends. We will have ignored the best national security
advice of our top military leaders. We will have denied the vision and
betrayed the dream of two presidents who first proposed the
Comprehensive Test Ban, Dwight David Eisenhower and John Fitzgerald
Kennedy. We will have missed a priceless chance to improve our ability
to detect and deter nuclear tests and we will be left without a
response when our own children ask why, when we had a chance to put
America on the side of banning nuclear explosive tests forever, we
said no.

Neither this treaty nor any other can entirely eliminate risk. But if
you weigh on one side the risks for America of approving the CTBT and,
on the other, the risks of killing it, my friends, it isn't even

Once in a great while, our nation is called upon to make a truly
fateful choice: 36 years ago it was to approve a limited ban on
nuclear tests; later it was to approve and then make permanent the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty and to begin the process of slowing,
stopping and then reversing the buildup of nuclear arsenals by the
United States and our counterparts in Moscow. Each time there were
Cassandras who looked into the future and prophesized doom, and each
time those who viewed sound arms control as a contributor to our
national security were proven right and the world moved a little
further away from the nuclear brink.

I am as convinced as I can be that most Americans do not want to live
in a world in which nuclear testing is business as usual. They do not
want to weaken the regime that discourages potentially hostile nations
from developing nuclear weapons. They want America to assume the
mantle of leadership in a cause that is central to the security of
future generations. They want America to join the CTBT and make it
work. When the Senate votes, they want the Senate to vote yes on the
CTBT, yes for a safer world.

The second issue I would like to discuss today is resources. Those of
you who have never lived in the District of Columbia may not follow
the federal budget process very closely -- and I don't blame you.
Unfortunately, I don't have the same luxury. From 1990 to 1994, our
country's international affairs budget hovered around $25 billion a
year in today's dollar. During the past five years, this figure has
declined by about 20 percent. Unfortunately, the world is not 20
percent smaller than it was in 1994 or 20 percent less dangerous or 20
percent less in need of American leadership. And what has been a bad
situation is now in danger of growing very much worse.

Yesterday, the House of Representatives voted by a margin of three
votes to slash President Clinton's Fiscal Year 2000 budget request by
$2 billion. Earlier today, the Senate followed suit. The result of
this legislation, if it were to become a law, would be to cut foreign
affairs resources below their previously inadequate levels. And this
would create a clear and present danger to American interests, which
is why I have recommended and the President has said he would veto the
bill as soon as it reaches his desk.

The proposed reductions don't even include another $2 billion in
emergency needs that we have identified since the President's budget
was prepared. The result is a potential shortfall of such magnitude
that it would be nearly impossible for me to do my job.

I hope most of you would agree that although our economy is strong and
our military power unmatched, serious threats to the security of our
citizens remain. These include international terrorists who have
targeted Americans, the possibility of conflict in key regions, the
risk of a renewed financial crisis, drug trafficking, and the spread
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles that can
deliver them.

These and other threats directly affect the lives of the American
people and that is why I would like to do the stereotype of foreign
aid what one Presidential candidate wanted to do to the tax code:
drive a stake through it, kill it, bury it, and make sure that it
never rises again.

Let's be clear. When we provide resource to safeguard nuclear
materials in the former Soviet Union or help South American farmers
find alternatives for growing cocoa or train foreign police in
counter-terrorism, we are aiding America. The same principle applies
when we take steps to ensure stability on the Korean peninsula where
37,000 Americans help keep peace along the world's last Cold War
border; or, when we assist those struggling to maintain peace in
troubled regions such as the Middle East, Northern Ireland and the

In recent weeks, we have heard some suggest that America need not
concern itself when aggression or atrocities that are committed
overseas unless they are committed directly against us. Obviously, we
neither can nor should try to right every wrong or fight every fight.
But the history of this century warns us that problems abroad, if left
unattended, will too often come home to America.

We have a strong interest in acting where we can to prevent
disagreements in strategic regions from becoming conflicts and in
containing conflicts before they become all-out wars. History also
teaches us that we cannot ensure America's security by going it alone
or by relying solely on military might.

Security results from a marriage of diplomacy to power and that
requires using the full range of American policy tools. Our armed
forces must remain the best led, the best trained, best equipped and
most respected in the world. And, as President Clinton has pledged and
our military leaders ensure, they will.

But to be effective, force and diplomacy must complement each other,
for there are many occasions in many places where we rely on diplomacy
as our first line of defense to protect our interests and we expect
our diplomats to defend those interests with skill, knowledge and

Although many Americans are under the impression it is far more, the
amount we allocate for the full range of international programs is
equal to about one penny for every dollar the Federal Government
spends. But that penny can spell the difference between hard times and
good times for our people, war and peace for our country, less and
more freedom for our world. And this is true in part because American
dollars leverage the contributions from others.

For example, in the wake of NATO's successful campaign to reverse
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, we have asked allies to pay the lion's
share of costs in supporting the new era of stability in southeast
Europe. But it would be far easier to persuade the others to do their
part if it were clear we would do ours.

Finally, as Secretary Christopher can attest and last year's Africa
bombing illustrated, the men and women who work in our embassies
abroad are on the front lines every day on every continent. They
deserve, for they have earned, the honor and support of the American
people and they deserve the protection that would be provided by full
funding for the multi-year security construction program the
Administration has proposed.

The decisions congressional appropriators must make are complex, but
our economy is strong and the investments we have recommended
affordable. The President's budget request would finance foreign
policy without detracting from our defense or domestic needs while
still yielding a surplus.

The budget controversy in Washington revolves around real issues that
relate to the role of the federal government in such matters as
education and health care. But the protection of national security is
a bedrock task of our national government. It is the centerpiece of
our constitution and why our union was formed. It cannot be delegated,
subcontracted, privitized or left to others to do; it is the solemn
responsibility of the executive and legislative branches in
Washington, each according to its role.

The best leaders of both parties in Congress understand this. They
know that American diplomacy belongs on the short list of budget
priorities. This was the case President Clinton recently made in
Missouri to the applause of the American Veterans of Foreign Wars and
it should be the starting point in negotiations on the final shape of
the Fiscal Year 2000 budget.

A decade has passed since the Berlin Wall fell, and some may feel that
in the absence of superpower rivalry the United States can now get by
on the cheap -- and they're wrong. For just as an eagle needs food to
fly, the world's greatest democracy needs resources to lead. The
debate over foreign policy funding is not new in America. It has been
joined repeatedly from the time the Continental Congress sent Ben
Franklin to Paris to the proposals for Lend-Lease and the Marshall
Plan that bracketed World War II, to the central European democracy
and Nunn-Lugar programs a few years ago.

In each case, history's verdict has gone decisively to those who argue
that America must meet its responsibilities, as opposed to those who
said that America simply can't afford to lead. Neither the question of
foreign affairs funding nor the approval of a treaty to ban nuclear
explosive tests ought to be considered a matter of partisan interest.
Because the great divide that exists today is not between the left and
the right or between Republican and Democrat, it is between those who
believe America can afford now to retreat from the world and those who
believe that if America were to retreat we would no longer be America.

Throughout this century and under administrations of both parties, our
country has assumed great responsibility in time of war, of peace, of
victory and uncertainty. And for that, each and every one of us should
be very grateful. And this afternoon, let us dedicate ourselves to
upholding that tradition and to ensuring America's leadership on
behalf of peace, in defense of freedom, and in support of justice, and
hope that that will continue for many decades to come.

Thank you very much.

MODERATOR: The Secretary has agreed to take a few questions. Larry

Q: I would like to thank you, Madame Secretary, for an eloquent and
powerful speech. I agree with almost everything you said, but the
problem underlying the two problems you mentioned is that since the
end of the Cold War we seem to have lost the tradition of a bipartisan
foreign policy and it appears there is no prospect of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty being approved, ratified, and we now
learn that it may need to be withdrawn. We know about the budget
problems and the dim prospects there.

I would like to ask you what can be done in the politics of this
country and in the dialogue of this country to reconstruct that
traditional of bipartisanship in foreign policy?

ALBRIGHT: Well, you have put your finger on the major problem. And I
know that it's probably easier for people that are in the executive
branch to talk about the importance of bipartisan foreign policy than
for those in the legislative branch, and having been on the other side
at a certain stage of my life I can understand that.

But I do think that what we have to do is to restate the fact that
even though the Cold War is over that we have huge responsibilities
and those that, in many ways, are harder to fulfill than when the
world was simply divided between the red and the red, white and blue.
And we used our foreign affairs budget, frankly, to seduce countries
to be on our side.

We are in a completely different era at this point where the issues
are much harder to understand, much more complex in terms of their
interdependence, and they take more study time, frankly. And I know
that both Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry would agree that
when they were in office, and I now, we spent an incredible amount of
time going to the Hill and asking for a bipartisan foreign policy. It
takes two to tango, you know.

And I think that the problem here is -- and I am quite shocked, I must
say, quite shocked -- by the language of some of the people that I
have worked with very closely in the Republican party when they talk
about slashing foreign aid and feeling as if they have done a favor to
the country by saying that we're not going to give money to those
foreigners. That strikes me as not appropriate for this era.

I believe that it is through your help, frankly -- I think the public
has to go to its elected officials and say that a great country can
not carry on issues that are central to our national security like the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by playing party politics. I have said
that when I became -- I used to be partisan, but I have said that when
I fit into Secretary Christopher's shoes that I had all my partisan
instincts surgically removed. I may have to go back to the doctor.

But I think that I feel very strongly that we can not operate without
a bipartisan foreign policy. It's impossible and those rules that used
to exist that partisanship on foreign policy ended at the water's edge
are gone, and it's a disaster for us in the United States in terms of
pursuing a logical and strong foreign policy on behalf of our national

Q: Secretary Albright, I wanted to ask you a question. It's a little
way from your speech but I couldn't resist since you're here asking
you about Chechnya and what's happening there right now. As you are
aware, a humanitarian catastrophe is underway; 120,000 refugees have
already left the republic, most of them into the tiny Republic of
Ingushetiya which is unable to cope. Civilian targets are being hit
throughout Chechnya.

So I was wondering what should the US be doing at this point, in your
opinion? Should we be promoting a return of the OSCE mission which was
so successful in 1996 in helping to resolve the problem there?

ALBRIGHT: Clearly, this is a very serious problem and we have -- I had
discussions with Foreign Minister Ivanov when I saw him last week in
New York. The President has been in touch at his level; the Vice
President has. We have sent our ambassador in to have discussions with
the Russian authorities to tell them the following: I think that they
clearly have a terrible and a legitimate concern with terrorism in
Moscow and we have all thought what it would be like if apartments
buildings had come down in New York City and that number of people had
died. And we are working with them on how to cooperate on
anti-terrorist activity. When we were in New York the Permanent
Members of the Security Council put out a joint statement saying that
we would all cooperate on anti-terrorism.

We have also spoken to them about the danger of Chechnya redux -- I
mean, they didn't exactly do very well for themselves there the first
time -- and that what they need to do is to try to develop a dialogue
with the legitimate leaders there and not take a kind of an approach
where they are just mowing everybody down and affecting civilians, who
are becoming refugees. And we are making a lot of suggestions about --
that they need a different negotiating tactic.

On the OSCE issue, I happen to agree with you. I have spoken with Knut
Vollebaek, the Norwegian Foreign Minister who is head of the OSCE, and
seeing whether they are in a position to revive what were very helpful
discussions. But it is a great tragedy and I think I was saying to the
Foreign Minister that it's quicksand. The word I couldn't think of in
Russian quickly enough but I think he got the idea.

Q: Madame Secretary, on this question of complex humanitarian
emergencies, there's 20 or 25 of them going on around the world. Do we
have a clear concept or policy or philosophy of when do we get
involved and, more particularly, when do we get our military involved
and their capacity to really perform that mission, which is not their
traditional role?

ALBRIGHT: I think this is a discussion of the most challenging kind
that we have actually been having for some time. I know when Secretary
Christopher was there, we talked about it then vis--vis operations,
obviously in the Balkans and also in Africa, and I was very interested
in the speech that Kofi Annan gave at the opening of the General
Assembly because he put together a lot of very interesting ideas for
discussion on this and spoke about the conflicts that we need to deal
with in terms of our respect for sovereignty and our desire for
humanitarian solutions and the complexity that that provides to the
international system.

We have also -- and when I taught, I was really good at this, of
dividing up what is a national interest and a vital national interest
and that was then. And I think that it is a lot simpler to try to
categorize things in that particular way than when you are actually
looking at situations on a day-by-day basis.

We have the following approach, which is that the United States does
have vital national interests, some of which are connected with
geo-strategic regions and allies. And I won't go through the list so
that in case I leave one out I don't start a war, but we all know what
they are.

But we are also making quite clear that disastrous humanitarian
conditions do affect our national interest because we are America and
we feel that it is not possible for people to live where they are
macheted to death or ethnic cleansing takes place. Now, we also have
said -- and the President said this in his statement at the UN -- that
we can't be everywhere. I just said it also.

So we have to figure out what is the best method for dealing with
this. And I think in some ways, if you look at the lesson of Kosovo
and East Timor, that part of an answer is there. In Kosovo, I have
believed for a long time that what was happening in the Balkans could
have been prevented had something been done earlier. But as things
have developed, we have a responsibility to do something. And there,
we did have what was essential, was the support of the largest, most
powerful military alliance in history and we did, in fact, fight a
war, the first one that NATO did, and I think have managed to make a
difference. It is not over; it continues to be complicated. But there
was a mechanism for taking a group of countries with our leadership to
solve a problem.

In Indonesia, interestingly enough, I know that there is criticism
about the fact that things didn't happen quickly enough. But the truth
is, it's pretty textbook if you think about what happened. There was
an agreement with the United Nations on a voting procedure. The
Indonesian Government had said that they were going to be in a
position to protect. They then didn't, but there was a UN mission that
went to assess the situation. As luck would have it, the President was
meeting with his counterparts from APEC in Auckland, and his
dedication and leadership when there was a critical mass of leaders
there helped to push the Indonesians into accepting an international
peacekeeping force that had been voted by the Security Council. And we
are not the lead country; there is another lead country.

So the question is whether if you have an alliance or a lead country,
then it allows us to play a role that is concomitant with our interest
and what we can do. We are supplying a lot to the East Timor
peacekeeping operation in terms of support, strategic support, lift,
et cetera, of things that we can do.

The question that always comes -- and it's the legitimate question --
what about Africa. And I think there, there are a large number of
peacekeeping -- potential peacekeeping operations. I am going to
Africa next week; in fact, I'm going to Sierra Leone. I think the
question is whether we can get a mandate that makes sense to get
Africans to participate in the solution and then develop the role that
we need to play. But I think this is a -- I know people want to call
it a doctrine but it is a policy in evolution, knowing full well that
we must have humanitarian intervention and trying to find some kind of
a set of criteria that will allow us to make judgments. But we can't
get away from the case-by-case approach to this because each of the
situations is somewhat different.

I will try to be shorter but, as a professor, it's 50 minutes.

Q: Thank you very much, Madame Secretary, for joining us. If I can go
back to a point that you raised in the content of your remarks and
that Larry Diamond picked up on, and that has to do with foreign
operations and the way we talk about it and think about it.

I suspect that if you ask most Americans how they would feel about the
need to support US foreign policy and US overseas missions, that you'd
get a resounding yes and a positive voice. In fact, I think most
Americans think we spend considerably more than we do. So part of the
problem, obviously, is to correct the record.

But part of the reason also is a consequence of the fact that there
are lots of stories in the news, including part of the world that I
pay a lot of attention to, namely Russia, that has to do with
allegations of corruption and misappropriation of funds, et cetera, et
cetera. As a practical matter, how do you engage that as a
policymaker? How do you talk about that and how do you try to keep
people's vision focused on what, in the end, is the central issue,
which is how to provide the resources to make American diplomacy

ALBRIGHT: Well, clearly, the issue of corruption is something that is
plaguing the international system and we consider it, as we deal with
the results of globalization, how you in fact deal with global
corruption in a variety of places. A couple of years ago, I signed the
Anti-Bribery Convention -- and Corruption -- because we are trying to
deal with it as an endemic problem.

As far as specific allocations, we have looked very closely at what
has been going on and the IMF money. There is no corroboration to the
fact that it has been, in fact, misused in any way. Clearly, there
have been bad things going on in terms of Russia and other countries.
But I do not think that this, in any way, undercuts the argument that
it is in US national interest to do what we can to reduce the threat
of loose nukes in Russia or to try to figure out how to employ the
scientists that could go to other countries.

I don't want to downgrade or downplay the importance of the corruption
issue. I gave a speech a couple of weeks ago at Carnegie on Russia and
I said the Russian Government must make fighting corruption a high
priority. I think they, to some extent, believe it's a political trick
here and we have pounded it into their heads, frankly, that this is
not just a -- this is not a political problem, this is a genuine
problem and they must deal with the corruption.

But I also think it cannot be turned into an excuse -- as it just has
been, by people that I have respected -- to say we can't give money
that goes into somebody's pocket. We keep very good tabs, actually, on
the money that we have, do give out. The story that the New York Times
wrote about corruption in Bosnia was just dead wrong. The money that
disappeared was their own money; it wasn't our money. And a story gets
written up wrong and it has legs that just carry it for miles.

So we have to be able to stand up and say, your story is wrong. Now,
the part that is hard is nothing is ever totally wrong; there is
always some grain and somebody who wants to demagogue an issue can do

But I think we can account for bilateral assistance that is given. And
what goes through the multilateral banks, we are being told it is all
being investigated and has not been diverted into places that it
shouldn't be. But we can't argue with the fact that there is capital
flight and that through the global banking system and through
globalization of everything, it has developed into a big problem. I'm
not denying that.

Q: Madame Secretary, we seem to have a difference between our approach
when we are a lead country versus when we are involved with NATO or
the UN. A case in point might be Iraq where, while it's not in the
paper every day, I believe we are still flying air missions and
shooting missiles at radar sites that lock onto our aircraft. We don't
seem to have an exit policy.

Whereas, in Kosovo or Bosnia where we are working with the UN or we're
working with NATO, we seem to be able to extract ourselves a little
bit more quickly or at least lay off some of the problems of follow-up
to some of the other countries as well.

Has this problem in Iraq caused our policy to change and to have less
of what we would call lead country involvement because it is harder to
get out? Or is that just a happenstance in Iraq that's different than

ALBRIGHT: Well, first of all, I would just differ with you on the
assumption on Iraq. What is being done in Iraq is on the basis of
Security Council resolutions that have been in place for the last 10
years, eight years, and the no-fly zones are a part of it -- we are
not flying alone -- and enforcing the no-fly zones is very important.

Now, what you are right about is that there is a fraying of the
consensus that has existed in the Security Council because there are
those countries who believe that the sanctions that have been put on
Saddam Hussein are -- the kind version of this is that they are
hurting the people. The less kind version is that they are hurting

But I think that the problem is that it is very hard to maintain
multilateral sanctions for a long period of time. So what we are doing
now is working within the Security Council to have a new resolution
that would, in effect, recreate the consensus in the Security Council
on maintaining sanctions until the resolutions are fulfilled, an
increased oil-for-food program and a way to get a monitoring group
back on the ground to make sure that disarmament takes place.

I think your question is to, is it harder to get out when you're
alone. I haven't thought about it that way. But I'm not sure; it may
be easier, actually, because you don't have to deal with -- I mean,
this is a theoretical answer.

That is not the kind of pivot that we are looking at that question in.
I think that we believe that we have a responsibility along with
others to make sure that Saddam Hussein is not able to reconstitute
his weapons of mass destruction, become a threat to the region and
then, ultimately, to our national interest. And we do have the support
of many countries to do that. We do not -- and we are trying to
recreate support for maintaining the sanctions regime that is
definitely fraying because people -- countries are tired of keeping a
sanctions regime in for a long period of time. But we believe that we
have to hold the line so that he cannot reconstitute his weapons of
mass destruction.

MODERATOR: Madame Secretary, Dr. Albright, thank you very much for

ALBRIGHT: Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you. I enjoyed it very
much. Thank you. It was a lot of fun. Appreciate it.

(end transcript)