APPENDIX (cont.)


Question. The Treaty talks about "permanent" changes in organizational structure, and about "temporary" deployments to flank regions. What would constitute a "permanent" change? Also, when does a "temporary" deployment cease to be temporary? The Treaty also requires that parties notify the introduction of new types of TLE into the ATTU. When the United States sent stealth fighters to the Paris air show, for example, what notifications were we required to provide? If a decision were made to deploy these fighters for months at a time to a base in Europe, when would we be required to report on their introduction? Would they be inspectable if located at such a base? When would the Soviets be required to report on new types of equipment deployed with their internal security forces?

Answer. The Treaty does not define or explain the meaning of the term "permanent" as it relates to the reporting rule on permanent changes in organizational structure set forth in Section VIII(1)(A) of the Protocol on Information Exchange. However, the United States understands a change to be "permanent" whenever a change takes place in the basic organizational structure of a unit or formation identified in Section I of the Information Protocol (e.g., a permanent change would occur when the table of organization and equipment (TOE) of an armored regiment is changed from 40 tanks to 45 tanks).

The Treaty does not define or explain the meaning of the term "temporary" as it relates to the "flank flow rule" set forth in Article V(1)(B) of the Treaty. Nor did the negotiators agree on, or extensively discuss, the word temporary in terms of a specified duration or length of time. However, during the negotiation of Article V(1)(B), it was made clear that the purpose or the provision was to provide for limited reinforcements (i.e., temporary deployments) in "exceptional circumstances" and for "a limited duration." It was stressed during the negotiation that such deployments were not to be permanent and would take place, for example, during a crisis or prior to hostilities. In view of these qualitative descriptions, the term "temporary" may be construed to indicate a duration of days or weeks or, at most, several months, but not years.

When the F-117 participated in the Paris air show this year, the Unit d States provided, in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section IV of the Protocol on Existing Types, notification that the F-117 was a new type of conventional armament and equipment under the Treaty and that it had entered within the area of application (that is, the F-117 had entered the area of application and remained there for more than 7 days). Because the F-117 has already been notified as a new type in accordance with Section IV of the Protocol on Existing Types, further introduction of such aircraft into the area of application would have to be reported only on an annual basis following entry into force of the Treaty pursuant to subparagraph I(A) of Section X of the Protocol on Information Exchange. Treaty-limited armaments and equipment such as the F-117 would be subject to inspections within the area of application in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection.

Because armaments and equipment held in internal security organizations are not deemed to be "in service, with a State Party's conventional armed forces (see Article II(1)(R)), no State Party, including the Soviet Union, is required by Section IV of the Protocol on Existing Types to notify the introduction of new types of armaments and equipment into its internal security organizations. However, Section IV of the Information Exchange Protocol does require a State Party to exchange annually after entry into force of the Treaty information on the number and types of battle tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, armored infantry righting vehicles subject to Article XII, and specialized attack helicopters held in its internal security organizations. This annual information must, therefore, reflect any new types added to a State Party's internal security organizations during the previous year. Also, paragraph 2 of Article XII requires that a State Party provide notification if it reassigns battle tanks artillery, armored infantry righting vehicles, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, or armored vehicle launched bridges in service with its conventional armed forces to its internal security forces. Such notification must include information on the numbers, by type, of such equipment so reassigned.


Question. It is our understanding that NATO has established a CFE verification coordination office. What exactly are the name and responsibilities of this office, and how will it function? Does NATO or any of its elements have other responsibilities germane to CFE implementation? If so, what are they? What sub-organizations are charged with what responsibilities? How will these Alliance organizations inter- act with the United States OSIA, DOD, State Department, etc.?

Answer. At the suggestion of Secretary Baker, NATO allies agreed to establish a Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) as a forum for intra-alliance coordination on issues related to arms control verification. A central task of the VCC is to ensure appropriate alliance coordination for CFE verification. This is particularly important since the CFE Treaty ascribes certain functions to groups of parties, not to individual nations. The VCCs terms of reference define its mandate in terms of facilitating alliance coordination, and Allies have been careful to ensure that no national prerogatives devolve upon the VCC. For example, only nations can make judgments about verification. The VCC also serves as a forum for alliance work on implementation of the evaluation and inspection provisions of the 1990 Vienna Document and the CSBM8 regime.

In organizational terms, the VCC is a NATO committee subordinate to the North Atlantic Council. Most NATO Allies have two representatives at the VCC's meetings (usually a foreign ministry and a defense/military official), which generally occur twice a month. We expect the pace of meetings to pick up as implementation draws nearer. The VCC is supported by a small Verification Support Staff (VSS), which is part of NATO's international staff, and which assists national representatives and the VCC's chairman in carrying out their functions in the areas of on-site inspection coordination (to ensure most effective utilization of NATO's active quota and equitable sharing of the burden of reduction monitoring, which has no quota), data management, and inspection support.

Other NATO organizations play a role in both the data management and inspection support areas. A data management experts, group subordinate to the VCC meets regularly in Brussels, with U.S. participation. Under the auspices of the NATO military committee, Allied military authorities have been instrumental in fulfilling the inspection support aspects of the VCC's mandate, particularly through the establishment of training courses for CFE inspectors.

The State and Defense Departments, supported by other agencies such as ACDA and ACIS, play a leading role in intra-alliance discussions in the VCC. That is the official forum for alliance decision-making on verification coordination issues. OSIA and relevant branches in the Joint Staff have also developed inspector training courses and continue to provide crucial expertise through temporary assignment of U.S. personnel to the VSS.


Question. The Protocol on Inspection, Section 1, paragraph (J)(4), appears to re- quire an accounting of TLE held by units smaller than a battalion, but which are not subordinate to a regiment or brigade. The paragraph seems to say that such TLE will be accounted for as a single OOV, which will be identified with the next higher headquarters. In this regard, the Soviet data appears to have rolled up such units under Soviet. division headquarters. Is this permitted by the passage?; i.e., doesn't the passage say that this form of unit accountability will not apply if a regiment or brigade is also subordinate to that headquarters (as is the case for divisions)? Please provide an explanation of the obligation, and of any Soviet interpretation that may be different from our own.

Answer. TLE is reported according to the provisions of the Protocol on Information Exchange. TLE held in units below the level of independent or separately located battalion are reported as part of the holdings or their next higher organization, which could be a division. This is a separate issue than the counting of OOVs which is addressed in this question. For the purpose of counting OOVs, a division would be an OOV if it had no subordinate brigade/regiment units, but only company-sized units; if there was a regiment or brigade unit in the division, the division would not be an OOV, but the independent companies TLE would still be reported under the division since they are not subordinate to any lower formation or unit.


Question. What issues have already been brought to the Joint Consultative Group for its consideration? Do any of these suggest that other parties may have interpretations of the treaty that are different from our own? If so, what are the issues, and what are the positions/interpretations of the individual parties involved? Similarly, what possible differences of interpretation, if any, have arisen in bilateral or other non-JCG-related circumstances? Again, what are the issues and positions/interpretations of the involved parties?

Answer. Since it began meeting in the fall of 1990, the Joint Consultative Group has focused most of its attention on issues relating to the initial exchange of information (and subsequent revisions effective as of Treaty signature), JCG procedures and working methods, a notification list and associated formats, inspection costs, inspection reports, reporting of accidental destruction of treaty limited equipment and corrections to the different language versions of the Treaty text. In addition, there have been a number of briefings on trial inspections conducted by various Treaty signatories. There has also been some work on programs to facilitate an automated data exchange. Pursuant to the Treaty, active states were notified at the JCG in March, and other notifications have also been made as appropriate. Discussion of these and other issues is ongoing and has taken place both in formal and informal group sessions of varying participation, as well as on a bilateral basis between interested States Parties.

In the process of reviewing the information exchange, almost all States Parties have found it necessary to revise their data, often several times. Most of these corrections have reflected technical errors, such as incorrect identification numbers, or additions of a small number of units or amount of equipment omitted by mistake in the November exchange. Questions concerning the information provided by the States Parties have covered a broad range of issues. Many of the explanations offered have revealed the complexities of applying some Treaty provisions to the armed forces of 22 states, each with its own terminology and structure. Thus the Soviet delegation has repeatedly questioned UK reporting of certain "regiments" as equivalent to battalions. The UK rep, in turn, has explained on several occasions that the word "regiment" in the title of a number of British units is an historical, honorific title used for units which are at the battalion level. The Soviets have similarly questioned U.S. reporting of some of its battalions, which the Soviets believe to be independent battalions. The United States has explained its approach to these battalions in its force structure bilaterally and in the formal JCG.

Some of the remaining questions raised about the information exchange, and especially about Soviet data ,relate to divisions listed without TLE, divisions listed without expected subordinate units, the total number of TLE reported-including specific questions about several hundred aircraft, MI-3 helicopters and MT-LBS, re- porting of military training establishments, reporting of independent repair and maintenance facilities, the timing and detail of reporting of accidental destruction of aircraft, and the amount of TLE reported as awaiting export. From discussion thus far about the best way to apply Treaty provisions to yield the most accurate and comprehensive accounting of TLE, there appears to be a general consensus about the basic provisions of the Treaty. The JCG is continuing to address all of these issues as it seeks consensus on how best to implement the Treaty. The Soviets, in particular, have said that they anticipate being able to provide explanations of their data to clarify their position on any remaining questions. The United States will continue to participate actively in the effort to answer questions and resolve any disputes.


Question. To the best of your knowledge, do all 22 states party to the CFE Treaty have the same interpretation to the Protocol on Inspection, Section II, paragraphs 17 and 18, as is presented on page 139 of the Article-by-Article Analysis of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe?

Answer. We do not know whether all 22 States Parties share the interpretation of the term "in-country period" as set forth in the Article-by-Article Analysis of paragraphs 17 and 18 of Section 11 of the Protocol on Inspection. However, the United States has participated in a number of mock CFE inspections in Europe with various States Parties. During those mock inspections, the subject of in-country period was raised and no State Party, during the inspections or subsequently, expressed disagreement with the U.S. interpretation of that term.



Question. The treaty is vague on the definition of some of the boundaries of the ATTU. Is there an official map of the ATTU? Have the Soviets passed over a map defining their portion of the ATTU? Where were the locations where there is uncertainty in the definition of the ATTU?

Answer. There is no official map of the ATTU. The dispute between Greece and Turkey over whether the Turkish Port of Mersin (from whence the 1974 Cyprus invasion was launched) was inside or outside the area of application almost derailed closure on the CFE mandate in early 1989. The compromise which made it possible to initial the mandate and start the CFE negotiation left the description of the Turkish line of demarcation imprecise on this one point (after the town of Goezne, the text reads "and thence to the sea"). When this issue resurfaced in the negotiation proper, it was agreed to take over the mandate text verbatim. It was further agreed not to seek maps as integral parts of the treaty. It is not expected that this imprecision will cause problems in implementing the treaty; should the issue come up, it can be addressed within NATO.

(Russian map goes here)

Just before the conclusion of the CFE negotiation, the Soviets provided to the treaty depositary (the Netherlands), for circulation to all signatories, a map showing the delineation of their military districts, which also shows the easternmost boundary of the ATTU zone. This map, while not a part of the treaty is a treaty-associated document.

The delineations on the Soviet map provide a sound basis for dealing with future disputes over boundaries in the Soviet Union.


Question. The Soviets have a somewhat different legal view of TLE subordinated to the land-based naval forces. The CFE Treaty, for example, limits the Soviets to 13,150 tanks in the ATTU, and the June agreement limits them to 933 tanks in the naval infantry and coastal defense units.

Describe the legal status of the following situations in terms of U.S. and Soviet interpretations:


Tanks in ATTU

Tanks in nerving/coasted













Describe the philosophical and juridical differences between the two nations for these conclusions.

Will it be necessary for the Senate to vote on the executive agreement of June 14, 1991 with the Soviet? Why or why not?

Answer. Situation 1.-Both the United States and the Soviet Union would agree that the Soviet Union is in compliance with both the treaty and the June 14 legally binding Statement.

Situation 2.-Both the United States and the Soviet Union would agree that the Soviet Union is in compliance with the treaty but in violation of the June 14 legally binding Statement.

Situation 3.-The United States (and, it seems likely, 20 other treaty Signatories of; well) would argue that the Soviet Union is in violation of both the treaty and the June 14 legally. binding Statement. On the other hand, the Soviet Union would argue that it is in compliance with the treaty but in violation of the June 14 legally binding Statement.

Situation 4.-The United States (and, it seems likely, 20 other treaty signatories as well) would argue that the Soviet Union is in violation of both the treaty and the June 14 legally binding Statement. On the other hand, the Soviet Union would argue that it is compliance with the treaty but in violation of the June 14 legally binding Statement.

The juridical differences between the United States and the Soviet Union may be summed up as follows. The United States (and every other treaty signatory with the obvious exception of the Soviet Union) maintains that both article III of the Treaty and the June 14 legally binding Statement capture conventional armaments and equipment of a type limited by the treaty held within the area of application by Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense forces. On the other hand, the Soviet Union asserts that Naval Infantry and Coastal Defense forces are not covered by the treaty, but are captured by the June 14 legally binding Statement. Furthermore, the Soviets would note that the Statement is "outside the framework of the treaty" and thus not legally part of it.

It will not be necessary for the Senate to vote on the June 14 legally binding Statement. The Statement does not require ratification because it, by its own terms, is "outside the framework of the treaty" and because it does not limit United States armed forces or armaments, only Soviet forces and armaments. However, as a document relevant to the treaty, it was transmitted for the information of the Senate in accordance with past practice.


Question. Article III exempts several classes of TLE from the TLE totals of the CFP, Treaty.

Did NATO write essentially all the provisions for this article, including the provisions on paramilitary forces?

Did the Soviet statement of June 14, 1991 clarify and strengthen article III in order to rule out exemptions for naval infantry and coastal defense units?

Paramilitary. Are the most threatening types of TLE excluded from the paramilitary exemption? Describe the situation on article XII, in which a limit of 1,000 was placed on the number of armored infantry fighting vehicles. Does article XII narrow the paramilitary exemption in article III?

Answer. While the provisions in article III-just as all treat provisions-were subject to negotiation with other participants, little of the original language developed by members of NATO was changed. The paramilitary exemption (internal security) was the most controversial, with the Soviets insisting that AIFVs be exempt.

This exemption was later limited to 1,000 AIFVs in internal security organizations; holdings in excess of 1,000 count against treaty ceilings. Article XII also puts an absolute limit of 600 on a state's paramilitary AIFV holdings in the land area, and commits each state party to refrain from the acquisition of combat capabilities by internal security organizations in excess of those necessary for meeting internal security requirements.

The most threatening types of TLE are exempt from treaty ceilings under the internal security exemption. All tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and specialized attack helicopters count against ceilings, as do AIFVs in excess of 1,000, even if assigned to internal security organizations. That leaves only the least-threatening armored combat vehicles exempt from treaty limits.

In the view of 21 treaty signatories, article III is unambiguous and needs no clarification. The Soviet Union, however, continues to maintain that article III does not cover equipment assigned to land-based naval units and that this equipment is limited only in their June 14 legally-binding statement. The Soviets' confirmation in that statement that all equipment in treaty categories located in the zone counts- irrespective of organizational assignment-should make such disputes considerably less likely in the future.


Question. The Soviets will destroy about 20,000 TLE because of the CFE Treaty. In addition, in June 1991, the Soviets stated that they would destroy about 3,600 TLE because or the issue of the naval infantry, and an additional 14,500 that had already been moved from the ATTU to cast of the Urals.

How much additional TLE beyond the 38,000 listed above has the Soviet Union stated that it will or did destroy? How does the sum of this value and 14,500 com- pare to the amount of TLE that the U.S. is quite sure was in the ATTU on November 19, 1990 and not declared as of February 1991?

Are the Soviets destroying considerably more TLE, beyond their CFE requirements, than the number of TLE that they are suspected (with good confidence) of having removed a little after November 19, 1990?

Describe the specific situation on some of the data discrepancy issues.

What do you perceive as the root of the Soviets' problems on the data declarations of November 19? Please give some illustrative examples.

Answer. (The answer to this question, which is classified, has not yet been completed. It will be provided as soon as possible.)


Question. The CFE Treaty allows modernization of TLE through new production. The treaty does not monitor the production of TLE. The U.S. is outside the ATTU, and our Allies are inside the ATTU.

Why did our Allies not favor resident inspectors at their production plants?

Are the provisions for verification of the TLE sufficient to monitor the numbers of TLE in the ATTU, without having production monitoring? How will the CFE address the issue of production of TLE?

How many TLE production sites does the Soviet Union have? Are there indications that the Soviet production facilities are slowing down, or converting to other uses? What kinds of suggestions will General Powell have for the Soviets on conversion of these giants to peaceful uses on his trip of July 22, 1991?

Answer. (The answer to this question portions of which are classified, has not yet been completed; it will be provided as soon as possible.)


Question. The Stockholm Accords of 1986 were historic in that they provided the legal framework to carry out on-site inspections in the Soviet Union. The first CSBM inspection took place on August 28-30, with the U.S. performing the inspections.

In what ways do the CSBM agreements strengthen the CFE Treaty?

In what ways could the CSBM agreements be enhanced to help the Eastern European nations with their security concerns?

Answer. The Vienna Document 1990 and the CFE Treaty are complimentary in their contribution to security in Europe. While the CFE Treaty places limits on the amount and location of military equipment in Europe, the CSBM measures contained in the politically binding Vienna Document 1990 enhance the openness and transparency of the activities of the units and formations which would use this equipment in a time of conflict.

Although the CFE verification regime is in itself adequate to insure compliance with the Treaty, CSBMs will complement the Treaty by strengthening communications and transparency regarding military forces, weapons Systems and exercises; through risk reduction mechanisms in place for consultations and cooperation in the areas of unusual military activities and hazardous incidents; and through utilizing inspections of territory and evaluations of units and formations among participating states.

The confidence- and security-building measures agreed to in the Vienna Document 1990 by the leaders of the CSCE countries at their summit in Paris in November 1990 were a major development in assisting the Eastern European nations with their security concerns. An important military-security development at the Summit was the creation of the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) in Vienna. The CPC houses a number of mechanisms that link the Eastern European nations with the rest of Europe in both a symbolic and practical way.

The document established a CSCE-wide communications system, which will be used to exchange military data on stationed forces and military exercises in order to reduce the possibility of conflict due to misunderstanding or miscalculation. As a result of the CSCE Berlin ministerial, the communications system will now be, used in CSCE emergency situations. Also, the CPC houses a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes and a means for any country to question another about unusual military activities that create a security concern.

CSBM negotiators are currently considering measures remaining on the table from before the Paris Summit as well as others that have been tabled since. However, the workplan for the CSBM negotiators between now and the March 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Conference calls for emphasis to be placed on implementing those CSBMs agreed at the Paris Summit. Also, between now and the Helsinki Follow-up Conference, there are, for example, a number of implementation meetings to take place such as the Military Doctrine Seminar and the Annual Implementation Meeting. The CSBM takes aim to begin preparations on a final document this winter.


Question. The 22 nations will work out the details of the CFE Treaty and consider compliance issues in the JCG.

Will the JCG be overburdened with the complexity of the CFE Treaty and its 22 States Parties?

What would the administration recommend to the JCG in order to prevent being overburdened with its management of the CFE Treaty? Will this be easy to do within the framework of the JCG's provisions in article XVI of the treaty?

Answer. We do not believe that the Joint Consultative Group will be overburdened with the complexity of the CFE Treaty and its 22 States Parties.

Paragraph 5 of the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group states that "Sessions of the point Consultative Group shall last no longer than four weeks, unless it decides otherwise." One purpose of this paragraph is to provide for those situations where the issues to be resolved in the JCG would require a longer session than four weeks. It is to prevent the possible situation where the JCG would be overburdened with work.

Furthermore, paragraph 4 of the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group stategy that "Additional sessions shall be convened at the request of one or more States Parties by the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group, who shall promptly inform all other States Parties of the request." This paragraph provides for those instances where issues to be resolved by the JCG must be addressed when the JCG is not in session. Additional JCG sessions can be convened to address those issues. There are fewer possibilities for the JCG to be overburdened when the JCG has the flexibility to address problems as they occur.

Attention must also be paid to the expertise of many of the State Party representatives who make up the JCG. Many of these individuals took part in the CFE negotiations and possess an in-depth understanding of the treaty. Therefore, many of the issues to be resolved can be addressed by experts who can solve the problems in an efficient manner.

It should be noted that the JCG is made up of representatives from the 22 States Parties that signed the CFE Treaty in November 19, 1990. All States Parties presented in the JCG have an equal voice in the group. It is not an independent tribunal nor a body that manages the treaty. Rather, the JCG meets to discuss issues of compliance and monitor the implementation of the treaty. It should also be noted that some of the types of issues which may be addressed in the JCG (e.g., questions for compliance) may also be handled by other means such as bilateral discussions.


Question. The CFE flanks contain the nations of Norway, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria and four Soviet military districts.

How does the treatment of the flanks differ from the other three zones?

What is the definition of "temporary" in article V.1.B?

Can the Soviets place all of the TLE in the flanks to either the north or south? Would this be wise in military terms?

Answer. The system of zones established by Article IV can best be envisioned as four different sized zones nested within one another so that the smallest is subsumed and overlapped by the next largest zone. Article IV provides four group limitations in each category of TLE on the basis of zones is to prevent destabilizing force concentrations within the area of application.

The territory in the area of application not contained within the zone described in paragraph 2 of Article IV was informally referred to during the negotiations as the "flank" area. The special numerical limitations for the flank area are set forth in Article V of the Treaty. The purpose of Article V is to help facilitate regional stability by placing limits on the numbers of TLE that can be located in the flanks of the area of application. Without Article V, a group of States Parties could theoretically have been permitted to concentrate all of its TLE in the flank area. Article V limits the TLE holdings of each group of States Parties to the difference between the overall limitations on TLE within the area of application and the limitations of the largest subzone within the area of application.

There is no definition in the Treaty of the term "temporary." The provision permits limited exercises in the flanks, which traditionally have involved deployments measured in days or weeks.

Treaty provisions limit the amount of equipment which can be placed on the flanks. Within those bounds, the Soviets could place all Permitted equipment in either the northern or southern flank area. Article IV. 1, however, places a ceiling on the amount and kind of equipment the Soviets can store in either of the flank areas. In any event, it would not be wise in military terms to concentrate all permitted TLE within a flank area.


Question. What is the definition of "temporarily removed" in article X.4?

Answer. Paragraph 4 of article X provides that treaty-limited armaments and equipment (TLE) shall be counted as not being in active units, even when such TLE are temporarily removed from designated permanent storage sites (DPSS) in accordance with paragraph 7-10 of article X. Paragraphs 7-10 of article X allow for removal of TLE from DPSS in two special cases.

The more important of the two cases concerns paragraphs 9-10, in which each group of States Parties is permitted, subject to advance notification, to temporarily remove from DPSS up to 650 battle tanks, 1,000 armored combat vehicles, and 300 artillery pieces at any one time. In such a case, paragraph 10 of article X makes clear that all TLE so removed must be returned to DPSS within 42 days of their removal. Thus, in this case, the term "temporarily removed" is specifically defined in paragraph 10 to mean 42 days or less. However, it should be noted that paragraph 10 also provides for an exception to the general 42-day rule. It notes that TLE removed for "industrial rebuild" are not subject to the 42-day rule, but instead must be returned immediately upon completion of their rebuild. This limited exception was created because it was acknowledged that certain types of major repair of equipment might take longer than 42 days.

The other special case mentioned in paragraph 4 of article X involving temporary removal from DPSS concerns paragraph 7 of that article. Paragraph 7 provides that each State Party has the right to remove up to 10 percent or 10 items of TLE, whichever is less, from DPSS without advance notification. However, paragraph 7 makes clear that such removals shall be only for the purpose of maintenance, repair or modification of the TLE so removed. Thus, paragraph 7 sets forth a qualitative standard by which the term "temporarily removed" is understood to mean the time it takes to maintain, repair or modify an individual item of TLE.


Question. Article XI constrains the number of active AVLBs to 740 for each group of States Parties.

Why is the number of AVLBs in storage in the ATTU not constrained in the CFET?

Answer. Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges are not one of the five categories of treaty-limited armaments and equipment covered by the provisions of articles III through IX. Rather, limitations on AVLBs were included in the treaty as a separate stabilizing measure as a way of impeding further the ability of a State Party to launch a surprise attack or to initiate large-scale offensive action. As such, it was not considered necessary to limit AVLBs in storage.


Question. If a new type of artillery was developed that could destroy tanks with a laser, would it be covered by the CFE Treaty?

Describe the legal framework for considerations such as this.

Answer. Modernization programs and future new systems are addressed through the treaty equipment definitions and corresponding "type rules."

New models or versions of an existing type of treaty-limited equipment would be limited under the "type rule" in the Protocol on Existing Types. This Protocol states that, for example, "All models or versions of an existing type of battle tank listed above shall be deemed to be battle tanks of that type."

The signatories agreed that modernization would have to be discussed as it occurred and that the existing treaty definitions provide an adequate vehicle for this purpose. The equipment definitions are designed to capture within treaty limits any future type of such equipment.

In each definition, the general description takes precedence over specific parameters. If a State Party deployed a new artillery system designed to accomplish the mission foreseen for "artillery"-as described in the first part of the artillery definition-but which did not meet the specific criteria for current artillery systems, such a system might still be deemed artillery. This would be a matter for the JCG to address. It should be noted, however, that the artillery definition specifies that any future large caliber direct fire system which has a secondary effective indirect fire capability shall be counted against the artillery ceilings. This sentence was designed to capture direct fire gun systems, such as antitank and antiaircraft guns, that also have an indirect fire capability comparable to artillery pieces. While no such systems exist today, this provision would preclude circumvention of the treaty's provisions by the development of new types of direct fire guns in the future.

The key, here, is an indirect fire capability: without it, a system cannot function effectively as artillery. A laser is typically conceived of as a direct fire system, and even if a laser artillery system existed today, it probably would not count as artillery under the treaty, because it would not be capable of performing the artillery role (i.e., engaging targets by delivering primarily indirect fire) without very special adaptive optics.

If a State Party deployed a new type of battle tank that used a laser for its main armament, however, the JCG might well deem it capable of performing the role foreseen in the tank definition. As a result, it would be counted against the treaty's tank ceilings.


Question. Presidents Eisenhower and Bush have encouraged monitoring of treaties with aircraft.

What is the status of the aerial inspection regime in CFE-1A and in the Open Skies Treaty negotiations? What are the differences in approach and technology for these two regimes? What are obstacles to completing these two agreements?

Answer. The CFE Treaty specifies that, during their residual phase of the treaty, parties will have the rig it to conduct-and the obligation to receive-aerial inspections within the area of application, with implementing provisions to be developed during the CFE follow-on negotiations.

Following resolution of the dispute with the Soviets over the CFE counting rules, CFE-1A has just recently begun work in earnest. Aerial inspection modalities are on the agenda, but for now, negotiators are concentrating on other issues. In any event, NATO has decided to give precedence for the time being to achieving an Open Skies agreement.

Open Skies negotiations adjourned in May 1990. No agreement was possible at that time due to the sharp division between the Soviet Union and almost all other participants on the central issues of Open Skies. Since then the U.S. and NATO have worked to bring about a resumption of the negotiations on a positive basis.

At the November 1990 Paris summit all participants, including the Soviet Union, agreed on the significance of achieving an Open Skies agreement. NATO allies declared in their June 1991 NAC communiqué that "the Allies attach high importance to the earliest possible establishment of an Open Skies regime." In Berlin, that month, Secretary Baker publicly underscored the importance of Open Skies to the new Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

We and our NATO allies made a very forthcoming proposal to the Soviets this spring, inviting them to a multilateral session to discuss our respective positions on Open Skies. We have not yet received a Soviet response.

Although neither agreement has been finalized-including which technology will be involved-it is clear that the mandate and purpose of the two regimes are different. CFE aerial inspection would apply only to the ATTU area, whereas Open Skies would also include all Soviet territory east of the Urals as well as U.S. and Canadian territory. CFE aerial inspections would be designed to monitor compliance with CFE Treaty obligations. Open Skies has a broader intent, emphasizing increased openness and confidence-building concerning the military capabilities of participating parties.

Still at issue in the Open Skies negotiations are:

Quotas: participants suggest as many as 110 flights annually over the Soviet Union; Soviets willing to accept 25;

Sensors: most participants want a broad range of sensors, allowing all-weather, day-night observation; Soviets, citing technology constraints, prefer only optical sensors;

Coverage: most participants want full coverage of all participating parties with restrictions permitted only for reasons of flight safety; Soviets would exclude certain regions of the Soviet Union on national security grounds and have tried to link this to coverage of foreign bases in non-participating states; and

Aircraft: most participants seek the right to use observing state aircraft; Soviets insist that the host country have the right to decide on the aircraft used, and that foreign national aircraft would not be allowed to overfly Soviet territory.

NATO indicated to the Soviets in the spring that it would be prepared to deal with Soviet concerns on aircraft, if the Soviets would move on the other key issues of quotas, sensors and full territorial openness. There has been no Soviet response to date, either on the substance of the NATO proposal or on the invitation to convene another multilateral session.

Question. In the spring of 1991, the Hungarian and Romanian Governments signed a bilateral Open Skies agreement. What are the basic elements of this agreement?

Answer. The Hungarian-Romanian Open Skies agreement, signed May 11, 1991, consists of the main agreement and eight annexes. It draws heavily from the NATO- proposed text developed in the course of the Ottawa and Budapest rounds of the multilateral Open Skies negotiations.

The regime calls for quotas of four flights per year for each side. Both look for- ward to expanding flights under a multilateral agreement.

Due to national technology shortcomings and the desire to move quickly, only optical and video camera sensors are used. Both parties acknowledge that all-weather, day-night capable sensors can and should be added to the regime when they become available to the parties.

The observing party has the right to choose either its own aircraft or that of the observed state. Aircraft and sensor inspection by the observed party is limited to 8 hours.

Covered airspace is limited only for safety reasons, which must be publicly announced. Alternative altitudes, routing, or timing may be suggested by the observed party.

Raw data is shared by means of dual sensors, with joint processing at designated sites in the observed country.

The treaty creates a Consultative Commission to update annexes (e.g. available sensors) and resolve disputes over implementation. The Commission would also be the first instance for presentation of any significant data-disturbing or unusual military activity-found during an overnight.


Question. Challenge inspections might conceivably take place at privately owned locations. Because the U.S. is not in the ATTU, the Fourth Amendment on searches and seizures is not applicable to the CFE Treaty.

Have any of the other States Parties introduced legislation to deal with fourth amendment issues in their countries? If so, please describe the elements of their legislation.

Answer. Affected Allies are taking appropriate actions to address the possibility or, for example, a challenge inspection at a privately owned TLE production site.



Question. OSIA has generally gotten high marks for carrying out the historic inspections which ensured compliance to the INF Treaty.

How many Soviet and U.S. missiles were destroyed under the INF Treaty? How many Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons were on these missiles? How many on-site inspections did the U.S. and the Soviets carry out?

Answer. 1846 Soviet missiles (654 SS-20s) eliminated; +846 U.S. missiles eliminated: 2692=Total eliminated.

Each SS-20 had 3 nuclear warheads. The other missiles carried 1 nuclear war- head each. It should be understood that nuclear weapons are not destroyed as part of the INF Treaty.

As of 31 July 1991, a total of 653 inspections have been accomplished. It is important to note that while baseline and elimination inspections have ended, and close- out inspections are expected to be completed by this fall, quota and continuous portal monitoring inspections are currently scheduled to continue throughout the decade. Soviets: 94 Elimination Inspections; 61 Quota Inspections; 31 Closeout Inspections; +31 Baseline lnspections=Total 217

U.S.: 130 Elimination Inspections; 62 Quota Inspections; 127 Closeout Inspections; + 117 Baseline Inspections=Total 436 as of 31 July 1991.

Question. On what fraction of the 051s were there significant problems?

Answer. Less than one percent. There have been very few compliance issues.

Question. What were the "lessons learned" from the INF Treaty?

Answer. Several of the more important "lessons learned" from the INF Treaty include:

  1. Flexible funding and support planners are needed in the first stages;
  2. Acquisition of permanent facilities is the longest lead item;
  3. A mix of OSIA cadre and specialist augmentees is the best approach;
  4. Identifying and recruiting appropriate specialists is time consuming, but crucial to the mission. A trained, experienced team leader is the key;
  5. The mock inspection is the most meaningful training event;
  6. Generally, Soviets have followed the U.S. lead, insisting on strict reciprocity for inspection procedures, rights and obligations;
  7. Inspection technology must be relevant to the task and appropriate to the locale; and
  8. TLE descriptions, photos and site diagrams must be detailed and accurate.

OSIA's existing infrastructure, which includes worldwide facilities, communications, data base management, and other operational and logistical arrangements, provides a foundation upon which to facilitate the implementation of the CFE Treaty. OSIA's European office, the Forward Gateway at Rhein-Main Air Base near Frankfurt, Germany, and OSIA's participation in the Arms Control Implementation Unit (ACIU) in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow will be key elements for meeting CFE Treaty requirements.

Despite the considerable experience gained from INF implementation, these offices will confront significant new challenges in handling the activities associated with the vast amounts of CFE Treaty-limited equipment and the complex coordination required to operate effectively in a Treaty regime which involves twenty-two sovereign nations.

Question. What did CargoScan cost to buy and to operate? Could this monitoring task have been handled with cheaper means? What lower-technology means could have been used to distinguish an SS-20 from an SS-25?

Answer. CargoScan initial cost: The On-Site Inspection Agency did not have the responsibility for the initial costs of the CargoScan. The Air Force Electronic Systems Division spent approximately $15.4 million in Procurement and Military Construction funds for the CargoScan initial costs. CargoScan operations and maintenance expenses cost approximately $1.1 million annually.

The policy community decides on what equipment is to be used and OSTA implements this decision.


Question. Various methods have been devised to tag TLE, but they were not adopted.

Were any countries seriously interested in tagging all TLE? Why was tagging not acceptable to these countries?

Answer. OSIA performs operational activities relating to treaty implementation. Tagging is an issue to be determined by the policy community.

Question. How will serial numbers be used within the CFE verification regime?

Answer. It is our understanding that serial numbers will only be used in two instances in CFE: (1) to register TLE when the reduction process commences at reduction sites; and (2) to keep track of recategorized helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft. In the First case, the serial number may be recorded to permit reductions inspection teams the option of departing the reduction site after identifying the TLE to be destroyed and to return to confirm reduction at the end of the reduction cycle. Inspectors may place additional markings-such as tags-on such equipment if they wish.

Question. Why is tagging not consistent with the general philosophy of CFE monitoring?

Answer. Again, this issue is better addressed to the policy community than OSIA.


Question. About how many onsite inspections of each type will the Soviets receive at their military sites?

Answer. There are two basic types of quota inspections provided and each is covered by separate provisions. Declared site and challenge inspections aim to monitor compliance with provided data throughout the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU). These inspections are based on quotas which are derived from identified Objects of Verification (OOV).

The Soviets declared 910 OOVs at treaty signature. During baseline, 20 percent or 182 of these 0OVs will be subjected to inspection. Up to 15 percent of these 182 inspections can be challenge inspections.

In addition, reductions of TLE and certifications of recategorization of certain helicopters and aircraft will be conducted without a right of refusal. NATO has the right to, and plans to, inspect every reduction and certification event. Because neither Soviet plans for reductions nor NATO plans for monitoring them have been finalized, estimating the number of reduction and certification inspections in the Soviet Union would be difficult at this time.

Question. Other than counting TLE, what other benefits will follow from these inspections? Please describe the U.S. participation in these onsite inspections. How many inspections will the U.S. lead? What arrangements have been made for U.S. personnel to join inspections led by other Western countries?

Answer. The benefits that accrue from these inspections are: (1) deterrence of cheating at declared sites; and (2) increased levels of confidence and greater trust. This is fundamentally important in establishing understanding and greater transparency among the 22 signatories to the treaty.

The U.S. share of the NATO inspection quota is approximately 18 percent.

The U.S. will lead all of its share and will participate on other teams to an as yet unknown degree.

We have coordinated closely with our NATO allies on U.S. personnel joining other Western teams.

All destruction events are inspectable with no quotas or rights of refusal, other than limiting the number of inspections at each site to one at a time. It is NATO's intent to witness all Soviet and East European destruction events.

We will also be inspecting the results of recategorization of multipurpose attack helicopters and reclassification of combat-capable trainer aircraft without the right of refusal.


Question. In March 1991, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the following costs of monitoring the CFE Treaty.


First 44 Months:

Total 205 to 610
Annual Average 55 to 165

First Five Years:

Total 240 to 710
Annual Average 60 to 140

First Ten Years:

Total 365 to 1,085
Annual Average 35 to 110

What are OSIA's estimates for costs and manpower to monitor the CFE Treaty? Which assumptions of CBO do you disagree with? What is your estimate fortune aerial inspection regime for CFE?

Answer. Cost of Monitoring the CFE Treaty. -- The Congressional Budget Office Report, US Costs of Verification and Compliance Under Pending Arms Treaties (September 1990), concludes that CFET verification will cost the U.S.:

OSIA anticipates additional annual costs of approximately $12-16 million when the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe enters into force. OSIA is not the only agency that will incur costs for monitoring CFE. Therefore, this projection does not reflect total costs.

OSIA is unable to comment on the CBO cost projections and their assumptions. We are not responsible for the specific costs associated with the treaty implementation beyond those required for OSIA's mission requirements.

The Treaty provides for an aerial inspection regime within the ATTU following completion of the residual level validation period. If such a regime is approved, each State Party will be obliged to accept an agreed number of inspections. There is no basis for developing meaningful cost data yet. That issue will be addressed in CFE-1A follow-on negotiations.


Question. Please describe briefly how OSIA will carry out its tasks under the CFE Treaty.

Answer. Inspection teams for all types of inspection are composed of 9 members. For declared and challenge inspections, the team will consist of a core OSIA team of 6 members.

OSIA will form each team of U.S inspectors largely from its own permanently assigned personnel, supplemented on a TDY basis by a few selected personnel from the Department of Defense and other concerned agencies, as appropriate. Teams will vary in composition. Their organization will be tailored to the specific type of inspection mission which the team is assigned.

Certification and reduction inspection teams may be of multinational composition. Team composition modalities for certification and reduction inspections are currently being established by NATO nations.

The relationship between escorts and inspectors during the actual conduct of an Inspection on one of our bases during CFE will be similar to that established during INF. The main difference between escort operations under CFE and those carried out under INF is that the host State Party, not the U.S., will have the obligation to operate Points of Entry (POE) to receive the inspection teams and will be required to provide them transportation and logistical support (meals and lodging) while traveling from the POE to the site or between sites. U.S. escort obligations officially begin at the entry to a facility used exclusively by the U.S. and terminate upon departure from the U.S. facility. The U.S., as appropriate, also will provide liaison officers to travel with the inspection team from the POE or other site to the U.S. site. Ongoing bilateral negotiations with applicable host state parties will finalize the relationship between host state and U.S. escort teams.

Question. What kind of reporting books has OSIA developed for the OSIs of each type?

Answer. OSIA has developed training manuals to assist inspectors in recording of data pertaining to treaty limited equipment. All reporting is done through the inter-agency.


Question. Is OSIA being effectively informed in the NSC interagency process?

Answer. Yes, OSIA receives policy guidance formulated through the interagency mechanism established by the President and transmitted through the Department of Defense.

Question. Is OSIA effectively able to present its "lessons learned" views to the NSC interagency process?

Answer. Yes. From late spring 1990 through Treaty signature in Paris, OSIA pro- vided an experienced Team Chief to the U.S. delegation in Vienna to offer technical advice on procedural issues in inspection operations. This has permitted the Agency to better understand the desire of the delegation in crafting the Treaty document. OSIA also participates in the interagency process here in Washington, DC.


Question. Is it reasonable to use a set of data which is not a legal and integral part of the Treaty and which is not before the Senate, in order to calculate the fundamental obligation of the Treaty-the Soviet reduction obligation?

Answer. While the data submitted by each participant are not an integral part of the Treaty, they are a legal requirement imposed on all participants, with the precise kind of information and the timetable for submitting it spelled out in the Treaty's Information Exchange Protocol, which is an integral part of the Treaty.

These submissions are, by their very nature, extremely lengthy and detailed. Countries will need to change their data on a regular basis; if they were part of the Treaty, this could not be done without Treaty amendment. Moreover, the data submissions of all 22 participants would have to be agreed to by all other signatories.

The data are intended primarily to serve as a database for on-site inspections and for comparison with information obtained through national technical means. Participants are expected to submit correct data and questions about its accuracy will be the basis for discussion and for compliance concerns in the Joint Consultative Group (and bilaterally). Consultations in the JCG over the initial CFE data submissions have been going on since shortly after Treaty signature.

Article VIII of the Treaty describes how participants' reduction liabilities are to be calculated. The base for this calculation is the "holdings notified."

That does not mean a reduction liability must be accepted without question. The focus of inquiry, however, must be the accuracy of the "holdings notified." Certainly one of the important concerns of other participants since signature of the CFE Treaty has been the lower-than-expected holdings notified by the Soviet Union and the consequent low reduction obligation. This problem was partially resolved, with the Soviets' agreement to calculate their Coastal Defense and Naval Infantry holdings against their permitted CFE ceilings, and to reduce their overall holdings in the zone accordingly.

Analysis by the Intelligence Community and discussions of the Soviet data in the JCG and bilaterally have helped narrow differences with the Soviets over their initial data submissions. We are continuing to pursue remaining data questions. The IC has been unable to confirm the location or disposition of approximately 19,000 pieces of equipment which, some time prior to signature, it had estimated were located in the zone. It is very unlikely that we will be able to further significantly refine the estimate for the number of TLE actually in the zone as of 19 November 1990.

All the initial CFE data submissions have been made available to the Senate. A copy of the original Russian and an English translation have been provided to this Committee staff.

Question. Is it reasonable to use the Soviet data for calculating the Soviet reduction obligation, even when the United States knows that it is deliberately and grossly inaccurate?

Answer. The United States and other participants have questioned the Soviet data. Analysis by the U.S. Intelligence Community and discussions in the JCG and bilaterally have helped narrow differences with the Soviets. We are continuing to pursue remaining data questions. The IC has been unable to confirm the location or disposition of approximately 19,000 pieces of equipment which, some time prior to signature, it had estimated were located in the zone. It is very unlikely that we will be able to further significantly refine the estimate for the number of TLE actually in the zone as of 19 November 1990.

The Treaty provides for the calculation of the reduction obligation on the basis of "holdings notified" in the zone. On the basis of the data they provided as of signature, the Soviets would be obligated to destroy or convert in the zone 19,689 pieces of equipment. In addition, as a result of their June 14 legally-binding statement, they will destroy or convert another 1,493 pieces of equipment in the zone; 1,492 outside the zone; and modify-in accordance with Treaty procedures-753 armored personnel carriers into armored personnel carrier look-alikes. (In addition, the Soviets have made a political commitment to destroy at least 14,500 additional pieces of equipment in Treaty-limited categories now located beyond the Urals.)

The June 14 legally-binding statement is the result of a concerted effort on the part of the United States and other 20 signatories to bring the Soviets into compliance with their Treaty obligations.

As noted above, it is very unlikely that we will be able to further significantly refine the estimate for the number of TLE actually in the zone as of 19 November 1990. Should Soviet underreporting be proven, however, that could be the basis for an increase in their reduction obligation.

Question. How is the Soviet reduction obligation to be calculated under the Treaty?

Answer. How to calculate the reduction obligation is set forth in paragraph 7 of Article VIII of the Treaty: "* * * a State Party's reduction liability in each category shall be no less than the difference between its holdings notified, in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange, at signature or effective upon entry into force of this Treaty, whichever is the greater, and the maximum levels for holdings it notified pursuant to Article VII."

The Protocol on Information Exchange requires each State Party to notify "overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty." Thus, a state's reduction obligation is directly related to the amount of equipment held in the zone as of signature or as of entry into force. Should it be determined that a State Party has violated its obligation to provide accurate data, then it may be determined that the State Party has violated other obligations that are based derivatively on that inaccurate data, such as its reduction obligation.

Question. Have the Soviets violated the CFE obligation to declare accurate data at Treaty signature? Is a non-compliance report on the CFE Treaty being drafted or planned by ACDA right now, even during the CFE ratification process?

Answer. The formal analysis that would lead to a particular compliance finding has not yet taken place. However, the data discrepancy issue will clearly have to be addressed in the Report. Preliminary drafting of elements of the Report is underway it is due to the Congress by 1 December.

Question. The Committee requests a formal, written, legal opinion from ACDA on precisely how to calculate the Soviet obligation to reduce, especially in a circumstance in which the Soviets have violated the CFE obligation to declare accurate data at Treaty signature.

Answer. How to calculate the reduction obligation is set forth in paragraph 7 of Article VIII of the Treaty: "* * * a State Party's reduction liability in each category shall be no less than the difference between its holdings notified, in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange, at signature or effective upon entry into force or this Treaty, whichever is the greater, and the maximum levels for holdings it notified pursuant to Article VII."

The Protocol on Information Exchange requires each State Party to notify "overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings in each category of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty." Thus, a state's reduction obligation is directly related to the amount of equipment held in the zone as of signature or as of entry into force. Should it be determined that a State Party has violated its obligation to provide accurate data, then it may be determined that the State Party has violated other obligations that are based derivatively on that inaccurate data, such as its reduction obligation.

Question. Can the Committee have the CIA briefing on the CFE "smoking gun" evidence, along with ACDA's comments?

Answer. The Intelligence Community has provided this briefing to members of the Committee. Requests for additional presentations of the briefing should be ad- dressed to the DCI.

ACDA has no comments on this briefing. It is a part of the evidence related to Soviet CFE data issues.

Question. Can the Committee have the DIA Briefing by Dave Thomas on Soviet camouflage, concealment, and deception in INF CFE and STRAT?

Answer. We understand that this briefing has been provided to members of the Committee.


Question. If the Treaty text and your presentation of the Treaty's meaning are clear and mutually consistent then can we expect the Executive Branch to act in accordance with that interpretation even if the Senate does not explicitly state in the resolution of ratification that we are relying upon you to do so?

Answer. Yes. The Administration will in no way depart from the interpretations of the CFE Treaty that we are presenting to the Senate.


Question. Does the Defense Department agree that there are at least eight well documented cases of Soviet negotiating deception in START, five cases of negotiating deception in SALT I, six cases of negotiating deception and data base falsification in SALT II, and three cases of deception in the INF Treaty negotiations?

  1. If not, can the Defense Department provide specific documentary refutation of this list?

Answer. There is little question that, in the past, the Soviets have negotiated deceptively. However, whenever such activities have been identified, we have raised them with the Soviets through diplomatic channels.

  1. Soviet concealment activities, deceptions and active measures have been reported and analyzed in the annual Presidential Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements and in Department of State reports on Soviet active measures. As examples, President Reagan determined some Soviet strategic forces concealment activities to be direct violations of the SALT II Treaty, and President Bush determined in the 1990 President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Treaties that Soviet failure to inform the U.S. of the existence of SS-23 missile systems in Eastern Europe during the INF negotiations and after, constituted "bad faith."

Question. What are the implications of Mr. Yeltsin's testimony for the consummation of START?

Answer. The U.S. Government has spent nine years negotiating a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Soviet Union to reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both sides for the first time in history. Cognizant of past Soviet deceptions, the U.S. Government sought in START more explicit assurances regarding Soviet activities that were of concern. The outcome of the negotiations is a treaty that meets the principal objectives the U.S. had in entering into these negotiations in 1982. For example, the START Treaty will reduce the destabilizing heavy Soviet SS-18 ICBMs by 50 percent, it will cap the aggregate throw weight of each side, and it will provide the U.S. with intrusive on-site inspection rights in the Soviet Union. Taken as a whole, this treaty represents a significant improvement in strategic stability at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides.

Question. Mr. Secretary, last summer the Senate unanimously passed a Helms amendment which was included in the final FY 1991 Defense Authorization Act requesting that, before the United States signs a START Treaty with the Soviet Union, the President should report to the Congress on whether covert Soviet SS-233 in Eastern Europe violated the INF Treaty.

President Bush did send Congress a report in February stating that the Soviet SS-23 deployment did constitute "bad faith." But he didn't say whether it was a violation of the INF Treaty. Moreover, the cutoff date for information in his report was set arbitrarily by the bureaucracy at November, 1990. Yet I understand that between the arbitrary November date and the actual date of the report in February, the United States received significant new information about the SS-23 deployment.

  1. Why is it that this information has not been sent to Congress?
  2. And will the President report before the CFE Treaty is ratified and before the START Treaty is signed on whether this new information confirms that the SS-23 deployment is a Soviet violation of the INF Treaty, or Soviet "fraud in the inducement" to the INF Treaty?


  1. New information acquired since the submittal of the President's Annual Report on Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements is being analyzed and evaluated by the administration and will be submitted to the Congress in the Supplemental Report on SS-23 Missiles in Eastern Europe. You can be sure that we shall provide any new significant information on the SS-23s to the Congress in a timely manner.
  2. The administration anticipates reporting, before the Senate consents to ratification of the START Treaty, on the implications of the SS-23 deployment in Eastern Europe for the INF Treaty.


Question. General Powell, does the Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of "military significance" used to evaluate a possible Soviet violation of the CFE Treaty state that a Soviet undeclared, covert, or illegal force of roughly about 15,000 to 30,000 pieces of Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE) would constitute a "militarily significant" violation?

Answer. No. Individual items of conventional military equipment only possess a significant military capability when they are manned by proficient crews, organized into ready formations which are sustainable and have the requisite command and control infrastructure. This synergism, in the proper scale, produces a militarily significant capability. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assess military significance in terms of combat divisions, not in terms of numbers of pieces of TLE alone. Our analysis found that a cohesive Soviet force of [deleted] combat ready divisions in excess of treaty limits could provide the Soviets with a military advantage sufficient to threaten the cohesion of NATO's defenses in the central region. However, the Soviets could have to further augment this force to achieve theater-wide objectives or sustain large scale offensive operations.

Question. General Powell, what are the assumptions and the criteria which underlie this Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of "military significance" used to evaluate a possible Soviet violation of the CFE Treaty?

Answer. The Joint Staff analysis began with an Intelligence Community assessment that the Soviets would organize their post-CFE allotment of TLE in the ATTU into approximately [deleted] fully, equipped divisions. Based on this force structure, the Joint Staff evaluated the additional Soviet forces in excess of treaty limits that would be required to threaten the cohesion of NATO defense. In computer simulation wargame analysis, Soviet forces, irrespective of their origin, were added to the battle Simply to measure the level at which the Soviets could break through and potentially threaten the cohesion of NATO's defenses. This analysis was based on the following assumptions: [deleted.]

Question. If the minimum level in the Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of "military significance" regarding CFE compliance is a violation of at least 15,000 pieces of Treaty-Limited Equipment, does this standard mean that the JCS would consider an illegal Soviet CFE force of more than 15,000 pieces of TLE to be "militarily significant?"

Answer. Quantification of "military significance" depends on the operational (size, disposition, composition, location, and capabilities) context and case-by-case analysis. A militarily significant threat could occur at any point along continuum depending again on the context. Joint Staff analysis of a credible, large-scale central region wargame scenario that gave the Soviets every reasonable advantage indicates that the Soviets would need a cohesive force of at least [deleted] combat divisions in excess of treaty limits to achieve a military advantage sufficient to threaten the cohesion of NATO's defenses. It is important to note that we are talking here of equipped, manned, and supported divisions, not simply "division equivalents" based on quantities of TLE.

Question. Since the CFE Treaty was signed on November 19, 1990, there has been a "data problem."

  1. On November 19, 1990, the Soviets declared their total number of pieces of TLE in the CFE zone of application at the time of signature, but was this number an under-declaration of the total number of pieces of Soviet TLE in the zone by about 36,000 pieces of TLE, according to the U.S. Intelligence Community?
  2. Does the U.S. Intelligence Community now believe that the gap between the number of pieces of Soviet-declared TLE in the CFE zone of application on the date of CFE signature, as compared to what U.S. NTMs indicate that the Soviets had in the CFE zone of application on the date of signature, has been reduced from about 36,000 pieces or undeclared TLE to about 19,000 pieces of undeclared TLE?
  3. If the U.S. Intelligence Community still believes that even now there is a gap of Soviet under-declaration of about 19,000 pieces of TLE, is this a "militarily significant" Soviet under-declaration by JC5 standards?

Answers (a) and (b): As the information at question is under the purview of the Intelligence Community, recommend that you address sections (a) and (b) of this question to the Director of Central Intelligence. (c): [Deleted.]

Question. The June 14, 1991 "compromise" on the Soviet effort to reopen CFE's Article Three resulted in a significant change to the treaty-the Soviets can now have over 1,500 more armored personnel carriers than the treaty originally allowed. Moreover, there are also no locational restrictions on any Treaty-Limited Equipment (TLE) in the CFE Treaty.

Accordingly, can the Soviets move around their over 1,500 more armored personnel carriers, ostensibly commanded by the Strategic Rocket Forces, and use them to suppress freedom in the Baltic States?

Answer. These armored personnel carriers are used for security at Soviet missile installations. We agreed it was appropriate to apply the counting rules exemption for certain equipment used for internal security purposes. The Soviets agreed not to increase their holdings of these vehicles and not to assign equipment to these units other than APCS.

Question. How many U.S. troops will be stationed in NATO when the CFE reductions are completed some forty months after entry into force?

Answer. There will be 150,000 U.S. troops stationed in NATO when the planned reductions are complete. They will make up a force structure of two divisions, one armored cavalry regiment and supporting air wings.

Question. Will the CFE Treaty codify the military withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe?

  1. Will it repudiate the "Brezhnev Doctrine?"

Answer. Yes.

  1. It would seem that Soviet unilateral reductions, their bilateral withdrawal agreements with former Soviet Warsaw Pact allies, and the CFE Treaty all point to a de facto repudiation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine."

Question. How will the Soviet Union's pledge to withdraw all of its forces from Poland, and from Germany by 1994, help in the implementation of the CFE Treaty?

Answer. This will facilitate reaching the sub-zone treaty limits in Zone 4 (Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia). The limits for active units in this zone are 7,500 tanks, 5,000 artillery pieces, and 11,250 armored combat vehicles.

Question. The Defense Department has stated that as recently as last year, the Soviets alone were out-producing all of NATO by 2 to I in tanks, 3 to 1 in armored troop carriers, and 10 to 1 in artillery.

  1. Are these ratios still approximately correct?
  2. Do they imply that the Soviets could replace all of the Treaty-Limited Equipment that they dismantle under CFE in several years?
  3. How many years would it require for the Soviets to replace their loses from CFE at the current Soviet production rates?
  4. Will the Soviets have to declare their production of CFE TLE?


  1. No. [Deleted.]
  2. No. [Deleted.]
  3. According to provisions of the CFE Treaty, the Soviets cannot replace their losses within the ATTU zone by means or production. New production of TLE introduced into ATTU based forces must be offset by equal reductions from the forces if the U.S.S.R. is to stay in compliance with CFE Treaty limits.
  4. No. The CFE Treaty does not require declaration of military production. However, as noted in the response to question 14(c) above, production that enters into service with conventional armed forces in the zone must be reported for in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange.

Question. Kommunist, the ideological journal of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had a very interesting statement in the edition signed to press on April 5, 1991. Kommunist stated: "Thanks to this transfer of armaments cast of the Urals before the CFE Treaty was signed, unprecedented in peacetime (and even in wartime), we will not only have about one third of all armaments remaining in Europe under the Paris [CFE] Treaty but also keep, quantitative advantage in land armaments over NATO, China, and Japan combined.

Do you agree with the implication of this statement-that the Soviet Union has subverted the CFE Treaty by maintaining its military superiority under the CFE Treaty?

Answer. The CFE Treaty is not designed to eliminate the Soviet Union as a military power. Indeed, they will remain the single largest military force on the Eurasian land mass. When the treaty is fully implemented, the Soviets will retain in Europe only 35 percent of the equipment they held in 1988. Moreover, the "sufficiency" provision will prevent them from creating a conventional force greater than one-third of the total armaments permitted in the area of application. NATO, as an alliance, will be permitted 50 percent of the total.

Question. This same edition of Kommunist also claims that Soviet defense spending will rise by at least 26 percent in 1991.

  1. Is this consistent with the Soviet force reductions we envisaged occurring under CFE?
  2. Why are we reducing our defense budget by about 25 percent over the next rive years, when there is evidence that the Soviets may be increasing their defense budget by at least 25 percent over the same 5 years?


  1. The announced Soviet military budget for 1990 was 70.9 billion rubles; for 1991 it is 96.6 billion rubles, an increase of 36 percent. (U.S. Government estimates or Soviet military spending are generally about double the numbers published by the Soviets.) The Soviets claim that the increase is due to price increases and that if calculated in 1990 prices the 1991 budget would be about 10 percent below the 1991 level.
    CFE reductions are to begin after the treaty is ratified and goes into effect. The Soviet Union has already reduced some of its forces unilaterally, and the CFE and START agreements call for significant reductions in conventional and strategic nuclear forces. Nevertheless, we know that the U.S.S.R. continues to modernize its forces and continues to produce military equipment at levels that exceed U.S. and even Allied levels in many categories of forces.
  2. One published Soviet Ministry of Defense Plan projects increased Soviet military spending (measured in 1991 prices) out to the year 2000; the plan reflects total spending for the ten year period that is 28 percent more than what total spending would have been if spending were held each year to the 96.6 billion ruble level for 1991. Some Soviet civilian officials have acknowledged that although the Soviet military is calling for increased military spending, this does not mean the Soviet military will necessarily get what it seeks.

There have been and continue to be significant changes in the international situation, including, but not limited to, the U.S.S.R. We took into account these changes when we developed the Defense program and budget that was submitted to Congress earlier this year.

We are able to conclude that the threat of a massive attack against Europe initiated by the U.S.S.R. with little warning is no longer realistic. We also concluded, however, that our planning must reflect the threat of regional contingencies throughout the world, as well as the need to maintain nuclear deterrent forces.

At the same time, we recognize that there are great uncertainties about the future of the Soviet political and economic systems and about the future of the Soviet military. We will certainly need to watch closely what happens to Soviet efforts to maintain and modernize their forces and to fund their defense activities in future years. If we believe that the U.S.S.R. has abandoned efforts to reform, or if Soviet force modernization develops to the point that it poses an unacceptable threat to the United States interests, we will make corresponding changes to our force planning and structure, and to our defense expenditures.

Question. On January 3, 1991, Moscow's Komsomolskva Pravda stated that: "When the [CFE] Treaty was signed, it was praised and supported by none other than Marshal D. Yazov. This was natural. Another thing was strange: to hear it contrary opinion from his very mouth a bit later during the work or the 4th Congress of the Peoples' Deputies * * * High officials of the Ministry of Defense also responded negatively to the document at a closed meeting which recently occurred with the editors of military publications. Just where are they [the Soviet military] speaking the truth-in Paris or in Moscow?"

  1. Do you agree with Komsomolskva Pravda that the Soviet military opposes the CFE Treaty?
  2. Given their under-declaration of data and their reopening of Article Three, is the Soviet military likely to implement the CFE Treaty faithfully?


  1. No. The Soviet military participated fully, both through their General Staff and Ministry of Defense, in the negotiation or the CFE Treaty. General Moiseyev himself helped develop the Soviet compromise on Article III dispute.
  2. Yes.

Question. Secretary of State Baker testified to the committee on July 11, 1991, that: "CFE allows us to maintain deterrence at lower levels of forces, allowing for reductions in the resources we devote to Europe's defense." Can you tell us how NATO and the United States contribution to NATO will be reduced under CFE?

Answer. There are two issues here-equipment and personnel.

First, CFE itself requires reductions of Treaty-Limited Equipment. Due to the treaty's zonal ceilings, as well as to NATO's reduction allocations, reductions required of the U.S. are generally larger than our major allies. For example, we must reduce our tanks by at least 32 percent; the Dutch, by 19 percent; and the British by 15 percent. The planned German reduction was 20 percent (now 40 percent due to unification-acquired surpluses). Thus besides achieving a stable balance at lower levels, the treaty also shapes a better distribution within NATO of the burdens of collective defense.

Second, CFE has contribute to bringing about a reduced Soviet threat, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and a new NATO strategy. As a result, NATO now intends to maintain deterrence at lower and differently configured force levels. Our forces in Europe will stand at about 150,000 personnel by 1995. Other allies reductions' are still under review, but we anticipate similarly-proportioned reductions from them.

Question. The Soviet June 14, 1991 Statement to the Joint Consultative Group said: "Military formations and units deployed within the area or duplication of the treaty will be organized in line with the Soviet defensive doctrine.

  1. What is this Soviet "defensive doctrine?"
  2. Has this Soviet "defensive doctrine" yet been defined and adopted, or is it still in the formative stage?

Answer (a): [Deleted.]

Answer (b): [Deleted.]

Question. At the end of the Reagan administration, the Soviets were allowed to "down-load" about 1,500 ballistic missile Re-entry Vehicles under START. Now the Bush administration has agreed to allow the Soviets to "download" another 1,500 RVs. This is a total allowed "down-loading" for the Soviets of 3,000 extra RVs, which is about 60 percent of the total of 4,900 ballistic missile RVs allowed to the Soviets under START.

Is it reasonable to allow the Soviets to have 60 percent of the allowed total of ballistic missile RVs as bonus, extra legal, "downloaded" RVs?

Answer. In December, 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on warhead attributions for each side's existing types of ballistic missiles. Certain existing types, such as the Trident II and SS-N-23, are attributed with fewer warheads than the number of Reentry Vehicles (RVs) they are capable of carrying. For example, the Trident 11 is attributed with eight warheads, and the SS-N-23 is attributed with four warheads, even though both can carry more RVs. However, START prohibits these systems from being deployed with more than eight and four RVs, respectively. RV on-site inspection and access to Soviet flight test telemetry will help to monitor the RV loadings. Systems such as these are not considered to be downloaded under the START Treaty.

The treaty allows each side to download up to a total of 1250 RVs. 896 SS-N-18 RVs count toward this 1250 limit, as do any Minuteman III RVs that tire downloaded. Insofar as permitted by this limit, a side may also download up to 500 RVs on no more than two other existing types of ballistic missiles. (Given that 896 SS-N-18 RVs already count under the 1250 limit, the Soviet Union could download 500 RVs only by retiring some SS-N-18s.)

Question. Is it true that under START, future types of Soviet ballistic missiles are going to be counted at 50 percent of the actual number of RVs that they can carry?

Answer. No. Under START, the number of warheads attributed to future types of ballistic missiles will be the maximum number of actual plus simulated RV releases that a future type demonstrates in night tests. However, the warhead attribution for future types with front sections of an existing design will be no less than the number derived by dividing 40 percent of the missile throw-weight by the weight of the lightest RV tested on that type of missile. (A missile's throw-weight does not normally consist solely of RVs but may also include other items such as the post-boost vehicle, missile guidance system, and penetration aids.) For future types with front sections of a fundamentally new design, the application of this "40 percent rule" will be subject to agreement in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The 40 percent rule is intended to discourage attempts to undercount warheads on future types.

Question. Has the United States agreed in START to allow the Soviets to increase the number of RVs on their ballistic missiles by 20 percent, So that the Soviet SS-N-23 which now can carry 10 RVs can in the future carry 12 RVs, and yet only count under START as carrying 4 RVs?

Answer. The START Treaty prohibits the flight-testing or deployment of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or a Submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with a number of RVs greater than the number of warheads attributed to it. For example, since the SS-N-23 is attributed with four warheads, it is not allowed to be flight-tested or deployed with more than four RVs. In addition, the treaty prohibits production, flight testing or deployment of ICBMs or SLBMs with more than 10 RVs. RV on-site inspection and access to Soviet flight test telemetry will help monitor these prohibitions.

Question. The issues of how much the Soviets are spending on defense, and to what extent the military burden has contributed to the Soviet economic crisis, are especially relevant when Gorbachev is coming hat in hand to the West for economic aid, and applying for membership in international economic organizations. Gorbachev and other Soviet officials have admitted publicly that militarization of that economy at the expense of consumption has been traditional Soviet economic policy. Numerous Soviet economists have put the debt burden at 25 to 30 percent of GNP.

The Congress' Joint Economic Committee (JEC) has relied exclusively on the CIA for public policy analysis of Soviet economic growth and defense expenditures for two decades or more. Yet Gorbachev himself has contradicted CIA analysis that the defense consistently has been a constant share of Soviet GNP. All of CIA's Soviet economic policy analysis-the size and growth rate of GNP, defense expenditures- has been challenged by Soviet economists as well as a number of Western analysts, including Dr. Michael Boyskin. Senator Moynihan has even introduced a bill to abolish the CIA, in large part over these economic issues.

Mr. W.T. Lee of DIA has been one of the few Western critics of CIA analyses of Soviet defense expenditures and the only Westerner who has a consistently excellent track record on this subject. As you know, he was invited to testify at the Moynihan Hearings and also participated in the National Academy of Sciences Conference on these issues requested by Senator Bingamin and Rep. Hamilton. Yet Mr. Lee never has been invited to testify to JEC. Now is the time.

Will you permit Mr. Lee to testify before the JEC?

Answer. Mr. Lee is an employee of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Questions regarding his availability for testimony should be directed to the Director of that Agency.

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