Chapter 2


Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney speaking at NATO Headquarters following the first meeting of NATO and former Warsaw Pact delegations in April 1992.

On May 29, 1990, President Bush signed National Security Directive 41, instructing the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) to prepare to conduct on-site inspections under the CFE Treaty.1 Simultaneously, the President expanded OSIA's mission by directing it to recruit, train, and plan for conducting on-site inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty, and the Nuclear Testing Treaties. On-site inspection was a common element in monitoring and verifying compliance with these new arms control treaties. In December 1987 President Reagan had signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which laid the groundwork for future arms control agreements. "Trust but Verify," Reagan's oft-repeated phrase for characterizing American attitudes toward arms control treaties with the Soviet Union, remained a powerful policy objective throughout all treaty negotiations in the early 1990s.2  


The On-Site Inspection Agency prepared to implement several other treaties and agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention.

  Ratification and entry into force of these treaties would allow the United States and other signatories to conduct on-site inspections at military and industrial sites in as many as 160 nations. Hundreds of different weapon systems and thousands of individual weapons would be subject to inspection. With inspection rights came escort responsibilities. Under all the treaties, the U.S. government assumed an obligation to escort foreign inspection teams at U.S. sites and facilities. Inspectors and escorts with expertise on these divergent treaties and their weapon systems would be drawn from many different fields: conventional arms, strategic nuclear arms, chemical weapons, and underground nuclear testing. In addition, the demand for linguists would increase in response to new treaty requirements. The On-Site Inspection Agency would expand significantly to fulfill the United States' obligations under these treaties.3

In fact, the expansion began in 1990. President Bush signed three major arms control agreements: new protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) with the USSR on June 1, 1990; a new agreement on the Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons with the USSR, also on June 1, 1990; and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) with 20 European nations and Canada on November 19, 1990.4 On-site inspection, a key element in each of these agreements, provided critical information for verifying that other nations were complying with their treaty obligations. For the U.S. government, the determination of treaty compliance rested with the president. In 1990, President Bush stated his administration's policy in his annual arms control report to the U.S. Congress5:

"Without exception, the United States expects meticulous fulfillment of all existing and future arms control agreements, and all obligations that they entail. I am committed to ensuring that there is scrupulous compliance with all arms control agreements and related undertakings. We cannot and will not accept any lesser standard. Put simply, arms control commitments must be precisely defined and scrupulously observed. Nothing less will do."



In accordance with precedents established in implementing the INF Treaty, the On-Site Inspection Agency had a strictly operational role in implementing the CFE Treaty. President Bush, in National Security Directive 41, directed Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, Director of OSIA, to prepare to conduct on-site inspections under the CFE Treaty. In that same May 1990 directive, the president stipulated that the secretary of defense would be responsible for ensuring that the U.S. government was in compliance with all CFE Treaty provisions.6 After considerable debate within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military services, General Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended to Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney in April 1991 that the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) be designated the Department of Defense's (DoD) executive agent for treaty implementation. On June 14, 1991, Secretary Cheney gave General John R. Galvin, USA, USCINCEUR, authority to task all DoD forces and organizations within the CFE Treaty's area of application.7 Responsibilities of the executive agent included developing procedures to monitor the status of U.S. forces and equipment subject to the treaty and reporting periodically on that status to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, the executive agent was to ensure that all U.S. forces developed and carried out plans to receive foreign on-site inspectors. The plans had to incorporate provisions to protect sensitive points and special access programs. General Galvin and the USCINCEUR staff would supervise the transfer of U.S. treaty-limited equipment (TLE) to allied nations under the NATO Harmonization Plan. Finally, he was responsible for any treaty-required reduction of U.S. equipment.

General Galvin directed treaty implementation through the U.S. European Command and three subordinate commands: U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), and U.S. Navy Europe (USNAVEUR). For U.S. forces and facilities stationed in the Azores and in Iceland, which were subject to the CFE Treaty but were not under USCINCEUR's command, the U.S. Atlantic Command issued directives ordering them to comply with the secretary of defense's memorandum. To define the roles, missions, and responsibilities required to implement the CFE Treaty, the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Atlantic Command, and OSIA developed a joint Memorandum of Understanding.8

Essentially, this key memorandum delineated the responsibilities for training, logistics, and inspection operations. It tasked American land, air, and naval forces within the treaty's area of application to plan and train to receive on-site inspections by Eastern group inspection teams. The memorandum also defined the type of logistical support U.S. military units and site commanders would provide for the inspection teams, specifically, security, ground transportation, emergency medical care, medical evacuation, and administrative work areas. Site commanders were to provide meals and accommodations, if available on the installation, for the inspection and escort teams. If this was not possible, then that responsibility fell to OSIA. U.S. site commanders were to facilitate the inspection process by having their equipment and facilities ready for the foreign inspection teams, and by providing helicopter overflights when required. They would also designate sensitive sites to the OSIA personnel escorting the on-site inspection teams.


General John R. Galvin, U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Europe.


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