17 February 2000
(Warns against seeking "perfect" solutions to disarmament) (2,650) Geneva -- The U.S. representative to the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) urged delegates "to focus on what is possible now" rather than trying to "seek perfect, all-encompassing solutions to disarmament." In a statement to the CD on February 17, U.S. Ambassador Robert Grey said the first priority for the United States in this session will be negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). He pointed out that the United States has removed unilaterally hundreds of tons of fissile material from military stockpiles and has pledged voluntarily to make it available for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards "as soon as practical." Highlighting another priority, Grey said the United States is seeking a role for the CD in negotiating a comprehensive ban on the transfer of anti-personnel landmines (APL). The ambassador also put the U.S. effort to adapt the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty into context. The international environment has changed dramatically in the nearly 28 years since the ABM Treaty was signed, he said, and the threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction using advanced delivery mechanisms is now "real, growing and increasingly unpredictable." Grey said the United States is considering a limited defense against such threats. "We have made clear that we are committed to work with Russia, in a spirit of cooperation against a threat we both face," he said, "to identify adaptations of the ABM Treaty that would make its provisions consistent with a limited National Missile Defense." Grey also pointed out that the United States and Russia have amended the ABM before. On the theme of disarmament, Grey underscored the fact that the United States has dismantled 7,000 nuclear warheads since 1993 and 13,000 during the past decade. He also said that NATO has reduced its reliance on nuclear forces radically since the end of the Cold War. He noted, for example, that the number of nuclear weapons for sub-strategic forces in Europe has gone down by 85 percent. Grey said the United States is working with Russia and others to ensure that nuclear materials are safe and secure, to enhance transparency, and to transform excess weapons plutonium "irreversibly into forms that cannot be used in nuclear weapons." On the recent setback for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the U.S. Congress, Grey said a CTBT task force has been formed, with former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman John Shalikashvili at its helm, to work to "encourage the Senate ultimately to give its advice and consent to ratification." Senate ratification of the CTBT, he said, is something that President Clinton is convinced will happen. Following is the as delivered text of Grey's statement: (begin text) Madame President, As your country begins its service in the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), let me assure you of my delegation's full support in the difficult job you have undertaken. As your predecessor just over a year ago, I faced many of the same challenges that still confront you. It is undoubtedly a great frustration for both of us that the CD remains deadlocked in its efforts to agree on any elements to include in our work program. Some of the previous speakers during this session have claimed that the state of multilateral disarmament in the world at large does not give cause for optimism. That is too negative an appraisal. Even if one were to accept that the international community is not making as much progress as we would like, we in the CD need to remember that the picture outside our halls is not entirely bleak. The full record includes many practical achievements, and the international community continues to consolidate them today. The United States and Russia, for example, are ahead of schedule in making START I reductions, and our two countries have agreed to seek even lower levels of deployed warheads in START III. The United States continues to dismantle nuclear warheads; we have dismantled 7,000 since 1993 and 13,000 over the past decade. The U.S. has unilaterally removed hundreds of tons of fissile material from military stockpiles and has voluntarily pledged to make this material available for IAEA safeguards as soon as practical. We continue to work with Russia and others to ensure that nuclear materials are safe and secure, to enhance transparency, and to transform excess weapons plutonium irreversibly into forms that cannot be used in nuclear weapons. In the non-nuclear field, the global regime established by the Chemical Weapons Convention continues to be strengthened. A wide range of countries have intensified their cooperation aimed at discouraging missile tests and the export of destabilizing missiles and related technologies. The UN is negotiating a global protocol to combat the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in small arms, which often pose a danger to regional stability. On the Korean peninsula, efforts to reduce tensions continue under a broad initiative developed by former Secretary of Defense William Perry. The U.S. and other countries are actively seeking to promote strategic restraint in South Asia, and there have been hopeful developments in negotiations to secure a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Undeniably, the U.S. Senate's failure last October to agree to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was a setback. However President Clinton made it abundantly clear that the fight is not over. He is convinced that, in the end, the United States will ratify the CTBT, and the Administration has already taken steps to secure this outcome. A CTBT task force has been established, and the President has appointed General John M. Shalikashvili as a special adviser to reach out to members of the Senate, seek to bridge differences, and encourage the Senate ultimately to give its advice and consent to ratification. Madame President, Here in the CD, my country's first priority remains negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). This goal was identified in the Principles and Objectives document of the 1995 NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) Review Conference as the next practical step in multilateral efforts leading toward nuclear disarmament. One speaker, however, whose country subscribed to the NPT Principles and Objectives document, has now stated that his country will not permit the CD to negotiate on FMCT unless there are parallel negotiations on nuclear arms reductions and outer space. But there is a broad understanding in this body that these two topics are not ripe for treaty negotiations in the CD. The United States for its part is prepared to discuss, in a suitable context, outer space issues and questions related to the long-term goal of nuclear disarmament; but proposals for CD negotiations now in these fields are clearly not a basis for consensus. It would be even more problematical to go in the other direction and downgrade CD work on FMCT from negotiation to discussion. A negotiation on FMCT is not new to the CD. In 1995 and 1998 the CD established ad hoc committees with just that task. To do anything less now would be a step backward. If we cannot move forward on the basis of a solid international consensus formally endorsed by the member states of the CD, all the Parties to the NPT, and at the UN General Assembly, then no agreement is safe. Succumbing to the temptation to reopen previously agreed issues will only slow the disarmament process even further and increase the obstacles to the achievement of our shared goals. My delegation is concerned that we are headed in the wrong direction again this year. We began this session with an implicit understanding that two main issues remained to be resolved before we could agree on elements of a work program and get down to business. Yet so far we seem to be increasing rather than decreasing our areas of disagreement. What happens next is up to us. The CD will have no trouble maintaining its role as the world's single multilateral negotiating body if we do what is expected of us: negotiate multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements that contribute to the security and well being of humankind. We need to focus on what is possible now, not seek perfect, all-encompassing solutions to disarmament. We also need to resist the urge to score political debating points or involve the CD in issues it cannot address effectively. If we can do this, members of the CD will have no trouble keeping it relevant and engaged. If not, those who seek progress on disarmament will look elsewhere. In my remarks today, I have focussed primarily on FMCT negotiations as a first priority for the CD. The United States continues to seek a CD role in negotiating a comprehensive ban on transfers of anti-personnel land mines (APL). We realize that the CD has never taken a formal decision to negotiate on APL, but it has on FMCT. We are deeply concerned that one or two countries are now calling this consensus on FMCT into question. Madame President, On another issue, I am obliged to comment on the remarks made recently in this hall by the distinguished representative of China. Aside from the erroneous impressions they created, these remarks involved the kind of name calling on issues extraneous to the CD that complicates our mutual efforts to get practical work done. It was implied that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was little more than a tool of the United States, available on demand for enforcing hegemonism, intervening in countries' internal affairs, and practicing the unauthorized use of force. As for seeking hegemony, the record speaks for itself. Americans are not interested in that sort of thing. One of our founding fathers and early Presidents, John Quincy Adams, got it right when he wrote this about the United States of America and her policy: "Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own." That having been said, vindicating our national freedom and independence in today's world means accepting responsibilities far different from those we were willing to accept in Adams' time. The United States is now a main actor on the world stage-not the main actor, but a main actor. This is an important and crucial distinction, for, as a distinguished historian, Eugene Rostow, who was my old boss at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pointed out: "[Though] American pride resists it, the United States is not strong enough, and cannot make itself strong enough, to protect its security interests in world politics with its own efforts alone. Our dependence on alliances and coalitions will necessarily continue in the years ahead...." The point is clear: America looks for peace and security in partnership with like-minded nations. We don't seek domination, we seek balance. Just as we govern ourselves with a series of checks and balances, we embrace the same idea in international affairs. In short, we don't seek hegemony. We don't have the temperament or the inclination for it, nor do we have the means. In addition, the assertion that our NATO allies are manipulated with impunity by the United States simply isn't true. Defensive, democratic alliances don't work that way, either in Europe or elsewhere. Democratic alliances reach agreement collectively after much give and take. Massachusetts people like me learn very early in life that people who live north of us in Vermont, Maine, New Hampshire, and our Canadian cousins as well, are just like us. They don't take orders from anyone. Neither do democratic allies like the Norwegians, the Dutch or the Australians, to name but a few. If there are any doubts on that score, just check with anyone who ever negotiated a NATO communiqué together with our French allies. Far from exacerbating international tensions, the United States and its alliance partners in Europe and elsewhere have worked very hard to reduce them. In addition, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear forces. The number of nuclear weapons for sub-strategic forces in Europe has gone down by over 85 per cent. The readiness posture of alert forces is now measured in weeks rather than minutes, and in 1996 NATO ministers announced that NATO has "no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new member countries." All the allies are parties to the NPT, and all NATO members are committed to early entry into force of the CTBT. The distinguished representative of China also implied that the United States practiced a double standard toward arms control agreements and was trying to weaken or abolish the ABM Treaty. I reject this assertion. There has already been substantial public discussion of this issue, so the facts should be clear by now. The international environment has changed dramatically in the nearly 28 years since the ABM Treaty was signed. The threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction using advanced means of delivery is real, growing, and increasingly unpredictable. The spread of these technologies should not have happened, but regrettably it did. Those who allowed it to happen should have known what the consequences would be. The United States is considering a limited system to defend against such threats. We have made clear that we are committed to work with Russia, in a spirit of cooperation against a threat we both face, to identify adaptations of the ABM Treaty that would make its provisions consistent with a limited national missile defense. Our two countries have amended the ABM Treaty before, and bilateral discussions on START and ABM issues are continuing, including here in Geneva, even as the CD continues to squander its time. There are reasons to wonder at the source of this criticism. Four of the five nuclear weapon states have reduced their holdings of these weapons and increased transparency. The other nuclear weapon state is modernizing its forces and is not increasing its transparency. This same state decided to "test" fire missiles in 1996 in response to political developments of which it did not approve, and it has been building new missile fields in locations that raise concerns. Yet this state's representatives accuse the United States of practicing hegemonism and seeking unilateral security at the expense of the security of other states. And they call into question an open, orderly process aimed at finding necessary adaptations that can keep a long-standing arms control agreement relevant and effective. Madame President, The United States has a long history in arms control and disarmament. We have negotiated and implemented many agreements and continue to do so. Here in the CD the U.S. has already shown considerable flexibility on important elements of our program of work. In the spirit of making practical progress in areas where we know consensus exists, it is time for other CD members to show similar flexibility. If the CD does not get down to work, it will confirm my authorities' suspicions that this is because some governments don't want it to work. The U.S. supports the efforts your delegation will be making to reach consensus on the CD's program of work. We are ready to work closely with you, and your successors if need be, to create the conditions that will allow the conference to resume negotiations on FMCT. Conducting negotiations is the CD's main business, and the world at large will judge our success or failure by how well we do that job. Thank you, Madame President. (end text) (The Washington File is distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)