

US Army TRADOC  
TRADOC G2  
Handbook No. 1.06



# *Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping Terror*

*in the COE*



US Army Training and Doctrine Command TRADOC G2  
TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity TRISA-Threats  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
15 September 2008  
Incorporating Change 1  
5 December 2008

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

## Summary of Changes

### CHANGE 1 dated 5 December to TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.06 dated 15 September 2008

- The Change 1 supersedes TRADOC G2 handbook No.1.06 dated 15 September 2008 and is published Change 1 as a complete handbook document.
- The handbook title is changed to *Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping Terror in the COE*.
- Chapter titles change as listed in the Table of Contents
- Hostage-taking receives additional attention throughout the handbook in conjunction with kidnapping.
- Definitions used to describe the difference between kidnapping and hostage-taking are from US Code Title 18.
- Chapter 1 addresses several conditions that may exist for US soldiers or civilians when detained by a hostile government or in terrorist captivity.
- Table 1-2 adds a note to acknowledge that the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK)(North Korea) was removed from the US Department of State's State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list in October 2008 by the US Government.
- Chapter 4 provides two major vignettes on hostage-taking that involved US soldiers in the conduct of military missions.
- Appendix C adds two references as background Code of Conduct information.

# Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping Terror in the COE

## Contents

	Page
Contents .....	i
<b>Preface</b> .....	iii
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>1</b>
Purpose .....	2
Terrorism – Scope the Issue .....	3
Kidnapping and Hostage-Taking – Know the Threat.....	3
Understanding the OE and the COE.....	4
Summary .....	7
<b>CHAPTER 1: HOSTAGE-TAKING AND KIDNAPPING</b> .....	<b>1-1</b>
Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping in Contemporary Times.....	1-1
Section I. Define the Terms .....	1-1
Section II. Describe the Context.....	1-13
Kidnapping Terror Two Decades Ago .....	1-17
Kidnapping Terror One Decade Ago .....	1-21
Contemporary Kidnapping and Hostage-Taking Terror .....	1-26
Summary .....	1-32
<b>CHAPTER 2: TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS AND BEHAVIORS</b> .....	<b>2-1</b>
Terrorist Motivations and Behaviors.....	2-1
Section I: Goals and intent.....	2-1
Section II: Motivation.....	2-6
Section III: Behavior .....	2-13
Summary .....	2-19

---

<b>CHAPTER 3: TERRORIST MODELS AND AFFILIATIONS.....</b>	<b>3-1</b>
Terrorist Models and Affiliations .....	3-1
Section I: Organizational Commitment .....	3-3
Section II: Organizational Structure.....	3-5
Section III: Organizational Categories .....	3-10
Summary.....	3-14
<b>CHAPTER 4: HOSTAGE-TAKING CASE VIGNETTES .....</b>	<b>4-1</b>
Hostage Case Vignettes.....	4-1
Case Study Elements: A Model.....	4-2
Case Methodology .....	4-4
Case Study: Kumanovo (1999) .....	4-5
Case Study: Karbala (2007) .....	4-29
<b>CHAPTER 5: COMBATING TERRORISM TODAY.....</b>	<b>5-1</b>
Combating Terrorism Today.....	5-1
Rationales for Kidnapping and Hostage-Taking .....	5-3
Action Modeling for Kidnapping or Hostage-Taking .....	5-6
Kidnapping and Hostage-Taking Outcomes .....	5-14
Summary.....	5-19
<b>Appendix A .....</b>	<b>A-1</b>
<b>Geneva Convention – Prisoners of War (Extract).....</b>	<b>A-1</b>
<b>Appendix B .....</b>	<b>B-1</b>
<b>UN International Convention Against Taking of Hostages .....</b>	<b>B-1</b>
<b>Appendix C .....</b>	<b>C-1</b>
<b>Code of Conduct .....</b>	<b>C-1</b>
Obligations and Responsibilities.....	C-2
The Code of Conduct .....	C-4
<b>References .....</b>	<b>1</b>

## PREFACE

***Hostage-taking and Kidnapping Terror in the Contemporary Operational Environment*** is a supplemental handbook to the US Army Training and Doctrine Command capstone handbook guide on terrorism, TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1, *A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. Understanding terrorism and actions such as kidnapping or hostage-taking spans foreign and domestic threats in a complex and uncertain array of threats in the contemporary operational environment (COE).

**Purpose.** This unclassified informational handbook supports operational missions, institutional training, and professional military education for US military forces in the War on Terrorism (WOT). This document promotes an improved understanding of terrorism objectives, motivation, and behaviors in the conduct of kidnapping or hostage-taking. Compiled from open source materials, this terrorism handbook promotes a “threat” perspective as well as enemy situational awareness of US actions to combat terrorism.

**Handbook Use.** This handbook exists primarily for US military members in operational units and installation-institutional activities. Other groups of interest include Department of Army Civilians (DAC) and DA contractors. Additional groups of interest include interdepartmental, interagency, intergovernmental, civilian contractor, or nongovernmental, private volunteer and humanitarian relief organizations, and the general citizenry. Study of historical and contemporary terrorist incidents improves training awareness, mission exercise, and operational readiness. Selected references present citations for detailed study of specific terrorism topics. Unless stated otherwise, nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to a specific gender.

**Proponent Statement.** Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2 is the proponent for this publication. Both the capstone guide and supplemental handbook are prepared under the direction of the TRADOC G2, TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA). This handbook will be updated to maintain a current and relevant resource based on user requirements. Send comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 directly to Director, US Army TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA), ATTN: ATIN-T, Threats Terrorism Team, 700 Scott Avenue, Bldg 53, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-1323.

This handbook is available at <https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil> and requires an Army Knowledge Online (AKO) login password for website access.



This Page Intentionally Blank

## Introduction

**America is at war and should expect to remain fully engaged for the next several decades in a persistent conflict against an enemy dedicated to US defeat as a nation and eradication as a society.<sup>1</sup>**

***Operations, US Army Field Manual 3-0  
February 2008***

*Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping Terror in the Contemporary Operational Environment* is a supplemental handbook to the US Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1, *A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. The TRADOC G2 capstone reference guide describes terrorism and its potential impacts on US military forces in the conduct of mission operations. This supplemental handbook highlights the nature of kidnapping and hostage-taking in a full spectrum contemporary operational environment (COE). Our Army doctrine declares a long conflict with an enemy that is uncompromising in ideology and intended outcome. Know the enemy. **The United States of America is at war.**



Figure 1. **Kidnapping, Hostage-Taking, and Terror in the COE**

Army doctrine also describes the contemporary environment as uncertain where lines separating war and peace or enemy and friend have blurred, and where military missions can be an overlapping combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations.<sup>2</sup> The Army will be involved in missions, tasks, and activities before, during, and after combat operations. Knowing who an adversary or enemy is and what rule of law protection exists or how persons or organizations

<sup>1</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 27 February 2008), viii.

<sup>2</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 6 October 2008), Foreword, iv, vi.

recognize and comply with international or national protocols provide context to preparation for and reaction to acts such as kidnapping or hostage-taking. As a victim of kidnapping or being taken hostage, an individual must evaluate the specific circumstance of the captivity and make decisions based on his knowledge of what actions are admissible during his captivity.

## PURPOSE

This terrorism handbook, in conjunction with the Army TRADOC G2 capstone Handbook No. 1, *A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, serves as an unclassified resource to inform US military members on the nature of kidnapping, hostage-taking, and terrorism. These aspects complement the deliberate processes of US military forces risk management, protection of the force, mission orders conduct, and leader decision-making. This situational awareness is critical to individual, family member, unit, work group, installation operations security, and protection of the force.

From a “Threats” perspective, terrorism intent and capabilities indicate possible and probable types of threat action that may be directed against US military members, units, and organizations. Factors other than military power may place limitations or restrictions on both threats and friendly forces. Commanders, organizational leaders, and other military members must understand and appreciate the “Threat” and can use this handbook to create opportunities to:

- Understand terrorist goals and objectives, as well as patterns, trends, and emerging techniques of kidnapping, hostage-taking, and terrorism operations.
- Appreciate the kidnapping and hostage-taking threat to US military members, family members, Department of the Army Civilians (DAC), and contractors in support of Army missions. The threat may extend to coalition partners and local citizens in an area of operations. Institutional locations include training and education sites, installations, and support facilities.
- Relate appropriate levels of protection of the force, operational security (OPSEC), and kidnapping and hostage-taking prevention and countermeasures at installations and units.
- Use kidnapping and hostage-taking awareness as integral to vulnerability analysis for Active Component (AC) forces, Army Reserve forces, and State National Guard forces: (1) deployed on an operational mission, (2) in-transit to or from an operational mission, or (3) designated as installation or institutional support not normally deployed in the conduct of their organizational mission.

## **TERRORISM – SCOPE THE ISSUE**

Terrorism is a significant challenge for US military forces in the twenty-first century. Terrorist violence such as kidnapping and hostage-taking emerged in recent years from an agenda-forcing and attention-getting tool of the politically disenfranchised to a significant asymmetric form of conflict. While terrorist acts may have appeared to be extraordinary events several decades ago, today terrorism surpasses these former isolated acts and demonstrates a profound and recurring impact on local, regional, national, and international populations.

Terrorists do not plan on defeating the US in a direct military confrontation. Action against US military forces will often be indirect, that is, asymmetric. Terrorists will seek to find vulnerability and will exploit that weakness. The ability to kidnap or take a hostage, once vulnerability is identified, offers a lucrative target for the terrorist that can yield significant propaganda impacts far beyond a particular ransom or momentary spotlight of publicity.

## **KIDNAPPING AND HOSTAGE-TAKING – KNOW THE THREAT**

Is kidnapping or hostage-taking a tactic, technique, or procedure? Does either action have the ability for larger operational impact? Can kidnapping or hostage-taking cause strategic consequences? Yes, is the answer to all three of these questions.

Kidnapping and hostage-taking is an abduction that forces a heavy psychological burden on the cast of players that are involved in such a crime. The seizure affects not only the individual or individuals who are abducted, but generates an anxiety in a larger group of people as location and welfare of the abducted target is unknown, as demands and actual intentions of abductors are in doubt, and the prospect of rescue is hazardous at best. If “terrorism is theater” and kidnapping and hostage-taking can be imagined as drama, the final act can quickly degenerate to a tragedy where actors and actions end in disaster.

Today’s reality is a world of global interconnectivity and a stage for near instantaneous news or propaganda. Kidnapping or hostage-taking can prompt a sensational headline, can extort political and military action or lack of action, and can divert scarce capabilities from other important missions in a military area of operations. One incident, minute in scope and singular in purpose, can amplify the uncertain and complex conditions of an operational environment to create an international incident and spotlight a terrorist agenda.

## UNDERSTANDING THE OE AND THE COE

The US Department of Defense (DOD) defines operational environment (OE) as a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.<sup>3</sup> This environment includes air, land, maritime, space, and associated adversary presence, as well as friendly and neutral systems. These other systems associate political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, legal, and other elements in contemporary day-to-day life. Appreciation is a holistic awareness rather than a discrete assessment of a specific issue or action.

A way of appreciating these critical variables in a real-world context is to analyze environment through use of the acronym PMESII plus PT. These elements for analysis are political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, and other physical aspects such as geography-topography-hydrology and time (PMESII + PT).




Figure 2. Operational Environment and the Threat

A model of PMESII+PT can be used to spotlight the complex reality of a Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). This complexity appreciates a synergistic combination of all critical variables and actors that create the

<sup>3</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military Terms*, 12 April 2001, as amended through 17 October 2008; available from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/o/03922.html>; Internet; accessed 5 August 2008.

conditions, circumstances, and influences that can affect military operations today and for the foreseeable future.<sup>4</sup>

The COE is an overarching construct to an operational environment. The COE comprises two primary dimensions. A sphere of tangible physical space can be associated but not limited to the geographic dimensions of various forms of operational area. Complementing this physical space, the COE must embrace the cognitive realm of interaction among friendly forces and partners, threats and enemies, and neutral groups. The composite of “conditions, circumstances, and influences”<sup>5</sup> from these two dimensions is essential to effective thinking, planning, and acting in an operational environment (OE).

As mission orders or directives define operational areas with graphic parameters to a military commander, the human dimension of thought, dialog, and action affects a constantly evolving system of systems. Cognitive and physical domains are integral to each other. Each operational environment (OE) exists within the real-world understanding of the contemporary operational environment (COE). The Army TRADOC G2 describes the COE as presented in the text box below:

**Contemporary Operational Environment**

The contemporary operational environment is the realistic combination of current and near-term operational environment **variables** with a capabilities-based composite of potential adversaries to create a wide array of **conditions** necessary for full spectrum training and leader development.

<sup>4</sup> US Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC G2, TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) White Paper, *The Contemporary Operational Environment*, July 2007.

<sup>5</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 September 2006), II-15 to II-24.




Figure 3. The Dynamics of COE Awareness

As national experience and priorities of action have evolved since the grim reality terrorist attacks in 2001, the Nation has stated a more conspicuous declaration against some terrorists who will not be dissuaded: “The hard core among our terrorist enemies cannot be reformed or deterred; they will be tracked down, captured, or killed.”<sup>6</sup>

Translating these national priorities against terrorism for an installation or unit operations security and protection plan, key leaders and planners conduct detailed analysis of high risk targets (HRT) and mission essential capabilities. Both installations and units prioritize efforts and support based on the specific threat and time available.

Clearly, the terrorist is gathering intelligence too, and is seeking to identify or create points of vulnerability in a potential target area. Patience and persistence can be a two-edged sword. A terrorist attack will usually be a carefully crafted incident. Vigilance in protection of the force by each US military member, family member, government civilian employee, and government contractor is one of the most notable and responsible personal measures that can deter or dissuade a terrorist attack.

<sup>6</sup> The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2006), 11.

## SUMMARY

This handbook presents an informational guide to the nature of kidnapping and hostage-taking threats in the context of the COE:

**Chapter 1** defines kidnapping and hostage-taking in the context of terrorism, and describes terror of recent decades as it merges in contemporary times.

**Chapter 2** discusses the motivations and behaviors of terrorists. As a tactic or technique of terror, kidnapping and hostage-taking in a full spectrum environment can include foreign and domestic Threats, and can range the actions of a lone individual or the operation of a highly organized transnational network.

**Chapter 3** assesses models of organization related to terrorism and inspects the connections between acts of terror, criminal gang activities, and terrorist group affiliations. The linkages among criminal activities for fiscal profit and terrorist activities accenting a political agenda can be easily blurred in environments that exhibit political unrest, civil office corruption, poverty and unemployment, and segments of a population that feel disenfranchised from the governing establishment.

**Chapter 4** illustrates different kidnapping or hostage-taking incidents. The examples demonstrate diversity of purpose; differing tactics, techniques or procedures; as well as victim treatment and incident outcome. Case vignettes analyze the hazards to US military members deployed in offensive and defensive missions, and during stability operations. Other case vignettes in this handbook reflect kidnapping or hostage-taking incidents that have involved US military or civilian members in recent decades.

**Chapter 5** presents observations on contemporary kidnapping and hostage-taking to emphasize friendly force requirements for vulnerability analysis, risk management, and training for force readiness. Thinking and planning like the Threat, whether conventional to unconventional or symmetrical to unsymmetrical in nature, considers vulnerabilities of US armed forces throughout a complete force generation cycle of home station training, during in-transit movements, and while deployed in an area of operations. Similar comprehensive analysis occurs with institutional US forces and fixed activities and installations.

Appendices provide supplemental information on kidnapping and hostage-taking, as well as reference to US military member prisoner of war conduct. Circumstances and conditions vary: (A) Geneva Convention in handling prisoners of war, (B) international protocols against hostage-taking published by the United Nations, and (C) the US Armed Forces Code of Conduct.

An overarching theme of this handbook is – We are at war on terror. ***Know the Enemy!***

This Page Intentionally Blank

---

## Chapter 1

# Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping in Contemporary Times

**In recent years old hatreds and conflicts have combined with new threats and forces of instability -- challenges made more dangerous and prolific by modern technology. Among them: terrorism, extremism and violent jihadism; ethnic, tribal and sectarian conflict; proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials; failed and failing states; nations discontented with their role in the international order; and rising and resurgent powers whose future paths are uncertain.**

Honorable Robert Gates  
Secretary of Defense, February 2008

This chapter defines key terms related the terrorism of kidnapping and hostage-taking in contemporary environments. In the ongoing war on terror, our US Army doctrine recognizes that people are part of the “terrain” and their support is a primary factor of success in future conflicts. The enemy knows the same critical factor of conflict and will use various means to disrupt stability in an area of operations whether that environment is urban or rural in locale and region. A tactic, technique, and procedure of the terrorist is to intimidate or extort people. Actions are intended to create anxiety, fear, and mayhem in support of immediate, intermediate, or long-term terrorism objectives.


## SECTION I. DEFINE THE TERMS

### TERRORISM

1-1. Terrorism is a special type of violence. While terrorism often seeks legitimacy as political action, terrorism is a criminal offense under nearly every national or international legal code. Although terrorism has not yet caused the physical devastation and large number of casualties normally associated with traditional warfare, terrorism can produce a significant adverse psychological impact and present a threat greater than a simple compilation of the number of people killed or the quantity of materiel destroyed.

1-2. Examples of psychological impact are the 911 attacks on the United States and the US anthrax incidents in 2001. For some people, these attacks weakened their sense of safety and security. The experience of catastrophic terrorism was evidence that the United States was not immune to attacks by known international or transnational terrorist groups.

1-3. What is terrorism? Terrorism is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as: “The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”<sup>7</sup>



1-4. This definition is not a universally accepted definition outside of the Department of Defense. The study of terrorism has often been mired in conflict over definitions and frames of reference. The DOD doctrinal definition will be used for this handbook.

1-5. However successful in attracting attention or creating fear and anxiety, terrorist acts often fail to translate into concrete long-term gains or achieve an ultimate objective.<sup>8</sup> Escalating acts of terrorism can be self-defeating when the acts become so extreme that public reaction focuses on the acts rather than on the terrorist’s intended purpose and issue. The 911 attacks had significant political, social, and economic impacts on the United States and the world. Yet for many citizens, these terrorist acts fortified their will and resolve. Consequently, a national resolve emerged from these catastrophic incidents to combat terrorism and reassert confidence in the Nation.

<sup>7</sup> Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001, as amended through 17 October 2008.

<sup>8</sup> Caleb Carr, *The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians: Why it has Always Failed and Why It Will Fail Again* (New York: Random House, 2002), 11.

## KIDNAPPING

1-6. Kidnapping is a difficult term to define precisely because many legal variations exist depending on the level of governance establishing laws and the conditions that may be specified or purposely remain general in scope. One legal dictionary notes that, "...kidnapping occurs when a person, without lawful authority, physically moves another person without that other person's consent, with the intent to use the abduction in connection with some other nefarious objective."

1-7. Two common aspects of kidnapping are: (1) movement or detention must be unlawful. Under various US state and federal statutes, not all seizures and movements constitute kidnapping: In the civilian sector, the police may arrest and detain a person they suspect of a crime. Parents are allowed to reasonably restrict and control the movement of their children. (2) some aggravating circumstance must accompany the restraint or movement. Examples of circumstances include a demand



for money, a demand for something of value, an attempt to affect a function of government, an attempt to inflict injury on the abducted person or persons, an attempt to commit a felony, or an attempt to terrorize a third party.<sup>9</sup>

Fig. 1-1. Kidnapped Journalist Team

1-8. In US Federal kidnapping investigations, the categories of conduct that frame the crime are usually: limited duration kidnapping where the victim is released unharmed; kidnapping that occurs as part of another crime; and kidnapping for the purpose of ransom or political concession. Other legal considerations used to describe the crime involve duration of kidnapping and if the victim was injured causing a permanent disability or life-threatening trauma, was sexually exploited, whether or not a dangerous weapon such as a firearm was used, or if the victim was murdered during the kidnapping.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *The Free Dictionary*, s.v. "Kidnapping," available from <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Kidnapping>; Internet; accessed 15 April 2008.

<sup>10</sup> "2007 Federal Sentencing Guidelines," available from [http://www.miami-criminal-lawyer.net/federal-sentencing-guidelines/2007guid/2a4\\_1.html](http://www.miami-criminal-lawyer.net/federal-sentencing-guidelines/2007guid/2a4_1.html); Internet; accessed 11 April 2008.

1-9. Using the US Code (Title 18)<sup>11</sup> to define kidnapping and its conditions: kidnapping is an act that unlawfully seizes, confines, moves, decoys, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when --

- the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of whether the person was alive when transported across a State boundary if the person was alive when the transportation began;
- any such act against the person is done within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States;
- any such act against the person is done within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States as defined in Section 46501 of Title 49;
- the person is a foreign official, an internationally protected person, or an official guest as those terms are defined in Section 1116 (b) of this title; or
- the person is among those officers and employees described in Section 1114 of this title and any such act against the person is done while the person is engaged in, or on account of, the performance of official duties.



1-10. US Code (Title 18) links kidnapping to terrorism under the general term of terrorism and also with the term of international terrorism. Chapter 204<sup>12</sup> describes "terrorism" as an activity that --

- involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or

<sup>11</sup> Cornell University Law School, US Code Collection, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 55, Section 1201. *Kidnapping*; available from [http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc\\_sec\\_18\\_00001201----000-.html](http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00001201----000-.html); Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

<sup>12</sup> Cornell University Law School, US Code Collection, Title 18, Part II, Chapter 204, Section 3077. *Terrorism*; available from [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?terms=terrorism&url=/uscode/html/uscode18/usc\\_sec\\_18\\_00003077----000-notes.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/search/display.html?terms=terrorism&url=/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00003077----000-notes.html); Internet; accessed 18 April 2008.

of any State; and

- appears to be intended— (1) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (2) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (3) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or **kidnapping**.

1-11. The term “international terrorism” means activities that satisfy the conditions stated for terrorism [above], and occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.<sup>13</sup> For this handbook, a definition of kidnapping is:

### Kidnapping

Kidnapping is an act that unlawfully seizes, confines, moves, decoys, abducts, or carries away person and detains that person or persons to extort ransom or reward.

1-12. Another simple definition describes kidnapping as the knowing and illegal detention or confinement of a person against that person’s will. The cause of this involuntary detention can be from force, mental or physical coercion, or from other means including false representations.<sup>14</sup> Standard English dictionaries provide a similar description such as, “to seize and hold or carry off (a person) against that person’s will, by force or fraud, often for ransom.”<sup>15</sup>

1-13. However, defining terms is usually not enough perspective to accurately assess information, conditions, and outcomes. Departments of the United States Government such as the Department of Defense and the Department of State collect and evaluate data differently dependent on the

<sup>13</sup> Cornell University Law School, US Code collection, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, Section 2331. *International Terrorism*; available from [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc\\_sec\\_18\\_00002331----000-.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode18/usc_sec_18_00002331----000-.html); Internet; accessed 18 April 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Library of Congress, Military Legal Resources, “Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 134, Predefined Offenses - Kidnapping;” available from [http://usmilitary.about.com/od/punitivearticles/a/134\\_3.htm](http://usmilitary.about.com/od/punitivearticles/a/134_3.htm); and [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military\\_Law/UCMJ\\_LHP.html](http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/UCMJ_LHP.html); Internet; accessed 17 April 2008.

<sup>15</sup> Neufeldt, V. (Ed.). (1991). *Webster’s New World Dictionary* (3d ed.) New York: Simon & Schuster’s, Inc., 742.

charter of the department and the purpose of a particular report. How data is collated from year to year or how criteria are used to determine incidents claimed kidnapping differ. The US National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) annual *Report on Terrorist Incidents* is an example. Data may address only noncombatants.

1-14. The NCTC and the Department of State (DOS) use Title 22 of the US Code as a baseline for defining terrorism. Terrorism is "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents."<sup>16</sup> From a NCTC and DOS perspective, a combatant is a person "in the military, paramilitary, militia, and police under military command and control, who are in specific areas or regions where war zones or war-like settings exist." A policeman or a military member kidnapped outside of a war zone or war-like setting is considered a noncombatant by this NCTC definition.<sup>17</sup>

1-15. If time, purpose, or techniques are considerations of how a crime of kidnapping is determined, other incidents may be grouped together as one incident when multiple actions occur in close proximity in time and space. For example, On February 22, 2006 in Samarra, Iraq, insurgents detonated two improvised explosive devices inside the Shiite "Golden Dome" Mosque. The mosque dome collapsed and damaged the building walls. During the next two days, numerous attacks between Shiite and Sunni occurred numbering over 180 attacks on mosques, killing 12 Sunni imams and seven Sunni civilian worshippers, kidnapping 14 Sunni imams, and causing substantial damage to many mosques. The NCTC designated this as one act of terror.<sup>18</sup> US military missions involved in concurrent combat and stability operations would identify several of these actions as distinct and separate incidents.

1-16. So, defining terms and conditions are critical to understanding the context of particular reports on kidnapping or hostage-taking and is necessary to accurately portray conditions and significance of a particular incident or series of abductions.

<sup>16</sup> National Counterterrorism Center, *Report of Terrorist Incidents -2006* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 30 April 2006), 2.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 5 and 6.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

## HOSTAGE-TAKING

1-17. The term hostage-taking is often used interchangeably with the term kidnapping in public discussion and media. However, a difference exists as presented in the following definition based on Title 18 of the US Code:

**Hostage-Taking**

Hostage-taking is an act that seizes or detains an individual coupled with a threat to kill, injure or continue to detain such individual in order to compel a third person or governmental organization to take some action.

1-18. When considered in the context of terrorism, hostage-taking is usually the seizure or detention of an individual with the threat to kill, injure, or continue to detain the individual in or to compel a third-party or governmental organization to do, or to abstain from doing, an act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual.<sup>19</sup>

1-19. A hostage crisis is usually described through four phases of the initial seizure; a period of captivity; a rescue, release, or recovery of the hostage; and, repatriation.<sup>20</sup> The composite of military, civil, and political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated, or missing personnel from uncertain or hostile environments or otherwise denied areas is called personnel recovery operations.<sup>21</sup> Actions in repatriation may include US military members, DOD civilian employees, DOD



contractor employees who have been Prisoners of War (POW), held hostage by terrorists inside or outside of the continental USA, detained in

<sup>19</sup> Department of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 7 – *Consular Affairs*. See also, [http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia\\_reading\\_room/usam/title9/crm000011.htm](http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm000011.htm)

<sup>20</sup> Department of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 7 – *Consular Affairs*. 1825.2 “Four Stages of a Hostage Crisis.”

<sup>21</sup> Department of Defense, DOD Directive 2310.2, *Personnel Recovery*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 22 December 2000), 2.

peacetime by a hostile foreign government, evading enemy capture, or otherwise missing under hostile conditions.<sup>22</sup> Defining conditions for a particular situation may be open to differing interpretations depending on the intention of individuals involved as captors or victims, or the legal status of an environment between or among nations or groups. A term such as “peacetime” could be defined as “a situation where armed conflict does not exist or where armed conflict does exist, but the United States is not directly involved.”<sup>23</sup> The context of each situation must be analyzed on a case by case basis.

1-20. The US Army Regulation on the Code of Conduct and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) training provides guidance that illustrates different conditions that allow or restrict specific actions on the part of the US captive. Two paragraphs from Army Regulation 350-30 are presented as examples when detained by a hostile government or when detained by terrorists.<sup>24</sup>

\*\*\*\*\*

**\* Guidance for personnel when detained by governments**

Once in the custody of a hostile government, regardless of the circumstances that preceded the detention situation, detainees are subject to the laws of that government. In light of this, detainees will maintain military bearing and should avoid any aggressive, combative, or illegal behavior. The latter could complicate their situation, their legal status, and any efforts to negotiate a rapid release.

a. As American citizens, detainees should be allowed to be placed in contact with U.S. or friendly embassy personnel. Thus, detainees should ask immediately and continually to see U.S. embassy personnel or representatives of an allied or neutral government.

b. Soldiers who become lost or isolated in a hostile foreign country during peacetime will not act as combatants during evasion attempts. Since a state of armed conflict does not exist, there is no protection afforded under the Geneva Conventions. The civil laws of that country apply. Soldiers are therefore encouraged to contact local authorities as soon as possible in these situations. However, delays in contacting local authorities can be caused by—

- (1) Injuries affecting the soldier’s mobility.
- (2) Disorientation.
- (3) Fear of captivity.
- (4) A desire to see if a rescue attempt could be made.

<sup>22</sup> Department of Defense, DOD Directive 2310.4, *Repatriation of Prisoners of War (POW), Hostages, Peacetime Government Detainees and Other Missing or Isolated Personnel*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 21 November 2000), 1.

<sup>23</sup> Headquarters of the Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-30, *Code of Conduct, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Training*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 10 December 1985), 12. Available from [www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar350-30.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar350-30.pdf) ; Internet; accessed 20 November 2008.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

c. Since the detainer's goals may be maximum political exploitation, soldiers who are detained must be extremely cautious in everything they say and do. In addition to asking for a U.S. representative, detainees should provide name, rank and social security number, date of birth, and the innocent circumstances leading to their detention. Further discussions should be limited to and revolve around health and welfare matters, conditions of their fellow detainees, and going home.

d. Historically, detainers have attempted to engage military captives in what may be called a "battle of wits" about seemingly innocent and useless topics as well as provocative issues. To engage any detainer in such useless, if not dangerous, dialogue only enables a captor to spend more time with the detainee. The detainee should consider dealings with his or her captives as a "battle of wills." This would entail the will to restrict discussion to those items that relate to the detainee's treatment and return home against the detainer's will to discuss topics of importance to the detainer.

e. As there is no reason to sign any form or document in peacetime detention, detainees will avoid signing any document or making any statement, oral or otherwise. If a detainee is forced to make a statement or sign documents, he or she must provide as little information as possible and then continue to resist to the utmost of his or her ability. If a detainee writes or signs anything, such action should be measured against how it reflects upon the United States and the individual as a member of the military, or how it could be misused by the detainer to further the detainer's ends.

f. Detainees cannot earn their release by cooperation. Release will be gained by the soldier doing his or her best to resist exploitation, thereby reducing his or her value to a detainer, and, thus, prompting a hostile government to negotiate seriously with the U.S. Government.

g. Soldiers should not refuse to accept release unless doing so requires them to compromise their honor or cause damage to the U.S. Government or its allies. Persons in charge of detained soldiers will authorize release of any personnel under almost all circumstances.

h. Escape attempts will be made only after careful consideration of the risk of violence, chance of success, and detrimental effects on detainees remaining behind. Jailbreak in most countries is a crime; thus, escape attempts --

(1) Would provide the detainer with further justification to prolong detention by charging additional violations of its criminal or civil law.

(2) May result in bodily harm or even death to the detainees.

**\* Guidance for soldiers when in terrorist captivity**

a. Capture by terrorists is generally the least predictable and structured form of peacetime captivity. The captor qualifies as an international criminal. The possible forms of captivity vary from spontaneous hijacking to a carefully planned kidnapping. In such captivities, hostages play a greater role in determining their own fate since the terrorists in many instances expect or receive no rewards for providing good treatment or releasing victims unharmed. If soldiers are uncertain whether captors are actual terrorists or surrogates of government, they should assume that they are terrorists who do not represent their government.

b. If assigned in or traveling through areas of known terrorist activity, soldiers should exercise prudent antiterrorist measures to reduce their vulnerability to capture. During the process of capture and initial internment, they should remain calm and courteous, since most casualties among hostages occur during this phase.

c. Surviving in some terrorist detentions may depend on hostages conveying a personal dignity and apparent sincerity to the captors. Hostages, therefore, may discuss non-substantive topics such as sports, family, and clothing, to convey to the terrorists the captive's personal dignity and human qualities. They will make every effort to avoid embarrassing the United States and the host government. The purpose of this dialogue is for the hostage to become a "person" in the captor's eyes, rather than a mere symbol of his or her ideological hatred. Such a dialogue also

should strengthen the hostage's determination to survive and resist. A hostage also may listen attentively to the terrorist's feelings about his or her cause to support the hostage's desire to be a "person" to the terrorist; however, he or she should never pander to, praise, participate in, or debate the terrorist's cause with him or her.

d. Soldiers held hostage by terrorists should accept release using guidance in paragraph 5-4g above. Soldiers must keep faith with their fellow hostages and conduct themselves according to the guidelines of this regulation. Hostages and kidnap victims who consider escape to be their only hope are authorized to make such attempts. Each situation will be different, and the hostage must weigh carefully every aspect of a decision to attempt to escape.

\*\*\*\*\*

## THE THREAT AND OPPOSING FORCES

1-21. What is the threat and who are opposing forces? One way of describing the "Threat" is any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies.<sup>25</sup> A recent description in US Army regulatory guidance states the "Threat" as the sum of the potential strengths, capabilities, and strategic objectives of any adversary that can limit or negate US mission accomplishment or reduce force, system, or equipment effectiveness. It does not include natural/environmental factors affecting the ability of the system to function or mission accomplishment; mechanical/component failure affecting mission accomplishment; or program issues related to budgeting, restructuring, or cancelation of the programs. Areas of interest, concerns, or anticipated outcomes influence how a term is defined. For the purpose of this handbook, "Threat" is defined as follows:

### Threat

The sum of the potential strengths, capabilities, and of any adversary that can limit or negate US mission accomplishment or reduce force, system, or equipment effectiveness.

US Army Regulation 381-11

1-22. From a training perspective, opposing forces serve a critical function in providing the conditions necessary to train and evaluate readiness of a US force when confronted with a particular mission set. As part of an operational environment, an opposing force presents a training adversary which stresses a US force in accomplishing its mission to US Army

<sup>25</sup> Headquarters of the Department of the Army, Army Regulation 350-2, *Opposing Force (OPFOR) Program*, 9 April 2004.

standards. An Opposing Forces (OPFOR) is an adaptable resource for the commander to portray primary and contingency threats prior to the identification of a specific adversary or enemy. For this handbook, “opposing force” is defined as stated in Army Regulation 350-2.

### Opposing Force

A plausible and flexible military and/or paramilitary composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces used in lieu of a specific threat force for training or developing US forces.

US Army Regulation 350-2

### Threat Analysis

(DOD) In antiterrorism, a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning potential terrorist activities by terrorist groups which could target a facility. A threat analysis will review the factors of a terrorist group's existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting, as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying probability of terrorist attack and results in a threat assessment. See also antiterrorism.

Joint Pub 1-02

1-23. With a clear definition of “what” the Threat is and how strengths and weaknesses of an adversary can be structured to confront a US force, a complementary understanding must exist on “how” such threats relate to terrorism, kidnapping, and hostage-taking. This handbook focuses an awareness training and uses the Department of Defense threat analysis definition from Joint Publication 1-02.



Fig. 1-2. Opposing Force (OPFOR) Role Players in Army Training

1-24. To know the enemy, threat analysis considers the announced purpose of the group or cell, demonstrated capabilities, stated intentions, adaptations through the group or cell's history, and what targets are attacked or most likely to be targeted. Other targets can be used as a supporting effort or as a diversion from primary targets. Three Department of Defense definitions describe these defensive and offensive measures against terror:

#### **Combating Terrorism**

(DOD) Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CbT. See also antiterrorism; counterterrorism.

Joint Pub 1-02

#### **Antiterrorism**

(DOD) Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. See also counterterrorism; proactive measures; terrorism.

Joint Pub 1-02

#### **Counterterrorism**

(DOD) Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. See also antiterrorism; combating terrorism; terrorism.

Joint Pub 1-02

1-25. For example, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb openly targets foreign nationals in its regional area of operations. Kidnapping and hostage-taking contractors, tourists, and other foreign nationals can have a significant impact on foreign investment in a region. These can be a lucrative means of self-financing terrorism with the ransoms that are often paid to captors for the release of victims. Ransoms reported in millions of Euros or US dollars is a recurring event.<sup>26</sup> Concurrently, announcements by cell leaders may proclaim loftier ideological goals and aims such as acts pleasing to their sense of theological righteousness, to a belief that collective actions similar to other al-Qaeda affiliates will yield recognition

<sup>26</sup> Olivier Guitta, "AQIM's new kidnapping strategy," available from [http://www.metimes.com/international/2008/03/24aqims\\_new\\_kidnapping\\_stratgey/5871/](http://www.metimes.com/international/2008/03/24aqims_new_kidnapping_stratgey/5871/); Internet; accessed 4 august 2008.


of their cause in the Maghreb, and to the negative psychological and physical effects that kidnapping creates on "...our enemies...and apostates and crusaders." <sup>27</sup> Combating terrorism is a combination of antiterrorism and counter-terrorism actions.

## SECTION II. DESCRIBE THE CONTEXT

1-26. Historical perspective provides one of several entry points to appreciating context to the contemporary issue of kidnapping, hostage-taking, and terrorism. How did the United States experience terrorism 10 years ago or 20 years ago? Assessing trends and patterns over modern decades will usually start from the "advent of modern terrorism in 1968."<sup>28</sup>

1-27. By the mid-1970s, the power of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and extremist Shiites in Lebanon stressed whatever tenuous political power sharing existed. Competing militias staked claims to geographic areas and political influence and the country regressed into civil war. Both Syria and Iran supported various groups as part of regional power plans. Shiite extremists resorted to terrorism to attempt the removal of Western influence in Lebanon. Some incidents indicated that terrorism might be a successful tactic or operational campaign. The seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran (1979-1981) and the 1983 bombings in Lebanon appeared to create a sense of US concession and withdrawal and a US inability to respond. Kidnapping or hostage-taking of US victims during this period sometimes ended in release (Dodge) and at other times resulted in murder (Buckley) of US citizens.<sup>29</sup>

1-28. A common definition of kidnapping is "the act of illegally holding one or more persons captive in a secret or otherwise hidden or unknown location." This abduction has many characteristics, however, the focus of most of this handbook is kidnapping in a hostage-taking sense of holding prisoners of war or captives in order to cause or prevent some action<sup>30</sup> by a governmental organization.



<sup>27</sup> "An Interview with Abdelmalek Droukal," July 1, 2008, available from [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukal.html?tnemail1=y&\\_r=1&\\_r=1&\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukal.html?tnemail1=y&_r=1&_r=1&_r=1); Internet; accessed 3 July 2008.

<sup>28</sup> Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989* (Washington, D.C., GPO, April 1990), iii.

<sup>29</sup> Norman Antokol and Mayer Nudell, *No One A Neutral: Political Hostage-Taking in the Modern World*, (Medina, OH: Alpha Publications of Ohio, 1990), 17-23.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 22-23.

1-29. Three main categories of kidnapper are professional criminals, mentally disturbed people, and terrorists. Here definition of categories can easily blur as groups crossover in plans and actions such as professional criminals working in conjunction with a terrorist group for monetary gain.<sup>31</sup> Kidnapping is a criminal act. Yet, a professional dialog can identify the purpose and intention between kidnapping or hostage-taking as a means to obtain ransom or revenge, create social instability, gain media coverage, or spotlight an ideological agenda for recognition. Definition can be dependent on the details of a situation.

1-30. Terrorism of recent decades expanded the potential of being kidnapped as former norms usually associated with a ruling party or family became more random in selection of victims with anxiety and intimidation being aims.<sup>32</sup> Kidnapping during the rural-base guerrilla actions of Castro's early era in Cuba during the 1950s sought publicity more than significant concessions. Mass hostage taking seemed to capture the attention of the media more than the kidnapping of individuals.<sup>33</sup>

1-31. As urban guerrilla actions increased in popularity in the 1960s and 1970s, advantages also increased in kidnapping versus the more military type engagements of ambushes and other attacks. In addition to an improved ability to kidnap and blend into urban surroundings, acts like kidnapping could undermine and demoralize the government in power, could incite governmental countermeasures that might alienate large segments the population, and probably most important, would publicize a terrorist agenda in mass media coverage.

1-32. Terrorists such as Abane Ramdane in Algeria or Carlos Marigella in Brazil promoted the value of violent notoriety in an urban setting, combined with the shock effect of near real-time media coverage. While promoting publicity for a cause, kidnapping offered opportunities to negotiate release of previously captured terrorists or to obtain large ransoms that would fund ongoing and future terrorist and paramilitary operations.<sup>34</sup>



Fig. 1-3. Marigella

## LATIN AMERICA AND KIDNAPPING

1-33. A series of kidnappings in Latin and South America during the late 1960s and into the 1970s experienced mixed results. Incidents such as the kidnapping of the US Ambassador to Brazil or a US labor attaché to Guatemala

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 40.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 39.

were indicative of diplomatic targets. However, individuals as targets expanded to other people in roles and functions of business and commerce, as well as the military.<sup>35</sup>

1-34. For example, in 1970 in the Dominican Republic, six terrorists dressed in army uniforms kidnapped Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Crowley, a US Air Attaché in the Dominican Republic. One recent claim purporting to be one of the kidnappers stated that Crowley was not hurt during his captivity, but that the terrorists had every intention of doing so if the Dominican Republic officials and influence of the US did not meet demands for release of “political prisoners” in exchange for the US Air Force officer.<sup>36</sup> Narratives of the period called this a kidnapping.

1-35. An extremist group seeking to prevent the incumbent President of the Dominican Republic from serving another term, had witnessed the successes in recent kidnapping in the region. The kidnapping was intended to be a major humiliation for the President as well as gain release of fellow group members in custody. Negotiations were not achieving expectations until a compromise was agreed upon with the assistance of the auxiliary Archbishop of Santo Domingo. As 20 individuals were placed on a plane with the auxiliary Archbishop, Lieutenant Colonel Crowley was released unharmed by the terrorists. The plane departed for a prearranged site in Mexico.<sup>37</sup>

1-36. During the same period, terrorism incidents in South America displayed similar techniques in separate kidnappings. A US diplomat (Jones) was kidnapped but was able to jump from the terrorist vehicle and escape injured but alive. A US citizen, working as a public safety advisor (Mitrione), was kidnapped and subsequently murdered. Mitrione was found in a car with his wrists bound and shot in the back of the neck. In the same general time period, a Brazilian Consul was ransomed for \$250,000.

1-37. Other mounting bad publicity for the terrorists during the kidnapping of British Ambassador Jackson caused the Uruguayan government to declare harsh counterterrorism measures that weakened and eventually destroyed any effective terrorist *Tupamaro* resistance. This type of reaction also hampered what had been a promising democratic government in

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 40-41.

<sup>36</sup> Beras, Erasma. “One Man's Role in a Revolution,” *Latina Experience* dated March, 2006; available from <http://www.para-mi.net/Features/LatinaExperience/OneManRoleinaRevolution.htm>; Internet; accessed 29 April 2008.

<sup>37</sup> Antokol, Norman and Nudell, Mayer, *No One A Neutral: Political Hostage-Taking in the Modern World*, (Medina, OH: Alpha Publications of Ohio, 1990), 44.


Uruguay and encouraged a repressive and autocratic government for several years.<sup>38</sup>

1-38. Kidnapping or hostage-taking – terminology may seem interchangeable, but the two definitions of kidnapping and hostage-taking in US Code state a significant difference in hostage-taking as the abduction compels “...a third person or governmental organization to take some action.”

## KIDNAPPING ADAPTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST

1-39. Meanwhile in the Middle East, cultural, religious, and political turmoil was creating new levels of frustration and an intent for revenge as Israel defeated regional nations in the 1967 war. Displaced populations, people seeking a homeland, and historical vendettas signaled a long period of violence and brutality rather than limited compromise and coexistence.

1-40. George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, promoted an concept of international terrorism where targeting



could be indiscriminate, that is, anyone or anything might be selected as a target to enhance a particular organizational objective, and terrorist groups should work together to exploit a struggle on a global frontage rather than limited to locale or regional domain. An additional principle was the requirement for creating and maintaining international

attention and impact. Terrorist incidents must be spectacular, attract mass media coverage, and expect to gain awareness of the Palestinian grievances and issues.<sup>39</sup>

1-41. Kidnapping in the form of skyjacking occurred more frequently as terrorist groups sought to maintain and tension of the sensational and terror of mayhem and murder. Terrorist leaders recognized the value of variety in their attacks and the particular tension involving kidnapped hostages and possibility of individual or mass murder. Crimes such as the murders at Lod Airport in 1972 or the hostage-taking and murders in Munich, Germany during the 1972



<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 46-48.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 55-58, 60.

Olympics were indicative of the intended psychological impact of terror.

1-42. The Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine (Fatah) was founded in the early 1960s by Yasser Arafat and associates. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in an effort to represent the large number of Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon. Subgroups eventually splintered from the main body of the PLO with differing objectives of how to best achieve Palestinian liberation. Some of these groups included the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command, and *al-Fatah*.<sup>40</sup> In 1973, members of *al-Fatah*'s Black September terrorist group kidnapped the US Ambassador (Noel) to the Sudan, his deputy chief of mission, and the Belgian *Chargé d' Affaires* and a number of other diplomats at a reception at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. When demands for release of Palestinian guerrillas and an assassin were refused, the terrorists murdered these three diplomats. After the terrorists surrendered to Sudanese authorities, they were granted safe passage out of the country.<sup>41</sup>



Fig. 1-4. (Left) **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)**  
 (Center) **Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)**  
 (Right) **Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-  
 General Command (PFLP-GC)**

## KIDNAPPING TERROR TWO DECADES AGO

1-43. About 20 years ago, terrorist acts decreased significantly from the previous several years. In US Department of State reporting international terrorist incidents in 1989, 5.1 percent of cataloged events were kidnappings. After accounting for bombings (43.9%) and arson (27.5%),

<sup>40</sup> "Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)," available from <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/source/Terrorism/plo.html>; Internet; accessed 29 April 2008.

<sup>41</sup> Antokol, Norman and Nudell, Mayer, *No One A Neutral: Political Hostage-Taking in the Modern World*, (Medina, OH: Alpha Publications of Ohio, 1990), 52.

only armed attacks surpassed kidnapping as a tactic. Of the kidnappings, approximately 44 percent occurred in Latin America and about 19 percent happened in the Middle East.<sup>42</sup>




Fig. 1-5. Kidnapping Terror Two Decades Ago

1-44. By 1989, citizens of the United States were a major portion of Western kidnapping victims in the Middle East. Eight US citizens were among at least 25 separate incidents of kidnapping by terrorist groups that spanned kidnappings from 1985 to 1989. US victims included easy targets such as educators, a businessman, a news agency bureau chief, and one US Marine Corps officer.

Table 1-1. US Victims Kidnapped and Believed Held in Lebanon in 1989			
Name - Profession	Kidnap Date/Loc	Kidnap Claim By:	Status 1989
Terry Anderson AP Bureau Chief	16 MAR 85 West Beirut	Islamic Jihad	Still Held
Thomas Sutherland Educator	9 JUN 85 Khaldah	Islamic Jihad	Still Held
Frank Reed School Director	9 SEP 86 West Beirut	Ba'th Cells Organization and Arab Revolutionary Cells	Still Held
Joseph Cicippio Comptroller	12 SEP 86 West Beirut	Revolutionary Justice Organization	Still Held
Edward Tracey Writer	21 OCT 86 West Beirut	Revolutionary Justice Organization	Still Held
Robert Polhill Educator	24 JAN 87 West Beirut	Oppressed of the Earth & Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine	Still Held
Alann Steen Educator	24 JAN 87 West Beirut	Oppressed of the Earth & Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine	Still Held
Jesse Turner Educator	24 JAN 87 West Beirut	Oppressed of the Earth & Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine	Still Held
William Higgins Lt Col USMC	17 FEB 88 Near Tyre	Oppressed of the Earth & Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine	(?) Dead
NOTE: Over 25 foreign nationals were believed to be held in Lebanon by terrorist groups by the ends of 1989. This table lists those US citizen victims. Source: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, <i>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989</i> (Washington, D.C., April 1999), 12-13.			

<sup>42</sup> Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989* (Washington, D.C., April 1990), 5.

1-45. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Higgins, USMC, had been seized in February 1988 by a terrorist group calling itself the Islamic Revolutionary Brigades and Organization of the Oppressed on Earth. Higgins was a member of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization observer unit for Lebanon and was accused of spying by his captors. In July 1989, Israeli forces abducted a prominent Hizballah leader in South Lebanon as part of a counterterrorism campaign. Soon afterwards, pro-Iranian Hizballah terrorists released a videotape of the hanging of Higgins and claimed the murder was in retaliation for the abduction of the Hizballah leader. Although Higgins had probably been killed some time prior to this announcement, the terrorist group was able to declare the murder as part of a propaganda campaign and gain media attention for its agenda along with threats to execute other kidnapped US citizens.<sup>43</sup>

1-46. Other areas of the world in 1989 posed noticeable dangers for US citizens too. Communist groups caused several US deaths and conducted several attacks on US facilities in the Philippines. The Communist Peoples Party and its New People's Army (NPA) tracked a broader range of US citizens probably due to additional protective measures for high profile US officials. US Army Colonel James Rowe was assassinated on a daily route to a Manila office. Two US Department of Defense contractors were killed in their vehicle near Clark Air Force Base. Other terrorist groups such as the Muslim secessionist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) or the Reform the Armed Forces movement (RAM) threatened violence and in some cases targeted the cooperation of the Philippine government and US forces.<sup>44</sup>



Fig. 1-6. (Left) **Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army)**  
 (Center) **Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) (FARC)**  
 (Right) **M19 (19 April Movement)**

<sup>43</sup> Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989* (Washington, D.C., April 1990), 9, 11, 13, 14.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 38-39.

1-47. South America experienced significant terrorist activity in 1989 with the highest density of terrorist acts in Columbia. Narco-terrorism by narcotics traffickers, three leftist guerrilla groups (ELN, FARC, M-19), and right-wing paramilitary groups undermined the rule of law. The Department of State labeled this period for Columbia as “a country under attack.” Columbian judges, police, and other government officials were attacked regularly, and a leading presidential candidate was assassinated. Columbia extradited narco-traffickers to the United States and confiscated narco-assets and properties. Domestic terrorism expanded to target foreign persons and property. As narco-terrorists increased their attacks with bombing as a recurring threat – over 200 bombings in one three-month period – assassinations and kidnappings continued. One kidnapping victim was the son of one of the Columbian president’s closet advisors. Other kidnappings often involved foreign engineers working in the oil industry.<sup>45</sup>

1-48. If number of terrorist incidents recorded by the US State Department indicates the most dangerous areas of the world in 1989, the West Bank in the Middle East was the most dangerous, followed by Columbia.<sup>46</sup> In its worldwide assessment of terrorism and those political elements contributing to terrorism, the United States declared six countries as state sponsors of terrorism in 1989: Iran, Syria, Libya, South Yemen, Cuba, and North Korea. What changes in patterns and trends of global terrorism would occur ten years later in the last decade of the twentieth century? What regions would remain on the US state sponsors of terror list?

Table 1-2.

US Department of State: State Sponsors of Terrorism								
Year	State Sponsors of Terror							
1989	Iran	Syria	Libya	South Yemen			Cuba	North Korea
1998	Iran	Syria	Libya		Iraq	Sudan	Cuba	North Korea
2008	Iran	Syria				Sudan	Cuba	North Korea !

Source: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989* (Washington, D.C., April 1990); *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998* (Washington, D.C., April 1999); and, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007*, (Washington, D.C., April 2008).  
 NOTE !: OCT 2008, the US removed North Korea (DPRK) from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. See also, [www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jun/106281.htm](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jun/106281.htm)

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 17, 19.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., viii, APP C.

## KIDNAPPING TERROR ONE DECADE AGO

1-49. The year 1998 signaled some spectacular terrorism incidents but US State Department data suggested a downward trend in acts of international terrorism spanning several years. However, the 1998 bombings of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were sensational in the deaths of over 700 people and the other casualties of almost 6000 people.<sup>47</sup> The twelve US citizens killed in terrorist attacks in 1998 were at the Nairobi bombing. Most of these deaths and injuries occurred in Nairobi, Kenya due to the dense population, urban area, and collateral damage caused by the explosion that collapsed structures at and near the embassy. Bombing in urban areas to cause mass casualties and catastrophic damage was not a new tactic. In 1996, the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia by an extraordinary vehicle improvised explosive device (VBIED) killed 19 US military members killed and wounded scores of other lodging occupants.




Fig. 1-7. Kidnapping Terror One Decade Ago

1-51. Of 273 international terrorism attacks noted by the US state Department, 44 were kidnappings. In assessing 111 attacks against US property and interests, four were kidnappings.<sup>48</sup> Although kidnapping statistics might appear insignificant in comparison to other macro-issues of terrorism attacks, a sampling of kidnapping used in different regions of the world can be informative. Columbia was as a terrorism hotspot in 1998. As the Columbian government attempted to improve conditions for peace negotiations with insurgent groups, kidnapping by insurgent forces remained a threat as kidnap-for-ransom operations.

1-52. FARC commanders announced that they would target US military members assisting Columbian security forces but no specific acts were conducted against US military forces in Columbia. Bombing oil pipelines captured much of the media attention while during the year seven US citizens were kidnapped. The FARC kidnapped four birdwatchers at a FARC roadblock. One US citizen escaped and the other three people were released several

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., iii, 1.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 5, 96.

weeks later. In a separate incident, a retired US oil worker was kidnapped and released about five months later. The ELN released a US citizen who had been seized in early 1997. The ELN seized two other US citizens in northern Ecuador. One victim escaped and the other victim was released about one month later. As the year came to a close, the FARC had not accounted for three US missionaries who had been kidnapped in 1993.<sup>49</sup>

<b>Table 1-3. Sampling of 1998 International Terrorism-Hostage-Kidnapping</b>	
<b>Country</b>	<b>Incident</b>
Nigeria	Mob of angry youth seize eight Shell Oil workers in Bayelsa and demand jobs and economic development projects. Negotiations result in release of hostages.
Columbia	FARC rebels kidnap US citizen in Sabaneta. Victim released six months later.
Somalia	Somali clansmen seize nine foreign nationals when their airplane lands at Mogadishu. International pressure results in hostage release without paying \$100K ransom demand.
Georgia	Group of nationalists-mercenaries kidnap four UN observers from a compound in Zugdidi as bargaining chip to allow escape from Georgian authorities and release of criminal colleagues. Victims escaped or were released.
Russia	Groups of nationalists-mercenaries conduct numerous kidnappings usually for ransom or political concessions. Victims are often sold-resold among Chechen groups.
Chad	National Front for the Renewal of Chad (FNTR) seize six French and two Italian nationals demanding withdrawal of French forces and halt of oil exploration, Chad forces gained release of victims.
Ecuador	Unidentified kidnapers seize two US citizens and one Ecuadorian working for the Santa Fe Oil Company. One US citizen escaped the following day.
Columbia	FARC conduct raid at roadblock near Bogota killing three, wounding 14, and seizing 27 people. Rebels release victims during next 30 days of negotiations.
Ethiopia	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)(?) seize Austrian national traveling to Denan. Victim released about one month later.
Russia	Unidentified kidnapers in Grozny, Chechnya seize three Britons and one new Zealander. Partial remains of victims discovered two months later.
Sudan	Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) seize a British contractor and demand \$58K and 125 drums of diesel fuel. Victims released three weeks after abduction.
Yemen	Unidentified kidnapers, possibly Islamic Jihad, seize a group of tourists between Habban and Aden. Victims include two US citizens, twelve Britons, and two Australians. Yemeni rescue attempt fails with three Britons and one Australian killed, and one US citizen seriously wounded.
<i>Source: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998 (Washington, D.C., April 1999), APP A.</i>	

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 21-22.

1-53. In the Philippines, insurgent groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the New Peoples Army (NPA), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) continued attacks against the Philippine government. Terrorists suspected to be MILF and ASG conducted a series of kidnapping of foreign nationals.<sup>50</sup>

1-54. Greece was a European terrorism hotspot in 1998 with over 100 reported terrorism incidents. Most of these crimes were fire-bombings against Greek businesses and government facilities. Several attacks were launched against US or US-related businesses. No kidnappings of US citizens or military members were reported.<sup>51</sup>

1-55. Yemen experienced a number of bombings and kidnappings in 1998. More than 60 foreign nationals were kidnapped that was more than three times the number from the previous year. The Islamic Army of Aden claimed responsibility for one of these incidents that seized 16 Western tourists. Two victims were US citizens. When Yemeni forces attempted a rescue operation, four tourists were killed and two other tourists (one of them a US citizen) were wounded.<sup>52</sup>

1-56. Notoriety increased for Afghanistan as a training center and base of operations more many diverse Islamic extremist groups. The Taliban openly provided facilities and logistical support to various terrorist groups, and continued to host Osama bin Laden.<sup>53</sup> Political and special interest groups caused much domestic violence and security problems in India and Pakistan. Insurgencies in the Kashmir and northeast regions demonstrated attacks against civilians by militant groups and terrorists. Both India and Pakistan blamed the other country for supporting elements of the civil strife and terror.<sup>54</sup>



1-57. Comparing US State Department statistics of terrorist incidents in 1989 with dangerous areas a decade earlier, areas of significant terrorism

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 8, 11.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 10-11.

danger and concern to the world in 1998 included Columbia, Greece, Yemen, India, and Afghanistan. By number of incidents, Columbia recorded over 100 acts of terrorism.<sup>55</sup> The US State Department's 1999 announcement of seven state sponsors of terror listed: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Sudan. Iran continued planning and support of terrorist acts. A recurring issue is the providing safe haven for known terrorist or terrorist groups, as well as areas to train and prepare for terrorist operations.<sup>56</sup>

1-58. While international terrorism gained much attention throughout the world in 1998 and 1999, the United States also focused on domestic terrorism within the United States. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) *Report on Terrorism 1999* identifies several significant concerns and threats. Themes indicated that number of incidents may be decreasing but greater destruction and casualties in incidents appeared to be increasing. This included the interest in weapons of mass destruction. Concern was increasing on unaffiliated or loosely affiliated extremists, both domestic and international. Notoriety from right-wing groups such as the World Church of the Creator, left-wing groups such as the *Ejercito Popular Boricua-Macheteros*, and special interest groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) or Earth Liberation Front (ELF) was indicative of US domestic terrorism.<sup>57</sup> Still, kidnapping did not have the public attention that would occur soon after the turn of the century and the horrific terrorist events of September 11, 2001.

1-59. By early 2002, mass media attention of kidnapping reached a new surge with abduction of an American *Wall Street Journal* correspondent, Daniel Pearl, while he was investigating Muslim extremist groups in Pakistan. Within a month of his captivity, the kidnappers murdered Pearl and recorded his grisly death on videotape.<sup>58</sup> Mainstream media were reluctant to show the video, but the ease of Internet outlets soon allowed the terrorists to exploit this murder.



Fig. 1-8. Pearl

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., APP E.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 30-31.

<sup>57</sup> Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Threat assessment and warning Unit, Counterterrorism Division, *Terrorism in the United States 1999*, (Washington, D.C.: DOJ, 1999), 16-20.

<sup>58</sup> Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Political Violence Against Americans 2002*, (Washington, D.C.: Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, 2003), 22.

1-60. In the Philippines, a US missionary and his wife Martin and Gracia Burnham, were seized on Palawan by Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists in 2001 and taken to Basilan Island. The Muslim separatist group (ASG) declared that the Burnhams would be beheaded if its demands were not met. However, the Burnhams were captives for over a year in a jungle environment. Some other hostages seized at the same time were released; a third US citizen was murdered by the ASG. During a rescue attempt by Philippine military forces, Martin was killed by gunfire. Gracia was wounded by gunfire but recovered after convalescence in the United States.<sup>59</sup>



Fig. 1-9. **Burnhams in Captivity**

1-61. In Russia, separatist terrorist groups recognized the magnet-like attraction that mass kidnapping and hostage crises cause and ensure international media coverage. In late 2002, about 50 heavily armed Chechen terrorists seized a theater and over 800 patrons in southeast Moscow, Russia. Demanding concessions in the ongoing insurgency in the Chechen Republic, they used the media to publicize their demands and threats. A three-day period of negotiations ended when Russian Special Forces stormed the theater after attempting to anesthetize the terrorists and patrons with fentanyl gas through the ventilation system. The Russian attack killed all of the Chechen rebels, but excessive fentanyl killed many of the 120 hostages that died in the assault and rescue attempt. One American was among the dead patrons.<sup>60</sup>



Fig. 1-10. **Moscow Hostage Crisis**

1-62. By 2004, kidnapping acquired a new level of public revulsion with the videotaped beheading of US citizen Nicholas Berg in Iraq. One journalist reported his personal reflections on assignment in Iraq noting, “I have that image [Berg] in my head right now. I know exactly what it looked like. It was an image that branded itself on our minds and left a scar. It was terrifying...”<sup>61</sup> Yet, this form of seizure and grisly murder was not a new

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>61</sup> Richard Engel, “Nicholas Berg kidnapping, death,” available from

phenomenon. Chechen terrorists used videotapes of beheading captured Russian soldiers during the years of insurgency in Chechnya as a means of inciting anxiety and fear. The kidnapers of US journalist Daniel Pearl made a similar video of Pearl's beheading in Pakistan in 2002.

1-63. In Iraq, kidnapping was a normal occurrence with ransom the expected result prior to release of the victim. al-Zarqawi recognized an opportunity to exploit individual murders videotaped and released to mass media outlets. He attempted to cause a far-reaching emotional stigma on a global audience.<sup>62</sup> Reaction by viewers around the world was significantly negative to the series of kidnappings and murders that followed this incident. As terrorists or criminal gangs sought notoriety and apparent prestige for their acts of murder, some terrorists openly criticized such techniques as turning potential support away from the insurgency and the goals of Islamic extremist ideology in Iraq and the region.



Fig. 1-11. al-Zarqawi

1-64. Using US Department of State data for US civilian kidnappings in 2005, Iraq remained a primary US region of concern. Of the eleven recorded civilian kidnappings, ten kidnappings occurred in Iraq. The one other kidnapping occurred in Gaza.<sup>63</sup>

## CONTEMPORARY KIDNAPPING AND HOSTAGE-TAKING TERROR

1-65. Analysis of terror incidents during 2007 noted that most terrorist attacks were conventional attacks such as bombings and armed assaults. Also similar to previous US State Department reporting criteria for recent years, of the approximately 67,000 people killed or injured by terrorist attacks in 2007, over 50 percent of the victims were Muslims and most of these attacks occurred in Iraq. Other reports suggest that

<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17725245/page/3/>; Internet; accessed 13 May 2008.

<sup>62</sup> Justin Huggler, "Inside Story Iraq: Kidnap in Iraq is now big business," *Independent*; available from [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qn4159/is\\_20041024/ai\\_n12762703](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4159/is_20041024/ai_n12762703); Internet; accessed 13 May 2008.

<sup>63</sup> Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005*, 28 April 2006, "Terrorism Kidnappings of Private US Citizens in 2005 (by country)," available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/65970.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 May 2008.

victims categorized as civilians could be as high as 70 percent of the 67,000 casualties.<sup>64</sup>




Fig. 1-12. Kidnapping Terror in the COE

1-66. Kidnapping and hostage-taking increased in certain areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and was also a significant form of attack in countries such as Nepal and the Philippines. A table extracted from the *2007 Country Reports on Terrorism* illustrates major worldwide issues of kidnapping incidents from 2005 to 2007 related to the larger condition of terrorism worldwide, as recorded by the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) methodology.

Incidents of Terrorism Worldwide*	2005	2006	2007
Terror attacks worldwide	11,156	14,570	14,499
Attacks resulting in at least one death, injury, or kidnapping	8,032	11,322	11,125
Attacks resulting in at least one death	5,137	7,434	7,258
Attacks resulting in the death of zero people	6,019	7,136	7,241
Attacks resulting in the death of only one person	2,882	4,142	3,993
Attacks resulting in the death of at least 10 people	227	295	355
Attacks resulting in the injury of at least one person	3,839	5,798	6,259
<b>Attacks resulting in the kidnapping of at least one person</b>	<b>1,154</b>	<b>1,349</b>	<b>1,158</b>
People killed, injured or kidnapped as a result of terror attacks	74,309	75,211	72,066
People worldwide killed as a result of terror attacks	14,616	20,872	22,685
People worldwide injured as a result of terror attacks	24,853	38,455	44,310
<b>People worldwide kidnapped as a result of terror attacks</b>	<b>34,840</b>	<b>15,884</b>	<b>5,071</b>

\* In all cases limited to attacks targeting **noncombatants**. 2005 & 2006 numbers were updated since last year's publication on the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System at [www.nctc.gov](http://www.nctc.gov).

1-67. Companion tables compare the number of attacks resulting in at least one death, injury, or kidnapping against noncombatants in Iraq and Afghanistan during 2005 to 2007 in the larger condition of regional

<sup>64</sup> Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007*, Annex of Statistical Information, 30 April 2008; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/2007/103711.htm>; Internet; accessed 2 May 2008, 11.

terrorism, as recorded by the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) methodology.<sup>65</sup>

Incidents of Terrorism in Iraq *	2005	2006	2007
Terror attacks in Iraq	3,469	6,628	6,212
Attacks resulting in at least one death, injury, or kidnapping	2,837	6,026	5,574
People killed, injured, or kidnapped as a result of terrorism	20,731	38,863	44,008

Incidents of Terrorism in Afghanistan *	2005	2006	2007
Terror attacks in Afghanistan	491	969	1,127
Attacks resulting in at least one death, injury, or kidnapping	366	695	892
People killed, injured, or kidnapped as a result of terrorism	1,540	3,557	4,673

\* In all cases limited to attacks targeting **noncombatants**. 2005 & 2006 numbers were updated since last year's publication on the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System at [www.nctc.gov](http://www.nctc.gov).

1-68. Civilians remain an easy target. Journalists kidnapping or hostage-taking increased in 2007 from a reported 47 in 2006 to 79 in 2007. Although kidnappings at the time were most recurring in Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan use of kidnapping increased significantly from 2006 to 2007. An increase of kidnapping and hostage-taking in Afghanistan has continued in 2008. In early 2008, kidnapping government officials, key leaders, or members of international organizations gained significant media attention and bargaining power for terrorists. Incidents included kidnappings such as a Pakistan Ambassador to Afghanistan Tariq Azizuddin while transiting the Kyber Pass area. When abducted with his bodyguard and driver, his captors travelled for ten hours to a temporary location but Azizuddin was moved three times during his over 90 days of captivity. He was released after



Fig. 1-12. Captives



Fig. 1-13. Azuzuddin

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. Annex of Statistical information.

negotiations that were officially noted as “Recovery of Tariq Azizuddin was not due to any deal or exchange of terrorists.”<sup>66</sup>

1-69. The mass hostage-taking of 23 South Korean missionaries, prolonged deadlines, and the murder of two of the missionaries gained extensive news coverage for several weeks. A settlement between South Korean negotiators and the Taliban resulted in the release of the remaining 21 missionaries.<sup>67</sup> During the same period in mid 2008, terrorists raided a police station and kidnapped 11 policemen and 19 Frontier Corps members.<sup>68</sup>

1-70. Kidnapping or hostage-taking of foreign nationals almost guarantees media attention wherever the crime is committed. al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) kidnapped two Austrian citizens in early 2008. AQIM openly stated an aim to kidnap foreign nationals. Negotiating shifted from a demand for release of prisoners in Algeria and Tunisia to demands for a large ransom. Some reports claimed the kidnapping as retaliation for Western cooperation with Israel. Kidnapped in February 2008, by April demands had changed again. The terrorists also wanted release of two convicted al-Qaeda supporters and the withdrawal of Austrian peacekeeping forces from Afghanistan.<sup>69</sup> Demands and negotiations would continue for eight months until their release in November 2008.

1-71. In usually selecting easy targets to kidnap or take hostage, terrorists plan on exploiting the media as an additional pressure on negotiators to agree to terrorist demands in exchange for release of the kidnapped victims. Sometimes, the anxiety of unknown conditions of kidnap victims is a deliberate tactic as extended time can increase the notoriety of a particular terrorist group and its agenda. After long periods of no information, terrorist techniques may include sending severed body parts of kidnapped victims to an adversary. This grim technique was demonstrated in March 2008 when severed fingers of several civilian contractors were sent to US military forces in Iraq. The contractors had been kidnapped in

<sup>66</sup> “Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan Tariq Azizuddin returns Home,” available from <http://www.pakistantimes.net/2008/05/18/top4.htm>; Internet; accessed 5 August 2008.

<sup>67</sup> Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007*, 30 April 2008; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/2007/103711.htm>; Internet; accessed 2 May 2008, 11 and 19.

<sup>68</sup> “Taliban Kidnap 30, Kill3,” available from [news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080729/wl\\_sthasia\\_afp/pakistanuntrestnorthwest](http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20080729/wl_sthasia_afp/pakistanuntrestnorthwest); Internet; accessed 1 August 2008.

<sup>69</sup> “Kidnappers of Austrian Tourists Make new Demands,” available from <http://www.noburqua.blogspot.com/2008/04/kidnappers-of-austrian-tourists-make.html>; Internet. accessed 13 May 2008.

separate incidents during the previous one to two years. Soon after these announcements, human remains were identified in Iraq and confirmed as some of the missing contractors.<sup>70</sup>

1-72. Private US citizens reported as kidnapped in 2007 numbered 17 individuals per the National Counterterrorism Center’s *Country Report on Terrorism 2007*.<sup>71</sup> The table displays that areas other than Iraq and Afghanistan, such as Nigeria, are susceptible to kidnapping. Over 150 foreigners were kidnapped in the Niger Delta during 2007, either from off-shore or land-based oil facilities, housing compounds, or public roadways.<sup>72</sup>

**Table 1-4.**  
**Terrorism Kidnappings of Private US Citizens in 2007**

Country	Date	Number	Location
Afghanistan	SEP 22	1	Kabul
	< NOV 7	1	Kabul
Chad	OCT 1	1	Bardai
Iraq	JAN 5	1	Al-Haritha
	JAN 27	2	Sulaymaniyah
	FEB 1	1	Baghdad
	MAR 3	1	Baghdad
	APR 25 est	1	Kuwait-Iraq Border
	MAY 25	1	Kuwait-Iraq Border
	AUG 17	1	Al Amarah
Nigeria	JAN 7	1	Okan Oil Field, Delta State
	MAY 1	1	Okan Oil Field, Delta State
	MAY 9	4	Okan Oil Field, Delta State

Source: *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007*, April 30, 2008, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) Annex of Statistical Information  
NOTE: “Private US citizen” is defined as any US citizen not acting in an official capacity on behalf of the US Government.

1-73. Terrorists direct the anxiety of a missing person toward families of US military members also. In March 2008, the remains of Staff Sergeant

<sup>70</sup> Schulyer Dixon, “Remains of 2 US Contractors Recovered,” 24 March 2008; available from [http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5j\\_aTk3Yt9\\_JoVLKwPUTjr](http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5j_aTk3Yt9_JoVLKwPUTjr); Internet; accessed 14 May 2008.

<sup>71</sup> Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007*, “National Counterterrorism Center: Annex of Statistical Information,” (Washington, D.C., 30 April 2008).

<sup>72</sup> Department of State, “Travel Warning – Nigeria,” April 15, 2008, available from [http://travel.stet.gov/travel/cis\\_pa\\_tw/tw/tw\\_928.html?css=print](http://travel.stet.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_928.html?css=print); Internet; accessed 15 April 2008.

Matt Maupin were identified after a long period of uncertain outcome in Iraq. Maupin was seized during an attack on a convoy near Baghdad in 2004. About a week after the attack, terrorists released a videotape of him as a captive. About two months later, terrorists released a videotape that claimed to show his murder. At the time, US officials were not convinced of the video authenticity and continued to list Maupin as missing in action until the March 2008 announcement.<sup>73</sup>

1-74. Earlier incidents involving US Army soldiers appear to have been deliberate raids with the purpose of seizing captives. In May 2006, a temporary observation post manned by seven soldiers and one Iraqi interpreter near al-Mahmoudiya, Iraq was attacked in a pre-dawn raid that killed four of the soldiers and the interpreter. The three remaining soldiers were seized and moved to an undisclosed location. One soldier was murdered shortly afterwards and his body dumped into a river. Different terrorist groups claimed responsibility for the raid as US and Iraqi searches continued for the soldiers. Terrorists released a videotape of the two other soldiers mutilated and murdered.<sup>74</sup>



Fig. 1-14. **Combat Outpost**

1-75. A raid by terrorists on a US military checkpoint in Yusifiya south of Baghdad in June 2006 resulted in one US soldier being killed and two US soldiers being seized. About one month later, the terrorists released a videotape with graphic images of the two murdered soldiers' and their mutilated remains. The two bodies, when recovered close to the area from which they were seized, were tied together with a bomb between them. Three additional improvised explosive devices had been planted close to the two bodies.<sup>75</sup>

1-76. In early 2007, terrorists conducted a sophisticated raid against US soldiers in an Iraqi government compound in Karbala, south of Baghdad.

<sup>73</sup> Jay Warren, "Matt Maupin's Remains Found in Iraq," available from [http://www.wcpo.com/news/local/story.aspx?content\\_id=74a...](http://www.wcpo.com/news/local/story.aspx?content_id=74a...); Internet; accessed 12 May 2008.

<sup>74</sup> Brian Ross and Rhonda Schwartz, "Iraqi Insurgents Claim to have Killed Missing Soldiers," June 4, 2007; available from [http://blogs.abcnews.com/the\\_blotter/2007/06/neew\\_video\\_shows.html](http://blogs.abcnews.com/the_blotter/2007/06/neew_video_shows.html); Internet; accessed 1 April 2008.

<sup>75</sup> "US slams 'dead soldiers' video," CNN.com; available from <http://cnn.worldnews.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=CNN.com+...>; Internet; accessed 14 May 2008.

Insurgents disguised as US soldiers and driving vehicles that appeared to be a US diplomatic convoy, attacked a Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC) in the compound, killed one US soldier and wounded three other soldiers in a brief firefight, and captured four US soldiers in the compound. Bound and thrown into waiting vehicles, the captors attempted to evade pursuit by coalition forces. Prior to continuing their escape and abandoning their vehicles, the insurgents shot the four soldiers. Three US soldiers were found dead with the fourth soldier badly wounded. The Army officer died enroute to emergency medical treatment.

1-77. The Karbala, Iraq hostage-taking incident in 2007 and other hostage incidents such as the abduction of three US soldiers while on a mission near Kumanovo, Former Republic of Macedonia (FROM) in 1999 are described as case vignettes for study in a separate chapter of this terrorism handbook.

## SUMMARY

1-78. This chapter defined key terms related to terrorism, kidnapping, and hostage-taking in contemporary environments. In the ongoing war on terror, our US Army doctrine recognizes that people are part of the “terrain” and their support is a primary factor of success in future conflicts. The enemy knows the same critical factor of conflict and will use various means to disrupt stability in an area of operations whether that environment is urban or rural in locale and region.

1-79. Kidnapping or hostage-taking will remain a tactic, technique, and procedure of the terrorist to intimidate and extort people to create anxiety, fear, and mayhem in support of their immediate, intermediate, or long-term terrorism objectives.

## Chapter 2

# Terrorist Motivations and Behaviors

Al-Qaeda and its loose confederation of affiliated movements remain the most immediate national security threat to the United States and a significant security challenge to the international community...intent to mount large-scale spectacular attacks... current approach focuses on propaganda warfare – using a combination of terrorist attacks, insurgency, media broadcasts, Internet-based propaganda, and subversion to undermine confidence and unity in Western populations and generate a false perception of a powerful worldwide movement.

US Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2006*  
April 2007

This chapter examines the goals and motivation to use terror. Behavior of a terrorist may vary greatly depending on ideological commitment, individual intelligence and education, geographical setting, and organizational reach. The degrees of intent and capability hold the key of how serious each threat actually is as an enemy.

### SECTION I: GOALS AND INTENT



Figure 2-1. Kidnapping and Terrorism Propaganda

2-1. Terrorists are the enemy in the War on Terrorism. The nature of terrorists and their behaviors are a wide ranging set of data. Terrorism in general has many motivations depending on the special interests of the individual or cells.

2-2. Common characteristics or clearly defined traits may be indicated in simple comparisons, but any detailed study will identify that significant contrasts are more often the norm. Nonetheless, benefits exist in studying varied terrorist motivations and behaviors at the individual and organizational level. Observations on human nature and group dynamics under the conditions of stress, anxiety, and extremist values can provide insight into the causes of particular behaviors.

2-3. Understanding the goals of the enemy promotes an active approach to analyzing the transfer of goals to objectives, and objectives into operational plans and actions. While prediction is conditional, a terrorist will consider target value and cost required of the terrorist organization to successfully attack. A terrorist will evaluate what force protection measures are in effect in the vicinity of a target and determine the risk and cost benefit analysis. From these analyses and forms of study and surveillance, a terrorist will isolate weaknesses of a target and exploit these weaknesses.

2-4. Goals and objectives of terrorist organizations differ throughout the world and range from regional single-issue terrorists to the aims of transnational radicalism and terrorism. As the most prominent democracy and significant economic, military, and political power in the world, the US is a convenient and appealing target for extremists.

**...But our war with America is fundamentally different, for the first time priority is defeating it economically. For that, anything that negatively affects its economy is considered for us a step in the right direction on the path to victory. Military defeats do not greatly effect how we measure total victory, but these defeats indirectly affect the economy which can be demonstrated by the breaching of the confidence of capitalists and investors in this nation's ability to safeguard their various trade and dealings.'**

**Abu Mus'ab al-Najadi  
October 2005**

2-5. A sample statement by an al-Qaeda spokesperson focuses on a primary strategic aim of al-Qaeda. By causing the United States to commit significant wealth to protect its economy and

associated infrastructure and to employ a fully engaged US Armed Forces, al-Qaeda intends to stress and degrade US global presence and prestige.<sup>76</sup>

2-6. Another reason to expect greater use of terrorism against the US is regional or global competitors may feel that they cannot openly challenge, constrain, or defeat the US with any other technique. Nations have employed state sponsored or state directed terrorism to produce results that could not have otherwise been achieved against US opposition. Non-state actors can span the wanton attack of an individual terrorist to apocalyptic or theological extremist groups that seek to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.

2-7. Al-Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist networks configure a major terrorist threat with global reach. Attacks on high value economic targets are likely to be targeted within the US Homeland and US presence abroad.

**“Those youths are different from your soldiers. Your problem will be how to convince your troops to fight, while our problem will be how to restrain our youths to wait for their turn in fighting and in operations.”**

**Usama bin Laden, “Declaration of War Against The Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places” August 26, 1996**

2-8. How can comparatively small terrorist groups believe they can successfully confront the United States? For Islamic extremists, part of the answer reflects on fighters in Afghanistan and their success against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Many of these Islamic fighters were persuaded through their propaganda that they alone had defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, even though the US provided substantial support to the Islamic fighters.<sup>77</sup> Several vignettes describe kidnapping or hostage-taking in *The Other Side of the Mountain* by Ali Ahmad Jalai and Lester W. Grau.<sup>78</sup>

<sup>76</sup> “Unraveling Al-Qaeda’s Target Selection Calculus,” April 17, 2007, available from <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/070417.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 May 2007.

<sup>77</sup> Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002) 10,17.

<sup>78</sup> Jalai, Ali Ahmad and Lester W. Grau, *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War* (Quantico: USMC Studies and Analysis Branch, 1995).

2-9. In addition to many potential adversaries, enemies view the US as particularly vulnerable to the psychological impact and uncertainties generated by terror tactics in support of other activities.<sup>79</sup> Consequently, terrorist groups are likely to try capitalizing on what they may perceive as vulnerabilities. They include beliefs that:

- The United States of America is extremely casualty averse. Any loss of life takes on significance out of proportion to the circumstances.
- The US Government policies and policy makers are overly influenced by public opinion, which in turn is particularly susceptible to the adverse psychological impact of terrorism.
- The US economic performance is perception driven, and very vulnerable to the adverse psychological impact of terrorism.
- The US cannot sustain long term efforts or exhibit public sacrifice in pursuit of difficult national goals.

**“We have seen in the last decade the decline of the American government and the weakness of the American soldier who is ready to wage Cold Wars and unprepared to fight long wars. This was proven in Beirut when the Marines fled after two explosions. It also proves they can run in less than 24 hours, and this was also repeated in Somalia.”**

**Usama bin Laden interview by ABC News’ John Miller, May 1998**

2-10. The growing polarization of some domestic political issues means that the US is also likely to see increased terror attacks in the Homeland by a variety of domestic or so-called homegrown terrorist groups. These groups may target US forces either as symbols of government oppression, sources of weapons and equipment, or means to gain terrorist organizational prestige through a successful attack.

<sup>79</sup> Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare*, trans. Department of State, American Embassy Beijing Staff Translators (Washington, D.C., 1999).

## OPERATIONAL INTENT OF TERRORISM

2-11. Terrorism is primarily a psychological act that communicates through violence or the threat of violence. Terrorist strategies will be aimed at publicly causing damage to symbols or inspiring fear. Timing, location, and method of attacks accommodate mass media dissemination and optimize current news impact.

2-12. A terrorist operation will often have the goal of manipulating popular perceptions, and will achieve this by controlling or dictating media coverage. This control need not be overt, as terrorists analyze and exploit the dynamics of major media outlets and the pressure of the news cycle.<sup>80</sup> The hostage-taking of a group of South Korean missionaries in Afghanistan in 2007 captured mass media attention as terrorists gained significant worldwide coverage during the extended negotiations for release of the victims. During one media interview, a Taliban spokesman stated, "We had assurance from the Koreans that Kabul will release Taliban prisoners in batches and we will reciprocate...We gave them eight

Taliban names and they should have been freed by 7pm...yesterday, but nothing happened." A series of ultimatums included, "If by two o'clock today...the Taliban are not freed, then some of them [South Koreans] will probably be killed. Our patience is running out." During the negotiations, some of the captives were murdered by their Taliban kidnappers.<sup>81</sup>



Figure 2-2. **Prelude to Captivity**

2-13. In considering possible targets, terrorists recognize that a massively destructive attack launched against a target that cannot or will not attract sufficient media coverage is not purposeful. The 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania illustrate how two diplomatic posts created global sensation because of the attacks and resulting media coverage. Modern technology provides immediate broadcast coverage of violence. The September 11, 2001 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City was observed by millions of people worldwide on live television as the successive attacks occurred and sensational mass destruction followed.

<sup>80</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 136-142.

<sup>81</sup> "Taliban 'kills South Korean hostage,'" available from <http://www1.itv.com/news/b8e724e1d55edb55edbef76a8f98b010b6611.html>; Internet, accessed 4 August 2008.

## SECTION II: MOTIVATION

2-14. Motivation categories describe terrorist groups in terms of their goals or objectives. Some of common motivational categories are separatist, ethnocentric, nationalistic, and revolutionary.

### MOTIVATIONAL CATEGORIES

- **Separatist.** Separatist groups reach for a goal of separation from existing entities through independence, political autonomy, or religious freedom or domination. The ideologies that separatists promote include social justice or equity, anti-imperialism, as well as the resistance to conquest or occupation by a foreign power. Categories of ethnicity and nationalism can crossover in support rationale.



Figure 2-3. Beslan Hostage Crisis

- **Ethnocentric.** Ethnocentric groups see race as the defining characteristic of a society and a basis of cohesion. Group members promote the attitude that a particular group is superior because of its ethnic or racial characteristics.
- **Nationalistic.** The loyalty and devotion to a nation and the national consciousness place one nation's culture and interests above those of other nations or groups is the motivating factor behind these groups. This can aim to create a new nation or to split away part of an existing state in order to join with another nation that shares the perceived national identity.
- **Revolutionary.** These groups are dedicated to the overthrow of an established order and replacing governance with a new political or social structure. Often associated with communist political ideologies, other political movements can advocate revolutionary methods to achieve their goals.

## IDEOLOGY INFLUENCES

2-15. Groups with secular ideologies and nonreligious goals will often attempt highly selective and discriminate acts of violence to achieve a specific political aim. This often requires them to keep casualties at the minimum amount necessary to attain the objective. The intention is to avoid a backlash that might damage the organization's acceptability and maintain the appearance of a rational group that has legitimate grievances. By limiting their attacks they reduce the risk of undermining external political and economic support.

2-16. One example of a group that discriminates on target selection is the Revolutionary Organization 17 November. This is a radical leftist organization established in 1975 in Greece that is anti-Greek establishment, anti-United States, anti-Turkey, and anti-NATO. Its operations have included assassinations of senior US officials, Greek public figures, and attacks on and foreign firms investing in Greece. In total, 17 November is believed to have been responsible for over 100 attacks, but included 23 fatalities between 1975 and 2000.<sup>82</sup> In many instances, the group used a .38 caliber pistol or a .45 caliber handgun which came to be regarded as their signature weapon. While face-to-face assassination was their early modus operandi, the group later used rockets and bombs stolen from Greek military facilities. Over 50 rocket attacks were claimed by 17N.<sup>83</sup>



2-17. Religiously oriented and millenarian groups may attempt mass casualty incidents. An apocalyptic extremist frame of reference may determine loss of life as irrelevant and encourage mass casualty producing incidents. In 1995, the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan attempted to cause mass casualties by releasing sarin in the Tokyo subway system. They also kidnapped members of their cult who were suspected of preparing to depart from the cult.

Figure 2-4. **Shoko Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo**

2-18. Some terrorists state that killing people labeled as religious nonbelievers is acceptable in an attack. The 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Kenya inflicted more casualties on the local Kenyan inhabitants than US citizens. The ratio was approximately 20 non-US citizens for every US citizen killed. Wounded people

<sup>82</sup> "Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)," CDI Terrorism Project, 5 August 2002; available from <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/17N-pr.cfm>; Internet; accessed 24 September 2004.

<sup>83</sup> *Wikipedia*, "Revolutionary Organization November17," available from [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutionary\\_Organization\\_17\\_November](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolutionary_Organization_17_November); Internet; accessed 12 May 2007.

numbered over 5000 Kenyans; 95 percent of the total casualties were non-American.<sup>84</sup> Fear of moral backlash rarely concerns this type of terrorist organization. With numerous dead and maimed Kenyans, terrorists attempted to qualify a rationale for the deaths and appease critics, but overall were unapologetic for the destruction, deaths, or mayhem.



Fig. 2-5. **Nairobi Bombing**

2-19. For terrorist groups professing secular political, religious, or social motivations, their targets are often highly symbolic of authority: government offices, banks, national airlines, and multinational corporations with direct relation to the established order. Likewise, they may conduct attacks on representative individuals whom they associate with economic exploitation, social injustice, or political repression. While extremist religious groups also use much of this symbolism, there appears to be a trend to connect attacks to greater physical devastation and suffering. There also is a tendency to add religiously affiliated individuals, such as missionaries, and religious activities such as worship services to the targeting equation.

**The kidnapping of personalities...can be a useful form of propaganda for the revolutionary and patriotic principles of the urban guerrilla provided it occurs under special circumstances, and the kidnapping is handled so that the public sympathizes with it and accepts it.**

Carlos Marigella *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* 1969

2-20. With much of the global attention on contemporary Islamic extremism and terrorism, the 2007 NCTC *Report on Terrorism Incidents - 2006* cites an interesting statistic. "As in 2005, Muslims in 2006 again bore a substantial share of the victims of terrorist attacks. Approximately 58,000 individuals worldwide were either killed or injured by terrorist attacks in 2006...well over 50 percent of the victims were Muslims, and most were victims of attacks in Iraq."<sup>85</sup>

<sup>84</sup> Christopher C. Harmon, *Terrorism Today* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000; reprint, Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 51.

<sup>85</sup> National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), *Reports on Terrorism Incidents - 2006*, 30 April 2007, 11; available from <http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/Patterns-of-global-terrorism.asp>; Internet; accessed 2 May 2007.

2-21. Symbolism related to ideology may focus terrorist targeting in striking on particular anniversaries or commemorative dates. Nationalist groups may strike to commemorate battles won or lost during a conventional struggle, whereas religious groups may strike to mark particularly appropriate observances. Many groups will attempt to commemorate anniversaries of successful operations, or the executions or deaths of notable individuals related to their particular conflict. For instance, Timothy McVeigh conducted the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building on April 19<sup>th</sup>, the anniversary of the end of the Branch Davidian siege near Waco, Texas in 1993, as well as a violent incident from the American Revolution period in 1775.

## IDEOLOGICAL CATEGORIES

2-22. Ideological categories describe the political, religious, or social orientation of the group. While some groups will be seriously committed to their avowed ideologies, for others, ideology is poorly understood and primarily a rationale used to provide justification for their actions to outsiders or sympathizers. Common ideological categories include political, religious, and social.

### POLITICAL

Political ideologies are concerned with the structure and organization of the forms of government and communities.

- **Right Wing.** These groups are associated with the reactionary or conservative side of the political spectrum, and often are associated with fascism or neo-Nazism. Despite this, right-wing extremists can be every bit as revolutionary in intent as other groups. Their intent is to replace existing forms of government with a particular brand of authoritarian rule.



Fig. 2-6. Aryan Nation

- **Left Wing.** These groups are usually associated with revolutionary socialism or variants of communism such as Maoist or Marxist-Leninist. With the demise of many communist regimes and the gradual liberalization of remaining regimes toward capitalism, left-wing rhetoric can often move towards and merge with anarchistic thought.



Fig. 2-7. Shining Path

- **Anarchist.** Anarchist groups are anti-authority or anti-government, and strongly support individual liberty and voluntary association of cooperative groups. Often blending anti-capitalism and populist or communist-like messages, modern anarchists tend to neglect the problem of what will replace the current form of government, but generally promote that small communities are the highest form of political organization necessary or desirable.

## RELIGIOUS

2-23. Religiously inspired terrorism is on the rise. This is not a new phenomenon. Between 1980 and 1995, international terror groups espousing religious motivation increased by 43 percent.<sup>86</sup> Islamic terrorists and extremist organizations have been the most active and greatest recent threat to the United States. Religious extremism couches terrorism with distorted interpretation of theological dogma and can mask secular objectives as holy writ, infallible guidance, and non-negotiable responsibility. One commentary states, “The literature on terrorism clearly documented a dramatic rise in the religious affiliation of terrorist organizations. A generation ago none of the eleven international terrorist organizations was religiously oriented. By 2004, nearly half of the world’s identifiable and active terrorist groups are classified as motivated by religious. Today, the vast majority of terrorist groups using suicide attacks are Islamic, displacing secular groups like the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, religiously-oriented organizations account for a disproportionately high percentage of attacks and casualties.”<sup>87</sup>

2-24. Religious motivations can also be tied to ethnic and nationalist identities, such as Kashmiri separatists combining their desire to break away from India with the religious conflict between Islam and Hinduism. The conflict in Northern Ireland provides an example of the intermingling of religious identity with nationalist motivation. Christian, Jewish, Sikh, Hindu and a host of lesser known religious denominations have seen activists commit terrorism in their name or spawned cults professing adherence to the larger religion while following unique interpretations of that particular religion’s dogma.



Figure 2-8. IRA on City Street

<sup>86</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 90.


<sup>87</sup> *Small Wars Journal*, “SWJ Blog: Luttwak’s Lament,” available from <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/04/luttwaks-lament/>; Internet; accessed 12 May 2007.

## SOCIAL

2-25. Often particular social policies or issues will be so contentious among individuals or groups that beliefs incite extremist behavior and terrorism. This form of social terrorism is often referred to as single issue or special interest terrorism. Some issues that have produced terrorist activities in the United States and other countries are: animal rights, abortion, ecology and the environment, anti-government,<sup>88</sup> and ethnic, race, or minority rights.

## LOCATION OR GEOGRAPHIC CATEGORIES

2-26. Geographic designation of domestic or foreign terrorism has lost much of its meaning in the evolving membership of terrorist organizations. In the 1990s, domestic terrorism was commonly associated with right-wing or hate groups comprised of US citizens. Concerns about terrorism included the possibility recruiting military personnel into their groups. Terrorist rationales for this recruiting included lending a degree of legitimacy to militant claims, providing trained members to further train other group members in the use of weapons and tactics, and assisting in plans to steal military weapons, munitions, and equipment.<sup>89</sup>



2-27. More recent examples of citizens attacking their own country of citizenship blur the description of domestic versus foreign inspired terrorism. Examples include the 2002 Bali, Indonesia bombings that killed over 200 people and wounded over 200 people, and the 2005 London subway and bus bombings that brought a new level of terrorism to the United Kingdom homeland.

<sup>88</sup> "Group Profile, First Mechanical Kansas Militia," available from <http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=3418>; Internet; accessed 12 May 2007. Some proclaimed groups may be nothing more but individuals with a bizarre concept of the world and conspiracy. Notwithstanding, these type of people can pose a significant threat to military forces when plots develop to attack events such as a 4<sup>th</sup> of July celebration at a US Army installation.

<sup>89</sup> Steven Presley, *Rise of Domestic Terrorism and Its Relation to United States Armed Forces*, [Abstract] April 1996, available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/presley.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 May 2007.

- **Domestic or Indigenous.** These terrorists are “home-grown,” that is, they can be native born or naturalized citizens of a nation. They operate within and against their own country of residence. The terrorists may or may not have direct association with terrorist organizations located external to the attacked homeland. Examples include Timothy McVeigh and his bombing of the Murrah Federal Building, or the six men arrested in May 2007 for conspiring to attack US military people, facilities, and equipment at Fort Dix, New Jersey. The criminal complaint accents that “The philosophy that supports and encourages jihad around the world against Americans came to live here in New Jersey and threaten the lives of our citizens through these defendants.”<sup>90</sup> Initial investigation indicates that several of the men entered the US illegally years previous to this incident.
- **International or Transnational.** International can be visualized as terrorist activity that is primarily between two nations and their geographic location. International groups may operate in multiple countries, but retain a geographic focus for their activities. Issues will indicate regional impact as a norm. Transnational is a more expansive realm of operating among multiple national geographic locations, and creating global impact with operational or strategic reach. Capabilities may include use of cyberspace and the Internet, worldwide financial institutions, and satellite headquarters or clandestine cells in multiple hemisphere locales.

2-28. For example, Hizballah has several organizational cells worldwide and has conducted operations in multiple countries, but is primarily concerned with political events in the region of Lebanon and Israel. Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups are transnational. Their vision is global and “In general terms...exhibit many characteristics of a globalized insurgency. This insurgency aims to overthrow the existing world order and replace it with a form of neo-fundamentalist, reactionary, authoritarian, transnational state. They collect intelligence, engage in denial and deception, use subversion, launch propaganda campaigns, engage in sabotage, and, of course, embrace terror as a defining tactic. Terror, of course, not only serves as a means of destruction, but also garners them visibility and provides them identity.”<sup>91</sup>



Fig. 2-9. Hizballah

<sup>90</sup> CNN.com, “Official: Radicals wanted to create carnage at Fort Dix,” available from <http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/05/08/fortdix.plot/index.html>; Internet; accessed 12 May 2007.

<sup>91</sup> Henry Crumpton, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Remarks at Transnational Terrorism Conference- 12 January 2006,” available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2006/59987.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 May 2007.

## SECTION III: BEHAVIOR

### INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORS

2-29. No one profile exists for terrorists in terms of family background or personal characteristics. Several general observations may assist in understanding the extreme behavior of a terrorist. Notions of a bizarre social misfit or uneducated and unemployed person are a misperception as a norm. An analysis of over 150 al-Qaeda terrorists displayed a norm of middle- to upper-class, highly educated, married, middle-aged men.<sup>92</sup> Women are appearing in increasing numbers, and have been significant actors in groups such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, but men provide the vast majority of terrorist cadre in actual attacks. Adolescents and children have been used in terrorist attacks too. In some cases, children have been decoys or directly involved in acts of terror.<sup>93</sup> Murder, suicide bombing, and kidnapping are only three of the type incidents.



Fig. 2-10. Children In Terror

#### UTOPIAN WORLDVIEW.

2-30. Terrorists typically have idealized goals regardless of their aims as political, social, territorial, nationalistic, or religious. This worldview expresses itself forcefully as an extreme degree of impatience with the rest of the world and convinces the terrorist to validate criminal acts as allowable methods. The terrorist will commonly perceive a crisis too urgent to be solved other than by the most extreme methods. A perception may exist that the government is too corrupt or ineffective to adopt change. This sense of impatience with opposition is central to the terrorist worldview and is a norm of secular and theologically motivated terrorists.

<sup>92</sup> Philip G. Wasielewski, "Defining the War on Terror," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 44, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2007, 16.

<sup>93</sup> "Fatah Tricks 12-year-old Boy into becoming a Suicide Terrorist," 15 March 2004, available from <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+and+Islamic+Fund...>; Internet; accessed 8 June 2007.

## **COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS.**

2-31. Terrorist groups require recruitment, preparation, and integration into an operational structure in order to conduct terrorist acts. Recruits require extensive vetting to ensure that they demonstrate the ability to succeed in assigned missions and are not infiltrators counter to the group's purpose. Al-Qaeda assessed selected volunteers in a number of training camps and screened those individuals with the highest potential and skills. Additional training and testing determined those members who would be chosen for actual terrorist missions. The 9/11 attacks illustrated this type of ideologically indoctrinated and well prepared terrorists committed to a specific terrorist act.<sup>94</sup>

2-32. Terrorist group leaders will consider the relationship between the cost of using and possibly losing an asset, and the potential benefits to the group's notoriety.<sup>95</sup> Terrorist operational planning focuses on economies of personnel and balances the likelihood of loss against the value of a target and the probability of success. Masked by terms of martyrdom, terrorist propaganda promotes the concept that suicide is an acceptable and sought after means of commitment to an ideal.

## **SUBORDINATE TO SUPERIOR**

2-33. Unquestioning submission to a group's authority figure may evolve from intensive indoctrination and a personal need to belong to a group and feel a sense of collective purpose. This is true of hierarchical and networked organizations, and in large or small groups. Individual leaders may exhibit great charisma or promote themselves as having a profound understanding of religious or philosophical principles.<sup>96</sup>

2-34. If an individual feels disenfranchised from society or the ability to influence personal lifestyle and meaning, an authority figure within a terrorist group may be perceived as a role model and can suggest or demand tremendous sacrifices from subordinates. This form of inspirational leader uses persuasion and can also inspire

<sup>94</sup> Philip G. Wasielewski, "Defining the War on Terror," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 44, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2007, 17.

<sup>95</sup> Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," *Foreign Policy*, 120 (September/October 2000): 66-73.

<sup>96</sup> Sabil Frances, "Uniqueness of LTTE's Suicide Bombers," *Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies*, Article no. 321 (4 February 2000): 1; available at <http://www.ipcs.org>; Internet; accessed 7 September 2002.

“leaderless resisters” or “lone wolf avengers” to conduct individual acts of terror with no control by a chain of command.<sup>97</sup>

### DEHUMANIZATION OF NON-MEMBERS

2-35. Dehumanization permits violence to be directed indiscriminately at any target outside of the terrorist group. Assuming that all those outside of the group are either enemies or neutral, terrorists can rationalize in attacking anyone. Dehumanization removes some of the onus of killing innocent people. Some extremist views promote ideas that any compromise with adversaries is impossible. Other extremist views state that particular ethnic groups evolved from animals and are not worthy of any human comparison. Other viewpoints cite a continual struggle between oppressors and oppressed, and that a religious duty exists to fight and defeat inhuman opponents in the name of oppressed people and for the expansion of specific religious beliefs.

2-36. A terrorist can be indoctrinated to believe that murder furthers the interests of an unawakened social or ethnic people that are too oppressed or misinformed to realize its own best interests. Whether self-proclaimed as a revolutionary vanguard or a true patriot, a distorted concept assumes that the terrorist acts for the benefit of either a silent or ignorant mass that would approve of their struggle if they were free to choose or if they fully understood.

2-37. Terrorists can take this rationale of indiscriminate killing to an extreme. Some extremists promote attacks on civilians. Abu Anas al-Shami states, “Therefore, imams agree that if unbelievers shield themselves with the Muslims, how would it be for the Muslims if they did not fight? Thus it is permissible to fire upon them, and we mean the disbelievers.”<sup>98</sup>

2-38. Until his death in 2006, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi actively supported suicide terrorism and rejected any traditional separation of military or government targets from civilians who may be in the same vicinity. In addition to indiscriminate killings, al-Zarqawi also used very brutal tactics such as videotaped beheadings to create terror.



<sup>97</sup> Philip G. Wasielewski, “Defining the War on Terror,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, 44, 1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2007.

<sup>98</sup> Brian Fishman, *Zarqawi’s Jihad*, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, US Military Academy, 26 April, 2006, 20.

## LIFESTYLE ATTRACTIONS

2-39. The lifestyle of a terrorist, while not particularly appealing for members of stable societies, can provide emotional, physical and sometimes social rewards. Emotional rewards include the feelings of notoriety, power, and belonging. In some societies, there may be a sense of satisfaction in rebellion; in others there may be a perceived increase in social status or power. For some, the intense sense of belonging generated by membership in an illegal group is emotionally satisfying.<sup>99</sup>



Figure 2-11. Abu Nidal in 1980s

2-40. Physical rewards can include such things as money, authority, and adventure.<sup>100</sup> This lure can subvert other motives. Several of the more notorious terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s, such as Abu Nidal,<sup>101</sup> became highly specialized mercenaries, discarding their convictions and working for a variety of causes and sponsors. Abu Nidal is a nom de guerre for Sabri al-Banna and an international terrorist group named after its founder “Abu Nidal” – Abu Nidal Organization (ANO).<sup>102</sup> Sabris al-Banna rose in notoriety in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) but broke away from the PLO to form his own terror organization in the mid-1970s. The group’s goals center on the destruction of the state of Israel, but the group has served as a mercenary terrorist force with connections to several radical regimes including Iraq, Syria, and Libya.<sup>103</sup> ANO activities link to terrorist attacks in 20 countries with killing about 300 people and injuring hundreds of additional people totaling estimates of about 900 victims.<sup>104</sup>

2-41. Lifestyle attractions also can include a sense of elitism, and a feeling of freedom from societal mores. “Nothing in my life had ever been this exciting!” was a statement by Susan Stern, member of the Weather Underground, describing her involvement with the US domestic terrorist group.<sup>105</sup>

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 34-35.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., 271.

<sup>101</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 187.

<sup>102</sup> “Abu Nidal,” *Encyclopedia of the Orient* [database on-line]; available from [http://i-cias.com/e.o/abu\\_nidal.htm](http://i-cias.com/e.o/abu_nidal.htm); Internet; accessed 24 February 2004.

<sup>103</sup> “Abu Nidal Organization,” *Terrorism Questions and Answers* [database on-line]; available from <http://cfrterrorism.org/groups/abunidal.html>; Internet; accessed 24 February 2004.

<sup>104</sup> “Abu Nidal Organization (ANO),” *FAS Intelligence Resource Program* [database on-line]; available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/ano.htm>; Internet, accessed 24 February 2004.

<sup>105</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 176.

## ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR

2-42. People within groups have different behaviors collectively than they do as individuals. Terrorist organizations have varying motives and reasons for existence, and how the group interprets these guides or determines internal group dynamics. Groups are normally more daring and ruthless than the individual members. No individual wishes to appear less committed than the others, and will not object to proposals within the group they would not consider as an individual.<sup>106</sup> Leaders will not risk being seen as timid, for fear of losing their influence over the group. The end result can be actions not in keeping with individual behavior patterns as far as risk and lethality, but dictated by the pressure of group expectations and suppression of dissent and caution.

2-43. Group commitment stresses secrecy and loyalty to the group. Disagreements are discouraged by the sense of the external threat represented by the outside world, and pressure to conform to the group view. Excommunication from the group adds to the group's loathing and hatred of doubters or deserters.<sup>107</sup> The slightest suspicion of disloyalty can result in torture and murder of the suspect. The ideological intensity that makes terrorists such formidable enemies often turns upon itself, and some groups have purged themselves so effectively that they almost ceased to exist.<sup>108</sup>

2-44. Frequently, the existence of the group becomes more important than the goal the members originally embraced. A group may adjust objectives as a reason for continued existence. In some cases, success can mean disbanding the organization. As members reject group direction and methods, individuals or factions may cause factions to develop. The resulting splinter groups or dissenting individual members are extremely volatile and run the risk of compromising the original group's purpose.

2-45. In cases where the terrorists are not tied to a particular political or social goal, groups will even adopt a new cause if the original one is resolved. When first formed, many of the Euro-terror groups such as the Red Army Faction (Germany) and Communist Combatant Cells (Belgium) grew out of the 1960s student protest movement. The initial motivations for their actions were

<sup>106</sup> Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, rev. ed. (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 36.

<sup>107</sup> David C. Rapoport, ed., *Inside Terrorist Organizations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 157.

<sup>108</sup> Christopher C. Harmon, *Terrorism Today* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000; reprint, Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 213.

supposedly to protest US involvement in Vietnam and support the North Vietnamese government. When American involvement in Vietnam came to an end, some of the radical membership in Europe embraced Palestinian and pro-Arab causes rather than disband. Later, they conducted attacks against research facilities supporting the US Strategic Defense Initiative, and to protest and prevent deployment of the Pershing IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) in Germany.

2-46. Organizations that are experiencing difficulties may tend to increase their level of violence. This increase in violence can occur when frustration and low morale develops within the group due to lack of perceived progress or successful counter-terrorism measures that may limit freedom of action within the terrorist group. Members attempt to perform more effectively, but such organizational and cooperative impediments usually result in poor operational performance. The organization hopes that a change to more spectacular tactics or larger casualty lists will overcome the group's internal problems.<sup>109</sup>

2-47. After an increase in suicide attacks, the chief military leader of India's northern command in Kashmir stated that militants were launching attacks to lift the morale of their cadres, because continued Indian army operations were killing militants daily and weakening the terrorist group's capabilities.<sup>110</sup>

2-48. Another example is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. During a 13-month period, this al-Qaeda subgroup sustained a number of arrests and killings of their members, including the group's leader being killed and replaced four times. In May and June 2004, the subgroup conducted a wave of hostage taking, beheadings, and gruesome murders. *Sawt Al-Jihad*, an al-Qaeda identified journal, interviewed the leader of the Al-Quds Brigade, a subordinate unit of the group that took responsibility for the May 29, 2004 Oasis Compound attack at al-Khobar, Saudi Arabia where 22 people were killed. During this



<sup>109</sup> Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, rev. ed. (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 16.

<sup>110</sup> "Kashmir's Army Chief Fears Increased Suicide Attacks by Rebels," *South Asia Monitor*, 6 August 2003, 2; available from <http://www.southasiamonitor.org/focus/2003/july/24rebels.html>; Internet; accessed 20 April 2004.

interview, the terrorist commander claimed they had either beheaded or cut the throats of more than twelve of the victims.<sup>111</sup> Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was also responsible for a number of other murders including Robert Jacobs, an American contract employee, and the beheading of Paul Johnson, an American contract employee. The terrorist group released videotapes of both kidnappings and murders.

## SUMMARY

2-49. This chapter presented aspects of terrorist motivations and behaviors. Goals and objectives of terrorist organizations differ throughout the world and range from regional single-issue terrorists to the aims of transnational radicalism and terrorism.

2-50. Terrorism is primarily a psychological act that communicates through violence or the threat of violence. Common motivational categories include separatism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and revolution. Ideological categories can be framed by political, religious, or social purpose.

<sup>111</sup> *Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Shooting, Hostage Taking, Kidnapping Wave* – May/June 2004 (Alexandria: Tempest Publishing, LLC, 2004), 46-60.

This Page Intentionally Blank

## Chapter 3 Terrorist Models and Affiliations

Our [enemy] is proactive, innovative, well-networked, flexible, patient, young, technologically savvy, and learns and adapts continuously based upon both successful and failed operations around the globe.<sup>112</sup>

**Honorable Lee Hamilton**  
**Task Force Chairman for the Future of Terrorism Task Force 2007**  
**Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory Council**

This chapter assesses models of organization related to terrorism and inspects the connections between acts of terror, criminal gang activities, and terrorist group affiliations. The linkages among criminal activities for fiscal profit and terrorist activities accenting a political agenda can be easily blurred in environments that exhibit political unrest, civil office corruption, poverty and unemployment, and large segments of a population that feel disenfranchised from the governing establishment.



Figure 3-1. Different Kidnapping Capabilities-Intents in the COE

3-1. A terrorist organization's structure, membership, resources, and security determine its capabilities and reach. Knowledge of current and emergent models of terrorist organization improves an understanding and situational awareness of terrorism in a contemporary operational environment.

<sup>112</sup> Don Philpott, "The Future of Terrorism Task force," *Homeland Defense Journal*, April 2007, 16-20.

3-2. Popular images of a terrorist group operating in accordance with a specific political agenda and motivated by ideology or the desire for ethnic or national liberation dominated traditional appreciation of terrorism. While true of some terrorist organizations, this image is not universally valid. Terrorism threats range al-Qaeda and affiliated cells with regional, international, or transnational reach to domestic hate groups and self-radicalized, unaffiliated terrorists with single issue agendas and finite capabilities.

3-3. What is one of the most significant adaptations in terrorist organization? "Perhaps the most fundamental shift rests in the enemy's downsizing. We will not see large al-Qaeda armies. Rather, we will increasingly face enemy forces in small teams or even individuals. From an operational perspective, these are 'micro-targets with macro-impact' operating in the global exchange of people, data, and ideas. The enemy, their tradecraft, their tactics, their weapons, and their battlefield, our battlefield -- all evolve at the pace of globalization itself. We are facing the future of war today. The ongoing debate, sometimes disagreement, among allies reflects this new reality, this new way of war."<sup>113</sup>

3-4. In examining the structure of terrorist groups, this handbook presents two general categories of organization: network and hierarchy. A terrorist group may employ either type or a combination of the two models. The cell is the basic unit of organization in any of the models.



3-5. Contemporary groups tend to organize or adapt to opportunities available in the network model. Other variants professing an ideology can have more defined effects on internal organization. Leninist or Maoist groups can tend towards centralized control and hierarchical structure. Terrorist groups that are associated with a political activity or organization will often require a more hierarchical structure, in order to coordinate deliberate terrorist violence with political action. Examples include observing cease-fire agreements or avoiding particular targets in support of political objectives.

3-6. However, al-Qaeda presents an example that has evolved from a hierarchical organization to a much more networked organization. Aspects of

<sup>113</sup> Henry Crumpton, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Remarks at Transnational Terrorism Conference- 12 January 2006," available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2006/59987.htm>: Internet; accessed 12 May 2007.

hierarchy still exist in senior leaders, cadre for functional coordination, and dedicated sub-groups of terrorism. Current patterns display an increasing use of loosely affiliated networks that plan and act on generalized guidance on waging terror. Individuals with minimal or no direct connection to al-Qaeda may take their inspiration for terrorism from ideological statements of senior al-Qaeda leaders.

3-7. Presenting any generalized organizational structure can be problematic. Terrorist groups can be at various stages of development in terms of capabilities and sophistication. Change in terrorist leadership, whether through generational transition or in response to enhanced security operations, may signal significant adjustments to organizational priorities and available means to conduct terrorism. Groups professing or associated with ethnic or nationalist agendas and limiting their operations to one country or a localized region tend to require fewer capabilities. Larger groups can merge from smaller organizations, or smaller groups can splinter off from larger organizations. Organizational method is situation dependent on specific circumstances of an operational environment during specified periods of time.

## **SECTION I: ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT**

### **LEVELS OF COMMITMENT**

3-8. Typically, different levels of commitment exist within an organization. One way of display is four levels of commitment consisting of passive supporters, active supporters, cadre, and leaders.

3-9. The pyramid diagram at Figure 3-2 is not intended as an organizational diagram, but indicates a relative number of people in each category. The general image of overall density holds true for networks as well as hierarchies. Passive supporters may intermingle with active supporters and be unaware of what their actual relationship is to the organization.

3-10. Some groups will use coercion and leverage to gain limited or one-time cooperation from useful individuals. This cooperation can range from gaining information to conducting a suicide bombing operation.<sup>114</sup> Blackmail and intimidation

<sup>114</sup> Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, rev. ed. (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 270-271.

are common forms of coercion. Threats to family or community members, as well as a targeted individual, may be employed.




Figure 3-2. Typical Levels of Organization

- **Leaders** provide direction and policy; approve goals and objectives; and provide overarching guidance for operations. Usually leaders rise from within the ranks of an organization or create their own organization.
- **Cadres** are the active members of the terrorist organization. This echelon plans and conducts not only operations, but also manages areas of intelligence, finance, logistics, propaganda, and communications. Mid-level cadres tend to be trainers and technicians such as bomb makers, financiers, and surveillance experts. Low-level cadres are the bombers and similar direct action terrorists.
- **Active Supporters** are active in the political, fund-raising, and information activities of the group. Acting as a visible or tacit partner, they may also conduct intelligence and surveillance activities, and provide safehaven houses, financial contributions, medical assistance, and transit assistance for cadre members of the organization. Active supporters are fully aware of their relationship to the terrorist group but do not normally commit violent acts.



Figure 3-3. HAMAS

- **Passive Supporters** are typically individuals or groups that are sympathetic to the announced goals and intentions of an overarching agenda, but are not committed enough to take an active role in terrorism. They may not be aware of their precise relation to the terrorist group, and interface with a front that hides the overt connection to the terrorist group. Sometimes fear of reprisal from terrorists is a compelling factor in passive support. Sympathizers can be useful for political activities, fund raising, and unwitting or coerced assistance in intelligence gathering and other non-violent activities.

3-11. Terrorist groups will recruit from populations that are sympathetic to their goals. Legitimate organizations can serve as recruiting grounds for terrorists. Militant Islamic recruiting, for example, is often associated with the proliferation of fundamentalist religious sects. Some recruiting is conducted on a worldwide basis via schools financed from both governmental and non-governmental donations and grants. Recruiting may be conducted for particular skills and qualifications and not be focused on ideological commitment. Some terrorist organizations have sought current or former members of the US armed forces as trained operatives and as agents within an organization.

## SECTION II: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

### CELLULAR FOUNDATION

3-12. The cell is the smallest element at the tactical level of terrorist organization. Individuals, usually three to ten people, comprise a cell and act as the basic tactical component for a terrorist organization. One of the primary reasons for a cellular configuration is security. The compromise or loss of one cell should not compromise the identity, location, or actions of other cells. Compartmenting functions within organizational structure makes it difficult for an adversary to penetrate the entire organization. Personnel within one cell are often unaware of the existence of other cells and cannot provide sensitive information to infiltrators or captors.

3-13. Terrorists may organize cells based on family or employment relationships, on a geographic basis, or by specific functions such as direct action or intelligence. The terrorist group may also form multifunctional cells. Cell members remain in close contact with each other in order to provide emotional support and enhance security procedures.

3-14. The cell leader is normally the only person who communicates and coordinates with higher levels and other cells. A terrorist group may form only one cell or may form several cells that operate in local or regional areas, across national borders, or among several countries in transnational operations.

3-15. Two basic methods define organizational structure of a terrorist group. These methods are hierarchical and networked models. A terrorist group may employ either type or a combination of the two models.

## HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE

3-16. Hierarchical structure organizations are those that have a well-defined vertical chain of command, control, and responsibility. Data and intelligence flows up and down organizational channels that correspond to these vertical chains, but may not necessarily move horizontally through the organization.




Figure 3-4. Hierarchical and Networked Organization

3-17. Hierarchical organizations feature greater specialization of functions in their subordinate cells such as support, operations, intelligence. Usually, only the cell leader has knowledge of other cells or contacts, and only senior leadership has visibility of the organization at large.

3-18. In the past, terrorism was practiced in this manner by identifiable organizations with a command and control structure influenced by revolutionary theory or ideology. Radical leftist organizations such as the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, as well as ethno-nationalist terrorist movements such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army and the Basque separatist ETA group, conformed to this structure. These organizations had a clearly defined set of political, social or economic objectives, and tailored aspects of their organizations such as a political wing or social welfare group to facilitate their success. The necessity to coordinate actions between various subordinate cells such as political offices or non-violent support groups favored a strong and hierarchical authority structure.

### NETWORKED STRUCTURE

3-19. Terrorists are increasingly using a broader system of networks than previously experienced. Groups based on religious or single issue motives may lack a specific political or nationalistic agenda. They have less need for a hierarchical structure to coordinate plans and actions. Instead, they can depend and even thrive on loose affiliation with groups or individuals from a variety of locations. General goals and targets are announced, and individuals or cells are expected to use flexibility and initiative to conduct action in support of these guidelines.




Fig. 3-5. Networked Structure

3-20. The effectiveness of a networked organization is dependent on several considerations. The network achieves long-term organizational effectiveness when cells share a unifying ideology, common goals or mutual interests.<sup>115</sup> A difficulty for network organizations not sharing a unifying ideology is cells

<sup>115</sup> John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed., *Networks and Netwars* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 9.

can pursue objectives or take actions that do not meet the goals of the organization, or are counterproductive. In this instance, the independence of cells fails to develop synergy between their activities and limits their contribution to common objectives.

3-21. Networks distribute the responsibility for operations and plan for redundancies of key functions. Cells do not contact or coordinate with other cells except for coordination essential to a particular operation or function. Avoiding unnecessary coordination or command approval for action provides ability for terrorist leaders to deny responsibility of specified acts of terror, as well as enhance operational security.

3-22. Networks are not necessarily dependent on modern information technology for effective command and control. The organizational structure and the flow of information and guidance inside the organization are defining aspects of networks. While information technology can make networks more effective, low technology means such as couriers, paper messages, and landline telephones can enable networks to avoid detection and operate effectively in certain circumstances.

**TYPES OF STRUCTURE.**


3-23. There are various types of networked structure, depending on the ways elements are linked to other elements of the structure. There are three basic types: chain, hub, and all-channel. A terrorist group may also employ a hybrid structure that combines elements of more than one network type.

- **Chain Networks** Fig. 3-6. **Chain Network**



3-24. Each cell links to the node next in sequence. Communication between the nodes is by passing information along the line. This organization is common among networks that smuggle goods and people or launder money.

- **Hub and Star** Fig. 3-7. **Hub and Star**



3-25. Cells communicate with one central element. The central cell need not be the leader or decision maker for the network. A variation of the hub is a wheel design where the outer nodes

communicate with one or two other outer cells in addition to the hub. A wheel configuration is a common feature of a financial or economic network

- **All-Channel**




Figure 3-8. **All-Channel Network**

3-26. All nodes are connected to each other. The network is organizationally flat indicating there is no hierarchical command structure above it. Command and control is distributed within the network. This is communication intensive and can be a security problem if the linkages can be identified or tracked.




Figure 3-9 **Affiliated Network**

3-27. Despite their differences, the three basic types will be encountered together in hybrid organizations. A transnational terrorist organization might use chain networks for its money-laundering activities, tied to a wheel network handling financial matters, tied in turn to an all-channel leadership network to direct the use of the funds into the operational activities of a hub network conducting pre-targeting surveillance and reconnaissance.

**IDEOLOGICAL AFFILIATION**

3-28. A variation on network structure is a loosely affiliated method which depends more on an ideological intent, rather than any formalized command and control or support structure. These semi-independent or independent cells plan and act within their own means to promote a common ideological

position with terrorist organizations that may have regional, international, or transnational reach.

3-29. Individuals may interpret a theology and acquire an extreme viewpoint of how to promote the ideology with personal action. Cells may form from a general inspiration of al-Qaeda or similar ideological announcements.

### SECTION III: ORGANIZATIONAL CATEGORIES

3-30. There are many different categories of terrorism and terrorist groups and their levels of capability. This section addresses several common classifications of support to terrorist organizations and provides explanation relationships.

#### TERRORIST AFFILIATION

3-31. Categorizing terrorist groups by their affiliation with governments provides indications of their ability and means for intelligence, operations, and access to types of weapons. US joint doctrine identifies three affiliations: non-state supported, state-supported, and state-directed terrorist groups.<sup>116</sup>

##### NON-STATE SUPPORTED

These are terrorist groups that operate autonomously, receiving no significant support from any government.

##### STATE SUPPORTED

These are groups that generally operate independently but receive support from one or more governments.

##### STATE DIRECTED

These groups operate as an agent of a government and receive substantial intelligence, logistic, and operational support from the sponsoring government.



3-32. Association between or among terrorist groups increase their capabilities through the exchange of knowledge and other resources. Exchanges occur both directly and indirectly. Direct exchange occurs when one group provides the other with training or experienced personnel not readily available otherwise. An example of direct exchange is the provision of sophisticated bomb construction expertise by the IRA and ETA to less experienced groups. In 2001, three members associated with the IRA were arrested in Colombia. Traveling on false passports and with traces of explosives on their clothes and luggage,<sup>117</sup> the three individuals appeared to be an instance of inter-group terrorist support in use of explosives and other terrorist techniques. US government reports state an IRA and FARC connection since at least 1998 with multiple visits of IRA operatives to Colombia. Terrorism techniques not previously observed as a norm in FARC operations, such as use of secondary explosive devices, indicate a transfer of IRA techniques.<sup>118</sup>

3-33. In order to disseminate knowledge, terrorist organizations often develop extensive training initiatives. By the 1990s, al-Qaeda assembled thousands of pages of written training material, extensive libraries of training videos, and a global network of training camps.<sup>119</sup> This training material was distributed in both paper copy or via the Internet.

3-34. Indirect transfer of knowledge occurs when one group carries out a successful operation and is studied and emulated by others. The explosion of hijacking operations in the 1970s, and the similar proliferation of hostage taking in the 1980s were the result of terrorist groups observing and emulating successful attacks. However, this type of knowledge transfer is not restricted to just violent international terrorist groups.

3-35. These examples of knowledge exchange highlight the fact that assessments of terrorist threat capabilities cannot only be based upon proven operational abilities. Evaluating potential terrorist threats must consider what capabilities the specific terrorist cell may acquire through known or suspected associations with other groups.

---

<sup>116</sup> Joint Pub 3-07.2. *Antiterrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14 April 2006), II-4.

<sup>117</sup> Rachael Ehrenfeld, *IRA + PLO + Terror* [journal on-line] American Center for Democracy (ACD), 21 August 2002; available from <http://public-integrity.org/publications21.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2004.

<sup>118</sup> Jan Schuurman, *Tourists or Terrorists?* [press review on-line] Radio Netherlands, 25 April 2002; available from <http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/irel020425.html>; Internet; accessed 13 February 2004.

<sup>119</sup> Ben Venzke and Aimee Ibrahim, *The al-Qaeda Threat: An Analytical Guide to al-Qaeda's Tactics and Targets* (Alexandria: Tempest Publishing, LLC, 2003), 7.

## SUPPORT

3-36. There are several types of support that provide information about a terrorist group's capabilities. These are measures of the strength of financial, political, and popular support for a group, as well as the number of personnel and sympathizers the group influences. These factors indicate an organization's abilities to conduct and sustain operations, gather intelligence, seek sanctuary and exploit the results of operations.

- **Financial.** Is the organization well funded? Money is a significant force multiplier of terrorist capabilities and involves the practical matters of income and expenditure. Many of the terror groups of significant durability such as the IRA, HAMAS, or Hizballah have large financial resources. Infrastructure costs consider the political and social support obligations that some groups promote to the population they exist within in order to gain active or passive support.

3-37. HAMAS is an example of a terrorist organization that has strong financial backing. Although the actual amount of money available to HAMAS is difficult to determine, estimates are that they receive several tens of millions of dollars per year. Sources for their funding include unofficial sources in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, including approximately several million dollars worth of support per year from Iran. They also receive funds that are siphoned from apparent charities or profitable economic projects.<sup>120</sup>



Fig. 3-10. **HAMAS and Hizballah Politics**

- **Political.** Does the organization have political sponsors or representation, either within international, state, or sub-state political bodies? This measures the degree to which a group is state sponsored or supported, and considers whether the organization has its own political representatives or party that supports aims and methods. Political support can blur the distinction between terrorism and other forms of conflict and can generate sympathy and reduce negative consequences.

- **Popular.** What is the level of popular support or empathy? Passive or active support for the organization among populations it affects or operates within shapes

<sup>120</sup> "Hamas," International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Profiles of International Terrorist Organizations, n.d., 5-6; available from [http://www.ict.org.il/inter\\_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=13](http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=13); Internet; accessed 26 April 2004.

the organizational tempo of activities. Support from a constituency increases the effectiveness of other types of support and increases the legitimacy and visibility of a group. Popular support from populations terrorists operate within reduces the security risks and complicates the tasks of detection and defeat for the opposing security forces.



Fig. 3-11. IRA Poster

3-38. The size of a group in terms of the number of personnel is important but less so than other aspects of support. A small, well-funded, highly trained group may effectively attack targets, whereas a larger poorly funded and untrained group may be no direct threat to US targets other than those in immediate proximity to its base area of operations. For instance, the Japanese Red Army (JRA) conducted numerous attacks around the world in the 1970s, including an attempted takeover of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. In 1988, the JRA was suspected of bombing a USO club in Naples, where 5 people were killed, including a US servicewoman. Concurrent with this attack in Naples, a JRA operative was arrested with explosives on the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning an attack to coincide with the attack of the USO. Although the JRA conducted attacks around the world, the JRA only had six hard-core members, and at its peak, only had 30 to 40 members.<sup>121</sup>

## TRAINING

3-39. Training is the level of proficiency with tactics, techniques, technology and weapons useful to terrorist operations. Innovative application of tactics can render moderately harmless activities threatening. For example, the ability to stage a peaceful demonstration may be used to set the conditions for a riot that will provide cover for sniper assassinations of responding security forces.

3-40. Training video tapes have shown al-Qaeda operatives conducting live fire exercises for a number of scenarios. These scenarios include assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, and small unit raids on various types of targets. They

<sup>121</sup> Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002* (Washington, D.C., April 2003), 137.

often conduct detailed planning, diagramming, and walk-through rehearsals prior to the actual live-fire training exercise.

3-41. Proliferation of expertise and technology enables terrorist groups to obtain particular skills. In addition to the number of terrorists and terror groups that are willing and available to exchange training with one another, there are also experts in the technical, scientific, operational, and intelligence fields willing to provide training or augment operational capabilities on a contract basis.



Fig. 3-12. Training Video

## SUMMARY

3-42. This chapter provided descriptions of the common organizational models for terrorist groups. Discussion focused on hierarchical and networked structure. Levels of commitment exist within an organization and span senior leaders, active cadre, active supporters, and passive supporters. The cell is the foundation building block of either organization. Depending on how cells are linked to other elements, structure will display one of three basic configurations: chain, hub and star, or all-channel networks. Categorizing terrorist groups by their affiliation with governments can provide insight in terrorist intent and capability. Terrorist groups can align as state directed, state sponsored, or non-state supported organizations. This chapter assessed models of kidnapping organization related to terrorism and connections between acts of terror, criminal gang activities, and terrorist group affiliations.

3-43. **Know the Enemy.** Principal themes in this knowing are: (1) examine who will want to engage US military forces with terrorism, (2) understand organizational models of significant terrorist groups, (3) determine probable capabilities of specific terrorist groups based on their affiliation with other terrorist groups or sovereign governments. Proactive knowledge and situational awareness of an operational environment enhances the ability for US military forces to minimize the effects of terrorist activity in the conduct of unit missions.

## Chapter 4

# Hostage Case Vignettes

**When we hijack a plane it has more effect than if we kill a hundred...in battle...For decades, world opinion has been neither for nor against the Palestinians. It simply ignored us. At least the world is talking about us now.**

**George Habash**  
**Interview in German magazine *Der Stern* in 1970**

This chapter provides examples of hostage-taking incident analysis and implications. A methodology model of case study introduces basic principles to guide case development such as abstract, introduction, learning objectives, and case overview. Case questions and assessment set the stage for individual or group dialog and reflection in order to improve situational awareness and understanding, identify significant force protection issues, and learn from operational observations and after action critiques. Assessment can suggest ways to remedy readiness shortfalls as well as reinforce effective antiterrorism applications force protection.

### GENERAL




**Fig. 4-1. Soldiers on Point**

4-1. Two case vignettes present different perspectives on hostage taking. First, a case vignette presents the 1999 raid and abduction of three US Army soldiers near **KUMANOVO**, along the Serbia and Former Republic of Macedonia (FROM)

border. Three soldiers were released after one month of detention during the NATO air campaign against the Republic of Yugoslavia. Second, **KARBALA**, Iraq is a case vignette of the 2007 raid and abduction of several US Army soldiers. Several soldiers were murdered by their captors shortly after the seizure as their captors were being pursued by coalition forces.

4-2. An additional case study is available in TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.01, *Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terrorism*, dated 25 July 2007. This particular incident describes the seizure of a middle school in **BESLAN**, North Ossetia (Russia) in 2004 by Islamic extremist-terrorists. This mass hostage-taking crisis resulted in hundreds of deaths and hundreds of additional injured individuals. Several avenues of inquiry assess actions by government officials, military and security forces, law enforcement officers, negotiators, first responder teams, local citizens, and the terrorists. This case study has particular value for both military operational learning and institutional preparedness in military-civilian community and installation training and readiness.



**CASE STUDY ELEMENTS: A MODEL**

4-3. Case study method is a process of shared responsibility and disciplined exploration. In this terrorism handbook, case study organization comprises three main elements of (1) a case study abstract; (2) a main body comprising an introduction, learning objectives, situational overview, focus areas, case study discussion questions, and a brief case assessment; and (3) a reference list of selected open-source references per terrorist incident. The references are a prompt to seek additional resources through multi-media research and professional study.

4-4. Case study is an effective adult learning method that "...provides an opportunity to gain confidence in one's own judgment, but also a degree of humility as well. It also provides a most invaluable opportunity to learn how far

one can go by rigorous logical analyses of one of the other dimensions of the problem and the extent to which judgment comes into play when many factors which have no common denominator must be weighed.”<sup>122</sup>

4-5. This process guides, but does not dictate, a learning outcome. Using case method, every iteration “...provides opportunity for new intellectual adventure, for risk taking, for new learning. One may have taught [studied] the case before, but last year’s notes have limited current value. With a new group of students [leaders], the unfolding dynamic of a unique section, and different time circumstances, familiar material is revitalized.”<sup>123</sup>

4-6. Interaction among individuals can involve different techniques to compare and contrast analysis and synthesis of case study material. After an initial reading of the case study, options include focusing each student on one specific aspect of the incident and requiring an appraisal, creating two-person groups to identify key issues for the larger group study, using small groups to be advocates on a particular aspect of motivation, behavior, or outcome in an incident, or direct a simple free-writing exercise to suggest student topics for further investigation.<sup>124</sup>

4-7. Closure of a case study is based on a premise that most case studies do not have an endpoint answer or a salient solution. The norm should be a confirmation of what new understanding and awareness exists from case study, what actions may be appropriate in the immediate future, and what additional questions have been identified as a continuum of investigation and refinement .<sup>125</sup>

4-8. The case study presents, analyzes, and assesses salient aspects of a terrorism incident. This method evolves from an overarching study of selected terrorism characteristics, specified learning objectives, case questions which focus analysis, and a summarized assessment of the analysis for discussion. Research data comes from unclassified sources and is available from common open-source portals.

<sup>122</sup> Louis B. Barnes, C. Roland Christensen, and Abby J. Hansen. *Teaching and the Case Method*. (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1994), 41.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>124</sup> Raymond J. Wlodkowski, *Enhancing Adult Motivation to Learn*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1999), 228.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 230.

## CASE METHODOLOGY

**Abstract.** A brief statement summarizes the case study and its significant observations on foreign or domestic terrorism.

**Introduction.** A preface presents the principal contents and purpose of the case study. Providing background information, the introduction provides context to the incident and enhances an appreciation of the sequence of events and act of terrorism.

**Learning Objectives.** The group of intended outcomes from the case study enables focused study, discussion, and analysis of a specific terrorist incident.

**Case Questions.** Issues, stated as open-ended questions, propose primary study topics. These queries explore relationships of terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), and how terrorist capabilities were implemented to achieve a terrorist objective.

**Assessment.** Cogent statements summarize deliberate analyses of causal factors or linked relationships in a specified act of terrorism, and present informed conclusions to optimize planning and actions against terrorism capabilities.

**CASE STUDY: KUMANOVO (1999)**

**US Soldiers Near Kumanovo (1999)**

President Milosevic should make no mistake...We [USA] will hold him and his government responsible for their [Stone, Ramirez, Gonzales] safety and for their well-being.<sup>126</sup>

**US President Bill Clinton**



Fig. 4-1. Clinton and Milosevic

**MAP: REGION/LOCAL**

Former Yugoslav Republic  
of Macedonia, FYROM  
Vicinity Kumanovo




Figure 4-2. Balkan Region and Kumanovo

**ABSTRACT**

On 31 March 1999, three US Army soldiers were seized during a NATO peacekeeping and observation mission near the Macedonian and Serbia-Yugoslavia border. Yugoslav authorities claimed that the soldiers entered Serbian territory<sup>127</sup> and would be prosecuted as criminals in a Yugoslav military court rather than in

<sup>126</sup> “Captured US soldiers face military court in Yugoslavia,” *CNN.com*; available from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/01/nato.attack.05/>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>127</sup> “Three US soldiers captured by Yugoslav army,” *CNN.com*; available from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/01/nato-attack.02/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

accordance with the Geneva Convention.<sup>128</sup> The Yugoslav government exploited images of the three young men in uniform, two of them with obvious bruises and injuries, on Yugoslav television and with the international media. Soon afterwards, Yugoslavia stated that the US soldiers would not be tried and would be released at the end of hostilities. Nonetheless, a 32-day campaign of Yugoslav propaganda about the prisoners attempted to divert attention from the ongoing NATO mission to prevent ethnic atrocities in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia. The three soldiers were released by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević on 2 May 1999 to a delegation of US religious leaders.

Aspects of the capture and uncertainty of hostage negotiations are informative for conditions that can be very similar to a kidnapping incident.

## REGION SITUATIONAL BACKGROUND

As a name, Yugoslavia existed since 1929 in a region formerly named The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes from a post-World War I accord. After World War II, Marshal Tito consolidated his wartime partisan authority over a collection of many ethnic groups and instituted a government that progressed in its own style of communism-socialism for over four decades. The charismatic leadership of Tito and the uniqueness of Yugoslavia were inseparable in the subsequent decades of Warsaw Pact and NATO tensions across Europe.

When Tito died in 1980, Yugoslavian solidarity started to fray due to ethnic rivalries in a once unified Yugoslavia. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) declared their independence in 1991. The remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992. President Slobodan Milošević used coercion, paramilitary, and military actions in attempts to unite Serbs and neighboring republics into a "Greater Serbia." War erupted in Bosnia and regional areas suffered through massacres, mass expulsion of ethnic groups, and a resulting mass exodus of refugees from contested areas.

The Kosovo region experienced similar crimes as ethnic Albanians attempted to remove Kosovo from Serbia and declare independence. Criminal actions by several factions in 1997 and 1998 indicated that a peaceful settlement was very unlikely.<sup>129</sup> NATO determined that additional pressure must, "...enhance and supplement [Partnership for Peace] PfP activities in both Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to promote security and stability in these Partner countries

<sup>128</sup> "Milosevic may see soldiers' trial as media diversion," *CNN.com*; available from <http://www.cnn.com/US/9904/us.kosovo.01/>; Internet; accessed 24 February 2008.

<sup>129</sup> "Kosovo: A Chronology of Crisis;" available from <http://www.aiipowmia.com/other/kosovo.html>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2008.

and to signal NATO's interest in containing the crisis and seeking a peaceful resolution.”<sup>130</sup> In September 1998, NATO issued an ultimatum to stop all aggression but determined that the deteriorating regional situation required a forced peace accord.

By early 1999, continued expulsion of ethnic Albanians living in the autonomous republic of Kosovo and charges of “ethnic cleansing” by Serbs caused an international response. Some actions and reactions by members of the paramilitary Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) rated no better in escalating incidents of murder and mayhem. In January, the US announced a plan to end fighting in Kosovo and supported NATO air strikes if autonomy to the region was not accepted by Milošević. NATO allies warned Milošević that immediate force and ground troops could be used to enforce a peace settlement in Kosovo.<sup>131</sup>



Fig. 4-3. War-torn Village and Ethnic Fighting

International diplomacy stalemated as Milošević encouraged continued acts of murder and terror by Serbian military, paramilitary, and special police in Kosovo.



Fig 4-4. Refugees Flee to the Macedonian Border

During March 1999, Yugoslav Army and paramilitary Ministry of Interior troops moved out of garrisons in Kosovo and about 20,000 additional Serb forces massed at the northern Kosovo border.<sup>132</sup> On March 24, 2008 NATO forces conducted a broad wave of air attacks against Yugoslav forces in an attempt to halt the Yugoslav offensive in Kosovo. Cruise missiles and planes attacked over 40 sites to include military sites near Belgrade.

<sup>130</sup> NATO Press Release, “Statement on Kosovo,” May 28, 1998; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-061e.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2008.

<sup>131</sup> “Timeline Serbia 1998-1999;” available from [http://timelines.ws/countries/SERBIA\\_B.HTML](http://timelines.ws/countries/SERBIA_B.HTML); Internet; accessed 26 February 2008.

<sup>132</sup> Steve Bowman, “Kosovo and Macedonia: US and Allied Military Operations,” *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, July 8, 2003, 2.

Over the subsequent days, NATO broadened its air attacks on Yugoslavia to target Serb military forces in Kosovo. United Nations officials reported that some 500,000 ethnic Albanians had fled Kosovo. NATO officials raised the possibility of using ground troops in Yugoslavia as low-level air strikes began against armored vehicles and other tactical targets. Albania and Macedonia appealed for help as thousands of refugees fled Kosovo. By the end of March, NATO declared that Serbs were targeting ethnic Albanian leadership for executions and the US accused Milosevic of "crimes against humanity."<sup>133</sup> NATO accused Yugoslav authorities of deliberate "identity elimination" of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Yugoslav's representative at the UN countered with an allegation that NATO was creating an "artificial humanitarian situation" in an effort to expand NATO influence in the Balkans.<sup>134</sup>

The NATO air campaign continued a punishing offensive against critical infrastructure and Yugoslav-Serb forces.

The situation along the borders of regional nations such as Albania and Macedonia remained tense. As Serb forces continued attacks on Kosovar Albanians, Yugoslavia fortified its border with Macedonia as a likely staging area for any NATO peacekeeping force.<sup>135</sup>

## INCIDENT OVERVIEW.



As the NATO air campaign continued to pummel targets in Serbia and Kosovo, Serbian forces captured three US soldiers by during a NATO observation patrol on March 31, 1999 along the northern Macedonian border facing Serbia.<sup>136</sup>

Previously, the US Army had been participating in a United Nations mission called UNPREDP, the UN Preventive Deployment, as a protective measure for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).<sup>137</sup> The UN mandate was essentially



<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

<sup>134</sup> "Three US soldiers captured by Yugoslav army – 'Artificial refugee crisis,'" *CNN.com*; April 1, 2008; available from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/01/nato.attack.02/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>135</sup> "Timeline of events - Kosovo Uprising 1998-1999," available from <http://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr95/fkosovo1998.htm>; Internet; accessed 26 February 2008.

<sup>136</sup> "US Soldiers Ambushed in Macedonia, Beaten by Serb captors," May 11, 1999; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/utiloity/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defenselink.mil/nes/...>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>137</sup> "Pentagon: US soldiers' capture not stopping NATO bombing missions – Pentagon; Geneva Conventions cover all hostilities," April 1, 1999; available from

preventive, to monitor and report any development in the border areas that could undermine the confidence and stability in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or threaten its territory. The mission terminated in February 1999.<sup>138</sup> After the UN mission ended, US Army forces remained in the area to protect US infrastructure at Camp Able Sentry at the Skopje airport. This locale would be a probable staging area for NATO peacekeepers if they were deployed into Kosovo.<sup>139</sup>




Figure 4-5. Above left, Macedonia and Serbia Border Area

Figure 4-6. Above right, Terrain Relief Northwest of Kumanovo, FYROM

The three US soldiers were on a routine reconnaissance patrol northwest of Kumanovo, a town about 15 miles northeast of Skopje and the last large Macedonian town along Route E75 prior to meeting the Serbian border. Kumanovo is about 5 miles to east of the tri-border intersection of Kosovo, Serbia, and Macedonia. The three soldiers in an armored HMMWV were part of a larger three vehicle US patrol<sup>140</sup> that split into individual teams.<sup>141</sup>

<http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/01/nato.attack.04/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>138</sup> "UNITED NATIONS PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT FORCE;" available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/medals/unpredep.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 February 2008.

<sup>139</sup> "Pentagon: US soldiers' capture not stopping NATO bombing missions – Pentagon; Geneva Conventions cover all hostilities," April 1, 1999; available from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/01/nato.attack.04/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>140</sup> "Three US soldiers captured by Yugoslav army," *CNN.com*; available from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/01/nato-attack.02/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

Later during the patrol, the lone HMMWV and soldiers were fired on by 15 to 20 Serbs in military uniform with about 40 to 50 small arms rounds hitting their armored vehicle. Rough terrain slowed their attempt to evade the Serbs and gunfire. Once surrounded and with no other US assistance in sight, the leader of the three US soldiers decided to surrender without returning fire.

The first report of the incident was a hasty radio transmission from the US soldiers that they were receiving small arms fire and were surrounded. Three grid coordinates were received<sup>142</sup> but radio transmissions were interrupted and no clear location could be identified by other US patrol members in the vicinity. Contact ceased suddenly with the three soldier patrol. US and Macedonian forces initiated an immediate search in the area with air and ground assets but did not find the soldiers.



Fig. 4-7. US POW Medal

Within hours, Serb television displayed three bruised and injured US soldiers captured, according to Serb authorities, in Yugoslav territory.<sup>143</sup> Yugoslavia stated that the three soldiers would be tried by a military court. US reaction was immediate. President Clinton stated, “Yesterday three American infantrymen were seized as they were carrying out a peaceful mission in Macedonia. There was absolutely no basis for them to be taken. There is no basis for them to be held. There is certainly no basis for them to be tried.”<sup>144</sup>

Meanwhile, air strikes against Serb and Yugoslav forces and infrastructure continued. Targets included Yugoslav special forces, armored and other military vehicles, Serb ground forces and aircraft, and locations such as fuel facilities and a

---

<sup>141</sup> “NATO confirms US soldiers captured, Serbian TV shows men bruised and bleeding – NATO says the 3 are missing US servicemen,” April 1, 1999; available from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/01/nato.attack.01/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>142</sup> Gerry J. Gilmore, “US Soldiers Ambushed in Macedonia, Beaten by Serb Captors,” May 11, 1999; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/utility/pritnitem.aspx?print=http://www.defenselink.mil/news/...>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008. Major General Grange, Commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division comments as reported by American Forces Press Service.

<sup>143</sup> “NATO confirms US soldiers captured, Serbian TV shows men bruised and bleeding – NATO says the 3 are missing US servicemen,” April 1, 1999; available from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/01/nato.attack.01/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>144</sup> “Clinton says any trial of US soldiers has no basis;” available from <http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/1999/04/02/fhead.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

key bridge across the Danube River.<sup>145</sup> The NATO Secretary General reaffirmed that the alliance was determined to halt the killing of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and to damage the Serb “war machinery” in Yugoslavia as much as possible.<sup>146</sup>

On April 1, Serb security and paramilitary forces attacked into southwestern Kosovo and the city of Djakovica. Reports of civilians being murdered came from refugees. Similar reports continued in the following days of April as Yugoslav forces increased the expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo, and even crossed into northeastern Albania to temporarily seize a border village.<sup>147</sup>

Legal status of the three US soldiers was quickly addressed by the International Committee of the Red Cross with a statement that the three soldiers qualified as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention: “There is an armed conflict between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and these three captured soldiers are...prisoners of war.”<sup>148</sup> By early April, Yugoslavia acknowledged that the soldiers would not be tried and would be released at the end of hostilities. Nonetheless, this prisoner incident was a bargaining chip in Milošević’s political maneuvering and attempts to exploit media attention while Serbs and Yugoslavs continued expulsion and terror of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo<sup>149</sup> and offensive military and paramilitary actions in the region.

## RAID OR MEETING ENGAGEMENT

What actually happened near Kumanovo? As report of the capture raced throughout the international media, some correspondents speculated that the US soldiers may have strayed into Yugoslav territory by mistake. Other questions arose on why the patrol was out of mutual support distance from other vehicles in the observation mission.<sup>150</sup> The British



Fig. 4-8. Serb Soldiers Observe and Prepare

<sup>145</sup> “Three US soldiers captured by Yugoslav army,” *CNN.com*; available from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/01/nato-attack.02/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>146</sup> “NATO widens target list, seeks missing soldiers,” March 31, 1999; available from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/31/nato.atack.05/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>147</sup> Janet McMahon, “A Chronology of US-Middle East Relations,” *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Jul/August 1999; available from <http://www.wrmea.com/backissues/0799/9907060.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>148</sup> “Steven M. Gonzales;” available from <http://www.usvetdsp.com/gonzales.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>149</sup> “NATO widens target list, seeks missing soldiers,” March 31, 1999; available from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9903/31/nato.atack.05/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*

Foreign Secretary stated that the US soldiers were seized in a “snatch” [raid] operation in Macedonian territory.<sup>151</sup> US officials were analyzing what was known of the circumstances and stated that the US soldiers had been in Macedonia when captured.

Well after the seizure and eventual release of the three US soldiers, one perspective came from individual interviews with each of the three soldiers in the open press.<sup>152</sup> The following narrative is a condensed and combined version of the three US soldier’s experiences from their seizure by Yugoslav forces until their release over 30 days later to a US nongovernmental religious delegation.

**“We were conducting a reconnaissance mission...it was clear that we were in Macedonia.”**

SSG Stone

US Army Staff Sergeant Christopher Stone, Staff Sergeant Andrew Ramirez, and Specialist Steven Gonzales were the crew of an armored HMMWV<sup>153</sup> in a three vehicle reconnaissance patrol. While deployed along the Macedonian border as part of a United Nations peacekeeping mission in the region, patrolling along the border had been peaceful. Local villagers usually waved and smiled as the patrols passed through villages or countryside.

When the UN terminated this mission, US Army forces remained in the region under a NATO charter. The US Army changed uniforms and vehicles representing a UN presence to the green HMMWVs and normal uniforms of the US Army in a NATO role. The attitude of villagers shifted dramatically as the threat increased of NATO airstrikes against the Yugoslav Republic. Villagers were unfriendly and even included throwing rocks at passing NATO vehicles.

By March 31, 1999, the NATO air campaign had already been bombing Yugoslavia for several days. The three vehicle patrol was conducting its regular observation mission in the vicinity of the Macedonian border. The vehicles separated to

<sup>151</sup> “NATO confirms US soldiers captured, Serbian TV shows men bruised and bleeding – NATO says the 3 are missing US servicemen,” April 1, 1999; available from <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9904/01/nato.attack.01/index.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>152</sup> “War Stories – THREE US P.O.W.s CAPTURED BY SERBS;” available from <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/video/>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2008. These *Frontline* interviews describe personal recollections of the patrol, initial contact with the Serbs, the attempt to evade the small arms fire and capture, the physical abuse by the Serbs, the Serb television interview, their imprisonment, and eventual release to a nongovernmental US delegation.

<sup>153</sup> HMMWV: acronym for High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle.

accomplish individual mission tasks in their sector. SSG Stone's vehicle was performing reconnaissance of a secondary route that the patrol might have to use for a withdrawal if Serb-Yugoslav military forces crossed the border into Macedonia. The patrol was familiar with the rugged terrain, the road network, and local villages.

As the US Army team returned from their reconnaissance, they passed through a village they had passed through at least ten times in the previous 30 days. At first nothing appeared unusual from past patrols but as they drove through the village, they noticed a military truck on the outskirts of the village. Although a truck was not expected to be in the village, SSG Ramirez thought was that Macedonians must be training in the area. The US Army team continued along the village road while maintaining some distance between the vehicle and villagers who, in the past, had thrown rocks at the vehicle.

For SSG Stone and SSG Ramirez inside the vehicle cab, the irritation of hearing rocks bounce off the HMMWV changed suddenly to shock and the instant recognition that something was terribly wrong.

**“Down!”**

SPC Gonzales

Specialist Gonzales, as the gunner standing up in the turret, was first to recognize that the pings were actually rifle shots ricocheting off the armor of the HMMWV. He heard the distinctive report of gunshots from somewhere to the rear of the vehicle. As Gonzales yelled, “Down!” and ducked down from the turret, Ramirez felt the “tink-tink-

tink” in quick succession against the vehicle and knew they were taking fire. Stone was thinking “Ambush!” to himself. Ramirez reacted with immediate evasive driving to get out of the zone of small arms fire.



Fig. 4-9. Typical Macedonian Village

Thinking the shooting was coming from the truck on their left they had just passed, Ramirez turned right down a dirt road. Gonzales saw Serb soldiers for the first time as the HMMWV turned. The situation fared no better as 12 to 15 Serb soldiers came into view clustered in a small group next to the road. The Serbs looked surprised. Ramirez turned the HMMWV around quickly to avoid small arms fire from the flank. Events got worse. More Yugoslav soldiers were appearing from behind rocks and

haystacks. Stone remembered that moments later the vehicle was being hit with bullets from all sides.

Stone called in a situation report to his platoon sergeant that the team was under fire and surrounded. He stated the grid coordinates from the global positioning system (GPS) in the vehicle but unknown to Stone, only three of the coordinates were received. Then, the radio stopped transmitting. Afterwards, Stone reflected that the antenna may have been damaged by gunfire. In the same moments, Ramirez was attempting to get the vehicle maneuvering out of the gunfire but drove along and into a ditch next to the dirt trail. Then, the vehicle engine stopped abruptly. Ramirez believed that so many bullets hit the engine compartment that it simply ceased to function. As the vehicle wedged into a ditch, he could not get the vehicle restarted.



Figure 4-10.  
SSG Ramirez



Figure 4-11.  
SSG Stone



Figure 4-12.  
SPC Gonzales

Serb soldiers continued to fire at the HMMWV even when the vehicle had stopped. The firing stopped and they rushed the vehicle. Both the US soldiers and Serbs stared at each other and wondered what would happen in the next few seconds. Inside the HMMWV, the three US soldiers looked at each other and knew that any additional resistance was foolhardy. They had been surprised and they were surrounded. Since their mission rules of engagement directed that weapons be unloaded, any consideration to load their own weapons now was rash with about 30 Serb soldiers right outside the HMMWV.

Serb soldiers pounced on Ramirez, Stone, and Gonzales as they exited the vehicle. Five or six Serb soldiers grabbed each US soldier and started ripping their helmets and equipment off. At the same time, the Serbs were violently kicking and hitting their prisoners. Ramirez was hit in the head with the stock of a rifle that opened a gash as he fell to the ground. Soldiers kept kicking and stomping him. Later, Ramirez would learn he had broken ribs. Gonzales was kicked and beat while on the ground and was knocked semi-conscious when kicked squarely in the face. Some Serbs thought they had broken his leg. Stone received similar severe kicks and punches. The beatings stopped temporarily about five minutes after surrendering.

As the US soldiers lay on the ground among the Serb soldiers, a Serb leader directed that the US soldiers have their hands bound and brought toward the village. Villagers started to arrive and watched as the US soldiers were brought behind a horse stable. Ramirez remembered that a Serb guarding Stone had a pistol pointed to Stone's head. The Serb leader pushed the pistol away from Stone's head. Gonzales recalled being dragged around the corner of the building and hearing "...Kill you – Kill you!" in broken English from his captor.

**"We were all placed on our knees, the three of us with our hands behind our head. They put a rifle to the back of my head."**

SSG Stone

When they arrived behind the stable and were being searched, the three US soldiers were pushed their knees with their bound hands behind their heads. They were spaced abreast of each other facing a wall. Ramirez was in the middle, with Stone was on his right and Gonzales on his left. Gonzales used his peripheral vision to see rifles pointed at the rear of their heads and could sense the presence of a soldier and weapon behind his own head. Ramirez remembered thinking, "This is it. One of us is going to take it in the head, and me being in the middle, I'll probably see one of them get it."

**"One of us is going to take it in the head."**

SSG Ramirez

Whether this was a mock execution or a situation about to become a multiple murder is unclear; however, a Serb leader appeared and the US soldiers were pushed to the ground on their stomachs and searched. Beatings continued. One Serb hit Stone in the face with a running kick. In Stone's own words, "...right in the face. My nose immediately began to gush blood. After that, they did bring some gauze and put it in my nose after he kicked me."



Fig. 4-13. Serb Soldiers Near the Macedonian Border

These actions occurred within the 20 to 30 minutes of capture. Stone, Ramirez, and Gonzales were loaded on the floor of a Serb truck with their hands still bound and hoods over their heads. They were transported, under guard, for about an hour over rough winding roads that eventually entered on what seemed to feel like a major highway. The truck stopped at a military site and the three US soldiers were brought to a tent for medical treatment of their injuries. Ramirez received stitches for a head gash. Gonzales' leg

was inspected for a possible broken bone. All three soldiers were checked based on multiple bruises and cuts, and patches of blood on their uniforms. One of the medical people mentioned that they were prisoners of war and would be treated under the Geneva Convention.<sup>154</sup> They remounted the truck and were transported for about two more hours before arriving at a larger city.<sup>155</sup>

## EXPLOITATION AND INTERROGATION

Stone, Ramirez, and Gonzales were separated from each other upon arrival at the city. They were interviewed individually in a press conference type of format with cameras and Yugoslav Republic civilian and military officials. They were not coerced on what to say in response to staged questions, but most of the questions were strategic issues far beyond their tactical ability to answer. Questions presented issues of international politics and policies and the purpose of the NATO air campaign. These interviews occurred within the first six or seven hours since their capture.

For several days, the three US soldiers were detained in a nearby facility for interrogation. For the first one or two days, the soldiers were placed in a chair, hands bound behind their back and a hood over their head. While waiting to be interrogated, the anxiety of not knowing what would occur next and the isolation of not being able to look around was unnerving. A guard watched them 24 hours a day. The soldiers were not allowed to speak. If a soldier moved from a specific position, the guard would kick or beat him.

By the second or third day, the soldiers were placed on their side on the floor with hands still bound behind their back, a hood covering their head, and their legs bent. They were not allowed to move. The only relief came when they would eat a meal or be allowed to use the rest room. Even then, muscles, pressure points, and joints were very sore and cramped. Ramirez recalled the body pain of being in that restrictive position once for about a day and a half.

SSG Stone remembered the many times he contemplated whether or not they would survive their capture: "Within that first seven days, I was just preparing myself for the fact that we may not make it out of here."

**"...keep my head busy."**

SSG Ramirez

<sup>154</sup> "Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War," United Nations, Office of the High Commission for Human Rights: As adopted on 12 August 1949 by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, held in Geneva from 21 April to 12 August, 1949 with entry into force 21 October 1950; available from <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 March 2008.

<sup>155</sup> SSG Stone believes that this city was Nis, Serbia.

SSG Ramirez underwent four to seven interrogations in the seven days at this facility. Gonzales recalled three or four interrogations. He recalled the isolation of being in the dark and not knowing if it was day or night. Ramirez tried to keep his "...head busy with data." He felt the discomfort of being dehydrated and the strain of having to hold his bowel movements for long periods without relief. By the sixth or seventh day, he hallucinated at least once and called out to a member of his unit that he thought was there to rescue him. The guard ignored him.

The three person interrogation team consisted of a man in military uniform, a woman interpreter, a man in civilian clothes, and guards. Questions were asked through the interpreter. The hood was removed from the soldier's head and he might be allowed to have his bound hands in front of him as he sat on a chair.

The interpreter and interrogators would take turns in questioning and become angry often either as a technique or from actual frustration. Even though the soldiers did not know answers to strategic questions from the interrogators and stated this to them, interrogator techniques included asking a question and yelling or banging fists on a table. Another interrogator technique was to walk slowly back and forth behind the soldier tapping on a pistol in its holster. Ask a question. Demand an answer. The movement of guards standing behind the soldier was another unsettling psychological technique. Ask a question. Create anxiety. SSG Stone remembered one guard coming up and placing a baton against his neck while another interrogator lifted his coat up to display a revolver as a threat.

Other lines of questioning sought a confession that the three soldiers were part of a US special forces unit on a clandestine surveillance mission in preparation for a NATO attack, or a team for electronic intercepts or locating downed NATO pilots. Gonzalez remembered being accused of being a spy to assist a ground war against Serbia. The three US soldiers denied all of these probes. SSG Stone was never specifically told that they were prisoners of war, but recalled interrogators saying he would be put on trial as a war criminal.

After several days of interrogation, Yugoslav authorities realized that any useful intelligence from the soldiers, if any significant information had ever existed to exploit, was now old and of no immediate value. Yet, senior Yugoslav officials realized the media attention that three captured US soldiers could still provide as the NATO air campaign increased in its attacks.

## **ISOLATION AND PRISON CELL**

About the seventh day of captivity, the three US soldiers were moved to a prison facility. Each soldier was placed in a separate cell about four feet by four feet by twelve feet with simple furnishings of a bed, small table, and toilet facility. Their

hands were not bound and they could walk within the cell. Guards told them some basic rules on making their bed and keeping their cell clean. They were allowed to use their toilet and small wash basin as needed.

Each soldier could hear guards talking occasionally to each of the other US soldiers in their individual cells but were not allowed to say anything to either of the other US soldiers. Knowing that the other US soldiers were nearby was a consolation as the subsequent days were a period of confinement but without the physical and mental abuse experienced in the former facility and interrogations.

## **RELEASE AND FREEDOM**

Unknown to the three US soldiers, in early April a Cypriot envoy attempted to negotiate their release, but was unsuccessful. By late April, a 19-member religious delegation of US Orthodox Christian, Muslim, Roman Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant leaders traveled to Yugoslavia to seek the release of the three US soldiers. Reverend Jesse Jackson, and Dr. Joan Brown as the General Secretary of the National Council of Churches, were co-leaders of the delegation. Reverend Jackson had organized the trip even though Clinton Administration officials discouraged the effort.

In the weeks of imprisonment, the three US soldiers could hear air raid sirens, planes flying overhead, and the explosion of bombs. Their only updates on events going on outside of their cells were the inflated and false claims by guards of how many NATO aircraft had been shot down. Stone remembered being told several times that the US had not requested their release. Gonzales used routines to assist in coping with the isolation one day at a time: he made his bed and cleaned his cell per the instructions of guards, walked patterns within his cell, exercised before and after his meals, prayed and sang songs to himself, and once Red Cross items arrived, played card games like solitaire.

Reverend Jackson ensured that President Milošević understood Jackson had no authority to negotiate for the US Government. Initial expectations of the delegation were in doubt with statements by the Yugoslav assistant Foreign Minister declaring that the release of the US soldiers was not "...on the agenda."<sup>156</sup> Nonetheless, subsequent discussions occurred between the delegation and Yugoslav officials, as well as a private meeting between Milošević and Jackson to promote the "...advantages of taking the risk for peace".<sup>157</sup> While Jackson presented a moral appeal

<sup>156</sup> Rev. Jesse L. Jackson: Wins Freedom For American POWs In Yugoslavia," *Jet*, May 17, 1999; available from [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1355/is\\_24\\_95/ai\\_54796431/print](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1355/is_24_95/ai_54796431/print); Internet; accessed 21February 2008.

<sup>157</sup> Susan Sachs, "CRISIS IN THE BALKANS: PRISONERS; Serbs Release 3 Captured US Soldiers," May 2, 1999, *nytimes.com*; available from

to “build a diplomatic bridge,” Milošević indicated that one soldier, SSG Stone, might be released. Jackson noted that with Stone being “White” and Ramirez and Gonzales being Hispanic, releasing only Stone would “...send a very ugly signal back home.”<sup>158</sup> Eventually, Milošević agreed to an unconditional release all three US soldiers. When Jackson received a letter from President Milošević to give to President Clinton addressing NATO conditions to stop the air bombing campaign, Jackson reaffirmed he was not representing the US Government.

Stone, Ramirez, and Gonzales were unaware of the religious delegation. They were kept in isolation at the prison and met their first visitors when representatives from the International Red Cross arrived only days before a visit by Reverend Jackson, a US Congressman, and two journalists. A second visit to the three soldiers by members of the religious delegation indicated that they might be released in the very near future.

On May 2, 1999, SSG Stone, SSG Ramirez, and SPC Gonzales were released after the US delegation and Yugoslav officials signed official documents. As the delegation met the three soldiers, “They [Stone, Ramirez, Gonzales] came in and stood at attention with great dignity and self respect and they were quite self-contained and in control.”<sup>159</sup>

In the departure statement of the religious delegation, the Mission of United States Religious Leaders to Belgrade, noted that “The violence suffered by all people in Yugoslavia must end...the violence in Kosovo which has led to thousands of refugees; the death and destruction from the bombing campaign; and the constant rhetoric that demonizes rather than engages...Bombing and more war cannot bring peace....The role of faith must be a binding factor in this equation. We want to be forces for good and to promote negotiation over confrontation.”<sup>160</sup>



President Clinton thanked Jackson for his efforts to free the US soldiers, and also declared his intention to continue to solve the Kosovo tragedy: “As welcome our soldiers home, our thoughts also turn to the over 1 million Kosovars who are unable to go home because of the policies of the regime in Belgrade...Today we

---

<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A05EFD8163CF931A35756C0A96F958...>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>158</sup> Rev. Jesse L. Jackson: Wins Freedom For American POWs In Yugoslavia,” *Jet*, May 17, 1999; available from [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1355/is\\_24\\_95/ai\\_54796431/print](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1355/is_24_95/ai_54796431/print); Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>159</sup> Carol Fouke and Roy Lloyd, “US Religious Leaders Receive Freed Soldiers, Bring Them Out,” May 2, 1999, National Council of Churches, *1999 NCC News Archives*; available from <http://www.nccusa.org/news/99news54.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>160</sup> Rev. Jesse L. Jackson: Wins Freedom For American POWs In Yugoslavia,” *Jet*, May 17, 1999; available from [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1355/is\\_24\\_95/ai\\_54796431/print](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1355/is_24_95/ai_54796431/print); Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

reaffirm our resolve to persevere until they, too, can return with security and self-government.”<sup>161</sup>

In media interviews at the Croatian-Yugoslav border, the three soldiers indicated they were sympathetic with some guards on their most recent prison captivity and hoped that the two armed forces would not be forced to be enemies. Another report used terms of “...no ill will toward the Yugoslav people” and that the US soldiers had been treated well.<sup>162</sup> Some news media suggested that the US soldiers had started to identify psychologically with their captors in a Stockholm syndrome effect.<sup>163</sup>



Upon release of the three US soldiers, facial bruises and cuts from their capture were still obvious. During complete physical evaluations at a US military hospital in Germany, inspections revealed that Stone had been injured with a broken nose, Ramirez had two broken ribs and a swollen right leg. Other issues included wrist injuries due to the recurring handcuff use.

SSG Stone, SSG Ramirez, and SPC Gonzales received recognition by the US Army, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for their military duty and conduct in Macedonia and captivity. The medals spotlighted the US Armed Forces expeditionary nature of their mission, their service as part of a UN peacekeeping force, their subsequent duty as part of a NATO military mission, a commendation from the US Army, their status as former prisoners of war, and possibly most significant – the award of the Purple Heart medal for wounds received in a hostile environment.<sup>164</sup>

President Clinton had signed an Executive Order on April 13 declaring the area around Yugoslavia a combat zone

<sup>161</sup> Ibid.

<sup>162</sup> Carol Fouke and Roy Lloyd, “US Religious Leaders Receive Freed Soldiers, Bring Them Out,” May 2, 1999, National Council of Churches, *1999 NCC News Archives*; available from <http://www.ncccusa.org/news/99news54.html>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>163</sup> Thomas Atkins, “US Soldiers Pass tests, Signs of Injuries, American Soldiers Arrive at US Military Hospital in Landstuhl,” Bio-Yugo, Stone, Christopher J.; available from <http://www.pownetwork.org/bios/yugoslavia/ys01.htm>; Internet; accessed 24 September 2007. The syndrome is named after the Norrmalmstorg bank robbery in Stockholm, Sweden in August 1973 when hostages developed compassion and a supportive for their captors over the several day crisis. The term “Stockholm Syndrome” was coined by a criminologist and psychiatrist involved in the negotiations and post-crisis analysis.

<sup>164</sup> “Freed US soldiers heading home with Purple Hearts,” *CNN.com*, May 7, 1999; available from <http://www.cnn.com/US/9905/06/pows.return.home.02/>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2008.

with an effective date of 24 March 1999. The area encompassed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Kosovo), Albania, the Adriatic Sea and Ionian Sea above the 39<sup>th</sup> parallel.<sup>165</sup>

Reviewing the details of the March 31, 1999 incident near Kumonovo soon after the release of the three soldiers, US Army officials "...concluded beyond a shadow of a doubt that they [Stone, Ramirez, and Gonzales] were abducted by forces (who were) at least dressed in VJ (Yugoslav armed forces) uniforms within Macedonia." US military officials believe that the soldiers were under observation for some time from the Yugoslav side of the border before the abduction.<sup>166</sup>

## **TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES.**

### ***How "might" this raid-terrorism have been planned and conducted?***

- **Broad Target Selection.**

Surveyed border trace for NATO military forces working with Macedonian military or police forces.

- **Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance.**

Received regular reports on isolated small NATO units working along the Macedonia-Serbia border.

Calculated probable time-distance factors for quick reaction among small NATO observation or reconnaissance forces.

Observed actions at regular or random security routes in the vicinity of the Macedonia-Serbia border.

<sup>165</sup> Jim Garamone, "Clinton Signs Order Declaring Yugoslavia Combat Zone (Corrected copy)" American Forces Press Service, *News Articles*, April 16, 1999; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/utility/printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defenselink.mil/news/...>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

<sup>166</sup> "Freed US soldiers heading home with Purple Hearts," *CNN.com*, May 7, 1999; available from <http://www.cnn.com/US/9905/06/pows.return.home.02/>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2008. As late as 2003, the former US Army division commander of Stone, Ramirez, and Gonzales stated that, "Three of our soldiers were taken prisoner in Macedonia during the Kosovo campaign and taken into Serbia, and were held for awhile until eventually they were released. See "Grange: Treatment of POWs was a violation," *CNN.com*, March 25, 2003; available from <http://editon.cnn.hu/2003/US/03/23/sprij.irg.general.grange.pow/index.html>; Internet; accessed 25 February 2008.

- **Specific Target Selection.**

Knew that size of recurring vehicular mounted patrols.

Planned probable sites for isolated contact with small NATO unit.

Planned withdrawal routes of a cross-border incursion in Macedonia back into Serbia.

- **Pre-Attack Surveillance and Plans.**

Studied the village locale near Kumanovo for a raid-ambush.

Knew US manning strength and weapon systems per HMMWV.

Gained intelligence on the rules of engagement that were in effect for NATO forces along the Macedonian border.

Acquired raid equipment and material:

- Military truck
- Additional vehicular transportation (Given 20 to 30 Serbian soldiers were involved in the raid site and rapid mounted egress back to Serbia, more than one truck was required.
- Handcuffs or restraining straps
- Hoods or ad hoc material to cover heads of captured soldiers

Spoke basic words or phrases of English.

- **Attack Rehearsal.**


Verified pre-operational checks in or near staging site.

Conducted movements for undetected passage across the border.

Refined tactics of reinforced platoon-size raid.

Practiced actions for rapid withdrawal to Serbia and rendezvous at an initial safehaven or transfer point for detained soldiers.

Reviewed contingencies for escape and evasion based on tactical conditions.



- **Actions on the Objective.**

1. Arrived at raid site and started to establish ambush attack and support by fire positions.

US patrol returning from observation and reconnaissance.

2. Initiated hasty attack with rifle fire toward rear of US patrol vehicle.


US patrol attempts to evade direct gunfire and turns down dirt road.

3. Alerted raiding group elements of approaching US patrol vehicle.

4. Continued rifle fire on US patrol soldiers and vehicle as it comes upon element of raiding group.

5. US patrol turns around and attempts to evade direct gunfire but wedges in roadside ditch.

(SSG Stone believed that a deliberate ambush was being established because the site was an identifiable location clearly in Macedonia. SSG Ramirez stated that as he attempted to evade the initial gunfire by turning the vehicle down a dirt



Road. The Serb soldiers he came upon were very surprised and looked like they were possibly setting up an ambush.)

Dressed in Serbian military uniform. (The US soldiers recalled the distinctive double headed eagle insignia on the uniforms of their captors.)

6. Captured and beat three US soldiers as they surrendered to raiding party.

7. Placed three US soldiers on their knees facing a wall with weapons to the back of their heads.

Continued beatings of three US soldiers.

- **Withdrawal.**

Drove in a general northerly direction along trails and undeveloped dirt roads.

8. Transported three US soldiers, bound and hooded, across the Serb border to an initial safehaven.

Arrived at initial rendezvous in Serbia with kidnapped soldiers and confirmed the status of US soldier injuries with preliminary medical checks.

Transferred US soldiers to Yugoslav military officials and interrogation elements.

**9.** Exploited three US soldiers on Serb television with interviews and claim of capture in Serb territory.

**10.** Interrogated three US soldiers over first seven days of captivity in a containment facility in Serbia.

Continued physical and psychological abuse of three US soldiers.

**11.** Relocated three US soldiers to a prison facility in Serbia and isolated soldiers from each other, news of events in ongoing NATO air campaign, and any attempt for negotiating their release.

Allowed representatives of International Red Cross to visit three US soldiers.

Allowed members of US religious delegation to visit three US soldiers.

**12.** Released three US soldiers to a US nongovernmental religious delegation.

## **ASSESSMENT.**

The incident near Kumanovo was one episode in a much larger and long term US engagement in the region. US policy on southeastern Europe and the southern Balkans had been a significant interest for years. US ground forces experienced continuous deployments since 1993 in Task Force Able Sentry as part of a UN force in Macedonia. US Administration aims centered around three principles: support for broad European integration including NATO's enlargement, securing peace in Bosnia, and encouraging regional cooperation.<sup>167</sup>

At the tactical level of military operations, three US soldiers were performing their duties and abiding by their rules of engagement. A recurring observation role and reconnaissance mission, with unloaded crew and individual weapons, was surprised by an overwhelming Yugoslav military force. The leader of the three soldiers made a decision to not resist when resistance in a crisis of combat with unloaded weapons may have resulted in their deaths.

Yugoslav military forces abused their prisoners. The three US soldiers were not treated in the initial minutes, hours, and days of their capture in accordance with the protocols of the Geneva Convention for handling prisoners of war.

<sup>167</sup> Julie Kim, "Macedonia: Conflict Spillover Prevention," *CRS Report for Congress*, July 23, 1998, Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress, 5.

Yet, physical and psychological treatment varied on where the US soldiers were located and who was present as a captor. Gonzales "...saw the whole spectrum." During the first week, the US soldiers were treated very rough. Some guards presented a more soldier to soldier understanding and talked briefly with the US soldiers. Eventually, Yugoslav officials allowed the International Red Cross access to the US soldiers. Actions in the prison ranged from abusive to passive depending on who a particular guard was on duty. Some guards were professional in manner; some were not.

Once Stone, Ramirez, and Gonzales were released and in US control, the junior member of the three soldier team declared a powerful statement about unit Army camaraderie and teamwork – "I knew those guys [fellow soldiers of his unit] were doing the best they could the moment they heard our distress call."<sup>168</sup>

### **Immediate Aftermath.**

The NATO air campaign, Operation *Allied Force*, continued to bomb targets primarily in Serbia and Kosovo. By June 9, the Yugoslav Republic accepted a Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) that described the elements of a peace plan for the region. On June 10, the NATO Secretary-General reported that Serb forces were beginning to withdraw from Kosovo and directed a suspension of the air campaign. Clear indications that the Yugoslav Republic was complying with the MTA prompted NATO to begin ground operations on June 12, 1999.

The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, welcoming Yugoslavia's acceptance of a political agreement to end the violence and rapidly withdraw of its military, police and paramilitary forces. Placing Kosovo under UN administration, the resolution authorized the establishment of a UN mission in Kosovo and deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force (KFOR).<sup>169</sup> KFOR (Kosovo Force) initiated a new phase of peacekeeping with Operation *Joint Guardian*. On June 17, 1999, NATO terminated the air campaign based on the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and police.<sup>170</sup> The KFOR mission was to continue for several years.

### **Postscript: Milošević**

In October 2000, Milošević's attempts to manipulate presidential balloting prompted massive demonstrations and strikes throughout Yugoslavia. The election winner

<sup>168</sup> "Freed US soldiers heading home with Purple Hearts," *CNN.com*, May 7, 1999; available from <http://www.cnn.com/US/9905/06/pows.return.home.02/>; Internet; accessed 3 March 2008.

<sup>169</sup> "Kosovo – timeline of events;" available from [http://www.balkantimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en\\_GB/features/setimes/special/kosovo/contexts/timeline](http://www.balkantimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/special/kosovo/contexts/timeline); Internet; accessed 26 February 2008.

<sup>170</sup> Steve Bowman, "Kosovo and Macedonia: US and Allied Military Operations," July 8, 2003, *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress, 5 and 6.

replaced Milosevic. In April 2001, Milošević surrendered to a Serbian special police unit under a warrant alleging suspicion of corruption, abuse of power, and embezzlement. However, the Yugoslav Republic sent him to The Hague and its International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for trial on war crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity. His trial ended without a verdict because he died during the proceedings. The tribunal issued a statement that, "Milošević was found lifeless on his bed in his cell at the United Nations detention unit..."<sup>171</sup> Milošević suffered from heart ailments and high blood pressure. His cause of death in March 2006 is reported as a heart attack.

<sup>171</sup> Phillipe Naughton, "Slobodan Milosevic dies," March 11, 2006; available from <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article740089.ece>; Internet; accessed 21 February 2008.

This Page Intentionally Blank

## CASE STUDY: KARBALA (2007)

### US Army Soldiers in Karbala (2007)

The precision of the attack, the equipment used and the possible use of explosives to destroy military vehicles in the compound suggest that the attack was well rehearsed prior to execution. The attackers went straight to where Americans were located in the provincial government facility...

US Army Lieutenant Colonel Bleichwehl

#### MAP: REGION/LOCALE

Iraq  
Karbala Province  
Karbala  
and  
al-Mahawil



#### ABSTRACT

This terrorism vignette recounts a raid and seizure of US Army soldiers in Karbala, Iraq on January 20, 2007 at a Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC). Insurgents disguised as US soldiers and driving vehicles that appeared to be a US diplomatic convoy, attacked the PJCC, killed one US soldier and wounded three other soldiers in a brief firefight, and captured four US soldiers in the compound. These four soldiers were shot and murdered by their captors during the withdrawal phase of the raid.

#### REGION SITUATIONAL BACKGROUND

The region of Iraq was in the midst of an insurgency. A US Civil Affairs (CA) team at the PJCC was developing plans and actions to provide security for pilgrims who would be participating in the *Ashura* commemorations, a Shi'ite religious

observation.<sup>172</sup> Complementing tensions were expanding extremism that promoted kidnapping, hostage-taking, and murder to intimidate Iraqi government officials and population. Some provincial government officials and police were known to have supported local militia such as the Mahdi Army.<sup>173</sup> Other government and military officials stated concerns of neighboring nations supporting Iraqi militia, insurgent groups, and terrorists in actions to destabilize the Iraqi government.

## INCIDENT OVERVIEW

The US Civil Affairs team was meeting with Iraqi counterparts at the PJCC in the early evening hours of January 20, 2007. The PJCC allowed Iraqi officials, Iraqi security forces, and Coalition forces to coordinate security actions. Related projects included rebuilding schools, constructing water treatment units, and providing medical aid to local people.

As members of the CA team were in a coordination meeting, an official looking convoy of at least five black GMC Suburban vehicles arrived at the PJCC compound. As normal security, a US HMMWV was stationed at the front of the building and one US HMMWV was stationed at the rear of the building.<sup>174</sup> Other US military members were performing their duties in and around the Iraqi government facility. The convoy vehicles passed through the compound gate manned by Iraqi security forces and divided with some vehicles positioning at the front of the building as some vehicles moved to the rear of the building. The appearance of a US delegation of military or government officials did not seem suspicious to anyone.

Suddenly, an explosion and small arms fire erupted in the building.

A small group of armed men, probably between nine to twelve men, dressed like US soldiers had hurried from the vehicles toward the facility. A grenade had been thrown into the building as raiders assaulted in the building with small arms fire. Almost immediately after the explosion, one US soldier was killed and three soldiers were wounded as an assault team raced to a specific room in the building where two US Army leaders were meeting, seized them, and forced them to waiting vehicles.

<sup>172</sup> "Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center attacked by militia," Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Public Affairs Office, Camp Victory, 21 January 2007; available from [http://www.mnf.iraq.com/index2.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=9292&pop=1...](http://www.mnf.iraq.com/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=9292&pop=1...); Internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

<sup>173</sup> Gina Chon, "Karbala Attack Raises Concerns About Relying On Local Forces to Assist," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 24, 2007; available from <http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=10541>; Internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

Concurrently, two US soldiers manning a HMMWV were captured and pushed in vehicles ready to depart.<sup>175</sup> No Iraqi soldiers or police officers were killed in the assault. No attempt was made by Iraqi police to stop the departing vehicles.<sup>176</sup> One report states that raiders confiscated weapons from the Iraqi police as the convoy entered the compound.<sup>177</sup>

While the seizure was underway in the building, raiders destroyed or disabled HMMWVs with explosives to preclude any immediate vehicular pursuit from the compound.<sup>178</sup> Reports indicate that the raid was conducted so quickly, that some US military members reacting in the compound saw only vehicles racing out of the compound. US soldiers still in the compound alerted reaction forces of the attack.

The convoy sped out of Karbala with the several soldiers and headed in a general easterly direction. At some point near the Euphrates River, they passed an Iraqi police checkpoint without stopping. Details of the subsequent trailing of the convoy by Iraqi police are unclear in open source accounts; however, abandoned vehicles were found near the town of al-Mahawil. This location is approximately 30 miles east of Karbala.<sup>179</sup>

The captors evaded from the area, but murdered the four soldiers before they dispersed to avoid capture. Two soldiers were in the back of one of the vehicles, handcuffed together, and dead from gunshots. Another soldier was shot and dead nearby on the ground. The fourth kidnapped soldier was alive with a gunshot wound to the head but died enroute to a medical facility.<sup>180</sup>

Five vehicles were at the site,<sup>181</sup> with one report noting false antennas on the vehicles to indicate a diplomatic convoy. Other abandoned equipment at the site included ten Army combat uniforms, camouflaged helmets,<sup>182</sup> boots, radios, a non-

<sup>175</sup> "Four US soldiers killed after brazen kidnapping," *AP Baghdad*, January 28, 2007; available from <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/01/28/2003346633/print>; Internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

<sup>176</sup> "Karbala attackers posed as US military officials," January 23, 2007; available from <http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/014942.php>; Internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

<sup>177</sup> Gina Chon, "Karbala Attack Raises Concerns About Relying On Local Forces to Assist," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 24, 2007.

<sup>178</sup> Steve Schippert, "Qods Force, Karbala and the Language of War: US Soldiers Executed After Karbala Abduction: Chizari's Revenge and Suleimani's Test?," January 29, 2007; available from <http://threatswatch.org/analysis/2007/01/qods-force-karbala-and-thelan/...>; Internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

<sup>180</sup> Steven R. Hurst and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, "US Confirms Troops' Kidnapping in Iraq," *AP*, January 26, 2007; available from <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=n/a/2007/01/26/international/i124226S87...>; Internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Gina Chon, "Karbala Attack Raises Concerns About Relying On Local Forces to Assist," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 24, 2007.

US made rifle,<sup>183</sup> and body armor vests. One report notes that a computer, possibly a laptop computer, was taken when the soldiers were seized from the building.<sup>184</sup> The murderers escaped.

## IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH

The deception of appearing as an official US convoy cleared three Iraqi checkpoints easily before entering the compound. Individuals in the vehicles displayed identification badges and some spoke English.<sup>185</sup> One report claimed that one of the raiders had blond hair.<sup>186</sup> An Iraqi police spokesperson stated that US personnel had previously insisted on passing Iraqi checkpoints without going through a physical security screening. As Iraqi guards at the checkpoint cleared the convoy to pass, they notified Iraqi guards at the PJCC compound that a US convoy was on the way to their location.<sup>187</sup>

Investigation of serious security lapses included at least two senior Iraqi military leaders. Evidence in the conduct of the raid indicates that detailed information and intelligence was provided to the raiders on locations and operations within the PJCC compound.<sup>188</sup> About two weeks prior to the raid, the senior US officer murdered in the raid had stated that he believed the Iraqi police team he worked with had been infiltrated by Mahdi Army militia members.<sup>189</sup>

Iraq and US conducted an immediate large scale search for the murderers and did eventually capture and detain some individuals suspected to be part of the group.<sup>190</sup> Later, an individual identified as the leader of the kidnapping raid was killed by Coalition forces in Baghdad's Sadr City. A senior US military leader stated, "we've

<sup>183</sup> Steven R. Hurst and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, "US Confirms Troops' Kidnapping in Iraq," *AP*, January 26, 2007.

<sup>184</sup> Steve Schippert, "Qods Force, Karbala and the Language of War: US Soldiers Executed After Karbala Abduction: Chizari's Revenge and Suleimani's Test?," January 29, 2007.

<sup>185</sup> "Karbala attackers posed as US military officials," January 23, 2007.

<sup>186</sup> Steven R. Hurst and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, "US Confirms Troops' Kidnapping in Iraq," *AP*, January 26, 2007.

<sup>187</sup> "Four US soldiers killed after brazen kidnapping," *AP Baghdad*, January 28, 2007.

<sup>188</sup> Nick Simeone and Mike Emanuel, *AP*, "Two Senior Iraqi Generals Eyed in Brazen Attack on US Soldiers," *FOXNEWS.COM*, February 2, 2007; available from [http://www.foxnews.com/printer\\_friendly\\_story/o,3566,249403,00.html](http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/o,3566,249403,00.html); Internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

<sup>189</sup> Gina Chon, "Karbala Attack Raises Concerns About Relying On Local Forces to Assist," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 24, 2007.

<sup>190</sup> Steven R. Hurst and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, "US Confirms Troops' Kidnapping in Iraq," *AP*, January 26, 2007. See also, "Karbala attackers posed as US military officials," January 23, 2007.

been pursuing this guy relentlessly...Anybody who kidnaps an American soldier and murders them we're going to continue to hunt down."<sup>191</sup>

Soon after the raid, a senior Iraqi military official noted that the level of tactical sophistication indicated that Iranian intelligence agents may have supported elements of the Shi'ite Mahdi Army militia.<sup>192</sup> Other open sources suggested similar expertise and support from the Qods Force branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.<sup>193</sup> Some reports speculated that the raid may have been a retaliation for the US seizure and detention of Iranian individuals, and in at least one case a person claiming diplomatic status,<sup>194</sup> in Ibril, Iraq that were linked to the insurgency.

About the same time, the US Army acknowledged that links between the raid and Iran's involvement were being investigated.<sup>195</sup> The Qods Force and Lebanese Hizballah were known to be operating camps jointly near Tehran, Iran to train regional terrorists in attacks, bombing, and kidnapping.<sup>196</sup> By July 2007, a senior US military spokesperson declared that the Qods Force and Lebanese Hizballah had assisted militants in the PJCC attack and raid at Karbala. The senior US military spokesperson accused a breakaway Shia militant group of attacking the provincial government building in the PJCC compound.

## TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES.

### *How "might" this raid-terrorism have been planned and conducted?*

- **Broad Target Selection.**

Surveyed regional area for isolated US small units working and embedded with Iraqi government activities and police forces.

<sup>191</sup> "US military: Architect of US troop abductions killed," *CNN.com*, May 21, 2007; available from <http://cnn.worldnews.printhis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=US+military...>; Internet; accessed January 8, 2008.

<sup>192</sup> Steven R. Hurst, AP, "US confirms kidnap, slaying of soldiers Military's 1<sup>st</sup> report is contradicted," *boston.com*, January 27, 2008; available from [http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2007/01/27/us\\_confirms\\_kidnap...](http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2007/01/27/us_confirms_kidnap...); Internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

<sup>193</sup> Bill Roggio, "The Karbala Attack and the IRCC," *The Long War Journal*, January 26, 2007; available from [http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/01/the\\_karbala\\_attack\\_a-print.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/01/the_karbala_attack_a-print.php); Internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

<sup>194</sup> Steve Schippert, "Qods Force, Karbala and the Language of War: US Soldiers Executed After Karbala Abduction: Chizari's Revenge and Suleimani's Test?," January 29, 2007.

<sup>195</sup> Bill Roggio, "The Karbala Attack and the IRCC," *The Long War Journal*, January 26, 2007.

<sup>196</sup> Deborah Haynes, "Hezbollah is making trouble in Iraq, says US," *TIMESONLINE*, July 3, 2007; available from [http://www.timeonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle\\_east/articvle2017630.ece?print=yes...](http://www.timeonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/articvle2017630.ece?print=yes...); Internet; accessed 18 January 2008.

- **Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance.**

Received regular reports on isolated US small units working and embedded with Iraqi government activities and police forces.

Observed time-distance factors for US quick reaction forces.

Observed actions at permanent or random security check points along routes.

- **Specific Target Selection.**

Knew that a small civil affairs team and had been living at the Karbala JFCC for about ten days and that overall US military presence at the JFCC was minimal.

- **Pre-Attack Surveillance and Plans.**

Knew the specific provincial compound configuration and building floor plan by room, where a coordination meeting with US military leaders would be held, and the date and time of a specific meeting.



Knew the Iraqi and US manning strength, weapon systems, equipment, and operating patterns within the compound.

Acquired equipment and material to appear as US soldiers:

- Black GMC Suburban vehicles to simulate a US diplomatic convoy
- US Army combat uniforms, boots, helmets, and body armor vests
- US small arms, ammunition, and grenades
- Official looking identification badges
- Official looking radios and vehicular antennas
- Explosives
- Handcuffs or restraining straps

Used physical attribute of blond hair to further appear as a US military group.

Spoke English that sounded genuine as an oral indication of a US military group.



- **Attack Rehearsal.**

Verified pre-operational checks in or near staging site.

Conducted movement and passage through Iraqi security checkpoints.

Refined rapid execution of squad-size raid assault and assault support tactics.

Practiced route or routes for rapid evasion and rendezvous at an initial safehouse or transfer point for kidnapped soldiers.

Reconnoitered onward movement routes for seized soldiers to follow-on safehaven.

Reviewed contingencies for terrorist escape and evasion based on conditions.

- **Actions on the Objective.**

1. Confirmed that US soldier-leader targets were at a designated location.

2. Cleared through three Iraqi security checkpoints as US diplomatic convoy enroute to the PJCC.

- 3A. Positioned vehicles inside the PJCC compound for normal local security.

- 3B. Deceived US military members on local security at the building as an arriving US diplomatic convoy.

Dismounted vehicles and surprised US military members outside and inside the building.

4. Initiated the assault with the detonation of a grenade and small arms fire.

5. Moved directly to a specific meeting room in the building and seized two US Army leaders.

6. Seized, simultaneously, two US Army soldiers from outside the building.

7. Destroyed or disabled, simultaneously, vehicles in the compound with explosives that precluded immediate pursuit of the raiders.

8. Departed the compound quickly having seized four US soldiers.

• **Escape and Evasion.**


Drove quickly in a general easterly direction along roadways.

9. Cleared an Iraqi police checkpoint without stopping for security screening.

Iraqi police elements monitor movements of suspicious convoy. Reaction forces hinder planned withdrawal route.

Changed withdrawal and attempting to evade in a general northerly direction.

10. Abandoned five vehicles and murdered four captive US soldiers. Evaded Coalition reaction forces searching for raid group.




**ASSESSMENT**

The terrorists conducted an effective attack on a specific building in an Iraqi government compound with the purpose of seizing prisoners. Using US Army doctrine as a comparative tool,<sup>197</sup> the raid was unsuccessful in that the raiding group was not able to withdraw to a safehaven with their kidnapped US soldiers. Coalition reaction forces may have prevented an intended withdrawal route and escape with their prisoners.

The militants murdered the four US soldiers before abandoning their vehicles and evading Coalition pursuit.

The raid displayed a high degree of rehearsal, coordination, and timing in the several minutes of assault at the building. Deception and the principle of surprise were critical factors in the initial success of the attack. Whereas a raiding group may normally be comprised of a support element, assault element, breach element, and security element, the Karbala attack appears to have



<sup>197</sup> US Army Field Manual 3-21.8 (FM 7-8), *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, 28 March 2007; Chapter 7, "Offensive Operations," Section VI, "Special Purpose Operations," Paragraphs 7-137 to 7-140, "Raid."

consolidated a support element with two assault elements, and provided for its own local security as a small squad size (nine to twelve individuals) force.

One assault element attacked and seized US soldiers in the building, while another assault element disabled or destroyed vehicles in the compound. Given the small size of this raiding group, supporting fires were provided by these individuals outside the building. They also seized two prisoners from a US vehicle near the building. The deceptive vehicles, uniforms, badges, language, physical features and hair color, and overall appearance of the convoy precluded the need to breach security enroute and at the objective site. Their withdrawal was flawed in that no security element existed to slow or stop any potential pursuing forces.

*NOTE:* For more case study terrorism information, see: US Army TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.01, ***Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terrorism***, 25 July 2007.

## **US ARMY READINESS APPLICATION.**

### ***How “might” a kidnapping or hostage event be integrated in unit training?***

When planning a training exercise or readiness confirmation, a kidnapping or hostage event must present a realistic and coherent **condition** that supports the individual or collective tasks to be assessed or evaluated. Conditions provide the context to simulating a contemporary operational environment and a particular scenario and event.

Standards are institutionalized in Army doctrine, mission training plans, and related directives. Yet, to define and apply specific conditions in support of readiness, a valuable tool for the trainer and operator is US Army TRADOC G2 [DCSINT] Handbook, *Contemporary Operational Environment: Actors and Role Players Handbook*, August 2007. This guide provides a practical method for developing roles within a scenario to enhance an effective and efficient use of resources in training or operating to an Army standard.

Given a kidnapping or hostage-taking scenario has a clear adversary to combat, the dynamics of roles must also be considered in a complex mission setting. What conditions will challenge the individual or unit? Are roles emergent dependent on friendly forces actions and counteractions to scenario indicators? What echelon of leader or unit situational awareness will be presented in the operational or tactical setting? Question such as these will assist in defining neutral, friendly, hostile, or unknown elements of the scenario. Variables may quickly expand beyond a military appreciation of a situation. Considerations may include aspects affecting political, economic, or infrastructure outcomes.




Figure 4-14. **Five Steps to Planning ROLE PLAY**

To create desired conditions, what are the **requirements** of a kidnapper role or hostage captor role? What role affiliation exists, that is, does an event portray a simple crime for ransom or is there an intention of person to person exchange based on negotiations? What is the fidelity of a role? For example, does a hostage event expect detailed negotiations? If so, is there a larger set of requirements for role players such as guards, intermediary, financier, or political advisor?

How does the training event integrate tasks from the organization's mission essential task list (METL) and provide **realistic challenges and opportunities** in the context in the political, military, economic, information, infrastructure, physical environment

and time (PMESII+PT)? Is the training multi-echeloned, that is, is the training optimizing the event for various levels of leader decision making and organization action?

What **level of support** and material will be required to present a believable scenario? Are clothing, weapons, vehicles, language, and general habitat replicating the task condition? Additionally, what types of training and certification of role players must precede an event? Examples include events that may require vehicle driving license, weapons familiarization, or other specific proficiency and safety certifications.

The “Five Steps to Role Playing” figure illustrates an entry point to creating the appropriate conditions in order to enhance training and operating to Army standards.

NOTE: For more role player and event information, see: US Army TRADOC G2 [DCSINT] Handbook, ***Contemporary Operational Environment: Actors and Role Players Handbook***, August 2007.

This Page Intentionally Blank

## Chapter 5

# Combating Terrorism Today

The US Army soldier will confront irregular warfare with a host of nonprofessional soldiers and mercenaries, criminals, ideological extremists, and renegade military members. Tactics will include terrorism, ambushes, kidnapping, and other criminal actions. The environment of armed conflict will change with more activity in urban areas. Adversaries and enemies will expand organizational connectivity in regional, international, and transnational affiliations. Access to modern technologies and weaponry and access to information, intelligence, and propaganda capabilities will complicate an already challenging and difficult mission set of offensive, defensive, or stability operations.<sup>198</sup>

*DIA, Threat Assessment: Looking to 2016, 1997*

This chapter presents observations on kidnapping and hostage-taking as a contemporary threat with an emphasis on friendly force requirements for vulnerability analysis, risk management, and training for force readiness. Thinking and planning to counter the Threat, whether conventional to unconventional or symmetrical to unsymmetrical in nature, considers vulnerabilities of US armed forces throughout a complete force generation cycle. This spectrum of day-to-day missions includes home station training, during in-transit movements, and while deployed in an area of operations. Similar comprehensive analysis occurs with institutional US forces and fixed activities and installations.



Fig. 5-1. Combating Terrorism Today

<sup>198</sup> Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, *Threat Assessment: Looking to 2016*, (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1997).

## GENERAL

5-1. Kidnapping and hostage-taking is a reality of contemporary times. The 1997 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment of threats noted in this chapter's epigraph projected possible threats into the future. The themes stated then seem obvious today and probably appeared quite practical even in 1997. Today, the threats, locales, level of violence, propaganda, and effects of globalization are evident in daily living as the Army looks ahead to the second decade of the twenty-first century. Some regions of the world experience surges of kidnapping as a criminal or terrorist tactic. Reasons for kidnapping vary. However, a consistent symptom from kidnapping is the psychological stress that the event causes to victims and their families and friends. This uncertainty can ripple in its negative effects to political, social, and economic aspects of a small community, a regional society, or a nation-state.

5-2. A survey conducted by the United Nations<sup>199</sup> on kidnapping throughout the world highlighted at least three major points. As stated in the report:

- Kidnapping is both an increasing problem and an increasingly international problem, with victims and criminals (as well as their demands) frequently crossing international borders.
- Organized criminal groups and terrorist groups demonstrate a growing tendency to resort to kidnapping, especially for the purposes of extortion, as a means of accumulating capital. This financial base allows them to consolidate their criminal operations and undertake other illegal activities, such as trafficking in persons, firearms, or drugs, money-laundering and crimes related to terrorism.
- Kidnapping creates a complex and critical incident that requires skillful, timely, and effective responses by governmental authorities and civil law enforcement agencies.

5-3. These announcements are neither surprising nor new to the issues of kidnapping and terrorism. Nonetheless, both kidnapping and hostage-taking remain a major challenge for civil authorities, and to the extent that military forces will operate in the same operational areas on missions as part of regional stability or combat operations, kidnapping and hostage-taking is a concern for military authorities. A requirement exists to maintain awareness and understanding of the threat as well as the capabilities and limitations of criminal elements or terrorist cells that employ kidnapping or hostage-taking.

<sup>199</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Counter-Kidnapping Manual*, 2006, "International cooperation in the prevention, combating, and elimination of kidnapping and in providing assistance to victims: report of the Secretary General" (E/CN.15/2003/7, 5 March 2003), Vienna: UNODC, 2.

5-4. Looking at globalization and contemporary acts of kidnapping or hostage-taking, more and more victims are foreign nationals; more families, businesses, and organizations deal frequently in more than one country; and, criminals and terrorists appear to be more connected to international or transnational organizations, that is, more easily linked operationally in more than one country.<sup>200</sup>

## RATIONALES FOR KIDNAPPING

5-5. Rationales for kidnapping or hostage-taking deal with concession, that is, a criminal or terrorist seeks an outcome in support of an internal agenda. The outcomes may be as simple as ransom, attention to an organizational issue, revenge, or the desire to cause anxiety in a targeted person or people. Noted earlier, the effects can quickly expand from an isolated incident involving one person to a transnational crisis on political, social, and economic aspects of a nation-state.



5-6. Online announcements among terrorists discuss reasons for kidnapping or hostage-taking to include: forcing the release of imprisoned cell or group members, extracting information and intelligence from captives, capturing equipment and documents that can be used in subsequent terrorist operations, obtaining ransom for financing operations, and attempting to demoralize an adversary.<sup>201</sup>

5-7. In some incidents, the intended outcome is to commit a murder. This result may be combined with other aspects of demands and negotiations, but is a premeditated expectation to not release the kidnapped victim alive.

## TARGET PROFILES FOR KIDNAPPING

5-8. Individuals will be identified based on criteria established by the kidnapper or terrorist group. Kidnapping, if conducted for some type of financial ransom, can select targets based on individual or family wealth, or the anticipation that a


<sup>200</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, *Counter-Kidnapping Manual*, 2006, Vienna: UNODC, 13.

<sup>201</sup> "Jihadi Tutorial in Urban Terrorism and Kidnapping of Americans," available from <http://www.jamestown.org>; Internet; accessed 23 July 2008.

relationship with particular corporations or businesses will negotiate for release of the kidnapped victim. General social issues or political associations may be the reason for targeting a particular individual too.<sup>202</sup>

5-9. Location of the kidnapping or hostage seizure is selected for the optimum possibility of success. Daily personal and professional regimens may bracket the logical locations for a kidnapping. Three points of reference are the work place or office, the home or temporary residence, and the route between these normal daily sites. Some reports state that 90 percent of the crimes occur while enroute from one location to another and that 80 percent of the actual kidnapping occurs within 200 to 300 meters of the residence or office.<sup>203</sup>

5-10. Reflecting on why this focus of location should be no surprise to any simple analysis. When a target is at home or at work, the locale is clearly known and multiple aspects can be studied in and around that point of reference to plan the kidnap. Surveillance will gather detailed information about the target to identify potential weaknesses in personal security that can be exploited. Daily routine, if one exists, sets a template for surveillance. If target behavior is less formally structured and lacks recurring cycles or noticeable patterns of activity, detailed data collection of daily lifestyle will be maintained with an expectation of developing some noticeable pattern of activity and opportunity for kidnap consideration.



5-11. Target behavior will differ, however, surveillance techniques are a simple matter of observation and recording routine, variety, or random action by a potential target. A manual found in a Red Brigade safe house in 1983 recommended the following: "If the hours of leaving work shows too much irregularity it is necessary to fix a surveillance of the car trip from the house to the office and continue through the day. The best time for kidnapping is at the ends of the day when the man is tired and he's going home, but if the victim shows too much irregularity – he doesn't have a routine every day – start from the beginning of the morning when he leaves home and take him all though the day." One study of terrorist kidnappings in Italy during the 1980s displayed a pattern of kidnappings occurring between 7:30 pm and 9:30 pm.<sup>204</sup> The ability to establish patterns of activity will be key to contingency planning for an actual kidnap incident. The degree of personal or institutional security used by

<sup>202</sup> Alastair C. MacWillson, *Hostage-Taking Terrorism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 164.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, 165.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, 166.

the target in daily affairs will be another critical collection task for the kidnapping cell. Although ease of abduction will be a consideration, some motivations may choose a well protected target to demonstrate cell capability and the inability of an institution or government to protect its people.

## ORGANIZATION FOR KIDNAPPING OR HOSTAGE-TAKING: CELL

5-12. One way to evaluate capabilities and limitations for kidnapping or hostage-taking is cell organizational structure. In a cellular structure, cell members will be insulated from other organizational cells to minimize the compromise of an entire group if one cell or individual is arrested and interrogated. A command cell may control other cells such as intelligence, logistics, and direct action cells that have no direct inter-connection even though they are being coordinated toward a common purpose.

5-13. Terrorist websites share information on tactics and techniques for kidnapping. In one website announcement related to urban terrorism, comments included an appreciation of how kidnapping or hostage-taking is part of a larger group of operations that attack an enemy in depth and stress an adversary's security and force protection. Raids and ambushes are part of this grouping, as is the act of kidnapping. Cells may exist for surveillance and reconnaissance separately or may have functions combined into one cell. Discipline, patience, and collection of minute details are emphasized for study and consideration of the likelihood for kidnapping success.<sup>205</sup>




Fig. 5-2. Sample Cell Organization

5-14. Support cells will acquire necessary equipment and material with which to conduct an abduction. Equipment may include silenced weapons, anesthetic injections, restraining wire, electric stun devices, hand restraints, blindfolds, and vehicles. Multiple vehicles may be required to isolate the seizure site and assist with security while the kidnap cell evades from the immediate area.<sup>206</sup>

<sup>205</sup> Jeremy Reynalds, "Terror Site Provides Detailed handbook for Kidnapping Americans," available from <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/770990/posts>; internet; accessed 11 April 2008.

<sup>206</sup> Abdul Hameed Bakier, "Jihadi Tutorial in urban Terrorism and the Kidnapping of Americans," available from <http://jamestown.org/terroism/news/article.php?articleid=2374320>; Internet; accessed 5 August 2008.

5-15. An abduction cell is responsible for the actual seizure. This cell has capabilities to overcome resistance by the target or security elements, and may be responsible for transportation from the kidnapping or hostage-taking site to a nearby rendezvous. The victim is usually transferred to other locations to assist in the security of the victim. A separate cell may have responsibility for guarding and sustaining the victim in captivity. Conditions for the victim may include isolation, interrogation, and torture.<sup>207</sup>

## ACTION MODELING FOR KIDNAPPING OR HOSTAGE-TAKING

5-16. Terrorist operations are typically prepared to minimize risk and achieve the highest probability of success. Terrorists avoid an adversary's strengths and concentrate on an adversary's weaknesses. Emphasis is on maximizing security and target effects. This normally means the minimum number of attackers to successfully conduct an operation with the most effective<sup>208</sup> weapons available. Detailed planning is a norm but can be deliberately shortened when an opportunity arises and a terrorist.

5-17. Collection against potential targets may continue for years before an operation is decided upon. While some targets may be "soft" enough for shorter periods of observation, the information gathering will still be intense. Operations planned or underway may be altered, delayed, or cancelled due to changes to the target or local conditions. Tactical missions combine to complement operational objectives and strategic goals. The psychological impact on the target population is the overarching objective of any terrorist operation.

5-18. There is no universal model for terrorist planning but experience and success have demonstrated traditional principles for plans and

### Terrorist Planning Cycle

- ◆ **Broad Target Selection**
- ◆ **Intelligence and Surveillance**
- ◆ **Specific Target Selection**
- ◆ **Pre-attack Surveillance and Planning**
- ◆ **Attack Rehearsal**
- ◆ **Actions on Objective**
- ◆ **Escape and Evasion**

<sup>207</sup> Alastair C. MacWillson, *Hostage-Taking Terrorism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 166-167.

<sup>208</sup> *Note:* Effective in this case need not mean modern or destructive, but most suitable to cause the desired target effects. Knives, machetes, and other edged weapons have been used against terrorist victims in the modern era because of psychological impact on a target population.

operations. Terrorist organizations exchange personnel and training and study methods and operational successes of other groups. Innovation is a proven key component of operational success.

5-19. Terrorist operational planning can be analyzed according to common requirements. A plans and operation cycle provides a baseline in assessing particular terrorist cells and organization. The differences among organizations center on factors of intent and capability.

5-20. Current terrorist threats display the increasing desire and ability of a learning organization. Terrorist cells gather information and intelligence, analyze strengths and weaknesses, determine patterns, trends, and emerging actions, and identify vulnerabilities in an adversary's security to attack.

## **PHASE I: BROAD TARGET SELECTION**

5-21. This phase is the collection of information on a number of potential targets. Collection is gathered from diverse sources. Collectors may be core members of the terrorist cell, sympathizers, or people providing information without knowledge of the intended purpose. This phase also includes open source and general information collection. Some features of this type of collection are:

- Stories from newspapers and other media provide background information.
- Internet research provides data such as texts, pictures, blue prints, and video information.
- Potential targets are screened based on the intended objective and assesses areas such as symbolic value, critical infrastructure points of failure, expected number of mass casualties, and potential to generate high profile media attention.



5-22. The number of preliminary targets that can be screened is limited only by the capabilities of the group to collect information. Targets that are considered vulnerable and which would further terrorist goals are selected for the next phase of intelligence collection.

## PHASE II: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND SURVEILLANCE

5-23. Targets showing vulnerabilities may receive additional attention and priority of effort. This priority establishes the requirement to gather additional information on a target's patterns over time. This phase may be very short or can span years. Examples include the 2004 accounts of terrorist surveillance conducted for years on the International Monetary Fund, Prudential Building, New York Stock Exchange, as well as facilities in Las Vegas, Nevada. The type of surveillance employed depends on the target type. Elements of information typically gathered include:

- Practices/Procedures/Routines – For facilities this includes scheduled deliveries, work shift changes, identification procedures and other observable routines. For individuals, it can include regularly scheduled errands such as laundry pick up days or car parking locations.
- Residence and Workplace – This category applies primarily to the physical layout and individual activities at the two places the target typically spends the most time.
- Transportation/Routes of Travel – For individuals, this is the mode of transport and common routes to any regular destination such as house, work, gym, and school. For facilities, it addresses ingress and egress points, types of vehicles allowed on the grounds, or availability of transportation into the target site.



- Security Measures – This topic includes collection areas depending on the complexity of the security around the target: presence of a guard force; the reaction time of response units; any hardening of structures, barriers, or sensors; personnel, package, and vehicle screening procedures; and the type and frequency of emergency reaction drills are examples of key collection objectives. This is one of the most important areas of information for attack site selection, since intent is to bypass and avoid security measures and be able to strike the target during any period.

### PHASE III: SPECIFIC TARGET SELECTION

5-24. Selection of a target for actual operational planning considers some of the following factors:

- Does success affect a larger audience than the immediate victim(s)?
- Will the target attract high profile media attention beyond the immediate region?
- Does success make the desired statement to the correct target audience(s)?
- Is the effect consistent with objectives of the terrorist group?
- Does the target and mission success provide an advantage to the group by demonstrating its capabilities?
- What are the costs versus benefits of conducting the operation?



5-25. A decision to proceed requires continued intelligence collection against the chosen target. Targets not receiving immediate consideration may still be collected against for future opportunities.

### PHASE IV: PRE-ATTACK SURVEILLANCE AND PLANNING

5-26. Members of the actual operational cells begin to appear during this phase. Trained intelligence and surveillance personnel or members supportive of the terrorist cell may be organized to conduct the operation conduct this phase. This phase gathers information on the target's current patterns, usually days to weeks. The attack team confirms information gathered from previous surveillance and reconnaissance activities. The areas of concern are essentially the same as in Phase II but with greater focus based on known or perceived vulnerabilities.



5-27. The type of surveillance employed depends on the target's activities. The information gained is then used to:

- Conduct security studies.
- Conduct detailed preparatory operations.
- Recruit specialized operatives (if needed).
- Procure a base of operations in the target area (safe houses, caches, etc.).
- Design and test escape routes. Decide on type of weapon or attack.

## PHASE V: REHEARSALS

5-28. As with conventional military operations, rehearsals are conducted to improve the odds of success, confirm planning assumptions, and develop contingencies. Terrorists also rehearse to test security reactions to particular attack profiles. Terrorists use both their own operatives and unsuspecting people to test target reactions.

5-29. Typical rehearsals include:



- Equipment and weapons training and Skills performance.
- Staging for final preparatory checks.
- Deployment into target area.
- Actions on the objective.
- Primary and alternate escape routes.
- Initial safehouse-confinement facilities and guard operations.
- Transfer plans from initial to subsequent confinement sites.

5-30. Tests in the target area will be conducted to confirm:

- Target information gathered to date.
- Target pattern of activities.
- Physical layout of target or operations area.
- Security force reactions such as state of alert, timing response, equipment and routes.

## PHASE VI: ACTIONS ON THE OBJECTIVE

5-31. Once terrorists reach this stage of their operation, the odds favor a successful attack against the target. Terrorists conducting planned operations possess important tactical advantages. Since they are the attacker, they possess all the advantages of initiative and provide:

- Use of Surprise.
- Choice of time, place, and conditions of attack.
- Employment of diversions and secondary or follow-up attacks.
- Employment of security and support positions to neutralize target reaction forces and security measures.


5-32. Security and support positions will be emplaced to neutralize or slow reaction forces intend on rescuing the target from the kidnapers. Extensive preparation through surveillance and reconnaissance will identify security measures and normal security reactions.



5-33. Actions on the objective will sequence through several main tasks: isolate the kidnap site, gain access to the individual or individuals to kidnap, gain control of the target victim or victims, and immediately remove the victim or victims from the site.



5-34. Detailed rehearsals will have confirmed the simultaneous actions required of an assault element, security element, and support element. the kidnapping of German industrialist Martin Schleyer (1977) illustrates the multiple actions that allowed a swift isolation of a target at a designated site, access, control, and removal of the victim.




1. The Red Army Faction terrorists used a restricted street as the attack site. Having confirmed Schleyer's normal routes of travel and a norm of riding in a vehicle accompanied by a security vehicle.

2 and 4. The terrorist vehicles were located to isolate and block the two vehicles.

2 and 5. One vehicle was stationed to restrict movement on the street as a woman


terrorist pushed a baby carriage from the sidewalk into the road causing a reflexive action by Schleyer's driver.



6. Simultaneously, a vehicle swerved in front of Schleyer's vehicle to block from the front. The abrupt halt was the cause of the security vehicle to ram the back of Schleyer's vehicle and pin it between the terrorist and security vehicles in restricted street area.

7, 8, 9 and 10. The terrorists jumped out of the stationary bus and rushed the

security vehicle, killing the three security guards. A terrorist in the car blocking Schleyer's from the front ran to the passenger side of Schleyer's vehicle and killed the driver.



**11, 12, and 13.** Schleyer was pulled from the car and all of the terrorists mounted the bus and quickly drove away from the kidnap site. The entire attack sequence was about one minute in duration.<sup>209</sup>

5-35. The terrorists of the Baader-Meinhoff gang demanded release of eleven terrorist in prison. Negotiations did not appear to be progressing, and Schleyer was found dead in the trunk of an abandoned car in Mulhouse, France. Rather than fortify the power of the Baader-Meinhof gang, Schleyer's murder turned public opinion against the terrorists. Citizens started to submit more information tips on possible terrorist activities, and law enforcement increased counterterrorism efforts. Within two years of the murder, most of the terrorists involved in the Schleyer kidnapping had been captured or killed by German authorities.<sup>210</sup>

## PHASE VII: ESCAPE AND EXPLOITATION

5-36. Escape plans are usually well rehearsed and executed. Rapid dispersal from the target site can involve a transfer of the victim from one vehicle to alternate vehicles. Temporary safehouses may be used to hide the victim while law enforcement or military searches cordon the locale of the kidnapping.

5-37. Exploitation is the primary objective of the operation. The operation must be properly publicized to achieve an intended effect. Media control measures and prepared statements are examples of preparations to effectively exploit a successful operation. These will be timed to take advantage of media cycles for the selected target audiences.



<sup>209</sup> Robert K. Spear and D. Michael Moak, *Surviving Hostage Situations*, (Leavenworth, KS: Universal Force Dynamics, 1989), 17-18.

<sup>210</sup> Robert D. Chapman and M. Lester Chapman, *The Crimson Web of Terror*, (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1980), 76-77.

5-38. Unsuccessful operations are disavowed when possible. The perception that a group has failed can severely damage the organization's prestige, indicate cell vulnerability, or ineffective conduct. In addition to the impact on the adversary, successful attacks bring favorable attention, notoriety and support such as funding and recruiting to the terrorist organization.

## KIDNAPPING AND HOSTAGE-TAKING OUTCOMES

5-39. Four possible conclusions or outcomes are: release, rescue, escape, or death. Payment of a ransom or some other accommodation are means to one of these four results.<sup>211</sup> Time can be a factor when negotiations stall or when kidnappers are purposely holding a victim for a long period of time. Periods of no communication by kidnappers can be a technique to increase anxiety in those people attempting to recover the victim. Extended captivity can be an option that can transition to either an eventual release by the captors or the murder of the victim. Murder of the victim after an extended captivity may be a specific technique used to gain media attention for a terrorist agenda as the normal cycle of any particular storyline remaining in the spotlight diminishes.



5-40. Mistreatment or torture can be a specified technique too. Whether conditions are those of a jungle hideout or urban cellar, the safety and well being of the victim is often a key interest to the captor. Maiming is a technique but is not the normal action of many terrorists. Yet, incidents in recent years have displayed some terrorist groups that purposely torture victims for the ability to videotape graphic maiming or murder in an attempt to force compliance or concession by an adversary. Examples include delivering containers of blood, bloodstained clothing, or body parts of the hostage to break the resolve of an adversary.<sup>212</sup>


## KIDNAPPING AND HOSTAGE-TAKING: LEVELS AND LESSONS

5-41. US military members will continue to be a target for kidnapping. The act of kidnapping can appear in various forms of attack and intention. The basic act of

<sup>211</sup> Alastair C. MacWillson, *Hostage-Taking Terrorism*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 170.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, 168.

abduction can be of short duration or can be an extended period of time. Some reports categorize short term acts as express kidnapping, that is, abduction that intends to gain quick extortion of ransom followed by release of the victim. Extortion usually obtains cash money, coerced withdrawals from automatic bank teller machines, or immediate use of credit card accounts. This form of kidnapping can be just as dangerous as other forms of kidnapping. For example, in Lima, Peru as a group of express kidnapers were apprehended by police after a wave of express kidnappings, the group was found to be heavily armed with an Uzi machinegun and several pistols.<sup>213</sup>



5-42. The more conventional kidnapping is longer in duration. Time can span days, months, or years. The rescue of kidnap victims such as Ms. Betancourt from FARC terrorists in Columbia in 2008 ended a captivity of six and one-half years.<sup>214</sup> This same rescue operation included three US citizens that had been captive since 2003.<sup>215</sup> As sensational as this successful rescue was, the FARC still holds between 700 and 200 people captive as of summer 2008.

5-43. Another form is virtual kidnapping. In this instance, the victim is not actually abducted and is unaware that a ransom has been demanded. Criminals select a period of time when a target is out of normal communication with a family, business, or organization, Kidnappers announce that they have kidnapped the individual and demand a ransom short notice. Unable to confirm the whereabouts of the identified victim, a ransom is usually paid in this scam.<sup>216</sup>

5-44. Hostage-taking differs in that the location of the victim may be known and can be usually part of the intent in negotiating an outcome. Examples range from a simple bank robbery that is interrupted so criminals seize patrons to create more bargaining power for possible escape. Other examples are political and more tragic in nature where terrorists may fully plan on kidnap and murder to

<sup>213</sup> Wolfy Becker, "The 30 most dangerous kidnapping areas in lima," available from <http://journalperu.com/?p=157>; Internet; accessed 11 April 2008.

<sup>214</sup> Simon Romero and Damien Cave, "Bold Columbian Rescue Built on rebel Group's Disarray," available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/0704/world/americas/04rescue.html?ntemail1=y&r...>; Internet; accessed 6 July 2008.

<sup>215</sup> Department of State, "Travel Warning – Columbia," 5 February 2008, available from [http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis\\_tw/tw/tw\\_941.html?cs=print](http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_tw/tw/tw_941.html?cs=print); Internet; accessed 15 April 2008.

<sup>216</sup> "Kidnapping in Latin America: A Risk Overview for Business Travelers," International SOS Philadelphia Alarm center, May 2008.

cause political embarrassment for an opposing government organization. The hostage crisis and mass murder at a middle school in Beslan, North Ossetia [Russia] in 2004 was a calculated operation of kidnap [hostage-taking] and murder to force a major political concession from the Russian government or at least gain attention for regional separatist and Islamic extremist intentions.<sup>217</sup>



5-45. Criminal gangs and terrorists can create convenient relationships of kidnap-for-hire as a pure money making venture. Capabilities and limitations range that of a lone person who acts as an individual actor, to small local or regional criminal gangs, to large international or transnational networks of crime. The bridge between extortion and threats to the anxieties and violence of terrorism is often difficult to distinguish. Criminals may claim affiliation with specific terrorist groups to cause greater anxiety in a population, enhance propaganda to improve acceptability of their actions by a sympathetic population, or create cues to confuse and mislead countermeasures.<sup>218</sup>

## KIDNAPPING AND HOSTAGE-TAKING: PROPAGANDA

5-46. Public relations are a key consideration in any kidnapping or hostage incident. From a threats perspective, propaganda campaigns and acts of kidnapping can promote anxiety on varied audiences. Reports in 2008 on militant-insurgent actions in Afghanistan state that the Taliban acknowledges an appreciation and importance on informational objectives to influence attitudes, perceptions, and passive or active support in diverse groupings. Piecemeal communications over time or mass media announcements can affect local and regional audiences or can be focused toward secular populations, regional and international Islamic communities, and international western



<sup>217</sup> US Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1.01, *Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terrorism*, Ft Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA), 25 July 2007, Chapter 6.

<sup>218</sup> Richard Clutterback, *Kidnap, Hijack and Extortion: the Response*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 6.

societies.<sup>219</sup> Whether the threats or actions are true is of little significance if the threat and result achieves an intended anxiety in a targeted audience of the public, family members, or governmental decision makers.

5-47. Kidnapping or hostage-taking lends itself for ongoing media coverage. The media can develop story lines and seek to personalize the drama. As parallels to theater arise, the human aspects of triumph and tragedy can be shaped in many forms. Terrorists and national leaders can use this inclination of reporting to spotlight agendas and obtain conditional accommodations in front of a general public as well as coordinate for other covert arrangements.

5-48. For example, in 1985 a terrorist incident that captured international media coverage for a significant period of time was the hijacking of TWA flight 847. After departing Athens, Greece with 145 passengers, Shia Muslim extremists hijacked the aircraft and directed it to Beirut, Lebanon. About 100 passengers were US citizens. In Beirut, 19 women and children were released. The plane flew to Algiers, Algeria where 22 other passengers were released. Flying back to Beirut with 108 passengers, the terrorists demanded that 700 Shia prisoners seized by the Israelis be released. Israel stated that a prisoner release program was always in progress and would not rush their plans based on terrorist threats. One US Navy sailor was murdered by the terrorists who dumped his body from the plane onto the tarmac. The United States was considering multiple options but recognized the danger to passengers on any overt rescue attempt. Israel did announce that the Shia prisoners would be released without a declaration of specific dates. Eventually, President Reagan did broker for passenger release with influential leaders of the locale and region, Nabih Berri, a leader of the Shia militia in areas of Beirut, and President Assad of Syria.<sup>220</sup> Syria's President Assad also participated in the release of the Acting President of the American University in Beirut after he was kidnapped by extremists.<sup>221</sup>



5-49. In an earlier example from 1981, the kidnapping and hostage crisis of US Brigadier General Dozier by The Red Brigade was the first instance of the Red

<sup>219</sup> Jason Burke, "The Art of Asymmetric warfare," available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/27/afghanistan?gusrc=rss&feed=worldnews>; internet; accessed 5 August 2008.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid., 193-194.

<sup>221</sup> Michael Rubin and Suzanne Gershowitz, "How to Deal with Kidnapping s in Iraq," available from file://U:\How to Deal with Kidnappings in Iraq - Middle East Forum.htm; Internet; accessed 9 January 2008.

Brigades kidnapping a foreign national. The Red Brigades were responsible for a number of terrorist incidents and the highly publicized kidnapping and murder of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978. The demands released soon after the kidnapping included a condemnation of US military forces and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe, and promoted “European revolutionary forces” cooperate in their terrorism on a large scale. About one week after the kidnapping, the Red Brigades announced that Dozier “trial” was underway. A photograph of Dozier in captivity accompanied the announcement, as did a long 188-page document stating the terrorist group’s strategic aims. Fortunately, Dozier was rescued by Italian police and supporting organizations after 42 days of captivity. Dozier noted that his captors did not attempt to interrogate him, and did not discuss any grounds for his release. The terrorists were fully prepared to murder Dozier. During the rescue mission, quick action of police and the momentary hesitation of a terrorist with a weapon next to Dozier prevented Dozier’s murder.<sup>222</sup>

5-50. Whether US experiences from decades ago or the recent exploitation of kidnappings and hostage-taking by extremists in Iraq, Afghanistan, or other regions of the world, each crime delivers a message for contemporary times. Some instances have demonstrated consequences far beyond the isolated seizure itself. In one case, a nation removed its military forces out of a theater of operation. In other cases, commercial enterprises have declined to invest in a regional area. And in other cases, kidnapping has contributed to a downward spiral of public unrest and political instability.<sup>223</sup> In looking for observations and lessons in combating kidnapping and terrorism, the eventual disruption, dismantling, and defeat of Red Brigade actions in Italy may offer several perspectives. Aspects that marshaled resources and effectiveness against terror included a growing active public support to counter the criminal acts of terrorism, a national response that streamlined the collaboration of law enforcement and military organizations spanning national to local levels of government, a program of reconciliation for terrorists willing to renounce terror and crime, an interdiction program to minimize the ability for terrorist cells to receive materiel support from external sources, and concentrated cooperation with regional allies and partners.

<sup>222</sup> Norman Antokol and Mayer Nudell, *No One A Neutral: Political Hostage-taking in the Modern World*, (Medina, OH: Alpha Publications of Ohio, 1990), 117-118.

<sup>223</sup> Brian Jenkins, Meg Williams, and Ed Williams, “Kidnappings in Iraq Strategically Effective,” available from <http://rand.org/commentary/042905CT.html>; Internet; accessed 9 April 2008.

## SUMMARY

5-51. Although bombings and armed assaults against vehicles and facilities will most likely remain the majority of future terrorist attacks, attacks on US citizens will become the target of most anti-terrorism. Statements by the US Government over ten years ago, in terminology of the era, echo familiar themes: "US military forces will be at particular risk as the United States continues its involvement in "operations other than war" throughout the world...Irregular wars have proved persistent over time and across political structures and will likely be a problem of growing salience for US warfighters."<sup>224</sup>

5-52. In early 2008, Charles Allen, Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis, surveyed the context of terrorism:

In the 1980s and into the 1990s, terrorism was driven principally by political ideology, whether it was Palestinian, Hizballah, or so-called indigenous European terrorism, such as the Red Army Faction in Germany or the Red Brigades in Italy. Political goals were at the forefront of these group's agendas, however unrealistic, whether it was destruction of the state of Israel or a desire to see the rise of Marxist-Leninist states in Western Europe. An exception here was the Lebanon-based Abu Nidal Organization, deadly and extraordinarily brutal; it accepted state-sponsored sanctuaries, but operated semi-autonomously and employed proprietaries, especially in Europe, to obtain funds for its operations.

...More religiously motivated Sunni terrorist organizations began to rise to the fore, such as the Islamic Resistance Organization or HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad or PIJ. During this time, Hizballah continued to strengthen as a religiously driven political and paramilitary organization that conducted attacks against Israel in southern Lebanon.

...More religiously motivated Sunni terrorist organizations began to rise to the fore, such as the Islamic Resistance Organization or HAMAS and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad or PIJ....Hizballah continued to strengthen as a religiously driven political and paramilitary organization that conducted attacks against Israel in southern Lebanon.

...Al-Qaeda is a cult-like organization drawing to it youthful adherents from Muslim countries and communities around the world with the objective of restoring 'the caliphate' which stretched at one time from southern Europe through Indonesia. Adherents of this cult see a 'culture of secular humanism' emanating from the West and fear the encroachment of the West in the form of globalization. Al-Qaeda remains a guiding hand in this worldwide movement but draws on affiliated Sunni networks in the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia, and South Asia itself. It also reaches out through radical Imams to the Islamic diaspora in Europe and North America.

<sup>224</sup> Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, *Threat Assessment: Looking to 2016* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1997), 10 and 16.

...Al-Qaeda media themes throughout 2007 were consistent with previous messages of building unity in the Muslim community while instilling a sense of duty to support violence in defense of Islam.<sup>225</sup>

5-53. This handbook described the particular issues of kidnapping and hostage-taking. The physical and psychological stress of either incident is a reality of the contemporary operational environment. The crime is present in all societies and becomes more international and transnational in scope and reach as globalization improves the connectivity among people. Kidnapping or hostage-taking is rarely a random occurrence, and is usually an action planned in detail to exploit vulnerabilities of an adversary's security measures.

5-54. Experiences vary; however, using a model of planning and execution phases and a case study methodology of historical incidents, analysis can provide valuable lessons in how to combat and prevent some kidnappings. Given probable outcomes ranging release, rescue, escape, or death of a victim in a kidnapping or hostage-taking incident, risk management, prevention measures, and force protection are capable of minimizing the threat to US military members, family members, government employees, and government contractors. Kidnapping and hostage-taking is a clear and constant threat to US military members in the complex and uncertain environments in contemporary times and for the foreseeable future.

5-55. Today, each US military member acknowledges the threat in the context of terrorism and the contemporary operational environment. As noted by Secretary of Defense Gates in an April 2008 address to Army cadets at the US Military Academy at West Point:

**What has been called the 'long war' is likely to be many years of persistent, engaged combat all around the world in differing degrees of size and intensity. This generational challenge cannot be wished away or put on a timetable.**

<sup>225</sup> Charles Allen, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Implications for Homeland Security, May 6, 2008; available from <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=395>; Internet; accessed 7 May 2008. (On May 6, 2008, Charles Allen, undersecretary of homeland security for intelligence and analysis, addressed The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum.)

Appendix A

**Geneva Convention – Prisoners of War (Extract)**

**GENERAL**

A-1. This appendix to TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.06 is an extract of selected portions of the *Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*, adopted on 12 August 1949 by the Diplomatic Conference for the Establishment of International Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, held in Geneva from 21 April to 12 August, 1949; with an “entry into force” 21 October 1950.

A-2. *Source:* Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Geneva, Switzerland. *Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*. (1950). This document can be retrieved from the world wide web <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm>

A-3. The *Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War* is an extensive document organized in chapters and sections comprising 143 articles. Five annexes supplement directives of the main document.

A-4. Extracts from the *Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War* follow:

\*\*\*\*\*

**Article 4**

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:

1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided

that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:

- (a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
- (b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
- (c) That of carrying arms openly;
- (d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.

4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labor units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.

5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of international law.

6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.

B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:

1. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.

2. The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favorable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where

diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.

C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Convention.

**Article 5**

The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release and repatriation.

Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.

\*\*\*\*\*

**Article 9**

The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners of war and for their relief.

\*\*\*\*\*

**PART II**

**GENERAL PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR**

**Article 12**

Prisoners of war are in the hands of the enemy Power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured them. Irrespective of the individual responsibilities that may exist, the Detaining Power is responsible for the treatment given them.

Prisoners of war may only be transferred by the Detaining Power to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such transferee Power to apply the Convention. When prisoners of war are transferred under such circumstances, responsibility for the application of the Convention rests on the Power accepting them while they are in its custody.

Nevertheless if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in any important respect, the Power by whom the prisoners of war were transferred shall, upon being notified by the Protecting Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the prisoners of war. Such requests must be complied with.

**Article 13**

Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.

Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.

Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.

**Article 14**

Prisoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their persons and their honour. Women shall be treated with all the regard due to their sex and shall in all cases benefit by treatment as favourable as that granted to men. Prisoners of war shall retain the full civil capacity which they enjoyed at the time of their capture. The Detaining Power may not restrict the exercise, either within or without its own territory, of the rights such capacity confers except in so far as the captivity requires.

**Article 15**

The Power detaining prisoners of war shall be bound to provide free of charge for their maintenance and for the medical attention required by their state of health.

**Article 16**

Taking into consideration the provisions of the present Convention relating to rank and sex, and subject to any privileged treatment which may be accorded to them by reason of their state of health, age or professional qualifications, all prisoners of war shall be treated alike by the Detaining Power, without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria.

**PART III**

**CAPTIVITY**

**SECTION I**

**BEGINNING OF CAPTIVITY**

**Article 17**

Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent information. If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.

Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card showing the owner's surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The identity card may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner, and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be taken away from him.

No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.

Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which they understand.

**Article 18**

All effects and articles of personal use, except arms, horses, military equipment and military documents shall remain in the possession of prisoners of war, likewise their metal helmets and gas masks and like articles issued for personal protection. Effects and articles used for their clothing or feeding shall likewise remain in their possession, even if such effects and articles belong to their regulation military equipment.

At no time should prisoners of war be without identity documents. The Detaining Power shall supply such documents to prisoners of war who possess none.

Badges of rank and nationality, decorations and articles having above all a personal or sentimental value may not be taken from prisoners of war.

Sums of money carried by prisoners of war may not be taken away from them except by order of an officer, and after the amount and particulars of the owner have been recorded in a special register and an itemized receipt has been given, legibly inscribed with the name, rank and unit of the person issuing the said receipt. Sums in the currency of the Detaining Power, or which are changed into such currency at the prisoner's request, shall be placed to the credit of the prisoner's account as provided in Article 64.

The Detaining Power may withdraw articles of value from prisoners of war only for reasons of security; when such articles are withdrawn, the procedure laid down for sums of money impounded shall apply.

Such objects, likewise the sums taken away in any currency other than that of the Detaining Power and the conversion of which has not been asked for by the owners, shall be kept in the custody of the Detaining Power and shall be returned in their initial shape to prisoners of war at the end of their captivity.

**Article 19**

Prisoners of war shall be evacuated, as soon as possible after their capture, to camps situated in an area far enough from the combat zone for them to be out of danger.

Only those prisoners of war who, owing to wounds or sickness, would run greater risks by being evacuated than by remaining where they are, may be temporarily kept back in a danger zone.

Prisoners of war shall not be unnecessarily exposed to danger while awaiting evacuation from a fighting zone.

**Article 20**

The evacuation of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in conditions similar to those for the forces of the Detaining Power in their changes of station.

The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who are being evacuated with sufficient food and potable water, and with the necessary clothing and medical attention. The Detaining Power shall take all suitable precautions to ensure their safety during evacuation, and shall establish as soon as possible a list of the prisoners of war who are evacuated.

If prisoners of war must, during evacuation, pass through transit camps, their stay in such camps shall be as brief as possible.

## **SECTION II**

### **INTERNMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR**

#### **Chapter I**

#### **GENERAL OBSERVATIONS**

##### **Article 21**

The Detaining Power may subject prisoners of war to internment. It may impose on them the obligation of not leaving, beyond certain limits, the camp where they are interned, or if the said camp is fenced in, of not going outside its perimeter. Subject to the provisions of the present Convention relative to penal and disciplinary sanctions, prisoners of war may not be held in close confinement except where necessary to safeguard their health and then only during the continuation of the circumstances which make such confinement necessary.

Prisoners of war may be partially or wholly released on parole or promise, in so far as is allowed by the laws of the Power on which they depend. Such measures shall be taken particularly in cases where this may contribute to the improvement of their state of health. No prisoner of war shall be compelled to accept liberty on parole or promise.

Upon the outbreak of hostilities, each Party to the conflict shall notify the adverse Party of the laws and regulations allowing or forbidding its own nationals to accept liberty on parole or promise. Prisoners of war who are paroled or who have given their promise in conformity with the laws and regulations so notified, are bound on their personal honour scrupulously to fulfill, both towards the Power on which they depend and towards the Power which has captured them, the engagements of their paroles or promises. In such cases, the Power on which they depend is bound neither to require nor to accept from them any service incompatible with the parole or promise given.

##### **Article 22**

Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and affording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular cases which are justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be interned in penitentiaries.

Prisoners of war interned in unhealthy areas, or where the climate is injurious for them, shall be removed as soon as possible to a more favourable climate.

The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp compounds according to their nationality, language and customs, provided that such prisoners shall not be separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of their capture, except with their consent.

**Article 23**

No prisoner of war may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone, nor may his presence be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.

Prisoners of war shall have shelters against air bombardment and other hazards of war, to the same extent as the local civilian population. With the exception of those engaged in the protection of their quarters against the aforesaid hazards, they may enter such shelters as soon as possible after the giving of the alarm. Any other protective measure taken in favour of the population shall also apply to them.

Detaining Powers shall give the Powers concerned, through the intermediary of the Protecting Powers, all useful information regarding the geographical location of prisoner of war camps.

Whenever military considerations permit, prisoner of war camps shall be indicated in the day-time by the letters PW or PG, placed so as to be clearly visible from the air.

The Powers concerned may, however, agree upon any other system of marking. Only prisoner of war camps shall be marked as such.

\*\*\*\*\*

**Chapter II**

**QUARTERS, FOOD AND CLOTHING OF PRISONERS OF WAR**

**Article 25**

Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The said conditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case be prejudicial to their health.

The foregoing provisions shall apply in particular to the dormitories of prisoners of war as regards both total surface and minimum cubic space, and the general installations, bedding and blankets.

The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war individually or collectively, shall be entirely protected from dampness and adequately heated and lighted, in particular between dusk and lights out. All precautions must be taken against the danger of fire.

In any camps in which women prisoners of war, as well as men, are accommodated, separate dormitories shall be provided for them.

**Article 26**

The basic daily food rations shall be sufficient in quantity, quality and variety to keep prisoners of war in good health and to prevent loss of weight or the development of nutritional deficiencies. Account shall also be taken of the habitual diet of the prisoners.

The Detaining Power shall supply prisoners of war who work with such additional rations as are necessary for the labour on which they are employed.

Sufficient drinking water shall be supplied to prisoners of war. The use of tobacco shall be permitted.

Prisoners of war shall, as far as possible, be associated with the preparation of their meals; they may be employed for that purpose in the kitchens. Furthermore, they shall be given the means of preparing, themselves, the additional food in their possession.

Adequate premises shall be provided for messing.

Collective disciplinary measures affecting food are prohibited.

**Article 27**

Clothing, underwear and footwear shall be supplied to prisoners of war in sufficient quantities by the Detaining Power, which shall make allowance for the climate of the region where the prisoners are detained. Uniforms of enemy armed forces captured by the Detaining Power should, if suitable for the climate, be made available to clothe prisoners of war.

The regular replacement and repair of the above articles shall be assured by the Detaining Power. In addition, prisoners of war who work shall receive appropriate clothing, wherever the nature of the work demands.

**Article 28**

Canteens shall be installed in all camps, where prisoners of war may procure foodstuffs, soap and tobacco and ordinary articles in daily use. The tariff shall never be in excess of local market prices. The profits made by camp canteens shall be used for the benefit of the prisoners; a special fund shall be created for this purpose. The prisoners' representative shall have the right to collaborate in the management of the canteen and of this fund.

When a camp is closed down, the credit balance of the special fund shall be handed to an international welfare organization, to be employed for the benefit of prisoners

of war of the same nationality as those who have contributed to the fund. In case of a general repatriation, such profits shall be kept by the Detaining Power, subject to any agreement to the contrary between the Powers concerned.

### **Chapter III**

#### **HYGIENE AND MEDICAL ATTENTION**

##### **Article 29**

The Detaining Power shall be bound to take all sanitary measures necessary to ensure the cleanliness and healthfulness of camps and to prevent epidemics. Prisoners of war shall have for their use, day and night, conveniences which conform to the rules of hygiene and are maintained in a constant state of cleanliness. In any camps in which women prisoners of war are accommodated, separate conveniences shall be provided for them.

Also, apart from the baths and showers with which the camps shall be furnished, prisoners of war shall be provided with sufficient water and soap for their personal toilet and for washing their personal laundry; the necessary installations, facilities and time shall be granted them for that purpose.

##### **Article 30**

Every camp shall have an adequate infirmary where prisoners of war may have the attention they require, as well as appropriate diet. Isolation wards shall, if necessary, be set aside for cases of contagious or mental disease.

Prisoners of war suffering from serious disease, or whose condition necessitates special treatment, a surgical operation or hospital care, must be admitted to any military or civilian medical unit where such treatment can be given, even if their repatriation is contemplated in the near future. Special facilities shall be afforded for the care to be given to the disabled, in particular to the blind, and for their rehabilitation, pending repatriation.

Prisoners of war shall have the attention, preferably, of medical personnel of the Power on which they depend and, if possible, of their nationality.

Prisoners of war may not be prevented from presenting themselves to the medical authorities for examination. The detaining authorities shall, upon request, issue to every prisoner who has undergone treatment, an official certificate indicating the nature of his illness or injury, and the duration and kind of treatment received. A duplicate of this certificate shall be forwarded to the Central Prisoners of War Agency.

The costs of treatment, including those of any apparatus necessary for the maintenance of prisoners of war in good health, particularly dentures and other artificial appliances, and spectacles, shall be borne by the Detaining Power.

**Article 31**

Medical inspections of prisoners of war shall be held at least once a month. They shall include the checking and the recording of the weight of each prisoner of war. Their purpose shall be, in particular, to supervise the general state of health, nutrition and cleanliness of prisoners and to detect contagious diseases, especially tuberculosis, malaria and venereal disease. For this purpose the most efficient methods available shall be employed, e.g. periodic mass miniature radiography for the early detection of tuberculosis.

**Article 32**

Prisoners of war who, though not attached to the medical service of their armed forces, are physicians, surgeons, dentists, nurses or medical orderlies, may be required by the Detaining Power to exercise their medical functions in the interests of prisoners of war dependent on the same Power. In that case they shall continue to be prisoners of war, but shall receive the same treatment as corresponding medical personnel retained by the Detaining Power. They shall be exempted from any other work under Article 49.

\*\*\*\*\*

**Article 34**

Prisoners of war shall enjoy complete latitude in the exercise of their religious duties, including attendance at the service of their faith, on condition that they comply with the disciplinary routine prescribed by the military authorities. Adequate premises shall be provided where religious services may be held.

\*\*\*\*\*

**Article 126**

Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have permission to go to all places where prisoners of war may be, particularly to places of internment, imprisonment and labour, and shall have access to all premises occupied by prisoners of war; they shall also be allowed to go to the places of departure, passage and arrival of prisoners who are being transferred. They shall be able to interview the prisoners, and in particular the prisoners' representatives, without witnesses, either personally or through an interpreter.

Representatives and delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have full liberty to select the places they wish to visit. The duration and frequency of these visits shall not be restricted. Visits may not be prohibited except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an exceptional and temporary measure.

The Detaining Power and the Power on which the said prisoners of war depend may agree, if necessary, that compatriots of these prisoners of war be permitted to participate in the visits.

The delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall enjoy the same prerogatives. The appointment of such delegates shall be submitted to the approval of the Power detaining the prisoners of war to be visited.

\*\*\*\*\*

**Article 130**

Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.

**Article 131**

No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred by itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to in the preceding Article.

\*\*\*\*\*

*NOTE:* For the complete *Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*. (1950), see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Geneva, Switzerland. *Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*. (1950). This document can be retrieved from the world wide web <http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm>

Appendix B

**UN International Convention Against Taking of Hostages**

**GENERAL**

B-1. *Source:* UN General Assembly, *International Convention against the Taking of Hostages*, 17 November 1979. No. 21931. Online. UNHCR Refworld, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3ad4.html>

B-2. This appendix provides the international convention against the taking of hostages, as adopted by the general assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979. The document is registered ex officio in 3 June 1983. This convention is intended to one of several measures for the prevention, prosecution, and punishment of all acts of hostage-taking as indicative of international terrorism.

**INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST TAKING OF HOSTAGES**

*NOTE:* See following pages for the international convention.

This Page Intentionally Blank

**No. 21931**

---

**MULTILATERAL**

**International Convention against the taking of hostages.  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United  
Nations on 17 December 1979**

*Authentic texts: English, French, Arabic, Chinese, Russian and Spanish.  
Registered ex officio on 3 June 1983.*

---

**MULTILATÉRAL**

**Convention internationale contre la prise d'otages. Adoptée  
par l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies le 17 dé-  
cembre 1979**

*Textes authentiques : anglais, français, arabe, chinois, russe et espagnol.  
Enregistrée d'office le 3 juin 1983.*

Vol. 1316, I-21931

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION<sup>1</sup> AGAINST THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES

The States Parties to this Convention,

Having in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of friendly relations and co-operation among States,

Recognizing in particular that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights<sup>2</sup> and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,<sup>3</sup>

Reaffirming the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,<sup>4</sup> as well as in other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,

Considering that the taking of hostages is an offence of grave concern to the international community and that, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, any person committing an act of hostage taking shall either be prosecuted or extradited,

Being convinced that it is urgently necessary to develop international co-operation between States in devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention, prosecution and punishment of all acts of taking of hostages as manifestations of international terrorism,

<sup>1</sup> Came into force on 3 June 1983 in respect of the following States, i.e., on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in accordance with article 18 (1):

State	Date of deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession (a)	State	Date of deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession (a)
Bahamas .....	4 June 1981 <i>a</i>	Lesotho .....	5 November 1980
Barbados .....	9 March 1981 <i>a</i>	Mauritius .....	17 October 1980
Bhutan .....	31 August 1981 <i>a</i>	Norway .....	2 July 1981
Chile <sup>2</sup> .....	12 November 1981	Panama .....	19 August 1982
Egypt .....	2 October 1981	Philippines .....	14 October 1980
El Salvador .....	12 February 1981	Republic of Korea .....	4 May 1983 <i>a</i>
(Confirming the reservation in respect of article 16 (1) made upon signature.)		Suriname .....	5 November 1981
Finland .....	14 April 1983	Sweden .....	15 January 1981
Germany, Federal Republic of <sup>3</sup> .....	15 December 1980	Trinidad and Tobago .....	1 April 1981 <i>a</i>
(With a declaration of application to Berlin (West).)		United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .....	22 December 1982
Guatemala .....	11 March 1983	(In respect of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom.)	
Honduras .....	1 June 1981		
Iceland .....	6 July 1981 <i>a</i>		
Kenya .....	8 December 1981 <i>a</i>		
(With a reservation in respect of article 16 (1).)			

<sup>2</sup> See p. 277 for the texts of the declarations made upon ratification.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 213, p. 222.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 999, p. 171.

<sup>5</sup> United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/8028)* p. 121.

Vol. 1316, 1-21931

Have agreed as follows:

*Article 1.* 1. Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the "hostage") in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages ("hostage-taking") within the meaning of this Convention.

2. Any person who:

- (a) Attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking, or
- (b) Participates as an accomplice of anyone who commits or attempts to commit an act of hostage-taking

likewise commits an offence for the purposes of this Convention.

*Article 2.* Each State Party shall make the offences set forth in article 1 punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences.

*Article 3.* 1. The State Party in the territory of which the hostage is held by the offender shall take all measures it considers appropriate to ease the situation of the hostage, in particular, to secure his release and, after his release, to facilitate, when relevant, his departure.

2. If any object which the offender has obtained as a result of the taking of hostages comes into the custody of a State Party, that State Party shall return it as soon as possible to the hostage or the third party referred to in article 1, as the case may be, or to the appropriate authorities thereof.

*Article 4.* States Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the offences set forth in article 1, particularly by:

- (a) Taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those offences within or outside their territories, including measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of taking of hostages;
- (b) Exchanging information and co-ordinating the taking of administrative and other measures as appropriate to prevent the commission of those offences.

*Article 5.* 1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over any of the offences set forth in article 1 which are committed:

- (a) In its territory or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
- (b) By any of its nationals or, if that State considers it appropriate, by those stateless persons who have their habitual residence in its territory;
- (c) In order to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act; or
- (d) With respect to a hostage who is a national of that State, if that State considers it appropriate.

2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 1 in cases where

the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him to any of the States mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article.

3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with internal law.

*Article 6.* 1. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, in accordance with its laws, take him into custody or take other measures to ensure his presence for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted. That State Party shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.

2. The custody or other measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be notified without delay directly or through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to:

- (a) The State where the offence was committed;
- (b) The State against which compulsion has been directed or attempted;
- (c) The State of which the natural or juridical person against whom compulsion has been directed or attempted is a national;
- (d) The State of which the hostage is a national or in the territory of which he has his habitual residence;
- (e) The State of which the alleged offender is a national or, if he is a stateless person, in the territory of which he has his habitual residence;
- (f) The international intergovernmental organization against which compulsion has been directed or attempted;
- (g) All other States concerned.

3. Any person regarding whom the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are being taken shall be entitled:

- (a) To communicate without delay with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of which he is a national or which is otherwise entitled to establish such communication or, if he is a stateless person, the State in the territory of which he has his habitual residence;
- (b) To be visited by a representative of that State.

4. The rights referred to in paragraph 3 of this article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the State in the territory of which the alleged offender is present subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under paragraph 3 of this article are intended.

5. The provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article shall be without prejudice to the right of any State Party having a claim to jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 (b) of article 5 to invite the International Committee of the Red Cross to communicate with and visit the alleged offender.

6. The State which makes the preliminary inquiry contemplated in paragraph 1 of this article shall promptly report its findings to the States or organization referred to in paragraph 2 of this article and indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.

*Article 7.* The State Party where the alleged offender is prosecuted shall in accordance with its laws communicate the final outcome of the proceedings to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit the information to the other States concerned and the international intergovernmental organizations concerned.

*Article 8.* 1. The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a grave nature under the law of that State.

2. Any person regarding whom proceedings are being carried out in connexion with any of the offences set forth in article 1 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the proceedings, including enjoyment of all the rights and guarantees provided by the law of the State in the territory of which he is present.

*Article 9.* 1. A request for the extradition of an alleged offender, pursuant to this Convention, shall not be granted if the requested State Party has substantial grounds for believing:

- (a) That the request for extradition for an offence set forth in article 1 has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or political opinion; or
- (b) That the person's position may be prejudiced:
  - (i) For any of the reasons mentioned in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or
  - (ii) For the reason that communication with him by the appropriate authorities of the State entitled to exercise rights of protection cannot be effected.

2. With respect to the offences as defined in this Convention, the provisions of all extradition treaties and arrangements applicable between States Parties are modified as between States Parties to the extent that they are incompatible with this Convention.

*Article 10.* 1. The offences set forth in article 1 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be concluded between them.

2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, the requested State may at its option consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of the offences set forth in article 1. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offences set forth in article 1 as extraditable offences between themselves subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

4. The offences set forth in article 1 shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if they had been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with paragraph 1 of article 5.

*Article 11.* 1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connexion with criminal proceedings brought in respect of the offences set forth in article 1, including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings.

2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this article shall not affect obligations concerning mutual judicial assistance embodied in any other treaty.

*Article 12.* In so far as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims<sup>1</sup> or the Protocols Additional to those Conventions<sup>2</sup> are applicable to a particular act of hostage-taking, and in so far as States Parties to this Convention are bound under those conventions to prosecute or hand over the hostage-taker, the present Convention shall not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of armed conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols thereto, including armed conflicts mentioned in article 1, paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol I of 1977, in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

*Article 13.* This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single State, the hostage and the alleged offender are nationals of that State and the alleged offender is found in the territory of that State.

*Article 14.* Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as justifying the violation of the territorial integrity or political independence of a State in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations.

*Article 15.* The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the application of the Treaties on Asylum, in force at the date of the adoption of this Convention, as between the States which are parties to those Treaties; but a State Party to this Convention may not invoke those Treaties with respect to another State Party to this Convention which is not a party to those treaties.

*Article 16.* 1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.

2. Each State may at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or accession thereto declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph 1 of this article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph 1 of this article with respect to any State Party which has made such a reservation.

<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75, p. 31, 85, 135 and 287.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 1125, pp. 3 and 609.

3. Any State Party which has made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article may at any time withdraw that reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

*Article 17.* 1. This Convention is open for signature by all States until 31 December 1980 at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

2. This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention is open for accession by any State. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

*Article 18.* 1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.

*Article 19.* 1. Any State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. Denunciation shall take effect one year following the date on which notification is received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

*Article 20.* The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to all States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979.

This Page Intentionally Blank

## Appendix C

# Code of Conduct

### GENERAL

C-1. *Source:* Donna Miles, American Press Services News Articles (released April 27, 1999), "Code of Conduct: Guide to Keeping the Faith," available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42786>; Internet; accessed 7 August 2008. See also:

- Department of Defense, DOD Directive 1300.7, *Training and education to Support the Code of Conduct* (Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, December 8, 2000).
- Army Field Manual FM 3-21.75, *The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills*, January 2008, APP A, A-4.
- Headquarters Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 360-512, *Code of the U.S. Fighting Force*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1 June 1988).

C-2. This appendix provides a US Department of Defense overview of the Code of Conduct and the importance of knowing and complying with the obligations and responsibilities as a United States service member in the many different types of operations that are confronted in the contemporary operational environment. This press release [sourced at paragraph C-1 above] was issued shortly after the abduction of Staff Sergeant Andrew Ramirez, Staff Sergeant Christopher Stone and Specialist. Steven Gonzales, three cavalry scouts abducted March 31, 1999 by the Yugoslavian army while on a border patrol in the Former Republic of Macedonia.

### BACKGROUND

C-3. President Dwight Eisenhower introduced the uniquely American code of conduct in 1955, he said, partly in response to the North Koreans' use of prisoners for political propaganda during the Korean War.

C-4. Service members who've been captured have cited the code as the foundation that helped them through the toughest times in their military careers.

The code is based on time-honored concepts and traditions that date back to the American Revolution.

C-5. The six articles outline the obligations and responsibilities of US service members in harm's way:

## **OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

- To defend of the United States and its way of life.
- To avoid surrender and to evade capture at any cost short of death.
- To try to escape if captured.
- To reject favors from the enemy.
- To help fellow prisoners stay alive.
- To avoid collaborating with the enemy.
- To avoid statements or writing that discredits the United States or its allies.
- To maintain personal responsibility for all actions.
- To trust the US government to care for your loved ones and work toward your release.

C-6. Though not law or regulation, the code often coincides with the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, particularly those involving conduct in the face of the enemy, while evading capture or as a prisoner of war.

C-7. As demanding as the Code of Conduct may appear, many former US Prisoners of War called it "a lifesaver that gave them something to hold onto during their captivity."

- Army Chief Warrant Officer 3 Michael Durant said he couldn't have recited its six articles -- but clearly understood the spirit of the code and let it govern his actions when he was taken captive in October 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia. Durant suffered a broken back, a compound fracture of his right leg and a broken cheekbone when his helicopter was shot down during a firefight that ultimately cost the lives of 18 US soldiers. While in captivity, Durant's guards

shot him in the arm. The Somalis also videotaped and broadcast images of his battered face.

- Ironically, Army Chief Warrant Officer 2 Bobby Hall had read the code just minutes before he left Camp Page, South Korea, on an ill-fated training mission in 1994. Hall and copilot Chief Warrant Officer 2 David Hilemon had been waiting for the weather to clear so they could depart. By chance, Hall looked at a nearby wall and started reading the words on a Code of Conduct poster. Those words, Hall said, helped him through 13 days of captivity after his OH-58A Kiowa helicopter accidentally strayed over the border and the North Koreans shot him down.
- Air Force Captain Scott O'Grady said the Code of Conduct gave him the will to drive on and evade capture for six days after his F-16 fighter was shot down by a surface-to-air missile over Bosnia in 1995. "I knew it was my duty to survive," he said, adding that the code reminded him that, although alone behind enemy lines, "I was still part of a team working to get me out, and I had to do my part."
- Following the Code of Conduct "takes perseverance, motivation, bravery and courage," according to Lieutenant Commander Larry Slade, an F-14 Tomcat "backseater" shot down in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. But, he said, the code helped him survive 43 days in the hands of the Iraqis with honor.

C-8. The military has changed countless times since the introduction of the Code of Conduct in 1955, but the code itself has changed just twice. Its words were made gender neutral. The other change, initiated after the Vietnam War, clarified that service members may provide their captors more than just name, rank, Social Security number and birth date. The change was intended to allow prisoners some discretion if they are facing torture or other life-threatening circumstances. Prisoners of war may discuss more than just the "big four," as long as they don't willingly give their captors information that violates the code, even in the face of mental and physical duress.

## THE CODE OF CONDUCT

### ARTICLE I:

**I am an American, fighting in the forces which guard my country and our way of life.**  
I am prepared to give my life in their defense.

### ARTICLE II:

**I will never surrender of my own free will.** If in command, I will never surrender the members of my command while they still have the means to resist.

### ARTICLE III:

If I am captured **I will continue to resist by all means available.** I will make every effort to escape and to aid others to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors from the enemy.

### ARTICLE IV:

If I become a prisoner of war, **I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners.** I will give no information nor take part in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them in every way.

### ARTICLE V:

When questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, **I am required to give name, rank, service number, and date of birth. I will evade answering further questions to the utmost of my ability.** I will make no oral or written statements disloyal to my country or its allies or harmful to their cause.

### ARTICLE VI:

**I will never forget that I am an American,** fighting for freedom, responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.

## References

### DOCUMENTS NEEDED

JP 1-02. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Available online: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>  
FM 1-02. *Operational Terms and Graphics*. 21 September 2004.

### READINGS RECOMMENDED

These sources contain relevant supplemental information.

FM 3-0.2, *The Contemporary Operational Environment*. TBP.  
FM 3-21.75. *The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills*, 28 January 2008.  
FM 3-21.8. *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, 28 March 2007.  
FM 7-100. *Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy*. 1 May 2003.  
FM 7-100.1. *Opposing Force Operations*. 27 December 2004.  
FM 7-100.2. *Opposing Force Tactics*. TBP.  
FM 7-100.3. *Opposing Force: Paramilitary and Nonmilitary Organizations and Tactics*. TBP.  
FM 7-100.4. *Opposing Force Organization Guide*. 3 May 2007.

### **US Army TRADOC G2 Handbooks**

TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1, *A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, Version 5.0 (15 August 2007).  
TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.01, *Terror Operations: Case Studies in Terrorism* (25 July 2007).  
TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.04, *Terrorism and WMD in the COE* (20 August 2007).  
TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.05, *A Military Primer to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century* (10 August 2006)  
TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 1.07, *A Soldier's Primer to Terrorism TTP in the Contemporary Operational Environment* (5 June 2008)  
TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 3.0, *Insurgent TTP Diagrams*, October 2007.  
TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 5.0, *Paramilitary-Insurgent Terror Groups OIF*, November 2006 Update  
TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 9.0, *Paramilitary-Insurgent Terror Groups OEF*, July 2006  
TRADOC G2 Handbook No. 23.0 *al-Qaeda TTPs*, 2008

This Page Intentionally Blank

This Page Intentionally Blank



**Supplemental Handbook No. 1.06**  
***Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping Terror in the COE to***  
**TRADOC G2 Handbook No.1 *A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century,***  
**(Version 5.0)**  
**U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC G2**  
**TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)-Threats, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.**