1. Scope

This publication provides operational and organizational guidelines and establishes a framework for the planning and execution of joint conventional and unconventional evasion and recovery operations. It also provides specific guidance on joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP) for the conduct of certain aspects of these operations. This publication contains material common to all the Services which can be used as source material for indoctrination, briefing, training, and operational programs at all levels. It is derived primarily from Department of State policies, Office of the Secretary of Defense directives, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decisions, and policies and guidance developed by the JCS Executive Agent and the individual Services. This publication replaces the doctrine and guidance on evasion and related subjects contained in AFM 200-3/FM 21-77A/NWP 43 (A), 1 August 1967, “Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual.” Those portions of the manual pertaining to resistance to enemy interrogation, indoctrination, and exploitation; prisoner communications; prisoner of war camp procedures; and escape have been superseded by FM 21-78, 15 June 1989, “Resistance and Escape.”

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine and selected JTTP to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and selected tactics, techniques, and procedures and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and
Preface

procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

CARLTON W. FULFORD, JR.
Major General, USMC
Acting Director, Joint Staff

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Provides General Evasion and Recovery Considerations

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Discusses the Philosophy and Considerations of Recovery

For evasion and recovery (E&R) operations to be most effective, the joint force commander should integrate them fully with other available types of operations which support and recover isolated personnel, such as search and rescue, combat search and rescue, and diplomatic negotiations.

General

Evasion and recovery (E&R) operations are an integral part of military operations. The combatant commanders are responsible for developing plans and requirements to locate, support, recover, and repatriate isolated personnel. E&R operations improve the effectiveness of United States combat forces by preventing the capture and exploitation of US personnel by an enemy. E&R operations can be successful in any environment. Detailed plans, operations, and procedures should be developed at subordinate levels. Operational flexibility and multi-system redundancy are the primary factors in successful recovery. The Joint Search and Rescue Center is the organization responsible for integrating, monitoring, and maintaining records of all operations which support and recover isolated personnel. Component commanders establish rescue coordination centers (RCCs) to coordinate all component combat search and rescue activities, including coordination with other RCCs as appropriate.

The Guidelines for Evasion

Evasion is an extension of combat and a refusal to capitulate to the enemy. Potential evaders should understand their moral, legal, and operational responsibilities. To ensure potential evaders are properly prepared, the Services should integrate Code of Conduct and resistance training into appropriate E&R and survival training programs. Evaders are obligated by the Code of Conduct to make every effort to avoid capture and rejoin friendly forces.

Under established international law, an evader is considered a lawful combatant until captured. A prisoner of war escapee evading recapture is not considered a lawful combatant. The Law of War places certain restrictions on an evader. It is a
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Executive Summary

E&R requires training, planning, strategies, and support.

Successful E&R is dependent on effective training and prior planning. Training should include the techniques of combat survival, evasion movement, camouflage, surface navigation, E&R equipment, aids and devices, and recovery procedures and methods. Successful evasion is dependent on effective prior planning. The responsibility ultimately rests with the individual concerned. Sound evasion planning should incorporate intelligence briefings; selected areas for evasion area intelligence descriptions; E&R area studies; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape guides and bulletins; isolated personnel reports; and an evasion plan of action. Evasion strategies along the forward edge of the battle (FEBA) can depend on whether the FEBA is static, advancing, or retreating. Extended evasion occurs when the distance from the friendly force is much greater. Aids to evasion include evasion charts, blood chits, and pointee-talkees. In some instances, evaders may be isolated deep in hostile territory and early recovery will not be possible. E&R planners should develop means to provide assistance to the evader, such as caches and resupply operations, until recovery can be effected.

The Guidelines for Recovery

Recovery is the return of evaders to friendly control.

Successful recovery operations require extensive preparation and planning.

Recovery is achieved from planning, operations, and individual actions on the part of recovery planners, conventional or unconventional recovery forces, and/or the evaders themselves. Evaders may recover, or be recovered, to friendly control in a number of ways: they may make their way to friendly or neutral territory without assistance, they may be recovered as the result of planned conventional or unconventional recovery operations, or they may be recovered as the result of chance contact with friendly elements of the local populace performing acts of mercy or seeking profit.

The elements that impact recovery operations include availability of resources; capabilities and limitations of those resources; the exploitation of options as they become available; ability to task-organize; and the establishment of recovery
criteria. The methods for recovering evaders fall into two categories: conventional (unassisted recovery, combat search and rescue operations, or on-scene availability, making use of conventional aerial, surface, and subsurface military forces and equipment) and unconventional (planned assisted recovery or unplanned assisted recovery using special operations forces, guerrillas, clandestine organizations, and/or specially equipped clandestinely operated aircraft). Assisted recoveries can be either planned or unplanned due to chance. Once isolated, evaders should follow their evasion plan of action to the best of their ability. Whenever an individual is recovered, the most critical aspect of that recovery is the moment when the evader and the recovery force initially come together. Once in custody of the recovery force, evaders are searched and secured pending confirmation of their identity. All-source intelligence, civil affairs and psychological operations, operations security/military deception, and communications security all support E&R operations.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides operational and organizational guidelines and establishes a framework for the planning and execution of joint conventional and unconventional evasion and recovery operations. It discusses evasion and recovery operations across the range of military operations.
1. Evasion and Recovery Responsibilities

a. US Government (USG). The USG has the responsibility to assist and plan for the recovery of personnel who are isolated in hostile territory as the result of conflict throughout the range of military operations. This responsibility includes obtaining the release of US citizens who are unlawfully detained by hostile or unfriendly powers. The Department of Defense (DOD) retains primary responsibility for its personnel even though it may be necessary to coordinate or conduct recovery operations or activities through other agencies of the government.

b. DOD Organizations. The responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Mapping Agency, combatant commanders, and the Services are described in MCM 136-91, “Delineation of Responsibilities for Evasion and Escape Within the Department of Defense,” (To be replaced by CJCSI 3270.01). Users of this joint publication should ensure they are familiar with that document. Some specific evasion and recovery (E&R) responsibilities are described below and are summarized in Figure I-1.

- The combatant commanders, in response to strategic direction, are responsible for developing plans and requirements to locate, support, recover, and repatriate isolated personnel. Although the supported combatant commander initiates these efforts, the Joint Staff can assist Services and other agencies in providing support.

- The Services and the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are responsible for individual training of isolated personnel. The Services and USSOCOM should develop and procure equipment that meets the requirements established by the supported combatant commanders to locate, support, recover, and repatriate isolated personnel. Repatriation of recovered personnel is a Service responsibility with the supported combatant commander providing direct support.

- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has delegated to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) the primary responsibility for developing joint E&R tactics, techniques, and procedures publications; equipment; specialized E&R aids and tools; and for providing functional survival and E&R training expertise to the Services and combatant commanders. The Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Agency (JSSA) is the action agent for the CSAF.

2. Operational and Planning Considerations

For E&R operations to be most effective, the joint force commander (JFC) should integrate E&R operations fully with other available types of operations which support
and recover isolated personnel, such as search and rescue (SAR), combat search and rescue (CSAR), and diplomatic negotiations. The following paragraphs discuss operational and planning considerations for E&R operations.

a. **E&R operations are an integral part of military operations**, improving the effectiveness of US combat forces by preventing the capture and exploitation of US personnel by an enemy.

b. **E&R operations can be successful in any environment.** Local conditions should be considered as exploitable, surmountable factors rather than absolute barriers to success.

c. While combatant commanders provide strategic E&R guidance and specific training requirements for their operational area, detailed plans, operations, and procedures should be developed at subordinate levels, taking into consideration local geographic, climatic, political, cultural, and military factors. The joint E&R tactics, techniques, and procedures in this publication not only serve as guides for planning and operations, they facilitate realistic Service E&R training. Where possible, the E&R plan should be fully coordinated with the CSAR plan to ensure that evader equipment and procedures are compatible with CSAR equipment and procedures.

d. Since the assets most suited to the recovery of an evader may not be controlled by the evader’s parent Service, evasion support and recovery operations normally should be conducted as joint or multinational operations, as appropriate. Coordinating individual Service efforts and integrating organic recovery assets into joint
force recovery plans avoids duplication of effort, establishes complementary systems, and exploits unique, specialized resources.

e. **Operational flexibility and multi-system redundancy are the primary factors in successful recovery.** No single recovery system, force, or organization is suitable to all situations or can meet all requirements in any given situation. To cover all contingencies, a mix of conventional and unconventional recovery systems should be available for employment. Failure to establish alternative recovery systems or adapt standardized recovery systems to local conditions invites failure.

### 3. Joint Search and Rescue Center

The JFC normally designates the **Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC)** as the organization responsible for integrating all operations which support and recover isolated personnel. The JSRC normally validates and approves E&R operations concepts developed by the components, then monitors the implementation of those concepts. Once the component has implemented an E&R operational concept, the JSRC monitors its status and implements the best option to support and recover isolated personnel. The following paragraphs detail the events of the mission.

---

*The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission Begins — April 24, 1980*

*Artist, Ren Wicks - USAF Art Collection #69.80.*

The eight RH-53 helicopters take off from the carrier Nimitz for the rendezvous with the C-130 transports in central Iran. It is 7:30 in the evening somewhere in the Arabian Sea as the Navy Sea Stallion formation prepares for its journey to the secret meeting on the sands of Dash-e-Kavir desert, some 250 miles from the city of Tehran. The leading edges of one of the ruinous sandstorms that developed that night are visible on the horizon at the extreme right. The mission was joined by six C-130 Hercules Cargo planes from the US Air Force at the rendezvous site, flown in from Aswan, Egypt to refuel the choppers and jam Iranian radar. Dust storms and mechanical failures in three of the eight RH-53 helicopters forced abandonment of the mission.
describe the JSRC capabilities and responsibilities as they relate to E&R.

a. In addition to the roles and functions defined in Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR),” the JSRC is the primary combatant command organization to manage and coordinate E&R planning and operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components, or it may have a multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational search and rescue center). The JSRC should be staffed by trained personnel drawn from each joint force component, including US Coast Guard participation where practical. During peacetime, standing JSRCs normally oversee the development of integrated evasion and recovery concepts of operations to support operation plans, operation plans in concept format, and peacetime operations. The standing JSRCs should also coordinate training and exercises to prepare the JFC and component staffs, as well as forces which could be involved in SAR or E&R operations, to conduct support and recovery operations across the range of military operations. The JSRC coordinates the operational areas, reduces redundancy of coverage, and is familiar with the capabilities and limitations of the rescue coordination centers (RCCs) and forces under their control. E&R planners use this information to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures affecting potential evaders.

b. Normally, the JSRC is augmented by communications specialists, intelligence specialists, and personnel trained in SERE. During periods of conflict, the augmented JSRC acts as the coordination center to integrate E&R operations with other types of support and recovery activities. The JSRC provides the JFC the expertise required to accomplish the recovery mission. (Refer to Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue [CSAR],” for details on JSRC manning and operating procedures.)

c. To properly carry out its joint E&R management and coordinating functions, the JSRC performs the responsibilities listed in Figure I-2.

4. Rescue Coordination Center

Component commanders establish RCCs to coordinate all component CSAR activities, including coordination with other RCCs as appropriate. In some cases the JFC may task a component commander to designate the component RCC to function also as the JSRC. In this event, the JFC should give the component commander the requisite authority and responsibility for operating the JSRC as required by the joint force. (See Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue [CSAR],” for a detailed description of RCC responsibilities and functions.)
Ensures that a coordinated theater evasion and recovery (E&R) program is developed, and that all assigned forces possessing E&R capabilities and assets are prepared to execute the theater joint E&R mission

Maintains direct and continuous liaison with designated recovery assets and component command E&R offices of primary responsibility

Develops a joint force concept of operations and related tactics in coordination with the component commands and recovery assets

Ensures the development of E&R annexes to all joint force plans

Ensures the standardization of joint force E&R operations procedures involving conventional and special operations forces, and unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms, to include contact and authentication procedures

Ensures that all E&R equipment, tactics, procedures, and techniques are compatible within the joint force and are disseminated to potential users

Establishes procedures to task support to recovery forces and monitor mission progress and status of recovery assets

Establishes procedures to locate and communicate with personnel evading in denied or hostile areas

Determines evasion aid requirements

Recommends to the joint force commander E&R aids to support component requirements as well as the joint search and rescue center integrated support concept; coordinates with Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Agency (JSSA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for production of E&R aids as appropriate

Ensures that E&R scenarios during field and command post exercises are realistic, adequate, and reflect the theater environment and operating conditions

Participates in the development of E&R tactics, including exercise planning

Maintains records containing all available data on joint force personnel isolated in hostile territory conducting E&R; when no longer needed by the joint search and rescue center, forward them to JSSA for permanent archiving; do not destroy any records or case files relating to a missing, captured, or recovered person

Ensures that available data, including all-source intelligence, on the evasion environment in the theater is collected, maintained, and disseminated to appropriate commands

Forwards all information concerning sightings of missing, evading, or captured personnel to appropriate commands, DIA, and JSSA

Ensures that recovered and returned individuals who receive assistance from evasion mechanisms are debriefed by qualified intelligence personnel in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed debriefing policies and procedures (see Appendix A, “Administrative Processing of Department of Defense Individuals Who Have Returned from Isolated Territory”)

Ensures that the results of returnee debriefings are properly disseminated in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and JSSA guidance

Coordinates on all E&R-related directives issued by involved agencies

Provides selected personnel for specialized briefings or training when so directed by the joint force commander

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Figure I-2. E&R Responsibilities of the Joint Search and Rescue Center
1. Definition

Evasion is the process whereby individuals who are isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control.

2. Moral, Legal, and Operational Guidelines for Evasion

Potential evaders should understand their moral, legal, and operational responsibilities, and how varying techniques, equipment, and support affect evasion activities. To ensure that potential evaders are properly prepared, the Services should integrate Code of Conduct and resistance training into appropriate E&R and survival training programs and should develop E&R training and/or indoctrination programs for all personnel who may be subject to isolation or capture in hostile territory.

3. Code of Conduct Responsibilities While Evading

An evader remains a combatant for the duration of the evasion period. Article II of the Code of Conduct is shown in Figure II-1. Evasion is an extension of combat and a refusal to capitulate to the enemy. Evaders are obligated by the Code of Conduct to make every effort to avoid capture and rejoin friendly forces. Evaders who have been recovered provide useful information concerning successful evasion techniques and provide their country with inspirational morale victories, while denying the enemy the opportunity to capture and exploit prisoners. Efforts to evade fulfill both the intent and the spirit of the Code of Conduct. Evaders not only tie up enemy forces who have been directed to capture them, they cost the enemy time and resources that could otherwise be committed to other efforts. Even if eventually captured, evaders have nonetheless aided their country by denying the enemy potential access to timely intelligence.

“Evasion is the highest form of Resistance.”

SERE Training Instructor, JSSA

CODE OF CONDUCT — ARTICLE II

“I will never surrender of my own free will. If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.”

Figure II-1. Code of Conduct - Article II
Chapter II

4. Laws Governing Evasion

Evader actions are governed by a variety of national and international laws and conventions, depending on the type of conflict in which individuals are engaged.

a. Legal Aspects of Evasion During War

• Under established international law, an evader is considered a lawful combatant until captured. A prisoner of war (POW) escapee evading recapture is not considered a lawful combatant.

• Although this joint publication deals with principles and military guidance to govern the conduct of evasion and recovery activities only, it is nevertheless important to stress the distinction that is made between an evader and a POW escapee. This distinction is significant because although an individual who has escaped from a confinement facility engages in activities to avoid recapture, the individual is legally considered an escapee, not an evader, and the laws which protect an evader do not pertain. Under international law, an evader may commit acts of violence against legitimate military targets without being liable for prosecution by the enemy for violation of the local criminal laws. This entitlement does not extend to a POW escapee. An escapee is no longer privileged to commit hostile acts and may be charged under the laws of the detaining power for certain acts committed against the military or civilian population while escaping or avoiding recapture. The critical difference is the fact of capture. In the first instance, the individual is considered an evader and a lawful combatant and is subject to specific international laws; in the second instance, the escapee is subject to a totally different aspect of the law. Another distinction is made in the disposition of evaders and escapees who find their way into a neutral country. The evader who crosses into a neutral country is subject to detention by that country for the duration of the war. A neutral power that receives escaped POWs will leave them at liberty. If it allows them to remain in its territory, it may assign them a place of residence. The Geneva Conventions, particularly as set forth in Articles 91-94, GPW, recognize that POWs have a national obligation to escape and rejoin their own forces. Under those articles, POWs apprehended during or after an attempted escape are subject to disciplinary punishment only, provided any offenses they may have committed were for the sole purpose of facilitating their escape and provided those offenses do not entail any violence against life or limb or are acts intended for self-enrichment.

• The Law of War places certain restrictions on an evader, but it also provides evaders with a certain latitude in what is considered acceptable conduct. This is particularly true in the case of disguises.

  • Wearing of Enemy Uniforms. It is a violation of international law to “make improper use of” the uniform of the enemy. Persons captured while fighting in the enemy’s uniforms have traditionally been subject to severe punishment by the capturing power and treated as spies. It is, however, still permissible for military personnel isolated in hostile territory to use enemy uniforms to evade capture, as long as no other military operations are conducted while so attired. Persons who use the enemy’s flag, uniform, insignia, markings, or emblems solely for evasion are not lawfully subject to disciplinary punishment on that account, as long as they do not attack the enemy, gather military information, or engage in similar
Evasion operations. However, wearing an enemy uniform is extremely dangerous because it could result in the mistaken but likely treatment of the evader as a spy.

- **Wearing of Civilian Clothing.** It is a violation of international law to kill, injure, or capture the enemy by feigning civilian status, sickness or wounds, or by falsely indicating an intent to surrender or negotiate. For example, it would be unlawful to feign surrender and attack the enemy when they come forward to take you prisoner. However, **it is permissible for military personnel isolated in hostile territory to feign civilian status while evading, though they should avoid combatant or espionage activities while dressed as civilians.** Evaders who feign civilian status solely for evasion are not lawfully subject to disciplinary punishment on that account if captured. In practice, of course, it may be difficult for a military member to establish this if apprehended in civilian clothing. From a practical standpoint, all potential and actual evaders may at some time consider the possibility of trying to disguise themselves as local (enemy) people by putting on civilian attire in the expectation of passing as natives. At best, that is extremely dangerous. Where the evader’s race is different from that of people indigenous to the area, the procedure should be adopted only if there is no other alternative. Even in an area where racial dissimilarities would not betray the evader, the mannerisms of walking, eating, and even smoking, plus unfamiliarity with the language, would more than likely quickly bring on suspicion, leading to investigation and capture.

- **Under certain circumstances, the adoption of varying degrees of disguise may be logical, appropriate, and required.** For instance, if the population density is such that movement in uniform is not possible, the evader may be required to adopt some sort of disguise to transit the area. Likewise, if contact with an indigenous assistance group has been established, the evader may be required to disguise himself to facilitate movement within an assisted evasion network. In these instances, the judgment of the assistance group should be respected. In so doing, evaders need to understand that in the event of capture they will likely be treated exactly like members of the assistance group, unless they can convince their captors that they are Americans. If the evaders’ assistants have decided to disguise them in civilian clothing, they should retain at least some of their uniform. Such items as insignia, identification tags, US Armed Forces/Geneva Conventions Identification Card, and blood chit, to use as proof of status, would probably be the most convincing in the event of capture.

- **Misuse of the Red Cross and Other Protected Emblems.** Protected emblems may not be used as disguises for purposes of escape or evasion in armed conflict. Only bona fide medical personnel, chaplains, and relief agency personnel may wear these emblems during armed conflict.

b. **Legal Aspects of Evasion During Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).** Legal considerations for E&R during MOOTW in sovereign countries **differ from those during war.** The protection provided by the Geneva Conventions for evaders as belligerents does not apply in a situation where either conflict does not exist or, if it does exist, the USG is not directly involved. National laws govern illegal entry, acts of violence, theft, and other aspects. US military personnel may be subject to these national laws while operating in the target country. Violations
may be necessary to execute an operation; however, physical force or violence and theft may aggravate an individual’s legal position and release if captured. Force may be necessary to protect the military member’s life; however, it should be kept to a minimum. Legal concerns may be irrelevant because political factors and the target country’s relationship with the US may dictate the treatment of US personnel captured in an operation.

“There is but one honourable mode of becoming a prisoner of war. That is, by being taken separately; by which is meant, by being cut off, entirely, and when we can no longer make use of our weapons. In this case there can be no conditions, for honor can impose none. We yield to irresistible necessity.”

Napoleon I, Maxims of War, 1831

5. Evasion Throughout the Range of Military Operations

Although the fundamental principles of evasion remain fairly constant, varying circumstances influence the behavior and actions of evading personnel. Tactics, techniques, and procedures for E&R are often determined more by the type of conflict and its political implications than by the intensity of the conflict. Threats to E&R in war or MOOTW can be equally intense and may involve similar operational requirements, capabilities, and risks. The political situation, a major variant among conflict types, often determines the way E&R operations are executed. For instance, in conducting MOOTW, where the presence of US forces is denied, disavowed, or politically sensitive, recovery operations may have to be conducted covertly or clandestinely. Covert recovery operations are conducted in a manner which conceals the identity of the sponsor. Clandestine operations are conducted in a manner which assures secrecy or concealment of forces while the operation is being conducted. In war, the emphasis on secrecy is primarily for self-protection and surprise. Additionally, certain international laws, national policies, and practical considerations may come into play at different times and in different circumstances to further guide an evader’s actions. To help facilitate recovery, evaders will need reliable, long-range, two-way communications. Personnel location systems and/or geopositioning for personnel location should be used to augment long-range communications wherever available. Communications should ensure interoperability among friendly recovery forces and minimize interception and jamming by enemy forces. Using dedicated CSAR forces is the preferred mode of recovery whenever evaders are within range and the military situation permits. Use of these forces avoids placing undue requirements on unconventional recovery assets during periods of shifting attitudes among the indigenous population. Evaders located beyond the capabilities of dedicated CSAR forces present unique recovery problems. What follows are the basic considerations that E&R planners and potential evaders must take into account when planning for military operations.

a. Peacetime. There may be occasions when individuals will become isolated in a friendly or neutral foreign country as the result of an aircraft mishap, inadvertent border incursion, or similar circumstance. In such situations, the individuals’ goals should be to return to friendly control openly and as soon as possible. Individuals isolated under these circumstances should approach local authorities and request assistance in returning to friendly control or, if possible, openly approach a US embassy or consulate or a representative of a friendly government. On the other hand, evasion may be the proper course of action when an individual accidentally and unintentionally becomes isolated in a foreign country that is unfriendly to the United States, in an area
where there is no effective local government, or when there is reason to believe that the local population would mistreat the individual. Whenever US personnel operate in or near such areas during peacetime, combatant commanders should ensure that appropriate E&R plans have been developed and that recovery forces are prepared to execute the plans.

b. Military Operations Other Than War. MOOTW include a wide range of military activities. Examples are: nation assistance support to counterinsurgency, shows of force, peace operations, support to insurgency, support to counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, foreign humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, strikes and raids, protection of shipping, recovery operations, and DOD support to counterdrug operations. These types of military operations may include the risk that participating individuals could become isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory and be forced to evade. All available recovery resources should be reviewed for suitability, because considerations such as pre-mission operations security (OPSEC) and acceptable recovery “windows of opportunity” become major determinants of the ultimate method to recover an individual. The nature of the operation will dictate the time available for mission planning; pre-mission reconnaissance and survey of potential evasion routes, contact points, and recovery sites; and pre-mission stocking of caches. Such advance preparations, when possible, permit confident predictions about conditions at locations where individuals might become isolated. Detailed E&R plans can be based on these assumptions. Several types of MOOTW are addressed below, but other types may result from varying crisis situations.

- Support to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. Individuals involved in these types of operations who find themselves in an evasion situation are faced with contrasting concerns depending on whether they are supporting an insurgency or counterinsurgency. For example, evaders whose mission is to support an insurgent movement can expect to receive assistance in areas controlled by the insurgents or where the local populace is sympathetic to the movement. They should avoid government forces, government controlled areas, and areas where the population supports the government in power. Evaders can also anticipate that any recovery effort will most likely be conducted in a low visibility, clandestine, or covert manner. On the other hand, individuals involved in counterinsurgency operations who find themselves evading are faced with a completely different scenario: move to government-controlled areas, seek out government forces, and expect recovery by a force operating in a more overt, conventional manner. Because each situation has unique requirements, personnel involved in either of these scenarios, who might find themselves in an evasion situation, should be fully briefed prior to the onset of operations on the tactics, techniques, procedures, and assets that will be used to effect their recovery.

- Combatting Terrorism. Individuals participating in counterterrorism activities, who become evaders, are faced with a somewhat similar dilemma. The key variables in this situation are the location where the action has occurred and where the individual is evading (i.e., is the country where the counterterrorist action has occurred and where the individual is evading supportive or hostile to the US presence and action?). Evasion, even in a country where the government supports the US
action, can be dangerous because the evasion area could be populated by elements supporting the terrorist group. E&R planners should consider all possible scenarios in developing recovery plans.

- **Peacekeeping Operations.** Although a prerequisite for the establishment of a peacekeeping force is the consent, cooperation, and support of the parties to the dispute (a negotiated truce), the peacekeeping force is often required to deal with extreme tension and violence. Such conditions could lead to a situation where members of the peacekeeping force find themselves in an evasion situation. Once again, the territory where the evasion takes place and the political attitude toward the United States of the power that controls the territory will influence evader actions. Members of the peacekeeping force should be well briefed on the current political climate and on the attitudes of the parties to the dispute, and they should be given proper evasion guidance that takes the various possible evasion scenarios into proper consideration. In addition, planning for quick-response recovery operations should always precede the initial deployment of the force.

- **Other Operations.** Certain crisis avoidance or crisis-management situations may require the use of military force to enforce or support diplomatic initiatives, respond to emergencies, or protect United States citizens. Detailed E&R plans should be developed for these operations to the extent allowed by the crisis situation.

- **War**

  - **General Considerations**

    - The operations tempo of a large scale war along or within the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) may prohibit or preclude some recovery operations. This may be complicated by a lack of dedicated CSAR assets and limited special operations forces (SOF) effectiveness in and around the FEBA.

    - In addition to these difficulties, evasion may be severely restricted by the large number of enemy forces along the FEBA, by combat operations, and by the possibility that enemy forces may possess sophisticated night-vision devices and various sensors. Evaders along the FEBA should concentrate on evading, hiding, and surviving. After the battle has passed over, the evader should try to link up with other friendly forces without surprising friendly patrols. They should attract friendly attention from behind a rock or some other bulletproof object, preferably with a white flag or locally developed visual or verbal recognition signal. Evaders should make no fast or threatening moves and allow themselves to be captured. Once contact is made, there may be unit authentication numbers or questions and answers that will identify personnel as bona fide US evaders.

    - If the evader is on enemy-controlled territory and is unable to link up with friendly fighting units and the situation and the environment permit, other recovery modes may be employed to carry out a recovery. Aviation support operations along the FEBA may be diverted to make quick recoveries of evaders. See paragraph 8a for a more detailed discussion of evasion techniques along the FEBA.

- **Nuclear Warfare.** Planning for movement to a Selected Area for Evasion (SAFE) in a nuclear environment should include supplies to survive in a post-nuclear environment, as well as
In June 1951, Capt. Ward M. Millar, an F-80 pilot, was shot down over North Korea. Injured from the ejection with two broken ankles, evasion eventually proved fruitless and he was soon captured by the North Koreans. These few paragraphs summarize this airman’s exemplary behavior in the most trying of circumstances. Indeed, he was downed—but not defeated.

In captivity, Millar succeeded in convincing the North Koreans that he was an important prisoner. Consequently, they conceded medical care to his broken ankles, which unfortunately, consisted of encasing his ankles without first aligning the bones. Of course this “medical treatment” left him crippled, but he remained determined to escape. With the injuries he endured, crawling to freedom seemed unrealistic, so he fashioned himself special shoes made of rubber overboots stuffed with rags. This make-shift “orthopedic correction,” when combined with long wooden poles to act as support, enabled him to regain some mobility.

In this condition, yet with his spirit unbroken, Capt. Millar planned his escape. An important part of his strategy was to fool the enemy into thinking he could not walk far, and therefore required little direct supervision. This allowed Millar to collect food, discarded clothing, and other “escape kit” items. Using this strategy, Millar seized an opportunity and succeeded in escaping. In fact, he remained loose behind enemy lines for over a week. In the end, however, his lack of mobility and the ineffective contact with the local population led to his being recaptured—but only temporarily.

During his initial handling after recapture, he shrewdly befriended a North Korean NCO who expressed a desire to join Millar in escaping to the South. They repeatedly sabotaged the truck that would be used to transport prisoners to a POW camp, delaying Millar’s departure from the holding area. Meanwhile, Millar and the NCO schemed, trying to decide their best options for success. Should they evade to the coast; steal a boat and sail to the Yellow Sea; evade to the front lines and contact UN forces; or devise a way to signal coalition aircraft? This last option proved to be the solution. Capt. Millar and the Korean NCO improvised a signal lamp from the “stalled” truck’s battery and one of the headlights. When this didn’t work they stole a mirror from a house and tried again. This time they succeeded in signaling a passing jet which descended for a closer look. The pilot, having spotted a yellow “Mae West,” which Millar had displayed as a signal, called for support to begin rescue operations. A few minutes later Millar heard the whirling of a helicopter coming from the south; Millar then vectored it to a nearby clearing. With the jets holding off the advancing soldiers, Millar rode “piggy back” on the North Korean to the hovering helicopter and freedom.

After three months in hostile territory, Capt. Ward Millar’s ingenuity, tenacity, and just plain guts carried him through. (The Korean soldier received a citation and an undisclosed monetary award from the Air Force.)

a recommended time interval which allows for adequately reduced radiation levels before travel. Remaining in a covered area until radiation levels have subsided enough to permit travel will be key to an evader’s survival.

6. Training for Evasion

Successful E&R is dependent on effective training. There is no substitute for realistic training. In an evasion situation, there may be no second chance. High-risk-of-capture personnel should be thoroughly trained in the techniques of combat survival, evasion movement, camouflage, surface navigation, E&R equipment, aids and devices, and recovery procedures and methods. High-risk-of-capture personnel should be equally knowledgeable of the type of E&R intelligence data that is available relevant to their specific, potential area of operations. IAW DOD Directive 1300.7, “Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct,” these individuals must complete a Level C SERE School. All high-risk-of-capture personnel should also receive survival and evasion field refresher training periodically, or participate in evasion field exercises whenever possible. This training should include communications techniques and procedures including radio discipline, use of aircrew call signs, team or individual call signs or identifiers, signaling devices, and other actions that enhance successful recovery. Evasion continuation training (classroom and field) at the unit level is essential if high-risk-of-capture personnel are to be adequately prepared to participate in combat operations at a moment’s notice. As directed by DOD Directive 1300.7, “Training and Education Measures Necessary to Support the Code of Conduct,” E&R training will continue throughout an individual’s career.

7. Planning for Evasion

All personnel subject to isolation in hostile territory should be prepared for the possibility of finding themselves in an evasion situation. Successful evasion is dependent on effective prior planning. Although potential evaders receive considerable support from operations, intelligence, and unit/life support organizations and personnel as well as guidance from a variety of literature, regulations, and directives, the responsibility for proper preparation and planning for evasion ultimately rests with the individual concerned. No amount of headquarters planning effort will succeed if the potential evaders have not personally planned for evasion. Sound evasion planning should incorporate, as a minimum, the information available from the sources listed in Figure II-2 and described below.

a. Intelligence Briefings. Information on the mission route, enemy troop dispositions, impact of enemy operations on friendly or multinational military forces, status of the US or multinational military situation, changing attitudes of the enemy populace, and other information is essential

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<th>PLANNING FOR EVASION</th>
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<td>Intelligence Briefings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selected Area for Evasion Area Intelligence Description</td>
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<td>Evasion &amp; Recovery Area Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape Guides, and Bulletins</td>
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<tr>
<td>Isolated Personnel Report</td>
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<td>Evasion Plan of Action</td>
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Figure II-2. Planning for Evasion
when planning potential evasion. Evaders need to ensure that they are continually aware of changing conditions. A change in even one facet of the enemy situation may well force major changes to an evasion plan.

b. SAFE Area Intelligence Description (SAID). This information can be found in Appendix G, “Planning Supplement,” (Classified).

c. E&R Area Studies. E&R areas may be selected in any geographic region based on operational or contingency planning requirements. Although similar to SAFE areas in most respects, they differ in that not all conventional selection criteria for SAFE areas can be met because of current political, military, or environmental factors prevailing in the country.

d. Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Guides and Bulletins. These publications are essential reference documents for potential evaders. They contain the basic information to help an individual survive, successfully evade and, if captured, resist enemy exploitation. SERE guides and bulletins cover an entire country or region of the world and provide information on topography and hydrography, food and water sources, safe and dangerous plants and animals, customs and cultures, recognition of hostile forces, resistance techniques in captivity, and other types of information. In short, the type of general information that serves as the foundation upon which the more specific information found in evasion charts, SAIDs, and current intelligence briefings can be used to build a sound evasion plan.

e. Isolated Personnel Report. The Isolated Personnel Report (ISOPREP) (DD Form 1833) is the document which contains information to facilitate recovery. When filled in, the DD Form 1833 is classified CONFIDENTIAL. It enables a recovery force to authenticate evaders and conclude a successful tactical recovery during assisted evasion. Both the unit and the individual are responsible for ensuring that the ISOPREP is properly completed, kept on file, and ready to be transmitted to the JSRC when required. Failure to accomplish this requirement complicates recovery planning, puts the recovery force at risk, and jeopardizes the success of the recovery mission. (See Appendix C, “Sample Isolated Personnel Report,” for an example of an ISOPREP.)

f. Evasion Plan of Action. The evasion plan of action (EPA) is one of the critical documents for successful recovery planning. The EPA is the vehicle by which potential evaders, prior to their isolation in hostile territory, relay their after-isolation intentions to the recovery forces. EPAs should be completed by potential evaders with the aid of intelligence personnel and should be based on a thorough knowledge of the environment where isolation may occur. Evaders may gain such knowledge by studying the combat environment and the hostile territory before executing the mission and by pre-planning their evasion. Sources of information that should be used to develop EPAs include, but are not limited to; the theater and component concepts to locate, support, and recover isolated personnel; SAIDs; SERE Contingency Guides/Bulletins; E&R Area Studies; and evasion charts. All individuals operating in or over hostile territory should develop an EPA or review an existing EPA each time a designated target or operating area changes. See Appendix D, “Evasion Plan of Action Format,” for details on the content of an EPA.

8. Evasion Strategies

a. Along/Within the FEBA

- Static. Evasion along the FEBA is always difficult, especially along a
relatively static FEBA. Under these conditions, enemy and friendly forces can be expected to be densely arrayed and well camouflaged, with good fields of fire. Assistance may be close at hand and within radio range. The sources of assistance may be air cover by fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, helicopter recovery assets, and rescue by ground forces. If evaders near the FEBA feel sure that friendly forces are moving in their direction, they should seek concealment and allow friendly forces to overrun their position. Attempts to penetrate the FEBA should be avoided. Evaders face stiff opposition from both sides. Unit authentication numbers and/or locally developed codes may assist the evaders to safely make contact in or around the FEBA and when approached by friendly forces. Evaders may also be able to move away from the FEBA and contact unconventional recovery assets.

• **Advancing.** Individuals isolated in front of advancing friendly units should immediately take cover and wait for the friendly units to overrun their position. In these situations, the evader’s primary goal is to seek protection from friendly and enemy fire while trying to avoid capture. In some cases, the evader may be able to assist the friendly forces by reporting on key enemy elements. Evaders should not engage the enemy unless they have been appropriately trained and equipped and the probability of success outweighs the risks involved. Potential evaders should be briefed on procedures for safely contacting friendly units.

• **Retreating.** Attempting to catch up with retreating friendly units dangerously exposes the evader. Individuals between opposing forces should immediately take cover and wait for enemy units to pass over their position. After most enemy units have moved on, evaders should try to link up with other isolated friendly elements and return to friendly forces.

b. **Extended Evasion**

• The differences between extended evasion and short-range evasion are depicted in Figure II-3.

• The evader may be discouraged by the knowledge that hundreds of miles of travel over a period of months may be necessary. Therefore, a strong will to survive, coupled with an ability to withstand hardships and overcome obstacles, is essential.

• Every alternative should be considered before determining a course of action. For example:

  • Travel restrictions such as curfews, checkpoints, and roadblocks will have to be anticipated.

  • Local customs should be studied for possible imitation to avoid being conspicuous.

  • Information on specific border areas should be obtained and studied.

• The person who has been isolated in enemy-controlled territory needs to decide what equipment to keep and how and where to dispose of the remainder. The individual should presume that the descent or isolation has been observed by the enemy. The important thing is to avoid capture, even if it means leaving the scene of isolation and deviating from the EPA or leaving valuable equipment behind.
Extended evasion differs from short-range evasion in several respects:

- Distance from friendly forces is greater, ranging from hundreds to thousands of miles.
- The will to survive and the knowledge of survival techniques become more vital.
- Conditions such as travel restrictions, security checks, and border crossings are more prevalent.
- Supply economy should be planned and practiced. Items such as shoes, clothing, and supplies should be taken care of to assure the evader the maximum usage.

**Figure II-3. Extended Versus Short-Range Evasion**

• If possible, the entire journey to friendly or neutral areas, as well as to designated SAFE areas, should be completed without being observed. This journey may require living off the land and completing the entire trip on foot.

• Unplanned Assistance During Evasion. Under some circumstances, especially when seriously injured in such areas as the Arctic or desert, it may become necessary to seek assistance from local people in order to survive. However, this should be done only as a last resort. Even when evaders do not require emergency assistance and are doing everything possible to avoid contact with local people, unplanned contacts may occur. All such contacts are very risky; but if handled properly, they could result in life saving assistance during evasion. Unplanned assistance will normally fall into one of the following categories: contact with opportunists, accidental contacts, or acts of mercy.

  • Contact with opportunists may occur when an individual or a group of people seek financial or political gain by assisting or apprehending an American evader. The blood chit may be useful in this situation.

  • Accidental contact occurs when a local person and an evader accidentally encounter one another. Neither is comfortable with the situation and both are apprehensive about the outcome. Pre-mission study of the local people may make the evader aware of local attitudes toward Americans and provide some guidance as to how to communicate. A pointee-talkee or blood chit may also assist in communication and soliciting aid. This aid may range...
from the local person not sounding an alarm, to providing directions or survival assistance or information, to the best-case scenario where the evader is returned to friendly control.

- As previously mentioned, evaders in danger of dying because of environmental extremes or injuries may elect to seek an act of mercy from an individual in the local populace. This contact is very dangerous and may result in death or capture. The blood chit may be useful in communicating and convincing an individual to engage in an act of mercy. See Chapter III, “Recovery,” and Appendix G, “Planning Supplement,” (Classified) of this publication for recommended contact procedures.

9. Aids to Evasion

Evaders are challenged by the elements, terrain, hostile military forces, and the local populace. To overcome these and be successful, potential evaders should be provided adequate training, information, and equipment before beginning their mission. Whenever possible, potential evaders should carry evasion aids on their person, because isolation is usually sudden and unexpected. Evaders may be quickly separated from their equipment or may not have time to sort through it to select the most useful evasion items. Because space considerations and clothing configurations may limit the number of evasion aids which can be carried, consider selecting items of information and/or equipment that serve more than one purpose. Suggested equipment items include evasion charts; blood chits, pointee-talkees, or other means of communicating with the local populace; general reference materials on medical, survival, or cultural information; camouflage or environmental protection items; and miscellaneous items such as a small compass, survival knife, spare radio battery, or signaling devices.

a. Evasion Charts. The evasion chart (EVC) is designed to assist isolated personnel to evade capture and survive in hostile territory and to provide evaders with a means of navigating to a SAFE or other recovery point. The EVC program supports operational force requirements with a series of charts that covers geographic areas specifically identified by combatant commands. The EVC is a derivative of a standard product, the Joint Operations
Graphic (JOG), and is made up of approximately eight 1:250,000-scale JOG charts, usually four on each side. When JOGs of a particular area are not available, Tactical Pilotage Charts (1:500,000-scale) are substituted. The EVC is produced on a very strong material which is waterproof and resistant to tearing. Tailored to cover the individual environmental area concerned, it is a unique, multi-purpose product which combines standard navigation charts with evasion and survival information located on the margins. A typical EVC contains localized information on navigation techniques, survival medicine, environmental hazards, personal protection, and water and food procurement as well as color pictures of edible and poisonous plants. Additionally, the chart is overprinted with a camouflage pattern similar to the natural ground colors of the area, and may aid an evader in hiding when used as a shelter/cover. The chart is folded to fit in a flight suit leg pocket and shows an American flag on one of the outer panels. An evader can use this to identify himself, especially when contacting friendly troops in a hostile area. Procedures for ordering EVCs are found in the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) Map Catalog, Part 1 (Aerospace Products), Volume 1 (Aeronautical Charts and Flight Publications), Section 8 (Special Purpose Products). Although EVCs contain much information, including survival and medical guidance, and are designed to be carried by evaders as they make their way through enemy territory, potential evaders cannot afford to wait until they are already isolated before they study the chart. Effective evasion planning requires that potential evaders be thoroughly familiar with the information on the charts as well as how to use the charts before departing on their missions.

b. Blood Chits

• Description and Use. The blood chit is a small sheet of material on which is imprinted an American flag, a statement in English and several languages spoken by the populace in the operational area, and like numbers in each corner that identify the particular chit. The blood chit identifies the bearer as an American and promises a reward to anyone providing assistance to the bearer and/or helping the bearer to return to friendly control. When the blood chit number is presented to American authorities and the claim has been properly validated, it represents an obligation of the USG to provide compensation to the claimant for services rendered to evaders. (See Annex A to Appendix E, “Blood Chit Program Administration,” for a sample blood chit.)

• Individual Responsibilities

  • Although use of the blood chit is at the discretion of the individual to whom it is issued, it should be used only after all other measures of independent evasion and/or escape have failed and assistance is considered vital to survival. Unless the chit is taken by force or threat, individuals should retain it.

  • Upon receiving assistance, the evader provides the assistor with the blood chit number (either written or one cut from the chit). If the assistor requests, the evader may provide name, social security number (SSN), and signature. Although this additional information could, in the long run, pose a security problem for the assistor, that individual may insist on having more information than just a number to back up his claim for reward. The evader should tell the assistor (or, if verbal communication is not possible due to language barriers, point to the last lines of the statement on the blood chit) that a reward will be provided after the evader’s safe return to
friendly lines and when the number is presented to, and properly validated by, an official representative of the USG.

- **The blood chit has certain limitations as an evasion aid and form of identification.** The person providing aid may be skeptical of the value of a “number” as something that may produce a reward. The skepticism will increase if enemy propaganda has assured the person providing aid of ultimate and certain victory. When the evader tells the person providing aid that a reward is conditional upon the evader’s safe return to friendly lines and validation of the blood chit number by a USG official, the assistor will be forced to choose between the promise of the blood chit and the known risks that will be assumed in assisting the evader. Also, **there is a strong possibility that the person who is about to assist the evader will want to retain the blood chit as tangible evidence to claim the promised reward.** When the evader refuses to yield the blood chit, the assistor may become suspicious. Overcoming this difficulty will depend largely on the salesmanship of the evader.

- When the evader is in the hands of friendly guerrilla organizations, use of the blood chit as a means of identification may depend largely on the effectiveness of communications between the guerrilla group and American forces. The evader should expect to encounter some suspicion, because the guerrillas could suspect the chit may have been captured, stolen, or could be a skillful counterfeit, and the bearer could be an enemy using it to penetrate the group. In spite of this, the blood chit is a useful evasion aid, and using it wisely provides an excellent chance of return.

- **Blood Chit Production.** The DMA maintains the capability to produce and reprint blood chits at the request of the combatant commanders as coordinated through the JSSA.

- **Pointee-Talkee.** Pointee-talkees are similar to the language guides which were used by invasion forces during World War II. **They contain English phrases on the left side of the page and the same phrases written in the foreign language on the right side of the page.** The evader selects the desired English phrase and points to the translation of the phrase beside it. The evader

The blood chit, written in several languages, promises a reward for assisting US evaders.
Evasion

a. Caches. Caches may be prepositioned in enemy-controlled territory or in regions subject to being overrun by enemy forces, and their use should be considered in environments where extended evasion is projected. Evaders can use caches as sources of supplies, communications equipment, and other evasion aids. In denied areas, caches may be emplaced by unconventional assets before and/or after the outbreak of hostilities. Agencies and organizations that direct the establishment of caches that have the potential of supporting evaders need to keep the JSRC advised of the status and locations of those caches to optimally support potential evaders.

b. Resupply Operations. When an evader is isolated out of range of rotary-winged aircraft, there are no prepositioned caches, and recovery forces have been committed to other operations, it may be possible to air-deliver packages to evaders by fixed-wing aircraft. Planners must consider the vulnerability of the resupply aircraft. Depending upon the threat, dedicated combat

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may augment the pointee-talkee by making drawings and signs to help communicate with a local national whose language the evader does not speak or understand. **The major limitation of the pointee-talkee, as with the blood chit, is in trying to communicate with illiterates.** In many countries the illiteracy rate can be very high, so personnel may have to resort to pantomime and sign language, tactics that have been relatively effective in the past. Pointee-talkees should be developed in theater, where the language expertise is available, with the assistance of the JSSA, as required.

10. Support to Evaders

There may be occasions when an evader is isolated deep in hostile territory, and early recovery will not be possible. In such situations, E&R planners should develop means to provide assistance to the evader until recovery can be effected. There are two ways an evader in such a predicament can be supported: **prepositioned caches and resupply operations.**

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CHAPTER III
RECOVERY

“To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.”

General George Washington
Speech to Congress, 1790

1. Definition

Recovery is the return of evaders to friendly control, either with or without assistance, as the result of planning, operations, and individual actions on the part of recovery planners, conventional or unconventional recovery forces, and/or the evaders themselves.

2. Types of Recovery

Evaders may recover, or be recovered, to friendly control in a number of ways. They may make their way to friendly or neutral territory without assistance, they may be recovered as the result of planned conventional or unconventional recovery operations, or they may be recovered as the result of chance contact with friendly elements of the local populace performing acts of mercy or seeking profit. (See Figure III-1.) Potential evaders should be aware of these recovery possibilities and, when isolated in hostile or non-US controlled territory, become an integral part of the recovery effort.

3. Philosophy Behind Recovery Operations

Depending on the situation, successful recovery operations normally require extensive preparation and planning. The necessary resources must be identified, scheduled, and committed as early as possible, but evaders must be prepared for extended evasion in the event recovery operations are delayed.

4. Recovery Considerations

The elements that impact recovery operations are shown in Figure III-2 and are discussed below.

a. Availability of Resources. To increase the chances for successful recovery, planners should identify well in advance the resources and assets that will be required for a particular operation, ensure these resources will be available when required, and schedule them for employment.

b. Capabilities and Limitations. Because each type of resource that can be used for recovery operations has unique capabilities and limitations, recovery planners should be well versed in their respective characteristics so that these resources can be properly employed in a timely manner. Such in-depth knowledge further enhances the chances for successful recovery because it permits recovery planners to quickly develop alternative courses of action and options in response to changing recovery scenarios.

c. Task Organizing. The nature of any given conflict (specific purpose, intensity, or duration) that might leave individuals isolated in hostile territory will also dictate the resources and capabilities that will be required to accomplish the recovery mission. Consequently, task organizing of the recovery force will depend upon varying resource requirements and capabilities.
d. **Recovery Criteria.** There are certain essential elements of information which, when available to the decision maker, can simplify the recovery effort.

- **Location and Physical Condition of the Evader.** Accurate information concerning the location and physical condition of the evader prior to launching the recovery mission is crucial. With this knowledge, planners can more readily determine the optimum force composition, identify any requirements for special equipment and personnel, and plan recovery force ingress and egress routes to minimize contact with hostile forces.

- **Access.** A critical factor in the selection of any recovery site is whether we have air, land, or sea access to the site. Even
Recovery

if the recovery site is in enemy territory (or in friendly territory occupied by the enemy), we should still consider the spatial relationships of the site with respect to bordering friendly and neutral territory. For example, selecting a site in enemy territory might be pointless if a bordering territory refuses to grant overflight of its territory.

• Time. Different recovery assets will become operational at different times. Dedicated CSAR assets are generally operational earlier than unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms (UARM), and individuals may become isolated in areas where recovery assets are not yet operational. To permit interface with available recovery forces, evasion planners must ensure that all potential evaders have access to appropriate contact and communications procedures. Proper prior planning permits operations personnel to predict when the respective recovery assets will come on line to recover evaders. Planners should also ensure that potential evaders are updated in a timely manner as changes occur in the operational recovery environment.

• Movement. Individuals will not always be isolated within the range of operation of airborne recovery assets or in areas where ground recovery assets are operational. Normally, individuals are isolated in the vicinity of the FEBA, an area where unconventional recovery forces do not operate and where intense enemy activity restricts CSAR forces. Therefore, evaders will be expected to hide or move to areas offering better recovery opportunities. (See Chapter II, “Evasion,” paragraph 5c, of this publication for detailed FEBA evasion procedures.) E&R planners should always keep these possibilities in mind and ensure that potential evaders are properly briefed, trained, and equipped for evasion travel.

• Capacity. Recovery forces and assets are based or prepositioned in locations where they are expected to most effectively facilitate recovery operations. Since individuals are often isolated in unexpected areas and numbers, in some cases the capacity of available recovery forces may be inadequate for the number of evaders. E&R planners must be prepared to reallocate recovery assets to compensate for this imbalance or to establish priorities to determine which categories of evaders will be recovered by a limited capacity of recovery assets. If the estimated capacity of recovery assets appears inadequate for a given number of evaders, planners must ensure that potential evaders are aware of the situation and that they are trained and equipped for extended survival and evasion.

• Risk Assessment. The benefit to be gained from a recovery operation

Figure III-2. Recovery Considerations

if the recovery site is in enemy territory (or in friendly territory occupied by the enemy), we should still consider the spatial relationships of the site with respect to bordering friendly and neutral territory. For example, selecting a site in enemy territory might be pointless if a bordering territory refuses to grant overflight of its territory.

• Time. Different recovery assets will become operational at different times. Dedicated CSAR assets are generally operational earlier than unconventional assisted recovery mechanisms (UARM), and individuals may become isolated in areas where recovery assets are not yet operational. To permit interface with available recovery forces, evasion planners must ensure that all potential evaders have access to appropriate contact and communications procedures. Proper prior planning permits operations personnel to predict when the respective recovery assets will come on line to recover evaders. Planners should also ensure that potential evaders are updated in a timely manner as changes occur in the operational recovery environment.

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• Risk Assessment. The benefit to be gained from a recovery operation
should be commensurate with the anticipated risks of execution. Recovery operations should not unduly risk isolating additional combat personnel, preclude execution of higher priority missions, routinely expose certain unique assets to extremely high risk, divert critically needed forces from ongoing operations, or allow the military situation to deteriorate. Cost/benefit considerations and risk assessments should balance the value of recovering evaders against the potential loss of recovery assets or deterioration of the combat effort.

5. Categories of Recovery Operations

The methods for recovering evaders fall into two categories: conventional and unconventional. Although each method can be applied in a variety of situations, some methods may have advantages over others. Therefore, recovery planning should fully evaluate available assets and projected conditions to determine the best method of recovery depending upon the threat, the condition of the isolated personnel, and the types of recovery forces available to execute the mission.

a. Conventional Recovery Operations

• Forces. These operations make use of conventional aerial, surface, and subsurface military forces and equipment to conduct overt or low-visibility SAR operations. According to Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR),” “Each Service and United States Special Operations Command are responsible for performing CSAR in support of their own forces, consistent with their assigned functions. In so doing, each Service and USSOCOM should take into account the availability and capability of the CSAR-capable forces of the others, including the US Coast Guard.”

• Examples of conventional military forces include the US Air Force (USAF) Combat Air Forces rescue forces, US Navy (USN) carrier air-wing helicopter assets, US Naval Reserve (USNR) Helicopter Combat Support Squadrons, and other shipborne air assets. Conventional forces may also include USN and Coast Guard vessels, Marine Corps air-ground task forces capable of conducting tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel operations, US Army medical evacuation units, and other Army assets (helicopters, mechanized vehicles, and personnel).

• Types of Conventional Recovery Operations

• Unassisted Recovery. In unassisted recovery, evaders independently make their way back to friendly control or travel toward a point where contact with an assistance mechanism or a CSAR force can be accomplished. Evaders may simply hide and survive in a single location while waiting to be overrun by friendly forces or evade back to friendly or neutral territory. Unassisted recovery is normally a back-up option as a hedge against the failure of outside or assisted recovery efforts. (1) Successful unassisted recovery depends largely on the evader’s will and ability, personal background, physical condition, and previous SERE training. Evaders may need to travel long distances over unfamiliar terrain, suffering long periods of hunger, thirst, and exposure. (2) The primary concern of evaders facing these situations is reaching a location where recovery can be effected. Air-delivered or prepositioned supplies (caches) of evasion or survival
equipment can significantly improve the evader’s potential for success. Because extended unassisted recovery is always a possibility, EPAs and evasion equipment/aids should always address such evasion contingencies.

**Combat Search and Rescue Operations.** CSAR is a specific task to effect the recovery of isolated personnel during wartime or MOOTW. Doctrine and procedures for joint CSAR operations are described in Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).”

**On-Scene Available.** A third source of conventional recovery assets can come from appropriately equipped air, ground, or naval forces that are not specifically trained in combat recovery, but which happen to be in the area of an isolated individual and can be tasked to recover the evader. In such cases, recovery tasking can originate at the lowest organizational level that is aware of the situation and can quickly react. In all cases, however, the recovery effort should be coordinated with the JSRC, which continually monitors all ongoing and planned recovery operations. Use of such assets, including commercial ships whenever possible, would most likely be the result of chance and would be most effective in a non-hostile environment.

b. **Unconventional Recovery Operations.** These operations differ from conventional recovery operations in that they use specially trained and/or indigenous forces and unique equipment to assist an evader in returning to friendly control. Examples of unconventional forces include SOF, guerrillas, and/or clandestine organizations. Examples of unique equipment that might be used in unconventional recovery operations include submarines and specially equipped, clandestinely operated aircraft capable of surface-to-air recovery (STAR) operations.

**Forces.** See Figure III-3.

**SOF.** Two predominant tasks of SOF are the conduct of unconventional warfare (UW) and direct action (DA) missions. (1) UW is a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in
SULLY’S SAGA

“I went down at high noon. The air was stifling and the silence oppressive in the ten-foot tall Kunai grass. I was only about five and one-half degrees south of the Equator. I had been flying along at 180-200 miles per hour. Suddenly, I was on the ground with a feeling of loneliness and of being thrust backward 500 years in time... I was hoping that someone would come to look for me. But no one came. In those days, our air/sea rescue system was meager indeed, especially in the interior. Rescue efforts can be described something like this: ‘...Instructions to all pilots—look for Sully somewhere in the jungle.’ So, they looked the next day from 25,000 feet, came back, and reported, ‘No sign of Sully.’ The following day, the instructions were: ‘Don’t forget about Sully, he’s out there somewhere.’ From about 25,000 feet they did not see me again. On the third day their reaction was: ‘Too bad about Sully.’ And that was the way it was.”

On September 20, 1943, Captain Charles P. (Sully) Sullivan’s PH-38H was shot down over the forests of New Guinea. Thirty days later he rejoined his unit after successfully evading enemy patrols deep in the jungles of New Guinea. Fortunately today, an air crew member or other isolated US Service personnel can expect a far more sophisticated recovery attempt, but it does not eliminate the need to prepare for evasion as Sully’s Saga readily demonstrates.

On the fourth day Sully finally gave up on being rescued and decided to leave his hole-up site in search of water. As he ventured out in the jungle he became disoriented and confused; his efforts to retrace his steps were hopeless. He never found his wreckage or stashed equipment again. After several minutes of fearful panic, Sully remembers praying fervently to Mary and regained his calm. He evaded through the Guinea jungles with only the gear on his back and a .45 caliber side arm. He improvised to meet his needs, building a log raft to cross a river and a shelter out of banana leaves. He used parachute cord to set booby traps to warn him of intruders. During Sully’s initial contact with natives he was offered food, water, and shelter, but soon he sensed members of the tribe had turned hostile. He fled the village after defending himself against an attack by two villagers. He feared being tracked and hid in the jungle continuing to evade contact with any native peoples. When he saw two hunters down the valley, he moved off the trail; snapping a twig with his shoes which immediately drew the attention of the two hunters. Sully removed his shoes and moved as quickly as possible through the jungle to escape detection. He evaded barefoot for three more weeks until he spotted a “glimmer of light”. This turned out to be an Aussie long range patrol. After approaching them very carefully, all he could think of to say was, “Well there’s another one of those bloody yanks.” Sully’s adventure was still not over and after an Aussie plane crash landed on its first attempt to fly him to an air field closer to his unit he wisely waited for a C-47 to come and take him back to his unit after 30 days of survival, evasion and escape in the jungles of New Guinea.

Recovery

It includes the indirect activities of evasion and recovery. (2) A DA mission is a specified act involving operations of an overt, covert, clandestine, or low-visibility nature conducted primarily by a sponsoring power’s SOF in hostile or denied areas. As such, DA missions to locate, recover, and restore to friendly control persons held captive, isolated, or threatened in sensitive, denied, or contested areas may be conducted when the priority of the operation is sufficiently high to warrant planning and conducting a special operation. As a result, DA missions may be conducted with the principal aim of recovering personnel from hostile territory. (3) In effect, inherent SOF capabilities make these forces optimally suited for a range of collateral activities such as combat search and rescue, but planners should understand that special operations recovery missions may differ significantly from Service CSAR operations. To ensure a quick response recovery capability, CSAR forces normally rely on dedicated assets and established command and control on continual alert. Although SOF are not organized or trained to conduct SAR and CSAR as dedicated missions, they do maintain the capability to recover personnel and equipment or assist personnel in evading capture and escaping from hostile, denied, sensitive, or theater areas. Therefore, there may be situations when specialized SOF capabilities may be tasked to recover isolated personnel whose recovery is beyond CSAR capability. (4) These missions would normally be characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, and a thorough mission analysis. SOF routinely employ unconventional tactics and techniques, clandestine search, indigenous assistance, and ground combat elements. Special operations in permissive environments,
on the other hand, may be less complex and, therefore, may require considerably less planning and preparation time.

- **Guerrillas.** The use of guerrillas to recover evaders may provide added operational flexibility. Depending on the size of the guerrilla groups and their territorial control, these groups may be free to operate more overtly and control or limit enemy activity in the group’s base camp areas. For these reasons, evaders do not pose as great a security threat to guerrilla groups as they do to SOF teams. In addition, there may be less of a requirement to quickly exfiltrate evaders from these groups. There are two types of guerrilla groups—sponsored and unsponsored. (1) **Sponsored Guerrilla Groups.** Sponsored guerrilla groups may be supported, led, or advised by US or allied special forces elements. They may be recruited and trained by friendly forces or they may be dependent on allied countries. Because exfiltration of personnel and materiel may be a routine operation for these groups, evaders may be more expeditiously returned to friendly territory through their assistance. Planners should ensure guerrilla groups can use the communications, contact, and authentication procedures which have been established for the theater of operations. Evaders who find themselves under the control of such guerrilla groups should comply with all reasonable instructions issued by the group. (2) **Unsponsored Guerrilla**
Recovery

Groups. Un-sponsored, independent guerrilla groups may be comprised of mercenaries, dissidents, and outlaws. They may provide assistance to evaders when it is in the group’s perceived best interest, or through the convincing lure of a blood chit reward. Psychological operations may be employed to convince such groups it is in their best interest to aid evaders. Because it is unlikely that independent groups will have been trained in the same communications, contact, and authentication procedures as sponsored groups, planners trying to make use of such groups should be prepared to employ modified or alternate procedures. (a) The use of un-sponsored guerrilla groups to support recovery operations presents certain problems. Communications limitations between friendly forces and these guerrilla groups can increase the difficulty in arranging the recovery of evaders, thereby extending the evasion period. (b) Under certain conditions the group may try to use the evader to augment its forces. This situation presents problems because guerrilla groups may conduct operations in violation of US policy or international law. Under these conditions, evaders are to resist guerrilla attempts to solicit their participation and, if forced to participate, avoid direct involvement or minimize the effects of such actions. (c) Additionally, such groups may perceive advantages in retaining an evader for extended periods for use as a bargaining chip. Because independent guerrilla groups may perceive the evader as a de facto representative of the USG, evaders should conduct themselves with the utmost discretion while in their control.

Clandestine Organizations. These are organizations comprised mainly of indigenous personnel operating clandestinely or covertly in the hostile territory who are engaged in activities designed to change the political or military situation in that territory. These individuals may be political dissidents or minority groups that support resistance, revolution, or friendly intelligence activities by collecting, hiding, and forwarding materiel, information, and personnel.

Specially Equipped Clandestinely Operated Aircraft. When an evader’s location is known precisely, is within flying range of helicopters and/or fixed-wing aircraft, and the enemy threat is sufficiently low, a single, specially equipped, clandestinely operated aircraft can be used to carry out a recovery. (1) This aircraft should avoid enemy detection, quickly enter the enemy-controlled area, recover the evader, and return to friendly control. Helicopters with an air refueling capability, night vision devices, and terrain following radars make this a viable option. (2) For clandestine long-range recovery, one option would be to employ the fixed-wing Fulton Recovery System and appropriate aircraft, also known as the STAR system. This system is air dropped to an evader on the ground or in the water. The evader activates the system and is recovered.

Types of Unconventional Recoveries. Assisted recoveries can be either planned or unplanned, i.e., deliberately planned or as a result of chance.

Planned Assisted Recovery. In this type of operation, deliberate recovery planning permits the use of follow-on SOF missions, dedicated extraction teams, and UARMs that can be operated by guerrilla groups and other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, and return the
evader to friendly control. (1) **Follow-On SOF Missions.** SOF conducting short-term operations, such as special reconnaissance or DA missions, can be used to assist an evader. **If tasked** to include potential recovery actions as part of their initial mission planning, **SOF teams operating in or near a known evader location can move to this area, contact, authenticate, and recover the evader.** When adequate prior planning is conducted, the enemy situation permits, and resupply operations can be carried out, SOF can be tasked to perform the recovery after the primary mission is complete. (2) **Dedicated Extraction Teams.** Though dedicated recovery is not a primary SOF mission, the **JFC or his designated representative can task the special operations component to prepare dedicated extraction teams.** These unconventional elements develop specific recovery plans to complement existing CSAR. Addition of this type of capability enhances the overall theater recovery effort, particularly when an evader is located beyond the capabilities or is in a heavily defended area where use of CSAR is impractical. In this type scenario, SOF, multinational recovery teams (US and allied or coalition), and/or US-sponsored foreign nationals can be inserted into hostile territory and travel overland to a prebriefed or predetermined rendezvous point for contact with the evader. Once contact has been made, the recovery force and the evader make their way back to a location that is within range of friendly air assets. Conventional or unconventional aircraft, depending on availability and/or the enemy threat situation, can then be dispatched to meet and extract all personnel to friendly control. (3) **Unconventional Assisted Recovery Mechanisms.** UARMs are assistance mechanisms that have the potential to support E&R operations. This is particularly true in cases where the activities of the mechanisms are supported or directed by US or allied personnel. Other mechanisms or groups operating independently may also determine it is in their own interest to assist evaders. The potential of these organizations to assist E&R operations should not be ignored and should be exploited whenever possible. (a) **Value of UARMs.** UARMs are valuable assets because they can support and supplement both conventional and unconventional recovery operations. Their potential value should always be considered and, if possible, incorporated into recovery planning. With proper support, UARMs can be established in almost any environment. (b) **Establishment of UARMs in Advance of Operations.** UARMs should be created and maintained in advance of their potential need. The process of establishing viable UARMs is a long and hazardous one. No amount of last-minute
Recovery

UARM, evaders should project a favorable image of the US and its values, avoid acts that violate international law or discredit the US, avoid expressing ideas that could be misconstrued as official US policy or popular American attitudes, and refrain from making any agreements contrary to the interests of the US.

**Unplanned Assisted Recoveries.**
Unplanned assisted recoveries may occur when local people in enemy-held areas assist evaders in returning to friendly control. These people may be described under the following categories: (1) **Opportunist**. Some individuals or groups who may detain an evader with the expectation of monetary gain, materials, or political recognition for the evader’s safe return. (2) **Accidental Contacts**. Individuals may decide to help an evader they encounter anticipating the blood chit reward, or for other personal reasons. (3) **Individuals who Perform Acts of Mercy**. These are individuals whom an evader has intentionally selected in the hope that they will provide assistance in a life-threatening situation.
Chapter III

•• An effective theater blood chit program, coupled with an active psychological operations effort, may encourage these types of unplanned recoveries and, if properly exploited, could eventually be developed into an organized UARM.

6. Signaling

Once isolated, evaders should follow their EPA to the best of their ability, making every effort to blend in with the environment and avoid compromising the security of the contact area. They should be prepared to set out two types of signals: a recovery activation signal (RAS) and/or a load signal. See Appendix G, “Planning Supplement,” (Classified) for a detailed discussion of RAS and load signals.

7. Contact Procedures

Whenever an individual is recovered with the assistance of a dedicated recovery force, the most critical aspect of that recovery is the moment when the evader and the recovery force initially come together. The moment of contact is very tense because it requires two parties, unknown to each other and located in hostile territory, to meet without being detected by either enemy forces or elements of the local population, and without compromising either party’s security. Contact between an evader and a recovery force requires a great deal of preplanning. The JSRC, assisted by component intelligence and operations specialists, ensures that appropriate contact procedures are developed for use in the joint operating environment. The JSRC also ensures that joint force components are familiar with the contact procedures.

a. When developing standards and guidelines for contact procedures, several factors should be considered. These include, but are not limited to, the type of terrain in the operational or recovery area (desert, jungle, urban, and other types of terrain), the equipment and evasion aids that may or may not be available to the evader, enemy capabilities (such as air superiority, reconnaissance and/or direction-finding capabilities, and other enemy capabilities), as well as the availability and training level of recovery forces.

b. The JSRC coordinates and disseminates the theater-specific policies that will guide an evader’s actions from the moment of isolation to the actual contact with a recovery force. Those policies should be widely disseminated to ensure that commanders, potential evaders, recovery forces, mission planners, and briefers understand their respective roles in the operation. Potential evaders are responsible for ensuring that the information they put in their EPA complies with theater policies and that, if isolated, they follow their EPA as closely as possible. Accurate EPA data, and the evader’s degree of subsequent adherence to the EPA once isolated, are the principal factors in successful contact and recovery operations.

c. Successful contact is the last event in a series of specific actions the evader must initiate, and the entire sequence should be based on the guidelines and policies coordinated by the JSRC. When developing contact procedures, recovery planners should adhere to JSRC policies to ensure operational consistency throughout the joint force, and should address the two major types of recovery (conventional and unconventional) because each type involves different considerations. Guidance for the recovery process conducted by conventional CSAR recovery assets is contained in Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).” Guidance for contact procedures...
Recovery

The recovery force should have reasonable knowledge (probable or confirmed) of the evader's location and/or intentions.

A capable insertion or extraction platform should be available.

If the recovery mission is tasked as a follow-on mission, it will normally be conducted only when the primary mission has been completed.

The time frame in which the recovery team can respond (due to considerations of distance, terrain, and mobility) and access to the evader should be feasible and acceptable.

Friendly forces in the area should be deconflicted to ensure that the recovery site is secure from friendly attack.

The political climate should be favorable for a recovery operation by special operations forces or other friendly forces.

There should be no breach of operations security.

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carried out by unconventional recovery forces is discussed below. Before a recovery will be attempted, the criteria shown in Figure III-4 should be met.

d. There may be occasions when the political climate in the operational area would make it impractical or impossible for US forces to be involved in the recovery of evaders. In such cases, the direct assistance of indigenous forces may be necessary to successfully complete the recovery mission.

e. Once the evader has been contacted, the recovery force will most likely conduct authentication in a progressive manner. Immediately after contact, the recovery force will attempt to determine by observation that the individual they have contacted is the evader they have been sent to recover. If the recovery force doubts the evader’s identity, the evader will be moved as a “captive” to a more secure area for continued authentication.

- **Definitive authentication will be based on the information contained in the evader’s ISOPREP**, including the four-digit authentication number, personal authentication statements, and fingerprint information. Additional
information may be used, such as footprint and/or dental information. If the evader is unable to respond to questioning or cannot be fingerprinted, the recovery force will follow accepted detainee handling procedures pending authentication or return to friendly territory.

8. Custody

a. Once in the custody of the recovery force, evaders can expect to be searched and secured pending confirmation of their identity. Any weapons will be confiscated. Evaders should be quiet, avoid resisting, and carefully follow all instructions to avoid compromising the security of the recovery force. If the evader is incapable of answering or responding, the recovery force will follow accepted detainee handling procedures.

b. The status of the evader can change once identity has been ascertained and the recovery force commander has evaluated the situation. The evader could be held as an unarmed detainee or made part of the recovery force. In either case, the evader will be briefed on what to expect during the remainder of the recovery operation. Regardless of their status, evaders should understand that the recovery force commander is the mission commander until the mission is complete. Evaders should not ask operational questions. They must realize that being recovered does not necessarily mean a quick extraction. The recovery force will do everything within its power to effect a return to friendly control as quickly as possible.

c. There may be occasions when the recovery force that made the initial contact with the evader cannot, for operational reasons, deliver the evader safely to friendly territory. In such cases, the evader may be turned over to another group, to a UARM or another cell within the mechanism, or to a conventional force to complete the extraction from hostile territory. Should this happen, it is important for the evader to realize that although the recovery force commander may elect not to brief the details of the handover or crossover, the evader should do exactly as directed. At no time will the evader be abandoned. The evader will be under positive control at all times by either the delivering force or the receiving force, according to prior arrangements made by the two forces. Cooperation, trust, and discipline on the part of the evader are essential for mission success.

9. Support to E&R Operations

See Figure III-5.

a. All-Source Intelligence. All-source intelligence should be an integral part of all E&R planning and execution. Because an evader’s prospects for successful recovery depend heavily on depth of knowledge of the area of operations, all sources of intelligence should be exploited to provide potential evaders with the most detailed and reliable data available on the many factors that impact the evasion environment. This data should be provided to potential evaders in as timely a manner as possible. All-source

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**SUPPORT TO EVASION & RECOVERY OPERATIONS**

- All-Source Intelligence
- Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
- Operations Security / Military Deception
- Communications

Figure III-5. Support to Evasion & Recovery Operations
intelligence also enhances the survivability of conventional and unconventional recovery assets by decreasing their vulnerability to enemy counteractions.

d. **Communications**

- Communications systems for evasion and recovery should be established to permit the exchange of information between US organizations and US personnel in hostile territory who are not in the hands of E&R assets and/or mechanisms. Communications received or relayed by monitoring stations from isolated personnel need to receive a high precedence in retransmission to the JSRC. Communications from isolated personnel will be authenticated in accordance with the code system listed in the EPA for use by the isolated personnel.

10. **E&R-Related Message Traffic**

Preformatted message traffic between the JSRC and recovery forces, and between various recovery forces involved in an E&R
operation, is **vital to the successful execution of the operation**. Such messages permit the quick and unambiguous transmission of information in fast-paced operations. Commonly used message formats that support E&R operations are presented in Appendix F, “Evasion and Recovery Messages.” (Refer to Joint Pub 3-50.2, “Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR),” for US message text formats for the Search and Rescue Incident Report, the Search and Rescue Situation Summary Report, and the Search and Rescue Request.

## 11. Security

Personnel tasked to support or conduct recovery operations depend on effective security for their survival and mission accomplishment. Information concerning recovery plans, operations, capabilities, and procedures requires continuing long-term protection after plans have been executed or operations completed. The E&R point of contact for each combatant commander is responsible for identifying all personnel who require access to classified information dealing with UARM operations, assets, mechanisms, programs, or equipment and ensuring that they complete a Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (see Appendix B, “Sample Security Nondisclosure Agreement”).

a. **Security Reporting.** Identification of all personnel exposed to such information will be recorded and reported to the JSSA upon request, but no later than 31 December of each calendar year. This report includes name, rank, SSN, parent organization, level of exposure, and an indication that the individual either continues to have access to classified information or has been placed in an inactive status regarding access. Security guidance for all matters pertaining to E&R is contained in the Operational Evasion and Escape Security Classification Guide, November 1989. Violations of E&R security should be reported immediately to the JSSA (HQ JSSA, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5212).
APPENDIX A
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING OF DOD INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE RETURNED FROM ISOLATED TERRITORY

Annex A Debriefing Statement
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING OF DOD INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE RETURNED FROM ISOLATED TERRITORY

1. In accordance with MCM-136-91, “Delineation of Responsibilities for Evasion and Escape Within the Department of Defense,” (To be replaced by CJCSI 3270.01) the following procedures have been established for the administrative processing of DOD individuals who have returned from isolated territory.

2. The unit or organization that initially receives a member of the Department of Defense who has returned from isolation, evasion, captivity, or missing in action status is expected to:
   a. Provide care, custody, and safeguards for the returnee, including all required health care and protection from idle curiosity.
   b. Confirm the returnee’s identity and receive necessary disposition instructions by contacting the individual’s:
      • Service component or unit of assignment.
      • Joint Search and Rescue Center.
      • The Joint Services SERE Agency.
   c. If the individual’s identity cannot be confirmed, provide care, custody, and security controls and request appropriate instructions from the JSRC or nearest counterintelligence agency.

3. Before any debriefing or questioning, the returnee will be asked if any assistance was received during evasion or if the returnee has any knowledge of any sensitive or covert recovery plans, procedures, organizations, programs or equipment. If the returnee indicates that to be the case, the returnee will be directed to complete a Security Nondisclosure Agreement (see Appendix B). The individual will then be advised to cooperate with intelligence debriefers for tactical intelligence, but will be directed not to discuss sensitive or covert E&R information with anyone except a specific representative identified by the JSRC. The fact that the returnee has had access to certain classified programs may, in itself, be classified, and that fact will be treated as such when so directed by the director of the JSRC.

4. If the debriefer suspects the returnee of an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the debriefer will seek the advice of his staff judge advocate.

5. Returnees will be notified that they may not publish or disclose the details of their experience while isolated or evading without prior approval of the JSSA. The “Debriefing Statement” (Annex A to this Appendix) will be used to certify that the returnee has been notified of this requirement.

6. The unit or organization that initially receives the returnee and theater intelligence collection agencies may debrief the returnee for tactical intelligence. During this debriefing, the returnee will not be debriefed about sensitive or covert E&R plans, procedures, organizations, programs, or equipment unless directed by the theater JSRC or the JSSA.

7. The JSSA, in coordination with the JSRC, will determine if the returnee’s exposure to sensitive information warrants subsequent debriefing or assignment restrictions. The JSRC, in coordination with JSSA, will notify the returnee’s parent Service if such action is required. The Services will institute appropriate assignment restrictions, as required.
8. The JSRC will establish appropriate command procedures to ensure returnees under its control are debriefed by qualified personnel. The purpose of the debriefings is to determine the effectiveness of theater E&R concepts, plans, operations, tactics, procedures, techniques, security, and training. The results of these debriefings and any associated operational after-action reports will be forwarded to the JSSA, who will:

   a. Evaluate the debriefings and reports to determine worldwide trends.

   b. Disseminate associated briefings, reports, and analyses to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Service SERE schools, and theater E&R resources or organizations.

   c. Determine the validity of existing theater policy, doctrine, and procedures and institute changes as required.

   d. Maintain historical files of the debriefings, reports, and analyses.

9. Once the debrief has been completed and properly classified, the following instruction will be marked on the front:

   CONTENTS ARE CLASSIFIED BY _____________ IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958. DECLASSIFY ON: ___________. IF DECLASSIFIED, THIS INFORMATION MUST BE REVIEWED TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF DOD DIRECTIVE 5400.7, DOD DIRECTIVE 5400.11, AND DOD REGULATION 5400.7R ARE MET BEFORE PUBLIC RELEASE IS MADE.

10. It is conceivable that DOD could be tasked to recover non-DOD and/or non-US personnel. In such cases, the recovered individuals will be treated in accordance with paragraphs 2a-2c of this appendix, will be requested to complete a Security Nondisclosure Agreement (Appendix B), and will be requested to cooperate with intelligence debriefers for tactical intelligence, but will be directed not to discuss sensitive or covert E&R information with anyone except a specific representative identified by the JSRC.
Intentionally Blank
ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A
DEBRIEFING STATEMENT

DEBRIEFING STATEMENT

1. The undersigned representative of the United States Government certifies that:

   a. The United States will ensure that the information provided by the returnee will not be declassified, downgraded, or released to the public without Department of Defense (DOD) approval.

   b. The United States reserves the right to prosecute returnees for any offenses they may have committed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

2. The undersigned acknowledges that:

   a. Information concerning the returnee’s experience while isolated, evading or missing in action, whether debriefed to US representatives or not, remains the property of the US Government even after the returnee’s separation from government service, and information may not be published or released to the public in any form without the prior written approval of the Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Agency.

   b. Cooperation during this debriefing does not exempt the returnee from possible prosecution or adverse administrative action for any offenses the returnee may have committed under the UCMJ. (AUTHORITY: Title 5, United States Code, sections 552b.(a),(1),(6),(7),(A); title 18, United States Code, section 794 and 798; DOD DIR 5200.1R, Paras 1-401 and 1-603b.)

   Government Representative:                               Returnee:

   Signature ___________________________ Signature ___________________________

   Name ______________________________ Name ______________________________

   Rank & Service ______________________ Rank & Service ______________________

   SSN ______________________________ SSN ______________________________

   Organization _______________________ Organization _______________________

   Date ______________________________ Location ____________________________
Intentionally Blank
APPENDIX B
SAMPLE SECURITY NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

1. I, __________________________, understand that the information concerning covert or sensitive evasion and recovery plans, procedures, organizations, programs, and equipment belongs to the United States Government. I understand that disclosure of this information is punishable under title 18, United States Code, section 798 “Disclosure of Classified Information,” as amended.

2. I do solemnly swear/affirm that I will never divulge, publish, or reveal by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and as specifically authorized by the Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Agency.

3. I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve me of my obligation under this agreement and that the provisions of the agreement will remain binding upon me even after termination of my service with the United States Government.

4. I take this obligation of my own free will, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

WITNESS_________________________  SIGNED_________________________
NAME___________________________  NAME___________________________
SSN______________________________  SSN____________________________
RANK/GRADE____________________  RANK/GRADE____________________
ORGANIZATION__________________  ORGANIZATION__________________
DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
(5 USC 552a)

1. AUTHORITY: Title 18, United States Code, sections 794 and 798; and title 44, United States Code, section 3102.

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To maintain a record of those individuals who have been exposed to covert or sensitive evasion and recovery procedures, organizations, and/or equipment through the use of their name and/or social security number.

3. ROUTINE USES: The social security number is to be used to identify the individual. The information is to be retained strictly within the program.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE: Information is disclosed on a voluntary basis, but withholding information will render it impossible to grant an individual access to or participation in the program.
APPENDIX C
SAMPLE ISOLATED PERSONNEL REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

ISOLATED PERSONNEL REPORT (ISOPREP)
(See Privacy Act Statement on reverse before completing this form)

CLASSIFIED BY: APR 04-3
AR 525-90
NWP 19-2
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

INSTRUCTIONS
Items 1 through 15 and 20 through 23 are to be completed by Applicant. Items 16 through 19 and Item 24 are to be completed by RCC Personnel. All items are to be filled in INK; however, use a PENCIL for items 3, 13, 14, and 20 through 24.

1. NAME (Last, First, Middle Initial)

2. SSN

3. RANK/GRAD

4. BRANCH OF SERVICE

5. NATIONALITY

6. DATE OF BIRTH (YYYYMMDD)

7. OBVIOUS MARKS (Scar, Birthmark, MoI)

8. BLOOD GROUP

9. HEIGHT

10. COLOR OF EYES

11. COLOR OF HAIR

12. DATE PREPARED (YYYYMMDD)

13. DATE REVIEWED (YYYYMMDD)

14. AUTHENTICATOR NO.

15. SIGNATURE

16. DATE MISSING (YYYYMMDD)

17. LOSS POSITION

18. PRIORITY (Mandatory Information requiring priority review)

☐ YES ☐ NO

PERSONAL AUTHENTICATION STATEMENTS

20.

21.

22.

23.

24. ADDITIONAL DATA

DD FORM 1833  PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE
CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)
## CONFIDENTIAL (WHEN FILLED IN)

**AUTHORITY:** 10 U.S.C. Sections 133, 3012, 5031 and 5012; EO 9397.  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S):** It is essential to the combat search and rescue effort for the protection of search and rescue forces from enemy entrapment. The social security number is used to ensure positive identification.  
**ROUTINE USE(S):** It will be completed by each aircrew member who may be subject to action in or over hostile territory. It contains personal information that may be used to ensure positive identification. After the aircrew member has completed the form it will be classified "CONFIDENTIAL..."  
**DISCLOSURE IS VOLUNTARY:** The information is necessary since it affects the entire search and rescue mission and effect on individual of not providing information could be loss of crew status.

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<tr>
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<th>CODE</th>
<th>PRINT CODE</th>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>RIGHT HAND</th>
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<td>KK</td>
<td></td>
<td>10. LITTLE FINGER</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Finger Multilated</td>
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<td>PHOTOGRAPH (Front View)</td>
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<td>8. MIDDLE</td>
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<td>4. INDEX</td>
<td>PHOTOGRAPH (Profile View)</td>
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<td>7. INDEX</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. THUMB</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6. THUMB</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX D
EVASION PLAN OF ACTION FORMAT

1. Individuals completing EPAs should not use the statement “PER SAR SPINS” as a substitute for this document. Such a statement fails to provide recovery forces with the information required and provides no concrete data with which to plan a recovery operation.

2. EPAs should contain the following minimum information. Inclusion of this prescribed information into one document enhances operational effectiveness and precludes the possibility that critical information might not be available in a time-sensitive situation. These documents must be classified to at least the level of the operation order for the mission they support. Paragraphs must be individually classified to the appropriate level.

   a. Identification
      • Name and rank (for each crew or team member).
      • Mission number, aircraft or team call sign or identifier, crew or team position, type aircraft, call sign suffix, other.

   b. Planned Route of Flight, Travel, and/or Delta Points on File
      • If not on file, the route points must be described in the EPA for both INGRESS and EGRESS.
      • Describe inflight emergency plans for each leg of the mission.

   c. Immediate Evasion Actions and/or Intentions for the First 48 Hours, Uninjured (for example):
      • Hide near aircraft or parachute landing site or area of separation from team (distance and heading).
      • Evade alone or link-up with crew or team (rally points).
      • Travel plans (distance, duration or time, speed, and other such details).
      • Intended actions and/or length of stay at initial hiding location.

   d. Immediate Evasion Actions and/or Intentions, If Injured.
      • Provide hiding intentions if injured.
      • Provide evasion intentions if injured.
      • Provide travel intentions if injured.
      • Provide intended actions at hiding locations if injured.

   e. Extended Evasion Actions and/or Intentions After 48 Hours.
      • Destination (SAFE, mountain range, coast, border, FEBA).
      • Travel routes, plans, and/or techniques (either written and/or sketched).
      • Actions and/or intentions at potential contact or recovery locations.
      • Recovery/contact point signals, signs, and/or procedures (written out and/or sketched).
      • Back-up plans, if any, for the above.
3. The following information should be completed by appropriate communications and/or signal, intelligence, and life support personnel and attached to the EPA.

   a. Communications and Authentication

   • Color and/or letter of the day, month, or quarter; base time; base heading; base altitude; base number; codeword; bona fides; other (as applicable).

   • Available communications and signaling devices; type and quantity of radios, quantity of batteries, type and quantity of flares, beacons, mirrors, strobe lights, other.

   • Primary communication schedule, procedures, and/or frequencies (first 48 hours and after 48 hours).

   • Back-up communication schedule, procedures, and/or frequencies.

   b. In addition to the above minimum required information, units may wish to include the following optional information:

   • Weapons and ammunition carried.

   • Personal evasion kit items.

   • Listing of issue survival and evasion kit items.

   • Mission evasion preparation checklist.

   • Signature of reviewing official.
APPENDIX E
BLOOD CHIT PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

Annex A Sample Blood Chit
Appendix E

**BLOOD CHIT PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION**

1. In accordance with MCM-136-91, “Delineation of Responsibilities for Evasion and Escape Within the Department of Defense,” (To be replaced by CJCSI 3270.01) the following procedures have been established for the administration of the DOD Blood Chit Program.

2. The Joint Services SERE Agency is the office of primary responsibility for blood chit policy and for authorizing the production, distribution, and use of blood chits.

3. **Program Administration**
   
a. JSSA will maintain a master control record for all blood chits.

b. Each organizational level where chits are issued will maintain strict accountability by serial number.

c. Units will maintain a record of the blood chit serial number issued to each individual. An individual may be assigned a specific blood chit for the duration of his assignment to a unit; however, to assure positive control, the chit will only be issued before combat missions and deployments to high-threat areas and will be collected immediately after completion of missions.

d. The combatant commander will appoint a theater blood chit program manager or coordinator. This manager will maintain records reflecting which blood chits, by number, have been issued to component organizations. A copy of the initial inventory must be forwarded to JSSA. The program manager needs to establish procedures within the theater to maintain positive control of chits, including annual inventories.

e. The program manager must provide JSSA an annual inventory in December of each year reflecting which components have been issued blood chits, by blood chit number. Additional inventories should also occur at organizations possessing blood chits whenever there is a change of program manager or custodian; however, inventory results need not be forwarded unless a discrepancy is noted.

f. The loss or theft of blood chits is subject to appropriate investigation as would any controlled item. The report of loss or theft (specifying the blood chit serial number(s)), along with a report of investigation and a determination or reason for the loss or theft will be forwarded to the theater program manager and to JSSA as soon as possible after the loss or theft is discovered.

4. **Reporting**

a. Upon notification that an individual possessing a blood chit is isolated in hostile territory, the theater program manager will immediately forward to JSSA and to the DIA POW/MIA Office the individual’s name, rank, SSN, organization, location where missing, date missing, and blood chit number. This information will help in processing potential future claims against the government on a particular chit and will provide basic record data on individuals who may subsequently become prisoners of war.

b. Any individual who has made use of their blood chit and has received assistance must report the circumstances of the incident upon their return to US control. This information may be provided as part of a mission/evasion debriefing in accordance with existing plans. A copy of the individual’s debriefing, along with the blood chit, must be forwarded to HQ JSSA, Ft Belvoir, VA 22060, as soon as practicable. These operationally used blood chits will not be reissued but will become part
of JSSA’s permanent case files. The organization or organizations responsible for control of the blood chit will be simultaneously relieved of accountability for the particular blood chit.

5. Claims for Reward. Commander, JSSA will establish payment limitations and will provide or appoint an individual in-theater as their representative to adjudicate all claims, in coordination with JSSA, as required. USG organizations to whom claims are presented will forward a report detailing the claim to the adjudicator, info JSSA, which will determine the amount and nature of the reward and provide funds to the organization to satisfy the claim.

6. Program Classification Guidance

   a. All aspects of the DOD Blood Chit Program are UNCLASSIFIED.

   b. Although blood chits are unclassified, they are controlled and accountable items.

   c. Inventories and reports of the loss or theft of blood chits are UNCLASSIFIED, unless other factors in connection with the inventory or loss or theft require security classification.
ANNEX A TO APPENDIX E
SAMPLE BLOOD CHIT

ARABIC

اذا احتاج ولا اكتب لك كل. اذا احتاج الى مساعدتك الفعول على الاهتمام والأمانة والوفاء. الرجاء تأذن

PERSIAN (Farsi)

بهارکی می‌سازد. یارا حمیدی نوری

TURKISH


KURDISH

من ته مهیچ پیروکی هیژ مهیچ ته نامک

ENGLISH

"I am an American and do not speak your language. I will not harm you! I bear no malice towards your people. My friend, please provide me food, water, shelter, clothing, and necessary medical attention. Also, please provide safe passage to the nearest friendly forces of any country supporting the Americans and their allies. You will be rewarded for assisting me when you present this number and my name to American authorities."

PREPARED AND PUBLISHED BY THE
DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY AEROSPACE CENTER
AT LINDAL, MISSOURI

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APPENDIX F
EVASION AND RECOVERY MESSAGES

Annex  A  Safe Area Activation Request (SAFER)
B    E&R Report and Authentication Date Request (LUCKY)
C    E&R Authentication Data Report (PRINT)
D    E&R Supplemental Data Report (EARLY)
E    E&R Contact Point Report (NICKY)
F    E&R Handover/Crossover Point Report (QUART)
EVASION AND RECOVERY MESSAGES

1. This appendix provides formats and examples of messages used in E&R operations. The messages should be submitted on joint message forms.

2. The messages presented in this appendix as annexes include:
   


   e. E&R Contact Point Report (NICKY) (Annex E).


3. Example messages are presented in GENADMIN format.
1. **Purpose and Description.** SAFER is a message sent by the Theater Special Operations Command (SOC) to a special operations component (SFG[A]/NSWTG) that may have operational elements operating in the area of a SAFE toward which an evader or evaders may be evading. The message directs the component to task those operational elements to activate and service the SAFE, if operationally practicable. Activation and servicing of a SAFE consists of operational elements surveilling the SAFE and the SAFE contact point(s) (SAFE-CP) and being prepared to contact and recover evaders.

2. **Sent By.** THEATER SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, IMMEDIATE precedence, SECRET classification (CONFIDENTIAL for exercises).

3. **Sent To.** SO component (SFG[A]/NSWTG/STS) with operational element(s) in a position to service designated SAFE areas and contact points.

4. **When Sent.** Upon notification that evaders are possibly or probably present in the vicinity of a given SAFE.

5. **How Sent.** Record traffic.

6. **Responds To.** None.

7. **Expected Response.** Special operations Service component command forwards information to operational unit.

8. **SAFER Format.**

   FM THEATER SOC//
   TO COMPONENT COMMANDER//
   CLASSIFICATION
   OPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//
   MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC//
   SUBJ/SAFER/MISSION IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION//
   RMKS/
   1. ( ) Designation of SAFE to be activated.
   2. ( ) DTG to commence servicing contact point(s).
   3. ( ) Number of evaders who may be proceeding to SAFE-CP(s)
   4. ( ) Additional Information. Include narrative as required to provide supplementary information on the last known or estimated evader position(s), route(s) and enemy pursuit.//
   Declassification authority.//

   **NOTE:** No mission support designator is shown in the subject line because this action is not a mission support event. Also, no operational unit designator is shown in the subject line because the unit designator is initially assigned by the special operations component.
9. **SAFER Example**

FM THEATER SOC//
TO CDR SFG(A)//
CLASSIFICATION
OPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//
MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC//
SUBJ/SAFER/EE-02A/(U)//
RMKS/
1. ( ) 117-2 ONE ONE SEVEN DASH TWO.
2. ( ) 071700Z MAY ZERO SEVEN ONE SEVEN ZERO ZERO ZULU MAY.
3. ( ) TWO.
4. ( ) 1/F-15E, DOWN VICINITY (LOCATION) AT 051500Z HRS. TWO CHUTES OBSERVED. TWO RADIO CONTACTS INDICATE BOTH CREW MEMBERS PROCEEDING SOUTH SOUTHWEST. NO KNOWN ENEMY PURSUIT.//

DRV FROM: (classification source)
DECL ON: (declass date, event, or category)
ANNEX B TO APPENDIX F
E&R REPORT AND AUTHENTICATION DATA REQUEST (LUCKY)

1. **Purpose and Description.** The purpose of the LUCKY is to report that evaders have been contacted and placed in protective isolation and to request data required to authenticate before accepting the evader into the assistance mechanism.

2. **Sent By.** SO component (SFG[A]/NSWTG/STS) whose operational element has contacted and is holding evaders, IMMEDIATE precedence, SECRET classification (CONFIDENTIAL for exercises).

3. **Sent To.** THEATER SOC.

4. **When Sent.** Immediately after contacting evader(s) and placing in protective isolation.

5. **How Sent.** Record traffic. To submit several LUCKYs in one message, repeat the subject line and each item as often as necessary.

6. **Responds to.** None.

7. **Expected Response.** Authentication data extracted from evader’s ISOPREP (unless data was sent before contact).

8. **LUCKY Format:**

   FM COMPONENT COMMANDER//
   TO THEATER SOC//
   CLASSIFICATION
   OPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//
   MSGID/GENADMIN/COMPONENT COMMANDER//
   SUBJ/LUCKY/MISSION IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION//
   RMKS/
   1. ( ) First Name, Middle Name(s), Family (Last) Name, Rank/Grade, Social Security/ Serial Number.
   2. ( ) Date of Birth.
   3. ( ) Nationality and Branch of Service.
   4. ( ) Additional Information. Identifying marks or scars.// Also, if authentication data has been previously received and positive identification has been made, state that identification is positive and request exfiltration instructions, if applicable. If no previous authentication data has been received, request a PRINT report.

   Declassification authority.//
9. LUCKY Example:
   FM CDR SFG(A)//
   TO THEATER SOC//
   CLASSIFICATION
   OPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//
   MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR SFG(A)//
   SUBJ/LUCKY/EE-02A/ODA 511/NNNN/(U)//
   RMKS/
   1. ( ) ROBERT JAMES JONES, CPT, 613-91-4361.
   2. ( ) 26 JUN 70.
   3. ( ) US/USAF.
   4. ( ) PRINT REQUIRED.//
   DRV FROM: (classification source)
   DECL ON: (declass date, event, or category)
1. **Purpose and Description.** The PRINT is a message sent by the theater SOC to a SO component (SFG[A]/NSWTG/STS) for relay to an operational element holding an evader, which contains the authentication data on the evader(s) required to effect the evader’s positive identification. The PRINT contains personal and physical data, fingerprint codes, personal authentication statements, and the authentication number of the evader(s). The data is extracted from the evader’s ISOPREP.

2. **Sent By.** THEATER SOC, IMMEDIATE precedence, SECRET classification (CONFIDENTIAL for exercises).

3. **Sent To.** SO component (SFG[A]/NSWTG/STS) for relay to operational element.

4. **When Sent.** As soon as practicable after receipt of request for authentication. May be provided in advance for certain operations if identity of evader(s) or escapee(s) is known.

5. **How Sent.** Record traffic.

6. **Responds To.** LUCKY.

7. **Expected Response.** None.

8. **PRINT Format:**

   FM THEATER SOC//
   TO COMPONENT COMMANDER//
   CLASSIFICATION
   OPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//
   MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC//
   SUBJ/PRINT/MISSION IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION//
   RMKS/
   1. ( ) First Name, Middle Initial, Family (last) Name, Date of Birth. REPEAT First Name, Middle Initial, Family (Last) Name, Date of Birth, Nationality, and Branch of Service.
   2. ( ) Evasion and Escape Fingerprint Codes.
   3. ( ) Authenticator Question; ANS: Answer REPEAT, answer.
   4. ( ) Authenticator Question; ANS: Answer REPEAT, answer.
   5. ( ) Authenticator Question; ANS: Answer REPEAT, answer.
   6. ( ) Authenticator Question; ANS: Answer REPEAT, answer.
   7. ( ) Height in Inches or Centimeters, color of eyes, color of hair.
   8. ( ) Authenticator Number; REPEAT Authenticator Number.
   9. ( ) Additional information to include disposition instructions.//
   Declassification authority.//

---

**ANNEX C TO APPENDIX F**

**E&R AUTHENTICATION DATA REPORT (PRINT)**

F-C-1
10. PRINT Example.

FM THEATER SOC//
TO CDR SFG(A)//
CLASSIFICATION
OPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//
MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC//
SUBJ/PRINT/EE-02A/ODA 511/NNNN//(()//
RMKS/
1. ( ) ROBERT J. JONES TWO SIX JUN SEVEN ZERO RPT ROBERT J. JONES
   TWO SIX JUN SEVEN ZERO/UNIFORM SIERRA/UNIFORM SIERRA ALFA
   FOXTROT.
2. ( ) MM/MM/PP/NN/MM/OO/MM/KK/MM/LL.
3. ( ) SPOUSE’S MIDDLE NAME? ANS: FAY RPT FAY.
4. ( ) FAVORITE STATE? ANS: WYOMING RPT WYOMING.
5. ( ) FATHER’S OCCUPATION? ANS: DENTIST RPT DENTIST.
6. ( ) BOB’S NICKNAME? ANS: TURKEY RPT TURKEY.
7. ( ) SIX EIGHT INCHES/BROWN/BROWN.
8. ( ) SEVEN ONE SEVEN ONE RPT SEVEN ONE SEVEN ONE.
9. ( ) IF POSITIVE ID, MOVE TO RECOVERY SITE AND EXTRACT BY AIR
   ASSET.//
DRV FROM: (classification source)
DECL ON: (declass date, event, or category)
1. **Purpose and Description.** The EARLY is a message whereby the theater SOC can provide new, additional or changed information concerning recovered evaders to the operational element via the controlling SO component (SFG[A]/NSWTG).

2. **Sent By.** THEATER SOC, IMMEDIATE precedence, SECRET classification (CONFIDENTIAL for exercises).

3. **Sent To.** SO component (SFG[A]/NSWTG) for relay to the operational element.

4. **When Sent.** When additional authentication data is available and needed.

5. **How Sent.** Record traffic.

6. **Responds To.** Request for additional information of changes received after dispatch of PRINT.

7. **Expected Response.** None.

8. **EARLY Format.**

   FM THEATER SOC//
   TO COMPONENT COMMANDER//
   CLASSIFICATION
   OPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//
   MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC//
   SUBJ/EARLY/MISSION IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION//
   RMKS/
   1. ( ) Family (Last) Name, Rank.
   2. ( ) Changes or additions to print code data.
   3. ( ) Changes or additions to authenticator questions and answers.
   4. ( ) Additional information.//
   Declassification authority.//
9. EARLY Example.

FM THEATER SOC//
TO CDR SFG(A)//
CLASSIFICATION
OPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//
MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC//
SUBJ/EARLY/E-02A/ODA511/NNNN(/)//
RMKS/
1. ( ) JONES, CPT.
2. ( ) NONE.
3. ( ) SPOUSE’S MIDDLE NAME? ANS: LESLIE RPT LESLIE.
4. ( ) REPORTS INDICATE POSSIBLE BROKEN RIGHT ARM.//
DRV FROM: (classification source)
DECL ON: (declass date, event, or category)
ANNEX E TO APPENDIX F
E&R CONTACT POINT REPORT (NICKY)

1. **Purpose and Description.** The purpose of the NICKY is to report new E&R contact points and to terminate contact points that are no longer viable.

2. **Sent By.** Operational element or theater SOC through appropriate SO component, IMMEDIATE precedence, SECRET classification (CONFIDENTIAL for exercises).

3. **Sent To.** Theater SOC or operational unit.

4. **When Sent.** As soon as practicable after established contact points have been compromised and/or more viable contact points have been identified.

5. **How Sent.** As appropriate.

6. **Responds To.** None.

7. **Expected Response.** None.

8. **NICKY Format.**

   FM THEATER SOC OR COMPONENT COMMANDER//
   TO COMPONENT COMMANDER OR THEATER SOC//
   CLASSIFICATION
   OPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//
   MSGID/GENADMIN/THEATER SOC OR COMPONENT CDR//
   SUBJ/NICKY/MISSION IDENTIFICATION/CLASSIFICATION//
   RMKS/
   1. ( ) Contact point to be discontinued: UTM coordinates and description.
   2. ( ) New contact point: UTM coordinates and description.
   3. ( ) Initial evader action at the contact point.
   4. ( ) Contact agent response to evader action.
   5. ( ) Final contact procedures.
   6. ( ) Additional information. Include observation on enemy activity in the vicinity and anticipated actions by operational unit(s).//
   Declassification authority.//

9. **NICKY Example.**

   FM CDR SFG(A)//
   TO THEATER SOC//
   CLASSIFICATION
   OPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//
   MSGID/GENADMIN/CDR SFG(A)//
   SUBJ/NICKY/EE-02A/ODA 511/NNNN/( )//
   RMKS/
1. ( ) NOVEMBER INDIA 735621 SMALL WOODEN BRIDGE ON GRAVEL ROAD, SEVEN KM NORTHEAST OF (LOCATION/PLACE NAME).
2. ( ) NOVEMBER INDIA 724598 FORK, IN GRAVEL ROAD, TWELVE KM SOUTH OF (LOCATION/PLACE NAME).
3. ( ) EVADER PUTS OUT LOAD SIGNAL AT CONTACT POINT. EVADER MOVES TO SAFE DISTANCE AND HIDES.
4. ( ) ASSISTER WILL ALTER LOAD SIGNAL.
5. ( ) RECOVERY FORCE WILL “CAPTURE” EVADER WHEN HE COMES TO CHECK ON STATUS OF LOAD SIGNAL.
6. ( ) ENEMY INCREASING PATROLS VICINITY NOVEMBER INDIA 735621. WILL CHECK NEW CP BETWEEN ONE NINE THREE ZERO HOURS AND TWO ONE THREE ZERO HOURS. //

NOTE: This message is from the CDR SFG(A). It is assumed that the message actually was initiated by SFODA 511 and transmitted to the SFG(A).
1. **Purpose and Description.** The purpose of the QUART is to report location(s) and procedures to be used in passing recovered personnel from one recovery operational element to another. Considerable time may be required to transmit the message to the ultimate action element because one or more relay or readdressal actions may be necessary.

2. **Sent By.** Operational unit that will receive the recovered personnel. IMMEDIATE precedence, SECRET classification (CONFIDENTIAL for exercises).

3. **Sent To.** The operational unit holding personnel to be transferred. INFO Theater SOC and other applicable SO components.

4. **When Sent.** As soon as practicable before time of transfer to allow for message relay(s), and movement and positioning of personnel and units in accordance with arrangements prescribed in the QUART.

5. **How sent.** As appropriate.

6. **Responds To.** Notification of personnel to be transferred.

7. **Expected Response.** None.

8. **QUART Format:**

```
FM GAINING COMPONENT COMMANDER//
TO LOSING COMPONENT COMMANDER//
CLASSIFICATION
OPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//
MSGID/GENADMIN/GAINING COMPONENT COMMANDER//
SUBJ/QUART/OPERATIONAL UNIT DESIGNATOR OF TRANSFERRING
ELEMENT/OPERATIONAL UNIT DESIGNATOR OF RECEIVING ELEMENT/
CLASSIFICATION//
RMKS/
1. ( ) Location and description of primary handover/crossover point.
2. ( ) DTG of crossover (primary).
3. ( ) Signals to be used by receiving unit at primary handover or crossover point (clear and danger).
4. ( ) Special instructions (primary).
5. ( ) Location and description of alternate handover or crossover point.
6. ( ) DTG of handover/crossover (alternate).
7. ( ) Signals to be used by receiving unit at alternate handover or crossover point (clear and danger).
8. ( ) Special instructions (alternate)//
Declassification authority.//
```
9. QUART Example:

FM COMNSWTG//
TO CDR SFG(A)//
INFO THEATER SOC//
CLASSIFICATION
OPERATION FLAGWORD OR EXERCISE//
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNSWTG//
SUBJ/QUART/ODA-511/SQD21( )//
RMKS/
1. ( ) ZULU WHISKEY 630520 BRIDGE OVER SMALL STREAM.
2. ( ) 122200Z MAY ONE TWO TWO ZERO ZERO ZULU MAY.
3. ( ) CLEAR, MAN AT WEST END OF BRIDGE REPAIRING BOOT. DANGER, NO MAN REPAIRING BOOT.
4. ( ) DO NOT APPROACH FROM WEST (LEFT) BANK. TRANSFER ALONGSIDE OF BRIDGE ON EAST (RIGHT) BANK.
5. ( ) ZULU WHISKEY 635530 FORK IN GRAVEL ROAD.
6. ( ) 132300Z MAY ONE THREE TWO THREE ZERO ZERO ZULU MAY.
7. ( ) CLEAR, MAN REPAIRING BOOT IN FRONT OF FORK. DANGER, NO MAN REPAIRING BOOT.
8. ( ) TRANSFER IN WOODED AREA ONE ZERO ZERO METERS BEHIND FORK IN ROAD.//

DRV FROM: (classification source)
DECL ON: (declass date, event, or category)
APPENDIX G
PLANNING SUPPLEMENT

Published Separately
The development of Joint Pub 3-50.3 is based upon the following primary references.


2. The Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of August 12, 1949 (the Geneva Conventions), which include the following treaties to which the US Government is a party.
   a. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field (GWS).
   b. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (GWS SEA).
   c. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) (specifically Articles 91-94).


1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the Joint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the US Air Force. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director, J-7, Joint Staff.

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XOXD//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7/JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHANGE NUMBER</th>
<th>COPY NUMBER</th>
<th>DATE OF CHANGE</th>
<th>DATE ENTERED</th>
<th>POSTED BY</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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</tbody>
</table>
4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PSS, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington D.C. 20301-7400.

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Washington, D.C. 20593-0001

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GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAF</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAR</td>
<td>combat search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>direct action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMA</td>
<td>Defense Mapping Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E&amp;R</td>
<td>evasion and recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EARLY</td>
<td>evasion and recovery supplemental data report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>evasion plan of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVC</td>
<td>evasion chart</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEBA</td>
<td>forward edge of the battle area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISOPREP</td>
<td>isolated personnel report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOG</td>
<td>joint operations graphic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSRC</td>
<td>joint search and rescue center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSSA</td>
<td>Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUCKY</td>
<td>evasion and recovery report and authentication data request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>missing in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>military operations other than war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICKY</td>
<td>evasion and recovery contact point report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSWTG</td>
<td>naval special warfare task group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>prisoner of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRINT</td>
<td>evasion and recovery authentication data report</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
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<td>QUART</td>
<td>evasion and recovery handover-crossover point report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAS</td>
<td>recovery activation signal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>rescue coordination center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFE</td>
<td>selected area for evasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFE-CP</td>
<td>selected area for evasion-contact point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFER</td>
<td>evasion and recovery selected area for evasion (SAFE) area activation request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAID</td>
<td>selected area for evasion (SAFE) area intelligence description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERE</td>
<td>survival, evasion, resistance, and escape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>special operations command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>Social Security Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAR</td>
<td>surface-to-air recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UARM</td>
<td>unconventional assisted recovery mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNR</td>
<td>United States Naval Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

act of mercy. In evasion and recovery operations, assistance rendered to evaders by an individual or elements of the local population who sympathize or empathize with the evaders’ cause or plight. (Approved for inclusion in next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

assistance mechanism. Individuals, groups of individuals, or organizations, together with material and/or facilities in position, or that can be placed in position by appropriate US or multinational agencies, to accomplish or support evasion and recovery operations. (Approved for inclusion in next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

assisted recovery. The return of an evader to friendly control as the result of assistance from an outside source. (Approved for inclusion in next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

authentication. 1. A security measure designed to protect a communications system against acceptance of a fraudulent transmission or simulation by establishing the validity of a transmission, message, or originator. 2. A means of identifying individuals and verifying their eligibility to receive specific categories of information. 3. Evidence by proper signature or seal that a document is genuine and official. 4. In evasion and recovery operations, the process whereby the identity of an evader is confirmed. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

blood chit. A small sheet of material depicting an American flag and a statement in several languages to the effect that anyone assisting the bearer to safety will be rewarded. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

bona fides. Good faith. In evasion and recovery operations, the use of verbal or visual communication by individuals who are unknown to one another to establish their authenticity, sincerity, honesty, and truthfulness. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

cache. In evasion and recovery operations, source of subsistence and supplies, typically containing items such as food, water, medical items, and/or communications equipment, packaged to prevent damage from exposure and hidden in isolated locations by such methods as burial, concealment, and/or submersion, to support evaders in current or future operations. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

clandestine operation. An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of identity of sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat search and rescue. A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during wartime or military operations other than war. Also called CSAR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat survival. Those measures to be taken by Service personnel when involuntarily separated from friendly
forces in combat, including procedures relating to individual survival, evasion, escape, and conduct after capture. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**contact point.** 1. In land warfare, a point on the terrain, easily identifiable, where two or more units are required to make contact. 2. In air operations, the position at which a mission leader makes radio contact with an air control agency. 3. In evasion and recovery operations, a location where an evader can establish contact with friendly forces. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**contact procedure.** Those predesignated actions taken by evaders and recovery forces that permit link-up between the two parties in hostile territory and facilitate the return of evaders to friendly control. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**conventional recovery operation.** Evader recovery operations conducted by conventional forces. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**covert operation.** An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**direct action.** Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; and conduct independent sabotage. Also called DA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**evader.** Any person isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory who eludes capture. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**evasion.** The process whereby individuals who are isolated in hostile or unfriendly territory avoid capture with the goal of successfully returning to areas under friendly control. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**evasion aid.** In evasion and recovery operations, any piece of information or equipment designed to assist an individual in evading capture. Evasion aids include, but are not limited to, blood chits, pointee-talkees, evasion charts, barter items, and equipment designed to complement issued survival equipment. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**evasion and escape.** The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**evasion and escape route.** A course of travel, preplanned or not, that an escapee or evader uses in an attempt to depart enemy territory in order to return to friendly lines. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**evasion and recovery.** The full spectrum of coordinated actions carried out by evaders, recovery forces, and operational
recovery planners to effect the successful return of personnel isolated in hostile territory to friendly control. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

evasion chart. Special map or chart designed as an evasion aid. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

evasion plan of action. A course of action, developed before executing a combat mission, which is intended to improve a potential evader’s chances of successful evasion and recovery by providing recovery forces with an additional source of information that can increase the predictability of the evader’s actions and movement. Also called EPA. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

Fulton Recovery System. A method used for quickly extracting personnel from isolated areas that consists of a kit containing a harness, tow line, and helium-inflated balloon dropped to an individual(s) by a specially designed aircraft that is capable of snaring the tow line and extracting the harnessed individual(s) from the area. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

isolated personnel report. A DOD Form (DD 1833) that contains information designed to facilitate the identification and authentication of an evader by a recovery force. Also called ISOPREP. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint search and rescue center. A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint search and rescue and combat search and rescue operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force. The facility is operated jointly by personnel from two or more Service or functional components or it may have a multinational staff of personnel from two or more allied or coalition nations (multinational search and rescue center). The joint search and rescue center should be staffed equitably by trained personnel drawn from each joint force component, including US Coast Guard participation where practical. Also called JSRC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

handover/crossover. In evasion and recovery operations, the transfer of evaders between two recovery forces. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

load signal. In evasion and recovery operations, a visual signal displayed in a covert manner to indicate the presence of an individual or object at a given location. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

high-risk-of-capture personnel. US personnel whose position or assignment makes them particularly vulnerable to capture by hostile forces in combat, by terrorists, or by unfriendly governments. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

joint search and rescue center director. The designated representative with overall responsibility for operation of the joint search and rescue center. (Joint Pub 1-02)

pointee-talkee. A language aid containing selected phrases in English opposite a translation in a foreign language. It is used by pointing to appropriate phrases. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)
**recovery.** In evasion and recovery operations, the return of evaders to friendly control, either with or without assistance, as the result of planning, operations, and individual actions on the part of recovery planners, conventional/unconventional recovery forces, and/or the evaders themselves. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**recovery activation signal.** In evasion and recovery operations, a precoordinated signal from an evader that indicates his presence in an area to a receiving or observing source that indicates “I am here, start the recovery planning.” (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

**recovery force.** In evasion and recovery operations, an organization consisting of personnel and equipment with a mission of seeking out evaders, contacting them, and returning them to friendly control. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

**recovery site.** In evasion and escape usage, an area from which an evader or an escapee can be evacuated. (This term and its definition modifies the existing term and its definition and is approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

**rescue coordination center.** A primary search and rescue facility suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for coordinating and controlling search and rescue and/or combat search and rescue operations. The facility is operated unilaterally by personnel of a single Service or component. For Navy component operations, this facility may be called a rescue coordination team. Also called RCC (or RCT for Navy component). (Joint Pub 1-02)

**SAFE area intelligence description.** In evasion and recovery operations, an in-depth, all-source evasion study designed to assist the recovery of military personnel from a selected area for evasion under hostile conditions. Also called SAID. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**selected area for evasion.** A designated area in hostile territory that offers evaders or escapees a reasonable chance of avoiding capture and of surviving until they can be evacuated. Also called SAFE. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

**special operations.** Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**surface-to-air recovery.** Also called STAR. See Fulton Recovery System.

**unconventional assisted recovery.** Evader recovery conducted by directed unconventional warfare forces, dedicated extraction teams, and/or unconventional
assisted recovery mechanisms operated by guerrilla groups or other clandestine organizations to seek out, contact, authenticate, support, and return evaders to friendly control. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**unconventional assisted recovery mechanism.** That entity, group of entities, or organizations within enemy-held or hostile areas which operates to receive, support, move, and exfiltrate military personnel or selected individuals to friendly control. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

**unconventional recovery operation.** Evader recovery operations conducted by unconventional forces. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Pub 3-50.3 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1** Project Proposal
- Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2** Program Directive
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCs
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3** Two Drafts
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4** CJCS Approval
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCs
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a Joint Publication

**STEP #5** Assessments/Revision
- The CINCS receive the pub and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each pub and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each pub is revised

*All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Pub 3-50.3 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process.*