Chapter 6 -- CFE Treaty Baseline

Inspectors discuss treaty provisions behind an ACV in Azerbaijan.

U.S. BASELINE INSPECTION OPERATIONS

The U.S. inspection teams conducted 44 baseline inspections at Eastern sites. Because of civil unrest in Georgia, the U.S. government canceled one mission out of concern for the safety of its inspectors. Teams deployed to nine different countries, inspecting Russia most frequently. Of the 44 inspections, only one was a challenge inspection, conducted in Belarus; the other 43 U.S. inspections were declared site inspections. In total, the United States conducted 22 CFE single inspection missions and 11 missions during which teams inspected two sites. Unlike their Eastern counterparts, U.S. teams inspected only one or two sites per mission, never approaching the 10-day in-country allowance outlined in the treaty.

The U.S. pattern of inspection operations was influenced by the NATO deconfliction schedule. The schedule allocated each NATO state three-day inspection periods, or "slots," in which to conduct CFE inspections. The three-day slot restricted a team's ability to conduct sequential inspections. The treaty allowed 84 hours to conduct two declared site inspections, 48 hours for the first and 36 hours for each sequential inspection. The NATO slot allowed only 72 hours; the team lost 12 hours when squeezing two inspections into the same slot. In the later stages of baseline, the slots were sometimes consecutive, allowing a team six days in country to complete its mission. By contrast, the Russian CFE teams adopted a less costly approach by inspecting 10 U.S. sites during two inspection missions. The cost of supporting and transporting an inspection team was borne by the inspected state, while the inspecting state paid its way to and from the inspected state. Two trips instead of five or six produced a significant savings for the inspecting state.¹⁹

Inspections were extremely intrusive, and U.S. inspectors were trained to probe and push as deeply as possible when inspecting. An inspection team had significant rights when conducting an inspection; however, the treaty also stipulated limits that protected the inspected state. The treaty authorized an inspection team to inspect all areas within a declared site except those that belonged exclusively to another OOV. In addition, inspectors had the same rights at locations separated from the site where CAEST of the inspected unit were routinely present, such as a railhead. This meant, among other things, that the inspection team had the right to access, entry, and unobstructed inspection of any location, structure, or area within a structure in which CAEST were permanently or routinely present.

Escorts, however, could apply treaty restrictions on an inspection team to limit access to or within a structure in several ways. The first and most common way was by citing the two-meter rule. An escort could deny an inspector access through any entrance that was less than two meters wide because that was the threshold through which no CAEST could fit. Having passed through an entrance greater than two meters wide, the team could continue its inspection within the facility until it reached a point where escorts could successfully apply the two-meter rule. A second limitation was the right to shroud sensitive equipment and deny inspectors access to any shrouded item or container, so long as any one of its measurements fell under two meters. Third, escorts could also deny inspectors access to hardened aircraft shelters. While an escort team could normally prevent an inspection team from entering a hardened aircraft shelter, inspectors had the right to look in to determine if any CAEST were present. Further, if CAEST were positioned in an aircraft shelter and the inspectors were denied entry, they had the right to counterdemand that all treaty-limited equipment (TLE) be brought out for display to determine quantities, types, and models.

Escorts could deny access to aircraft shelters,but inspectors could require that TLE be brought out of the shelter.

Conventional
Armaments and
Equipment
Subject to the
Treaty

Finally, escorts could deny, limit, or delay access to those areas or shrouded equipment that the inspected state's government considered sensitive. Sensitive areas could hold equipment that the inspected state considered critical to national security, such as a communications center or a special weapons storage facility. But not all sensitive areas dealt with national security; prisons, for example, were frequently declared sensitive areas. If an escort team chief declared an area or object sensitive, he then needed to state whether there were any CAEST in the area. If CAEST were present, the escort team was required to report the amount, type, and model and to take steps to satisfy inspectors that no additional equipment was present.

As with access to facilities, the treaty allowed the inspected state to impose limits on inspectors' access to CAEST. The Protocol on Inspection limited inspectors' access to the extent they could confirm visually the number, type, and model or version of a piece of CAEST. If inspectors encountered recategorized helicopters, reclassified aircraft, armored vehicle look-alikes, or reduced equipment, specific inspection protocol procedures allowed inspection of the interior of these vehicles to confirm the status of the equipment. Inspectors could require that the doors of an armored vehicle look-alike be opened to confirm that the vehicle could not transport a combat infantry squad. Equipment within or on such a vehicle could be shrouded, and the inspectors had no right to enter the vehicle.