NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.

Command and Control of Special Operations Forces for 21st Century Contingency Operations

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________________

3 February 2003
Abstract

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES FOR 21ST CENTURY CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

The establishment of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in the late 1980’s created a single command designed to correct serious deficiencies in the ability of the United States to conduct special operations and engage in low-intensity conflict. Among other things, the creation of USSOCOM intended to correct problems associated with the command and control of Special Operations Forces (SOF). However, these command and control problems still exist today.

Recent contingency operations in Afghanistan and the Philippines have shown the command and control difficulties with SOF. The command and control structure established for Task Force DAGGER was *ad hoc* in nature and did not follow current doctrine. Although not perfect, the C2 structure established for Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines followed current doctrine and proved much easier to work with. Current doctrine is a starting point for establishing command and control structures and combatant commanders should follow this doctrine when establishing lines of command.

Creating a Standing Joint Task Force is not the way for combatant commanders to establish their staffs. In contrast, this paper argues that the optimal C2 for SOF operations in the 21st century should be a blend of doctrine and practical lessons learned during recent combat operations.
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INTRODUCTION

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 culminated four years of work by influential members of Congress. Senators William Cohen and Sam Nunn, among others, also realized that the United States required a much-improved organizational focus and chain-of-command for special operations. These two senators pushed legislation through Congress and the final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended Goldwater-Nichols, mandating the creation of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). USSOCOM was designed to correct serious deficiencies in the ability of the United States to conduct special operations and engage in low-intensity conflict. President Reagan signed the bill into law on 13 April 1987 and the Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987.

SOCOM’s mission is to support the regional combatant commanders, U.S. ambassadors and country teams, and other government agencies by providing special operations forces (SOF). SOCOM accomplishes its mission by using Army, Navy, and Air Force SOF when necessary. In great part, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, as amended, intended to correct problems associated with the command and control of SOF. However, such problems still exist today.

At the strategic and operational levels of war, an effective chain of command exists from the President to the Secretary of Defense to his combatant commanders. The functional and geographic combatant commanders have staffs that train during exercises in preparation for times of crisis. The geographic commanders have Theater Special Operations Components (TSOCs) that normally exist as sub-unified commands (e.g., Special Operations Command Pacific—SOCPAC). The TSOC provides special operations expertise, a discrete
element that can plan and control SOF employment, and theoretically a ready-made joint task force (JTF) capability. However, manning problems tend to detract from the actual combat readiness of some TSOCs. The TSOCs train to be able to provide a JTF staff, but tend to be unprepared to execute this capability when actual crises erupt.

Recent operations in Afghanistan (and even earlier in DESERT STORM) demonstrate how a combatant commander uses his resources to conduct wartime operations. The combatant commander has the flexibility, per joint doctrine, to establish JTFs or not. The commander also may delegate such flexibility to his component commanders, who in turn may establish JTFs (e.g., Special Operations Task Force DAGGER, Afghanistan) or conduct operations as a component.

Despite the flexibility afforded by doctrine, recent operations in Afghanistan (specifically Task Force DAGGER) and the Philippines reveal problems associated with optimal SOF command and control (C2), and methods for solving them. This paper argues that the optimal C2 for SOF operations in the 21st century should be a blend of doctrine and practical lessons learned during recent combat operations.

**CURRENT DOCTRINE**

Command is central to all military activity, and unity of command is central to effective military effort. Inherent in command is the authority a military commander lawfully exercises over his subordinates. Although he may delegate that authority (as operational control) to accomplish missions, he is still responsible for the attainment of those missions. The combatant commander is the only person who has Combatant Command (COCOM) over forces assigned to him. He may delegate Operational Control (OPCON) or Tactical Control (TACON) to subordinate commanders, but may not delegate COCOM. The
combatant commander of each geographic command may delegate OPCON and TACON of special operations forces to the commander of the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). However, the command relationships must be clear. The combatant commander must ensure his forces understand for whom they are working and to whom they report. Unity of command can make or break a military force as illustrated during recent operations in Afghanistan and the Philippines. Although excellent officers and enlisted personnel may cover deficiencies in unity of command, a concise picture of who reports to whom makes operations clear, understandable, and leaves no doubt in anyone’s mind who is supporting the force and who is the supported force.

Joint Pub 3-0 states the principles and doctrine for conducting joint operations. It defines command and control as, “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command, in particular, includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to accomplish assigned missions.” It is imperative for the combatant commander and joint task force commander, if appointed, to understand the command relationships among superiors and subordinates. Both superiors and subordinates alike must understand to whom they report in case resource adjustments are necessary or problems arise.

Figure 1 details current joint doctrine per Joint Pub 3-0. The Joint Force Commander (JFC), usually established to command a JTF, has the authority to organize forces best to accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations. The JFC may or may not include any of the depicted entities. He may choose to organize his land forces under the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) dependent on mission tasking or units
assigned. Alternatively, he may leave the JFLCC off his task organization, and use the Army and Marine Service Component commanders. Normally, the JFC will establish a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and place all air assets under his operational control. However, the task organization must be flexible enough to accommodate all phases of assigned operations. The combatant commander or JTF commander, if assigned, will organize his forces, establish subordinate commands, set command relationships, and provide guidance to his commanders once he has established the joint task force. The task organization for a sub-unified command (e.g., Theater Special Operations Component) and a JTF may resemble the task organization shown above. When the combatant commander designates a JFC, the theater SOC may become the JFSOCC. In addition, the TSO may recommend that the JFC establish a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). The JSOTF is a temporary joint SOF headquarters established to control SOF forces of more than one Service in a specific theater of operations or to accomplish a specific mission. The TSO may establish a JSOTF when the C2 requirements exceed his own staff capability.
JSOTF is normally formed around elements from the theater SOC or another existing SOF organization. The TSOC commander may appoint himself the JSOTF commander or remain the JFSOCC in charge of multiple JSOTFs if necessary. However, he is most likely to remain the JFSOCC and delegate OPCON of the JSOTF forces to a designated JSOTF commander.15

The Joint Force Commander seeks unity of command and effort by ensuring his subordinates understand the lines of communication among the various levels of command. Centralized planning and decentralized execution are also essential for operational success. Centralized planning ensures all units are involved in the operations planning. Decentralized execution enables subordinate commanders the flexibility and capability to accomplish their assigned missions. Common doctrine is necessary when establishing command relationships. The U.S. armed forces Joint Publications provide much of the common doctrine necessary for conducting joint and multinational operations. Finally, the interoperability among units and Services is necessary to ensure all combatants are on the same execution timeline. One unit’s misunderstanding about who is doing what can cause disaster. Comparing a JTF’s organizational structure with how well it provides unity of effort, interoperability, centralized planning and decentralized execution, and conformation to common doctrine gives us a point of departure for determining whether operations are going to be successful or not.

TASK FORCE DAGGER – OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

The USCENTCOM commander (Commander, CENTCOM) conducts U.S. military operations in and around Afghanistan. Commander, CENTCOM has, per joint doctrine, a permanently dedicated special operations component (SOCCENT). SOCCENT commands,
plans, coordinates, and conducts operations with SOF provided to him by the Commander, Special Operations Command (Commander, USSOCOM).

The Commander, CENTCOM established Task Force DAGGER, a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), at Khanabad AB, Uzbekistan, in early October 2001. Included in TF DAGGER were elements of the 16th Special Operations Wing (SOW) from Hurlburt Field, FL, and the 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) from Ft. Campbell, KY.\textsuperscript{16} Initially the commander of the JSOTF was the commander of the 16th Operations Group from the 16th SOW. However, on 12 October 2001, the commander of the 5th SFG assumed command of the JSOTF because he had the preponderance of forces at Khanabad. The JSOTF initially controlled special operation aviation assets in Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Oman, and Turkey.

The command and control (C2) structure established for operations in Afghanistan was malformed from the beginning of the conflict. According to the Joint Special Operations Air Component J-3 for TF DAGGER, CENTCOM’s command and control structure was not adequate because it included ambiguous lines of communication. Figure 2 shows the organization initially established by CENTCOM in early October 2001, and it remained this way through the initial phases of the war.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Figure 2}\textsuperscript{17}
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This was not an optimal command and control structure. The TF DAGGER commander worked directly for the Commander, CENTCOM, because the SOCCENT commander was not available due to other tasks. This author believes the Commander, CENTCOM, probably established the C2 structure in this manner because there was very little time for planning the operation. The crisis CENTCOM faced did not enable an adequate buildup of forces and forced an *ad hoc* command relationship. U.S. national command pushed hard to start the war as soon as possible.18 This, in turn, caused very limited planning time and sub-optimal command and control structures. It was not until early December 2001 that SOCCENT was established as the JFSOCC, reporting to the CDR, CENTCOM, and with TF DAGGER and other SOF as subordinate SOCC components.19

TF SWORD (which later became TF-11), led by Major General Dailey, comprised forces from the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).20 TF SWORD began operations in early October from bases in Pakistan.21 Although doctrine states all SOF should fall under one JFSOCC, it does not have provisions for two different SOF components. TF SWORD did not report to the JFSOCC because it was CENTCOM’s desire that he report directly to the combatant commander.22 During the first three months of the conflict, this command relationship, established in the OPORD at the beginning of operations, was clear among SOF units but caused considerable confusion among personnel outside the special operations arena. Mission parameters separated the distinct SOF components and both entities understood the arrangement. The only issue was when both task forces wanted to use the same air assets and the staffs overcame this problem.23

Although the C2 structure eventually changed into a more effective model over time, operations in Afghanistan had numerous problems. The ambiguous C2 structure shown in
Upon arrival in theater in late October 2001 and lasting at least the first three months of the conflict, the Combined/Joint Force Air Component Commander (C/JFACC) confused the situation when AC-130 sorties were involved. TF DAGGER, and later the C/JFSOCC, allocated AC-130 sorties in support of SOF on the ground and allocated the extra sorties to the C/JFACC for close air support (CAS) missions. The C/JFACC misunderstood the C/JFSOCC’s intention of using these sorties and thought he had OPCON of these forces when, in fact, he only had TACON of AC-130s for the CAS missions they were tasked to accomplish. Operational control of AC-130 aircraft remained with the C/JFSOCC throughout combat operations, specifically as authorized by the operations order (OPORD).

More and more coalition forces deployed into the area of operations as the conflict grew. CENTCOM eventually established a Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC), later the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC), on 13 November 2001. Figure 3 shows the command and control structure in early December 2001. TF DAGGER and TF K-BAR were geographically separated JSOTFs. TF DAGGER was responsible for the northern Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and the Special
Operations missions conducted from Uzbekistan. TF K-BAR was responsible for the southern Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) and southern CSAR missions.

Problems persisted even when better-defined command lines were drawn after the establishment of the C/JFSOCC in late November 2001. The C/JFSOCC began tasking Task Forces DAGGER and K-BAR with some regularity, but staff shortages hampered SOCC effectiveness. As a result, the majority of TF DAGGER tasks still came directly from the Commander, CENTCOM, via nightly video teleconferences (VTCs). This was further aggravated by the fact that TF DAGGER was required to fulfill two execute orders (EXORDs) issued by CENTCOM, one for its Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission and the other for its classified SOF mission. This overall relationship strains a unit when it is performing two distinct and equally important missions.

Confusion over command relationships continued even after the establishment of the C/JFSOCC and C/JFLCC. Some SOF units and personnel OPCON to TF DAGGER and the C/JFSOCC were TACON to the C/JFLCC during certain missions in November and December 2001. ARCENT’s Combat Arms Assessment Team (CAAT) Initial Impressions Report (IIR) states, “the use of special operations forces in concert with conventional forces was difficult due to poorly defined command relationships and SOF’s predisposition to avoid sharing information or conduct parallel planning with conventional forces. SOF elements’ unwillingness to vertically share information with the CFLCC staff and horizontally with other conventional forces hindered operational and tactical planning and execution.” This confusion stemmed from command relationships. Commanders of units exercise OPCON as their command authority. Commanders may provide forces TACON to perform specific missions, but the OPCON authority still rests with the designated commander. According to
the IIR, ‘CENTCOM commander’s decision to retain operational control of SOF forces restricted the C/JFLCC’s ability to coordinate effectively with his subordinate SOF elements.’ This author does not understand this statement because CENTCOM eventually assigned all SOF assets OPCON to the C/JFSOCC (except for TF SWORD/TF-11 assets). Regardless, this ineffective command relationship created an environment that lacked not only unity of command but also unity of effort between the C/JFLCC and the various SOF elements TACON to the C/JFLCC.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILIPPINES (OEF-PI)

OEF-PI comprised operations in support of the Philippines armed forces in the global war on terrorism. Pacific Command’s (PACOM) theater Special Operations Component was the lead organization for this operation. The commander of Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC), was designated the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander by US Commander, Pacific (Commander, PACOM), and tasked to establish a base of operations on the Philippine island of Zamboanga. Figure 4 shows the command and control structure set up by Commander, PACOM, and the JTF commander for operations in the Philippines. The command relationships shown in Figure 4 are straightforward and follow joint doctrine.

The SOCPAC staff comprised a majority of the JTF staff. In addition, most of the JTF forces were Special Operations Forces from Okinawa, South Korea, Guam, and Hawaii. The Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), headed by the 353rd Special Operation Group (SOG) commander, provided forces for joint special operations air tasks. In addition, D-Company of the 3rd Battalion from the 160 Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) provided Army helicopters to support the contingency operations. The Army SOF component came from the 1st Battalion of the 1st Special Forces
Group stationed in Okinawa. In addition, a SEAL team from Guam helped conduct operations. Finally, a Marine Security Element from MARFORPAC helped provide force protection for the command headquarters.

The SOCPAC J-5 states that the command and control structure was not perfect but it worked well. In addition, the SOCPAC J-3, who remained back at Camp Smith, HI, stated the C2 organization was doctrinally sound and well understood. This C2 structure is close to optimal. This stems, in part, from the amount of time the staff had in setting up the JTF. In addition, the C2 diagram suggests there were few C2 problems. The SOCPAC J-5 states, “there were always OPCON/TACON problems but we were able to work it out. PACAF did
not want to lose OPCON of its Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) helicopters from the 33 RQS located at Kadena AB, Okinawa. Therefore, the JTF took TACON of those assets for the missions assigned without any problems, and the relationship worked well.”

This unity of effort shown by the two flying commands, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC) and PACAF, provides an excellent example of how an OPCON/TACON relationship can work to everyone’s advantage. The JSOAC received TACON of the PACAF assets for only the mission PACAF was supporting and the PACAF AFFOR retained OPCON.

The JTF commander worked for the PACOM commander per joint doctrine. The OPORD provided the JTF components with their tasks and, upon dissemination, granted DIRLAUTH (direct liaison authorized) among component units. The command relationships among the components are less constrained when the JTF commander grants such DIRLAUTH. DIRLAUTH is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to consult or coordinate an action directly within a command agency or outside the granting command. Commanders normally grant DIRLAUTH among units for planning purposes and not for mission tasking. Units do not need to go through the JTF headquarters for mission coordination and have more flexibility when granted DIRLAUTH. This is very important when planning operations. All units must be on the same execution schedule when conducting operations. Centralized planning and decentralized execution are vital to successful completion of mission tasking. DIRLAUTH allows for accomplishment of both. Centralized planning is inherent to DIRLAUTH because all units work towards the same goal. Decentralized execution is present because all participants understand the mission and how to accomplish it without higher authority micromanagement. The JTF
accomplished centralized planning and decentralized execution throughout the Philippine operations.

Common doctrine was prevalent for operations in the Philippines. The JTF commander established the C2 structure per joint doctrine and it worked well. Each commander has his preferences. However, as the SOCPAC J-5 stated, “each commander has his own idea of how command and control should be arranged. Many senior commanders still do not understand what it means to have OPCON of a unit...some think that the staff functions can have OPCON of a unit when commanders only get OPCON.” Joint doctrine is a point of departure when establishing command relationships. Commanders must ensure all participants understand these relationships and who is supporting whom. Confusion reigns among units that do not understand for whom they work while conducting wartime operations. The JTF for OEF-PI accomplished the same results as TF DAGGER, but with greater ease because of a more effective C2 structure. The OEF-PI command and control structure closely approximates the optimal C2 structure necessary for SOF operations in the 21st century.

CONCLUSIONS

The recent combat operations give a great example of how and how not to establish a command and control structure. The initial C2 structure established for TF DAGGER by CENTCOM during the commencement of operations in Afghanistan was not the optimal structure necessary for sustaining successful combat operations. There was no unity of effort because there were no clear lines of communication between the combatant commander and his subordinates. The lines of command got better as time progressed, but there was still considerable confusion about who worked for whom and who supported whom. Such
confusion causes lack of unity of effort, leads to centralized execution because the commander is the only one who knows the mission, and leads to decentralized planning because no one knows who is planning what. CENTCOM somewhat ignored common doctrine during planning for operations in Afghanistan. If the CENTCOM commander had established a Joint Task Force Commander instead of himself acting as the JTF commander, many of the communications problems probably would not have happened. Only the professionalism and dedication to duty by the soldiers involved allowed the operations in Afghanistan to be as successful as they were.

In contrast, common doctrine guided the C2 structure established during the OEF-Philippines operation, which facilitated unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. There is no doubt that this is about as optimal as it gets when establishing a command and control structure for an operation.

The biggest difference between the two operations was the quality of communications flow. The TF DAGGER flow was sketchy at best. Information flowed from the components up to the CJFSOCC instead of the other way around. The CJFSOCC asked the JSOAC questions about possible mission tasking instead of going through the JSOTF. The whole relationship was backwards. Doctrine tells us that the immediate commander should task his units with missions. However, CENTCOM, not the C/JFSOCC tasked TF DAGGER every night in his VTC. This caused turmoil. Planners did not receive their missions until after midnight each night. Crews and teams could not do any in-depth analysis because they were always trying to catch up. In addition, command relationships were fogged during certain joint operations. The CFLCC thought the CJFSOCC was TACON for a mission and the CJFSOCC thought otherwise.
In contrast, the execution of the Philippine operation was relatively smooth. There were occasional “speed bumps”, but overall the command and control structure established by the commander PACOM was accurate per doctrine. PACOM tasked missions to the JTF instead of vice versa. Commander PACOM established the command relationships up front in the OPORD. Units knew to whom they reported and who reported to them. Commanders need this solid line of communication so there are no questions. All missions conducted during OEF-Philippines had a set command structure, and commanders did not deviate from the OPORD.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Optimal SOF Command and Control Structure

At the operational level of war, the optimal command and control structure for SOF operations in the 21st century should be a blend of doctrine and practical lessons learned during recent combat operations. Joint Vision 2020 states the following:

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction over the joint force. It is necessary for the integration of the Services’ core competencies into effective joint operations. The increasing importance of multinational and interagency aspects of the operations adds complexity and heightens the challenge of doing so. Command and control includes planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations, and is focused on the effective execution of the operational plan; but the central function is decision making.\(^{39}\)

Command authority rests with the combatant commander. He can delegate operational control to the JTF commander when necessary. Command and control is more than just telling troops to defeat the enemy. C2 starts in the planning phase and goes through execution. The combatant commander must establish effective lines of command early and ensure all personnel know their role in the fight. Currently, joint doctrine mixed with the
command and control structure illustrated during OEF-Philippines hits the mark.

Commanders must apply joint doctrine during times of crisis.

- **Standing Joint Task Force**

  One possible counterargument to using current joint doctrine is the concept of each combatant commander establishing a Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) for use in combat operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has directed that all geographic commanders establish a SJTF headquarters (SJTFHQ) by 2005. The advantage of having a SJTFHQ is to provide a core of operational experts to afford the combatant commander a continuous planning capability that may be augmented when the situation dictates. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) states that, “the SJTFHQ provides the ability to rapidly form, deploy, and employ the joint force early in a contingency”. The major push for this concept is the ability to deploy a staff rapidly when a contingency arises. Typically, a combatant commander must appoint a JTF commander and staff to commence combat operations. However, often this staff is untrained in joint task force procedures. Combatant commanders, by establishing a SJTFHQ, would have a core of personnel to use during times of crisis. These planners could be augmented if necessary. In addition, Mr. Myers’ states, A SJTFHQ would lift the burden of joint task force command from the shoulders of the air, land, sea, and special operations component commanders and their staffs. This requires that they divide their time between component and joint force operations and spend considerable time in organizing and training augmentees and other component liaison officers.

  The SJTF concept applied to SOF may be a bad idea. A SJTFHQ set up to run primarily a SOF operation is a misuse of resources. SOF operations are unique in scope and depth. Most commanders do not understand the full capability SOF operators bring to the fight. A theater SOC is a sub-unified command established for SOF operations, who is
already tasked in doctrine to establish a SOF JTF (JSOTF) when necessary. Therefore, putting a staff of non-SOF operators into a SOF operation is not the optimal way of conducting business. In addition, the SOCPAC J-3 states he does not like the idea of a standing JTF in theaters.\textsuperscript{44} The optimal solution for organizing a SOF operation is to use current doctrine and the organization employed during the recent operations in the Philippines.

**POSTSCRIPT**

It is extremely difficult to prosecute combat operations when the C2 structure is established “on the fly” as one commences operations. However, U.S. forces went to war in Afghanistan without an on-the-shelf plan in a very difficult environment. They showed ingenuity in tackling the challenges of operating half way around the world.\textsuperscript{45} The professionalism and dedication to duty shown by all the special operations and conventional forces made overcoming the command and control problems challenging but feasible. Lt Col Schafer states that the players made the C2 structure work.\textsuperscript{46} The ARCENT CAAT Initial Impressions Report states, “every success enjoyed by the CFLCC and CJFSOCC was the direct result of professional cooperation between higher, subordinate, and adjacent commands. Informal relationships between members of the CFLCC staff and members of the SOF community operating in the Afghan Area of Operations helped overcome the difficulty between the SOF and conventional forces.”\textsuperscript{47} Although CENTCOM did not establish the optimal command and control structure for operations in Afghanistan, the professional warriors at Task Force DAGGER successfully accomplished their mission and removed the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.
NOTES


3 Ibid, 5.


5 HQ USSOCOM/SOCS-HO, 6.

6 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict), 11.

7 Ibid, 13.


9 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict), 13.

10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Pub 3-0 (Washington, DC: 10 Sep 2001), II-17.


12 Ibid, V-3.


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19 Personal experience, Oct 01-Jan 02.

20 Johann Price, 1.

21 Ibid.

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