Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


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System Planning Corporation: "Non-Proliferation Issues" South Korea Executive Summary Under the terms of a 1979 Memorandum of Understanding signed between the United States and South Korea, the ROK is prohibited from developing ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 180 km. During the past several years, however, South Korea has attempted to alter the terms of this agreement by seeking membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime. It appears that the ROK wants regime membership for two reasons: On the one hand, the ROK wants to obtain some level of technical independence from the United States on the missile issue so that it can build missiles to strike targets throughout North Korea. On the other hand, MTCR membership will give South Korea access to missile and rocket technology of other regime members, thus allowing the ROK to make advances in its aerospace and space launch programs. These are areas that both the ROK government and private industry have targeted for significant growth and advancement in the coming years. While the ROK is currently prohibited from building missiles with a range greater than 180 km, there appears to be a general consensus in unclassified literature that South Korea is developing missiles that violate these parameters. The literature suggests that the South Koreans have modified a version of the American-supplied Nike Hercules, the NHK-1/-2, to fly to ranges up to 250 km. The ROK is also developing a successor to the NHK-2, the NHK-A, that, according to preliminary estimates, may be able to reach ranges of 320 km. In addition, the ROK recently test launched its first independently developed space launch vehicle, the KSR. While there is virtually no information about the KSR in the unclassified literature, one source stated that the KSR could be modified into a ballistic missile with a 900 km range. Based on recent statements by the South Korean government and industry officials, South Korea plans to become a leader in Asia's aerospace industry by developing state of the art space launch vehicles and satellites. If these plans ever come to fruition, South Korean aerospace technology may become available to international markets, thus necessitating effective and responsible export control systems. One scholar has argued that South Korea has been exemplary in controlling the spread of ROK missile technology because of South Korea's close military ties with the United States. Despite the ROK's past behavior, however, it may be difficult to assess the future direction of South Korea's export control practices for missile technology in the post-cold war era. There appears to be strong disagreement in unclassified literature about the effectiveness of South Korea's export control system. One author implies that the ROK's export control system is comparable in practice to the nations of the post-COCOM/Wassenaar Arrangement, and is thus deserving of special licensing benefits. Another author, however, writes that South Korea's export control system is ineffective and in need of reform. Due to the disparate nature of the unclassified body of literature on South Korea's export controls, it is difficult to assess the future direction of the ROK's controls over missile technology, and the probability of it supplying such technology to nations with hostile intentions towards the United States. Prior Assessments of South Korea's Ballistic Missile Capabilities and Export Control System Prior Assessments of ROK Ballistic Missile Capabilities There is a limited body of literature on the ROK's ballistic missile capabilities. The largest and most comprehensive source on this issue is a paper written by Peter Hayes in March 1993 for the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies entitled, "International Missile Trade and the Two Koreas." This work provides a detailed analysis of both North and South Korea's ballistic missile programs, and offers a description of North Korea's missile export practices. Hayes constructed this project from a variety of secondary sources that included Asian newspapers, academic articles and both U.S. and South Korean government reports. In addition to Hayes' report, there have been numerous press clippings in South Korean newspapers and in Jane's Publications on the developments in South Korea's ballistic missile programs. Both of these sources have based their analysis on information provided by the ROK government on South Korea's ballistic missile programs. Assessment Criteria for Export Controls There is an extremely limited body of literature on South Korea's export control system. Despite an extensive database search, there appears to be little information to draw on except for two academic works: Han S. Park's, "South Korea's Export Control Policy," in International Cooperation on Nonproliferation Export Controls: Prospects for the 1990s and Beyond, edited by Gary K. Bertsch, Richard Cupitt and Steven Elliot-Gower, and Richard Cupitt's, "Nonproliferation Export Controls in East Asia," which devotes a section to South Korea's export control system. Both of these studies examine the structure of South Korea's export control system, including, the system's statutory and legal requirements, the institutions responsible for implementing and overseeing government controls, and the government's efforts in working with private industry to improve internal compliance systems. Cupitt's work, which was published in the 1997 Summer/Fall issue of The Journal of East Asian Affairs, provides a detailed description of the export licensing process in South Korea, and examines the role of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) in the ROK's export control system. Cupitt came to his conclusions after personally interacting with leading government and industry officials. In addition to conducting interviews and discussions with these figures, he supplemented his research by consulting numerous government documents, and by constructing a statistical questionnaire for government and industry officials. Cupitt's study fails to document any flaws in South Korea's export control system, and in general, implies that the ROK's export controls work both effectively and efficiently. Cupitt's conclusions, however, stand in strong contrast to Park's assessments. Park's study, which was published in 1994, takes a critical look at South Korea's export control system and ultimately concludes that the current system is ineffective and in need of drastic reform. After examining a wide range of secondary sources that included Government Directives and national trade figures, Park contends that deteriorating trade relations with the United States, combined with the fall of Communist systems in Asia and Eastern Europe, has opened up new markets for South Korean corporations and their products. Park asserts that the Korean government is not only unable to control the export of dual-use goods to these emerging markets, but often turns a blind eye so that Korean companies may circumvent the export control process. South Korea's Defense Industry: Domestic Structure, Cooperation with U.S. and Arms Exports Background The ROK government has supported the creation of an indigenous South Korean defense industry since the early 1970s. Three government decrees put Seoul's policy into motion: A 1973 Law on the Defense Industry, a 1974 Force Improvement Plan for the buildup of ROK armed forces, and a 1975 Defense Tax Law that was designed to finance the development of the defense industry. This support of the defense industry was also largely based on the Government's general policy during the 1970s of nurturing investment in the shipbuilding, steel, and the electronics industries. The growth of these sectors helped established links to defense production as the production of armaments became interwoven into the manufacture of ships and heavy machinery. Today, South Korea possesses one of the largest domestic defense industries in the world, spending more than $14 billion per year on defense-related activities. 1 A handful of large corporations in the ROK manufacture the majority of South Korea's weapons systems. These companies will almost certainly continue to lead in both the research and development, and production of new systems. Many of the smaller companies in the South Korean defense industry will continue their role as subcontractors to these chaebols. The following table outlines specific companies that produce missile-related components and technologies 2 : COMPANY GOODS Doo Woo Industries Missile Bodies Sam Sun Industrials Kooryong Rocket Tubes Daewoo Heavy Industries Aircraft Fuselage and Parts Tong Myung Heavy IndustriesLauncher Hydraulic Systems Chun Ji Industrials Missile Components Hankuk Fiberglass Co. Major Missile Products Samsung Aerospace Rocket Propulsion Systems South Korea's technological capabilities for defense do not match the standards of those in Japan, Western Europe and the United States. In recent years, however, South Korea's defense technology capabilities have advanced significantly. Most of South Korea's chaebols have created new civilian research centers since the mid-1980s. Over the past few years, civilian-related research has been applied to weapons development. Chaebols have given much more attention to military-related research as the profitability of the defense industry in the ROK has increased. It appears that the ROK has attempted to develop some degree of self-sufficiency in developing military-related technology in the 1990s, especially, in reducing its dependence on U.S. military parts and components. Korean defense officials have stated that the ROK needs to be able to maintain its military equipment without U.S. support, and that South Korea should scale back its collaborative efforts with the United States on the development of specific weapons platforms. 3 Arms Exports From the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s, South Korea exported several hundred million dollars of military equipment annually. The majority of this equipment was Korean-designed without U.S. involvement. During this time frame, Korea's largest markets were the Middle East, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. South Korean firms were able to gain market share through competitive pricing that resulted from lower labor costs. In recent years, however, South Korea's arms exports have dropped sharply. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1996, the ROK exported only $60 million worth of military equipment in 1996. 4 East Asia's recent financial crisis, however, may affect South Korea's armaments exports. There is considerable speculation in both the ROK and the United States that South Korea's recent financial meltdown may affect the ROK's defense procurement plans in the coming years. South Korea may no longer have the financial resources to devote to weapons production. If this is the case, South Korea's defense conglomerates may begin to look to the international arena as a market for its products. South Korea's Ballistic Missile Capabilities According to the unclassified body of literature, South Korea does not yet possess the capability to indigenously produce state-of-the-art ballistic missiles, or space launch rockets that can be converted into Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. It appears that South Korea's past reliance on U.S. military assistance, and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the U.S. and ROK in 1979, has retarded South Korea's capability to produce aerodynamic and ballistic missiles without outside assistance. The ROK's capacity to produce missile components was largely derived from its ability to modify missiles supplied by the United States. In recent years, however, South Korea has stepped up its efforts to indigenously produce missiles. There is evidence suggesting that the ROK has independently developed several versions of the Nike Hercules missile from U.S. designs. Furthermore, there is also considerable speculation that South Korea is developing a series of rockets, like the KSR, which will be used as a space launch vehicle, or can be converted into a Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. Based on recent statements by South Korean Government and Industry officials, the ROK has ambitious aerospace and space plans. In November 1996, Trade, Industry and Energy Minister Pak Chae-yun revealed a blueprint for South Korea's space industry that would make the ROK a hub of industry in East Asia by 2015. 5 If these plans come into being, South Korea will almost certainly become capable of producing booster rockets, and thus, ICBMs. There is no evidence in the literature suggesting, however, that the ROK has any plans for the latter. A brief discussion of South Korea's ballistic and aerodynamic missile capabilities follows: Nike-Hercules Variant (NHK-1/-2/-A) South Korea has designed several different surface-to-surface versions of the Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile. The ROK military received its first Nike Hercules from the United States in 1960. During the 1970s, the ROK's Agency for Defense Development began to modify the missile in an attempt to increase range, improve accuracy, and transform the missile to strike ground targets. By 1975, the Agency had developed a version of the missile, the NHK-1, that could reach a range of 150 km. In 1978, the ROK test fired the NHK-1's successor, the NHK-2. This missile reportedly possessed improved electronics and warhead munitions, and could strike targets up to 250 km away depending upon the weight of the payload. During the late 1980s, the United States expressed concern that the NHK-2's technical capabilities violated the parameters of the 1979 MoU between the United States and South Korea. This led to a 1990 inspection by the United States of the missiles. Although U.S. inspectors confirmed the missile's 180 km range to be in compliance with the bilateral agreement, they also concluded that the NHK-2 could be modified to hit targets 250 km away. 6 It appears, however, that the United States knew many years prior to the inspections that the NHK-2's range could be increased significantly by vertically stacking three identical stages or by clustering smaller stages horizontally. 7 Several authors have implied that the NHK-2 could be modified to carry a nuclear explosive device. In 1979, Ground Defense International concluded that "it may not be too difficult [for the ROK] to obtain a nuclear charge and thus produce a fine tactical nuclear weapon." 8 Peter Hayes also noted in his March 1993 study "International Missile Trade and the Two Koreas," that the Nike Hercules could carry a 0.1 - 0.5 ton warhead, "a considerable distance." 9 Several sources have suggested that South Korea is planning the development of a successor to the NHK-2, the NHK-A. This missile is purported to have a longer range than the NHK-2, perhaps as long as 320 km. 10 Very little information is available in the unclassified literature. KSR Rocket The ROK successfully launched its first ever scientific research rocket, the KSR-1 in 1993. The rocket was 6.7 meters in length, had a single stage, and could reach an altitude of 75 km. 11 Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems states that ROK could modify the KSR-1 to a ballistic missile to carry a 200 kg payload a range of 150 km. 12 On July 10, 1997, the ROK test launched its first independently developed science rocket, the KSR-2. According to reports from The Korea Herald, the rocket is 11.1 meters in length, has two launch stages, and weighs approximately two tons. On its initial test flight, the rocket carried a 150 kg scientific observation unit to an orbit of 151.5 km. unclassified literature, however, does not indicate if the payload went into orbit. Although the South Koreans have not given any indication that they will convert the KSR-2 into a ballistic missile, Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems notes that, "unconfirmed reports suggest that a secondary use might be for a series of ballistic missiles with ranges from 100 to 900 km." 13 The literature suggests that the KSR-2 program is a step toward a South Korean space launch program. According to an article published in Jane's International Defense Review Extra in February 1997, South Korea is developing a three-stage version of the rocket that may be completed by 1999. 14 There is no information in the unclassified literature, however, specifying the potential range of this rocket if converted into a ballistic missile. Atlas Centaur IRBM In 1979, the ROK military attempted to acquire components and technology from the United States for the Atlas Centaur IRBM. The Atlas was first deployed by the United States, and was designed to deliver a W-38 nuclear warhead 7,000 km. While Peter Hayes' study "International Missile Trade and the Two Koreas" concludes that the ROK purchased nose cone materials, alloys, guidance systems, assembly equipment, and engineering drawings for the Atlas Centaur from the United States, the study also states that it is unclear whether the exchange ever took place or if the sale was blocked by the State Department. 15 South Korea's International Arms Control Commitments South Korea is party to numerous international arms control agreements that are designed to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction. South Korea signed the NPT in 1975, and became a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group in October 1995. In 1996, the ROK began participating in the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. South Korea and the Missile Technology Control Regime South Korea adheres to the export conditions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), although it has never formally joined the arrangement. In recent years, however, the ROK has expressed strong interest in joining the regime despite efforts by the United States to keep South Korea bound to a highly restrictive bilateral agreement on missile development. The U.S. Position In 1979 the United States and South Korea signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that placed highly restrictive conditions on South Korea's ballistic missile development capabilities. Under the terms of the agreement, the ROK is prohibited from developing missiles with a range greater than 180 km and above the maximum weight of 300 kg. The United States has shown no indication that it will permit Seoul to join the MTCR and alter the terms of the 1979 agreement. The United States has asserted on numerous occasions that any activity by Seoul to alter the conditions of the 1979 accord will ultimately have a harmful effect on U.S. efforts to control North Korea's ballistic missile program. 16 In addition, the United States has contended that any improvements in South Korea's ballistic missile capabilities could spark an arms race in East Asia, and could cause North Korea, Japan and China to seek improvements in their ballistic missile capabilities. 17 The ROK Position South Korea has aggressively lobbied the United States to allow it to join the MTCR, which would ultimately ease U.S. control over its ballistic missile programs. During negotiations with the United States, South Korea argued that it had neither the desire nor the technical capability to indigenously develop missile technology comparable to that of China, Japan and North Korea. The ROK argued that it wished to obtain a minimal level of technical independence from the United States on the missile issue, and that MTCR membership was just as much an issue of national sovereignty as it was a defense issue. 18 South Korean negotiators also argued that the 1979 bilateral agreement with the United States was having a harmful impact on the ROK's space program by limiting the development of rocket launchers and other space launch-related technology. 19 They contended that the 1979 agreement would ultimately have a harmful effect on the nation's economic development insofar as the ROK could never become a global economic power without an indigenous space program and space launch capability. In addition to extending the ranges of its aerodynamic and ballistic missiles to 300 km, as a MTCR member South Korea would also be able to cooperate with other regime members and thus be permitted access to their missile technology and research. Despite South Korea's commitment to the 1979 MoU, the unclassified literature suggests that South Korea could be developing missiles and space launch vehicles that violate the 1979 accord. ROK Export Controls: Organization and Structure The South Korean Government issued a decree in February 1991 specifying the regulations for the export of some goods and technologies. 20 In October 1993, the South Korean government stated in the Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Commodities and the Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Technology that the nation had developed a "comparable in practice" export control system. 21 South Korea's Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) is the central entity within the Korean Government that oversees the implementation of export controls. In addition to MOTIE, six government agencies have some peripheral involvement with export controls: the Economic Planning Board, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Commerce, the Office of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of National Defense. 22 South Korea's Customs office works in conjunction with these Ministries and also checks individual exports. The ROK's national export control system is coordinated by the Council on Export and Import of Control of Strategic Commodities and Technical Data, and the Committee for Export Control of Strategic Commodities, which is headed by MOTIE. 23 Statutory Requirements Starting in October 1995, South Korea began controlling the export of six different groups of items. The first three lists correspond to the former COCOM standards and include an Industrial List, a Munitions List and Nuclear List. The following year, the ROK revised these three lists to follow the three-tiered structure of dual-use items that include (Basic, Sensitive and Very Sensitive) and the military items controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement lists. Lists four to six outline the goods and technologies that correspond to the control lists of the nuclear nonproliferation regime (including the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zanier Committee), the MTCR, and the chemical and biological weapons conventions. The ROK government, however, will expand the scope of these lists as South Korean companies begin to produce goods that are subject to control. 24 The ROK requires that exporters obtain an Individual Export Permit for any item on the control lists. The government, however, may award Blanket Export Permits for shipments to nations that are members of the multilateral export control regimes. Furthermore, specific blanket exports may be issued for multiple exports for the same importer. Under both circumstances, the exporting company must have Internal Compliance Programs in order to receive the licenses. It appears that the ROK distinguishes its export controls for three different types of countries. The South Korean government outlaws exports of items on the six lists to nations that have attempted to develop or plan to develop weapons of mass destruction, to nations that threaten international peace, or to nations that foster regional conflict. 25 South Korea does not specifically identify these nations, but does classify them as either members or nonmembers of the nonproliferation export control regime. While South Korea has banned the export of goods and technologies to nations that do not adhere to international nonproliferation standards, Korea offers licensing benefits to nations that have adopted responsible export control systems, including, General Blanket Export Permits. Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy While a number of South Korean Ministries play some role in the ROK's export control procedures, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) is the central authority in South Korea's export control process. Any company that wishes to export a strategic item must apply to MOTIE for a Korea Import Certificate. MOTIE issues export licenses for dual-use items after consulting four technical committees that correspond to the control lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the NSG (and Zannger Committee), the Australia Group and the MTCR. 26 Under Article 61 of the Foreign Trade Act, MOTIE is empowered to investigate suspicious trade cases. Although the ROK government has never uncovered any violations of its export control regulations, Article 48-11 of the implementation decree states that the Government can deny companies and individuals the right to trade strategic goods for up to one year if convicted of export control violations. In an attempt to keep South Korean industry well informed about the government's nonproliferation export control standards, MOTIE provides training for officials in the private sector, and distributes published information on compliance issues. It appears, however, that a lack of information on this subject has harmed past MOTIE efforts to convince companies about the importance of compliance. Weaknesses in South Korean Export Controls According to Han S. Park, South Korea's export control system policies are consistent with the regulations of the post-COCOM Wassenaar arrangement. The rapid political and economic change that has occurred since the end of the cold-war, however, has had a harmful impact on the effectiveness of South Korea's current export control system. Park concludes that the dissolution of Communism in Asia and Eastern Europe, and the development of South Korea's "northern diplomacy" mean that Seoul's export control initiatives are in need of comprehensive change. If the ROK does not reevaluate its export control practices, the nation may not be able to effectively control the export of its technologies and goods in the future. Expanding Economic Relations with Former Communist Nations Since the end of the cold war, the ROK has established commercial relationships with Russia, China and the nations of Eastern Europe. Prior to the early 1990's, South Korea had no economic interaction with any of these countries. In recent years, however, South Korea has started to believe that the economic opportunities in these nations are great, and that stronger commercial ties with them will offset its diminishing trade relationship with the United States. On the one hand, the ROK views Russia, China and the nations of Eastern Europe as ideal trading partners. In addition to being new markets, they are sources of cheap labor for ROK industries. On the other hand, these countries want to expand economic relations with the ROK, particularly because of the ROK's advanced telecommunications and electronics industries, areas that produce products with dual-use applications. ROK government and industry officials have asserted that South Korea sees great opportunities ahead for economic cooperation in high technology arenas. Park concludes that the shared interests between the ROK and its new trading partners could have significant ramifications for South Korea's export controls. Government Inability and Unwillingness to Implement Controls Park contends that despite pressure from the United States to comply with Wassenaar guidelines, the ROK government has recently been unwilling to implement the necessary controls over its exports so long as such activities are economically productive. Furthermore, Park writes that ROK companies have frequently manipulated the ambiguities in South Korea's export control laws in order to export goods and technologies that may be used in military applications abroad. Large aerospace firms such as Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo and Goldstar have been extremely aggressive at developing new technologies that can be used in military applications. Even if the ROK government has the will to strengthen its export control system, it may not possess the resources and the ability to enforce these controls before companies divert their goods and technologies abroad. Park also writes that in recent years the ROK government has manipulated U.S. requests to enforce its export control regulations: The ROK government assures the United States that its export control practices are consistent with Wassenaar standards, but in practice, frequently cooperates with private industry to circumvent them. ROK Missile Exports: Reasons for Responsible Behavior Despite the many questions that exist regarding the effectiveness of South Korea's export control system, Peter Hayes asserts the ROK has been extremely responsible in limiting the spread of its missile technology. In his 1993 study, Hayes lists three reasons why the ROK has never entered the commercial missile market: Its security alliance with the U.S., its adherence to international arms control agreements, and the high costs of advanced missile systems: 27 The Security Alliance With the United States The U.S.-ROK security alliance has discouraged the ROK from developing its own ballistic missiles, and from exporting missile related technology. Although South Korea has expressed strong interest in developing its own indigenous missile program, the United States has used its leverage to ensure that South Korea does not develop ballistic missiles beyond the parameters of the 1979 MoU. International Arms Control Agreement Adherence South Korea has greatly valued its reputation as a peaceful trading state, and its membership to international arms control agreements. Despite several efforts to develop reprocessing technology for its nuclear programs, South Korea has been a strong supporter of the Nonproliferation Regime, and has abandoned efforts on several occasions to develop such technology. Although Hayes asserts that South Korea will be a loyal adherent to the export conditions of the MTCR if it ever becomes a regime member, the United States clearly fears that South Korea would eventually develop advanced booster rockets and missiles, with or without international assistance. The Cost of Advanced Missile Systems In the past, South Korea has never had to develop its own ballistic and aerodynamic missiles systems because of the U.S.'s security commitment to the Korean Peninsula. The ROK relied heavily on U.S.-controlled missiles deployed on the peninsula to offset the missile threat of the DPRK. The South Korean military thus believed that it had more significant military priorities than advanced missile programs. Conclusion: The Future of Korea's Missile Programs and Related Export Controls While South Korea has relied heavily on the United States for security assistance and protection for many years, the unclassified literature suggests that the ROK has become determined to develop advanced missile and booster rocket technology indigenously, especially in the face of a declining U.S. presence in Korea and the Asia/Pacific Region. South Korean officials have stated on a number of occasions that South Korea will devote significant resources to developing a technologically advanced space program in the coming years, thus making the ROK a significant player in the aerospace market. Although South Korea is committed by the 1979 MoU to refrain from building missiles with a range greater than 180 km, the literature suggests that the ROK already possesses missiles that may violate the parameters of the agreement and may be attempting to develop SLV's that could be converted into ballistic missiles with ranges up to 900 km. In analyzing the unclassified body of literature on this subject, it is very difficult to draw conclusions about the future of South Korea's export control policies for missile technology. On the one hand, some scholars believe that South Korea has a highly effective export control system which carefully monitors the transfer of missile related technology Individuals like Richard Cupitt assert that South Korea has in recent years developed an export control system that is "comparable in practice" to systems in COCOM/Wassenaar nations, and that South Korea's export control system is secure enough to ensure preferential licensing treatment from foreign importers. On the other hand, Han S. Park writes that South Korea's export controls need to be reformed and that the entire system is ineffective. Park concludes that the ROK government has neither the will nor the resources to implement an export control system that is effective. In realizing the enormous trade opportunities that have materialized with former Communist nations since the end of the cold war, the ROK government is willing to allow South Korean companies to circumvent trade restrictions so long as such behavior is economically productive. Furthermore, the United States is losing leverage with South Korea over a number of issues, including, international trade. If Cupitt's analysis of South Korea's export control system is more accurate than Park's, South Korea already has strong export control mechanisms in place for missile technology transfers. If the ROK ultimately develops long range ballistic missiles that can strike targets around the world, Cupitt believes the ROK's export control system is effective enough to prevent the spread of this technology. If Park, however, is painting a more accurate picture of South Korea's export control system, then South Korea may very well export ballistic missile technology in the future. If South Korea's large aerospace corporations continue to become more involved with the nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the ROK government refuses to implement its export control guidelines, South Korean ballistic missile technology could be obtained by hostile nations in these regions. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1997, p. 78. According to this report, the ROK has the tenth largest defense budget in the world. 2. For more information, see Peter Hayes, International Missile Trade and the Two Koreas, Monterey Institute for Nonproliferation Studies, March 1993, p. 7. 3. United States Congress Office of Technology Assessment, "Global Arms Trade: Commerce in Advanced Military Technology and Weapons," United States Government Printing Office, 1992, p. 133. 4. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1996, p. 129. 5. The Seoul Yonhap, "ROK: Government Targets Space Industry as Growth Industry," FBIS-EAS-96-224, November 14, 1996. 6. See Duncan Lennox, ed. Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems (Jane's Information Group Limited, Surrey, UK) May 1997, JSWS-Issue 24. 7. Gerald Steinberg, "Two Missiles in Every Garage," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, October 1983, p. 48. 8. Ground Defense International, "South Korea," no 58, November 1979, pp. 36-37. 9. Peter Hayes, "International Missile Trade and the Two Koreas," Working Paper No. 1, Program for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, p. 9. 10. Duncan Lennox, ed. Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems (Jane's Information Group Limited, Surrey, UK) May 1997, JSWS-Issue 24. 11. The Korea Herald, "Science Rocket Ready for Launch: KSR project developed solely with local technology," July 5, 1997. 12. Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems (Jane's Information Group Limited, Surrey, UK) May 1997, JSWS-Issue 24. 13. Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems (Jane's Information Group Limited, Surrey, UK) May 1997, JSWS-Issue 24. 14. Wyn Bowen, Tim McCarthy and Holly Porteous, "Ballistic Missile Shadow Lengthens," Jane's International Defense Review Extra, February 1997, pp. 1-4. 15. See Peter Hayes, "International Missile Trade and the Two Koreas," p. 11. 16. The Korea Herald, "South Korea, United States: ROK Needs U.S. Missile Technology, Wants Less U.S. Restrictions," FBIS-EAS-96-237, December 9, 1996. 17. The Seoul Yonhap, "South Korea, United States: U.S. Rejects ROK Request on Developing Long Range Missile," FBIS-EAS-96-234, December 4, 1996. 18. The Seoul Yonhap, "South Korea, United States: U.S. Demand for Transparency Major Hurdle to Missile Issue," FBIS-EAS-96-234, December 4, 1996. Under the parameters of the MACRO, South Korea would be able to develop missiles with ranges that could strike targets virtually anywhere in North Korea. 19. The Seoul Yonhap, December 4, 1996. 20. Prime Minister's Decree Number 245, effective February 10, 1991. 21. Richard T. Cupitt, "Nonproliferation Export Controls in East Asia," The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Summer/Fall 1997, p. 465. 22. Han S. Park, "South Korea's Export Control Policy," in International Cooperation on Nonproliferation Export Controls: Prospects for the 1990's and Beyond, eds. Gary K. Bertsch, Richard T. Cupitt and Steven Elliot-Gower (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994) p. 255. 23. Cupitt, p. 467. 24. Ibid., p. 465. Also note that South Korea has banned the export of dual-use items for military end-use. 25. Ibid., p. 466. 26. See Cupitt, p. 466. Also note that the Ministry of Science and Technology reviews license applications for the export of nuclear and strategic technology while the Ministry of National Defense licenses exports and the transfer of items that fall on the Australia Group and MTCR lists for military end-users. 27. Hayes, p. 22.


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