Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers


TOC / Previous / Next

Henry Sokolski 1 : "Space Technology Transfers and Missile Proliferation" Space Cooperation for Peace? If one had to identify the greatest drivers of missile proliferation, Russia and China would surely lead the list. These two nations have transferred missile technicians, critical missile parts and production facilities to Iran, Brazil, North Korea, Syria, Pakistan, India and Iraq. Russia, moreover, has been in the wholesale business of modernizing China's missile force for nearly a decade. When one speaks of missile proliferation, then, it is not surprising that most policy makers focus on these suppliers, their client states and the physical transfers they make. Concentrating on these nations' tangible missile proliferation, though, ignores a much more uncontrollable phenomenon, which is U.S., Chinese, and Russian civilian space cooperation. Through this commerce, the U.S. itself encourages and even subsidizes known Russian and Chinese missile proliferation entities, while Russia has been able to transfer all manner of military technology to China and India. Unfortunately, this help is all too often downplayed within the policy and intelligence communities. A key reason why is that this financial, technical help is difficult to monitor (photographs are of little help here) and is politically sensitive. Despite this or perhaps because of it, it is quite significant. It encourages Russian and Chinese officials to discount our missile nonproliferation pleadings, fosters a disturbing cynicism regarding aerospace export controls, and accelerates missile proliferation generally. What does this missile technology assistance consist of? In the case of the U.S., a number of things. First, U.S. - NASA space cooperation worth well over $400 million (from l994 through l997) with The Russian Space Agency--an entity that the Russian press itself recently confirmed has funneled Russian missile technology to Iran. 2 Second, the transfer of U.S.-made satellites to Chinese and Russian space launcher providers, whose commercial operations would otherwise would be seriously underutilized. These firms include Salyut/Khrunichev, STC Complex, Polyot (which make variety of rockets, including SS-25 military derivatives), Great Wall Industries (a major exporter of Chinese missiles), the Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (the civilian successor to BWYIC, maker of Chinese missiles including the M-Family systems fired against Taiwan and exported to Pakistan). Third, the hard currency to pay for the launch of these satellites--from $25 million to $85 million a launch; approximately $500 million to date for Russia (10 launches including low earth orbit--LEO--launches) and China (14 launches including LEO launches) each--money these firms can use to finance their own missile development and exports. 3 Fourth, intangible technology--coupling load analysis, guidance data packages, upper-stage solid rocket propellant certification, upper stage control design validation, lower stage design validation, general quality assurance, etc.--critical not only to assure timely, reliable, accurate placement of satellites in space, but also of missile warheads against specific enemy targets. 4 How did this commerce get started? In l987, a year after the Challenger disaster, the U.S. government decided to relieve the demand on limited ESA and U.S. space launch services by allowing China a chance to bid on the launch of U.S.-made satellites. The risks of helping validate the design of the Long-March rocket (which China had designed as a military system) 5 was well known. I know this because, as a Senate staffer, I had made inquires at fairly senior levels at the Defense Department about the attendant risks of letting our satellite companies work with the Chinese on Long March launches. The argument made at the time was that such cooperation might well strengthen China militarily and that given our continuing Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, this was a benefit. In short, indirect missile technology transfers were assumed. After the Soviet Union's demise, the U.S. continued to approve Chinese launches largely because U.S. satellite manufacturers and their customers demanded it. Not only that, but an active effort was made to encourage Russian launches of U.S. satellites as well. The argument here was not just driven by commercial demand, but missile nonproliferation: The U.S. had an obligation, State Department officials insisted, to employ Russia's missile makers in peaceful pursuits lest they take their expertise and goods to countries like Iran. A corollary rationale was, then, used in l993 to support U.S. sponsorship of Russian membership in the MTCR. To get Russia to pacify its missile technology and missile technology exports, the U.S. had to give it positive incentives--a larger quota of satellite launches, increased government-to-government space cooperation, and membership in the MTCR. Of course, under the missile technology control provisions of the National Security Authorization Act of l990, once a nation became a member of the MTCR it could only be sanctioned if it could be shown that it intentionally allowed the export a controlled missile item in violation of its own laws and refused to investigate the matter - a most improbable matter to prove. Also, if the export was made to another MTCR nation, sanctions against the exporting nation were prohibited. The Russia-ISRO Case Before U.S. officials could make Russia an MTCR member, however, they had to resolve an existing sanctions action taken by the previous administration against Glavcosmos, a Russian missile export firm that contracted with the Indian Scientific Research Organization (ISRO) to sell it several cryogenic upper stages along with the production technology necessary to produce them. 6 Under the MTCR, the transfer of missile production technology--hardware or know-how--is strictly forbidden. More important, the Russian upper stage technology could be used to help India extend the range of its rockets to reach Beijing and to improve the accuracy of its missiles. 7 Initially, the Russians refused to terminate the deal but after U.S. officials promised Russia $400 to cooperate in developing the space station and to expand the number of U.S.-made satellite launches Russia could bid on, Moscow relented. In July of l993, Russian President Yeltsin promised President Clinton to reconfigure Russia's contract with ISRO by November 1 of l993 so it would exclude any transfers of production technology. Between July and October, however, ISRO personnel were found on site in the Russian rocket manufacturing plants that made the cryogenic stages and Indian officials claimed that Russia transferred more than "4/5ths" of the sanctioned production technology. 8 India Minister of State in the Department of Atomic Energy and Space also announced that, contrary to the Russians' pledge not to transfer "technical manuals" that would permit India to produce its own cryogenic rocket engines, Russia sent it "drawings of the engine" in September of l993 that would enable India to produce the engines within a few years. 9 Even though all of these missile technology transfers clearly violated the MTCR and the spirit of the Yeltsin-Clinton agreement, which was subsequently finalized in September of l993, they were forgiven on the legal technicality that the agreement with the U.S. allowed Russia until November 1 of l993 to reconfigure its contract with ISRO. That assessments of deal should still differ so much (one former high-level official recently dismissed the deal as a clear failure while Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott recently cited it as one of the most significant nonproliferation successes of the Clinton Administration) is itself a indication of the inherently ambiguous character of such intangible technology controls. As one Hill staffer complained early on about the deal, "It's not clear about what's allowed and not allowed." 10 Worse, yet, even where the deal was clear and clearly violated, the l993 understanding was not enforced. This was driven home in June of l994 when Motorola officials visited the Russian aerospace firm of Salyut/Khrunichev and discovered a six-foot tall, high-fidelity scale mock-up of the Indian Geostationary Launch Vehicle (GSLV). The mock-up was extremely detailed and depicted all the interfaces for the entire launch system--i.e., launch gantry, pad fittings, fueling tubes, and cryogenic umbilicals--and the Russian cryogenic upper stage. When asked what the purpose of the model was, the Russians explained that they were teaching the Indians how to integrate the launch of their GSLV with the cryogenic upper stage. 11 Transfers of such launch integration technology is clearly prohibited by paragraphs 2 and 4 of the MTCR guidelines and paragraphs 1 (b); 2 (b)(2) of the MTCR Annex. Yet, the Chairman of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee, who had requested to be kept thoroughly briefed on intelligence relating to Russia's compliance with the July l993 deal, knew nothing about this violation until his committee staff learned of it through unclassified channels from me. This revelation promoted a series of memos and a request from the Chairman for a meeting with Vice President Gore, who negotiated the final l993 space cooperation-missile nonproliferation deal with Russia. 12 At this meeting, which was held in September, Vice President Gore professed no knowledge of the Motorola meeting but promised to have the intelligence community "look into it." U.S. Satellite Transfers to China The factors that doomed the U.S.-Russian understanding of l993 to failure--the financial pressures of U.S. satellite producers to find alternative launch services, the political pressures to maintain good relations with a former foe, the inherent difficulties of controlling intangible missile technology, and the interchangeability between civilian and military space technology--have also come into play with recent U.S. satellite transfers to China. As noted earlier, the U.S. allowed China to bid on the launch of U.S.-made satellites in l987. Since then the firm, which sells Chinese space launch services, Great Wall Industries, has been sanctioned under U.S. missile sanctions twice. These sanctions, imposed in l99l and l993 for Great Wall Industries' export of M-ll tactical ballistic missile technology exports to Pakistan, however, were lifted in no small part because of U.S. satellite manufacturers' desires to unfettered access to Chinese launch services. More important, the need U.S. satellite makers have to assure successful launches have tempted them all too frequently to share some of America's most sensitive missile technology. The need for such transfers became clear in December of l992 when the Chinese launch of a Hughes satellite, Optus B2 for Australia failed. Hughes had plans to launch many more of its satellites with the Chinese. With satellites costing hundreds of millions of dollars (vice the launch services, which cost between $25 million to $85 million) , Hughes and; its satellite customers, and, later, other satellite makers, such as Loral, could hardly afford additional Chinese launch failures. These would not only increase the cost of insuring the launches, but delay the operation of satellites (and, hence, the revenues they might generate) by as much as 18 to 24 months. Since the satellites' purchase were heavily financed, this time literally cost money. Starting in l993, then, Hughes and other satellite makers who wanted China to launch their payloads made every effort to limit the possibilities for error. Discussions were joined with the Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) about the sufficiency of CALT's attitude control system on China's Long March launcher, a system the Chinese said they had already proven on their M-family tactical ballistic missiles. Martin-Marietta, meanwhile, requested an opportunity to certify the propellant and witness the test firings of a Chinese apogee kick motor, propellant not dissimilar to what the Chinese are trying to perfect in their development of a road-mobile solid rocket ICBM. Martin-Marietta also sought to exchange information concerning the reliability and integration of the Chinese upper-stage control systems, which are critical to the separation and ignition of that section, to its proper attitude control and the spin release of the satellite. These same control functions are also critical to China's perfection of an accurate Multiple Independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) for its new solid-rocket system as is Motorola's interest in having Great Wall launch small low earth orbit Iridium satellites with a multi-satellite dispenser that might double as a multiple warhead dispenser. Finally, late in l993, a number of U.S. satellite makers asked the U.S. Commerce Department if they could share coupling load analysis critical to assure that China's space launchers will ignite, separate their stages, and cut off their engines or motors in a manner that would not shatter the satellites they are carrying. This would not only help assure the safe, efficient launching of the most sensitive civilian payloads, but also of complex MIRVed military systems as well. None of this should be seen as news. In fact, the sensitivity of such technology transfers was flagged over four years ago in a detailed article I wrote for the International Defense Review entitled "U.S. Satellites to China: Unseen Proliferation Concerns." Again, this piece was based entirely on unclassified information. It received some notice on Capitol Hill: The House Armed Services used it to block an attempt to move a substantial amount of satellite-related hardware and technology off the munitions list and under Commerce Department jurisdiction. Yet, the most interesting reception came later. First, almost a year after the article's publication, the CIA asked me to brief my piece to a group of analysts. I was introduced as the author of the "brilliant piece" published in International Defense Review. I flatter pretty easily but this seemed a bit bizarre: The audience consisted of mostly of aerospace engineers, I'm only a political science major. Apparently, the Agency was just beginning a project to assess the military impact of U.S. dual-use technology transfers. My article, which was merely the result of unclassified discussions with others, was considered "path breaking" I assume the intelligence community now has such intangible satellite and space-related technology transfers much more adequately covered. It would be worth finding out. As disconcerting as this reception was, though, the next bounce I received from the article was even more bizarre. It turns out that The New York Times ran a story last Saturday concerning a grand jury investigation into whether or not Hughes and Loral had transferred rocket guidance technology to the Chinese after the first Long March launch failure in l996 in contravention of U.S. export control laws. 13 ABC News, The Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, and several other news organizations all were calling wanting to know what I knew about the investigation since, as one reporter put it, "you predicted it". Unfortunately, I couldn't tell them much since I didn't know anything. What I do know, though, is that this story was predictable and that as long as the U.S. tolerates Russian space cooperation with nations like India and China and continues to extend such cooperation itself, missile proliferation is likely to accelerate, not recede. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1. Henry Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues for academics, policy makers and the media. Also teaches graduate school courses on proliferation issues at Boston University's Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. 2. See Yevgeniya Albata, Novaya Gazeta Ponedelnik Russian No. 10, "Hiring of Missile Experts for Iran Described," take 5 of 7, March 16-22, 1998. 3. Data derived from interviews with State Department officials, Scott Pace of RAND, and Charles Cline. 4. See Henry Sokolski, "US Satellites to China: Unseen Proliferation Concerns," International Defense Review, April 1994, pp. 23-26. 5. The Long-March rocket doubles as an ICBM and test bed for developing new warhead packages. 6. See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, Margaret Tutwiller, "Russian Sale of Rocket Engine to India," May 11, 1992. 7. On the military significance of the cryogenic engines, see Henry Sokolski, "The Military Significance of the Original Russian Rocket Technology Deal with India," attached as Appendix A. 8. See Vivek Raghuvanishi, "Russia, India Discuss Cryogenic Contract," Space News, November 15-28, 1993. 9. See John Wallach, "Clinton-Yeltsin Pledges Unlock Missile Dispute," Hearst Publications, July 26-August 6, 1993 and Reuters, "Russia Not to Give Rocket Technology, India Says," July 25, 1994. 10. Defense Daily, "NASA Downplays Impact of Russia-India Engine Deal," July 27, 1994. 11. Interview with a Defense Department official present at the Moscow meeting. 12. See Nick Furman to Mr. Sensenbrenner, "Potential Russian Violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime," August 1, 1994. 13. Jeff Gerth with Raymond Bonner, "Grand Jury Probes 2 Firms' Ties to China Missile Program," The New York Times, April 4, 1998.


TOC / Previous / Next