The Honorable John McCain  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC  20510  

Dear Mr. Chairman:  

I am pleased to submit the enclosed report in response to Section 1062 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015.  

This report details both the planning assumptions and scenarios used to determine the size and force structure of the Army for Fiscal Years 2016 through 2020, and an evaluation of the adequacy of the proposed force structure for meeting the goals of the National Military Strategy. The report provides a description of alternative force structures examined, their advantages and disadvantages, their resource requirements and reasons for why those not selected were rejected. Additionally, the report contains an independent risk assessment of the proposed Army force structure, conducted by the Chief of Staff, Army. Lastly, the report provides a description of plans and actions taken to implement and apply the recommendations outlined in the Government Accounting Office Report 14-76 on actions needed to improve the stationing process.  

Thank you for the opportunity to present this report and for your continued support of our Army.  

Sincerely,  

John M. McHugh  

Enclosure
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

March 2015

In Response to Section 1062 of Public Law No. 113-291

Preparation of this report/study cost the Department of Defense (DoD) a total of approximately $7,190 for the 2015 Fiscal Year. This includes $10 in expenses and $7,180 in DoD labor.

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose of this Report

This report responds to the requirements of Section 1062 of Public Law 113-291. This section, reprinted below, directs the Secretary of the Army to report on force structure of the U.S. Army, to include the following:

An Act

To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2015 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SEC. 1062. REPORT ON ADDITIONAL MATTERS IN CONNECTION WITH REPORT ON THE FORCE STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY.

(a) Report Required.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Army shall submit to Congress a report on the matters specified in subsection (b) with respect to the report of the Secretary on the force structure of the United States Army submitted under section 1066 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239; 126 Stat. 1943).

(b) Matters.—The matters specified in this subsection with respect to the report referred to in subsection (a) are the following:

(1) An update of the planning assumptions and scenarios used to determine the size and force structure of the Army, including the reserve components, for the future-years defense program for Fiscal Years 2016 through 2020.

(2) An updated evaluation of the adequacy of the proposed force structure for meeting the goals of the national military strategy of the United States.

(3) A description of any new alternative force structures considered, if any, including the assessed advantages and disadvantages of each and a brief explanation of why those not selected were rejected.

(4) The estimated resource requirements of each of the new alternative force structures referred to in paragraph (3).

(5) An updated independent risk assessment of the proposed Army force structure, to be conducted by the Chief of Staff of the Army.

(6) A description of plans and actions taken to implement and apply the recommendations of the Comptroller General of the United States regarding force reduction analysis and decision process improvements in the report entitled "Defense Infrastructure: Army Brigade Combat Team Inactivations Informed by Analysis but Actions
Section I. Update of the planning assumptions and scenarios used to determine the size and force structure of the United States Army, including the reserve components, for the Future Years Defense Program for Fiscal Years 2016 through 2020

A. Planning Assumptions

This report is an update to the Army Report to Congress on Force Structure (August 2013) in response to Section 1062, National Defense Authorization Act 2013, which covered Army force structure for Fiscal Years 2014-2018. As mentioned in the August 2013 report, the Army used the established process of Total Army Analysis (TAA), which involves the participation of active and reserve component representatives in an open and collaborative manner, to determine the force for Fiscal Years 2014-2018 as a basis for building the Fiscal Years 2014-2018 program. TAA 15-19 was used to determine the Fiscal Years 2015-2019 force. In November 2012, the Army initiated TAA 16-20 for Fiscal Years 2016-2020 and derived planning assumptions from existing higher level documents such as the Defense Strategic Guidance (also known as "Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense") (January 2012), and Defense Planning Guidance, Fiscal Years 2014-2018 (April 2012). Other assumptions included in TAA 16-20 were: (1) the foundational activities selected for modeling capabilities demand represent the same level of effort anticipated for the future steady state environment; (2) priority of resources must go toward meeting Homeland Defense and Combatant Command war plan demands, followed by meeting Phase III (Dominate) demands in surge scenarios approved for DoD analysis; (3) resources are insufficient to build the exact capabilities demanded for all phases of a surge scenario; (4) there will be time to build capabilities for phases IV (Stabilize) and V (Enable Civil Authorities) of a surge scenario; and (5) phase I (Deter) and phase II (Seize the Initiative) requirements can generally be adequately met with forces built for phase III (Dominate).

As the TAA 16-20 cycle transitioned into the Fiscal Years 2016-2020 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) build, key documents that influenced force structure decisions were the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report (March 2014) and "Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), Fiscal Years 2016-2020" (July 2014). The QDR 2014 report builds on the Defense Strategic Guidance by describing a defense strategy consisting of three pillars: Protect the homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and to support civil authorities in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters; Build security globally, in order
to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners and cooperate with others to address common security challenges; **Project power and win decisively**, to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The 2014 QDR report states that military forces, in aggregate, will be capable of simultaneously defending the homeland; conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and in multiple regions, deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward presence and engagement. This is consistent with the requirements of the updated defense strategy and resourced at the President’s Budget level, Fiscal Years 2015–2019 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) forces. If deterrence fails at any given time, U.S. forces could defeat a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and deny the objectives of — or impose unacceptable costs on — another aggressor in another region. This force planning construct also applied to Fiscal Years 2016-2020 FYDP forces.

TAA 16-20 assumed an active component (AC) end strength (ES) of 490K, an Army National Guard (ARNG) ES of 350.2K and a United States Army Reserve (USAR) ES of 202K as the base force. These end strengths supported the decision announced in June 2013 to reorganize AC brigade combat teams while reducing their number from 45 to 33, later to 32. The number of ARNG brigade combat teams remained at 28. The 2014 QDR report states that Army AC ES would be further reduced to 440-450K, ARNG ES to 335K and USAR ES to 195K across the FYDP. This was reflected in the President’s Budget level, Fiscal Years 2015–2019 FYDP submission along with a description of the Aviation Restructure Initiative which aims to optimize the Army aviation force in both the AC and RC to better respond to contingencies at home and abroad. The 2014 QDR report further stated that if sequestration-level cuts are imposed in Fiscal Year 2016 and beyond, all components of the Army would be further reduced, with AC ES decreasing to 420K, the ARNG drawing down to 315K and the USAR reducing to 185K.

**B. Scenarios**

In accordance with strategic planning guidance, the Army updated its integrated security construct of DoD-approved future illustrative foundational activity and surge scenarios over a multiyear timeline for use in the Capabilities Demand Analysis (CDA) phase of TAA 16-20. The TAA 16-20 scenario set is found in the classified annex (provided as a separate enclosure) to this document.

The current suite of scenarios present challenges to CDA. There is no large counter-insurgency operation or long-term stability operation. Only one of the approved scenarios has a significant ground requirement and none of them adequately accounts for requirements associated with weapons of mass destruction elimination. The scenarios are overly optimistic in their assumption of allied, partner and host nation contributions. Scenarios assume units have a 100 percent equipment readiness rate and units are fully manned. The scenarios do not account for the attrition of forces. The scenarios assume transportation feasibility and forces arrive in
theater to meet combatant commander timelines. The requirement to support other Services and partner nations is not adequately considered. The scenarios do not account for the potential for longer duration conflicts. These scenarios do not stand alone with CDA, and combined they compound aggregate risk.

Activities contained in the integrated security construct represent the primary military missions described in the Defense Strategic Guidance, namely: (1) Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare; (2) Deter and Defeat Aggression; (3) Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges; (4) Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction; (5) Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space; (6) Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities; (7) Provide a Stabilizing Presence; (8) Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations; and (9) Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief and Other Operations. (NOTE: The Army does not have a role in “Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent” mission which is also in the Defense Strategic Guidance.)

The force structure supply file used for CDA incorporates force design updates approved for modeling. Planning factors and rules of allocation which affect modeling were also reviewed and updated as necessary. As in previous TAA cycles, CDA outputs were used to facilitate the Resourcing phase of TAA 16-20. The results of both the CDA and Resourcing phases of TAA were briefed to the Army Senior leadership for approval of the Fiscal Years 2016-2020 force for use in building the POM.

C. Results

TAA 16-20 initially developed a plan for shaping a Total Force comprising 490K AC ES, 350.2K ARNG ES and 202K USAR ES to meet strategic guidance. This plan also included the reorganization of brigade combat teams (BCTs) to 32 BCTs in the AC and 28 BCTs in the ARNG. Informed by the 2014 QDR report and the President’s Budget level Fiscal Years 2015-2019 submission, the Army adjusted its target end strength to 450K AC, 335K ARNG and 195K USAR across the FYDP. The President’s Budget level, Fiscal Years 2016-2020 FYDP submission reflects a non-sequestration adjusted reduction ramp of 490K AC ES in Fiscal Year 2015, 475K for Fiscal Year 2016, 460K for Fiscal Year 2017 and 450K for Fiscal Year 2018 and beyond. The number of AC brigade combat teams will be reduced from 32 to 30 and the number of combat aviation brigades from 13 to 11. ARNG and USAR ES will be reduced to 342K and 198K, respectively, in Fiscal Year 2016 and to 335K and 195K, respectively, in Fiscal Year 2017 and beyond. The number of ARNG brigade combat teams will decrease from 28 to 26 by Fiscal Year 17 and the number of combat aviation brigades will remain at 8 under the Aviation Restructure Initiative.

Section II. An updated evaluation of the adequacy of the proposed force structure for meeting the goals of the National Military Strategy of the United States
A. **U.S. National Military Strategy Goals**

The National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America, released on February 8, 2011, lists the U.S. national military objectives as: (1) Counter Violent Extremism; (2) Deter and Defeat Aggression; (3) Strengthen International and Regional Security; and (4) Shape the Future Force. The release of the NMS was followed by Defense Strategic Guidance entitled “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” release in January 2012.

A summary of the salient points of the objectives is listed below:

**Counter Violent Extremism:**

- “The Nation’s strategic objective in the campaign in South Central Asia is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaida and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return to either country.”

- “We will strengthen and expand our network of partnerships to enable partner capacity to enhance security. This will help reduce potential safe-havens before violent extremism can take root. We will nest our efforts to build partner capacity with broader national security priorities, consolidate our institutional processes and improve coordination across agencies.”

**Deter Aggression:**

- “The Joint Force will provide capabilities to deter aggression and assure our allies and partners through our nuclear arsenal and overseas missile defense capabilities.”

- “We will counter W[eapons] of M[ass] D[estruction] proliferation as it presents a grave and common threat to our Nation and others.”

- “We must also maintain a robust conventional deterrent.”

**Defeat Aggression:**

- “We must provide capabilities to defeat adversary aggression.”

- “Defeating adversary aggression will require the Joint Force to support National approaches to counter anti-access and area-denial strategies.”

- “Joint assured access to the global commons and cyberspace constitutes a core aspect of U.S. national security and remains an enduring mission for the Joint Force.”
Strengthen International and Regional Security:

- "Strengthening international and regional security requires that our forces be globally-available, yet regionally-focused."
- "Global posture remains our most powerful form of commitment and provides us strategic depth across domains and regions."
- "We will defend the homeland and play a critical role in supporting homeland security."

Shape the Future Force:

- "As we adjust to [increased budget] pressures we must not become a hollow force with a large force structure lacking the readiness, training and modern equipment it needs."
- "Our strategy, forged in war, is focused on fielding modular, adaptive, general purpose forces that can be employed in the full range of military operations. Joint Forces will improve their ability to surge on short notice, deploy agile command and control systems and be increasingly interoperable with other U.S. government agencies."
- "The skills and experiences of our Reserve and National Guard forces have become ever more relevant. To capitalize on the progress made, we must continue to utilize the Reserve Component and National Guard in an operational capacity as a trained, equipped, ready and available force for routine, predictable deployments."
- "Joint [Land] Forces will be capable of full spectrum operations and be organized to provide a versatile mix of tailorable and networked organizations operating on a sustainable rotational cycle."

B. Evaluation

A trained and equipped Army Total Force of 980K ES, supported by critical civilian and contractor manpower capability, can meet the current defense strategy at significant risk under the optimistic assumptions of the defense strategy. Major force structure decisions such as BCT reorganization and the Aviation Restructure Initiative are instrumental in preserving combat power at reduced end strength and posturing the force both at home and for overseas contingency operations. However, the strategy and underlying assumptions for which risk was assessed do not reflect the current international security environment. Therefore, the level of risk has increased. The force mix ratio which stood at 51 percent Active Component and 49 percent Reserve Component in Fiscal Year 2012 will change to 54 percent Reserve Component and 46 percent Active Component in Fiscal Year 2017. Additional resource reductions would challenge the Army’s ability to maintain balance between current ES/force structure and future investments, to include the capability provided by our civilian workforce. The POM for Fiscal
Years 2016-2020 is a transitional POM. The Army is posturing itself in accordance with the Defense Strategic Guidance, the 2014 QDR report and setting the stage for the development of the Army of 2025 and beyond. The Army’s Fiscal Years 2016-2020 force structure supports the needs of a force that will be smaller, yet still agile and ready to perform the full range of potential missions. This force keeps the Army in line with strategic guidance and reflects the evolving fiscal environment. There is risk associated with placing stress on a force by asking it to do more with less. Forces rotate quickly and some forces may not be at the desired state of readiness before deploying. There is less depth/flexibility to respond to the unexpected, and there will be an increased requirement to disengage from one activity when a higher priority activity appears. Risk also exists in the ability of the civilian workforce to generate and sustain combat power in key and critical capabilities such as maintenance, training and medical care. However, this evaluation must take into consideration the evolving international security environment which contains security challenges not envisioned in the NMS, namely, tension in eastern Europe, the threat of Islamic Extremism in Iraq and Syria and a humanitarian crisis in West Africa. These events increase the level of risk associated with a 980K force significantly.

The Fiscal Years 2016-2020 POM force sustains, and in certain ways, increases the Army’s contribution to the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community. The Army is increasing focus on carrying forward and improving the interoperability between SOF and General Purpose Forces (GPF) – extending the depth and reach of the SOF force across all of its mission sets. And, of course, the Army continues to provide mission-tailored, ready forces across all capability areas in support of ongoing operations around the globe. Taken together, these capabilities are indicative of the Army’s continuing ability to support the mission set of “Counter Violent Extremism” effectively.

The Army maintained its commitment to the joint force by supporting combatant commanders’ Phase 0 (Shape) and Phase I (Deter) intelligence requirements through Theater Military Intelligence Brigades. The Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) policy provides globally responsive, regionally engaged and mission tailored capabilities to meet combatant command requirements across the range of military operations. In addition to decisive action readiness, the RAF policy provides additional planning capacity, increased Army readiness and responsiveness to crises and readily available force packages for theater security cooperation and other “Phase 0” shaping activities. The Army has also sustained its commitment to providing the combatant commanders and other Services with continual communications and logistics support. Taken together, this set of capabilities plays a critical role in enabling partner capacity and enhancing security and in strengthening international and regional security.

This programmed force also protected and invested in Army air and missile defense capabilities, cyber capabilities and other capabilities critical to combating weapons of mass destruction or enabling the consequence management after their use. And, maintaining a ready, relevant and modern force provides the Nation with a highly credible deterrent threat and the ability to rapidly respond and defeat an adversary.
Where the Army’s programmed force accepts some level of risk is in depth and balance. The Defense Strategic Guidance specifically directed that the Army will not be sized to conduct long-term, large-scale stability operations. Thus, if the Army is called upon again to execute a lengthy campaign, the force will be stressed until the Army can regenerate combat power, a process that will require several years. In this case, stress means Soldiers being required to remain deployed for longer periods of time (e.g., beyond the historical norm of one year), or having to repeatedly redeploy without having had sufficient dwell at home to do the proper recovery and recuperation. This lack of depth is in some sense ameliorated by the Total Force Policy under which the Army operates – we fully leverage our Reserve Component in all that we do. The Nation also incurs strategic risk with its limited ability to respond to the unexpected. The degree of risk also varies over time. Near-term risk can be mitigated by diverting funding from the modernization and capital investment accounts to sustain training and readiness. We have some capability to do this due to the tremendous investments made during the recent years when funding was more readily available, but in the long run the risk is only deferred, not eliminated.

Section III. Description of any new alternative force structures considered, if any, including the assessed advantages and disadvantages of each and a brief explanation of why those not selected were rejected

A. Base Force

A major objective of TAA 14-18 was determining a base force that achieved an AC ES of 490K and this was done by cutting 8 AC BCTs (while maintaining 28 RC BCTs) and eliminating one corps headquarters (V Corps), 12K of enablers, 7.3K from Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students and the 10K Wartime Allowance. The base force also incorporated AC emerging growth in contracting, cyber, air and missile defense, fires command and control and a 2-star command and control element at Joint Base Lewis-McCord. Lastly, the base force factored in capabilities required to invest in and regenerate forces in the event that they become necessary in the future. TAA 16-20 continued to shape the capabilities of this base force within the end strengths listed above, taking into consideration senior leader guidance on the directed force, emerging growth and bill paying strategies.

Advantages to the base force design were:

1. The ability to reduce AC ES to 490K using a supportable personnel down ramp with minimal impact to Soldiers;

2. Increased BCT capability with the inclusion of a maneuver battalion, a brigade engineer battalion and additional fires;
3. Inactivation of units, a somewhat less costly alternative to the relocation of units;

4. The availability of equipment for redistribution to meet shortages in other Army units;

5. The addition of capacity in contracting, cyber, air and missile defense and command and control;

6. The ability to invest in and regenerate capabilities in the event that they become necessary in the future; and

7. No reduction in ARNG and USAR ES.

Disadvantages include:

1. A reduction of AC BCT inventory available for the range of military operations;

2. A reduction of force structure in the European Command Area of Responsibility, thereby limiting strategic flexibility; and

3. Strategic risk at the end of a surge.

B. Alternative Force

The alternative force evolved from the higher level decision to reduce Army end strength from that which was planned in TAA 16-20, namely 490K AC ES, 350.2 ARNG ES and 202K USAR ES to 450K AC ES, 335K ARNG ES and 195K USAR ES. This decision was made after completion of the TAA 16-20 cycle and during the Fiscal Years 2015-2019 POM build. Although the base force which was determined through TAA 16-20 was preferred, the alternative force came about as a result of force structure reduction decisions that occurred subsequent to the TAA cycle.

This alternative force also includes the BCT reorganization announced in June 2013, and adds the Aviation Restructure Initiative. The Fiscal Years 2016-2020 force structure will reduce the number of AC brigade combat teams from 32 to 30 and the number of combat aviation brigades from 13 to 11 in Fiscal Year 2016. The number of ARNG brigade combat teams will be reduced from 28 to 27 in Fiscal Year 2016. The locations at which the force structure reductions will occur are pre-decisional pending the results of the “Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Army 2020 Force Structure Alignment,” published in June 2014, and related community listening sessions scheduled for October 2014 through March 2015. Army Senior Leaders’ decisions and public announcements are tentatively planned for the June 2015 timeframe.

The increased effectiveness of the new BCT structure resident in both the base and alternative force offered major operational advantages. Extensive modeling and analysis confirmed the intuitive conclusion that the Army would incur no additional operational risk by reorganizing
roughly the same amount of raw combat power in a more effective tactical organization. Even under reduced end strength it appears that the Army will be able to largely preserve what it intended through BCT reorganization; however, this will come at a cost to other force structure. Additionally, the Aviation Restructure Initiative that the Army is undertaking ensures the proper balance of aviation structure between the active and reserve components.

There were disadvantages to the alternative force. A further reduction in end strength does entail a loss in some strategic depth and operational flexibility, if not capacity. However, given the directed end strength reductions, the Army is continuing to shape the force accordingly to best meet the defense strategy.

**Section IV. The estimated resource requirements of each of the alternative force structures referred to in Section III**

The Army concluded the cost associated with the alternative force structure will be roughly the same as that of the base force structure when considered holistically. The reason is that, while the Army has been directed to reduce its end strength under the alternative force structure, it is attempting to leverage any gains from initiatives like BCT reorganization and the Aviation Restructure Initiative to improve readiness of the force which was greatly affected by sequestration in Fiscal Year 2013. The end strength reductions, which have been accelerated to reach target end strength and continued operational demand, require sustainable resourcing and time to restore the balance of end strength, modernization and readiness. Therefore, the cost of the alternative force is roughly the same as the base force if it is to be resourced accordingly to achieve sustainable readiness.

**Section V. Updated independent risk assessment of the proposed Army force structure, to be conducted by the Chief of Staff of the Army**

See classified annex provided under separate cover.

**Section VI. Description of plans and actions taken to implement and apply the recommendations of the Comptroller General of the United States regarding force reduction analysis and decision process improvements in the report entitled “Defense Infrastructure: Army Brigade Combat Team Inactivations Informed by Analysis but actions needed to Improve Stationing Process” (GAO-14-76, December 2013) used in the Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Assessment of the Army**
a. The GAO report made five recommendations. The Army concurred with all five recommendations and committed to issue guidance through Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 5-10 to implement the recommendations.

b. As of December 2014, a draft DA PAM 5-10 containing appropriate guidance to implement GAO's five recommendations, consistent with the Army's response contained in the GAO Report has been reviewed by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Staff and other appropriate organizations. The draft DA PAM has been approved by the Director of Force Management and is with HQDA G-3/5/7, Administration and Resources Directorate, for final approval before it is published. A more detailed discussion of the guidance promulgated through the draft DA PAM 5-10 and the action the Army has taken consistent with that guidance is provided below.

Below is the information requested by DoD Office of Inspector General, pursuant to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3, to ensure adequate management action has been taken on the agreed-upon finding and recommendations contained in the GAO report. Excerpts of the five requests for information contained in the DoD Office of the Inspector General memorandum dated October 30, 2014, are reproduced in italics below. The Army's response follows each of the five requests.

a. Information Requested: Please discuss the current status of the Army's actions to issue guidance through Department of the Army Pamphlet 5-10 directing that stationing actions involving the loss or relocation of a brigade size unit or other units at an installation that exceed the Congressional notification threshold established in 10 U.S.C. §993(a) will include a staff recommendation for the Secretary of the Army on the use of community meetings as a means to gather public input. If the actions have been completed, please provide supporting documentation. If the actions are still ongoing, please explain and provide an estimated completion date.

(1) Section 2-2(c)(5) of the draft DA PAM 5-10 directs that “... stationing actions involving the loss or relocation of a brigade size unit or other units at an installation that exceed the Congressional notification threshold established in 10 U.S.C. §993(a) will include a staff recommendation for Army senior leaders on the use of community meetings as a means to gather public input.” The draft DA PAM 5-10 is currently under review by HQDA G-3/5/7, Administration and Resources Directorate, for final approval prior to publication.

(2) While the draft DA PAM is in final review, the Army has taken action to comply with the guidance contained therein. In preparation for end strength reductions below 490K AC
Soldiers as detailed in the 2014 QDR report, the Army will conduct Community Listening Sessions for 30 installations (from January – March 2015) where the combined reduction of Soldiers and Army Civilians could exceed 1K.

b. Information Requested: Please discuss the current status of the Army’s actions to issue guidance through Department of the Army Pamphlet 5-10 directing that the MVA model will be used to inform the stationing decisions related to the activation, inactivation or relocation of a brigade size unit or other units at an installation that exceed the Congressional notification threshold established in 10 U.S.C. §993(a). If the actions have been completed, please provide supporting documentation. If the actions are still ongoing, please explain and provide an estimated completion date.

(1) Section 2-2(a)(1) of the draft DA PAM contains guidance on the use of the Military Value Analysis (MVA) model stating that “[t]he MVA model is used to support stationing decisions related to force structure changes to a brigade size unit or other units, at an installation, that exceed the Congressional notification threshold established in 10 U.S.C. §993(a).” The draft DA PAM 5-10 is currently under review by HQDA G-3/5/7, Administration and Resources Directorate, for final approval prior to publication.

(2) While the draft DA PAM is in final review, the Army has taken action to comply with the guidance contained therein. In preparation for end-strength reductions below 490K AC Soldiers as detailed in the 2014 QDR report, the Army has reviewed and updated the attributes contained in the MVA model and will use the MVA model result to inform any necessary AC end strength reductions and stationing decisions to be implemented in Fiscal Year 2016 and beyond.

c. Information Requested: Please discuss the current status of the Army’s actions to issue guidance through Department of the Army Pamphlet 5-10 directing that significant changes to the MVA model will be reviewed by a GOSC chaired by the Director of Force Management prior to approval. If the actions have been completed, please provide supporting documentation. If the actions are still ongoing, please explain and provide an estimated completion date.

(1) Section 2-2(a)(3) of the draft DA PAM directs that “[s]ignificant changes to the MVA model, including but not limited to changes in the attribute weights, adding or removing an attribute or significantly altering the model will be reviewed by a general officer steering committee (GOSC), chaired by the Director of Force Management, prior to approval.” The draft DA PAM 5-10 is currently under review by HQDA G-3/5/7, Administration and Resources Directorate, for final approval prior to publication.

(2) While the draft DA PAM is under final review, the Army has taken action to comply
with the guidance contained therein. Following review of the MVA model’s attributes, Department of the Army subject matter experts, in close coordination with a team of experts from the Center for Army Analysis, recommended updates/changes to eight attributes. The proposal to update/change eight attributes in the MVA model was deemed sufficiently significant to warrant review by a GOSC. The eight updated attributes and the appropriate weighting of all attributes were reviewed and approved by a GOSC convened by the Director of Force Management and chaired by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7 on June 9, 2014.

d. Information Requested: Please discuss the current status of the Army’s actions to issue guidance through Department of the Army Pamphlet 5-10 directing that MVA model attribute scores for installations with non-contiguous training areas will include a statement explaining the manner in which the non-contiguous nature of the training area was given due consideration in the applicable attribute scores. If the actions have been completed, please provide supporting documentation. If the actions are still ongoing, please explain and provide an estimated completion date.

(1) Section 2-2(a)(4) of the draft DA PAM contains instructions directing that MVA model attribute scores for installations with non-contiguous training areas will include a statement explaining the manner in which the non-contiguous nature of the training area was given due consideration in the applicable attribute scores. The draft DA PAM 5-10 is currently under review by HQDA G-3/5/7, Administration and Resources Directorate, for final approval prior to publication.

(2) While the draft DA PAM is under final review, the Army has taken action to comply with the guidance contained therein. In preparation for end-strength reductions below 490K AC Soldiers as detailed in the 2014 QDR report, the Army worked with the subject matter expert for each of the attributes contained in the MVA model and drafted a statement explaining the consideration given to non-contiguous training areas for each attribute. The statements on the treatment of non-contiguous training areas have been consolidated and will be included as an appendix to the next MVA model results.

e. Information Requested: Please discuss the current status of the Army’s actions to issue guidance through Department of the Army Pamphlet 5-10 directing a regular review and update of the MVA model attributes definitions and data. If the actions have been completed, please provide supporting documentation. If the actions are still ongoing, please explain and provide an estimated completion date.

(1) Section 2-2(a)(3) of the draft DA PAM contains instructions directing that “[a]t a minimum, a formal review of the MVA model, along with its weights and attributes, will occur every two years.” The draft DA PAM 5-10 is currently under review by HQDA G-3/5/7,
(2) While the draft DA PAM is under final review, the Army has taken action to comply with the guidance contained therein. In preparation for end-strength reductions below 490K AC Soldiers as detailed in the 2014 QDR report, the Army worked with the subject matter expert for each of the attributes in the MVA model to review and, when appropriate, update attributes, formulas and definitions. Eight attributes in the model were revised/updated and all of the weights were reviewed and approved by a GOSC convened by the Director of Force Management and chaired by the Army DCS, G-3/5/7 on June 9, 2014. The Army will collect updated data for each attribute in the February 2015 to April 2015 timeframe. The MVA model’s results will inform any necessary end strength reduction and stationing decisions to be implemented in Fiscal Year 16 and beyond.

Conclusion

The Army used an established, comprehensive and transparent process, supported by DoD strategic and planning guidance and approved analytical products, to determine the Fiscal Year 2016-2020 POM force. This process included an analysis of an alternative force at reduced end strength -- which was directed during POM build -- to achieve the best force in support of an updated defense strategy under challenging and uncertain fiscal conditions. During the process, discussions were held with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff leaders to ensure that the Army’s Fiscal Years 2016-2020 POM force possessed the right mix of capabilities and capacity within authorized ES and total obligation authority to accomplish its core missions within acceptable risk. However, given the reality of the current international security environment, coupled with challenges with scenarios, risk has increased and the force is continually being assessed against its ability to meet these challenges. Moreover, the Army has taken action toward ensuring that recommendations to its stationing process are incorporated into the guiding pamphlet.

Classified Annex (provided separately)