Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California.
Training for Linguists
While weapons specialists developed their lesson plans in equipment identification, linguists had their own training requirements. Once selected for duty with OSIA, most linguists attended the Defense Language Institute's (DLI) Intermediate Russian Course in Monterey, California. The 27-week course provided linguists intense training to expand their ability to speak Russian. The course also introduced students to arms control treaty terminology. After successful completion of the DLI course, linguists arrived at OSIA's European Operations, and shortly thereafter attended a two-week course at the U.S. Army Russian Institute (USARI) at Garmisch, Germany. This course, sponsored by the Treaty Verification Division of USARI, put linguists into classrooms where they spoke only Russian as they studied terminology specific to the CFE Treaty. Freed from the daily pressures and distractions of individual and team training at Rhein-Main, students at Garmisch focused on the treaty's complex, technical language for six to seven hours a day. Back at Rhein-Main, in addition to individual daily practice, linguists gathered in small groups led by Alan J. French, OSIA European Operations' in-house Russian language professional. They drilled in Russian three to five hours a week, for practice in conversation and interpretation. Linguists enhanced their training by viewing taped Russian television broadcasts and reading any available written materials. Most linguists agreed, however, that the most realistic training for the inspection teams, short of an actual treaty inspection, was the mock inspections.7
One lesson Americans had learned in preparing to implement the INF Treaty was that mock inspections were an extremely valuable training tool. These inspections enabled teams to practice inspection and escort procedures, make and correct mistakes on the spot, uncover unanticipated problems or situations, and improve their procedures in accordance with treaty protocols. Teams went beyond scenario development and discussion in their offices to exercising their treaty knowledge at an inspectable site on a military installation.8 Seventeen months into treaty implementation, Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., USA, an experienced OSIA CFE Treaty team chief, led a series of training classes and a mock inspection with Moldovan inspectors in December 1993. He told the Moldovan team about the approach American inspectors took during mock inspections:
|"Our experiences during the
mock inspections before baseline and during the real
treaty inspections, both inspecting and escorting, were
very similar. This (fact) indicates that our level of
realism during training was very high. That is always one
of the main goals in training, to train the way you would
fight, to be as realistic as you can."9
Initial OSIA mock inspections for the CFE Treaty placed OSIA inspectors and escorts opposite their NATO counterparts. This was realistic training-teams traveled, lost sleep, missed meals, inspected unfamiliar military facilities, discussed treaty rights and obligations with foreign officers, and completed the inspection reports as required by the treaty. As inspectors, they aggressively demanded all of their government's treaty rights; as escorts, they made certain that their government's interests were fully protected. Colonel Kelley was a strong proponent of mock training inspections because his INF Treaty experience had convinced him that-
"The mock inspections are now and have always been the single most important training tool that we have at our disposal for a number of reasons. First, they force you to put into practice the skills that you have developed individually in these various areas over time. Second, the experience forces a team-or, in many cases, multiple teams-to function as a team. Mocks develop the cohesiveness that we wanted to see and permit the teams to further test each other on knowledge of the treaty, and knowledge of policy."10
Colonel Kelley turned the responsibility for the detailed coordination and planning of mock inspections over to Captain David R. Carter, USAF. As Chief of European Operations' Plans Branch, he worked directly with other NATO nations' treaty verification agencies to plan each series of mock inspections. Much of the initial coordination was completed over the phone, but final planning was done in person, approximately one month prior to inspection. Face-to-face, the planning officers from the nations ironed out the details of the exercise. After several planning meetings Colonel Kelley opted for a higher ranking team chief, a lieutenant colonel, to accompany Carter as a matter of protocol for the usually senior allied counterparts. For inspections of U.S. facilities, United States European Command (USEUCOM) relinquished the coordination of site selection to OSIA. Captain Carter or one of the Plans Branch NCOs then dealt directly with the component commands to determine which U.S. sites would be available to participate, either ground forces assigned to USAREUR or air forces under USAFE. With a list of U.S. sites available for mock inspection, U.S. planners and their NATO counterparts developed an agenda for the mock inspection including dates, units, locations, notification procedures, expenses, and team composition.11
Seal of the French verification agency L'Unité Française de Vérification.
|The initial U.S. mock inspections
were conducted with France's verification agency,
L'Unité Française de Vérification. Lt. Colonel Gessert
led this mission and the next five U.S. mock inspection
missions. Because Lt. Colonel Gessert was new to the
on-site inspection process, he relied heavily on his
deputy, Chief Warrant Officer 4 (CW4) Michael R. Lukes,
USA, who was an experienced INF Treaty inspector. On this
first mission, Gessert's nine-person team drove from
Rhein-Main Air Base on May 14, 1991, to Strasbourg,
France, the point of entry (POE) for this mission. The
following day they continued on to Nancy-Ochey Airfield,
where Lt. Colonel Gessert declared the French Air Force's
3rd Fighter Wing the object of verification (OOV) for the
first OSIA CFE mock inspection. Because the French
airfield was very large and there was much to be
inspected, Lt. Colonel Gessert surprised his hosts by
declining the prepared, formal luncheon.
At the site, Gessert divided his team in two subteams for the inspection, with CW4 Lukes leading the second team. The U.S. teams set out on foot to inspect the site, overlapping each other's efforts to ensure double coverage. Their approach was strictly business, as if the inspection were an actual CFE inspection in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. "We exercised every aspect of the treaty," Gessert recalled, "and made it very, very tough and very, very difficult" for the French escorts. After both U.S. subteams counted all the TLE and confirmed their counts to be correct, Lt. Colonel Gessert declared a sequential inspection. He then signed the inspection report, completing the mock inspection. The following day the American team traveled to Chenevières for the sequential inspection. There Gessert declared the French Army's 3rd Tank Battalion as the OOV his team would inspect. During this second inspection, Gessert observed that the French military escorts had become much more aggressive in their escort procedures, trying to minimize U.S. access and photography, but always remaining within the guidelines of the treaty. These first mock inspections mirrored what would become the U.S. trademark for all future CFE inspections: an aggressive, "letter of the law" approach to gaining all rights allowed under the treaty.
These missions confirmed that a detailed knowledge of the treaty was the key to a successful mission. Without a thorough knowledge of the treaty, team members could not effectively exercise all their government's treaty rights. Lt. Colonel Gessert also recognized the importance of teamwork and planning. Because an inspection team had limited time on-site, the team needed to develop a plan that allowed all team members to carry out their specific tasks, while allowing for a thorough inspection of the declared site, inspecting all areas and equipment twice. Each individual had to understand his role as an inspector so that the team could complete an inspection effectively. With a strong base of preparation and training, the team leader could make adjustments on-site as circumstances dictated.12
|At Rhein-Main, OSIA inspection
teams continued to hone their skills in areas such as
treaty knowledge, equipment identification, language, and
photography. The allied mock inspections allowed teams to
test those skills, to encounter different approaches to
the same treaty, and to establish inspection standards.
Over time nearly all the Eastern countries, as well as
the allies, pressed U.S. representatives to commit to
scheduling mock inspections. Colonel Kelley believed that
the United States had an obligation to give preference to
the NATO nations to conduct mock inspections because they
"had stuck with us in hard times and been true
allies to us." In addition to loyalty to allies, it
was also in the U.S. interest that all NATO inspections
of Eastern nations be thorough and consistent to provide
reliable and accurate information for a confident
assessment of treaty compliance.
From May 1991 until the treaty entered into force in July 1992, OSIA inspectors participated in mock CFE inspections with inspection teams from 13 NATO nations. All allied nations except Turkey and Italy participated in 27 OSIA missions, during which U.S. inspection teams conducted mock inspections at more than 50 sites. In addition to mock inspections with NATO teams, OSIA inspectors deployed on 11 missions to U.S. declared sites throughout Western Europe to conduct mock inspections with other OSIA teams. These OSIA-on-OSIA mock inspections provided training not only for the U.S. teams but also for the American military units that would receive Eastern inspection teams when the treaty entered into force. On several occasions, OSIA teams provided classroom training followed by demonstration mock inspections at U.S. declared sites. These missions, known as "road shows," allowed OSIA inspectors to reach various groups of people who would be responsible for treaty implementation, usually as installation escorts during inspections.
Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., briefing Greek inspectors during a mock inspection at Bitburg Air Base, Germany, October 18, 1991.
|One such mission began on October
28, 1991, when Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz, USA, led a team
to Sembach Air Base, Germany. During this mission OSIA
inspectors trained CFE points of contact (POCs) from
USAFE units on treaty escort and challenge inspection
procedures. Participants from the 16th Air Force bases in
Greece, Italy, Crete, and Turkey gathered, along with
Colonel Schuyler (Sky) Foerster, USAF, a member of the
U.S. delegation at Vienna, representatives from the 17th
Air Force, USAFE, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, European
Command (EUCOM), and Team Karcz at Sembach Air Base,
Headquarters of the 17th Air Force. On October 28th,
Colonel Foerster provided classroom treaty training,
emphasizing the inspection protocol. Representatives from
JCS, EUCOM, and USAFE then offered their organizations'
current guidance on treaty escort and challenge
inspection procedures. The final blocks of the course
provided instruction on working with linguists and with
the U.S. government's liaison procedures. The next day
Lt. Colonel Karcz demonstrated on-site the lessons taught
in the classroom, leading his inspection team through the
mock inspection at Sembach Air Base.
Participation in mock inspections enabled OSIA CFE team members to gel as competent, professional inspection teams. Individuals traveled as a team to new and unfamiliar locations, carried out specific tasks as part of an overall team effort to exercise all treaty rights, and gained valuable experience on how best to implement the CFE Treaty. The next step in preparation for the treaty's entry into force was mock inspections with teams from the Eastern group of states.13