The AIVD safeguards the national security of the Netherlands by identifying threats, political developments and risks which are not immediately visible. To this end, it conducts investigations both inside and outside the country. Where necessary, the AIVD shares information so that partners and other interested parties can take appropriate measures. The AIVD identifies risks and advises and mobilises third parties. If necessary, it actively works to reduce risks itself. The service thus has a clear position in the network of official organisations dedicated to the protection of national and international security.
Foreword

The investigation works of the General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, AIVD) reveal hidden threats to Dutch national security and expose the true intentions of other nations. The results enable other parties to take action.

The AIVD’s task is to reveal threats that are invisible to society. The AIVD annual report 2008 describes in detail how the AIVD reports on this to its co-operating partners. By doing so, the AIVD enables its partners to act.

Official reports issued by the AIVD have led to the arrest and prosecution of terrorist suspects, and also to exclusion orders banning persons who pose a threat to national security from remaining in the Netherlands. Moreover, information provided by the service has assisted national and local officials in developing policy measures to counter radicalisation. It has advised companies and institutions on the methods used by animal rights extremists, so that they can take appropriate countermeasures. The AIVD has identified hostile foreign intelligence agents, who have subsequently been made to leave the country. Its work has helped shape Dutch foreign policy, and its analyses have contributed to the protection of people, property, public services and vital information.

In this report, the AIVD draws particular attention to the precarious relationship between national security on the one hand and, on the other, openness and transparency. As such, it does more than merely fulfilling the service’s legal obligation to disclose its areas of interest. In my view, the report has an important role to play in improving the security awareness of Dutch society as a whole: not by causing unnecessary alarm, but by making the nation more resilient to the threats we face.

Dr G. Ter Horst
Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
The AIVD in short

The AIVD carries out investigations in the Netherlands and abroad, in order to identify threats and risks to national security in time. These may be directed against Dutch society as a whole, but also against government bodies, organisations or against individual citizens. They include threats of violence intended to bring about fundamental social change or to undermine the democratic process, but also efforts to disrupt civil society or to restrict the constitutional freedoms enjoyed by particular groups or individuals. In addition the AIVD gathers political intelligence, which is valuable for the government in its decision-making on foreign policy and during international negotiations. Finally the AIVD investigates risks to or threats against vital public services like water and energy supply, transport systems and telecommunications, as well as the dangers associated with classified government information falling into unauthorised hands.

Persons and organisations responsible for threats of this kind make every effort to conceal their activities. The AIVD focuses upon risks and threats which have yet to manifest themselves openly, so that preventive measures can be taken in time. In so doing, the AIVD is allowed to make use of special investigative powers under the Intelligence and Security Services Act (Wiv 2002).

The AIVD informs and advises public administrators, policymakers and other relevant parties at local, national and international levels. Using the information received, they can develop and adjust policies and take appropriate action. The service thus has both an advisory and a mobilising role: its products may contribute to or trigger the development of policy, but also prompt preventive measures such as heightened security or enforcement activity – arrests based upon an official report, for example. Under certain circumstances, and when no other effective measures are available, the AIVD itself may also act to reduce a particular risk.

The AIVD is an official agency directed by and accountable to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. In performing its duties, it co-operates with many domestic and international institutions and individual members of the public.
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Glossary
Security awareness under pressure

Nowadays, more and more information is provided online and in real time. Not just the latest news, but also details of political, economic and scientific developments. Government organisations are expected to join in this trend, in response to public demand for openness and transparency. Knowledge has to be shared quickly and widely. Also by the security and intelligence service. Entering “AIVD” as a search term in Google produces 251,000 hits in just 0.1 second.

There is a potential downside to all this, though. This chapter looks at the repercussions of openness, transparency and the broad dissemination of knowledge for the AIVD itself, as well as for the general security of Dutch society.

Sharing knowledge versus secrecy

The task of the AIVD is to provide relevant information to a variety of users – politicians, civil servants, private companies and public institutions – so that they can adapt their policy accordingly or take other appropriate measures. The service supplies large amounts of such information, in many cases accompanied by advice on the best way to act upon it. It is currently striving to improve the effectiveness of this advice: by intensifying its relationships with the users and understanding their wishes, it is engaged in a constant process to improve the quality of its reports.

At the same time, however, the very special nature of the AIVD’s work means that a lot of the information it holds must remain confidential. It cannot be disclosed to anyone, or only on a very limited basis. Wider release would risk revealing details of sources, methods or current knowledge, which in turn might undermine the AIVD’s effectiveness, could endanger lives and make individuals, organisations and its fellow services abroad more reluctant to co-operate.

This dilemma between openness versus secrecy is also visible in the relationship between the AIVD and the agencies responsible for investigating and countering criminal behaviour, such as the police and the Public Prosecution Service. In the Netherlands, a strict distinction has traditionally been drawn between the work of the intelligence and security services and that of investigative bodies. Each is assigned its own specific task and is governed by its own legislative regime. In the case of the AIVD, that is the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wet op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten 2002, Wiv 2002). Under this law, the service is not charged with
investigating criminal acts and so, in fact, may not gather information for the express purpose of pursuing a case in the courts. None the less, the intelligence it holds may well be highly relevant to criminal investigations and prosecutions. The AIVD observes a lot in the course of its work, including activities which directly impinges upon the democratic legal order. Chapter 2 of this report includes some examples of successful prosecutions, extraditions and deportations based upon official reports ("ambtsbericht") originating from the AIVD.

Information obtained by the service in fulfilling its own duties may be passed on to the Public Prosecution Service in the form of an official report. Such information can be used as basis for a criminal investigation, and it is now also admissible as evidence in court. Thereby, the AIVD information becomes part of the prosecution case. Because of this, the service must carefully consider the content of every issued report before issuing such documents. Criminal trials should be held in public, of course, but that may be at odds with the demands of intelligence work. At the same time, though, there is increasing pressure on the AIVD to reveal more information more often in support of the legal process. Although the service is not always in a position to satisfy this demand, it too has an inherent interest in seeing justice done – and in the visibility of it being done. It is vital, after all, that attempts to damage national security do not go unpunished, that the general public be aware of the threats and that they be neutralised in a transparent way.

**The risks of openness**

As well as expecting their government to be more open, the Dutch people – encouraged by the accessibility of the internet – are increasingly prepared to reveal personal details to the world. Individuals, companies and other organisations are posting more and more information on websites: about themselves, about employees, about products and about processes. This is often done voluntarily, although sometimes it is the result of perceived pressure to be more transparent. But there are risks involved. For example, details of job applicants, business relationships, friends and acquaintances become public knowledge once released into cyberspace. The medium has also facilitated fraud and other crimes: identity theft and the misappropriation of credit card details, for instance. And, as the AIVD sees in its work, these are not the only risks associated with openness.
Clandestine activities by foreign powers
Some foreign intelligence services are using clandestine means in an effort to gather sensitive political, military, economic, technical and scientific information. Their activities can also place vulnerable public services and ICT infrastructures at risk. In 2007 and 2008, for example, tangible threats came to light of digital attacks directed from China against government and commercial computer networks in the Netherlands. The Russian Federation, as well, has a broad interest in gathering intelligence about institutions like NATO and such sectors as science, technology, defence and energy. It is a sign of the times that the European Commission recently expressed concern about the increasing number of attempts to access sensitive and confidential information at its Brussels offices. It, too, publicly named Russia and China as responsible.

The AIVD provides civil servants and people in the commercial sector with customised information to assist them in taking precautions against potential intelligence-gathering activities. The service can also act independently to counter such threats.

Proliferation
The Netherlands is an appealing target for nations and organisations seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Much of the advanced technology available here can be used for both civilian and military purposes. It is therefore important that companies and scientific institutes be aware of the risks associated with excessive openness in their contacts with organisations in countries suspected of developing such weapons. The AIVD actively advises businesses operating in relevant sectors, whilst a unit operated jointly with the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) devotes much effort to informing companies, organisations and institutions about the risks involved, alongside its regular investigative work.

Terrorism, opposition to government asylum policy and animal rights extremism
It is not only foreign powers and commercial interests which benefit from openness on the part of Dutch companies and their employees. Active and potential terrorists can also exploit the information available – in selecting their targets, for example. Animal rights campaigners and other extremists are known to make use of it, too. For them, the internet has become a welcome source of intelligence about those individuals and firms that are involved in animal testing or the deportation of failed asylum seekers. Even suppliers, financiers and so on. Here again, apparently innocent information can give rise to serious security risks.
Conclusion

The AIVD tries to be as open as possible about its work, as this annual report itself demonstrates. By so doing, it is responding positively to public calls for transparency in its work. However, openness can entail risks – and not just to the service itself, but to other institutions, to companies and to individual citizens.

The AIVD has a role to play in exposing otherwise hidden risks, and it increases society’s resilience to them by disclosing information to particular audiences, accompanied by specific advise. For example, it provides information and education to government departments, companies and vital sectors which are potential targets of espionage. In 2008 the AIVD and the MIVD jointly produced a brochure warning of the risks of falling victim to hostile intelligence activities when travelling abroad. Advisory work in respect of animal rights and other political extremists also intensified, to make individuals, companies and government departments more aware of how the activists work, their tactics and their strategies. Finally, the AIVD is taking the opportunity presented by this report to describe in some detail the risks to national security it has identified in the course of its work.
Terrorism

Jihadist terrorism remains a threat to the Netherlands. Below is a summary of the main international developments associated with this phenomenon in 2008:

- The Netherlands and Dutch interests constitute preferred targets for internationally active jihadist networks;
- These networks appear to have placed greater emphasis upon Western targets; Reasons for this shift in focus include declining sympathy for the groups concerned, both within their own ranks and amongst their potential support base, due to the fact that most victims of their attacks in the Islamic world are Muslims;
- Al-Qaeda’s ability to commit and direct terrorist attacks has increased in recent years;
- The AIVD received a growing number of indications that individuals from Europe are receiving military training at camps in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. This could increase the ability of (core) Al-Qaeda and its allies to commit or direct attacks in Europe.

The main developments related to jihadist terrorism in the Netherlands in 2008 were as follows:

- Local Autonomous networks still appeared to be divided and to lack leader figures;
- Through the Counterterrorism Infobox, the AIVD supplied the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst, IND) with information which resulted in a number of jihadists being successfully dealt with under immigration law;
- Several members of national and international jihadist networks under AIVD investigation were arrested during the year, in some cases as a result of official reports from the service;
- During the night of 18-19 January 2008, members of a jihadist terrorist cell were arrested in Barcelona. The AIVD had information that a person directly associated with this group was in the Netherlands on a student visa and had been ordered to carry out an attack (possibly a suicide bombing) in Germany. That person was arrested and in August 2008 was handed over to the Spanish authorities.
2.1 International developments in jihadist terrorism

In March 2008 the National Co-ordinator for Counterterrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, NCTb) raised the general threat level for the Netherlands from “limited” to “substantial”. The reason for this change was an increased threat from internationally active jihadist networks, as perceived by the AIVD and MIVD (see also 2.1.2). The Dutch threat profile had already been high for some considerable time, due in part to its military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another contributing factor was the critical domestic debate about Islam. Particularly significant in this respect was the release by Geert Wilders, leader of the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), of the film *Fitna* in March 2008. This at first caused little unrest, either within the Dutch Muslim community or elsewhere in the world. Over a longer timescale, however, it appears to be an important factor in the country’s profile within jihadist networks. They regard *Fitna* as an insult to Islam, and so have seized upon it to legitimise the targeting of the Netherlands and Dutch interests. As a result, the possibility of a jihadist terrorist attack in the Netherlands increased in 2008.

The AIVD believes that the Netherlands is likely to remain a preferred target for some time. This assessment is based in part upon the evolution of Denmark’s threat profile in the wake of the so-called “cartoon affair”. Another factor is an apparent strategic reorientation by the internationally active networks during the course of 2008, involving a shift of emphasis towards Western targets. One reason for that is criticism, both from within their own ranks and in the wider Muslim community, that their attacks in the Islamic world cause mainly Muslim victims. By this reasoning their violence should be directed more specifically against targets viewed as legitimate and “uncontroversial”, such as Western interests in general and, in particular, those individuals or nations viewed in jihadist eyes as offending Islam. In this way the movement hopes to have the maximum mobilising effect and to win over “the hearts of Muslims worldwide”.

**The threat from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region**

In August 2008 the AIVD released two analyses warning of an increased threat to Dutch interests from Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups based in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

These analyses also formed the basis for an assessment of the repercussions of that threat for a number of specific individuals, facilities, public services and other sectors. As a result of that exercise, the AIVD subsequently raised the threat level for several of those subjects. The assessment was based in part upon a study conducted
in collaboration with the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG)\(^1\) and completed in 2008, examining the process of target selection by jihadist networks.\(^2\)

The Pakistan-Afghanistan border region is an important base for internationally active networks which also threaten both the Netherlands and Dutch interests abroad. During the past year, several Dutch citizens or persons located in the Netherlands have travelled to the area to develop facilitating activities. Wherever possible, the AIVD has taken action to disrupt this.

As well as core Al-Qaeda, other groups active there include the Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). An analysis conducted in 2008 by the AIVD and verified by fellow services indicates that core Al-Qaeda’s ability to carry out terrorist attacks has increased in recent years. To a great extent, this is explained by the many alliances Al-Qaeda has forged with other networks and groups, both in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region itself and elsewhere in the Islamic world. With the jihadist agenda of those allies becoming more international, at least at the propaganda level, the threat to the West and its interests has intensified.

One development of particular concern is the growing evidence that people from Europe are undergoing military training at camps in the border region. As a result, the ability of (core) Al-Qaeda and its allies to commit or direct attacks in Europe could increase. Not only might the trainees themselves carry out such actions upon their return to Europe, but they could also guide or support others. Although the AIVD has been unable to confirm the presence of any Dutch citizens in the training camps, the AIVD considers it a possibility. Nor can the AIVD rule out the chance that recruits from other European countries might be ordered to carry out attacks in the Netherlands.

**The strategic objectives of AQIM**

By comparison with its predecessor, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, GSPC), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Al Qa’ida in de Islamitische Maghreb, AQIM) has declared a far more international jihadist agenda. Its aim in doing this is to create broader support for its struggle against the Algerian government: since the bombings in Algiers on 11 April 2007, it too seems to have become more sensitive to accusations that such attacks

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\(^1\) A partnership of European security service

\(^2\) The results of this study have been shared with the NCTb, the Joint Counterterrorism Committee (GCT), all the police Regional Intelligence Units (RIDs) and the Special Branch of the Royal Military Constabulary (BD/KMar)
harm Muslim civilians. It is therefore conceivable that AQIM will shift its attention to “uncontroversial” targets, such as the West and its interests. This might enable it to mobilise sympathy in North Africa, and also enhance its international status as a proponent of the “just” struggle in defence of Islam. As well as adopting a jihadist rhetoric with threats against Western interests, in the past two years AQIM has actually attacked foreigners and foreign interests in Algeria with some regularity. By extending such activities into the wider region, or even Europe itself, the organisation would raise its profile considerably. For the time being, though, the majority of AQIM actions remain directed against the Algerian government, and in particular the security apparatus in the north-east of the country.

Unlike the “old” GSPC, AQIM carries out suicide attacks quite regularly. In August and September 2008, for example, it once again proved itself capable of launching such operations on a large-scale with a series of suicide vehicle bombings against security facilities in Boumerdès, Bouïra and Tizi Ouzou. Nevertheless, the Algerian authorities have made some progress in combating AQIM, using a combination of tough repressive measures and reconciliatory politics. Despite this partial success, however, this organisation remains the greatest threat to peace and stability in North Africa and to Western interests in that region.

At the time of writing, the conflict with the Algerian government seems to be the first and foremost tricker in AQIM’s activities. Although the organisation does represent a potential danger to Europe, not least because of geographical proximity and potential appeal to North-African migrants, it currently appears not to be planning attacks in Europe. But it did receive some support from within Europe in 2008, in the form of recruitment, fundraising and assistance to fighters attempting to reach Algeria. Several North-African networks with links to Algerian terrorist groups were dismantled during the year, in Spain, France, Belgium and Italy.

### 2.2 Domestic developments: threats from local networks neutralised

From the investigation of jihadist networks active or based in the Netherlands during 2008, it is apparent that the threat of terrorism increasingly comes from transnational networks and from local networks with an international orientation rather than from local autonomous networks.

Over the past year, the local autonomous networks in the Netherlands have been riven by internal divisions and a lack of leadership. No specific terrorist threats issued from
this quarter in 2008, although a number of incidents of concern did occur. The AIVD facilitated measures to help neutralise these dangers during the course of the year.

**Arrest resulting from official report**
On 11 November 2008, for instance, a resident of The Hague was arrested by the National Criminal Investigation Service (Nationale Recherche, NR). Just prior to this arrest, the AIVD issued an official report stating that the suspect had been radicalising rapidly and might have access to firearms. During a search of his home, police did indeed find two weapons plus live ammunition and a silencer. A Rotterdam court later sentenced the man to four months’ imprisonment, including one month suspended, for illegal possession of firearms. In its investigation of the case, the NR found no evidence of involvement in any terrorist crimes.

**Successful use of immigration law**
As well as local autonomous networks, there are also jihadist networks with a more international orientation active in the Netherlands. These usually concentrate upon activities in support of and recruitment for violent jihad elsewhere in the world. Members of one such network, the so-called “Rotterdam Twelve”, were arrested in 2002 after the AIVD had issued an official report about them. All, however, were acquitted at trial in 2003. Since then, proceedings against the group under immigration law – based in part upon further AIVD official reports – have resulted in six of the twelve being declared undesirable aliens. In 2008 the AIVD issued another official report concerning an Algerian member of the group, prompting the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) to declare him, too, an undesirable alien. He has since left the Netherlands. The AIVD concludes that this action has brought a virtual end to the recruitment and facilitation activities by this particular network, which in any case has now more or less collapsed.
Official reports to the IND

The IND is one of the official bodies to which the AIVD issues official reports stating the service considers a person a “threat to national security”. Under the Immigration Act (Vreemdelingenwet), such a report provide the IND with sufficient grounds to declare the subject an undesirable alien, which means that he or she may not enter or remain in the Netherlands. To do so is a criminal offence and the subject may be detained until he or she can be deported from the country.

A person declared an illegal alien has a legal right to appeal against the decision. As part of this procedure, the judge hearing the case can ask to inspect the supporting documentation, including the official report, in order to weigh up the evidence. If such a request is made, the AIVD can enjoin confidentiality of the judge in question in respect of the information revealed.

Another official report issued in 2008 concerned a person of Moroccan origin, whom the AIVD has concluded represents a threat to national security because he sympathises with violent international jihad, maintains contact with like-minded people abroad and has actually provided them with support. This subject was subsequently declared an illegal alien and detained by immigration officials. It is expected that he will be deported to Morocco, the country of his birth, in the near future. An official report in respect of another member of the same family stated that this individual rejects the democratic legal order. On that basis, it is likely that he will be refused Dutch nationality.

In November 2008 an official report was submitted to the IND about a Turkish man whose leave to remain in the Netherlands has expired. He left the country in August 2008, travelling via Turkey to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region to take part in the violent international jihad. The official report states that he poses a threat to national security and the IND has now declared him an undesirable alien.

Counterterrorism Infobox

An advanced system developed in 2008 now provides simultaneous computer access to the information held by a number of partner organisations in the fight against terrorism. By bringing together data from the AIVD, the IND and the National Police Services Agency (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten, KLPD), this new system simplifies searches and speeds up analysis. The databases of other organisations are to be added at a later stage.
Transnational networks: increasing threat partly disrupted

The most significant developments related to jihadist terrorism in the Netherlands in 2008 concerned the activities of transnational networks. The trend here mirrored international events, in the sense that these networks’ most threatening activities were linked to organisations and networks in Pakistan or Afghanistan.

On 16 May 2008, acting upon a formal request from the French judicial authorities, the NR arrested a Dutch citizen of Turkish origin. The AIVD subsequently submitted two official reports to the Public Prosecution Service (OM) in connection with the French request for legal assistance. On 18 July, still in detention, the suspect was extradited to France. He was a key figure in an international facilitation network, with its most prominent manifestation in France, associated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Indeed, he was in direct contact with its leadership. The IMU is a terrorist organisation which has been driven out of Uzbekistan and, since the fall of the Taliban regime, has been operating in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. There it is in close contact with the Taliban and with other jihadist organisations and networks.

In August 2008 a Pakistani residing in the Netherlands on a student visa, Aqeel A., was handed over to the Spanish authorities under a European warrant for his arrest. The Department of Public Prosecutions in Spain considers him a full member of a Barcelona-based jihadist cell, fourteen members of which were arrested during the night of 18-19 January 2008. According to the Spanish authorities, the suspects – almost all of them of Pakistani origin – were part of an international network with plans to carry out suicide bombings in Spain, Portugal, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Aqeel A. is believed to have been preparing such an attack in Germany.

Based upon an official report from the AIVD, he was arrested in Breda on 14 March 2008 on suspicion of participating in an international jihadist network making preparations to commit acts of terrorism in Western Europe. Due to insufficient evidence for a successful criminal prosecution in the Netherlands, however, it eventually proved impossible to extend his period of remand here. To facilitate his extradition to Spain, and again acting upon an official report from the AIVD, he was declared an undesirable alien by the IND in April 2008.

Yet again – as with the London bombings of July 2005, the foiled attempt to blow up transatlantic flights from the United Kingdom in 2006 and the thwarted plans for attacks in Germany and Denmark in the summer of 2007 – the Barcelona case presented Europe with a serious terrorist threat emanating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. This time, however, the network involved did not fit the
prevailing image of Pakistani terror groups. The cells in both the UK and Germany consisted mainly of “home-grown” jihadists: young Muslims who grew up and were radicalised in the West, travelled to Pakistan or Afghanistan for training and then returned home with instructions to commit terrorist acts. In Barcelona, the “home-grown” component was missing. The members of that network included Pakistani-born long-term residents of Europe, who acted primarily as facilitators for younger “operatives”, also from Pakistan, who had been radicalised and trained there before being sent to Europe specifically to carry out suicide attacks. A scenario of this kind, with jihadists being flown in from outside Europe expressly to commit acts of terror, had previously been postulated, but until this case it had never actually come to pass. As such, it confirms the impression that networks in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region are determined to attack Europe directly.

2.4 Other terrorist groups

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
The AIVD is investigating support from within the Netherlands for the LTTE’s struggle in Sri Lanka. For the most part, this takes the form of fundraising within the Tamil community in the Netherlands. Because this activity takes place in several other Western countries, in 2008 the AIVD sought to engage the co-operation of a number of fellow services in addressing the issue. The AIVD also provided the appropriate authorities in the Netherlands with information concerning pro-LTTE activities.

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
Although a banned organisation in the Netherlands, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) enjoys substantial support within the Kurdish community here. The AIVD has observed that PKK-related political and military developments in Turkey sometimes generate unrest within the Kurdish community, both within the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe.

The news that PKK’s intellectual leader Abdullah Öcalan had allegedly been mistreated in prison prompted a violent response from young Kurds in Turkey and Europe in the autumn of 2008. Incidents ranged from cars being set on fire and clashes with Turkish youths to the throwing of a fire bomb at the Turkish embassy in Helsinki. In the Netherlands, however, there was no violence. Protests here were confined to peaceful demonstrations and the blockade of roads, in line with the Dutch Kurdish community’s usual response to events in Turkey.
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
The (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi, DHKP/C) is a Marxist-Leninist terrorist organisation seeking the establishment of a socialist state in Turkey. It considers violence a legitimate means of achieving that end.

In August 2008, fugitive DHKP/C leader Dursun Karataş died at a house in the Dutch town of Etten-Leur. He had been in hiding for years prior to his death, due to an outstanding international arrest warrant against him. During this time he probably moved throughout Europe, from one hiding place to another. In recent years his location and state of health were the subject of much rumour and speculation in the media, including suggestions that he was already dead. After his actual death, Turkish newspapers reported that he had received medical treatment at a clinic in Arnhem. Investigations by the AIVD have found no evidence to support this claim.

Although Karataş had played no significant role as an effective leader of the DHKP/C for many years, his stature as a symbol of the movement remained high. For many of its sympathisers, Karataş was the very embodiment of the socialist ideal. It is not yet clear how the loss of this symbolic figurehead will affect the DHKP/C, which has been struggling to attract new followers in recent years.

The DHKP/C is active in the Netherlands through a number of associations and foundations, most of them cultural or social in nature. Although the organisation in this country is very small, probably consisting of no more than a few dozen active supporters, the Dutch section stills play a part in the functioning of the DHKP/C in Turkey.
AIVD investigation of trends in radicalisation is not confined solely to moves in the direction of terrorism, but also includes other forms with a potential disruptive impact upon Dutch society. For example, those likely to bring about social polarisation and so-called “intolerant isolationism”. In the latter case, non-violent political Salafism is a major contributing factor. Representatives of this tendency in the Netherlands concentrate upon spreading their message – “dawa”, or the call to Islam – by peaceful means and in general reject violence in pursuit of their aims. However, there is some discussion within the political Salafist movement about the acceptability of taking part in the jihad in Muslim countries where a conflict is already under way, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

In 2008 the AIVD visited several mayors and some ten regional authorities to share information about the growth and professionalisation of non-violent radical Islam in the Netherlands, including the risks it poses to the democratic legal order both now and in the future. For the AIVD, good contacts with local government remain a hugely important factor in recognising radicalisation and in countering it effectively.

The AIVD’s key observations in this respect during the past year:

- Known Salafist centres present themselves in public as more moderate than they are behind closed doors;
- A certain amount of “self-policing” has started to appear, with extremists being turned away;
- The mainstream Dutch Muslim community’s resilience towards radical movements has increased;
- There was no increase in the number of extremist Islamic postings on Dutch websites in 2008.

Spurred by media attention, political pressure and critical responses from the Moroccan community, it has been observed that known Salafist centres have begun presenting themselves in public as more moderate than they really are behind closed doors. Whilst trying outwardly to give the impression that they are encouraging the integration of Muslims into Dutch society, internally statements of a polarising nature are still made. These may have negative social effects in the longer term. There appears to be an effort to eventually make Salafism a movement with influence and authority in the Netherlands. The AIVD will continue to monitor these developments closely in 2009.
A certain amount of “self-policing” has also started to appear within the Salafist centres. For example, the as-Soennah Mosque in The Hague turned away a group of young extremists and even reported them to the police. The AIVD report *The radical dawa in transition – the rise of Islamic neoradicalism in the Netherlands* has assisted local authorities in introducing policy to encourage this trend. Moreover, the mainstream Dutch Muslim community’s resilience towards radical movements has increased, with the AIVD noting that more and more people are publicly distancing themselves from the teachings of the Salafist centres.

### 3.1 The Turkish community and radicalisation in the Netherlands

The AIVD can confirm that resistance to radical Islamic ideologies remains strong within the Turkish community in the Netherlands. This was apparent, for example, in its response to the release of Geert Wilders’ film *Fitna*. A number of traditional factors in this community’s resilience – Turkish nationalism, for instance, and the existence of well-organised and relatively moderate Islamic institutions like Diyanet and Milli Görüş – still seem to retain influence. On the other side of the coin, the advance of radical Islam has been hindered by its lack of any coherent ideology, poor organising ability and absence of clear leadership.

Thus in the short and medium term, there is no danger that these religious ideas will find many receptive ears in the Dutch Turkish community. As also mentioned in the AIVD’s 2007 annual report, however, the number of individuals overcoming this general resistance to radicalise in the direction of jihadism is increasing. In some cases the internet, and in particular radical Islamic websites and forums, is playing a part in that process.

### 3.2 The Moroccan community and radicalisation in the Netherlands

A section of the Moroccan community in the Netherlands remains susceptible to radicalisation. They are mainly young people who, lacking the sense that they are appreciated and accepted, have difficulty finding a place in Dutch society. Recognising in each other a shared dissatisfaction and frustration with their own position, and that of Dutch Muslims in general, they meet on the internet and at events such as religious gatherings organised by youth preachers. For many, joining this radical Islamic youth culture provides a means of belonging to a group which gives them a sense of their own
identity in Dutch society: a way of gaining acknowledgement and support in developing a positive self-image.

The AIVD monitors organisations and individuals seeking to disseminate extremist ideas amongst this potentially receptive group. Some young Moroccans were seen to radicalise during the course of 2008, but only on a limited scale.

On the other hand, the service notes that many Moroccans are amongst those who are increasingly expressing their dissatisfaction with the position of Muslims in the Netherlands and the rest of world through democratic means and political activism. In particular, the conflict in Gaza from late December 2008 prompted initiatives such as demonstrations, petitions, fundraising, media statements and calls to boycott Israeli products. By comparison, the films released during the year by Geert Wilders and Ehsan Jami generated far less of a response.

3.3 Other communities and radicalisation in the Netherlands

Conflicts in countries of origin not a primary cause of radicalisation
AIVD investigations of the Somali, Iraqi and Afghan communities in the Netherlands have revealed that conflict situations in the country of origin are not a primary cause of radicalisation within the diaspora. This is not to say that certain individual members of these groups are not susceptible to the radical message, but their ethnic background is usually of secondary importance in that process. In particular, it has been observed that attempts to radicalise Iraqis and Afghans in this country almost fall on stony ground. Despite their heterogeneity, these two communities tend to avoid both internal conflict and confrontations with Dutch society. They do, however, take an interest in developments in their countries of origin and changes to Dutch asylum policy.

On the other hand, there is a greater receptiveness to radicalisation within the Somali community. What is striking here is that the marginalisation of Somalis in Dutch society is more significant as a contributing factor than the political instability in Somalia itself. At the same time, though, there are indications that violent resistance groups in Somalia can count upon support from some members of the community here.

Political activism in the Sudanese community
The request by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, that the incumbent President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, be tried for war crimes in the Darfur region caused unrest in the Netherlands and abroad.
When the charges were announced in July 2008, several demonstrations – both for and against the Criminal Court – were organised in this country. All passed off peacefully.

**Political and religious radicalisation within the Pakistani community**

Neither political developments in Pakistan nor terrorist attacks like the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad have caused any noticeable tensions within the politically and religiously diverse Pakistani community in the Netherlands. However, the country’s Islamic religious schools continue to attract Dutch and other Muslims, with the risk that there the Dutch students might come into contact with more extreme ideas of the kind propagated by numerous radical and jihadist movements in Pakistan.

### 3.4 The internet, radicalisation and jihadist terrorism

The situation with regard to Islamic websites in the Netherlands has changed little from 2007. A large proportion of them continue to present a Salafist message. However, the number of extremist postings fell slightly. In part, this can be attributed to stricter moderation by some of the larger web forums. But there also genuinely seems to be less interest amongst young Muslims in expressing extreme ideas online. The fact that internet users are increasingly aware that such postings are monitored, and that threats are in many cases reported to the police, has also probably contributed to their decline.

No new Dutch-language websites propagating jihadist ideology appeared in 2008. Most of those currently online – and there are fewer than ten – are now several years old and rarely, if ever, updated. The AIVD therefore believes that they probably attract few visitors any more. Amongst other radical Islamic movements, by contrast, the number of “live” websites and associated internet activities is increasing.

At the international level, radical Islamic organisations and individuals use the internet to exchange audiovisual content. The majority of this material, including that found on the Dutch part of the net, originates on a small number of mainly Arabic-language jihadist websites. In recent months, and especially during the second half of 2008, those source sites have been affected by persistent technical problems. So far, though, these have had few discernible effects for the situation in the Netherlands.
Political and animal rights extremism

Violent political activism and extremism pose a potential threat to the democratic legal order and so are subject to investigation by the AIVD. Organisations, groups, fluid networks and individual extremists are all monitored.

In classifying the subjects of its investigations, the AIVD draws a distinction between the terms “extreme” and “extremist”. “Extreme” refers to individuals and groups which operate on the fringes of, but still within, the established political spectrum and the democratic legal order. The description “extremist” is applied to a movement which has overstepped that boundary by, for example, resorting to violence in pursuit of its goals or publishing material intended to incite hatred.

The AIVD is in frequent contact, from the earliest possible moment, with the police and local authorities concerning expected actions. It also advises known and potential targets of left-wing activists or animal rights extremists – including both public agencies and private companies – so that they take appropriate precautions, such as raising staff security awareness.

The following developments related to political and animal rights extremism were noted during 2008:

- Militant anti-fascists continued to violently oppose the extreme right. On some occasions, adversaries were assaulted and robbed;
- Opposition to government immigration and asylum policy has become a core theme in Dutch left-wing activism. Increasingly, this movement is adopting the same modus operandi as used by animal rights extremists;
- A new radical animal rights group, SHAC Netherlands, has been established. Inspired by Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) in the UK, this orchestrates attacks on targets associated with the British animal testing laboratory Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS) by radical activists operating alone or in small cells. The AIVD expects the creation of SHAC Netherlands to increase the number of so-called “home visits”.

4.1 **Left-wing extremism**

**Anti-fascism**

The Anti-Fascist and Capitalist Archive Collective (Kollektief Anti Fascistisch en Kapitalistisch Archief, KAFKA) investigates right-wing extremists, compiles dossiers on them and supplies information to militant anti-fascists seeking direct confrontation with the far right. Principal amongst these groups is Anti-Fascist Action (Antifascistische Actie, AFA), which has branches throughout the Netherlands and can rely upon the support of a national secretariat. Under the slogan “Keep the right off the streets!” its activities include attempts to influence local authorities and sometimes menacing approaches to potential host venues. In a few cases, actual or suspected supporters of the extreme right have been assaulted and robbed. It also organises counterdemonstrations, particularly against the Dutch People’s Union (Nederlandse Volks-Unie, NVU), which on occasions turn violent. These confrontations are not actually led by the organising activists, but “delegated” to local anti-fascists, youths keen for a fight, football hooligans and the like.

AFA is in contact with like-minded groups abroad, particularly in Germany. Co-operation extends to the exchange of ideas, attendance at demonstrations in each other’s countries and sometimes participation in violent confrontations with the extreme right. The organisation likes to portray itself as a group of anti-fascists defending themselves against aggressive right-wing extremists, but in fact the roles are usually reversed. In 2008 a Dutch court ruled for the first time that AFA had been the aggressor in a left-right confrontation, at Uitgeest the previous February. It is not yet clear what effect this verdict will have upon the activities of the anti-fascists.

**Opposition to government immigration and asylum policy**

In 2008 activists opposed to current Dutch government immigration and asylum policy increasingly made use of the modus operandi pioneered by the anti-imperialists of the 1980s and used today by animal rights militants, including such tactics as “naming and shaming”. In other words, they publish the names and addresses of organisations or individuals in any way involved in the detention of asylum seekers, or threaten to do so. Implicit in this is a call to their supporters to take direct action at the published addresses, including people’s homes. Groups involved in radical activities against asylum policy usually operate under cover names adopted for the occasion. Either directly or through the police Regional Intelligence Units (RIDs), the AIVD has contacted a number of known and potential targets, and also relevant umbrella organisations, to advise them about what activities they might expect.
4.2 Right-wing extremism and the extreme right

As in previous years, division and fragmentation were the predominant features of the extreme and extremist right in the Netherlands in 2008. Different groups did appear together at a number of public demonstrations, attracting a total of 70-100 participants, but with no underlying sign of any increased unity. Youths who appear in public sporting extremist emblems and symbols remain primarily a public order problem; there is no indication that there is a gravitation towards right-wing terrorism.

First observed in the previous year, the far right’s noticeably more assertive attitude towards extremist counterdemonstrators did not result in any major confrontations in 2008. In another development, however, right-wing extremists began taking up a number of themes and methods previously associated mainly with the far left. Examples include tactics like squatting and tart throwing, as well as protests against alleged animal suffering or oppression by the state and the police.

Right-wing extremism: neo-Nazism

The Dutch People’s Union (Nederlandse Volks-Unie, NVU), a neo-Nazi political movement, has for some years now been successfully using legal action to fend off various local authority attempts to restrict its demonstrations. For these events have enough supporters to actually happen, though, the NVU is increasingly forced to rely upon the presence of other far-right groups, such as National Socialist Action/Autonomous National Socialists (Nationale Socialistische Aktie/Autonome Nationale Socialisten, NSA/ANS).

Several demonstrations and other activities considered a success by the organisers were held during 2008. They included a protest outside the Dutch Parliament in The Hague by ten NSA/ANS supporters against Party for Freedom (PVV) leader Geert Wilders, whom they regard as too pro-Israel. The same group showcased its revolutionary activist credentials at other demonstrations, and also by squatting a building in the village of Monster, whilst its leader outlined the organisation’s position in an ideological manifesto. This describes the NSA/ANS as a haven for “all revolutionary extraparlamentarians”, in solidarity with the Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion, RAF), pro-Islam, pro-squatting and standing in the tradition of the SA.\footnote{The Sturmabteilung, a division of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (NSDAP) in Nazi Germany} In many ways, its members outwardly try to resemble left-wing extremists – adopting a similar style of clothing and slogans, for example, and by acting as a “black bloc” at demonstrations.
The Netherlands has two regional Blood & Honour (B&H) groups. Westland is concentrated in the north of the province of Noord-Holland, Oostland in the east of Gelderland province. This neo-Nazi movement is suffering a decline in active membership, caused partly by a leadership crisis and the resulting dearth of activities. Another factor is the aftermath of the events at Uitgeest in February 2007, when B&H supporters were present at a New Year gathering of the Nationalist People’s Movement (Nationalistische Volksbeweging, NVB) which descended into violence after being disrupted by AFA activists. Although, as mentioned earlier, a court later ruled that the initial attack came from the “left”, both sides were deemed responsible for the subsequent affray. A number of B&H and NVB supporters received community service orders.

The extreme right: nationalism and ultranationalism
The only surviving Dutch ultranationalist political movement, the NVB, all but disappeared from view in 2008. By contrast, the nationalist action group Voorpost (“Outpost”) was responsible for a number of high-profile actions. In its own view, the high point was a tart-throwing incident targeting former Member of Parliament Wijnand Duyvendak. Voorpost’s activities had a provocative effect upon militant left-wingers, particularly the extremist AFA.

Following a police raid, the operators of the website Holland-Hardcore.com – a more nationalist variant of the neo-Nazi forum Stormfront.org – organised a demonstration calling for freedom of expression. This attracted some 80-100 activists from a wide variety of right-wing groups.

The unorganised extreme right
Particularly at the local level, certain groups of young people are sometimes incorrectly perceived as belonging to the extreme right or even extremists right because of their appearance, clothing and language. In most cases, however, their behaviour can be regarded as provocative rather than political. In fact, not all fully appreciate the true meaning of their chosen style and symbols. Nevertheless, the AIVD and the RIDs monitor this “unorganised extreme right” for signs that its members are being radicalised or recruited by established right-wing groups. In general, however, they tend to regard these youngsters as unreliable and therefore not suitable for enlistment.
4.3 Radical animal rights activism and extremism

Several radical groups in the Netherlands operate close to the dividing line between animal rights activism and extremism.

As well as the fur trade, Respect for Animals (Respect voor Dieren, RvD) targets circuses. On several occasions, these protests descended into scuffles between activists and circus staff, or even audience members. The extreme-right groups Voorpost and With the Animals Against the Beasts (Met de Dieren Tegen de Beesten, MDTB) also campaign against circuses, to the great displeasure of RvD, which regards this as a “left” issue.

The Coalition Against Animal Testing (Anti Dierproeven Coalitie, ADC) focuses primarily upon the Biomedical Primate Research Centre (BPRC) in Rijswijk, as well as the diplomatic missions of nations which export primates to Europe and the United States. In January 2008 the ADC scored what it saw as a major victory when the local authority in the town of Venray abandoned the development of ScienceLink, a planned cluster of biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. This brought to a conclusion the campaign to that end begun by ADC in 2007.

A strategic dispute between RvD and the ADC led to the establishment of SHAC Netherlands in 2008. Inspired by but not directly affiliated with Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) in the UK, this is a group of radical Dutch activists who want to go back to the origins of the “parent” organisation: actions directed at companies and other organisations associated in any way with the British animal testing firm Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS). In the short time since it was formed, SHAC Netherlands has publicly announced and carried out actions against several pharmaceutical companies and the NYSE Euronext stock exchange, on which HLS shares are listed. A conference on animal testing in Lunteren was also targeted, with threatening language used against delegates.

A number of acts of arson and criminal damage were committed in 2008 by radical animal rights activists operating individually or in small cells. The actual perpetrators are highly security conscious, but at the very least they draw inspiration and ideological succour from the ADC, RvD and SHAC Netherlands. Most of the crimes were “signed” ALF (Animal Liberation Front) or DBF (Dieren Bevrijdings Front), although that only means that those responsible subscribe to the philosophy behind these groups, neither of which exists as an actual organisation any longer. One-off cover names were also used. Cars were damaged in Soest, Lelystad, Zeewolde and elsewhere, and there were arson attacks in Lelystad, Hilversum and Wassenaar.
Since the foundation of SHAC Netherlands, the number of such incidents has increased. The AIVD expects this trend to continue for the time being and its work in the field concentrates upon revealing hidden threats. That may result in official reports to the Public Prosecution Service, based upon which a criminal investigation can begin. At the same time, the service is keeping local authorities, companies, industry organisations and scientific institutes informed of relevant developments.
Clandestine activities in the Netherlands by other countries undermine its sovereignty and may threaten national security. The AIVD therefore seeks to identify and counter such activities.

Below are the service’s principal observations in 2008:

- The threat posed by clandestine intelligence activities is serious and wide-ranging. For this reason, the AIVD intensified its efforts to identify and counter these activities in 2008;
- The Russian Federation has a broad interest in gathering intelligence about institutions like NATO and such sectors as science, technology, defence and energy. Its intelligence services are active in the Netherlands, in a number of areas;
- The Moroccan intelligence service has attempted to build a network of informants in the Netherlands, and to gain access to confidential databases. In pursuit of this aim, in 2008 it made use of Dutch police officers of Moroccan origin;
- The People’s Republic of China takes an undesirable interest in sections of the Chinese migrant community. It also seeks to exert influence over political and other decision-making in a number of areas, and there have been digital attacks directed from China against Dutch computer networks.

The threat posed by clandestine intelligence activities is serious and wide-ranging. And the way in which certain countries are trying to develop them is sometimes incompatible with their partner relationship with the Netherlands. The AIVD intensified its efforts to identify and counter such activities in 2008. At the international level, too, this issue has become more prominent than it once was.

For a number of reasons, the Netherlands and its citizens make “attractive” targets for foreign intelligence services. One is this country’s membership of important alliances such as the European Union and NATO, as well as its role as host nation of a large number of international organisations. In addition, there is the fact that it has a highly developed knowledge economy and is a world leader in technological innovation. An open economy and the Dutch entrepreneurial spirit also provide fertile ground for foreign intelligence services in pursuing their own operational agendas. Finally, the presence of large immigrant communities tends to attract unwelcome activities in two ways: on the one hand the intelligence services of their countries of origin may try to monitor and influence them secretly, whilst on the other hand they may try to recruit migrants to assist in unacceptable activities.
As a rule, the AIVD does not report on the activities of foreign intelligence services in any great detail, so as not provide these professional adversaries with too much information about the state of its counterespionage knowledge and expertise. The paradox that agencies which are secretly active in the Netherlands may be good partners in other areas of work also compels discretion in this respect. The nations mentioned in this report are not the only ones known to be operating clandestinely in the Netherlands.

The AIVD identified intelligence activities by a number of countries in 2008, and took a variety of countermeasures. For example, the service notified those public agencies empowered to act directly against such activities. In a number of specific cases, it also alerted target institutions directly. More generally, the AIVD tries to improve security awareness at vulnerable organisations. For example, it provides civil servants and people in the commercial sector with customised information to assist them in taking precautions against potential intelligence-gathering.

A brochure produced jointly with the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) and published in November 2008 warns of the risks of hostile intelligence activities when travelling abroad. This document has been compiled for anyone whose professional or personal circumstances may give them access to sensitive information of potential interest to a foreign power, and includes tips on how to minimise the risk of falling prey to attempts at espionage. It can be downloaded from the AIVD and MIVD websites.

The AIVD itself can respond to clandestine activities by restricting or suspending its co-operation with the organisation responsible, and by demanding that intelligence officers leave the country. It can also warn fellow services about those who use diplomatic cover, say, to engage in such activities so that they can be prevented from continuing them elsewhere.
5.1 People’s Republic of China

Because Beijing hosted the Olympic Games in 2008, the AIVD paid specific attention to inappropriate activities in the Netherlands by the Chinese government during the year. Prior to the games, for example, the service issued an open letter warning businesspeople and government officials planning to attend them of the risks inherent in visiting China. The letter included a list of do’s and don’ts to avoid exposure to espionage efforts.

Meanwhile, the AIVD noted that the Chinese authorities were taking an undesirable interest in certain sections of the Chinese immigrant community in the Netherlands, in an effort to exert political influence and control. Some members of that community were also enlisted to carry out intelligence activities on China’s behalf. During the past year, moreover, it has become apparent that the focus has begun extending beyond the “overseas Chinese”, with attempts being made to influence political and other decision-making a number of areas in the Netherlands.

As in the previous year, in 2008 the AIVD identified a tangible threat of digital attacks directed from China against both public and private-sector computer networks in the Netherlands. The primary, but perhaps not the only, targets of these “hacking” attempts are government departments and high-tech companies.

5.2 Russian Federation

The Russian Federation’s security and intelligence services have gained in power and influence in recent years. Not only has their operational, legal and financial leeway been extended, but they are now much better positioned than they once were. Russia’s foreign intelligence services have a permanent and active presence throughout Europe, including the Netherlands. Their principal targets include NATO and the science, technology, defence and energy sectors.

The AIVD established that Russian intelligence officers were included in several official scientific delegations visiting the Netherlands in 2008. There has also been interest in Dutch citizens holding positions of current or potential interest to the Russian Federation, both for intelligence-gathering purposes and with a view to influencing policy and decision-making.
5.3 Morocco

The Moroccan intelligence service is interested mainly in radicalisation processes, in preventing terrorist attacks in its own country and in membership of opposition groups which are banned there. The AIVD has observed that the service is attempting to build a network of informants in the Netherlands, and also to gain access to confidential databases. In pursuit of this aim, in 2008 it made use of Dutch police officers of Moroccan origin. After the AIVD revealed information about this activity, a number of Moroccan diplomats based in the Netherlands were recalled. Meanwhile, Parliament was informed of Moroccan intelligence activities in a ministerial letter.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) Parliamentary papers 2008-2008, 28844 no. 25
Nations suspected of violating international law to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their means of delivery, or of otherwise pursuing objectives which endanger the international legal order or the security and interests of the Netherlands and its allies, are known as “countries of concern”. Both the AIVD and its military counterpart, the MIVD, gather information about these nations and, based upon the results of their investigations, supply policymakers, executive bodies and other interested parties with relevant information. In October 2007 the AIVD and MIVD agreed to substantially intensify their co-operation to counter the proliferation of WMD. That resulted in the establishment of a joint unit in September 2008, a move which optimises the use of human and other resources in this field.

The new joint unit brings together all of the two services’ counterproliferation activities. On the security side, its task is to prevent any attempt by a country of concern to acquire know-how, technology or goods useful in the development of WMD or their delivery systems in the Netherlands. As far as intelligence is concerned, it gathers information about WMD programmes and their means of delivery in those countries.

In addition to the status of the programmes themselves, there are three other key intelligence themes: the structure of and methods used by procurement networks, co-operation with other powers and the political context within which the programmes operate. In-depth knowledge of developments in the countries of concern is absolutely essential to enhance Dutch resilience to the threats emanating from them. It is against this background that, based upon the information gathered, companies, universities and scientific institutions in the Netherlands are advised on how best to prevent clandestine activities in support of proliferation. This programme of “preventive awareness-raising” is making a tangible contribution to Dutch counterproliferation and export control policy.

**Trends in proliferation**

- Iran, Syria and North Korea remain countries of particular international concern;
- On the international stage, specific attention has been drawn to the potential risks associated with advances in biotechnology;
- AIVD investigation of procurement activities shows that, despite the sanctions announced by the international community, Iran is still managing to obtain so-called “dual use” goods (see glossary);
- The implementation of the sanctions against Iran is being refined, with the joint AIVD-MIVD unit advising on a number of measures in this respect.
6.1 Nuclear weapons

Iran
Irán’s nuclear programme continued to make progress in 2008. The country is still seeking to master the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from ore extraction to the production of atomic energy. So far, and due in no small part to a lack of transparency on the Iranian side, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been unable to confirm that the programme is for purely civilian ends, as claimed. Iran has yet to disclose the full extent of its past nuclear activities. The AIVD and MIVD will continue their investigations into the true nature of Iran’s nuclear programme in 2009.

Syria
On 6 September 2007 Israeli aircraft bombed a suspicious site in Syria. Early in 2008 it became clear that both Israel and the United States were convinced that a nuclear reactor was being built in secret at the location targeted.

North Korea
The so-called Six-Party Talks (between the United States, China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea and Japan) on North Korea’s nuclear programme resulted in an agreement under which, in return for economic and humanitarian aid and other considerations, the country undertook to dismantle its facility at Yongbyon and to provide a full, correct and verifiable list of all its nuclear activities.

6.2 Delivery systems

Under the doctrine of strategic deterrence, a suitable means of delivering WMD is a key element in their effectiveness. In this domain, the joint AIVD-MIVD unit has been concentrating mainly upon the Iranian, Syrian and North Korean programmes. Iran, for example, continued both to enhance its existing arsenal of ballistic missiles and to work on new models in 2008, with the aim of extending their range and improving their accuracy and deploy ability. The Iranian ballistic missiles can carry either conventional or non-conventional payloads.

6.3 Chemical and biological weapons

Many countries possess limited stocks of chemical and biological weapons for use in defensive research. The production of small quantities of these agents is permitted
for that purpose, as described in the international Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Under the former, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is responsible for ensuring that the weapons are indeed used for defensive rather than offensive ends.

In 2008, as in previous years, rapid industrial progress by countries of concern improved their ability to independently develop and manufacture the raw materials and precursors of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Especially in biotechnology, more and more know-how is being developed. Moreover, much of the “civilian” knowledge in this field could be of use in developing a biological weapons programme. This makes it very difficult to determine whether a particular line of research is purely peaceful in intent, whilst at the same time it is becoming easier to hide clandestine activities from the outside world. And as research globalises, the risk grows that sensitive knowledge will fall into the wrong hands. For this reason, in 2008 there was a specific effort on the international stage to draw attention to dangers of scientific research being misappropriated. Moreover, investigations have revealed that countries of concern are intensifying their co-operation in order to simplify the development and production of chemical and biological weapons. That collaboration encompasses the exchange of know-how, equipment and raw materials.

6.4 Procurement of know-how and equipment

The new joint AIVD-MIVD unit is investigating the procurement of relevant know-how and equipment by countries of concern in or through the Netherlands. Prompted in part by the sanctions regime, Iran’s activities in this respect are being examined even more closely than in the past. Collaboration with the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ), the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service/Economic Investigation Service (FIOD/ECD) and Customs was stepped up in a concerted effort to terminate all Iranian procurement activities in the Netherlands.

With each agency making the most of its own powers and consulting more closely than ever before with the others, this approach has already paid off. Its impact has been felt at the international negotiating table, in seizures of goods at the border and in the form of joint operations against companies deliberately involved in the export of sensitive products and know-how to Iran. As a result of this activity and the enhanced sanctions against Iran, fewer formal requests from EZ for recommendations concerning applications for export licences were received than in 2007.
Foreign intelligence

7.1 The Designation Order

The foreign intelligence task of the AIVD is defined by law. Under the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002), it is charged with safeguarding the national security of the Netherlands by “conducting investigations in respect of other countries, pursuant to matters designated by the Crown’s Prime Minister, in his capacity as Minister of General Affairs, in consultation with Our concerned ministers”.

“Our concerned ministers” in this case are the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Defence. In practice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs also takes a close interest in the issue. Together with the Prime Minister, they have compiled a four-year programme of intelligence needs in the form of the so-called Designation Order (“Aanwijzingsbesluit”) for 2008-2012. In this document, the intelligence needs of the Minister of Foreign Affairs are the greatest. However, it is the Minister of the Interior who is responsible for the AIVD’s fulfilment of its foreign intelligence task. The four-year Designation Order (prior to 2008, they were issued on an annual basis) should enable the service to develop and maintain a stronger position in this respect. Gathering intelligence abroad requires considerable patience, after all, and frequent changes to the nature of the assignment could hinder progress. Although established for a longer period, the Designation Order is still subject to an annual review. At the end of 2008 this resulted in a number of adjustments designed to update the assignment in line with current developments and to refine it on certain points. Gathering intelligence and passing on information gleaned from it is of course an ongoing process, and one which is performed in close consultation with the end users.

The AIVD gathers so-called “political intelligence” on the true, sometimes hidden intentions, activities and opinions of nations or regions specifically named in the Designation Order. The service is also charged with the prompt identification and notification of developments in countries or regions not mentioned by name, where these might pose a threat to Dutch national security or are otherwise significant. The focus in this case is twofold: identifying hidden or as yet unknown developments of relevance and monitoring countries where sudden, unexpected events or threatening incidents occur. A considerable proportion of the AIVD’s activities in respect of proliferation, as described in Chapter 6, fall within its foreign intelligence remit.

The intelligence collected and processed by the service provides the Dutch government with information it would find difficult or impossible to obtain by other means, such as
through diplomatic channels, but can assist it in formulating foreign policy positions and at the international negotiating table. In other words, its activities complement those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The AIVD concentrates upon gathering material vital to national security but otherwise unavailable, and hence obtainable only by means of intelligence work or through collaboration with fellow services. Common European, allied or international interests may also serve Dutch national security.

For the most part, the results of this work are passed on to users in the form of brief intelligence reports. Usually addressing current events, these are based as far as possible upon reliable intelligence sources and include an interpretation of the facts presented. The AIVD also produces intelligence analyses, in which a particular phenomenon or development is highlighted, described and explained, and publishes a fortnightly intelligence bulletin (Inlichtingenbulletin). This reports and interprets relevant international developments. When members of the government visit countries on which the AIVD has intelligence, it can supply them with specific information. Finally, the service regularly shares material verbally, and upon request will provide ministers or civil servants with briefings to improve their background knowledge of intelligence-related topics.

The AIVD further improved its information position in 2008, leading to a year on year increase of approximately 30 per cent in the number of reports issued. Recipients, particularly those at the ministries of Foreign Affairs and General Affairs (the Prime Minister’s department), are asked for feedback on the relevance of the products supplied; their appreciation rating also improved in 2008.

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations reports on the foreign intelligence activities of the AIVD, and their results, to Intelligence and Security Services Committee (CIVD) of the Lower House of the States-General. The CIVD also receives the service’s full annual report, classified Secret, in which it provides a detailed account of that work.

7.2 Trends and developments

This section describes a number of international developments likely to be of increasing interest to the Dutch government in the near future. Through its foreign intelligence activities, the AIVD can support the development of government policy in these areas.
To an ever greater extent, both Dutch national interests and the threats to them are taking on an international dimension or lie outside the country’s borders. As a result, the AIVD’s foreign intelligence task is becoming more and more inextricably bound up with its role as a domestic security service. One example of this can be seen in the efforts taken to assess the potential threats to Dutch interests arising out the release of the films *Fitna*, by Geert Wilders, and *An Interview with Mohammed*, by Ehsan Jami. Intelligence gathered by the AIVD also contributed to the security of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and informed a number of specific measures taken abroad. The continuing internationalisation of the threats has considerably increased the readiness on the part of security and intelligence services to co-operate with one another across borders, as well as actual examples of such collaboration.

The credit crunch, climate change, shortages of energy, water and raw materials, rapid population growth and the world health situation. All these are examples of global problems which impact the AIVD’s areas of interest. And economics is becoming more and more prominent in this picture. Serious economic problems cause political tensions, after all, with potentially far-reaching consequences: political and economic isolationism and protectionism, increasing extremism and worsening living conditions for already vulnerable groups, which in turn lead to frictions and internal threats to the stability of incumbent regimes and governments.

**Central and East Asia**

The economic crisis is already making its mark on Asia. New relationships and dependencies are appearing, and they could impinge upon Dutch interests. There is increasing concern about those countries with weak institutions and economies, growing Islamic extremism and problems with the distribution of energy, food and water. Almost all the Central Asian states are faced with these phenomena to a greater or lesser extent, as do Pakistan and Afghanistan. The security situation in the region also leaves much to be desired. Further deterioration could undermine the international legal order, security and stability.

**The Middle East and the Gulf region**

Developments in the Middle East in 2008 indicated some progress in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but also constant shifts in the regional balance of power. And that only served to increase instability. The Gaza crisis provides the most recent evidence of just how precarious the situation is. That finally flared up at the end of 2008, but the tension between Israel and Hamas had been growing for some time, albeit largely overshadowed by the former’s intensive negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. The latest crisis reiterates yet again that the peace process and the region’s instability demand constant attention.
Iran’s efforts to strengthen its regional position prompted hostile responses from the Gulf states and in several cases raised diplomatic and political tensions. Continuing doubts as to the true intent of the Iranian nuclear programme also fuelled the fire, feeding concerns that the region might become embroiled in an atomic race.

Meanwhile, the long-standing differences between the region’s Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims again came to the fore. Particularly if encouraged or exploited by various states, these could undermine regional stability in the long term.

The full impact of the global economic crisis had yet to be felt by the energy-producing Gulf states by the end of 2008, but it is expected that at least some of them will suffer economically from a sharp decline in their oil and gas revenues. Finally, the threat from terrorism across the entire Middle East and Gulf region remains undiminished.

Africa
Despite healthy development in a number of African countries, particularly the energy producers, overall the economic gap between the continent and the rest of world is widening. Moreover, the number of conflicts which are taking on regional proportions is increasing. Both tribal and religious strife threaten to turn large parts of Africa into “failing” states or regions. The precarious economic and political situation is being used as an excuse for abuse of power, in turn creating a permanent breeding ground for extremism, crime and terrorism. Lawlessness begets antipathies, which terrorist groups based in Africa gladly exploit. All these developments present huge challenges for the West, not least that posed by the increasing number of refugees arriving in Europe.

Latin America
After decades following an apparently unassailable neoliberal path, a sea change now appears to be under way in Latin America. The United States’ traditional regional dominance, political and military as well as economic, is being challenged by emerging powers and has already led to the creation of new international alliances. These developments also affect the interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Energy
From the outset, the credit crisis had global impact upon the energy market. During 2008 the price of oil fell to below US$50 a barrel, a level at which numerous producers are unable to operate at a profit. Tracking oil with a delay of several months, the price of gas under long-term contracts peaked in January 2009 and is now set to fall substantially. Looking beyond the current slump in the world economy, major problems seem likely to arise after 2010 as the larger and most easily accessible oil reserves are rapidly exhausted, with alternative supplies obtainable only with far greater
difficulty and at high cost. Although urgently needed, large-scale investment in energy
production is unappealing at current price levels. In any case, the potential investors
have themselves been hit by the credit crunch. A number of conflicts have revealed
all too clearly that certain powers are quite willing to exploit their status as energy
production or transit nations for political ends, a development which could easily
harm European interests. Much of the continent is heavily dependent upon oil and gas
produced in and piped through countries with fragile governance structures. This gives
serious cause for concern and so is a matter the AIVD will continue to monitor.
One of the AIVD’s tasks is to encourage official, statutory and other bodies to take adequate security measures. One way in which it does this is by producing threat and risk analyses concerning the people, property and services making up the so-called national security domain. This activity falls within the national Safety and Security System. The other aspect of the service’s security promotion remit, focuses upon sensitive information (see glossary), vital sectors and international organisations.

8.1 Safety and Security System

In general terms, individuals are primarily responsible for their own safety, as are the organisations to which they belong and the relevant local authorities. In addition the central government, however, has a special responsibility for certain persons, property and services because the national interest demands that they be able to operate safely and without disruption. Amongst these special cases are government ministers and the international organisations based in the Netherlands. They belong to the national security domain (“rijksdomein”). As the authority responsible for the official Safety and Security System (Stelsel Bewaken en Beveiligen), it is the National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, NCTb) who formally determines the measures pertaining to every level of threat affecting that domain.

The AIVD can conduct specific investigations into potential threats even when they fall outside the service’s normal area of attention. In these cases, however, the use of special intelligence methods is not permitted. Along with the Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, MIVD) and the National Police Services Agency (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten, KLPD), the AIVD provides the NCTb with information detailing both known and conceivable threats to a particular person, property or service.

The AIVD produced 213 so-called “threat products” for a variety of recipients in 2008, the majority covering subjects within the national security domain. Others concerned national politicians, major events, international tribunals based in the Netherlands, diplomats, diplomatic premises and foreign visits. As in 2007, there proved to be a particular need for threat assessments related to politicians.
8.2 Security promotion tasks

As far as security promotion is concerned, the main focus of the AIVD’s work in 2008 was the supply of customised threat information designed to protect national security interests. The intention is that the recipients of this advice act upon it by taking the necessary security measures themselves.

Counter-terrorism Alert System

The purpose of the Counter-terrorism Alert System (Alerteringssysteem Terrorismebestrijding, ATb) is to provide government services and certain commercial industries with advance warning of an identified terrorist threat, so that they can prepare themselves accordingly. During 2008 the AIVD produced threat analyses for all the sectors covered by the ATb, based upon which the NCTb determined a formal threat level for each of them.

Vital sectors

As well as the terrorism-specific information supplied through ATb, the AIVD also keeps certain vital economic sectors informed of other threats affecting them. In line with plans formulated in the previous year, in 2008 the service initiated and extended such contacts across a number of industries. Five actual threat analyses were compiled during the year.

Information concerning threats to and vulnerabilities in key infrastructure, particularly in the face of so-called cybercrime, is shared under the auspices of the National Advisory Centre for Vital Infrastructure (Nationaal Adviescentrum Vitale Infrastructuur, NAVI). The AIVD is one of three public agencies represented on this “exchange”, together with the KLPD and Govcert, the Government Computer Emergency Response Team. Membership of NAVI continues to increase. The Dutch teaching hospitals joined in 2008, whilst at the time of writing the telecommunications sector and the Port of Rotterdam were on the point of affiliating. The AIVD made a number of presentations to members during the year, including one on security issues affecting the Mifare smartcard chip and another on industrial espionage.

8.3 Sensitive information and security

The AIVD actively promotes the security of state secrets and other sensitive information. A special unit, the National Signals Security Bureau (Nationaal Bureau voor Verbindingsbeveiliging, NBV), approves and develops security products. The
service also helps shape national and international regulations, as well as overseeing the advice provided on this topic to public agencies and private companies.

In August 2008 the Cabinet decided to intensify and expand the scope of NBV activities so that government departments can further reduce their exposure to ICT security risks. The intensification applies primarily to the bureau’s advisory, product development, evaluation and research roles, whilst its scope has been extended to include information systems with a lower security classification. Priority is to be given to new products which can also be adopted by other client departments and to government-wide projects.

**Secure government products**

A number of products were approved for government use in 2008. They included systems to protect classified information held on hard disks, data deletion software and networks. It was also decided to develop the fourth generation of the secure Tiger XS mobile encryption device, voice encryption solutions for communications classified “restricted” (“departementaal vertrouwelijk”) and two network security products, CryptoGuard for confidential material and an IP encryptor.

Another link in the overall security chain is checking offices and meeting rooms for hidden surveillance devices. This is done by means of electronic “sweeps”, the number of which the AIVD conducted at various government premises increased slightly in 2008.

The unintentional transmission of sensitive information in the electromagnetic radiation generated by ICT equipment is yet another security risk. The AIVD checked equipment and buildings for several ministries – the Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs – in 2008, providing them with advice on the safe deployment of equipment susceptible to this problem. EU institutions were also provided with similar support on several occasions.

The AIVD’s production of cryptographic keying material, for use by government departments and other partners in protecting classified material, increased in 2008 and the service’s client base expanded.

Chaired by the AIVD and made up of representatives from the ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice, the Interior and General Affairs, the Data Security Working Group (Werkgroep Bijzondere Informatie, WBI) helps guide the activities of the NBV. It also assists other departments in determining their product and other information.
security needs, an aspect of its work which intensified in 2008 in order to provide a more custom-made service.

**National Security Authority (NSA)**

The National Security Authority (NSA) is a designated domestic agency responsible for protecting classified information received from international organisations like NATO and the EU. In the Netherlands that responsibility is shared by the Minister of Defence and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, who has delegated her task to the AIVD. The Ministry of Defence concentrates upon security in the military domain and the AIVD upon the civilian sphere. Co-ordination and external representation remain with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

As an NSA, the AIVD conducts regular inspections of all national agencies with access to classified information from international organisations and screens the personnel who come into contact with it. In 2008, some 180 visits to such organisations were carried out in partnership with the MIVD. Through its representatives on the relevant security committees and working groups, the AIVD also contributes towards the development of security policy and regulations by NATO, the EU and other international bodies.

In its capacity as an Appropriately Qualified Agency (AQUA, see glossary), the AIVD carried out two second-party evaluations of cryptographic equipment for the EU in 2008. The results of both were positive, and the products were subsequently approved. Meanwhile, NATO approved the use of the Tiger XS mobile encryption terminal developed by the NBV for communications up to “NATO secret” classification. This device is now used by several EU partners.

**Information security advice**

A wide-ranging information security audit of ministries and other Dutch government organisations was conducted in 2008, in preparation for the expansion in 2009 of the AIVD’s advisory role in this respect, in terms of both client base and subject matter.

**Host nation**

The Netherlands hosts a number of international organisations and so is responsible for ensuring that they can function without disruption. To this end, the AIVD advises them on security risks associated with their premises, personnel and visitors.
8.4 Security access cards

In March 2008 the Mifare Classic chip, which is widely used in proximity cards for Dutch government buildings, was “hacked” by researchers at Radboud University Nijmegen. At the request of the Minister of the Interior, the AIVD validated this breach and advised all departments using the chip – including those where it forms part of applications other than access cards – about the risks and the additional precautions they should take. Meanwhile, the service was also consulted on the development of a new card, the Rijkspas (“Government Access Pass”). It supervised two studies of candidate chip technologies and carried out a third itself. This process eventually resulted in one chip being selected as secure enough for use in the Rijkspas, given the current state of the technology. It will now be implemented.
Security screening

Certain jobs are designated “positions involving confidentiality”, meaning that an abuse of office could seriously endanger national security or other important state interests. Which specific positions are subject to this classification is determined by ministers in the relevant government department, acting in consultation with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.

A person cannot take up a position involving confidentiality until the AIVD has granted them Security Clearance (Verklaring van Geen Bezwaar, VGB). This takes the form of a statement declaring that there is no objection on national security grounds to the subject filling the post in question. To determine that, they undergo a screening process. The scope of this is directly related to the national security sensitivity of the position concerned. There are three standard types (A, B and C), with “Level A” – reserved for functions of the highest sensitivity – being the most rigorous and “Level C” the least. In addition, there are special categories for certain positions in civil aviation, the police force and the Royal Household. The AIVD has respectively mandated the Royal Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee, KMar), the National Police Services Agency (Korps Landelijke Politiediensten, KLPD) and the Royal and Diplomatic Protection Service (Dienst Koninklijke en Diplomatieke Beveiliging, DKDB) to perform the screenings in these categories.

In assessing the data gathering during the screening process, the AIVD applies set procedures and operates within a clear statutory framework. The way in which screenings can be checked by the Intelligence and Security Services Regulatory Committee (Commissie van Toezicht betreffende de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CTIVD) is also established in law.

Security screenings address the following matters:

- Criminal records and other contacts with the judicial system;
- Participation in or support for activities that may endanger national security;
- Membership of or support for organisations which endanger the democratic legal order;
- Other personal conduct and circumstances.

The AIVD bases its decision whether or not to issue a VGB upon the facts revealed during the screening process. Clearance is refused only when there exist insufficient guarantees that the subject will fulfil the duty of confidentiality arising out of his or her
position under all circumstances, or when the screening fails to produce enough solid data to make a sound judgement on that question.

9.1 Developments in 2008

“Safer, Faster”

Objectives

The “Safer, Faster” (“Sneller Veiliger”) improvement programme was initiated in 2007, with the aim of eliminating backlogs and reducing delays in the security screening process. The Security Screening Act (Wet veiligheidsonderzoeken, Wvo) imposes an eight-week time limit for completion of the procedure, but in practice that deadline was frequently not met. In 2007, for example, only 15 per cent of Level A screenings for government departments were finished within eight weeks. The principal target set for “Safer, Faster” was to bring that figure up to 95 per cent across the board with effect from 1 September 2008 – and in the case of Level A screenings for police forces and five specific ministries, by 1 May 2008. The percentage target was set based upon the assumption that an average of one in twenty screenings cannot be completed within the statutory eight-week period for reasons beyond the AIVD’s control, such as waits for information requested from fellow services abroad.

Implementation

The implementation of “Safer, Faster” has resulted in a variety of improvements. For example, the incoming flow of screening applications is now better regulated, thanks to the AIVD’s stringent policy concerning the designation of positions involving confidentiality. Once agreement has been reached over the list of such positions, implementation agreements are made with the applicant institutions (the employers of the persons concerned) as to the number of requests for clearance they will submit. The actual screening processing has also been improved by introducing a planning and control method for better time management. Another area which is now being handled better is the procurement of data from external sources: by designing the questions put to them in such a way that they generate a complete picture of the subject, the time needed to obtain full information has been substantially reduced.

To clear its backlog of security clearance work – defined as those screenings applied for prior to 1 January 2008 but still outstanding – the AIVD has invested in a new, planned approach to the process. As a result, the backlog was reduced from 2574 cases on 1 January 2008 to just ten by the end of the year.
Great advances have also been made in reducing the time taken to complete screenings. Two progress reports on this aspect were submitted to Parliament in 2008. One of these, dated 18 December and covering the period between 1 May and 5 October 2008, stated that 91 per cent of all Level A screenings for the police were completed within the statutory eight-week period. For the five specifically selected ministries, the figure was 89 per cent. For an account of the remaining few per cent the reader is referred to the reports themselves. These improvements, a direct result of “Safer, Faster”, are also reflected in the statistics for the year as a whole. The percentage of screenings meeting the completion deadline is somewhat lower in those figures, however, since they also include results dating from before the target entered force on 1 May 2008. Measured over 2008 as a whole, the average proportion of Level A screenings completed within the statutory period was 84 per cent for the police and 82 per cent for the ministries.

**Civil aviation security screening**

In response to the conclusions reached by the Committee of Inquiry on Access Control at Schiphol Airport (Commissie Toegangsbeheer Schiphol), also known as the Oord Committee, in September 2005 the ministers of the Interior and Justice promised Parliament that a dynamic review would be conducted of all personnel holding positions of trust in the civil aviation sector. The necessary amendments to the Security Screening Act entered into force in December 2007, affording the AIVD powers to take the initiative and check these persons’ police and judicial records and to initiate a full rescreening if justified by the findings. For this to become a dynamic process, three conditions had to met: the establishment of a link to the Royal Military Constabulary (KMar) database of personnel holding positions involving confidentiality at Schiphol Airport; computerised access to police and judicial records; and the introduction of an information system capable of processing the details of large numbers of subjects. The first and last of these are now in place, but there is still no computer access to police and judicial records, so the AIVD remains unable to dynamically check civil aviation personnel against them.

For the same reason, it has not yet been possible to begin so-called “function clustering”. This is a system whereby people working in positions involving confidentiality in the security restricted areas (SRAs) at airports are able to change jobs within the same “cluster” without having to undergo further screening. Once the system has been introduced, it is expected to reduce the number of applications for security clearance in the civil aviation sector.
Police security screening

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations has been designating positions involving confidentiality within the police service since 2001. Informed by practical experience, policy in this respect has evolved over time.

In 2007 it was noted that a relatively high number of police jobs had been categorised as Level A positions, and also that there were a lot of posts in the police-specific Category P. Because of this, in 2008 a project group rewrote the designation guidelines for police positions to tighten the criteria for allocation to either of these two categories without increasing the risk to national security. This exercise removed 3000 positions from the Level A category, to which they had been assigned unnecessarily, early in the year. The project group also completed new draft Designation Guidelines for Category P Positions (Leidraad Aanwijzen P-Vertrouwensfuncties), which have since been applied to a number of lists of positions involving confidentiality. An initial assessment shows that this measure can reduce the number of posts falling within that category by 30 per cent. The draft guidelines have now been submitted to the Board of Chief Constables (Raad van Hoofdcommissarissen) for approval, after which they will be introduced nationally.

Personal conduct and circumstances

Under Article 4, Clause 2, of the Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002), the employer of a person being assigned to a position involving confidentiality has an important role in informing them about the legal responsibilities and requirements involved. Arising out of this important task, in 2008 the AIVD received many enquiries from employers related to such positions and the associated security screenings. Although its website already provides guidelines and brochures on this topic, the service gave notice that it plans to invest further in the information it provides. In 2009, for instance, it will publish a Personal Conduct and Circumstances Guide (Leidraad Persoonlijke Gedragingen en Omstandigheden) to clarify the nature of investigations in this respect as part of the security screening process.

9.2 Objections and appeals

Under the Wvo, a person who is refused a VGB or has it withdrawn is entitled to lodge an official objection. The number received increased slightly in 2008, to 116. That compares with 108 the previous year. But there was a sharp rise, to 35, in objections to refusals or withdrawals on the grounds that insufficient information could be obtained concerning either the subject or his or her partner. In the bulk of these cases the problem lay in the fact that one of them had been struck from the Dutch population.
The number of legal appeals lodged fell from 31 in 2007 to 18 in 2008. One possible reason for this is that the Council of State (Raad van State) – the country’s highest court in such matters – has consistently ruled that the AIVD’s policy as regards VGB refusals and withdrawals is not unreasonable. With that in mind, most potential appellants probably see little hope that the courts will uphold their case. Seven second appeals to higher courts were initiated in 2008 – two of them by the minister – compared with ten the previous year.

In one of its 2008 rulings, the Council of State confirmed that, in deciding whether to refuse or withdraw a VGB on the grounds of a subject’s criminal record, the circumstances under which the crime was committed are irrelevant. It is assumed that any extenuating circumstances have already been taken into account by the Public Prosecution Service when laying charges or by the court when passing sentence.

Another ruling concerned the interpretation of the term “duty of effort” in cases where a VGB is refused or withdrawn on the grounds of insufficient information. Even if the person being screened or his or her partner has lived in a country with which the AIVD does not maintain a working relationship, the service still has an obligation to make all reasonable effort to acquire the information it needs to form a sound judgement. According to the Council of State, that duty is fulfilled if the minister has established that the AIVD must not co-operate with another security service due to insufficient democratic accountability and inadequate guarantees that it respects human rights.

Finally, the Council of State ruled on the refusal or withdrawal of VGB based upon secret documents. In this case it confirmed that the necessary standards for judicial review of the disputed decision are met as long as it and the lower court hearing the case have been able to inspect the documents concerned. Providing that has happened, the principle of fair play has been respected. It should be noted, however, that the subject must give both the Council of State and the lower court permission to include the documents in their deliberations. If he or she does refuse to do so, that compromises these bodies’ ability to review the legality of the original decision on its full merits. And the subject must bear the consequences of that.
9.3 Productivity summary

Number of positions involving confidentiality by sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>6,259</td>
<td>6,499</td>
<td>5,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence contractors</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>20,800</td>
<td>20,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil aviation</td>
<td>35,437</td>
<td>44,369</td>
<td>40,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>16,147</td>
<td>16,608</td>
<td>17,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Household</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vital sectors</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>1,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>78,159</td>
<td>90,092</td>
<td>86,285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Positions with defence contractors require security clearance from either the AIVD or the MIVD, with the former conducting screenings for posts at private companies.

Requests for security screening received by the AIVD, by level and category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level A</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Category P (police)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category KH (Royal Household)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level B</td>
<td>5,048</td>
<td>4,896</td>
<td>3,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level B through KMar</td>
<td>3,708</td>
<td>4,806</td>
<td>5,589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level C</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>11,796</td>
<td>12,983</td>
<td>11,545</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all, 328 requests for NATO and EU clearance were received in 2008 and 955 requests from fellow services for administrative checks were received and processed.

Security clearance refusals in 2008, with grounds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clearance</th>
<th>Judicial record</th>
<th>Insufficient information</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Level A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Level A, police</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Category P (police)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Level B</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Level B, civil aviation</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance Level C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>793</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Control and accountability

10.1 Control

Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations is ultimately responsible for the proper functioning and effective performance of the AIVD. She oversees and plans its tasks in such a way that they serve the public interest as usefully as possible. That requires that priorities be set clearly and that they be co-ordinated with a variety of interested parties, including those who use AIVD services. In the fight against terrorism, for example, there are close and frequent consultations with the Minister of Justice. In the case of foreign intelligence, there are intensive contacts with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence.

Council for National Security
The Council for National Security (Raad voor de Nationale Veiligheid, RNV) is a Cabinet subcommittee made up of the Prime Minister, the two Deputy Prime Ministers and the ministers of the Interior, Justice, Defence and Foreign Affairs. They meet once every two months, and more often if necessary, to discuss a wide range of issues touching upon national security.

A number of items featured regularly on the RNV’s agenda in 2008: the annual plans of the AIVD and the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), the designation of subjects for investigation by the foreign intelligence branches of those two agencies and the reports of their activities. Also discussed were the quarterly National Terrorism Threat Assessment (Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland, DTN) and its policy implications, the counterterrorism progress reports submitted biannually to Parliament by the ministers of the Interior and Justice and general developments in international zones of conflict and tension.

The preparatory work for RNV meetings is delegated to two official bodies: the Joint Counterterrorism Committee (Gezamenlijk Comité Terrorismebestrijding, GCT) and the Joint Intelligence Services Committee (Comité Verenigde Inlichtingendiensten, CVIN). The former addresses all matters specifically related to terrorism and the fight against it and includes representatives from all central government organisations with a role in that counterterrorism effort. The CVIN, on the other hand, has a more wide-ranging national security remit. It meets once every two months, or more often if necessary, chaired by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of General Affairs in his capacity as Intelligence and Security Services Co-ordinator. Its other members are
senior civil servants from the ministries of the Interior, Defence, Justice and Foreign Affairs.

10.2 Parliament and legislation

The Minister of the Interior is accountable to parliament. This is an obligation she fulfils both in public before the entire Lower House and, where necessary, in private at confidential sessions of its Intelligence and Security Services Committee (Commissie voor de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten, CIVD).

 Intelligence and Security Services Committee

When matters related to the AIVD cannot be publicly disclosed, the Minister of the Interior fulfils her duty of accountability to Parliament in closed sessions of the CIVD. In 2008 this was made up of the parliamentary leaders of all parties with elected members in the Lower House, with the exception of the Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP) – which has opted not to join – and those groups which have split from established parties during the current session. The Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) and the Party for the Animals (Partij voor de Dieren, PvdD) have been represented on the committee since 2007.

When invited to appear before the committee, the minister – supported by the Head of the AIVD – provides verbal responses on topics raised concerning the service’s operational activities. If required, she also supplies information in writing. In addition, she may herself take the initiative to notify the CIVD of developments.

The minister appeared before the CIVD on six occasions in 2008. Matters discussed included a variety of topics related to terrorism. Because of his responsibilities in this regard, the Minister of Justice was also present on those occasions. The CTIVD produced no reports with secret appendices, which the CIVD would have had to consider, during the year.

 Lower House

The Departmental Select Committee for the Interior and Kingdom Relations (Kamercommissie voor BZK) discussed two CTIVD reports with the minister in 2008 (see 10.7). On 7 June she appeared to discuss the cancellation of the ScienceLink project in Venray following actions by radical animal activists (see 4.3). The 2007 annual reports of the AIVD, CTIVD and CIVD were examined on 3 September, as were the first progress report on the “Safer, Faster” improvement programme (see Chapter 9), a ministerial letter concerning improvements made by the AIVD to correct a number
of shortcomings previously identified by the CTIVD and another letter on the current state of its information management development activities. Finally, on 30 October, the House met in plenary session to debate activities by the Moroccan intelligence services in the Netherlands.

**Legislation**

*Amendment of the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002*

Following its approval by the Lower House of Parliament on 16 October 2007, a bill to amend the Intelligence and Security Services Act 2002 (Wiv 2002) is now before the Upper House. The purpose of the change is to enhance the means available to the intelligence and security services to investigate and act against terrorism and other threats to national security. The Data Protection Authority (College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens, CBP) issued an advisory document on the proposal at the request of the Upper House, and on 7 May 2008 the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations submitted the government’s response. The CBP subsequently produced its own reply to that, and on 23 September the Upper House issued a provisional report on the bill. The minister will submit her memorandum of reply in 2009. To this will be appended a draft Order in Council detailing the powers to mandate disclosure of information provided for in the amendment.

Another proposed amendment to the Wiv 2002 will be submitted to the Council of State for its advice in 2009. Among other things, this would establish a general statutory basis for special collaborations between services, such as the Counterterrorism

**Legislation on Bonaire, Sint-Eustatius and Saba**

Upon completion of the current constitutional reform process in the Netherlands Antilles, the islands of Bonaire, Sint-Eustatius and Saba are due to become special municipalities of the Netherlands proper. When that happens, the AIVD will assume responsibility for their national security. Both it and the MIVD consider it essential that the Wiv 2002 and the Security Screening Act (Wvo) enter force on the islands immediately upon their accession, since only then will an adequate legal framework exist for the services to meet their security responsibilities in full. The necessary amendments to these two acts have been included in the Bonaire, Sint-Eustatius and Saba Institutional Revision Bill (Aanpassingswet BES, ABES), one of the proposed laws implementing the new constitutional arrangement. The AIVD plans to fulfil its future obligations on the islands through a Regional Intelligence Unit (Regionale Inlichtingen Dienst, RID) to be part of the new 27th constabulary.

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7 Parliamentary papers 2007-2008, 30805 no. 11 and 30977 no. 10 and no. 11
Co-operation between the security services within the realm

In the light of the constitutional reform process, a satisfactory legal framework is a precondition for a continuing and developing relationship between the security services in the states making up the Kingdom of the Netherlands. To that end, they – together with official representatives from Sint-Maarten – met in 2008 to discuss the operational and legal prerequisites needed to place their activities within a sound, modern framework. Of particular importance here are such matters as the proper formulation of a service’s task, the powers it requires and how it is regulated.

10.3 Applications under the Freedom of Information Act

Under freedom of information rules, anyone is entitled to submit a request to inspect information the AIVD may hold about them. Much use was again made of this right in 2008. However, a number of restrictions apply to this form of disclosure. For example, it covers only information which is not relevant to current AIVD activities. And even outdated material cannot be inspected if that would or might compromise the service’s sources and methods. Moreover, a person may only inspect their own record or that of their deceased spouse, registered partner, child or parent. The procedure and conditions are described in more detail online, at www.aivd.nl.

January and February saw a peak in such applications. This was most probably caused by the publication late in 2007 of the book *Frontdienst, de BVD ten tijde van de Koude Oorlog*, by Dick Engelen, about the work of the AIVD’s predecessor service on the “front line” of the Cold War. In response to the resulting demand, the source information cited in that work’s footnotes was made available on CD-ROM and on the AIVD website. After this initial surge, the number of applications returned to a level comparable with that of previous years.

In all, 161 requests were received in 2008: 109 for information held on the person making the application, 21 concerning deceased relatives, 22 for non-personal data and nine in respect of persons unrelated to the applicant.

Eleven applicants submitted objections following a refusal to permit inspection of records, five lodged appeals against rejected objections and one went to a second appeal in a higher court. Of those cases active in 2008, thirteen objections, three first appeals and four second appeals were settled during the year.

Of the objections, one was partially upheld and the rest were rejected. All the first appeal cases were either dismissed or declared inadmissible in court. The Council of
State (Raad van State) upheld four second appeals on procedural grounds, but in every case allowed the actual decision taken by the AIVD to stand.

10.4 Notification

Article 34 of the Wiv 2002 requires that, five years after the completion of certain investigations involving its special powers, the AIVD review whether the subject can be notified that they have been investigated in that way. In a ministerial letter on the duty of notification, dated 4 December 2008, Parliament was provided with an explanation of the grounds on which it may currently be postponed, withheld or annulled. Because of this, the AIVD has not produced a notification report. The letter also stated that it is still too early to reach a verdict in respect of experiences concerning the duty of notification.

10.5 Complaints

Every year the AIVD, the CIVD, the CTIVD, the Minister of the Interior and the National Ombudsman all receive complaints from members of the public, under Article 6 of the Wiv 2002, concerning actual or supposed service activities. If these cannot be settled informally, they are referred to the minister, who seeks the advice of the CTIVD. A complainant who is unhappy with the minister’s decision may turn to the National Ombudsman for independent reconsideration of the matter.

The CTIVD believes that, under the Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht, Awb), even complaints which are patently unfounded must undergo the proper consideration procedure. In the past it was standard practice for the AIVD to respond in writing, in an effort to put the complainant’s mind at rest. Now, however, at the CTIVD’s instigation and as long as they are admissible (as per Article 9:4, Clause 2, of the Awb), such complaints are submitted to the committee for its advice. So far, it has dismissed all complaints of this nature.

In all, 26 complaints were received in 2008. Of these, 15 were forwarded to the CTIVD for its advice. Two of the others were settled satisfactorily during the informal consideration phase, six were declared inadmissible and one was not considered because it was actually a repeat submission of a complaint which had previously been dealt with. The remaining two were still under consideration at the time of writing.

8 Parliamentary papers II 2008-2009, 30977 no. 18
In only one case did the committee recommend that a complaint be upheld. That was submitted by a person who felt that his security screening had been conducted incorrectly and inefficiently, since the AIVD could simply have adopted the clearance previously issued to him by the MIVD. He also believed that the statutory deadline for completion of the screening procedure had been exceeded. The CTIVD’s advice in this case was followed by the minister.

Finally, a complaint reported in the 2007 annual report, concerning alleged AIVD involvement in the subject’s detention abroad, was settled in 2008. In line with the CTIVD’s advice, it was dismissed. The complainant has since referred the matter to the National Ombudsman.

10.6 Intelligence and Security Services Supervisory Committee

The Intelligence and Security Services Supervisory Committee (CTIVD) is an independent body which oversees compliance with the Wiv 2002 and Wvo. In 2008 it compiled two regulatory reports concerning the AIVD. The first was a review of the assessment processes which informed the extent of past AIVD interest in Mohammed B., the murderer of film maker Theo van Gogh in 2004, whilst the second examined the service’s compliance with undertakings made by the Minister of the Interior in the wake of CTIVD reports 1-10. Both documents were submitted to Parliament during the year, accompanied by responses from the minister, and they, their recommendations and the responses were considered by the Lower House in writing as well as in debate.

In its report on Mohammed B., the CTIVD states that the service should have paid more attention to him due to his active and prominent role in the Hofstad Group of terrorists, and because of his generally violent demeanour. Moreover, the committee made a number of critical comments concerning the functioning of the AIVD at the time. It refrained from issuing any recommendations concerning the investigation into Mohammed B., however, since that took place in 2003-2004 and so for the most part they would be obsolete.

As for the second report, the committee’s findings were generally positive. Almost without exception, its recommendations have been accepted by the minister and to a large extent have already been incorporated into the service’s internal regulations and procedures. A few require changes to the law, though, and so will take longer to implement.

9 Parliamentary papers II 2007-2008, 29854, no. 22 and 29924, no. 25
In a report published in 2007 on its review of co-operation between the service, the police RIDs and the Royal Military Constabulary (KMar), the CTIVD stated that that had progressed considerably in recent years thanks to “Chain and Quality” (Keten en Kwaliteit). A joint project by the AIVD, the police, KMar and the Security Directorate at the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, this has improved collaboration in several areas and has also enhanced the clarity surrounding their co-operation. Nevertheless, the committee believes that there still are a number of key points with scope for improvement: overall control by the AIVD, the service’s operational strength and external orientation and the level of equality between the partners. To put these recommendations into effect, in 2008 the AIVD and the services performing tasks for which it is responsible under Article 60 of the Wiv 2002 launched “Project Bridgehead” (Bruggenhoofd). This is due to be completed in 2010.
11 Organisational development and management

11.1 Organisational development

The AIVD initiated an internal reorganisation in 2008, focusing primarily upon its management, efficiency and effectiveness and upon improving structures and processes. The “new” service is to be more firmly organised around the intelligence process, with the result that it will further enhance its ability to conduct investigations, to interpret the information obtained, to mobilise others to take action and, where necessary, to act of its own accord in reducing risks to national security. Due to be completed in mid-2009, the reorganisation should also enable the service to respond even more quickly and flexibly to national and international developments.

11.2 Information management

For an intelligence and security service, the primary working process consists almost entirely of processing information. The scale of this task has massively expanded for the AIVD in recent years, due in part to the digitisation of security-relevant information flows and to far more intensive sharing of data with partner agencies. Consequently, the service is permanently having to invest in up-to-date and secure information management.

At the beginning of 2008 the AIVD centralised its IT functions under the auspices of a new Information Management Directorate. This is charged with ensuring the continuity, reliability and availability of IT facilities within the service, and with implementing the necessary improvements to them. The principal aims of this ongoing modernisation are to make archived documents easier to retrieve and to develop better search functions, so that the information held can be viewed and analysed in a coherent fashion.

To this end, five major innovation projects have begun, each with its own focus. The first is intended to further professionalize the management systems used by the AIVD. The necessary IT support for these systems was implemented in 2008 and the project should be completed in 2009. Also in 2008, an advanced system was introduced to improve the automatic compilation of information within the Counterterrorism Infobox. Two of the projects are designed to strengthen IT support for the security screening process, with one focusing upon their completion within the statutory deadline and the other upon making the process a dynamic one involving the
systematic monitoring of persons holding positions involving confidentiality. Finally, the internal document management system at the AIVD is undergoing an overhaul to make the compilation of dossiers and support for the service’s work processes more professional. This project is due to be completed in 2010.

11.3 Organisational management

The AIVD fulfilled its duty of regular policy accountability to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in 2008 by means of quarterly progress reports on results relevant to political and administrative matters and on adjustments to the annual plan. Management reporting was based upon the working agreements reached with the minister and was also provided in line with the ministry’s management control system.

Finance

The AIVD’s workforce continued to grow in 2008, reaching a total of 1,393 full-time equivalents (FTE). Consequently, the service is now approaching its “growth platform” of 1,504 FTE. This expansion is being funded from a series of previous allocations to increase capacity. Last year, additional resources were made available to intensify and extend the service’s National Signals Security Bureau role (see 8.3) in 2008 and 2009 and to improve the provision of information. The latter allocation, a total of € 6 million in 2008, was invested in internal information management and the associated technology infrastructure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1 General expenditure</td>
<td>€ 170.5 million</td>
<td>€ 169.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 Confidential expenditure</td>
<td>€ 4.1 million</td>
<td>€ 6.0 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Explanatory note

The AIVD exceeded its allocated budget for 2008, as set out in the government’s autumn financial statement, by a total of € 4.2 million. Of that overspending, € 2.4 million was general expenditure and € 1.8 million was confidential expenditure. The former was accounted for by additional costs related to the AIVD’s new premises. No details can be given concerning the confidential expenditure. Moreover, a number of irregularities in financial management in 2008 have been identified. These pertain mainly to tendering procedures such as outsourcing and to expired contracts, although another concerned liabilities: following the implementation of a new management
system for finances and procurement, discrepancies were found between the services liability position under the old system and that in the new one.

11.4 Quality management

With a view to safeguarding and improving quality on a permanent basis, the AIVD has conducted an extensive programme of audits focusing upon the outcomes of the Prospect 2007 development programme. The points these revealed as requiring attention are incorporated into the service’s future development plans. A further stimulus to improve the organisation has been provided by the system of self-evaluations by individual units, which began in 2007. To ensure that quality standards in compiling dossiers remain high in the future, a study of this particular topic has been conducted. Accurate documentation and careful management of files on sources are crucial to effective, responsible operations and to the protection of those sources. The overall results of the study were positive, although a number of – mainly administrative – points requiring improvement were found. Finally, the AIVD’s co-operation with the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) produced concrete results in the field of quality assurance, in the form of joint studies on the effectiveness of investigations related to non-proliferation.
List of definitions

Agent
A person who, instructed by and reporting to the AIVD, is assigned to gather specific intelligence concerning persons and organisations. They may do this under an assumed identity or position, but not necessarily. The information in question is either of potential relevance to the AIVD’s performance of its own task or could assist the service in taking measures to protect others.

Al-Qaeda
In current usage, this refers collectively to both the “core” Al-Qaeda and to like-minded terrorist organisations in various parts of the world. Organisations which join in with core Al-Qaeda do not establish any organisational ties with it, but instead affirm their allegiance to its international jihadist agenda. Such a joining is only recognised when both parties have acknowledged it. This is usually done through public statements by (core) Al-Qaeda, and a spokesman for the organisation in question.

AQUA ( Appropriately Qualified Agency)
A security organisation of a European Union member state which, by virtue of satisfying the EU standards in that regard, is qualified to carry out so-called “second-party evaluations” of communications encryption equipment, regardless of its country of manufacture. The Netherlands acts as an AQUA alongside France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy.

Caliphate
A state ruled by the earthly successors of the Prophet Muhammad.

CBRN terrorism
Exercising of or threatening with violence against persons or causing serious damage to, property or the fabric of society using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials, with the aim of bringing about social change or influencing the political decision-making process.

Classified information
State Secrets and other special information which will be detrimental to the interest of the Dutch state and/or its allies, if it were disclosed to unauthorised persons.
Core Al-Qaeda
The depleted remainder of the “old” Al-Qaeda which was based in Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, had a membership of jihadists drawn from throughout the Arab world and, after the US-led invasion in 2001, was driven from Afghanistan into Pakistan. This group includes the first generation of Al-Qaeda leaders, amongst them Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri. It is now called “core Al-Qaeda” to distinguish it from the larger pre-2001 organisation in Afghanistan.

Counter-terrorism Infobox (CT Infobox)
A partnership of the AIVD, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), the National Police Services Agency (KLPD), the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), the Public Prosecution Service (OM), the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD-ECD) and the Netherlands Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU-NL), with the AIVD as lead agency. Its aim is to combat terrorism by centrally compiling and comparing information. This concerns people and networks involved in some way with terrorism, particularly Islamist violence, and the associated radicalisation. The CT Infobox advises the participating agencies and others about the desirability of releasing information, as well as on opportunities to use the criminal law, immigration law, administrative sanctions or intelligence-related measures in the fight against terrorism.

Countries of concern
Countries suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and which pursue objectives that may pose a threat to the international legal order and to the security and interests of the Netherlands and its allies.

Dawa
In Arabic, the “call to Islam”. The AIVD uses this term to refer to peaceful activities intended to persuade as many Muslims as possible to profess the faith actively. In the case of non-practising Muslims, that means returning them to active religion. See also: “Radical dawa”.

Delivery systems
Means of delivery necessary for the effective use of CBRN weapons, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft.

Dual-use goods
Goods or materials which can be used for either civilian or military purposes. This term is used in the fight against further dispersion of weapons of mass destruction.
Fundamentalism
In Islam, a movement which combines a literal interpretation of scripture in social and intellectual isolation with an intolerant attitude towards those of other persuasions.

Intolerant isolationism
A form of radicalism, on ethnic, religious, ideological or political grounds, which involves highly intolerant attitudes towards other sections of the population and so seeks to create so-called “enclaves” for its “own” group. In those domains there is no place for groups from different ethnic backgrounds or with dissenting religious, ideological or political views (exclusivism). In many cases, efforts are also made to impose the dominant group’s own laws and standards over those of the western host nation (parallelism).

Islamism/Islamic
A radical movement within Islam which seeks to make society a reflection of what it claims is prescribed in the original sources of the faith: the Koran and the Sunnah, i.e. the sayings and practices of the Prophet. Islamism has a political agenda, which may find its expression in violent, non-violent or even democratic forms. Related terms: “Salafism” and “Wahhabism”.

Jihadism
An extremist ideology based upon the glorification of violent jihad, or “holy war”.

Jihadist network
A fluid, dynamic, vaguely delineated structure consisting of a number of radical Muslims with some form of mutual association, both individually and at a collective level in the form of cells or groups. At least temporarily, they are linked by a common purpose: the pursuit of a jihadist aim. For the AIVD, a person involved with a jihadist network is classified as a “member” if they play an active part in it and consciously contribute towards achieving the jihadist goal.

Based upon their member profiles, strategy and methods, the AIVD distinguishes between three kinds of jihadist networks: transnational, internationally-oriented local and autonomous local. However, these distinctions should only be regarded as providing a model to describe reality:

- **Transnational jihadist networks** are groups which transcend national borders in their efforts to achieve objectives related to the violent jihad;
- **Local jihadist networks with an international orientation** confine their activities in pursuit of those objectives to the Netherlands. They do not work with networks in
other countries, but are in contact with them. As a result, they may come under the influence of jihadists abroad;

- Local autonomous jihadist networks are also confined to the Netherlands, but do not have international contacts.

Jihadist terrorism
Actual or threatened jihadist violence against persons, property or the fabric of society, with the aim of bringing about societal change or influencing the political decision-making process.

Vital sectors
Sectors and sections of the national infrastructure which are so vital to Dutch society that their failure or serious disruption could cause major damage to society.

National security domain
See: Safety and Security System.

Official report
A notification –in writing– to a person or institution revealing personal details held by the AIVD which could assist the recipient in discharging their public responsibilities. (Dutch: “ambtsbericht”.)

Proliferation
The spread of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and of their delivery systems.

Radical dawa
As an extension of the classical interpretation of the term “dawa “, this refers to radical activities – including but not limited to religious conversion efforts – as performed by, for instance, a variety of missionary movements from the so-called Islamic “guide nations” in the Middle East. The radical nature of these activities lies in the fact that they seek to fundamentally reform society along strict Islamic lines, in the process eliminating Western constitutional democracy, openness and pluralism.

Radicalisation
An increasing willingness to pursue and/or support fundamental changes in society, possibly by undemocratic means, which are in conflict with or could pose a threat to the democratic legal order.
Safety and Security System
The Dutch national system for protecting people, property and services. Its basic principle is that individuals are primarily responsible for their own safety, with the support of any organisation to which they belong and the relevant local authorities. The central government, however, has a special responsibility for certain groups of people (such as politicians), property (such as the International Criminal Court) and services (such as civil aviation). Collectively, these are known as the national security domain (“rijksdomein”) and are overseen by the National Co-ordinator for Counter-terrorism (NCTb). In performing this task, he draws upon threat-related information provided by such bodies as the AIVD, the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) and the National Police Services Agency (KLPD), (Dutch: “Stelsel Bewaken en Beveiligen”).

Salafism
A broad ideological current which seeks a literal return to the “pure Islam” of the faith’s early period.

Security screening
An investigation of an individual in search of facts or circumstances which, on grounds of national security, may be relevant to filling a positions involving confidentiality.

Positions involving confidentiality
A job or other appointment in which the holder might be able to compromise national security. This is the case when there is access to state secrets, when a lapse of integrity could endanger national security and in certain specific positions in vital sectors.

Separatism
Efforts by a particular section of the population to separate itself from existing national ties and establish its own state.

Sigint
Signals intelligence: the interception and localisation of electronic signals transmitted on radio frequencies.

Special intelligence resources
Technical and other instruments which are deployed in the exercise of a special power under the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act and which are usually secret in nature.
Terrorism
Ideologically motivated actual or threatened violence against persons, property or the fabric of society. With the aim of bringing about social change or influencing the political decision-making process.

Terrorism lists
There are several such lists, including those issued by the United Nations and the European Union. The UN list, compiled pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1267, contains the names of persons and entities suspected of terrorist activities associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The EU list complements this, also naming individuals and groups not related to Al-Qaeda.

Third-party rule
In the intelligence and security community, the principle that information received from another service is for the recipient agency’s own use only and cannot be provided to third parties without the prior permission of the originating service. Also called the “third-country rule”.

Violent jihad
The armed struggle against supposed enemies of Islam, legitimised by the invocation of Islamic legal doctrine.
About the photography

The AIVD wants to be more transparent, seeking the right middle way between the openness society demands and the overtness our work requires. The photographs in this report symbolise our link with the wider community. The paste-ups depict a world where people can live and work safely.

The locations shown are public places which reflect the diversity of Dutch society. The inventive use of inserts providing different views of the same situation suggests time and movement.

The images are illustrative only, with no direct relationship to the content of this report.
Credits

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